n.  It 


'/ 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


TREATISE  OiN  DAMAGES 


COVERING  THE 


ENTIRE    LAW    OE    DAMAGES 


BOTH 


GENERALLY   AND   SPECIFICALLY 


BY 

JOSEPH  A.  JOYCE 

__    AUTHOR  OF  "  JOYCE  ON  IN8URANC]    "    4.ND  JOINT   \  r  I  HOR  (>F  "  JOYCE  ON 
ELECT KI<     LAW  " 

AM) 

HOWARD  C  JOYCE 

JOINT  AUTHOR  OF     '.puyii    i.s   ELECTRIC  LAW" 


IN  THREE  VOLUMES 

Vol.  I. 


THE  BANKS  LAW  PUBLISHING  CO. 

21  MURRAY  STREET,  NEW  YORK 
1903 


:\ 


T 

\9( 


Copyright,  1903, 
By  JOSEPH  A.  JOYCE 

AND 

HOWARD  C.  JOYCE. 


DEDICATED 

TO 

THE  MEMORY 

OF 

Joseph  Defendokf  Joyce. 


PREFACE. 

In  writing  this  treatise  the  authors  have  endeavored  to  pre- 
sent to  the  legal  profession  a  work  which  exhaustively  discusses 
the  fundamental  principles  of  the  law  of  damages,  not  only  as 
to  their  application  in  general,  hut  also  particularly  in  relation 
to  the  various  subjects.  With  this  purpose  in  view,  definitions 
are  first  given,  followed  by  a  concise  statement  of  the  general 
principles  of  liability  and  damages,  after  which  each  and  every 
specific  subject,  wherein  the  question  of  the  recovery  of  dam- 
ages or  the  measure  thereof  has  arisen  in  the  courts,  is  fully 
and  conscienftously  discussed  and  presented  and  is  made  thor- 
ough and  complete  within  itself,  thus  enabling  the  court  or 
lawyer  to  ascertain  generally  and  specifically  the  entire  law  of 
damages.  In  order,  however,  to  obtain  this  result,  logical  ar- 
rangement has  not  been  sacrificed,  but  on  the  contrary  has  been 
followed  as  closely  and  as  exactly  as  the  judgment  of  the  au- 
thors and  the  peculiar  nature  of  some  of  the  subjects  would 
permit. 

It  is  believed  that  every  subject  properly  within  the  law  of 
damages  has  been  examined  and  treated  in  these  three  volumes. 
Matters  which  have  seemed  to  the  writers  to  be  of  peculiar  or 
especial  value,  have  been  considered  without  regard  to  the  fact 
whether  or  not  the  decisions  covering  them  are  few  or  numerous. 

Inasmuch  as  actions  to  recover  damages  for  personal  injuries 
and  for  the  death  of  a  human  being  have  occupied  so  largely  in 
excess  of  others  the  attention  of  the  courts,  the  authors  have 
given   to   them    the   space   and    prominence    which    their   proper 

consideration    necessitates.      The    latter   subject    has    also    1 n 

treated   by  grouping  together  as  nearly  as   possible   all  similar 

v 


•  vi  PREPACK 

statutory  provisions  so  as  to  harmonize  what  otherwise  might 
seem  to  be  inconsistent  decisions. 

The  adjudications  upon  the  law  of  damages  in  relation  to 
matters  of  insurance,  the  law  of  electricity,  marine  torts,  ship- 
ping and  admiralty,  are  of  so  much  importance  that  it  has  been 
deemed  advisable  to  exhaustively  consider  them  in  addition  to 
other  subjects,  with  a  view  of  meeting  the  needs  of  special 
practitioners. 

With  the  intention  of  affording  every  possible  aid,  to  those 
who  may  find  occasion  or  necessity  for  using  these  volumes, 
official  and  unofficial  reports  and  series  of  selected  cases  have 
been  cited,  and  the  notes  and  illustrations  have  been  made  as 
full  and  complete  as  the  space  would  permit. 

The  authors  have  in  this  treatise  as  in  their  preceding  efforts 
endeavored  to  make  the  work  valuable  alike  to  the  lawyer  who 
looks  for  principles  and  to  the  one  who  depends  upon  cases. 

The  courtesy  of  the  president  and  faculty  of  Columbia 
University  in  extending  to  the  authors  the  use  of  its  law 
library  and  likewise  that  of  the  president  and  officers  of  the 
American  Law  Library  of  this  city  for  a  like  kindness  is  ac- 
knowledged with  pleasure. 

Trusting  sincerely  that  this  treatise  will  accomplish  the  pur- 
poses intended,  it  is  respectfully  submitted  to  the  legal  pro- 
fession. 

New  York  City, 
June,  1903. 

JOSEPH  A.  JOYCE. 
HOWARD  C.  JOYCE. 


CONTENTS 

OF  VOLUME  I. 


TITLE  I. 

GENERAL  AND  PARTICULAR  TERMS  AND  DEFINITIONS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


TERMS   AND    DEFINITIONS. 


1.  Damage  defined.  §  20. 

2.  Damages  defined.  21. 

3.  Damages  defined — Codes    and       22. 

constitution. 

4.  Damnum  absque     injuria    de-        23. 

fined.  24. 

5.  Measure  of  damages  defined.  25. 
G.  Measure    of   damages    defined 

—Codes.  20. 

7.  Civil  damages  defined. 

8.  Nominal  damages  defined.  27. 

9.  Nominal     damages     defined —       28. 

Codes. 

10.  Constructive  damages  defined.        29. 

11.  General  damages  defined. 

12.  General      damages     defined — 

Code.  30. 

13.  Special  damages  defined. 

14.  Special      damages      defined —       31. 

Code. 

15.  Direct  damages  defined.  32. 
10.   Direct       damages        defined —        33. 

Codes.  34. 

17.  Prospective  damages  defined. 

18.  Consequential      damages    de-       35. 

fined.  36. 

19.  Consequential      damages      de- 

lined — Code.  37, 


Resulting  damages  defined. 
Remote  damages  defined. 
Contingent  or  too  remote  dam- 
ages defined — Code. 
Contingent  damages  defined. 
Speculative  damages  defined. 
Actual  or  single  damages   de- 
fined. 
Compensatory      damages     de- 
fined. 
Substantial  damages  defined. 
Punitive,   vindictive   or  exem- 
plary damages  defined. 
Punitive,   vindictive  or  exem- 
plary    damages     defined — 
Codes. 
Double,     treble,    triple   or   in- 
creased damages  defined. 
Double  and  single  or  joint  and 

several  damages  defined. 
Additional  damages  defined. 
Liquidated  damages  defined. 
Liquidated  damages  defined 

Codes. 

Unliquidated  damages  defined. 
Temporary  or  permanent  dam- 
ages defined. 
Continuing  damages  defined. 

vii 


Vlll 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS   OF   VOL.   I. 


Entire  damages  defined.  I  §  40.  Reasonable 

39.   Excessive,    inadequate    or  in-  provisions. 

sufficient  damages  defined.     ' 


damages — Code 


CHAPTER  II. 


PARTICULAR    TERMS,    .MAXIMS    AND   PHRASES. 


§  41.  Actio  non  datur  non  damnifi- 
CatO. 

42.  Ad  damnum. 

43.  Ad  quod  damnum;  writ  of. 

44.  ••  Damage  by  the  elements." 
4.">.  Damage  feasant. 

40.  "  Damages,      costs      and     ex- 
penses." 

47.  Damni  injuria?  actio. 

48.  Damnify. 

49.  Damnum  fatale. 

50.  Damnum  infectum. 


§  51.   Damnum  rei  amissse. 

52.  Damnum     sine     injuria     esse 

potest. 

53.  De  minimis  non  curat  lex. 

54.  Indemnity. 

55.  Indeterminate  and  determinate 

damages. 

56.  Injuria  sine  damno. 

57.  Inquiry  of  damages;  writ  of. 

58.  Proximate  damages. 

59.  "  Sound  in  damages." 


TITLE  II. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LIABILITY  AND  DAMAGES. 


CHAPTER  III. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF   LIABILITY. 


§  60.  General  statement — Distinc- 
tion between  damage  and 
damages,  liability  and  meas- 
ure of  damages. 

Damages  generally. 

Fundamental  law — Ubi  jus  ibi 
remedium. 
63.  Same     subject — Violation     of 
statutory  duty. 

There  must  be  a  breach  of 
some  legal  duty. 

Same  subject — Governmental, 
judicial,  discretionary  and 
police  duties  and  powers — 
Liability. 


61. 
62. 


64. 


65. 


§  06. 

67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 

71. 


73. 

74. 


Moral  obligations,  duties  and 
wrongs. 

Lawful  acts. 

Volenti  non  fit  injuria. 

Accident  or  casualty. 

Act  of  God — Inevitable  acci- 
dent. 

Damnum  absque  injuria — Gen- 
erally. 

Same  subject — Application  of 
the  doctrine  continued. 

De  minimis  non  curat  lex. 

Injuria  sine  damno. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


75.  Certainly  as  ;i  requisite. 

7ti.  Nominal  damages — Generally. 

77.  Nominal  damages — Breach  of 

contract. 

78.  Nominal  damages  only,  unless 

substantial  damage  proved. 

79.  Nominal  damages — New  trial 

and  reversal. 

80.  General  damages. 

81.  Special  damages. 

82.  Direct  damages. 

83.  Consequential  damages. 

84.  Proximate  cause. 

85.  Proximate  cause  continued. 

86.  Proximate  cause  for  jury. 

87.  Natural  and  proximate  result 

of  act  complained  of. 

88.  Proximate  consequences  illus- 

trated. 

89.  Natural  and  probable   conse- 

quences— Those  in  contem- 
plation of  parties — Con- 
tracts. 

90.  Natural   and    probable  conse- 

quences— Torts. 

91.  Remote,  contingent  and  spec- 

ulative damages. 

92.  Application    of      rule    as    to 

remote  or  speculative  dam- 
ages. 


§     98.  Same  subject  continued. 
'.»4.  Actual,     compensatory     and 

substantial  damages. 

95.  Double,   triple  <>r  treble,   "i 

other  increased  damages. 

96.  Same  subject — How  fixed. 
i'T.   Liquidated       damages — Pen- 
alty. 

98.  Unliquidated  damages. 

99.  Continuing  damage  and  dam- 

ages—  Entirety  of  damages. 

100.  Excessive    or      unreasonable 

damages. 

101.  Same  subject  continued. 

102.  Voluntarily  remitting  excess 

— Remittitur  by  court. 

103.  Where  excess  is  small. 

104.  Evidence  as  a  factor. 

105.  Two   or    more    excessive  ver- 

dicts. 
10t>.   In  excess  of  amount  claimed 
or  of  ad  damnum  clause. 

107.  Inadequate  damages. 

108.  Excessive      and      inadequate 

damages — Power  of  court:. 

109.  Excessive      and      inadequate 

damages — Trial  court. 

110.  Jury   and    instructions — Gen- 

erally. 


CHAPTER   V. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§  111.  Exemplary     damages     gener-    §  115.   Not    as    punishment    but    as 


ally. 

112.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment. 

113.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment 

— Continued. 

114.  Where  act  punishable  or  pun- 

ished criminally. 


compensation. 

116.  Doctrine  of   exemplary  dam- 

ages denied. 

1 17.  Same  Bubject  conl  inued. 

118.  Plaintiff     UOt     entitled    to    as 

matter  of  right. 


PARLE   OF   CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


119.  Elements  necessary  to  justify. 
L20,   Wanton  or  malicious  act. 
121.  Malice  sufficient  to  justify. 
l-_'2.  Gross  negligence. 
VS.).   Actual     damage     should     be 
shown. 

124.  Actions  allowed  in. 

125.  Instances  when  allowed. 

126.  Interference  with  exercise  of 

personal  rights. 
L27.    Instances  when  not  allowed. 
128.  In  action  on  bond. 
1J'.».  State  may  fix  amount. 

130.  Where  two  or   more  defend- 

ants. 

131.  Against   persons   under   legal 

disability. 

132.  Effect  of  death  of  wrongdoer. 

133.  Mitigation  of  damages. 

134.  Act  done  in  exercise  of  a  sup- 

posed right. 

135.  Against        corporations — Ac- 

cepted rule. 


§  136.  Decisions  holding  ratification 
or  authorization  of  act  nec- 
essary. 

137.  Same  subject — Particular  de- 

cisions. 

138.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

139.  Decisions  holding  ratification 

or  authorization  of  act  un- 
necessary. 

140.  Same  subject — Particular  de- 

cisions. 

141.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

142.  Against    municipal    corpora- 

tions. 

143.  Evidence  as  to  motives. 

144.  Evidence  as  to  financial  con- 

dition of  defendant. 

145.  Amount,  matter  of  discretion 

with  jury. 

146.  Instructions  as  to  exemplary 

damages. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


NEGLIGENCE   AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


§  147. 

Generally. 

§  159. 

1  18. 

Negligence  defined. 

160. 

149. 

Ordinary  care. 

150. 

Presumption  of  negligence. 

161. 

151. 

Burden       of       proof — Negli- 

gence. 

162. 

152. 

Negligence — For  jury. 

1.',:;. 

"  Inevitable  accident" — "  Act 
of  God." 

154. 

"  Inevitable  accident " — "  Un- 
avoidable accident." 

163. 

155. 

Inevitable   or  unavoidable  ac- 

cident—Illustrations. 

164 

156. 

Avoidable  accident. 

157. 

Avoidable  accident — Illustra- 
tions. 

165 

158. 

Duty  to  use  ordinary  care  to 
avoid    consequence    of    an- 
other's negligence. 

166 

Gross  negligence. 

Wilful  injury— Wanton  negli- 
gence. 

Contributory  negligence— De- 
fense to  action. 

Contributory  negligence  as 
defense  not  affected  by  stat- 
ute, giving  right  of  action 
for  death. 

Negligence — Open  and  visible 
defects — Contributory  neg- 
ligence. 

Wilful  injury — Contributory 
negligence  no  defense. 

Contributory  negligence  — 
Burden  of  proof. 

Contributory  negligence  — 
Burden  of  proof  —  Con- 
tinued. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS    OF    Vol..    I. 


XI 


§  167.  Contributory  negligence  — 
Burden  of  proof— Conclu- 
sion. 

168.  Doctrine  of  comparative  negli- 

gence. 

169.  Error  <>f   judgment — Sudden 

emergency  —  Contributory 
negligence. 

170.  Error  of   judgment— Sudden 

emergency— Neglige  nee. 

171.  Contributory       negligence 

Stop,  look  and  listen. 

172.  Imputed  negligence. 

173.  Imputed     negligence  —  Cases 

generally. 


§  174.   [raputed      negligence-    Sua 
band  and  wife. 
17").  Contributory     negligence    of 
parent  us  affecting  recovery 

for  injury  to  child — Recov- 
ery by  parent. 

170.  Contributory     negligence     of 

parent  as  affecting  n very 

for  injury  to  child  Recov- 
ery by  child. 

177.  Contributory  negligence  — 
Degree  of  care  required  of 
children. 


TITLE  III. 

WRONGS  AFFECTING  BIGHTS  OF  PERSONS. 


CHAPTER   VII. 


physical   i n.i n: iks. 


§  178.  Physical  injuries— Substan- 
tial and  nominal  damages — 
Generally. 

179.  Damages  flowing  from  negli- 

gent   act  though   not  con- 
templated. 

180.  Disfigurement  of  person. 

181.  Inconvenience. 

182.  Prospects    of     marriage    im- 

paired. 

183.  Miscarriage  —  Loss      of     pro- 

spective offspring— Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for. 

Miscarriage — Loss  of  pro- 
spective offspring — Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for 
— Conl  inued. 

Miscarriage — Loss     of     pro- 
spective offspring— Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for 
— Conclusion. 
186.  Exemplary  damages. 


184. 


185. 


IsT.  Exemplary  damages  contin- 
ued. 

188.  Exemplary    damages— Physi- 

cal injuries  occasioned  by 
animals. 

189.  Exemplary       damages    -  Mal- 

practice. 

190.  Exemplary  damages— Placing 

cantharides  in  wine. 

191.  Direct  results   of   injury -De- 

fect in  highway  Statute 
—What  included—  Massa- 
chusetts. 

192.  Interest  not  recoverable. 

193.  Mitigation  of  damages. 

194.  Duty   of    injured     person    to 

minimize  damages  Medi- 
cal assistance 

lft.").   Same  subject  continued. 

196.  Duty  of  injured  person  to 
submit  to  surgical  opera- 
tion. 


Xll 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS    OF   VOL.    T. 


197.  Effect  of  plaintiff's  death. 

198.  Release  of  claims  for  personal 

injuries — Generally. 

199.  Release    when     induced     by 

fraud  no  bar. 

200.  Same  subject  continued. 

201.  Setting  aside' of  release— Re- 

turn of  consideration    not 
necessary. 

202.  Release    limited    to    injuries 

specifically  mentioned. 
20:*..  Release  by  railroad  employee 
— Acceptance  of  benefits  of 
relief  association. 

204.  Recovery  of  special  damages 

— Pleadings. 

205.  Amendment    of    complaint- 

Increased  damages. 

206.  Instructions— Generally. 


§  207.  Amount  of  recovery — Instruc- 
tions as  to. 

208.  "Such  sum   as   will  compen- 

sate " —  "  Fair  and  just  com- 
pensation " — "Fair  and 
reasonable  compensation" 
— Instructions. 

209.  Instructions  —  Measure        of 

damages — Miscellaneous. 

210.  New  trial  based  on  change  of 

experts'  opinions. 

211.  Inadequate   damages— Gener- 

ally. 

212.  Excessive  damages. 

213.  Excessive      damages — Remit- 

titur of  part  of  judgment. 

214.  Excessive     damages — Review 

of  question  as  to  amount. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


PAIN   AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL   SUFFERING. 


§  215.   Pain  and  suffering — Physical 
injury. 

216.  Pain  and  suffering— Evidence 

as  to. 

217.  Pain  and  suffering— Effect  of 

prior  injury  or  disease. 

218.  Mental  suffering— Physical  in- 

jury. 

219.  Same  subject  continued. 

220.  Fright — not  result  of  physical 

injury. 

221.  Fright— Physical     injury    re- 

sulting from. 


§  222.  Same  subject  continued. 

223.  Mental  suffering — Fear  of  con- 

sequences   of    injury — Rite 
of  dog. 

224.  Mental   suffering   of    injured 

person — Disfigurement. 

225.  Mental   suffering — Action  by 

husband  for  injury  to  wife 
— parent  and  child. 

226.  Mental  suffering— Pleading- 

Evidence. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

LOSS  OF  TIME,  EARNINGS   AND   IMPAIRED   EARNING  CAPACITY. 


227.  Loss  of  time— Earnings — Di- 

minished capacity  to  labor. 

228.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Evi- 

dence of  must  be  given. 


§  229.  Evidence — Loss      of      time — 
Earnings    and    diminished 
ability. 
230.  Same  subject  continued. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS   OF    VOL.    I. 


xni 


§  231.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Not 
recoverable  where  wages 
are  paid — Evidence. 

232.  Prospect    of    increased   earn- 

ings. 

233.  Loss  of  time — Business. 

2:)4.   Loss  of  time— Partners — Evi- 
dence. 
•_':'»•").   Loss  of  profits. 

236.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Pro- 

fessional men. 

237.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Can- 

vasser or   travelling  sales- 
man on  percentage  basis. 

238.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Ped- 

dler. 


§  239.  Total  or  partial  incapacity 

English  workmen's  act — 
Construct  ion  of. 

240.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc., — 

Pleading  of  as  special 
damages. 

241.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  eb 

Recovery  for  and  evidence 
admissible  under  general 
allegations. 

242.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc., 

Recovery  for  and  evidence 
admissible  under  general 
allegations — Continued. 


CHAPTER  X. 


PERMANENT    INJURIES  — PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


§  243.  Permanent  injuries — Prospec- 
tive loss — Generally. 

244.  Prospective     loss — Must     be 

reasonably  certain. 

245.  Same  subject  continued. 

246.  Prospective   loss — Permanent 

injuries — Must  be  evidence 
as  to. 

247.  Permanent  injury  or  disabil- 

ity may  be  inferred. 


§  248.  Prospective  loss — Permanent 
injury — Mode  of  assessing 
damages  for. 

249.  Prospective   loss — Permanent 

injury — Mode  of  assessing 
damages  for — Continued. 

250.  Past    and    prospective   loss — 

Recovery  for  in  one  action. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


EXPENSES — PHYSICIAL   INJURIES. 


§  251.  Expenses  of  treating  injury — 
Generally. 

252.  Expenses  of  treating  injury — 

Evidence  as  to,   necessary. 

253.  Evidence  as  to  expenses  in  ac- 

tion by  married  woman. 

254.  Surgical    and    medical  treat- 

ment— Medicines  and  drugs. 

255.  Medical     expenses — Payment 

for,  not  prerequisite  to  re- 
covery. 

256.  Expenses  for  nursing. 


§  257. 


258. 
259. 
260. 

261. 


202. 


Services  of  physician— Evi- 
dence of  payment  or  value 
of — Whether  necessary. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject — Conclusion. 

Expenses  in  the  future — Re- 
covery of. 

Expense  for  work  of  substi- 
tute in  place  of  injured  per- 
son. 

Expense  of  repairing  wagon. 


XIV 


TABLE    01    CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL  INJURY   CASES. 


§  263.  Evidence  as  to  plaintiff's  con- 
dition in  life. 

264.  Same  subject  continued. 

265.  Evidence    as    to    defendant's 

condition  in  life. 

266.  Evidence    as  to  character  of 

plaintiff  —  Chastity  of  fe- 
male. 

267.  Evidence  as  to  expectancy  of 

life — Mortality  tables. 

268.  Same  subject  continued. 

269.  Same    subject      continued  — 

Cases. 

270.  Presumption  against  serious- 

ness of  injury — Evidence  to 
rebut. 

271.  Admission  in  evidence  of  dep- 

osition charging  attempt  to 
make  injuries  appear  worse, 
erroneou  s — Case . 

272.  Action     against    city — Judg- 

ment roll  conclusive  in  ac- 
tion on  bond. 

273.  Exemplary      damages  —  Evi- 

dence in  mitigation  of. 

274.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — 

Future  consequences  of 
physical  injuries. 

275.  Same  subject  continued. 

276.  Expert  evidence  not  admissi- 

ble as  to  speculative  or  pos- 
sible future    consequences. 

277.  Same  subject  continued. 

278.  Evidence  of  physician  based 

on  examination  of  injured 
person  as  to  his  condition. 


§  279.  Expert  evidence  based  on 
statements  of  injured  per- 
son. 

280.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence 

— Appearance     and    condi- 
tion before  and  after  injury. 

281.  Expert  evidence  as  to  cause 

of  condition. 

282.  Same  subject  continued. 

283.  Expert     evidence — Ordinary 

results  from  injury  of  like 
character. 

284.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — 

Malpractice — Cases. 

285.  Opinions  as  to  amount  of  dam- 

ages— Elements  of  damages. 

286.  Evidence  as  to  feigning — Per- 

sonal injuries. 

287.  Hypothetical  questions. 

288.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence 

— Cases  generally. 

289.  Same  subject  continued. 

290.  Statements  and  complaints  of 

injured  person. 

291.  Same  subject  continued. 

292.  Same  subject  concluded. 

293.  Physical    examination  of  in- 

jured person. 

294.  Same  subject  continued. 

295.  Physical  examination  of  plain- 

tiff— New  York. 

296.  Same  subject  continued. 

297.  Exhibiting  injuries  to  jury. 

298.  Evidence    admissible     under 

pleadings — Cases. 

299.  Same  subject  continued. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PARENT   AND   CHILD — PHYSICAL   INJURY. 


§  300.  Recovery  by  parent — Loss  of 
services  of  minor  child. 


§  301.  Judgment  for  parent  in  be- 
half of  child  not  bar  to  ac- 
tion for  loss  of  services. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


§  302.  Action  by  widow  for   loss   <>t 
services  of  minor  child. 
30:5.  Recovery  by  parent— Loss  of 
services — Minor  in  employ 
of  another. 

304.  Statute    as    to   employee   not 

applicable  to  parent. 

305.  Injury  to  child  — Parent's  re- 

covery for  expenses,  nurs- 
ing, etc. 

306.  Injury  to  child— Parents   re- 

covery for  future  expenses. 

307.  Evidence  as  to   parent's  con- 

dition in  life. 


§  308.  1  'hild    en    venti  e    Ba    m<  re 
I  damages  for  injury  to. 

309.  Pain  and  Buffering     Minors. 

310.  Expenses     Keens  cry    ol      by 

minor. 

311.  Loss     of     time  -Diminished 

earning  capacity     Aiinoi . 

312.  Prospective  loss  -Permanent 

injury     Minor. 

313.  No  recovery  by  minor  for   in- 

juries to  mother. 
3]  1.  Recovery  by  minor  for  loss  of 

wages  in  past. 
315.  Negligence  of  parent. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


HUSBAND    AND    WIPE— PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


§  31f>.  Husband's  recovery  for  loss 
of  services  and  society  of 
wife — Loss  of  earnings. 

317.  Husband   cannot   recover   for 

wife's  suffering. 

318.  Loss        of  time— Married 

woman. 

319.  Same  subject  continued. 

320.  Wife's   right   to   recover   not 

precluded      by     husband's 
right. 

321.  Sale    of    laudanum    to    mar- 

ried woman — Recovery  by 


husband  for  loss  of  services 

— Case. 
§  322.  Injury  to  wife  -Expenses  for 

medical  treatment    recover- 
able by  husband. 

323.  Recovery     for      services      of 

husband  in  nursing  injured 
wife. 

324.  Recovery     for      services      of 

daughter  as  nurse. 

325.  Expenses — Recovery    <>f      by 

married  woman. 

326.  Pain    and   suffering— Married 

woman. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


ACTIONS    r.V    PASSENGERS. 


§  327.   Actions  by  passengers  may  be 
in  contract  or  tort. 

328.  Physical  injuries — Passengers 

— Generally. 

329.  Permanent  physical    injuries 

— Passengers — Cases. 

330.  Passenger    injured    alighting 

from  car. 


§  331.  Passenger  injured— Lex  loci 
contractus— Statutory  limi- 
tation as  to  recovery. 

332.  Exemplary  damages. 

333.  Exemplary         damages— As- 

sault son  passengers. 


XVI 


DABLB   OF   CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


g  534.   Exemplary  damages— Failure 

or  refusal  to  transport  pas- 
senger. 

335.  Same  Bubject  continued. 

336.  Penalty    statute     Failure    to 

transport  and  discharge  pas- 
sengers at  destination — 
■•  Legal  or  just  excuse." 

337.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train. 
Wrongful  ejection  from  train 

— Continued. 

339.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train 

— Concluded. 

340.  Exemplary      damages— Ejec- 

tion of  passenger. 

341.  Exemplary      damages— Ejec- 

tion of  passenger — Unnec- 
essary force  or  violence. 

342.  Exemplary       damages — Ejec- 

tion of  passenger — When 
not  recoverable. 

343.  Exemplary      damages— Ejec- 

tion of  passenger — Cases. 

344.  Passenger  left  at  wrong  sta- 

tion. 

345.  Duty  to  minimize  damages — 

Ejection  of  passenger. 

346.  Passenger  carried  beyond  des- 

tination. 

347.  Passenger  carried  beyond  des- 

tination— Continued. 


§  348.  Exemplary  damages — Passen- 
ger carried  beyond  destina- 
tion. 

349.  Passenger — Illness  due  to  ex- 

posure— Walking  to  desti- 
nation. 

350.  Same  subject — Conclusion. 

351.  Passenger — Injury   to    health 

by  exposure. 

352.  Fright  in  connection  with  phy- 

sical  injury — Expulsion  of 
passenger. 

353.  Mental    suffering,    etc. — Pas- 

senger carried  beyond  des- 
tination. 

354.  Mental    suffering — Injury    to 

feelings,   etc. — Ejection   of 
passenger. 

355.  Mental  suffering — Passengers 

— Cases  generally. 

356.  Failure     to     give     passenger 

proper  accommodations. 

357.  Injury  or  insult  by  third  per- 

sons to  passenger. 

358.  Wrongful    charge    of    fare — 

Taking  up  tickets,  etc. 

359.  Stipulations    exempting    car- 

rier from  liability. 

360.  Statutory  exemption  from  lia- 

bility— Passengers      riding 
on  platforms  of  cars. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


ASSAULT   AND   BATTERY. 


§  361.  Assault  and   battery — Gener- 
ally. 

362.  Elements  of  damages  recover- 

able. 

363.  Loss  of  time — Evidence. 

364.  Mental  suffering. 

365.  Assault  on  pregnant  woman. 

366.  Action  by  married  woman. 

367.  Assault  unintentionally  com- 

mitted. 

368.  Matters  in  aggravation. 


§  369.  Exemplary     damages — When 

recoverable. 
Same  subject  continued. 
Exemplary     damages — When 

not  recoverable. 
Exemplary     damages — Effect 

of  criminal  prosecution  on 

allowance  of. 
Same  subject  continued. 
Evidence    as   to    defendant's 

wealth. 


370. 
371. 

372. 


373. 

374. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS    OF    Vol-.    I. 


XVII 


§  375.  Mitigation  of  damages— Gen- 
erally. 

376.  Same  subject  continued. 

377.  Words  in  mitigation. 


§  378.    Pleading. 

379.  Evidence  generally. 

380.  Whether    verdicts     excessive 

tor  various  injuries. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 


LI  P.  EL    AM)    SLANDER. 


§  381.  Words  actionable  per  se. 

382.  Evidence  showing  malice. 

383.  Privileged       communications 

— Whole  communication  aot 

privileged  because  parts 
are,  if  one  part  alone  action- 
able per  se. 

384.  Nominal  damages. 

385.  Measure  of    damages  —  Com-       401. 

pensatory.  402. 

386.  Measure  of  damages  generally 

— In  discretion  of  jury — Ex- 
cessive verdicts. 

387.  Injury    to    feelings  —  Mental 

suffering.  04, 

388.  Expenses — Counsel  fees. 

389.  Libelous     article    concerning        405. 

member     of      legislature —       406. 
Official       investigation      of 
charges  —  Expenses  —  Loss        407. 
of  time  and  labor — Case. 

390.  Injury  to  reputation. 

391.  Injury   to    business — Loss  of 

employment — Special  dam- 
ages. 409. 

392.  Charge  of  incapacity  in  pro- 

fession— Allegation  of  spe- 
cial damage  not  necessary. 

393.  Special  damages — Pleading. 

394.  Special  damages— Pleading —       411 

Continued.  412. 

395.  Special    damages — Action  by 

husband  for  slander  of 
wife. 

396.  Facts  tending  to  enlarge  the 

scope  of  a  libel   should  be        414. 
pleaded. 

397.  Exemplary  damages— Malice. 
y    2 


Exemplary  damages  may  be 
awarded  though  actual 
damages  nominal. 

Exemplary  damages  —  Two 
defendants. 

Plea  of  truth  as  justification 
— When  damages  aggra- 
vated thereby. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Exemplary  damages — Malice 
— Reckless  or  wanton  con- 
duct. 

Same  subject  —  Newspaper 
publications. 

Evidence  of  prior  statements 
of  like  import — Reiteration. 

Repetition  after  recovery. 

Evidence — Social  standing 
and  wealth  of  defendant. 

Exemplary  damages — Several 
defendants — Malice  of  one 
not  imputed  to  others. 

Exemplary  damages — Slander 
by  wife. 

Exemplary  damages — Tele- 
graph company — Libelous 
message. 

Exemplary  damages  as  af- 
fected by  statute. 

Justification. 

Mitigation  of  damages — Gen- 
erally. 

Evidence  of  good  faith  in 
mitigation — Absence  of 
malice. 

Same  Bubject  continued. 

Evidence  that  defamatory 
matter  was  common  rumor. 


XV111 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS   OE    VOL.    I. 


416.  Source  of    imformation— Au- 

thority of  others  —  News 
agency — Copied  from  news- 
papers. 

417.  Same  subject  continued. 

418.  Provocation  in  mitigation. 

419.  Same  subject— When   insuffi- 

cient. 

420.  Retraction  in  mitigation. 

421.  Exemplary     damages  — How 

affected  by  rules  of  absent 
proprietor  of  newspaper  as 
to  investigation. 

422.  Evidence  as  to  bad  character 

and  reputation  of  plain- 
tiff. 


§  123.  Evidence  as  to  bad  character 
and  reputation  of  plaintiff 
— Continued. 

424.  Allegation     of    two    libelous 

charges  —  Only  one  sub- 
mitted to  jury — Proof  of 
the  other  in  mitigation. 

425.  Evidence    in  behalf  of  plain- 

tiff as  to  his  social  position 
—  Reputation  —  Financial 
condition. 

426.  Evidence    to  show    sense    in 

which  words  were  .spoken 
— To  whom  applicable. 

427.  Actions     against     mercantile 

agencies. 

428.  Slander  of  title. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


429. 


-Gen- 


Malicious    prosecution 
erally. 

Malice  and  want  of  probable 
cause  must  both  exist. 
431.  Malice — What    amounts    to— 
May  be  inferred. 

Probable  cause— What  is. 

Conviction  in  criminal  prose- 
cution— Evidence  of  proba- 
ble cause. 

Probable  cause — Burden  of 
proof — Evidence. 

Acquittal  in  criminal  prose- 
cution— Evidence  of  want 
of  probable  cause. 

436.  Measure  of  damages — Gener- 

ally. 

437.  Measure  of  damages — Gener- 

ally— Continued. 


430. 


432. 
433. 


434. 


435. 


§  438.  Mental  suffering. 

439.  Evidence     in     mitigation    of 

damages. 

440.  Advice  of  attorney. 

441.  Advice  of  prosecuting  attor- 

ney, magistrate,  etc. 

442.  Exemplary  damages. 

443.  Wealth     of     defendant— Evi- 

dence— Genei-ally. 

444.  Malicious  prosecution  of  civil 

suit — Attachment. 

445.  Malicious  attachment — Where 

business    unlawful    no    re- 
covery for  injury  to. 

446.  Maliciously     causing    person 

to  lose  employment. 

447.  Pleading. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

FALSE   ARREST   AND    IMPRISONMENT. 

§  448.  False    arrest    and    imprison- 1  §  450.  Measure  of  damages— Gener- 
ment — Measure  of  damages,  .  ally — Excessive  damages. 

449.  Same  subject  continued.  451.  Mental  suffering. 


TABLE    OP   CONTENT8   OF    VOL.    I. 


XIX 


162.  Punitive  damages. 

453.  Same  subject  continued. 

454.  Mitigation  of— Continued. 


§  455.   Evidence — Generally. 
45ii.  Pleading. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


ALIENATION    OF    AFFECTIONS  — CRIMINAL    CONVERSATION. 


§  457.  Alienation  of  affections — 
Criminal  conversation — 
Measure  of  damages  for. 
458.  Etfghl  of  wife  to  recover  for 
alienation  of  affections  of 
husband. 


§  459.   Exemplary  damages. 

460.  Evidence  in  mitigation. 

461.  Advice   by  parent  to    son  to 

leave  wife. 

462.  Evidence — Generally. 

463.  Pleading. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


SEDUCTION. 


§  464.  Seduction — Action  by  woman 
to  recover  for. 

465.  Seduction — Abortion  by  phy- 

sician— Liable    for     entire 
damages — Case. 

466.  Action  by  woman — Mitigation 

of  damages. 


467.  Action  by  parent. 

468.  Action  by  parent — Mitigation 

of  damages. 

469.  Action  by  parent — Barred  by 

marriage  subsequent  to  so- 
duction  and  before  confine- 
ment. 


TITLE  IV. 

CIVIL  DAMAGE  ACTS. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


§  470.  Civil  damage  acts — Who  may 
sue. 

471.  Measure  and  elements  of  dam- 

ages— Generally. 

472.  Death. 

473.  Loss  of  support. 

474.  Injury     to    feelings — Mental 

suffering. 


§   175.   Exemplary    damages — Gener- 
ally. 

476.  Exemplary  damages    General 

rule. 

477.  Sale  by  employee  without  de- 

fendant's knowledge  no  de- 
fense Exemplary  damages 
— Mitigation  of. 


XX 


I'AI'.l.i:    OF    ((>  NTH  NTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


§   178.   Evidence    affecting    damages 
— Generally. 

17'.'.   Evidence    showing    unlawful 
Bale. 

480.  Sales  by  two  or  more  persons 

— Recovery  in  case  of. 

481.  Plaintiff's  knowledge  and  con- 

sent   to    sale    may  be    de- 
fense. 


§  482.  Release  of  damages  by  wife 
no  defense  to  action  by 
children. 

483.  Pleading. 

484.  Civil    rights     acts — Damages 

and  penalties. 


TITLE  V. 

DAMAGES  FOR  CAUSING  DEATH. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


DAMAGES    FOR    CAUSING    DEATH — GENERALLY. 


§  485.  Death  by  wrongful  act,  etc. — 
Preliminary  remarks. 

486.  Actio  personalis  moritur  cum 

persona. 

487.  Actio  personalis — Continued — 

Tort  or  contract — Election 
of  remedies. 

488.  Actio      personalis — Tort    or 

contract — Election  of  rem- 
edies— Continued. 

489.  Same  subject  continued. 

490.  Death — Abatement   or  survi- 

val —  Rights  of  action  — 
Statutes — Generally. 

491.  Death — Effect  of    subsequent 

statute — Survival. 

492.  Death  before   or    after  judg- 

ment, verdict,  etc. 

493.  Death   of    wrongdoer  —  Com- 

mon law  and  statutes. 

494.  Death    of     wrongdoer  —  Con- 

tinued — Abatement  and 
survival  of  actions. 

49o.  Death — Civil  action — Remedy 
purely  statutory. 

496.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy 
for  losses  by  death  or  where 
death  ensues— Generally. 


497.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — 

Continued — Decisions,    etc. 

498.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — 

Continued — Whether  rem- 
edy  new  and   independent. 

499.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — 

Whether  same  is  new  and 
independent — Continued. 

500.  Same  subject — Conclusion. 

501.  Construction     of     statutes  — 

General  principles. 

502.  Construction  of  statutes,  etc. — 

Survival  and  death  loss. 

503.  Construction  of  survival  and 

death  loss  statutes,  etc.— 
Continued. 

504.  Death— Conflict  of  laws— Ex- 

traterritorial jurisdiction 
—  Foreign  administrator  — 
Federal  jurisdiction. 

505.  Same  subject  continued. 

506.  Death  —  Conflict    of     laws  — 

Lex  loci — Lex  fori. 

507.  Death  —  Conflict    of    laws  — 

Foreign  administrator  — 
Party  in  interest —  Federal 
jurisdiction  —  Opinions  in 
recent  decisions. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENT8    OF    \<>L.    I. 


XXI 


§508.  Death— Conflict    of    laws-    §  509.   Death— Conflict  of  laws— Ex- 


Foreign  administrator — Ex 
traterritorial  jurisdiction 

Where  action  does  not  lie — 
Federal  jurisdiction. 


tratei  ritorial  jorisdii  I 
Federal  jurisdiction     Mexi- 
can laws. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

DEATH — RECOVERY    AND    DAMAGES— GENERAL    PRINCIPLES 

AND    RULES. 


§  510.  Death— Measure  of  damages— 
Generally. 

511.  Same  subject  continued. 

512.  Deiith— Measure   of    damages 

— Age  as  a  factor — Gener- 
ally. 

513.  Death— Measure   of   damages 

— Mental  and  physical  abil- 
ity, health,  strength,  etc., 
as  factors — Generally. 

514.  Death  of  children— Damages 

— Age,  sex,  mental  and 
physical  ability,  health, 
strength,  etc. — Generally. 

515.  Beneficiaries  —Widow  —  Loss 

of  support. 

516.  Beneficiaries  —  Widow  —  Fi- 

nancial condition  of  de- 
ceased    husband — Increase 


§  517. 


518. 

519. 
521 1. 
521, 


of  his  property — Dower — 
Settlement  on  widow. 

Beneficiaries  Widow  and 
children  —  Number,  ages, 
sex,  dependency  and  sup- 
port— Financial  and  phys- 
ical condition — Expendi- 
tures and  financial  condi- 
tion of  deceased — Gener- 
ally. 

Death — Pecuniary  loss  or  in- 
jury— The  statutes — Gener- 
ally. 

Death — pecuniary  loss  as 
measure  of  damages. 

Death— Pecuniary  loss  or 
damage — Construed. 

Same  subject  continued. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

DEATH — DAMAGES    PROPORTIONED    TO    THE    INJUR? 


§  522.   Damages 
injury- 

523.  Damages 

injury 
tinned. 

524.  Damages 

injury- 

525.  Damages 

injury- 
Eviden 

526.  Damages 

injury- 
ages. 


proportioned  to  the 

-Statutes. 

proportioned  to  the 

—  Statutes  —  Con- 
proportioned  to  the 

-Pecuniary  loss, 
proportioned  to  the 

-Pecuniary      loss — 

ce. 
proportioned  to  the 

-Exemplary      dam- 


527.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — .Jury  aud  instruc- 
tions to  jury. 

528.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Factors  generally 
to  be  considered. 

529.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Sufferings  of  in- 
jured person. 

530.  Damages   proportioned  to  the 

injury —  Mental  aud  phy- 
sical suffering — Loss  of 
society,  etc. 


XX11 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS   OF    VOL.   I. 


$  531.  Damages  proportioned  to  the] 
injury — Relationship   legal 
and  actual  of  deceased  to 
beneficiaries— Support  and 
dependency. 

532.  Same  subject  continued. 

533.  Same  subject  concluded. 

534.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Contract  relation. 

535.  Damages   proportioned  to  the 

injury — Reasonable  expec- 
tation of  pecuniary  benefit. 

536.  Same  subject  continued. 

537.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Physical  and  finan- 
cial condition,  age,  number 
of  family,  etc.,  of  benefici- 
aries. 

538.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Expenses  of  sick- 
ness, funeral,  etc. 

539.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Annuity. 

540.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Life  expectancy — 
Annuity,  etc.,  tables. 

541.  Damages      proportioned      to 

the  injury — Nominal  dam- 
ages. 

542.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  husband 
— Husband  and  father. 

543.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury— Death  of  wife. 

544.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  parent. 

545.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  parent — 
Care,  training,  etc.,  of  chil- 
dren. 


§  546.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death  of  parent — 
Children's  majority. 

547.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death   of   children 
— Generally. 

548.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  minor 
children. 

549.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  children 
— Minority  and  majority. 

550.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of   children 
— Adults. 

551.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Evidence  — Gener- 
ally. 

552.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Excessive  and  in- 
adequate damages — Gener- 
ally. 

553.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Evidence  of  de- 
ceased's habits— Mitiga- 
tion. 

554.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Insurance. 

555.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Legacy,   devise    or 
inheritance. 
550.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Marriage    and     re- 
marriage. 

557.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Defenses  —  Pre- 
scribing medicine  for  own 
family. 

558.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Self-defense — justi- 
fication. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

DEATH — "FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION    FOR    THE    PECUN- 
IARY  INJURY." 


§  559.   "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 


— Statutes    and   constitu- 
tion— Generally. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    •  • 


XX1U 


§  560.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Pecuniary  loss  only. 

561.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Nature  of  action  and 
proof  of  damages-  Nomi- 
nal damages. 

562.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Damages  for  jury— Ex- 
cessive or  inadequate  dam- 
ages. 

563.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Factors  generally  to  be 
considered. 

564.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Sufferings  of  person  in- 
jured not  a  factor. 

565.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Exemplary  or  vindictive 
damages. 

566.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Solatium  —  Mental  suf- 
fering not  a  factor. 

567.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury11 
— Loss  of  society  of  de- 
ceased. 

568.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
. — Relationship    legal   and 
actual  of  deceased  to  bene- 
liciaries. 

569.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Legal  duty  or  obligation 
of  deceased — Legal  right 
of  beneficiaries  — Support 
and  assistance,  depend- 
ency. 

570.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit — 
Prospective  damages. 


§  571.   "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 

—  Prospect  of  inheriting. 
572.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniar]!  injury  M 
—Physical  and  financial 
condition,  age,  number  uf 
family,  etc. — When  admis- 
sible. 

.".7:;.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Physical  and  financial 
condition,  age,  number  of 
family,  etc. — When  inad- 
missible. 

,Y74.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 

—  Financial  advantages 
accruing  from  death  inad- 
missible to  reduce  dam- 
ages. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury11 
— Probable  accumula- 
tions. 

11  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Funeral  expenses  and 
expenses  for  sickness, 
etc. 

577.  "  Fail  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Funeral  and  medical  ex- 
penses, support, etc.,  paid 
by  defendant— Mitigation 
of  damages. 

578.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
—Life  expectancy— Mor- 
tality tahles. 

579.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Death  of  husband. 

580.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  wife  — Death 
of  wife  and  mother. 

581.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 

— Death  of  parent. 


575, 


57i 


XXIV 


TABLK    OF    CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    I. 


582.  ••  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Support,  care,  etc.,  of 
children. 

583.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  parent — Dam- 
ages not  limited  to  chil- 
dren's minority. 

584.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — Gen- 
erally. 

585.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — Evi- 
dential factors  relating  to 
children. 

586.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — Evi- 
dential factors  relating  to 
parents,  or  next  of  kin. 

587.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — De- 
cisions and  opinions. 


§  588.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Services  of  minor,  cost 
of  support,  etc. — Damages 
not  limited  to   minority. 

589.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Nominal  damages — 
Death  of  infants. 

590.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  unborn  child. 
5.91.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  child  —  Ex- 
pense occasioned  by 
mother's  sickness. 

592.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Collateral  kindred  — 
Next  of  kin. 

593.  Death  —  Mitigation   of  dam- 

ages —  Defenses  —  Insur- 
ance. 

594.  Death — Defense  —  Provoking 

difficulty  —  Liability  of 
sheriff  or  officer. 

595.  Death — Allowance  of  interest. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


DEATH — "FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION  WITH  REFERENCE 
TO  THE  PECUNIARY  INJURIES"  —  "DIRECT  DAMAGES" 
SUSTAINED  —  FORFEITURE  OR  FINE  —  "  SUCH  SUM  AS  THE 
JURY   MAY   DEEM   REASONABLE. 


596.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Stat- 
ute. 

597.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Stat- 
utes —  Continued — Gener- 
ally. 

598.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary   injuries" — Stat- 


utes —  Continued  —  Bene- 
ficiaries, etc. 
§  599.   "Direct  damages  sustained" 
— Miners'  statute. 

600.  Forfeiture     or    fine  —  Indict- 

ment —  Railroads  —  Com- 
mon carriers — Statute. 

601.  "Such  sum  as  the  jury  may 

deem  reasonable  "  — Stat- 
ute. 

602.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 


TAI'.I.F    OF    CONTENTS    OF    Vol..    I. 


XXV 


or 


cuniary  injuries"      Pecu-    §  610. 
Diary  loss. 

603.  Same  subject  continued. 

004.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Ex- 
emplary damages. 

605.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Jury 
and  instructions. 

600.  Same  subject  —  Proper  and 
erroneous  instructions  — 
Illustrations. 

607.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  — Fac- 
tors generally  to  be  consid- 
ered. 

608.  Same     subject     continued — 

Evidence  of  wages. 
609  "Fair  anil  just  compensation 
with   reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries11 — Suffer- 
ings of  person  injured. 

610.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Sola- 
tium —  Mental  suffering, 
loss  of  society,  etc. 

611.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  — Phy- 
sical injury  to  benefici- 
ary. 

612.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  — Rela- 
tionship, legal  and  actual, 
of  deceased  to  beneficia- 
ries. 

613.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Legal 
or  moral  obligation — Le- 
gal right — Support  or  de- 
pendency . 

614.  Same  subject  continued. 

615.  Same  subject  concluded. 


618. 
619. 
620. 
621. 


622. 


623 


624. 


625. 


626. 
627. 


628. 


629. 


••  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  refei  i  ace  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  1;,-  i 
sonable  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary  benefit. 

"  Fair  and  jus)  compensation 
with  refei  ence  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries''  —Phy- 
sical and  financial  condi- 
tion— Age  and  number  of 
beneficiaries. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject— Conclusion. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  Wealth 
of  defendant. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Prob- 
able accumulations. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" —  Ex- 
penses of  sickness,  fu- 
neral, etc. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  —  Life 
expectancy  —  Mortality 
tables. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "—Nomi- 
nal damages. 

Same  subject  continued. 

•■  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Death 
Of  husband  Husband  and 
father. 

Same  subject-  Annuity  — 
Dower,  etc. — Instruction 
and  opinion  of  court. 

'•  Fair  and  just    compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  Death 
of  wife. 


XXVI 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS    OF   VOL.   I. 


§  630.   Same     Bubject      continued  — 
Married  woman's  act. 

631.  "  Fair  and  just   compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Death 
of  parent. 

632.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Train 
ing,  etc.,  of  children — 
Death  of  parent. 
033.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Death 
of  children. 

634.  Same  subject  continued. 

635.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Death 
of  children — Minority  and 
majority. 


§  636.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with   reference  to  the  pe- 
•  cuniary  injuries  " — Death 
of  children — Adults. 

637.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Collat- 
eral kindred. 

638.  Defenses — Mitigation  of  dam- 

ages— Insurance. 

639.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — De- 
fenses —  Remarriage  and 
marriage. 

040.  Death — Defenses — Pension  to 
widow  and  children  in 
mitigation. 

641.  Damages  assessed  on  affirm- 
ance of  judgment. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

DEATH — "  FAIR  AND  JUST  "  DAMAGES  "  WITH  REFERENCE 
TO  THE  PECUNIARY  INJURY." 


§642.  "Fair  and  just"  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " —  Stat- 
utes— Generally. 

643.  Same  subject  continued. 

044.  Same  subject  concluded. 

645.  "Fair  and  just"  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniar j'  injury  "  —  Pe- 
cuniary loss. 

04*;.  Same  subject  continued. 

647.  "  Fair    and    just  "  damages 

' '  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Dam- 
ages for  the  jury. 

648.  "  Fair    and    just  "    damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Fac- 
tors generally  to  be  con- 
sidered. 


§  649.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Sev- 
erance of  contract  rela- 
tions— Partnership. 

650.  "Fair    and     just"    damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " —  Suf- 
ferings of  the  person  in- 
jured. 

651.  "  Fair    and    just  "    damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — So- 
latium— Mental   suffering. 

652.  "  Fair    and    just  "    damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Re- 
lationship, legal  and  ac- 
tual, of  deceased  to  bene- 
ficiaries. 


J  A.BLE    OF   CONTENTS    l  >F    V  OL.    r. 


xxvn 


654. 

655. 


656. 


657. 


$663.  "Fair    and     just"    damages  I 
••  with    reference    t"    the 
pecuniary     injury"—  Le-    $  663. 
<r;il  or  moral    obligation- 
Legal  right— .Support  and 
dependency. 

Same  subject  continued. 

"  Fair  and  just  "  damages 
'•  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary benefit. 

"Fair  and  just"  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Pros- 
pect of  inheritance. 

"Fair  and  just'1  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Phy- 
sical and  financial  condi- 
tion, age,  number  of 
family,  etc.—  When  ad- 
missible. 

658.  "Fair    and     just"    damages        668. 

"with     reference    to     the        669. 
pecuniary      injury  "—  Fi- '      670. 
nancial    condition — When 
inadmissible. 

659.  "  Fair    and      just"    damages 

"with     reference   to    the        671, 
pecuniary  injury"— Prob 
able  accumulations. 

660.  "  Fair    and    just  "    damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury"— Ex- 
pense of  funeral,  sickness, 
etc. 

661.  "Fair     and     just"    damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "  —  Life 
expectancy  and  inert  nary 
tables. 

662.  ••  Fair    and    just*1    damages 

••  with  reference  to  the  pe- 


cuniary    injury  "  —  Nom- 
inal (I  tin. i 
•  Fair     and     just  "     dan,:. 

■•  witli  reference  to  tin-  pe- 
cuniary injury "  Death 
of  husband— Husband  and 

father. 

"Fair    and     just"    dam 
••  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary   injury "        Death 
of  \\  ife. 

"Fair  aud  just'*  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  "  —  Death 
of  parent 

•■  Fair  and  just"  damages 
••  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury"  —  Train- 
ing, etc.,  of  children. 

•■Fair  and  just**  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury"'  —  Death 
of  children. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject  concluded. 

••  Fair  and  just  "  damages 
•■  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  "  -  Death 
of  adults. 

Death  of  children— Minority 
and  majority. 

••  Fair     and      just  **     dan 

'•  With  reference  I"  tile  pe- 
cuniary  injury*'-  Death 
Of  children  Minoriu  and 
majority. 

•■  Fair    and    just ""    damages 

••  w  ith  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury"  Moth- 
er's sickness  from  child's 
death. 
"Fair  and  just"  damages 
••  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  ""—Collat- 
eral kindred. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED  IN  VOL.  I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


A. 


Abbot  v.  Heath  (84  Wis.  314),  278. 
Abbott  v.  Blossom  (06  Barb.  [N.  V.) 

853),  488. 
Abbott  v.  Galch  (13  Md.  314),  89. 

Abbott  v.  McCaddan  (81  Wis.  563), 

643,  6.-)7,  663,  665. 
Abbott  v.  Tolliver  (71  Wis.  74  i,  266. 
Abeel  v.  Wolcott  (Cole  &  Caines  [N. 

Y.],  229;  1  Caines  [N.  Y.],  250),  57. 
Abclesv.  Bransfield  (18  Kan.  16), 311. 
Abilene  v.  Wright  (4  Kau.  App.  708), 

215,  255,  298,  299. 
Abrahams  v.  Cooper  (81  Pa.  St  232), 

448,  449,  451. 
Abraham  v.  Kidney  (104  Mass.  222), 

467. 
Ackerson  v.   X.    Y.  L.  E.  &   W.    Ry. 

Co.  (32  X.  J.  L.  254),  135. 
Adam  v.  British  &  F.  S.   Co.   ([1898] 

2  Q.  B.  430;  67   L.   J.   Q.    B.    X.  s. 

844),  69. 
Adams  v.    Ames  (19  Wash.   425j   53 

Pac.  546),  70. 
Adams  v.  Clymer  (1  Marv.  [Del.]  80), 

251. 
Adams  Exp.   Co.   v.   Egbert  (36   Pa. 

St.  360),  78,  87. 
Adams  v.   Fitchburg   K.   Co.    (67  Vt. 

76),  497. 
Adams  v.    Fitchburg  K.    Co.     ([Vt.] 

30  Atl.  687),  508. 
Adams  v.   Xellis  (59  How.    [X.   Y.] 

385),  492. 
Adams  v.  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (95  Fed. 

938),  499. 
Adams  v.  Robinson  (65  Ala.  586).  62, 

76,  77. 
Adams  v.  Salina  (58  Kan.  246),   123.    | 


Adams  v.  Smith  (58  111.  417),  422. 
Adams  Bote!  Co.  v.  Cobb  ([Ind.  T.] 

53  S.  W.  478),  300. 
Addington  v.  Western  <fe  A.   K.   Co. 

(93  O a.  566i,  77. 
Adler  v.  Cloud  (42  S.  C.  272),  73. 
Administrators,  See  Board  oi 
Advance  Elevator  A   \\.  Co.  v.  Eddy 

(23  111.  App.  352),  81. 
vEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boon  (95  U.  8.  117), 

84. 
Aggs  v.    Shackelford    Co.    (85    Tex. 

145),   1. 
Agricultural  &  Mech.  Assoc,  v.  State. 

Carty  (71    Md.   86),  528.  530.   532, 

535,  536,  549. 
Ahern  v.  Collins  (39  Bio.  145),  448. 
Ahem    v.   Oregon    Teleph.     Co.   (24 

Oreg.  276).  148. 
Ahern  v.  Steele  (46  Bun  [K  T.],  517), 

514,  586,  589. 
Ahern  v.  Steele  (48  Hun  [\.  Y.],  617), 

563. 
Aiello  v.  Aaron  (OS  X.  Y. Supp.  186), 

94. 
Ainlcy    v.    Man.    Ry.    Co.    (47    Hun 

[\.  Y.l,  206),  316. 
Aird   v.    Fireman's    Journal    Co.    (10 

Daly  [\.  V.].  254),  401. 
Airey   v.   Pullman   Pal.   Car.   <<>.  i  .".0 

La.  Ann.  648),  347. 
Akersloot  v.  Second    Ave.  K.  Co.     10 

X.  Y.  St.  R.  231),  214. 
Alabama  G.  S.    R  Co.    v.  Arnold   (80 

Ala.  600),  84,  122. 
Alabama   (..  S.  R.  Co.   v.  Bailey  (112 

Ala.  167),  215. 
Alabama,  G.  &    S.  H.  Co.  v.  Bu 

(116  Ala.  509),  175,  514. 

xxix 


XXX 


TABLE    OF   CASKS    CITED    TN    VOL.    I 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
R.  Co 


Alabama   <;.   S.    R.   Co.    v.    Burgess 

(119  Ala.  555),  209. 
Alabama  <..  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll  (52 

T.  s.  App.  442),  263. 
Alabama  G.S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll  (84 

Fed.  772),  263. 
Alabama  G.   S.    R.   Co.  v.  Davis  (119 

Ala.  572),  252. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier  (93 

Ala.  45),  139,  145. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Heddleston 

(82  Ala.  218),  351. 
Alabama   G.  S.   R.    Co.  v.   Hill    (90 

Ala.  71 ),  293. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill  (93  Ala. 

514),  135,  180, 186,  187,  215,  248. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Moorer  (116 

Ala.  642),  64. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Yarbrough 

(83  Ala.  238),  251. 
Alabama  M.  R.    Co.  v.   Griffith  (63 

Ark.  491),  229. 
Alabama  Mineral  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marcus 

([Ala.]  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  490),  228. 
Alabama  M.   R.  Co.  v.   Marcus  (115 

Ala.  389),  229. 
Alabama  &  V.  R.    Co.   v.   Carter  (77 

Miss.  511;  27  So.  993),  64. 
Alabama  &  V.   R.   Co.  v.  Davis  (69 

Miss.  444),  172. 
Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Purnell  (69 

Miss.  652),  335. 
Alabama,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sellers  (93 

Ala.  9),  112,  122,  123,  344. 
Albany  v.  Sikes  (94  Ga.  30),  71. 
Albert  v.  Bleecker   St.  &  R.  R.  Co. 

(2  Daly  [N.  Y.],  389),  83. 
Alberti  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(43  Hun[N.  Y.],  421),  214. 
Albertie  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.  (118  N.  Y.  77),  263,  264,275. 
Albrecbt  v.  Walker  (73  111.  69),  114. 
Alcorn  v.  Mitcbell  (63  111.  553),  369, 

370. 
Aldrich   v.  Concord   &  M.   R.  Co.  (67 

N.  II.  380),  84. 
Aldii.b  v.    Sager   (9    Hun     [N.  Y.], 

537),  471. 


Alexander   v.    Blodgett  (44  Vt.  476), 

364. 
Alexander  v.  Humber  (86  Ky.  565), 

251. 
Alexander  v.    Harrison   (38  Mo.  258), 

440. 
Alfaro  v.  Davidson  (40  N.  Y.  Super. 

[8  J.  &S.]  87),  11. 
Alijandro  (56  Fed.  621),  214. 
All  v.  Barnwell  County  (29  S.  C.  161), 

523. 
All  v.  Burnwell   Co.  (  [S.   C]  7  S.  E. 

58),  503,  523. 
Allaire   v.   St.   Luke's    Hospital   (76 

111.441),  308. 
Allegheny  Co.  v.  Grier  (179  Pa.  639), 

68. 
Allegheny,  City  of,    v.   Zimmerman 

(95  Pa.  St.  287),  90. 
Allen  v.  Ames  &  C.  R.  Co.  (106  Iowa, 

602),  267. 
Allen  v.  Atlantic   St.   R.   R.   Co.  (54 

Ga.  503),  514. 
Allen  Co.  Commrs.  v.  Crevistou  (133 

Ind.  39),  65. 
Allen  v.  Conrad  (51  Pa.  St.  487),  75,76. 
Allen  v.  Dillingham  (8  C.  C.  A.  544), 

522. 
Allen  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (42  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  227),  214. 
Allen  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (42  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  277),  214. 
Allen  v.  News  Pub.  Co.  (81  Wis.  120), 

397. 
Allen  v.  Quann,  (80  111.  App.  547),  70. 
Allen  v.  Queens  Co.  (84  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

399),  65. 
Allen    v.  State   Steamship   Co.   (132 

N.  Y.  91),  151. 
Allen  v.  Steers  (30  La.  Ann.  586),  94. 
Allen   v.    Texas  &  P.   R.   Co.  ([Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  27  S.  W.  943),  176. 
Allender   v.    Chic.    R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 

Co.,  (37  Iowa,  264),  194. 
Alliance  v.  Campbell  ([C.  C]  3  Ohio, 

Dec.  630),  229. 
Alliger  v.    Brooklyn   Daily  Eagle  (2 

Silv.  S.  C.  [N.  Y.]  5),  420. 


TABLE   01    '  ASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


XXXI 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Alliger  v.  Mail    Printing  Ajbbo.  (20 

\.  V.  Supp.  763),  402 
Ailing  v.  Ailing  (52  N.  J.  Eq.  92;  27 

Atl.  655),  667. 
Allis  v.  McLean  (48  Mich.  428),  91. 
Allison   v.  Chandler  (71  Mich.    542), 

80,  122,   134,  186. 
Allison    v.   Gulf,  C.    A-    S.    I'.  H.  Co. 

([Tex.  Civ.    App.]  29   S.   W.   425), 

107,  211. 
Allyn  v.  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  (105  Mass. 

77),  165. 
Alstin   v.  Huggins    (3    Brev.    [S.  C] 

185),  81. 
Alt  v.  Grosclose  (61  Mo.  App.  409  i.  95. 
Althorf  v.  Wolf  (22  N.  V.  355),  193. 
Althorf  v.   Wolfe   (2    Hilt.   [N.    Y.J 

344),  5(13,  569,  570,  579,  581,  593. 
Althouse  v.  Sharpe  (13  Wkly.    Dig. 

[X.  Y.]  478),  214. 
Alton  Paving   B.    &  F.   Brick  Co.  v. 

Hudson  (74  111.  App.  612),  214. 
Amer.    Bldg.  &  L.    Assn.   v.  Hart  (2 

Wash.  594),  78. 
American  Express   Co.  v.  Patterson 

(73Ind.  430),  455. 
American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Risley  (77  111. 

App.  476),  206. 
American  Strawhoard  Co.   v.   Foust 

([Ind.  App.]  39  N.  E.  891),  227. 
American  Sug.   Ref.   Co.  v.   Johnson 

(60  Fed.  503),  503. 
American   .Surety    Co.    <>f   X.    Y.    v. 

Woods  (106  Fed.  263),  78. 
American        Waterworks       Co.      v. 

Dougherty  ([Neb.]  55  X.  W.  1051), 

218. 
Amoskeag  Mfg.    Co.   v.   Goodale  (46 


Anderson  v.  Cullen  (29  V  V.  St  R. 

494  i,  515. 
Anderson  v.  Des  .Moines  St.  R,  Co. 

(97  Iowa,  739),  L98. 
Anderson   v.    Manhattan   R.   Co.  il 

Misc.  [N.  V.,  504),  214. 
Anderson  v.  Miller  (96  Tenn.  35),  84. 
Anderson    v.    St.    Cloud    ([Minu.]  81 

X.  W.746),  65. 
Anderson    v.  Taylor   (56    Cal.    131), 

87. 
Anderson   Foundry  &   M.   Works  v. 

Meyer  (15  Ind.  App. 
Andrews  v.  Hay  (reek  l:.  Co.  (60  \. 

J.  L.  610),  71. 
Andrews  v.   Chicago, M.  &  St.  P,  K. 

Co.  (HG  Iowa,  677),  520. 
Andrews  v.    Hartford,   etc.,    K.    Co. 

(34  Conn.  57),  199. 
Andrews  v.  Stone  (10  Minn.  72),  361. 
Angell  v.  St.  Louis  (20  R.  I.  391  i.  63. 
Annas   v.    Milwaukee  A-  X.    R,  R,  I  o. 

(67  Wis.  48),  615,  516,  648,  602.  654, 

855,  657,  659,  663,  667. 
Anonymous  (21  Misc.   [X.    Y.]   656), 

515. 
Anthony  v.  Gilbert  (4  Blackf.  [Ind.] 

348),  111. 
Antonio,  City  of.  v.  Smith  ([Tex.]  59 

S.  W.  1109),  82. 
Appleby   v.  Ilorseley  Co.  No.   1  ( [C. 

A.]  68  L.  J.  Q.    B.   X.  S. 

2  4  B.  521),  528,  544. 
Appleton     v.     Fullerton     (1     Gray 

[Mass.],  186),  62,  74,  7c. 
Arare   v.    Idaho  Canal   Co.   ([Id.]   46 

Pac.  1024),  67. 
Archeson  v.  Western  In.  Teleg  Co. 

(96  Cal.  641),  78. 


N.  H.  53),  76. 
Amrhein  v.  Quaker  City  Dye  Works    Aid  more  Coal   Co.   v.   Bevil  (61  Fed. 

(192  Pa.  253),  99.  757  |,  503,  596. 

Anderson  v.   Byrnes   (122  Cal.  272),    Arkansas    M.    K.    Co.    v.   Griffith   (68 

501.  Ark.  491  i.  267.  268. 

Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R,  Co.    Arlinev.  Laurens  Co.  (77Ga.  24 

(35  Xeb.  95),  602,  607,610,  615,  626.     Armour  v.  Czischki  (59  111.  App.  17). 
Anderson  v.  Columbia  Finance  &  I.  |     514,  607,  61 1.  635,  686. 

Co.  (20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1790),  430,431,  j  Armstrong  v.  Percy  (6  Wend.  [N.  Y.] 

440.  I      535),  46. 


X  X  X 1 1 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    LN    VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Armstrong  v.    Pierson  (8  Iowa,  29), 

422. 
Armsworth  v.  South  Eastern  Ry.  (11 

Jur.  758),  522,  524,  540. 
Arndt  v.  Bourke  ([Mich.]  79  N.  W. 

190),  264. 
Arnesen  v.   Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co- 

(9  Misc.  [X.  Y.]  270,214. 
Arnold  v.  Henry  Co.  (81  Ga.  730),  65. 
Arnold   v.   Sayings  Co.  (70  Mo.  A  pp. 

159),  385,  386,  412. 
Arnott  v.  Standard  Assoc.  (57  Conn. 

86),  412. 
Arrovvood  v.  South  Carolina  &  G.  E. 

R.  Co.  (126  N.  C.  629),  64. 
Artusy    v.     Missouri     Pac.     R.     Co. 

([Tex.]  11  S.  W.  177),  522. 
Asbury  v.  Charlotte  Electric  Ry.   L. 

&  P.  Co.  ([N.  C]  34  S.  E.  654),  149. 
Ash  v.   Bait.   &   O.    R.   Co.    (72   Md. 

144),  508. 
Ash  v.  Marlovv  (20  Ohio  St.  119),  432. 
Ash  v.  Prunier  (105  Fed.  722),  462. 
Ashby  v.  White  (2  Ld.    Raym.  953), 

62,  76. 
Ashby  v.  White  (1  Salk.  21),  62. 
Ashcroft  v.  Chapman  (38  Conn.  230), 

261. 
Asher  v.  Cabell   (2  U.  S.  App.  158), 

522. 
Asher   Lumber  Co.    v.  Lunsford  (17 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  559),  104. 
Ashley   Wire  Co.    v.    McFaddiu    (66 

111.  App.  26),  603,  607. 
Aslew   v.    Charlotte    (35    App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.J  62),  214. 
Assessment  &  C.  of  Taxes,  In  re  ([S. 

D.]  54  N.  W.  818),  501. 
Atchison  v.  Acheson  (9  Kan.  App.), 

287. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Billings 

(7  Kan.  App.  399),  63. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown 

(57  Kan.  785),  440. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown 

(31  Pac.  79),  342. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cham- 
berlain (4  Okla.  542),  119. 


Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Chance 
(57  Kan.  40),  285. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Click 
([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  32  S.  W.  226), 
214,  279. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
Ion  (7  Kan.  App.  549),  226. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cross 
(58  Kan.    424),  514,  635. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cun- 
ningham (59  Kan.  722),  199. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Dicker- 
son  (4  Kan.  App.  345),  338,  354. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Elder 
(50  111.  App.  276),  214. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry 
(55  Kan.  715),  139. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  La- 
moreux  (5  Kan.  App.    813),  342. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Co.  v.  Long  (5 
Kan.  App.  644),  340,  343. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Ginnis  (46  Kan.  109),  219,  316,  325. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Midgett 
([Kan.  App.]  40  Pac.  995),  218. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Xapole 
([Kan.]  40  Pac.  669),  499. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice 
(36  Kan.  593),  448. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ards (58  Kan.  344),  102,  109. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowe 
(56  Kan.  411),  215. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith 
(44  Kan.  4),  434. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Snedeger  (5  Kan.  App.  700),  285. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart 
(55  Kan.  667),  135,  214. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Willey 
(57  Kan.  764),  80,  81,  82. 

Athens  v.  Carmer  (169  Pa.  St.  426), 
73. 

Atkins  v.  Gamble  (42  Cal.  86),  72. 

Atkins  v.  Gladwish  (25  Neb.  390), 
369. 

Atkins  v.Man.  R.  Co.  (57  Hun  [N.  Y.], 
102),  277,  288. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


wxni 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Atkinson  v.   Vancleave  ([Ind.  App.]    Auerv.  Mauser  (6  Pa.  Super.  CI 

57  N.  K.  7:11).  443.  430,  131,  132,435. 

Atl.  <fc  W.    P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Loft  in  (86    Aufdenberg  v.  St  Louis,  T.   M. 


Ga.  43),  158. 
Atlanta   &    W.    P.    K.    Co.   v.  Smith 

([Ga.]  20  s.  E.  763),  811. 
Atlanta    Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold 

(100  Ga.  566),  514. 
Atlanta    Consol.    St.    K.    Co.    v.    Bag- 

nell  (107  Ga.  15  7).  205. 
Atlanta  Consol.  St.   R,  Co.  v.  Bates 

(103  Ga.  333),  229,  328. 
Atlanta  Consol.  St.  11.  Co.  v.  Hardage 

(93  <;a.  4571,  340. 
Atlanta  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  O wings 

(97  Ga.  663),  232. 
Atlanta,  etc.,   Airline    Co.  v.  Gravitt 

(93  Ga.  369),  176. 
Atlanta,  etc.,   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Johnson 

(66  Ga.  259),  243. 
Atlanta  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs  (88  Ga. 

647),  215. 
Atlanta  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker  (93  Ga. 

462),  289. 
Atlantic  v.  Martin  ( [Ga.]  13  S.  E.  805), 

100. 
Atlantic   &    D.    R.    Co.  v.  Delaware 

Const.  Co.  (08  Va.  503),  82,  92. 
Atlantic  &  D.   R.  Co.  v.  Ironmonger 

(95  Va.  625),  318,  325. 
Atlantic  &  G.  C.  Consol.  Coal  Co.  v. 

Maryland  Coal  Co.   (62  Md.   135), 

120. 
Atlantic  &  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Dunn    (lit  Ohio  St.  162),   111,  114, 

135,  139,  140,  340. 
Atlas  Engine  Works  v.  Randall  (100 

tnd.  293),  177. 
Atlanta,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Wood  (48  Ga. 

565),  224. 
Attwood  v.  Fricott  (17  Cal.  38),  76. 
Atwater   v.   Morning  News  Co.  (67 

Conn.  504),  411. 
Atwood  v.  Bangor,   O.   &    O.    T.    R. 

Co.  (91  Me.  309),  161. 
Auchmuty  v.  Ham  (1  Denio[\.  Y.l, 

495),  110. 
Auditor  v.  Crise  (20  Ark.  540),  57. 
3 


l;.  Co.  I  L82  Mo.  563 
Augusta    Factory  v.   Barnes  (72  Ga, 

217).  L36. 
Augusta    Factory    v.   Davis    (S7  Ga, 

495. 
Augusta  Factory  V.Hill (83  Ga.  709), 

511. 
Augusta    R.  Co.    v.  (.lover  ([Ga.]  18 

s.  E.   106),  102,  504. 
Augusta  s.   It.  Co.  v.   McDade  (105 

Ga.  134),  L65. 
Aurora   v.  Seedelmann   (34   111.    App. 

285),  617,  619. 
Austin  v.  Hyndman  (119  Mich.  615), 

381. 
Austin  v.  Wilson    (4  Cush.    [Mass.], 

273),  114,  372. 
Austin  A:    \.    \V.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Mc- 

Elmurry  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  88  S.  W. 

■240).  278,  286. 
Austin,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Beatty  (73 

Tex.  592),  L59,  169. 
Austin  Rap.  Trans.  R.  Co.  v.  Cullen 

([Tex.]  29  S.  W.  256),  514,  537,  541, 

548,  552. 
Ava  v.  Grenawalt  (73  111.  App.  633), 

240. 
Avery  v.  Ray  (1  Mass.  12),  361,  377. 
Ayres  v.  Del.,  etc..  K.  It.  Co.  |  L58  N. 

Y.  254),  243,  244,  247,  250,  274. 
Ayres  v.  Saragota    Springs  (46  Hun 

[N.  Y.|.  448),  247. 
Backhouse  v.  Bononie  (9  II.  L.  Cas. 

503),  71. 
Bacon  v.  Bacon  (76  Miss.  158),  448. 
Haddock  v.  Salisbury  (2  Cow.  [N.  Y.] 

811),  422. 
Badgely  v.  Decker  (44  Barb.  [N.  Y.l 

577.)  467. 
Badostain  v.  Grazide  (115  Cal.  425), 

371,  373. 
Bagby  v.  Harris  (0  Ala.  173),  75. 

Bagleyv.  Mason(69Vt  L75),S63, 379. 

Bahel  v.  Manning  (112  Mich.  21:  70 
N.  \V.  327),  63. 


XXXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Baier  v.  Schermerliorn  (96  Wis.  372), 

81. 
Bailey  v.  Bailey  (94  Iowa,  598),  462. 
Bailey  v.  Centre ville  (108   Iowa,  20), 

196,  229,  241,  245. 
Bailey  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  (4  Biss. 

[U.  S.]  430),  602,  607,  610,  618. 
Bailey  v.  Gray  (53  S.  C.  503),  155. 
Bailey  v.  Jourdan  (18  App.  Div.  [N. 

Y.]  387),  173. 
Bailey  v.  Lawrence  Co.  (52  S.  D.  393), 

65. 
Bailey  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(4  Ilarr.  [Del.]  389),  67. 
Bailey  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.   R.  Co.  (80 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  4),  214. 
Bailey  v.  Westcott  (16  N.   Y.  St.  R. 

671),  91. 
Bain  v.  Cushman  (60  Vt.  343),  285. 
Baker  v.   Bailey   (16   Barb.    [N.   Y.] 

54),  488. 
Baker  v.  Barker  Asphalt  P.  Co.  (92 

Fed.  117),  68. 
Baker  v.  Botton  (1  Campb.  493),  495. 
Baker  v.  Carter  (83  Me.  132),  515. 
Baker  v.  Drake  (53  N.  Y.  211),  87. 
Baker  v.  Flint  &  P.  M.    R.  Co.   (91 

Mich.  298),  301. 
Baker  v.  Hornik  (57  S.  C.  213),  430. 
Baker   v.    Irish    (172    Pa.    St.    528), 

209. 
Baker  v.  Lainer  (82  Ga.  216),  111. 
Baker  v.  Manhattan   R.   R.   Co.   (118 

N.  Y.  533),  178,  228,  236. 
Baker  v.  New  York,  N.  II.  &  R.  Co. 

(28  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  316),  214, 
Baker  v.  Richmond  City  Mill  Works 

(105  Ga.  225),  285. 
Balch  v.  (hand  Rapids  &  S.  R.  Co. 

(67  Mich.  394),  645,  648,  654. 
Balcom  v.  Michels  (49  111.  App.  379), 

425. 
Baldwin  v.  Boulware  (79  Mo.  App. 

5),  387,  390,  415,  416,  419. 
Baldwin  v.  Dewitt   (19   Ky.  L.   Rep. 

1248),  107. 
Baldwin  v.  Fries  (46  Mo.  App.  288), 
114,  120,  410. 


Baldwin  v.  N.  Y.  &  II.  S.  N.  Co.  (4 

Daly  [N.  Y.],  314),  81,  136. 
Baldwin  v.  Western  Railroad  Co.  (4 

Gray  [Mass.],  333),  240. 
Balhoff  v.  Michigan  C.   R.  Co.  (106 

Mich.  606),  152. 
Ball  v.  Bruce  (21  111.  161),  124. 
Ball  v.  Ilalsell  (161  IT.  S,  83),  65. 
Ball  v.  Horrigan  (47  N.  Y.  St.  R.  384), 

448. 
Ball  v.  Mabry    ([Ga.],  18   S.   E.    64), 

244. 
Ballard  v.  Furcell  (1  Nev.  342),  57. 
Ballou  v.  Farman  (11  Allen  [Mass.], 

73),  227. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams 

( [D.  C.  App.]  25  Wash.  L.  Rep.  167), 

172. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barger 

(80  Md.  23),  333. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blocker 

(27  Md.  277),  120,  186. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyd  (67 

Ind.  32),  121. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.   R.  Co.  v.  Bryant 

(9  Ohio  C.  C.  332),  203. 
Baltimore  &   O.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Camp 

(54  U.  S.  App.  110),  263. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr  (71 

Md.  135),  344. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  (State) 

Chambers  (81  Md.   371),  528,  531, 

541,  542. 
Baltimore  &   O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  (State) 

Grimes  (71  Md.  573),  515,528,532, 

536,  537,  540,  542,  544,  546. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  (State) 

Hauer  (60  Md.  449),  166,  532,  535, 

536,  544. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Hellen- 

thal  (88  Fed.  120),  161. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Hen- 

thorne  (73  Fed.  634),  249. 
Baltimore  &   O.   R.   Co.  v.  Joy  (173 

U.  S.  226),  492,  497,  505,  506. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.   R.  Co.  v.  (State) 

Kelly  (24  Md.  271),  515,  524,  526, 

530,  531,  532,  537,  541,  542. 


TABIiE    i  'I     I  A.SES    CITED    IN    Vol..    I. 


WW 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Baltimore  &  <>.  B.  B.  Co.  v.  (State)  Baltimore,  etc.,  Trans.  Co.  v.  Boone 
Malrowe(63Md.  135), 524, 527, 528,        I  15  Bid.  344),  122. 

530,  581,  .".:;_',  :>:;:>.  537,  -Ml.  Balton  v.  V.  lines  cm  Va.  398),  152. 

Baltimore  <k  O.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Bambo  Baltzer  v.  Chicago  A  B  I  o.    S3  Wis. 


(59  Fed.  77),  003. 
Baltimore  &  O.  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Kasbcrry 

(13  Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.  L85),  546. 
Baltimore  &  O.  B.  B.  Co.  v.  Stanley 

(.VI  111.  A  pp.  215),  517,  007,  619,  632. 
Baltimore  &  O.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  (State) 

Trainer  (33  M.l.  542),  528,  540,556. 


459),  It)'.'. 
Baltzer  v.  Chicago,  M..  &   X.  B  Co. 

(89  Wis.  257),  21  I. 
Bamberger  v.  Citizens  St.   B.  <<>.  (95 

Tenn.  L8),  162,  17.".. 
Bamford  t.   Pittsburgh  B.  Traction 

Co.  ([Pa.]  11  Atl.  iocs!,  215. 


Baltimore  *  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  (State)    Bamka  v.  Chicago,  St.  1'.  M.  A  <  >.  B 

Woodward  (41   Md.  268),  524,  535,        Co.  ([Minn.]  63  N.  W.    1116),  300, 

540,  542.  301. 

Baltimore  &  O.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Slan-  |  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Coos  (39  Neb. 

ker  (180  111.  357),  299.  437),  11,  13,  81,  111,  117. 

Baltimore  &  O.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Slan-  ,  Bank  of   llopkinville  v.  Western  By. 

ker  (77  111.  App.  567),  110.  Asylum  1 1  Ky.]  56  S.  W.  925  1.  65. 

Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keck  j  Bangs    v.  Loveridge   (60  Fed. 

(89  111.  App.  72),  309.  507- 

Baltimore   &  O.   S.  W.  R.   R.  Co.   v.    Bannon  v.  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

Pletz  (61  111.  App.  161),  176.  (24  Md.  108),  112,  218. 

Baltimore  &   O.  S.  W.   R.  B.  Co.  v.    Bail.ee  v.  Reese  (60  Miss.  906),  161. 

Then  (159  111.  535),  514,  603,  605,  i  Barber  v.  Barber  (23  Conn.  335),  406. 


607,  616,  635. 

Baltimore  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cumber- 
land (176  U.  S.  232),  64. 

Baltimore  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cumber- 
land (12  App.  [D.  C]  598),  514. 

Baltimore  &  Rnstertown  Twp.  v. 
(State)  Crimes  (71  Md.  573),  515, 
528,  532,  536,  537,  540,  542,  5  1 1,  5  16. 

Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baei 
(90  Md.  97),  193. 

Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kemp 
(61  Md.  619),  329. 

Baltimore  City  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooney 
(87  Md.  261),  177. 

Baltimore  City  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kemp 
(61  Md.  74),  179,  318,351. 

Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boteler 
(38  Md.  668),  266. 

Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Breissig 
(25  Md.  378),  111,  122,  186. 

Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mulli- 
gan (45  Md.  486),  156. 

Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  B.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
acre  (35  Ohio  St.  627),  166. 


Barbour  v.  Stephenson  ( [Ky.]  32  Fed. 

66),  467. 
Bail. our  County  v.  Horn  (48  Ala.  567  I, 

142.  263. 
Barfield  v.  Southern  B.  Co.  (108  Ga. 

744),  63. 
Barg  v.  Bonsfield  (65  Minn.  355),  21  1. 
Barker  v.  Cunard  s.  S.  Co.  (91   Hun 

[N.  Y.],  495),  356. 
Barkerv.  Kilbourn  (16  Wis.  is:,  1.  128. 

Barker    v.   l'rizcr    (  150    1ml.    I  1.   397, 

104. 
Barkley  v.  X.  V.  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co. 

(35  App.  [N.  Y.]  22s  1,  274 
Barkly  v.  Copeland  (74  Cal.  I  |,  106. 
Barksdale  v.  City  of  Laurens  1 58  S.  C. 

H3),  65. 
Barlow  v.  Louder  (85  Ark.  492),  28, 

62,  76,  120. 
Barnard   v.  Gall   (43   La.  Ann. 

501. 
Barnard  v.  Poor  (21  Pick.  [Mass.]  878), 

111,  116. 
Barnard  v.  Shirley  (151  lad.  160),  71. 


X  \  X  V  1 


TABLE   OF   (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Barnes  v.  Jones  (51  Cal.  303),  95. 
Barnes  v.  Keene  I  132  N.  Y.  L3),  ^64, 
300,  305. 

Barnes  v.  Martin  (15  Wis.  240),  318, 

362,  366,  371. 
Barnes  v.  Rembarz  (150  111.  192),  214. 
Barnes   v.  Shreveporl    <  it y  Ry.  Co. 

(47  La.  Ann.  L218),  176. 
Barnes  v.  Ward  (2  Car.  &  K.  661)/523. 
Barnetl  v.  Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (75  Mo. 

App.  446),  335. 
Barnett  v.  Lneas  (Ir.  R.  6  C.  L.  247), 

523. 
Barnett  v.  Reed  (51  Pa.  St.  190),  111, 

120,  124. 
Barnowski  v.  Helson  (S9  Mich.  52), 

150. 
Barr  v.  I'.arr  (8  Neb.  68),  369. 
Barr  v.  Hack  (46  Iowa.  308),  415. 
Bair  v.  Kansas  City  ([Mo.]  25  S.  W. 

562),  274. 
Barr  v.  Moore  (87  Pa.  St.  385),  114, 

372. 
Barr  v.  Post  (56  Neb.  698),  362,  376, 

380. 
Banc  v.  Beading  B.  Co.  (155  Pa.  St. 

170),  164. 
Barrelle  v.  Penn.  B.  R.  Co.  (4  N.  Y. 

Supp.  127),  292. 
Barrett  v.  Delano  ([Me.]  14  Atl.  288), 

471. 
Barrett  v.  Dolan  (130  Mass.  366),  472. 
Barrett   v.   Lake   Ontario   Twp.    (68 

A  pp.  Div.  601),  163. 
Barrett  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  II.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.  (61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  9),  214. 
Barrett     v.    Railroad     Co.    (3    Allen 

[Mass.],  101),  95. 
Barrie  v.  Seidel  (30  Mo.  A  pp.  559),  75. 
Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  (1  Biss. 

[U.  S.]  412),  602,  603,604,  607,  609, 

610,  612,  613,  614,  616,  619,  022,  637, 

639. 
Barron  v.  Mason  (31  Vt.  197),  432. 
Barrons  v.  Sycamore  (100  111.  588), 

81. 
Barry   v.  Edmunds  (116  U.    S.  .550), 

94,  111. 


Barth  v.  Kansas  City  El.  Ry.  Co.  (142 

Mo.  535),  521. 
Bartlett  v.  Cicero  Light,  H.  &  P.  Co. 

(177  111.  68),  597. 
Bartlett  v.  Roach  (68  111.  174),  63. 
Bartley   v.    Trorlicht   (49   Mo.   App. 

214),  228,  240. 
Barton   v.    Brown    (145    U.   S.   335), 

488. 
Barton  v.  Springfield  (110  Mass.  131), 

L69. 
Barton  v.  Syracuse  (37  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

292,  aft'd30  N.  Y.  54),  65. 
Bartram  v.  Stone  (31  Conn.  159),  375, 

377. 
Bass    v.    Chicago,    etc.,  Ry.   Co.  (42 

Wis.  (154),  136,  340. 
Bassell     v.   Elmore   (48  N.  Y.   561), 

393,  404. 
Bassett  v.  Bassett  (20  111.  App.  543), 

161. 
Bates   v.   British  Amer.   Assnr.    Co. 

(100  Ga.  249),  104. 
Batlike  v.  Krassin  ([Minn.]  80  N.  W. 

950),  458. 
Battell  v.  Wallace  (30  Fed.  229),  419. 
Bauer  v.  Richter  (103  AVis.  412),  515. 

516,  645,  655,  659,  663. 
Banman  v.  Bean  (57  Mich.  1),  375. 
Bay  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Harris  (67  Ala. 

6),  243. 
Beach  v.  Bay  State  Steamboat  Co.  (6 

Abb.  [X.  Y.]  415),  503. 
Beach  v.  Brown  (20  Wash.  266),  458. 
Beach   v.    Banney   (2  Hill    [N.   Y.], 

309),  393. 
Beal  v.  South  Devon  Ry.  Co.  (3  H.  & 

C.  337),  159. 
Beale  v.  Ry.  Co.  (1  Dill.  [U.  S.]  569), 

135. 
Beallev.  School  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.] 

475),  102. 
Bearce  v.  Bass  (88  Me.  521),  411. 
Beard  v.  Burts  (95  U.  S.  634),  65. 
Beard  v.  Skeldon  (113  111.  584),  597, 

599. 
Beard  v.  Skeldon  (13  111.  App.  54), 

617,  618. 


TABLE   01    CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


XXXV11 


Beardmore    v.    Carrington    (2    Wils. 

244),   ill. 
Beardsley  v.  Mayuard  [4  Wend.  [N. 

Y.]  336),  426. 
Beardsley  v.  Swann  (4  McLean  [U.  S. 

C.  C],  333),  215,  227. 
Beardstown   v.  Smith  (150  111.   169), 

204. 
Beasley  v.  Meigs  (1G  111.  139),  4ou. 
Beatti   v.  Rapid  K.    Co.    (119    Mich. 

512),  208,  355. 
Beaumont  v.  Greathead  (2C.  B.  404),  7. 
Beavers    v.    Missouri    P.    R.    Co.    (47 

Neb.  701),  107. 
Bebee  v.  Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.    (71 

Tex.  424),  404. 
Beck  v.  Railway  T.  P.  U.  (118  Mich. 

497;  77  N.  W.  L3;  5  Det.  L.  N.  599), 

71. 
Beck  v.  Small  (35  Minn.   405),    111, 

144. 
Beck  v.   Thompson  (31  W.  Va.  459; 

7  S.  E.  447),  24.  55,  112. 
Beck  v.  Thompson  (31  W.  Va.  220), 

362,  369. 
Becker  v.   Albany    R.   Co.    (35   App. 

Div.  [X.  Y.]  4(1),  214. 
Becker  v.   Dnpree  (75  111.   107),  119? 

130. 
Becker  v.  Janinski  (27  Abb.  X.  Cas. 

45),  318. 
Becker  v.  Public  Ledger  (6  l'a.  Hist. 

R.  89),  402,  403. 
Beckett  v.   Grand  Trunk   R.   W.  Co. 

(13  A.  R.  174),  554. 
Beckwith  v.  Bean  (98 U.  S.  266),  454. 
Beckwith  v.  Boyce  (12  Mo.  440),  100. 
Beckwith  v.  Griswold  (29  Barb.  [X. 

Y.|  291),  99. 
Beckwith  v.  New  York  Central  11.  R. 

Co.  (01  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  200),  227,  233, 

243. 
Bedford  v.  Moody   (find.   App.  1899] 

55  X.  E.  499),  257. 
Bedford  v.  Moody  ([Ind.  1899]  58  X 

E.  499),  258. 
Beech   v.   Kuder  (15   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

89),  70. 


Beechei  v.  Long  Island  R,  Co.  (53 
App.  Div.  [X.  V.l  324),  562,  563, 
572,  578,  579. 

Beecker  v.  Derbj  Bi  idge  &  Fei  i 

(24  Coin,.  491),  112. 
Bee    Pub.    Co.    v.    World     Pub.    Co. 

([Neb.]  82  X  W.  ^  101. 

Beers  v.  Shannon  (7:;  N.  V.  292),  '.'7. 
BeerB  v.  Walhizer  (4:;  Hun  (N.   V.J, 

254  i,  47:1.  477. 
Begg  v.  Whittier  (48  Me.  314),  57. 
Behler   v.    Daniels  ([R.    l.J    31  Atl. 

582),  63. 
Beisiegel    v.    New  York  Cent.    R.    R. 

Co.  (40  X  Y.  9),  229. 
Belding  v.   Black  Hills  &   Ft.  P.  R. 

Co.  (3  S.  I).  369;  53  X  W.  750),  499, 

OIL'. 

Belding  v.  Johnson   ([(la.]   12  S.  E. 

304),  472. 
Belfourv.  Raney  (3  Eng.  [Ark.]  479), 

78. 
Belknap  v.  Boston  &  Me.  R   R.  (49 

X.  II.  358),  115,  119,  135,  265. 
Belknap  v.   Scheld   i  161  r.   S.   17), 

65. 
Belknap  v.  Stewart  ([Neb.]  56  X.  W. 

881),  515. 
Bell  v.  Atlantic  City   R.  R.   Co.  ([N. 

J.]  33  Atl.  211  i.  434. 
Bell  v.  Campbell  (17   Kan.  212),  119, 

127. 
Bell    v.  Cunningham   (3  Pet  [U.  S.] 

69),  94. 
Bell  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (26  L. 

R.  Ire.  42S),  221,  222. 
Bell  v.  Gulf  &  C.  K.  Co.  (76  Miss.  71), 

219. 
Bell   v.   Litt   (12    App.  Div.  |X.  Y.] 

C26),   295. 
Bell  v.  Midland    Ry.  Co.  (10  C.  B.  X. 

s.  306),  111. 
Bell  v.  Morrison  (27  Miss.  68),  111. 
Bell  v.  Morse    ([Kan.]   29    Pa.    1086), 

100. 
Bell  v.  Sun  Printing  &   Pub.  Co.  (10 

.1.  &  s.  [N.  Y.|  267),  393. 
Bell  v.  Wo. .ten  (53  <.a.  684),  405. 


X  X  X  V 1 1 1 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IX   VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Belief ontaine,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder 

(18  Ohio  Si.  399),  11'). 
Belle  of  Nelson  Distilling  Co.  v.  Riggs 

(20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  499),  293. 
Bellinger  v.  New   York  C.  R.  Co.  (23 

N.  V.  12),  67. 
Belt  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  ([Tex.] 

22  S.  W.  1062),  508,  509. 
Belt  v.  Washington  Water-Power  Co. 

(24  Wash.  387),  80. 
Belt  A:   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blocker  (27  Md. 

277),   139. 
Belt  Elec.  Line  Co.  v.  Allen  (19  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1656),  293. 
Beltz  v.   Yonkers  (74  Hun   [N.  Y.], 

73),  214. 
Belyeav.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.M. 

R.  Co.  (61  Minn.  224),  325. 
Benagam   v.    Plassan   (15    La.   Ann. 

703),  214. 
Benedict   v.    Michigan,  B.  &   P.   Co. 

(115  Mich.  527),  107. 
Benner  v.  Atlantic  Dredging  Co.  (134 

N.  Y.  156;  45  N.  Y.  St.  II.  774;  31 

X.  E.  328),  72. 
Bennett  v.  Backus   Lumber  Co.   (09 

Minn.  530),  214. 
Bennett  v.   Bennett  (110  N.  Y".  584), 

458. 
Bennett   v.    Brooklyn    II.   R.   Co.  (1 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  205),  214. 
Bennett  v.  City  of  Marion  (102  Iowa, 

425),  142. 
Bennett  v.  Drew  (3  Bos.  [X.  Y.]  355), 

83. 
Bennett  v.  Hyde  (6  Conn.  24),  425. 
Bennett  v.  Levi  (46  X.  Y.  St.  R.  754), 

471. 
Bennett   v.    Reed    (51    Pa.   St. 

186. 
Bennett  v.    Salisbury   (78  Fed 

102,  412,  421. 
Bennett  v.  Smith   (23   Hun   [N. 

50),  133. 
Bennett  v.  Smith  (21  Barb.    [X. 

439),  460. 
Benoit  v.  Troy  &  Lansingburgh  R.  R 

Co.  (154  N.  Y.  223),  169. 


190 : 


769 1 


Y.], 

Y.] 


Benson  v.   Chicago  &  A.  R.   Co.   (78 

Mo.  504),  38. 
Benson  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 
■     (41  111.  App.  227),  207. 
Benson    v.  Maiden  &  M.   G.   Co.    (6 

Allen  [Mass.],  149),  83. 
Benson  v.   Village  of  Waukesha  (74 

Wis.  31),  94. 
Bent  v.  Emery  (173  Mass.  495;  53  N. 

E.  910),  65. 
Benton  v.  Benton  (122Cal.  395),  515, 
Benton  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  (42  [Iowa], 

192),  165. 
Benton    v.  Chic,  etc.,  R.  R.    Co.  (55 

[low.,.],  496),  300. 
Benton  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co.  (122 

N.  C.  1007),  562,  563,  572,  575. 
Benz  v.  South  Bethlehem   ( [C.   P.]  5 

Northampton  Rep.  381),  80. 
Bergen  v.  New  Orleans  (35  La.  Ann. 

523),  91. 
Bergeson  v.  United  States  Projectile 

Co.  (2  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  57),  214. 
Bergmann  v.   Jones  (94  N.   Y.  51), 

80,  124,  391,  397. 
Bergold  v.  Nassau  Elec.   R.   Co.   (30 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  438),  172. 
Berkson   v.    Kansas   City   Cable    Co. 

(144  Mo.  211),  104. 
Berly  v.  Taylor  (5  Hill  [N.  Y.],  577), 

488. 
Bernard  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  (Rap- 
ports Judic.   De  Quebec  (11  Cour. 

Super.  9),  539. 
Bernard  v.  Merrill  (91  Me.  358),  300, 

301. 
Bernier  v.    Bernier  (147   U.  S.   242), 

501. 
Bernstein  v.  Meech  (130  N.  Y.  354), 

91. 
Bernstein  v.  Singer  (1  App.  Div.  [N. 

Y.]  63),  422. 
Berry  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.   ([C. 

C.  I).  Ind.]  70  Fed.  679),  176. 
Berry  v.    Sugar  Notch   (191   Pa.   St. 

345),  S4. 
Berry  man  v.  Cox  (73  Mo.   App.  67), 

369,  379. 


TABLE   OF   CASE8   CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


XX  XIX 


Berryman  v.  Cox  (1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  29), 

374. 
Bertholf  v.  O'Reilly  (8  Hun  [N.  V.J, 

1G),  471. 
Betliam  v.  Philadelphia  1 196   Pa,  St 

802;  46  At  1.  448),  65. 
Betser  v.    Betsei  (81  III.   A.pp.  399), 

458,  460. 
Betting  v.  Hoblet  ( [111.]  30  N.  E.  1048), 

I7s. 
Bibb  Co.  v.  Ham  i  110  Ga.  340),  80. 
Bierback  v.  Goodyear    Rubber   Co. 

(54  Wis.  208),  235. 
Bierbaurv.  New  Fork  C.  &  II.  R.  R. 

Co.  (15  Hun  [N.  V.],  559), 560,  5G2, 

586. 
Biering  v.  First  Nat.    Hank  (09  Tex. 

599),  111,  124. 
Bigelow  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 

(48  Mo.  App.  367),  244,  245. 
Bigelow  v.  Reed  (51  Me.  325),  161. 
Biggs  v.  Barb  Wire  Co.  (GO  Kan.  217), 

64. 
Bilgrien  v.  Dowe  (91  Wis.  303),  79. 
Billingsleyv.  Maas  (93  Wis.  176),  432, 

4::  I,  450. 
Billman  v.  Ind.  C.  &  L.   R.   Co.   (76 

Ind.  166),  58,  00. 
Billmeyer  v.  Wagner  (01  Fa.  St.  92), 

89. 
Hinfoid  v.  Johnston  (82  Ind.  426),  90. 
Binford  v.  Young  ( 115  lud.  170),  111, 

124. 
Birch   v.  Railroad  Co.    (165    Pa.   St. 

339),  602. 
Birchard  v.  Booth  (4  Wis.  67),  361, 

369,  370,  37.".. 
Birge  v.  Gardiner  (19  Conn.  500),  177. 
Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  (110 
X.  V.  504),  561,  562,  569,  570,  584, 

586,  588,  589. 
Birmingham  v.  Lewis  (92  Ala.  352), 

175,  ISO. 
Birmingham  v.  Rochester  City  &  B. 

R.  Co.  (45  V  Y.  St.  R.  72  t).  214. 
Birmingham  Tract.  Co.  v.  Southern 
Bell  Teleph.  &  Teleg.  Co.  (119  Ala. 
144),  71,  71. 


Birney  v.  Wash.  Print.  Teleg.  Co.  (18 

Md.  341  1.  1  19. 
Bieaillon  v.  Blood  (64  N.  H.565),  176. 
Bishop  v.  Belle  '  ity  R.  Co.  (92  Wis. 

L39),  170. 
Bishop   v.    Journal    Newspaper  Co. 

(168  Mass.  327),  384,  412. 
Bishop     v.     St.     Paul     <  ity     R,     Co. 

([Minn.]  50  X.  W.  927),  214. 
Bishop  v.  St.   Paul  City  By.  Co.  (48 

Minn.  26),  329. 
Bissell  v.N.  V .  c.  nt.  B.  B.  Co.  (25  X. 

Y.  442),  359. 
Bittner  v.  CrosstownSt.  By.  Co.  (153 

N.  Y.  76),  170. 
Bixby  v.  Uunlay    (56  X.    11.   456),  90, 

111,  115. 
Bizell  v.   Booker   (16  Ark.  308),  69, 

148,  i:.5. 
Black  v.  Buckingham  (174  Mass.  102), 

434 
Black  v.    Carrolton   R.    Co.  (10   La. 

Ann.  3:1),  214,  225,  328. 
Blackmail  v.  Cardiner  Bridge  (75  Me. 

514),  261. 
Blackvvell  v.   Johnston  (  [Ky.]   56  S. 

W.  12),  413. 
Blackwell   v.    Kansas   City   (76   Mo. 

App.  46),  207. 
Blackwell  v.  Landreth   (90  Va.   748), 

415. 
Blackwell  v.  Lynchburg,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(Ill  N.  C.  151),  169. 
Blackwell  v.  Moorman,  ill  X.  C.  151), 

575.  563. 
Blackwell  v.    O' Gorman    Co.   ([R.  I. 

1901]  40  Atl.  28),  100. 
Blaecbinska  v.  Howard   Mission  (130 

X.  V.  497),  299,  318. 
Blagge  v.  llslcy  (127  Mass.    191 1.  467. 
Blair  v.  Chic.,  etc.,  B.  B.  Co.  (89  Mo. 

334),  322. 
Blake  v.    Midland    B.    Co.   (18  Q.    B. 

1101.  218. 
Blake  v.  Midland   By.   (o.   (18  Q.  B. 

'.1::  1.  498,  499,  524,  •'•:'•".  660. 
Blake  v.  Railway  Co.  (10  Bug.  Law 

&  Eq.   14;',).  499. 


xl 


TABLE   OF   (ASKS   CITED   IX    VOL. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Blakesleev.  Hughes  (50  Ohio  St.  490), 
425. 

Blanchard  v.  Baker  (S  Greenlf.  [Me.] 

253),  78.  74. 
Blauchard  v.  Burbank  (16  111.  App. 

375),  50,  94,  123,  448,  449. 
Blanchard  v.  Ely  (21  Wend.  [X.  Y.] 

342),  94. 
Blauchard  v.  United  States  (32  Ct. 

CI.  444),  65. 
Blankenship  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 

R.  Co.  (15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  82),  156. 
Blate  v.  Third  Ave.   R.   Co.  (29  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  388),  235. 
Blate  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (60  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  732),  196. 
Blaymire  v.  Healey  (6  Mees.  &  W.  55), 

71. 
Blewett  v.  Coleman  (1   Pears.  [Pa.] 

516),  134. 
Bligh  v.  Biddeford  &  S.   R.   Co.   (94 

Me.  499),  623. 
Blin  v.  Campbell  (14  Johns.  [N.  Y.] 

432 ),  489. 
Bliss  v.  Franklin  (13  Allen  [Mass.], 

244),  439. 
Bliss  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (160 

Mass.  447),  201. 
Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.    R.    Co.   (89 

Wis.  371),  244,  245,  282,  290. 
Blodgett   v.    Stone  (60   N.    H.    167), 

76. 
Bloedel  v.  Bimmerman  (41  Neb.  695), 

615. 
Blood  v.   Herring  (22  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

1725),  83,89. 
Bloom  v.  Manhattan  Elec.  R.  Co.  (43 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  378),  246. 
Bloominjjdale  v.  Brinckerhoff  2  (Misc. 

[X.  Y.]  49).  515. 
Blount  v.   Simmons,  (119  N.   C.  50; 

25  S.  E.  789,  aff'd  26  S.  E.  649),  65. 
Blowers  v.  Sturtevant  (4  Den.  [X\  Y.] 

46),  515. 
Bloxham   v.   Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(  [Fla.]  17  So.  902),  65. 
Bluedornv.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (108  Mo. 

439).  63. 


Blumhardt  v.  Rohr(70  Md.  328),  111, 

124,  387,  390. 
Blumhardt  v.  Rohr  (70  Md.  342),  400. 
Blyth  v.   Brimiugham  Water  Co.  (11 

Exch.  781),  148,  154. 
Board.     See  Commissioners. 
Board  v.  Head  (3   Dana  [Ky.]  491), 

94. 
Boardman  v.  Goldsmith  (48  Vt.  403), 

118. 
Boardman   v.    Marshalltown   G.   Co. 

(105  Iowa,  445),  79,  123. 
Board  of  Admrs.  v.  McKowen  (48  La. 

Ann.  251),  68. 
Board  of  Education  v.  United  States 

(30  Ct.  CI.  160),  65. 
Board  of   Shelby  Co.  v.   Scearce  (2 

Dav.  [Ky.]  576),  503. 
Boden  v.  Demwolf  (56  Fed.  846),  517 

828,  833,  836. 
Bodkin  v.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.  (31 

Fed.  134),  78. 
Boehm  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.   &  A.  R.  Co. 

(91  Wis.  592),  339. 
Boelter  v.  Ross  Lumber  Co.  (103  Wis. 

324),  293. 
Boetcher  v.  Staples  (27  Minn.  308), 

114,  372. 
Bogartv.  Burkhalter  (2  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

525),  80. 
Boggess  v.   Metropolitan  St.  R.   Co. 

(118  Mo.  328),  160,  194. 
Boggs  v.   Missouri,  K.  &   T.   R.   Co. 

(156  Mo.  389;  57  S.  W.  550),  63. 
Bohm  v.  Dumphy  (IMont.  333),  119, 

120. 
Bohn  v.   Cleaver  (25  La.  Ann.  419), 

91. 
Bohrer  v.  Dienhart  Harness  Co.  (19 

Ind.  App.  489),  90. 
Boikens  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.   R.  Co. 

(48  La.  Ann.  831),  199. 
Boise  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 

(6  Okla.  243),  271. 
Boldt  v.  Budwig  (19  Neb.   739),  111, 

117. 
Bolin   v.   Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R. 

Co.  (108  Wis.  333),  168. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Xll 


[References  are  to  Sections.  ] 
Bolineer  v.  St.  Paul  &  I).  R.  Co.  (36    Boatwick   v.  Bait.   &  Ohio  EL  R.  Co. 


Minu.  41S,  -121  i.  503,  517. 
Bolte  v.  Third  A.ve.   R,  Co.  (38  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  234),  298. 
Bolton  v.  Vellines   (94   Va.  393),  448 

450,  45:;. 
Boltz  v.  Sullivan  (101  Wis.  008),  215, 

2  IS. 

Bond  v.  Hilton  (2  Jones  L.  [N.  C] 

149),  77. 
Bonebrake  v.    Huntington   Co.    (141 

Ind.  02),  05. 
Bonesteel  v.  Bonesteel(30  Wis.  511), 

448. 
Bonuafee  v.  Williams  (3  How.  574), 

507. 
Bonnett  v.  Galveston,   II.  it  S.  A.  I;. 

Co.    (89   Tex.   72),    528,    548,    550, 

551. 
Book  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (75  Mo. 

App.  004),  827. 
Booth  v.  Rome,   W.  &  O.  T.   R.   Co. 

(140  N.  Y.  207;  55  X.  Y.  St.  R.  656; 

35  N.  E.  592,  which  rev'd  44  \.  Y. 

St.  R.  9;  17  X.  V.  Supp.  336),  07. 
Booth  v.  Spuyten  Duyvil  R.  M.  Co. 

(00  N.  Y.  487),  75,  89,  91. 
Borden  City  In?  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Adams 

(09  Ark.  2 P.M.  83. 
Borland  v.   Barrett  (76  Va.  128),  114 

120,  121,  145,  369. 
Borough.     See  Name  of. 
Bosch  v.    Burlington  A-   Mo.    R.  Co. 

(44  Iowa.  402),  87. 
Boater  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co. 

(36  W.  \'a.  318),  488. 
Bostick   v.    Blower   (49   X.    Y.  Supp. 

1040),  515. 

Boston  &  A.  K.  Co.  v.  O'Reilly  1 158 

U.  S.  334),  234,  2:!5. 
Boston  A-  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurd  (108 

Fed.  110).  510. 
Boston  A  M.  It.  Co.  v.  McDuffey  (51 

U.  S.  A])]..  Ill),  500. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  McDuffey  (79 

Fed.  934,  942  i.  101.  505. 
Boston  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Flake  (2  Mason 

[U.  S.],  120),  ill. 


(45  N.  V.  712).  153. 
Boatwick  v.  Rutherford  i  I  Hawks  L. 

[X.  C.J  Ml),  439. 
Boswortll     v.    Standard    Oil    Co.    (92 
Hun  [N.  Y.J.  485),  21  1. 

Botsford  v.   (  base  1 108   Mich.  4:12), 

400. 

Bottoms  v.  Seaboard   a-    i;.   k.  Co. 

(114  X.  C.  tin1.',.  170. 
Boult.r  v.  Webster  ( 11  L.  T.  598  |,  541. 
Bourke  v.  Cork  &  Macroom  Ky.  i  I 

L.    R.    lr.   282),  528,  5:12,  5:;:;,  535, 

537,  5  11,  548. 

V.  Danville  (53  Yt.  190),  183. 
Bowden  v.  Bailes(101  ff.  C.  612),  111, 

124,  402. 
Howe  v.  Bruunbauer  (13  Misc.  (X.  Y.] 

631),  290. 
Bowen  v.   Gainesville,  J.  &  S.  R,  (    •. 

(95  Ga.  G88;  22  S.  EL  695),  63. 
Bowen  v.  Hall  (20  Yt.  232),  415. 
Bowen  v.  Huntington  (35  W.  Va.  682  i. 

2S1. 
Bowen   v.   Southern    R.  Co.   ([S.   C. 

1900]  30  S.  E.  590),  63. 
Bowers  v.  City  of  Boston  ([Mass. J  29 

X.  E.  633),  503. 
Bowes  v.  City  of  Boston  (15.")    Ma^. 

344),  070. 
Bowei  sox   v.    Bowersox   (115    Mich. 

24),  402. 
Howes  v.  City  of  Boston  ([Mass.]  4 

N.  E.  03:; ).  503. 
Bowler  v.  Lane  (3  Mete.  [Ky.]  311), 

135,  498. 
Bowles  v.  Kansas  City  (51  Mo.  App. 

410).  292. 
Bowles   v.   Rome,  W.    A  O.  R.  Co.  (40 

Hun  [X.  r.],  324),  514,  562,568 

572.  ;>7::.  586. 
Bowman  \.  city  of  Omaha  (59  Neb. 

84;  80  N.  W.  259),  65. 
Bowman  v.   Western   Fur.  MtVr.   Co. 

(96  Iowa.   L88),  449. 
Bowsher   v.    Chic.    15.    A  Q.    R,   Co. 

([Iowa,  1901]   ,N4    X.  W.   958),   257, 
258. 


xlii 


TABLE   OF   ('ASKS   CITED   IN  VOL.   I. 


Boyce   v.  Manhattan  R.   Co.  (118  N. 

Y.  314),  161. 
Boyce  v.  Shawangunk  (40  App.  Div. 

V  V.)  593),  214. 
Boyd  v.  Brown  (17  Pick.  [Mass.]  453), 

94. 
Boyd   v.    New  York  C.   &  H.   R.  R. 

Co.  (6  Civ.  Proc.  [N.  Y.]  222),  595. 
Boyd  v.  Watt  (27  Ohio  St.  259),  480. 
Boyden   v.  Burke   (14  How.   [U.  S.] 

575),  81. 
Boyden  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.  (70  Vt. 

125),  521. 
Boyden  v.  Moore  (5  Mass.  365),  79: 
Boye  v.  City  of  Albert  Lea  (74  Minn. 

230),  65. 
Boyer  v.  Barr  (8  Neb.  70),  111,  117. 
Boyle  v.  Case  (18  Fed.  880),  206. 
Boyle  v.  Degnon-McLean  Const.  Co. 

(61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  1043),  165. 
Boyle  v.  Reeder  (1  Ired.  [N.  C]  607), 

91. 
Boyle  v.  Staten  Island  &  S.  B.  L.  Co. 

(17  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  024),  488. 
Boyles  v.  Prisoek  (97  Ga.  643),  291. 
Bradburn  v.  G.  W.  Ry.  (44  L.  J.  Ex. 

9),  554. 
Bradburn  v.   G.  W.  Ry.   Co.   (L.   R. 

Exch.  1),  193. 
Bradford  v.  Boley  (107  Pa.  St.  506), 

473,  477. 
Bradford  v.  Downs  (125  Pa.  St.  022), 

194. 
Bradley  v.  Flewitt  (0  Rich.  L.  [S.  C] 

09),  70. 
Bradley  v.  Ohio   R.  &  C.    R.  Co.  (126 

N.  C.  735;  36  S.  E.  181),  03. 
Bradley  v.  Sattler  (156  111.  603 

625,  633,  634. 
Bradner  v.  Faulkner  (93  N.  Y 

133,  454. 
Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  &  T.  R.  Co. 

(44  L.  J.C.P.  148),  488,  530,  538,  542. 
Bradshaw  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.   (114 

111.  172),  59. 
Bradstreet  v.  Gill  (72  Tex.  115),  427. 
Bradstreet   Co.    v.    Oswald    (96    Ga. 

396),  388,  391,  394,  427. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Bradwell  v.  Pittsburg  &  W.  End  Co. 

(1 :','.'  Pa.  404),  107. 
Brady  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (6N.  Y. 

Supp.,  533),  214. 
Brady  v.  Prettyman  (193  Pa.  St.  628; 

44  Atl.  919),  64. 
Brady  v.   Whitney  (24    Mich.    154), 

78. 
Bragg  v.    Laraway  (65   Vt.   073;    27 

Atl.  492),  73. 
Prague  v.  Ry.  Co.  (192  Pa.  St.  242), 

64. 
Braithwaite  v.  Hale  (108  Mass.  38), 

227,  229. 
Braithwaite   v.  Hall  [Mass.   S.   J.  C. 

1897]  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  623),  229. 
Branford   City,    The  (29   Fed.  373), 

508. 
Brannan  v.  Kokomo,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (115 

Ind.  115),  172. 
Brannon  v.  Silvernail  (81   111.    434), 

114. 
Brantley  v.  Gunn  (29  Ala.  387),  87,  88. 
Brantigam  v.  White  (73  111.  561),  123. 
Brasell  v.   La  Campagnie  du  Grand 

([Tc.   Rap.   Jud.  Quebec]  11  C.  S. 

159),  198. 
Brash  v.  Steele  (7  D.  B.  M.  [Scotch] 

539),  515. 
Brasington  v.   South   Bound  R.  Co. 

([S.  C]  40  S.  E.  665),  122. 
Brauer  v.   Oceanic   Steam  Nav.   Co. 

(34  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  127),  82,  92. 
Braun  v.  Craven   (175   111.  401),  219, 

220,  221. 
Bray  v.  Ford  (05  L.  J.   Q.  B.  N.   S. 

213),  386. 
Brazil    v.   Pierson    (44    Minn.    212), 

274. 
Breckenfeldeu  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 

R.  Co.  (79  Mich.  560),  657. 
Breen  v.  Fairbank  (35  Mo.  App.  554), 

78. 
Brenstein  v.  Singer  (1  App.  Div.  [N. 

Y]    63),  422. 
Brent  v.  Kimball  (60  111.  211),  75. 
Brentner  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (68 

Iowa,  530),  150. 


,  300, 
515), 


TABLE   OF   ('ASKS   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.  ] 


XlllI 


Bretton  v.   Grand    Rapids  street  R.  I 

Co.  ([Mich.]  51  N.  W.  270),  246. 
Brewer  v.  Chase  i  121  Mich.  526),  415, 

418. 
Brewer  v.  Dew  (11  M.  &  W.  825),  111. 
Brewer  v.  Jacobs  (22  Fed.  217),  444. 
Brewer  v.  Watson  (65  Ala.  88),  119. 
Brewster  v.  Link  (28  Mo.  l  17),  95,96. 
Brickell  v.  New  York  Central  <&   II. 

K.  R.  R.  Co.  (  120  X.  V.  290),  L72. 
Brickerv.   Elliott  (58  Ohio  St.  726), 

102. 
Bridge  v.  Oshkosh  (71  Wis.  363),  280. 
Bridges  v.  Asheville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (27 

S.  C.  456),  177.  301. 
Bridges  v.  North   London  R.  Co.  (L. 

R.  (i  Q.  B.  377),  151. 
Bridges  v.  Stickuey  (38  Me.  361  ),  91. 
Bridges  v.   Tennessee   Coal,  T.  ife    R. 

Co.  (10!)  Ala.  287;  L9  So.  495),  68. 
Bridgman  v.   Hopkins   (34  Vt.   532), 

422. 
Brig,  see  Name  of. 
Briggs  v.  Oliver  (4  Hurlst.4  C.  403), 

150. 
Briggs  v.  Taylor  (28  Vt.  180),  159. 
Brighamv.  Carlisle  (78  Ala.  243),  91. 
Bright  v.  Barnett  &  R.  Co.  (88  Wis. 

299),  648,  654 
Brighton  v.   Lake  Shore  &    M.  S.   R. 

Co.  ([Mich.  18'.).")]  HI  N.  W.  550),  198. 
Brignoli  v.  Chicago  &   G.  E.  Ry.  Co. 

(4  Daly  [N.  Y.],  182),  227,  220. 
Brinkmeyer    v.    Kvansville    (29    Ind. 

187),  05. 
Brisco  v.  Mimah  Consol.  Min.  Co.  (82 

Fed.  952),  84. 
Briscoe  v.  Alfrey  (01  Ark.  L96;  31  S. 

W.  505),  67. 
Briscoe  v.  Little  (19  Miss.  [X.  Y.]  5), 

101. 
Briscoe  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (103  Ga. 

224  >,  158. 
Bristol  Mfg.  Co.  v.Gridley(28  Conn. 

201),  11,  13,  15,   18,  82,  76,  81,  83, 

87,  88. 
Britton    v.   (hand   Rapids    R.  Co.  (9 

Mich.  159),  228. 


Britton  v.  Granger,   IS  Ohio  C.   C. 

2-1  ..  132,  135,  139. 
Brizsee   v,  Torrence  (21   Wend.   [X. 

Y.]  144),  124. 
Broadway  v.  Patterson  (72  Mich,  122), 

665. 
Brock  v.  Gale  (14  Fla.  523 
Brockway    v.    Patterson   (72    Mich. 

122),  472,  478,  654. 
Broks  v.  Harlan  (65  Cal.  421  i,  568. 
Broiriley  v.  Wallace  (1  Esp.  2:17),  400. 
Bronson    v.    Bruce    (59    Mich.    107), 

413. 
Bronson  v.   Forty-Second    St.    M.   & 

Si.    N\    A.    K.    R.    Co.  (07  Hun  [N. 

V.],  017).  21  1. 
Bronson  v.  Green  (2  Duv.  [Ky.]  234), 

111. 
Brook  v.   Harrison  (91    X.    Y.    83), 

111. 
Brook  v.  Luden  (0  X.  Y.  Supp.  510), 

211. 
Brooke  v.  Turner  (95  Va,  696),  501. 
Brookmire   v.    Monaghau    (15    Hun 

[X.  Y],  10),  472. 
Brooks  v.  Carter  (Ga.  34  Fed.   505), 

377. 
Brooks  v.  Clark  (57  Tex.  105),  122. 
Brooks  v.  Harrison  (id  X.  V.  v:'.  i.  387, 

397. 
Brooks    v.    Kings  Co.  El.   11.    Co.  (4 

Misc.  288),  150. 
Brooks  v.  Ludin  (1  X.  Y.  Supp.  338), 

107. 
Brooks  v.  Sehwenin  (54   N.   Y.   343), 

318. 
Broom  v.   Jennings   (Kirhy   [Conn.), 

392),   107. 
Broscharl   v.  Tuttle  (59  Conn.  I  |,  ,.1"-. 

'.to. 
Brosnan  v.  Sweetser(127  Ind.  1 1,  255, 

256. 
Broughton  v.  McGrew  (89  Fed.  672), 

406,  115,  122. 
Brown  v.    Allen  (35    Iowa,  306),  121, 

133. 
Brown  v.  Bait  At  O.  R.  Co.  (23  Wash. 

L.  Rep.  337),  20:'.. 


xliv 


TABLE   OF  casks   CITED   IN    VOL.    1. 


[References  ar 

Brown    v.    Barnes    (39   Mich.   211), 

406. 
Brown  v.  Barry  (3  Dall.  [U.  S.]  365), 

501. 
Brown  v.  Brown  (124  N.  C.  19),  461. 
Brown  v.  Brown  (121  N.  C.  8),  458. 
Brown   v.   Butler   (66  111.  App.  86), 

471,  472. 
Brown  v.  Cape  Girardeau,  A.  Mac.  & 

P.  U.  Co.  (89  Mo.  152),  119. 
Brown  v.  Chadsey  (39  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

253),  454. 
Biown  v.   Chicago  &  N.   W.  E.  Co. 

(Wis.  1901;  85  N.  W.  271),  63. 
Brown   v.  Chicago  &   N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(102  Wis.   137),  495,  499,  501,  503, 

642,  643,  674. 
Brown  v.    Chicago,   etc.,   K.   Co.   (80 

Mo.  457),  81. 
Bi'own  v.   Chicago,  M.   &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (54  Wis.  342),  184,  349. 
Brown   v.    Congress  St.    R.    Co.    (49 

Mich.  153),  151. 
Brown  v.  Cummings  ( 7  Allen  [Mass.], 

507),  362. 
Brown  v.  Doyle  (69  Minn.  543),  102. 
Brown   v.  Durham  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

22  S.  W.  868),  427. 
Brown  v.  European  &  W.  A.  R.  Co. 

(58  Me.  384),  176. 
Brown    v.    Evans   (8   Sawy.     [U.    S. 

C.  C]  478),  374. 
Brown  v.  Evans  (17  Fed.  912),  114. 
Brown   v.  Green  (1  Penn.  Del.  535), 

215,  243,  256. 
Brown  v.   Kendall  (6   Cush.  [Mass.] 

292),  69,  154. 
Brown  v.  Laurens  Co.  (38  S.  C.  282), 

<)5. 
Brown  v.  Master  (111  Ala.  397),  442. 
Brown  v.  McBride  (24  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

235),  440,442. 
Brown    v.    Mt.    Holly   (69   Vt.   364), 

292. 
Brown   v.   Perkins  (1  Allen  [Mass.], 

89),  76. 
Brown   v.    Record  ([Tex.]  23   S.    W. 

704),  522. 


e  to  Sections.] 
Brown  v.  Eohins  (4  H.  &   N.  186), 

Brown  v.  Smith  (83  111.  291),  432. 
Brown  v.  Southern    P.  Co.  (7  Utah, 

288),  102. 
Brown  v.  St.  Paul,  M.   &   M.   R.  Co. 

(36  Minn.  236),  94. 
Brown  v.  Swineford  (44  Wis.    282), 

112,  il4,  372. 
Brown  v.  S.   W.   R.  Co.  (36  Ga.  377), 

83. 
Brown  v.  Syracuse  (77  Hun  [N.  V.], 

411),  177,  514. 
Brown  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  ( 11*  Misc. 

[K  Y.]  504),  286,  319. 
Brown   v.    Turner   (174  Mass.    150), 

501. 
Brown   v.  White  ([Penn.  S.  C.    J 902] 

51  Atl.  962),  257. 
Brownback  v.  Frailey  (78  111.    App. 

262),  220,  221. 
Browner  v.  Davis  (15  Cal.  9),  77. 
Browning  v.  Jones  (52  111.  App.  597), 

460. 
Broyles  v.  Prisock  (97  Ga.  643),  229, 

230. 
Brozek  v.   Steinway  Ry.   Co.    (10X. 

Y.  App.  Div.  360),  171. 
Bruce  v.  Beall  (99  Tenn.  303),  299. 
Bruce  v.  Priest(5  Allen  [Mass.],  100), 

266. 
Bruce  v.  Uley  (79  Mo.  322),  134. 
Bruch  v.  Carter  (3  Vr.   [32  N.  J.  L.] 

544),  76. 
Bruhm  v.  Ford  (33  U.S.  323),  92. 
Brundy  v.   Maginness  (76  Cal.  532), 

124. 
Brunswick  &  Western  R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Gibson  (97  Ga.  489,  497),  158. 
Brunswick  &  W.   1!.  Co.   v.  Wiggins 

([Ga.  1901]  39  S.  E.  551),  16(i. 
Brunswig  v.  White  (70  Tex.  504),  514, 

524,    527,    528,   529,    537,   538,  541, 

548,  549,  551,  557. 
Brusch    v.    St.     Paul     City    R.     Co. 

([Minn.]  55  X.  W.  57),  290. 
Brush  v.  Blot  (16  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.] 

80),  411. 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


xlv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Brush  Elec.   L.  &   P.  Co.  v.  Lefevre 

([Tex.    Civ.    A  pp.    1900]  55  S.   \V. 

896),  632. 
Brush   Elec.   L.   &    P.   Co.  v.  Simon- 

sohn  (107  Ga.  TO),  214,  218,  224. 
Bryan  v.  Congdod  ([C.  C.  App.  8th  C] 

86  Fed.  221),  448. 
Bryan  v.  McGuire  (3  Head  [Tenn.], 

530),  120. 
Bryant  v.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  I  O. 

(98  Iowa,  483),  214,  232. 
Bryant  v.  Sidgewell  (133  Mass.   86), 

480. 
Bryer  v.   Foerster  (9   App.   Div.    [X. 

Y.]  542),  214. 
Buchanan   v.   Foster   (23  App.    Div. 

[X.  Y.]  542),  458. 
Buchanan  v.  Goethmann  ([C.  P.  Pa.] 

29   Pitts.    L.   J.    N.   S.    302),    448, 

452. 
Buchanau  v.   New  Jersey  R.  R.  Co. 

(23  Vr.  [X.  J.]  265),  220. 
Buchard  v.   Booth  (4  Wis.  67),  120, 

124. 
Buck  v.  Maddock  (167  111.  219),  478. 
Buck  v.  Maddock  (67  111.  App.  466), 

475. 
Buck  v.  Mfg.  Co.  (69  X.  H.  257), 64. 
Buck  v.  Peoples,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (40  Mo, 

App.  555),  256,  300,  305,  306. 
Buck  v.  Peoples  St.  R.  &  E.  L.  &  P. 

Co.  ([Mo.]  18  S.  W.  1090),  214. 
Buck  v.  Peoples  St.  R.  E.  L.  &  P.  Co. 

(  16  Mo.  App.  555),  300,  305,  306. 
Buckalew  v.  Tennessee  Coal  T.  &  R. 

Co.  (112  Ala.  146),  768. 
Buckel  v.  Suss   (28  Abb.   N.   C.  21), 

460. 
Buckley  v.  Knapp  (48  Mo.  152,  162), 

112,  113,  144. 
Buckley  v.  Manufacturing  Co.  (113 

N.  Y.  540),   163. 
Bucknam  v.  Greal   Northern  K.  Co. 

([Minn.]  79  X.  W.  98),  220. 
Bucknam   v.    Nash   (3    Fairf.   [Me.] 

474),  94. 
Bucksport  v.   Rockland  (56  Me.  22), 

633. 


Budd   v.   Mcriden  Elec.   Rd.   Co.  (69 

Conn.  272),  499,  502,  569. 
Buddv.  Salt  Lake  City  R.  Co.  ([Utah, 

L901]  65  Pac.  486),  275. 
Buffalo  L.  Oil  v.  Everest  (3  How.  [N. 

S.]  79),  212. 
Buford  v.  Mel, iiny  i  l  Mott  &  M.  [8. 

C]  268),  122. 
Bullmanv.   [nd.  C.  &   L.   R.   Co.  (76 

Ind.  166),  87. 
Bullock   v.   Bergman   (46    Ind.   270), 

91. 
Bullock  v.  Del.   L.  &  W.   R.  Co.  (61 

X.  J.  L.  550),  145. 
Bullock  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(105  X.  C.  180),  161. 
Bulwer  v.  Bulwer  (53  L.  .).  Ch.  402), 

901. 
Bundy   v.   Magiuness   (76  Cal.   532), 

111,  369,  3,72. 
Bunn  v.  Delaware,  L  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(6  Hun  [X.  Y.],  303),  161. 
Bunyan  v.  Loftus  (90  Iowa,  122),  471. 
Buuyea  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.  (19  S. 

C.  76),  881. 
Burckhalter  v.  Coward  (16  S.  C.  436), 

401. 
Burkett  v.  Lanata  (15  La.  Ann.  337), 

75,  76.  145. 
Burk  v.  Dunn  (55  111.  App.  25),  33. 
Burk  v.   Howley  (179  Pa    St.    539)i 

449. 
Burk  v.  Serrill  (80  Pa.  St.  413),  119. 
Burke  v.   Broadway  &  Seventh  Ave. 

R.  R.  (o.   (19   Barb.   [X.  Y.]  529)j 

176,  177. 
Burke  v.    Dillingham  (60   Fed.  729). 

522. 
Burke  v.  Melvin  (45  Conn.  243),  :'". 
Burke  v.  Wetherbee  (98  N.  Y.  562), 

163,  586. 
Burke  v.  Wetherbee  (18  Wkly.   Dig. 

[X.  V.]  369),  562. 
Burkett  v.  Griffith  C><)  Cal.  532),   128. 
Burleson  v.  Reading  i  no  Misc.  512), 

270. 
Burlington  &    M.    R.  Co.  v.  Crockett 

(17  Neb.  570),  598. 


xlvi 


TABLE   OV    (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Burlington  &  Q.  K.  Co.  v.  Emmert 

(53  Neb.  237),  81. 
Burlington,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wendt 

(12  Neb.  76),  159. 
Burnett  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(55  Iowa,  49(3),  300. 
Burnham  v.  Strother  (66  Mich.  519), 

»6. 
Burnham  v.  Webster  (3  N.  Y.  St.   R. 

50),  366. 
Burnham  v.  Webster  (54  N.  Y.  Super. 

30),  325. 
Burns  v.  Ashboro  &  M.  R.  Co.  (125  N. 

C.  304;  34  S.  E.  495),  563,  575,  579. 
Burns  v.  Grand  Rap.  &.  I.  R.  Co.  (113 

Ind.  169;  15  N.  E.  230),  495, 503,  504. 
Burns  v.  Hiues  (94  Va.  413),  119. 
Burns  v.   Houston,  W.  S.  &  P.  F.  R. 

Co.  (15  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  19),  205,  559. 
Burns   v.    Merchants   &    P.    O.    Co. 

([Tex.   Civ.  App.   1901]  63  S.    W. 

1061),  552. 
Burnside  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  (47 

N.  H.554),  81. 
Burr  v.    Burr  (7  Hill  [N.  Y.],  207), 

113. 
Burr  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  ([N.  J.  1899] 

44  Atl.  845),  214. 
Burridge    v.    City   of    Detroit    (117 

Mich.  557),  65. 
Burrillv.  New  York,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (14 

Mich.  34),  81. 
Burrows   v.  Syracuse   (150   111.    588; 

37  N.  E.   1096,  rev'g  49  111.    App. 

590),  71. 
Burton  v.   Pinkerton  (36   L.   J. 

137),  91. 
Burton  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R 

(82  N.  C.  504),  563,  573,  575. 
Bush  v.  McMann  (12  Colo.  App.  504), 

393. 
Bush  v.  Prosser  (11   N.  Y.  347),  413. 
Bussy  v.  Donaldson  (4  Dall.  [U.  S.] 

206),  94. 
Butler  v.  Cushing  (46  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

521),  150. 
Butler   v.    Kent  (19   Johns.   [N.  Y.] 

223),  87. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (3  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  453),  211. 
Butler  v.  Man.  R.  Co.  (3  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

353),  276. 
Butler  v.   Manhattan  R.  Co.  (143  N. 

V.  417),  183,  568,  570,  584,  587,  590. 
Butler  v.   Mercer  (14  Ind.  479),  114, 

;}72. 
Butman  v.  Hussey  (3  Fairf.  [12  Me.] 

407),  62,  76. 
Butez  v.   Fonda  J.  &  G.   R.  Co.   (45 

N.  Y.  Supp.  808),  212. 
Butz  v.  Cavanagh  (137  Mo.  503),  514. 
Byam   v.    Bullard    (1  Curt.    [U.   S.] 

101),  68. 
Byrket  v.  Monohon  (7  Blackf.  [Ind.] 

83),  401. 
Cabell  v.  Arnold  (86  Tex.  102),  448. 
Cable  v.  Dakin  (20    Wend.  [N.   Y.] 

172),  120. 
Cable  v.  Southern   R.    Co.  (122  N.  C. 

892),  346. 
Cabot  v.  McKane  (1  N.  Y.  St.  R.  495), 

242. 
Caddy  v.  Barlow  (1  Man.  &  Ryl.  275), 

111. 
Cady  v.  Case  (45  Kan.  733),  120. 
Cahalin  v.   Cochran    (1   N.  Y.  St.  R. 

583),  150. 
Cahill   v.    Cincinnati,   etc.,    Ry.   Co. 

(92  Ky.  345),  172. 
Cahill   v.   Eastman   (18  Minn.    324), 

67. 
Cahill  v.  Murphy  (94  Cal.  29),  387. 
Cahuzae  v.  Samini    (29  Ala.  288),  79. 
Cain  v.  Railway   Co.    (97  Ga.  298), 

158. 
Cairncross  v.  Pewaukee  (78  Wis.   66; 

47  N.  W.  13),  72. 
Calcroft   v.    Harborough    (4  C.  &  A. 

499),  460. 
Caldwell  v.  Central  Park  N.  &  E.  R. 

R.  Co.  (7  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  67),  380. 
Caldwell  v.  N.    J.  Steamboat  Co.  (47 

N.  Y.  282,  affg  56  Barb.  425),  63, 

122,  135,  151,  186. 
Caldwell  v.  Parker  ([Tex.]    17  S.  W. 

87),  104. 


Ex. 


Co. 


TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IN    VOL.    I  xlvn 

[References  ai-e  to  Sections.  1 
Caldwell  v.  Prunelle  (51  Kan.  511;  W    Campbell  v.  Campbell  (54  Wis.   90), 


I'm.  949),  65. 


422. 


Calkins  v.  Barger   ill  Barb.  [N.  V.]    Campbell   v.   Cornelius  ([Tex.    Civ 


424),  67. 


App.  1894]  23  S.  W.  117,.  214. 


Call  v.  Easton  Transit  Co.   (180  Pa.    Campbell  v.  Finney  (8  Watte  [Pa.], 


618),  152. 
Call  v.  Hays  (  169  .Mass.  586),  132. 
Callaghan  v.  (all.  rata  (39  Mo.  137), 

113. 
Callahan    v.   Caranto   (39   Mo.  156), 

111. 
Callahan  v.    Ingram  (122   Mo.   355), 

397. 
Callahan  v.  Sharp   (27  Hun   |N.  V.], 

85),  176. 
Callahan  v.  Warne  (40  Mo.  131  ),  152. 
Callaryv.  Easton  Transit  Co.  (185  Pa. 

176),  155. 
Callaway  v.   Laydon  (47  Iowa,  450), 

474. 
Callaway  v.   Mellett    ( 15    Ind.  App. 

866),  340,  343. 
Callaway  v.    Spurgoon    (63  111.  App. 

571),  514,  605,  634. 
Callaway  Min.  &    Mfg.    Co.  V.    Clark 

(32  Mo.  305),  91. 
Calumet   Elec.    St.    R.     Co.    v.    Van 

Pett  (173  111.  70),  602,  606. 
Calumet   Iron  &  Steel   Co.  v.  Martin 

(115  111.  368),  602,  603,  606. 


95. 
Campbell  v.   Harris  N  Tow  Civ.  App. 

636),  225. 
Campbell  v.  Josepb  11.  Bauland  Co. 

(41  App.  Div.  174  . 
Campbell  v.  McCoy (3  rex.  Civ.  App. 

298),  214. 
Campbell  v.  North  Amer.  Brew.  Co. 

i22  App.  Div.  [N.  V.]   114),  214. 
Campbell  v.  Pullman  Pal.  C.  Co.  (42 

Fed.  484),  2  1:;. 
Campbell  v.  Rio  Grande   W.   R.  Co. 

(16  Utah,  346),  504. 
Campbell  v.  Rogers  (2  Bandy  [Ohio}, 

110),  508. 
Campbell  v.  Syracuse  (20Wkly.  Dig. 

[N.  V.]  449),  220. 
Campbell     V.    York     (172    Pa.     222), 

268. 
Cam;. bell  v.  York  (172  Pa.  205),  267. 
Canada    A.    R.    Co.    V.    Ilurdman   (25 

Can.  S.  C.  205),  68. 
Canadian    Pacific   Ry.   Co.  v.    Robin- 
son ([Ont]  14  S.  C.   R.   105).  195, 

530. 


Calumet   K.    R.   Co.  v.    Moore   ([111.]     Canavan  v.  Stuyvesant  ( 12  Misc.  [N 


15  X.  E.  764),  104. 
Calvin  v.  Peek  (62  Conn.  155),  136. 
Camden*  A.  R.  Co.  v.   Williams  (61 

N.  .1.  L.  646),  267,  268,  661. 
Cameron  v.  Bryan   ([Iowa]    56  N.  W. 

4:34),  214. 
Cameron  v.    Bryan  (89    Iowa,    214), 

188. 
Cameron  v.  Croat  Northern  lly.  Co. 

([\.  D.]  80  N.  W.  885),   162. 
Cameron  v.  Great    Northern    R.    Co. 

(8N.  D.  124),  166. 
Cameron  v.  Union  Tr.  Line  (10  Wash. 

507),  244.  245. 
Cameron   Sun   v.    McAnaw   (72  Mo. 

App.  196),  103. 
Camp  v.  Camp  (59  Vt.  667),  111. 


Y.j  74).  176. 
Candrian  v.  Miller  (98  Wis.  164),  381, 

122. 

Canfield  v.  chic  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(59  Mo.  App.  354),  139,  1  15. 
Canning  v.    Williamstown  (1   Cush. 

[Mass.]  151),  215,  218,  219,  227. 
Canning   C<>.  v.    Innes  (24   111.    App. 

33),  150. 
<  lannon  v.  Brooklyn  <  !ity   R.  R.  '  !o. 

(14  Mise.  [N.  Y.|  400),  214. 
Cannon  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.   R .Co. 

(9  Mise.  [N.  Y.]  282),  214.  215,216, 

274.  280,  282. 
Canter  v.  American  Ins.  Co.  (3  Pet. 

[U.  8.]  307),  72. 
Cantini  v.  Tillman (54  Fed.  009),  501. 


xlviii 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITED    IN    VOL. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


1. 


Capital    Traction   Co.  v.    Lusby  (26 

Was!..  L.  Rep.  163),  171. 
Capithorne  v.  Hardy  (173  Mass.  400), 

256. 
Card  v.  Columbia  (191   Pa.   St.  254), 

84. 
Cardon  v.  McConnell  (120  N.  C.  461), 

428. 
Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  R.  Co.  (1  Cusb. 

[Mass.]  475),  4S8,  495,  510. 
Carey  v.  Shults  (60  Ind.  IT),  454. 
Carl  v.  Ayers  (53  N.  Y.  17),  432. 
Carl  Corper  Brew.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Min- 

wegen  &  W.  Mfg.  Co.  (77  111.  App. 

213),  432. 
Carlaud  v.  West.  Un.   Tel.   Co.  (118 

Mich.  369),  488. 
Carlisle   v.   Sheldon    (38    Vt.    440), 

174. 
Carlisle,    Borough    of,  v.     Brisbane 

(113  Pa.  St.  554),  172. 
Carolan  v.  Southern   P.    R.  Co.  (84 

Fed.  84),  68. 
Carpenter   v.    Barber   (44   Vt.  442), 

133. 
Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R. 

Co.  (38  Hun  [N.  Y.],  116),  563,  569, 

572,  578,  586. 
Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R. 

Co.  (50  Hun  [N.  Y.],  116),  570. 
Carpenter  v.  Franklin  (89  Tenn.  143; 

14  S.  W.  484),  73. 
Carpenter  v.   Matt  (66  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

632),  422. 
Carpenter  v.  McDavitt  (66  Mo.  App. 

1),  227,  263. 
Carpenter  v.   Mexico  Nat.  R.  R.  Co. 

(39  Fed.  315),  227. 
Carpenter  v.  Mexico  Nat.   R.  Co.  (17 

Wash.  L.  R.  630),  215,  218,  227. 
Carpenter  v.   Parker  (23  Iowa,  450), 

454. 
Carpenter  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (13  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  328),  449. 
Carpenter  v.  Rolling  (107  Wis.  559), 

648. 
Carpenter  v.  Wall  (11  Ad.  &  E.  803), 

468. 


Carples  v.  New  York  &  H.   R.  Co. 

I  16    App.   Div.    [X.    V.]   158),  229, 

242. 
Carney  v.  State  (84  Ala.  7),  515. 
Carnis  v.   Erwin  (59  111.    App.  555), 

172. 
Carr  v.  Easton  City  (142  Pa.  St.  139), 

172. 
Carr  v.  Risher  (28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  260), 

492. 
Carraherv.  Allen  ([Iowa,  1900]  83  N. 

W.  902),  82. 
Carrico  v.  West  Virginia,  C.  &  P.  R. 

Co.  (39  W.  Va.  86),  297. 
Carrier  v.  Bernstein  (104  Iowa,  572), 

479,  483. 
Carroll  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.    (58 

N.  Y.  126),  63. 
Carson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(96  Iowa,  583),  514. 
Carson  v.  Edgeworth  (43  Mich.  241), 

431. 
Carson    v.    Texas    Installment    Co. 

([Tex.    Civ.   App.]   34  S.  W.   762), 

123. 
Carston    v.   Northern   P.    R.   Co.    (44 

Minn.  454),  330. 
Carter  v.   Beckwith  (128   N.  Y.  312), 

102. 
Carter  v.  Columbia,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (19 

S.  C.  22),  166. 
Carter  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R. 

Co.  (69  Mo.  App.  295),  104. 
Carter  v.   Rigby   (2  Q.   B.   113),  522, 

523. 
Carter  v.  State  (49  La.  Ann.  1487;  22 

So.  400),  65. 
Carter  v.  Wells   Fargo  Co.    (64  Fed. 

1005),  178. 
Carterville  Coal  Co.   v.    Abbott  (81 

111.  App.  279),  503. 
Caruth  v.  Allen  (2   McCord  [S.  C], 

226),  76. 
Case  v.  Marks  (20  Conn.  248),  425. 
Casey  v.  Hulgan  (18  Ind.  590),  397. 
Casey  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

(25  Wkly.  Dig.  568),  152. 
Casey  v.  Oakes  (17  Wash.  409),  104. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    Vol..    1. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


xlix 


Caspar  v.  Prosdame  (46  La.  Aim.  36), 

362,  377. 
Cass  v.  Third   Ave  R.  Co.  (20  App. 

Div.  [N.  ST.]  91),  227. 
Cass   v.  Third   Ave.  R.  Co.  (20  App. 

Div.  [N.  V.j  591),  277,  287. 
Cassidy    v.    Angcll    (12    R.    1.    147), 

166. 
Cassidy     v.    Brooklyn    Daily     Eagle 

(138  N.  V.  239), 396. 
Casson  v.    Bromley    (184     Pa.    540), 

151. 
Casswt'll    v.     Wilmington    (2     Mar  v. 

[Del.]  360;  43  Atl.  160),  65. 
Caswell   v.  Worth  (6   E.  &  B.  849;  8.j 

E.  C.  L.  R.),  68. 
Castanos   v.   Ritter  (3  Dner  [N.  V], 

310),  81. 
Castello  v.  Landwehr  (28  Wis.  522), 

515,  651,  650,  603,  666. 
Castille  v.  CafTery  Cent.   R.  &  R  Co. 

(48  La.  Ann.  322),  504. 
Castner  v.   Sliker   (33  X.   J.    L.  95), 

375,  377. 
Catholic  Church  v.  Martin    (4    Roh. 

[La.]  62),  66. 
Catlin  v.  Martin  (69  N.  Y.  393),  515. 
Catlin  v.  Pond  (101  N.  Y.  649),  562. 
Causee   v.   Anders   (4  Dev.    &  B.  L. 

[N.  C]  246),  369. 
Cavanagh  v.  Ocean  Steam   Xav.   <  o. 

(19  Civ.  Proc.  [N.  Y.]  391),  505. 
Cavanaugh  v.   Austin   (42   Yt.   576), 

401. 
Cave    v.    Tyler    ([Cal.    1901]  65  Pa. 

1089),  76. 
Cayuga  Co.  Superv.  v.  State   (153  N. 

V.  279;  17  N.  E.  288),  65. 
Central,   etc.,   K.    Co.    v.    Mason  (51 

Miss.  234),  165. 
Central  R.,  etc.,  Co.  v.   Roberts  (91 

Ga.  513),  488. 
Central  Ga.   R.  Co.    v.  Bond  (111  Ga. 

13),  63. 
Central  Gas  &  Elee.  Fix.  Co.  v.  Sher- 
idan (49  N.  Y.  St.  It.  639),  488. 
Central  of  Ga.   R.  Co.  v.  Brown  ([Ga 
1901]  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  30),  135. 
4 


Central  <»f  Georgia  K.  Co.  v.  Edwards 

(14  i. a    528  .  B2. 
Central    of    Ga.    R.    Co.   v.  Johnston 

|  lo.;  t.a.  L30  .-'i:-. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.Co.  v.  Price  (106  Ga. 

L76),  84. 
Central  of  Ga.    R.   Co.  v.   Windham 

i  120  Ala.  231),  L46. 
Central  Pass.  Ry.    I  o.  v.  chatterson 

I  K.v.|  2'.»  S.  W.  18),  122. 
Cent.    Pass.    R.   Co.   v.  Kuhn  (86  Ky. 

578),  215,  2ls,  243,  251. 
Central  R  Co.  v.  Moore  (51  Ga.151), 

263. 
Centra]    K.    Co.    v.   Newman  (94   Ga. 

560),   164. 
Central    R.   Co.   v.  Serfass  (153  111. 

379),  215,  218,243. 
Central   R.  A-    Bkg.  Co.  v.  Lanier  (83 

(la.  587),  224. 
Central  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Loach  (70  Ga. 

|::l   .   511. 
Central    R.  &  Bkg.  Co.  v.  Strickland 

(90  Ga.  5G2),  212.  :•.:','.>.  342. 
Central  R.,  etc.,  Co.   v.    Kent  (87  Ga. 

402),   153. 
Central  Tex.  A-  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bush 

i  12   'Dx.    Civ.    App.  291:  34  S.  W. 

133),  63. 
Central  Trust    Co.    v.  Citizens   St.  R. 

Co.  ([U.  S.  C.  C.  D.    Ind.]   80  Fed. 

■J  is;  •_".)  Chi.'.  L.  News,  297).  65. 
Central   l'n.   Teleph.  Co.  v.  Fehring 

(146  Ind.  189).  107. 
Cernahaw     v.     Chrisler     (107     Wis. 

645),  76. 
Chacey  v.  Fargo  (5  N.  D.  173), 
Chacey   v.    Fargo    (64    N.    W.   932), 

:;■_'.-,. 
Chaiborne    v.   Chesapeake   &   O.    It. 

Co.  |  iii  W.  Va.  363),  112. 
Chalk  v.  McAlily  (11  Rich.  L.  [S.  C] 

153),  74. 
Chamberlain  v.  Porter  (0  Minn.  260), 

87. 
Chambers  v.   Frazier  (29    <duo  St. 

362),  79. 
Chambers  v.  Walker  (80  Ga.  642),  77. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Champion  v.  Vincent  (20  Tex.  811),  J 

28,  62,  7(1. 
Chandler  v.   Allison  (10  Mich.  400), 

194. 
Chapin  v.   Babcock  (67  Conn.  255 )» 

79. 
Chapin  v.  Fye  (21  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  71), 

95. 
Chaplin  v.  Hawes  (3  Car.  &  P.  544), 

63. 
Chapman  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co. 

(14  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  384),  214. 
Chapman  v.  Atlantic   A.ve.  R.  R.  Co. 

(14  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  404),  214. 
Chapman   v.   Dodd    (10   Minn.  350), 

437. 
Chapman  v.  Kirby  (49  111.  211),  91. 
Chapman  v.  Roth  well  (El.  Bl.  &   El. 

168),  525,  541. 
Chapman  v.  Southern  P.   R.  Co.  (12 

Utah,  30),  214. 
Chappedelaine      v.     Dechmaux      (4 

Cranch  [U.  S.],  306),  507. 
Charlebois  v.  Gogebie  &  M.   R.   Co. 

(91  Mich.  59),  643,  646,  662. 
Charlebois  v.   Surveyor  (27   Can.  S. 

C.  556),  432. 
Charleston  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Varnadore 

(94  Ga.  639),  338. 
Chartrand    v.    Southern    R.   Co.    (57 

Mo.  A  pp.  427),  227,  251,  254. 
Charwat  v.  Vopelak  ( 19  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

590),  381,  382. 
Chase  v.  N.   Y.   Cent.   R.  R.  Co.  (26 

N.  Y.  523),  501. 
Chase  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  (44 

Fed.  554),  29,  124. 
Chatfield  v.  Bunnell   (69   Conn.  511), 

439. 
Chatfield  v.  Wilson  (28  Vt.  49),  67. 
Chatfield    v.    Wilson   (1   Will.    [Vt.] 

670),  76. 
Chattanooga  v.  Neely  (97  Tenn.  527; 

37  S.  W.  281),  71. 
Chattanooga  R.  &   C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hug- 
gins  (89  Ga.  494),  274. 
Chattanooga  R.  &   C.   R.  Co.  v.  Lid- 
dell  (85  Ga.  482),  122,  135,  186. 


Chattanooga  1!.  ct  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyon, 

(89  Ga.  16),  346. 
Chattsworth   v.    Rowe   (66  111.  App. 

55),  100. 
Chatsworth   v.   Rowe  (166  111.  114), 

229,  241,  252,  278. 
Cheatham  v.  Red  River  Line  (56  Fed. 

248),  498.  , 
Chelinsky    v.    Hoopes   &    T.    Co.   (1 

Marv.  [Del.]  273),  231. 
Cherry  v.  McCall  (23  Ga.   193)   114, 

372. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis  (22 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  748),  302. 
Chesapeake   &  O.   R.    Co.  v.    Dixon 

(20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  792),  100,  515. 
Chesapeake    &   O.   R.   Co.  v.   Dodge 

([Ky.  1902]  66  S.  W.  606),  159. 
Chesapeake  &   O.  R.  Co.  v.  Friel  (39 

S.  W.  704),  214. 
Chesapeake  &  O.   R.  Co.  v.  Howard 

(27  Wash.  L.  Rep.  146),  200. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.   Judd  (20 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1978),  511. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Lang  (100 

Ky.  221),  521. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R  Co.  v.  Steele  ( [C. 

C.  App.   6th  C]  84   Fed.  93),  166. 
Chesapeake,   C.  &  S.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 

Higgins  (85  Tenn.  620),  505. 
Chestnut  v.  Chism  (20  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

23),  101. 
Chew  v.   Lucas   (15   Ind.    App.  595), 

91. 
Cheyenne  v.  Swan  ( [Wy.]  51  Pa.  209), 

501. 
Chiatovich  v.  Hanchett  (96  Fed.  681), 

386. 
Chicago  v.  Edson  (43  111.  App.  417), 

214. 
Chicago  v.  Elzeman  (71  111.  131),  227. 
Chicago  v.   Fitzgerald   (75  111.   App. 

174),  214. 
Chicago  v.  Hesing  (83  111.  204),   175, 

527,  603,  626,  634,  637. 
Chicago  v.  Honey  (10  111.  App.  535), 

255. 
Chicago  v.  Jones  (66  111.  349),  142. 


TABLE   OF   OASES    CITED    IN    Vol.. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Chicago  v.  Keefe  (114  111.  222),  602, 
616,  626,  634. 

Chicago  v.  K.lly  (69  111.  475).  11^. 
Chicago   v.    LanglasB    (52    111.   256), 

142. 
Chicago  v.  Mayor!  18  [11.359),  527. 
Chicago  v.   Major  (is  111.  349),  199, 

597,  603,  605,  626,  63.3. 
Chicago  v.   McCulloch  (10  111.  A.pp. 

459),  017,  619. 
Chicago  v.  Martin  (49  111.  'ill),  142. 
Chicago  v.  Powers  (42  111.    109),  617, 

61!),  631,  632. 
Chicago  v.  Sanders  (50  111.  App.  136), 

214. 
Chicago  v.  Schotten  (75  111.  468),  605, 

607,  til  I.  625,  626,  634,  635,  637. 
Chicago  v.  Seleu  (165  111.  371),  05. 
Chicago  A.   P.   B.  Co.    v.   Rembarz 

(51  111.  App.  5415),  214. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Adlcr  (28  111. 

App.  102),  007,  014,  636. 
Chicago  &  A.  K.  Co.  v.  Becker  (84 

111.  483),  -I  1.  527,  634. 
Chicago  A  A.  E.  Co.  v.  Blaul  (70  111. 

App.  51S),  214. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Carey  (115 

111.  115),  603,  014,  027,  632. 
Chicago  A-  A.  P.  C.».   v.   Gibbons  (65 

111.  App.  550),  tin.;. 
Chicago  A-  A.  P.  Co.  v.  Goltz  (71  I1J. 

App.  414),  211.  . 
Chicago  A-  A.    P.   Co.  v.    Harrington 

(77  111.  App.  499),  255. 
Chicago  A-    A.    P.    Co.   v.    Kclley  (80 

111.  App.  075).  010. 
Chicago  &    A.    P.   Co.  v.    Kelly  (182 

111.  207).  04,  ooo,  Ol'7,  636. 
Chicago  A  A.    P.  Co.  v.   Logue  (158 

111.  021  I,    170. 
Chicago  &  A.  P.  Co.  v.  Logue  (17  111. 

App.  292),  598. 
Chicago  A-    A.    P.   Co.    v.   Lyons  (47 

111.  A]. p.  292),  633. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.   v.  May  (108  111. 

2881,  515.  014. 
Chicago*  \.  P.  <'o.  v.  Pearson  (82 

111.  App.  605),  105,  607,  619. 


Chicago  a  A.  P.  ('<>.  v.  Randolph  (65 

III.  App.  208),  ::7.'.. 
Chicago  A  A.  P.  Co.  v.  Shannon  i  13 

111.  338),  598,  60  ;.  607,  613,  61  l,  617, 

626,  636,  637,  ■ 
Chicago  &  A.  P.  Co.  v.  Swan  (70  111. 

App.  331  I,  211. 
Chicago  A  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson  (63 

111.  107),  243. 
Chicago  &  C.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Starmei 

(26  Nel».  630),  227. 
Chicago  &  EdiBon  Co.  v.  Moreo  (86 

111.  App.  152),  014,  61!»,  627. 
Chicago  A   E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams   (69 

111.  App.  571 ),  354. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bivaus  ( 142 

111.  lOli.  285. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Chancellor 

(105  111.  438),  151,  165,  on:;. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleminger 

(77  111.  App.  186),  102,  243.  251. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.   R.   Co.  v.   Holland 

(122  111.  461),  254,  256. 
Chicago  &   E.   I.   R.    Co.   v.   Kneinin 

(48  IU.  App.  243),  517,  607,614,  619. 
Chic  ago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.    v.    Loeb  (118 

111.  20;5),  99. 
Chicago  &  E.   I.   R.   Co.  v.  O'Connor 

(119  111.580),  50:;.  597,  598,  009. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.   v.    Rousi 

111.  App.  286),  504. 
Chicago   &  E.     P.  (<>.    v.     Branyon 

([Iud.l  :;7  N.  E.  190),  514. 
Chicago  A    E.    R.  Co.  v.  BrinkkopBki 

(72  111.  App.  22),  100. 
Chicago    A    E.    P.    Co    v.    Cleminger 

(178  111.  536),  215,  255. 
Chicago  A-  E.   R.  Co.  v.   Meech  i  163 

111.  305),  194.  229,  241. 
Chicago  A  G.   I.  P.  Co.  v.  Spurney 

(69  111.  App.  549),  224. 
Chicago  A-  G.  T.  P.  Co.  \.  Gaeinowski 

I  1.-,:,  111.  L89),  108,  598. 
Chicago  A    G.    \Y.    P.   Co.   v.    Travis 
i  n    111.    App.    166),   607,  612,  014. 
op;. 
Chicago  &    I.    C.    P.    Co.    v.    Hunter 
([Ind.]  27  N.  E.  477),  82. 


lii 


TABLE   OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Chicago  &  X.  W.   R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield 

(37   Mich.   205),  205,  214,  .".14,  617, 

645,  653,  655,  657,  658,  668,  674. 
Chicago  <&   N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

(29  N.  E.  1109),  7. 
Chicago  &  N.   W.  R.  Co.  v.  Cicero 

(157  111.  48),  7-".. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Go.   v.  Gillison 

(72  111.  App.  ^07),  214. 
Chicago  &   N.  W.    R.  Co.   v.  Howard 

(6  111.  App.  569),  617. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kane  (70 

111.  App.  676),  214. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda 

(93111.  302),  614,  617. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.   Shannon 

(45  111.  197),  006. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet  (45 

111.   197),  607,   614,    616,    626,   635, 

636. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.   R.  Co.  v.  Whitton 

(13  Wall.  [U.  S.]  270),  645. 
Chicago  &   W.   I.   R.   Co.   v.   Ptacck 

(62  111.  App.  375),  607,  631. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond  (58 

Neb.  385),  598,  603,  615. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bryan 

(90  111.  126),  141. 
Chicago,  B.   &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Gunder- 

sou  (174  111.  495),  614,  625. 
Chicago,  B.   &  Q.  R.    Co.  v.  Gunder- 

son  (05  111.  App.  638),  607,619,  631. 
Chicago,   B.   &  Q.  R.   Co.   v.   Hague 

(48  Neb.  97),  03. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Harwood 

(80  111.  88),  606. 
Chicago,  B.  cfe  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines  (45 

111.  App.  229),  224. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  c,(.  v.  Honey 

([C.  C.   App.  8th  C]   0)3    Fed.  39), 

174. 
Chicago,    B.   &    Q.  R.  Co.  v.   Miller 
([C.  C.  App.  8th  C]  76   Fed.  439), 

203. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Nebraska 

(170  U.  S.  57),  71. 
Chicago,   B.  &   Q.   R.   Co.  v.    Oyster 
(58  Neb.  1),  598,  615,  019. 


Chicago,  I!.  *  Q.   R.  Co.   v.  Reith  (65 

111.  App.    101),  29:;. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.   R.  Co.  v.  Spirk  (51 

Neb.  KIT  i.  337,  338,  351,  488. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes 

(96  111.  162),  139. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Bus- 
kirk  (58  Neb.  218,  570 ),  598,  603,  615. 
Chicago,  B.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Oleson  (40 

Neb.  889),  152. 
Chicago  City  R.    Co.  v.  Allen  (169 

111.  287),  206. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.   Anderson  (93 

111.  App.  419),  100. 
Chicago   City    R.    Co.    v.     Anderson 

(80  111.  App.  71),  214,  219,  224,  241. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson  ( 182 

111.  298),  215,  241. 
Chicago   City  R.   Co.    v.    Fenniniore 

(78  111.  App.  478),  100,  102. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Leach  (80  111. 

App.  354),  214. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.   Meneely  (78 

111.  App.  679),  258. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor  (68  111. 

App.  613),  214. 
Chicago   City  R.  Co.   v.  Taylor  (170 

111.  49),  218,219,220. 
Chicago   City  R.   Co.   v.  Van  Bleck 

(143  111.  480),  280. 
Chic.  City   Ry.   Co.   v.   Wall   (93  111. 

App.  411),  238. 
Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox  (13S 

111.  370),  175,  177. 
Chicago  Consol.  B.  Co.   v.  Tietz  (37 

111.  App.  509,  599),  602,  610,  635. 
Chicago,  E.   &   L.   S.   R.  Co.  v.  Ada- 

mick  (33  111.  App.  412),  514,  005. 
Chic,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Brisbane  (24  111. 

App.  463),  344. 
Chic,   etc,  R.   Co.  v.   Bryan   (90  111. 

126,)  139. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Caulfield  (63 

Fed.  396),  224. 
Chic,   etc,  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Flagg   (43 

111.  364),  338,  354. 
Chicago,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   Gillam   (27 
111.  App.  386),  598,  602,  610,  626. 


TABLE   OF   casF.s   CI  CBD    IN    70L.    I. 


liii 


[References  are  to  Sections. 


Griffin  (68  111. 


( Ihic,  etc.,  R.  Co 

499),  341. 
Chicago,  etc.,  By. 

III.  142),  IT. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R. 

111.  385),  L65. 
Chic,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co.  v.  McKean  (40 

111.  218),  L33. 
Chicago,  etc.,  K.   Co 

Mich.  532),  169. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

111.  400),  597,  598. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Connor 

(119  111.  586),  21  l 


Chic,  R.    I.  &   P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Herring 
(.-.7  111.  59),  L39. 
Henry  (62    Chicago,  R.   I.  A   1'.   R.  Co.  \.   Ken- 
ned) (2  Kan.  App.  698),  244. 

Chic,  R.    i.   A-    P.    R.   Co.    v.   Posteu 
(59  Kan.  449),  1-1,  228,  233. 

Chic,  K.   I.  a-   1'.    K.  Co.  v.  Sheldon 
(f,  Kan.  App.  :;4T),  261,  279,  281. 

Chicago,  K.  I.  &  1'.  R.  Co.  v.   Young 
(58  Neb.  678),  597,  598,  603. 

Chicago,  R.    1.    A    T.    R.   Co.    v.   Zer- 
necke  ([Neb.]  82  N.  W.  26),  597,  600. 

Chicago,  R.   I.  A  T.  R.  Co.  v   Langs- 
ton  (92  Tex.  Tint),  289. 


(Jo. 


Co.   v.    Levy  (160 


.Miller   (40 
Morris   (26 


Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  .Sanderson    Chi. 'ago.  R.  1.  A  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter 


(1T4  111.  405),  160. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner  (108 

111.  538),  215,216. 
Chic  Forge  &  B.  Co.  v.  Rose  (till  111. 

App.  123),  432,  440. 
Chicago,  G.  W.    R.   Co.   v.   Kowalski 

([C.  C.  App.  8th  C]  84  Fed.  586), 

176. 
Chic,  K.  A  W.   R.  Co.   v.  O'Connell 

(46  Kan.  581),  122. 
Chicago,  M.  A  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dowd 

(115  111.  650),  508,  602,  603,  606. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Durke 

(148  111.  226),  71. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.   P.   R.   R.  Co.   v. 

O'Sullivan  (14:!  111.  48),  206. 
Chicago,  M.  A  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson 

(35  111.  App.  346),  605,  634. 
Chicago,  P.  &  St.   L.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis 

(48  111.  App.  274),  110,  214. 
Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Wool 

ridge   (174   111.  330),   602,  606,  612, 

614,  61T,  619,  626,626,  631. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  A  L.  Co.  v.  Boylea  (11 

Tex.  civ.  App.  522),  :;iT. 
Chicago,  R.   I.  A   1'.  It.   Co.  v.   Archer 

(46  Neb.  007),  246,  -T4. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  A    1".  li.  Co.  v.  Austin 

(69  111.  426),  632. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  A  1'.  K.  Co.  v.  Downey 

(85  111.  App.  1T5),  60T. 
Chicago,  R.   I.  A    1'.   R.  Co.  v.  Henry 

(T  111.  A]. p.  322),  61T. 


field  (10   Tex.   Civ.    App.  225),  520, 

524,  52S.  532,  :.:;t.  542,  54T. 
Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scurr  (50  Miss. 

B6),  110,  :146. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  A  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Scuit  (59  Miss.  456).  119. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  A  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker 

(  [Iud.j  33  V  E.  280),  279,  2S0.  291. 
Chicago,"  St.    L.   A*   P.   R.    R.   Co.   v. 

Spilker    ([Ind.]    32    Am.    L.    Reg. 

763),  278. 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Foster  (175  111. 

396),  22T. 
Chicago  W.  D.   R.  Co.   v.   Klauber  (9 

111.  App.  613),  81. 
Chicago  \V.  A  V.  Coal  Co.  v.  Streator 

i  IT'.'  111.  435),  73. 
Chick  v.  Southwestern    R.    Co.   (57 

Ga.  357),  495. 
Chickering  v.    Lord    ([N.  1L]  32  Atl. 

TT::  i.  95. 
Chidester  v.  Consol.    Peoples  Ditch 

Co.  (53  Cal.  56),  87. 
Child    v.     Horner    (13    Pick.  [Mass. J 

503),  419. 
Childers  V.   San   Jose    Mercury    Print 

A  P.  Co.  i  L05  Cal.  284),  397. 
Childress  v.  Emory  (8  Wheat.  [U.  S.] 

642),  507. 
Chiles  v.  Drake  (2  Mete.    [Kyi    146), 

111.  112,  11  I.  115,  12ii.  L86. 
Chilton  v.  st.  Joseph  (143  Mo.  192), 

244. 


liv 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Chipnian    v.    Union    P.    K.    Co.    (12 

lull,  68),  214. 
Chilly  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 

(148  Mo.  64),  100,  102. 
Choctaw.  (>.  &  G.  E.  Co.  v.  Alexander 

(7  Okla.  591  I,  501. 
Che >uquet tu  v.  Southern  Elec.  R.  Co. 

(152  Mo.  257),  71),  211: 
Chouteau  v.  Suydani  (21  N.  Y.  179), 

102. 
Christian  v.   Erwin  ([111.]  17  N.   E. 

707),  104. 
Christian  v.  Hanna  (58  Mo.  App.  37), 

4:;:,. 
Christianson  v.  Chic.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 

R.  Co.  (G7  Minn.  94),  90. 
Christie  v.  Galveston  City  R.  Co.  (39 

S.  W.  038),  242. 
Christman  v.  Russell  (73  Miss.  452), 

95. 
Chuhb  v.  Grell  (34  Pa.  St.  115).  425. 
Church  v.  Ante-Kalsomine  Co.  (118 

Mich.  219),  487. 
Churchill  v.   Bauraann  (95  Cal.  541; 

10  Pac.  770),  G8. 
Churchill  v.  Siggers  (3  El.  &  Bl.  929), 

444. 
Cicero  &  P.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown  (89 

111.  App.  318),  91. 
Cincinnati  v.  Conner  (55  Ohio  St.  82), 

501. 
Cincinnati  v.  Gregory  (3  Ohio  N.  P. 

142),  175. 
Cincinnati  v.  Guckenberger  (00  Ohio 

St.  353),  501. 
Cincinnati    &    C.    Air    Line    Co.    v. 

Rogers  (24  Iud.  103),  89. 
Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole  (29 

Ohio  St.  126),  340,  342. 
Cincinnati,  Hamilton  &  Indianapolis 

R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eaton  (94  Ind.  474), 

347,  349. 
Cincinnati,  II.   &  D.   R.  Co.  v.  Thie- 

baud  (114  Fed.  918),  504. 
Cincinnati  St.  R.   Co.  v.  Murray  (53 

Ohio  St.  570;  35  Ohio  L.  J.  22),  63. 
Citizens'  Rapid  Trans.  Co.  v.  Seigrist 

(96Tenn.  119),  171. 


Citizens  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hobs  (15  Ind. 

App.  610),  194. 
Citizens  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington  (58 

S.  W.  1042),  537. 
Citizens  Ry.    Co.  v.  Steen  (42  Ark. 

321),  139. 
Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Burke  (98  Tenn. 

650),  204. 
Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Steen  (42  Ark. 

321),  112. 
Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Tiviname  (121 

Ind.  375),  319. 
Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Willoeby  (134 

Ind.  563),  139,  141,  297. 
Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Willoeby  (15  Ind. 

App.  312),  300. 
City.     See  Name  of. 
City  Bk.  v.  Mershow   (33  Fed.  240), 

101. 
City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jeffries  (73  Ala. 

1*83),  133,  135. 
City  Pass.   R.    Co.   v.    Schuster  (113 

Pa.  St.  412),  176. 
City  R.  Co.  v.  Wiggins  ([Tex.    Civ. 

App.]  52  S.  W.  577),  291. 
City  Transfer  Co.    v.   Robinson  (12 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  555),  139. 
Claiborne  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R. 

R.  Co.  (46  W.  Va.  363,  453. 
Clapp  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.  (19 

Barb.  [N.  Y.]  461),  213. 
Clare  v.  National  City  Bank  (1  Sw. 

[N.  Y.]  539),  150. 
Clare  v.  Sacramento  Elec.  Power  & 

L.  Co.  (122  Cal.  504),  75,  94,  214. 
Clark  v.  American  Dock  &  Imp.  Co. 

(35  Fed.  478),  436,  448,  450,  451. 
Clark  v.  Bales  (15  Ark.  452),  111. 
Clark  v.  Bennett  (123  Cal.  275),  171. 
Clark  v.    Bohms    ([Tex.   Civ.  App.] 

37  S.  W.  347),  385. 
Clark  v.  Brown   (116  Mass.  504),  422. 
Clark  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.   ([Mo.] 

29  S.  W.   1013),  214. 
Clark  v.    Chicago   &   N.  W.   R.   Co. 

([Wis.]  36  X.  \V.  326),  81. 
Clark  v.  Dillon  (6  Daly  [N.  Y.],  526), 
318. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


lv 


[References 

Clark  v.  Elizabeth  (61  N.  Y.  L.  565), 

65. 
Clark  v.  Fairley  (30  Mo.  App.  335), 

119,  186. 
Clark  v.  Foot  (8  Johns.  [X.  Y.J  422), 

L66. 
Clark  v.   Fox   (10  App.  Div.  [N.    ST.] 

514),  390,  423. 
Clark  v.  Gay  (112  Ga.  777),  92*. 
Clark  v.  Hill  (69  Mo.   App.  oil),  458. 
Clark  v.  Louisville  A-  \.    R,  Co.  (101 

Ky.  34),  164 
(lark  v.  Newsam  (1  Excb.  131),  ISO, 

136. 
Clark  v.  Nevada    Land,  etc.,    Co.  (6 

Nev.  203),  91,  244. 
Clark  v.  Nordholt  ( 121  Cal.  26),  444. 
Clark  v.   Pope  ([Fla.]    10  So.    586), 

104. 
( 'lark  v.  Westcott  (2  App.  Div.  [  \  .  Y.\ 

603),  24:!,  258. 
Clark  v.  Wilson  (103  Mass.  219),  193. 
(lark  Mile-End  Spool  Co.  v.  Shaffery 

(58  N.  J.  L.  229),  314. 
Clarke  v.  Carfin  Coal  Co.  (L.  R.  [1891] 

App.  Cas.  412),  523. 
Clarke   v.    Chicago,   K.  &   X.    R.  Co. 

([Neb.]  37  X.  W.  484),  107. 
Clarke   v.    Fitch    (2    Wend.    [X.   Y.) 

459),  467. 
Clarke  v.  Mathewson  (12  Pet.  [U.  S.] 

164),  507. 
Claxton  v.  Lexington  &  B.  S.  R.  Co. 

(13  Bush  [Ky.],  636),  122. 
Claypool  v.  Claypool   (65    111.    App. 

446),  42:;. 
Clayton  v.  Keeler  (18    Misc.    [X.    V.  ] 

188),  869. 
Clegg  v.  Met.  St.   Ky.   Co.  (1   App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  207),  214,  274,  275,  281. 
Clegg  v.   Met.  St.    R.   Co.    (54  N/.  E. 

1089),  214. 
Cleghorn  v.  New  York  Cent.  «fe  H.  R. 

R.  Co.  (56  N.  Y.  44).  135,  136,   137. 
Clemens  v.  Sped   (93  Ky.  284;  19  S. 

W.  660),  71. 
Clement  v.  Major  (8  Colo.  App.  86), 

431,  432,  434,  440. 


are  to  Sections.] 

Clements  \.   Malone;  (66  Mo.  352), 

425. 
Clements  v.  Odorless  Excavating  Co. 

(67  Md.  461),  430. 
Clemmous  v.  Doneforth  (67  Vt.  417), 

381. 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St  L.  K.  R.  Co. 

v.    Baddeley   |  L50    111.    328),   598, 

629. 
Cleveland,   C.  C.    &   St.    L.   R.  Co.  v. 

Balleutine  (84  Fed.  935),  64,  68,  84. 
Cleveland,  C.   C.   ife  St.   L.   R.  Co.  v. 

Beckett  ([Iml.  App.j  39  N.  E.  429), 

213. 
Cleveland.  C.    C.  &  St.   L.   R.  Co.  v. 

Gray  |  148  Ind.  266),  63,  236. 
Cleveland.  C.   C.  &   St.    L.   R.  Co.  v. 

1 1  albert  (75  111.  App.  592),  212. 
Cleveland,   C.    C.   &   St.    L.    R.  Co.  v. 

Keeuan  (190  111.  217),  602,  616,  627. 
Cleveland,   C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Quillen  (22  Ind.  App.  496),  344. 
Cleveland,   C.   C.   &  St.   L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Tartt  (64  Fed.  830),  514 
Cleveland,   C.  C.   &  St.   L.   R.   Co.  v. 

Tartt  (99  Fed.  369).  64. 
Cleveland,   etc.,    R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cnrran 

(19  Ohio  St.  1),  359. 
Clevenger  v.  Dunaway  (84  111.  367), 

122. 
Clifton  v.  Lange  (108  Iowa,  472),  416. 
Clinton    v.     Laning    (61    Mich.    355), 

471. 
Clinton  v.  Mercer  (3  Murph.  [X.  C] 

119),  77. 
Clissold  v.   Machell  (26  Up.  Can.  Q. 

427),  112,  137,  138. 
Closson  v.  Staples   (42  Yt.  209),  437, 

444. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Blatchford  (11  Wall.  172), 

507. 
Cobb   v.    Clongh    ([U.    S.   C.  C.   D. 

Minn.],  83  Fed.  604),  65. 
Cobb  v.  Columbia  &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  (37 

S.  C.  194),  94. 
Cobb  v.  G.  W.  K\.  Co.  (62  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

335),  91. 
Cobb  v.  People  (84  111.  511),  128. 


lvi 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Cobb  v.  St.   Louis  &  H.  R.  Co.  (149 

Mo.  (509),  214,  251. 
Cochran   v.    Amnion    (16    111.    31(5 ), 

2G4. 
Cochran  v.  Baker  (34  Ore.  555),  102. 
Cochran  v.  Millet  (13  Iowa,  128),  111 

122,  1S9. 
Cochran  v.  Phila.  &  R.  I.  R.  Co.  (184 

Pa.  St.  565),  84. 
Cochrane  v.  Tuttle  (75  111.  361),  133. 
Cockburn   v.    Ashland   Lumber   Co. 

(54  Wis.  619),  89,  92. 
Coddington  v.  Lloyd  (8  A.  &  El.  449), 

452. 
Coffin  v.  Brown  ([Md.    1901]  50  Atl. 

570),  400. 
Coffin  v.  Coffin  (4  Mass.  41),  361. 
Coffin  v.  Vanilla   (8  Tex.   Civ.    App. 

417),  107,  448. 
Coffins  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (48 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  392),  214. 
Coghlan  v.  Third   Ave.   R.   R.  Co.  (7 

App.  Div.   [X.   Y.]  124),  514,  580, 

588,  589. 
Cogswell   v.    West   Street   &    N.    E. 

Electric  R.    Co.  (5  Wash.  46),  102. 
Cohea  v.  Coffers ville   (69  Miss.  561), 

65. 
Cohen  v.  Eureka  &  P.  R.   R.   Co.  (14 

Neb.  376),  227,  243. 
Cohn  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  (113  N. 

Y.  532),  85. 
Cohn  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.   Co.  (46 

Fed.  40),  91. 
Colburn  v.  State  (47  Ind.  310),  145. 
Colby  v.  McGee  (48   111.    App.  294), 

397. 
Cole  v.  Drew  (44  Vt.  49),  74. 
Cole  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  (159  N. 

Y.  59),  283,  295. 
Cole  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  (87  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  584),  295. 
Cole  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 

(95  Mich.  77),  274,  275,  286. 
Cole  v.  Tucker  (6  Tex.  266),  114,  120. 
Coleman  v.  Allen  ([Ga.]  5  S.  E.  204), 

81. 
Coleman  v.  Allen  (79  Ga.  637),  442. 


Coleman  v.  Coleman  (1  Marsh.  [Ky.] 

296),  106. 
Coleman  v.   Hagerman  (5  City  Hall 

Rec.  N.  Y.  63),  373. 
Coleman  v.  Ryan   (58  Ga.   132),  111, 

120. 
Coleman  v.  White  (43  Ind.  429),  460. 
Cole  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Falls  (90  Tenn.  466), 

501. 
Coley  v.  Statesville  (121  N.  C.  301), 

65,  90,  151,  563,  575,  578. 
Colley  v.  Davidson  (10  Minn.  392),  77. 
Collins   v.  Council   Bluffs  (35  Iowa, 

432),  145. 
Collins  v.  Council    Bluffs   (32  Iowa, 

324),  195,  243. 
Collins  v.  Dodge  (37  Minn.  503),  236. 
Collins  v.  East  Penn.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co. 

(56  Tenn.  841),  87. 
Collins  v.  East  Tenn.   G.    R.   Co.  (9 

Heisk.  [Tenn.]  841),  2. 
Collins  v.  Janesville  ([Wis.   1901]  87 

N.  W.  241 ),  105. 
Collins  v.  Janesville  (99  Wis.   464), 

214,  246. 
Collins  v.  New  Hampshire  (171  U.  S. 

30),  501. 
Collins  v.  South  Boston,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(142  Mass.  301),  117. 
Collins  v.  Stephens  (58  Ala.  543),  89. 
Collins   v.   Wilson  (18  Ky.   L.   Rep. 

1049),  379. 
Collin's  Park  &  B.   R.   Co.  v.  Ware 

(112  Ga.  663),  267. 
Collis  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

(71  Hun  [N.  Y.],  504),  514. 
Coloney  v.  Farrow  (91  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

82),  72. 
Colorado    Coal   &   I.    Co.    v.    Lamb 

([Colo.]  40  Pac.  251),  514. 
Colorado  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien 

(16  Colo.  219),  214. 
Colorado  Milling  &  El.  Co.  v.  Mitch- 
ell (26  Colo.  284),  501. 
Colorado    M.   R.    Co.   v.    Irevarthew 

(IColo.  App.  152),  81. 
Columbia  &  P.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawthorn 

(19  Pac.  [Wash.  T.]  25),  214. 


TABLE   OF    CASE      CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


VII 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Columbia  City  v.  Langohi  (20  Ind.  Commissioners   v.   Scearce  (2   Duv. 

App.  895),  L94,  195.  [Ky.|  576),  503. 

Columbia  Water  Power  Co.  v.    Co-  <  ommissioners  oi  Worcester  <  o.  \. 

lumbiaElec.   St.    R.     L.    A    ['.   Co.  Kyekman  i/.il   Md.  36;   16  AtL  317), 

([S.  E.J  20  S.  E.  1002),  65.  60. 

Columbus  v.  Ogletree  (102  Ga.  293),  Commons  v.  Walters  (1  Port.  [Ala.] 

267,  269.  323),  422. 

Columbus  v.  Sims  1 94  Ga.  483),  267.  Commonwealth.       See  state.      See 

Columbus  v.  Straasuer  (138  [nd.  301),  People.     See  Com. 


32.-.. 
Columbus    &    II.    C.    &    I.    Co.    v. 

Tuckm-  (48  Ohio  St.  41),  71. 
Columbus  &   W.   R.    Co.    v.    Bridges 

(86  Ala.  148),  L35. 
Colvin  v.  Peck  (62  Conn.  155),  L38. 
Colwell   v.    Manhattan   Ry.    Co.    (57 

Huu  IX.  V.i.  452),  258. 
Com.     Sec   State.     See  People.     See 

Commonwealth. 
Com.  (Armstrong)  v.    E.   II.  Taylor, 

Jr.,  Co.  (101  Ky.  325),  501. 
Com.    v.    Nagle   (4  Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

159),  515. 
Com.    v.    Place    (153   Pa.    St.    314), 

415. 
Comben   v.  Belleville  Stone  Co.  (50 

X.  J.  L.  [30  Vroom]  22b),  152. 
Combes  v.  Milwaukee    &    M.   R.   Co. 

(89  Wis.  297),  042. 
Comer  v.  Barfield  (102  Ga.  489),  L58. 
Comer  v.  Foley  (98  Ga.  (ITS),  338. 
Conicr    v.     Snowies    (IT    Kau.     441). 

454. 
Comer  v.  Sbaw  (98  Ga.  545),  58. 
Cmer  v.  Taylor  (32  Mo.  341),  468. 
Commerford   v.  Atlantic   Ave.    R,  R. 

Co.  (8  .Misc.  |\.  Y.]  599),  214. 
Cominskey     v.     Couuellsville      \.    & 

1..  St.  R.  Co.  I  4  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  431  ), 

107. 
Commissioners   v.   Duckett  (20  Md. 

468),  05. 
Commissioners  v.  Coffman  (60  Ohio 

St.  527;   is  OhioCir.  Ct.  R.  254), 65. 
Commissioners  v.  Hamilton  (60  Md. 

340),  305. 
Commissioners    v.    Legg    (110    [nd. 

479),  517. 


Commonwealth  v.  Boston  <&  A.  EC  Co. 

(121  Ma>s.  36),  503. 
Commonwealth   v.   Graham  ([Mass.] 

:;i  \.  E.  706),  :.i  1. 
Commonwealth     v.     McDufEy     (liiu 

Mass.  469),  66. 
Commonwealth   v.    Norfolk   (5  Mass. 

435),  361. 
Compton  v.    Long  Island   K.   R.   Co. 

(12  N.  Y.  St.  R.  554),  153. 
Compton  v.  The  Chelsea  (139  X.    V. 

538),  95. 
Conant  v.  Griffin    (48   111.    410),    598, 

621,  626,  627,  639. 
Condliff  v.  Condliff  (29  L.  T.  83),  5  1 1. 
Condliff  v.  Condliff   (29   L.  T.  831), 

523. 
Condon  v.  Great-Southern  &  W.  Ry. 

(10  Tr.  C.  L.  K.  415),  532,  533,  535, 

548. 
Cone  v.  Central    R.   Co.  (62  X.   J.    L. 

99),  448,  453. 
Cone  v.  Smyth  (3  Kan.  App.  607),  104. 
Conger  v.  Hudson    River  R.  R.  Co.  (6 

Duer  ]X.  V.].  375),  154. 
Conger  V.  Weaver  (20  \.   Y.  1  10),  78. 
Conley  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.  (95  Me. 

149),  605,  tin:. 
Conlin  v.  <  lonlin  (15  Rich.  Law  [s.  C.  |, 

201  i.  523. 
Conn.   Mut.  L.    Ins.  Co.  v.  V  Y.  iS    V 

II.  R.  R.  Co.  (25  Conn.  265),  495. 
Connell  v.  Stalker  (20  Misc.    ,  N.  Y.  ] 

423),   1 16. 
Connell]  v.  Nashville  (100  Tenn.  262; 
16  s.  W.  566),  65. 

Connelly  v.  Western  Oh.  Teleg.  Co. 
(|  7a.  L902]  7  Ya.  Law  Reg.  704), 
75,  91. 


lviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Connery   v.   Slavin  (23    Wkly.    Dig. 

[N.  Y.]  545),  176. 
Connoble  v.  Clark  (38  Mo.  App.  476), 

91. 
Connolly  v.   Knickerbocker*  Ice   Co. 

(114  N.  Y.  104),' 63,  177. 
Connors  v.    Railway    Co.    (71   Iowa, 

490),  499. 
Connors   v.   Walsh    (131   N.   Y.   590), 

369. 
Conrad   v.  Dobmeier  (57  Minn.  147), 

107. 
Conrad  v.  Dobmeier  ([Minn.]  58  N.  W. 

870),  94. 
Conroe  v.   Conroe  (47   Pa.   St.    198), 

422. 
Consol.  City  &  Chelsea  Park  Ry.  Co. 

v.  Carlson  (58  Kan.  02),  177. 
Consolidated    Coal    Co.     v.    Haeuni 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  South 

Orange  &  M.  Traction  Co.  (36  N.  J. 

Eq.  569),  71. 
Constitution  Pub.  Co.  v.  Way  (94  Ga. 

120),  420.    ■ 
Consumers  Pure  Ice  Co.  v.  Jenkins 

(58  111.  App.  519),  91. 
Conway  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(46  La.  Ann.  1429),  263. 
Conway  v.  New  Orleans  City  &  L.  R. 

Co.  (51  La.  Ann.  146),  214. 
Conway  v.  Nichol  (34  Iowa,  533),  460. 
Coogler  v.  Rhodes  (38  Fla.  240),  414, 

422. 
Cook  v.  Ansonia  (66  Conn.  413),  81. 
Cook  v.  Barkley  (2  N.  J.  L.  169),  415. 
Cook  v.  Cook  (100  Mass.  194),  393. 
Cook  v.  De  Kalb  Co.  (95  Ga.  218),  65. 
Cook  v.  Ellis  (6   Hill   [N.   Y.],  466), 


(146  111.  614),  215,  227. 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Maehl  (130 

111.  551),  597,  599,  618. 
Consol.  Coal  Co.  v.  Scheiber  (  65  111. 

App.  304),  255. 
Consolidated.     See  Consol. 
Consolidated  Kan.  City  S.  &  B.  Co.  v. 

Tinchert  (5  Kan.  App.  130),  256. 
Consolidated  Tract.   Co.  v.   Behr  (59 

N.  J.  L.  477),  171,  172. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Graham 

([N.  J.]  40  Atl.  773),  514. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Graham 

(62  N.  J.  L.  90),  101,  105,  212,  501, 

645,  646,  648,  668. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Haight 

(59  N.  J.  L.  577),  171. 
Consolidated    Traction    Co.    v 

mark  (60  N.  J.  L.  456),  172. 
Consolidated    Traction  Co.  v. 

(60  N.  J.  L.  244),  645,  660. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v. 

(30  Vr.  [N.  J.  L.]  275,  )175. 
Consolidated    Traction   Co.   v.  Lam- 

bertson  (59  N.    J.  L.  297),  220,  279. 
Consolidated    Traction    Co.   v.  Lam- 

bertson  (60  N.  J.  L.  457),  219. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Scott  (5S 

N.  J.  L.  682),  171,  177. 


113,  114,  372,  373. 
Cook  v.  Fogerty  (103  Iowa,  500;  57 

N.  W.  677),  63. 
Cook  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.   R.  Co.   (19  Mo. 

329),  247. 
Cook  v.  New  York  Cent.   R.    R.  Co. 

(17  N.  Y.  St.  R.  353),  91. 
Cook  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (10  Hun  [N.  Y.],  426),  595. 
Cook  v.  N.  Y.  C.   &  H.   R.  R.   Co.  (1 

N.  Y.  Snpp.  711),  274. 
Cook  v.   Redman  (45  Mo.  App.  397), 

99. 
Cook  v.  Ry.  Co.  (60  Cal.  604),  517. 
Cooley   v.    Trustees  of  N.   Y.   &   B. 

Bridge  (45    App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  243; 

CI  N.  Y.  Supp.  1),  65. 
Hoi-  I  Coon  v.  Moffitt  (3  N.  J.  L.  436),  467. 
Cooney  v.  Southern  Elec.  R.  Co.  (80 

Mo.  App.  226),  299. 
Cooper  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.   R.  Co. 

(22  Wis.  613),  647. 
Cooper  v.    Hopkins  (  [N.  II.]  48  Atl. 

100),  362,  364. 
Cooper  v.   Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry. 

Co.  (66  Mich.  261),  94,  514,045,646, 

647,  648,  653,  654,  655,  657,  600,  661, 

662,  669,  672. 
Cooper  v.  Mills  Co.  (69  Iowa,  350),  65. 


Hone 


Howe 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


lix 


([N.  J. 
Co.  (54 

It.      <'u 


Cooper  v.  Mulling  (30  <.a.  146),  214, 

227,  354. 
Cooper  v.  \.    V.    <  >.  A  W.    R.  Co.  (25 

App.    Div.    [X.  V.]  383),  -".IT,  562, 

50:3,  572. 
Cooper  v.  Shore    Elec.   Co. 

1899]  44  Atl.  023),  042. 
Cooper  v.  St.  Paul  Citj    P 

Minn.  379),  214. 
Cooper    v.     St.     Paul     City 

([Minn.]  56  X.  W.  588),  492. 
Cooper    v.    Sun    Print,    &     1'.     ASSOC. 

([X.  V.|  :.T  Fed.  566),  390,  102. 
Cooper  Mfg.  Co.   v.   Ferguson   (113 

U.  S.  727),  501. 
Cope  v.  Hampton  ( '<>.  ( (2  S.  < '.  17).  65. 
Cop.-  v.  Hastings  (183  Pa.  300;  41  W. 

X.  C.  it:::  28  Pitts.  L.  .!.  X.  S.  17:.: 

38  All.  717  1.  05. 
Copson  v.  N.  V.  X.   II.  &    II.  K.  Co. 

(171  Mass.  233),  249. 
Corbetl  v.  Twenty-third  St.  It.    Co. 

(114  X.  V.  579),  492,  495. 
Corbley  v.  Wilson  (71  111.  209),  401. 
Corcorain  v.  Ulster  &   I).   R.  Co.  (40 

X.  V.  Supp.  1117),  214. 
Corliss  v.  Worcester,  X.  &    II.  P.  Co. 

(68  X.  II.  404),  251,  511. 
Cormier  v.  Bouroue  (32    X.    P.   283), 

93. 
Cornelius  v.    Hambay    (150-  Pa.    St. 

359),  459. 
Cornell  v.  Putnam  (5S  X.  II.  535),  :305. 
Corning  v.  Corning  (6  X'.  V.  97),  266, 

376. 
Cornwall  v.  Mills  (44  X.  Y.  Supr.  45), 

500,  562,  580. 
Correster  v.  Kansas  City.  St.  J.  &  I '. 

P.  K.  Co.  (25  Mo.  App.  CIO).  82. 
Corridan  v.  Wilkinson  (20  Out.  App. 

184),  400. 
Conigan  v.  Dry  Dock    R.    K.    Co.  (0 

N.  Y.  St.  P.  213),  204. 
Corsicana   Cotton    oil  Co.  v.  Valley 

(14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  250).  302. 
Cortulla  v.  Kerr  (74  Tex.  89),  385. 
Corwin  v.  Walton   (18  Mo. '71),   118, 

114,  372. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  P.  Co.  (54 
X.  .1.  I..  283;  2:;  Atl.  810),  67. 

Cosulich  \.  Standard  <>n  <  o.  (122  N. 
V.  lis).  154. 

Cotulla  v.  Ken   171  'lex.  89),  397. 

Coughlan  v.  Baltimore  A:  O.  P.  Co. 
(24  Mil.  ,s4),  510.  55o. 

Coulter  v.   Pine   Township   (164  Pa. 

St.  5-13),  103. 

Countryman  v.  Fonda,  .1.  &  G.  K.  Co. 
(166  X.  V.  20]  1,  570. 

County.  Sir  Name  of.  See  Com- 
missioners. 

Courier-Journal  Co.  v.  Sallee  (20  Ky. 

P.  Rep.  r,34),  4(12. 
Courtney  v.   Clinton    (18    Iud.    App. 

0201,  ion.  362,  380. 
Courts  v.  Louisville  &  N.  K.  Co.  (99 

K\.  571).  35s. 
Courvoisier  v.    Raymond    (23  Colo. 

114),  265. 
Cousins    v.    Swords    (11     App.     Div. 

[X.  Y.j  338),  447,  456. 
Covell  v.  Wabash  I;.  Co.  (82  Mo.  App. 

180),  244. 
(ovell  v.  Wabash  P.  Co.  (82Mo.  App. 

1011).  215. 
Covington,     etc.,     Street   P.   Co.    v. 

Herrikoltz  (47  S.  W.  265),  177. 
Covington    S.    R.    T.   R.  Co.   v.    Pie] 

([Ky.]  8  S.  W.  440).  105. 
Covington   St.   Ry.   Co.  v.    Paeker  (9 

Bush  [Ky.].  455),  405.  514. 
Covington   Transfer  Co.  v.  Kelly  (36 

Ohio  St.  SO).   172. 
Cowden  v.  Wright  (24  Wend.  [X.  Y.] 
420),  225,  364. 

Cowen  v.    Knickerbocker  [ce  Co.  (0 

X.  Y.  St.  1;.  oi-_').  169. 
Cowen  v.  Winters  (96  led.  020).  340, 

313. 
Cowen  v.  Winters  (96  Fed.  0.",5).    111. 
Cowley   v.    Davidson   (10  Minn.  302). 

77. 
Cox  v.  Burbridge  (13.  C.  B.  [X.s.! 

430),  64. 
Cox  v.   Chic.  A    X.    W.    K.  Co.  (102 

Iowa,  711),  84. 


lx 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED   IN   VOL.   I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Cox  v.  Crumley  (5  Lea  [Tenn.],529), 

112. 
Cox  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  Rd.  Co.  (63  X.  Y. 

414),  492. 
Cox  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co. 

(11  Hun  [N.  Y.],  621),  564. 
Cox  v.  Richmond  &  1).  R.  Co.  (87  Ga. 

747),  80. 
Cox  v.  Strickland  (101  Ga.  482),  413. 
Cox  v.  Vanderkleed  (21  Iud.  164),  361, 

362. 
Coxhead  v.   Johnson   (20  App.   Div. 

[N.  Y.]  605),  214. 
Coxwell  v.  Prince  ( [Miss.]  19  So.  237), 

68. 
Coyle  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.   (20  L. 

R.  Ir.  409),  522. 
Coyne  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (42  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  617),  274. 
Crabb     v.    Nashville    Bk.     (6    Yerg. 

[Tenn.]  333),  102,  106. 
Grafter  v.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

300),  163. 
Craftsbury  v.  Greensboro  (66  Vt.  585), 

514. 
Craighead  v.  Railroad  Co.  (123  N.  Y. 

391),  163. 
Craker  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (36 

Wis.  657),  135,  136. 
Cram  v.  Hadley   (48  N.  H.  191),  115, 

119. 
Crampton  v.  Ivie  (124  N.  C.  591),  84. 
Cranfill  v.  Hayden  (22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

656),  392. 
Crank  v.   Forty-Second  St.,  etc.,  Ry. 

Co.  (53  Hun  [N.  Y.],  425),  243,  248. 
Craven   v.    Bloomingdale     (54   App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  266),  452. 
Craven  v.  Bloomingdale  (64  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  262),  452,  453. 
Craven  v.  Walker  (101  Ga.  845),  404. 
Crawford  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(121  N.  Y.  652),  246. 
Crawford  v.  Doggett  (82  Tex.    139), 

120. 
Crawford   v.   Mayor,  etc.,   of   Griffin 

([Ga.  1001]  39  S.  E.  988),  65. 
Crawford  v.  Parsons  (03  N.  H.438),  83. 


Crawford  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  (106  Ga. 

870),' 177,  514, 
Crawford  Co.  v.   Hathaway  (60  Neb. 

754),  76. 
Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Cross  Town  Rd. 

Co.  (56  How.  Pr.  [N.  Y.]  32),  488. 
Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Ciosstown  R.  Co. 

(19  Hun  [N.  Y.],  341),  570. 
Cregin   v.    Brooklyn    Ciosstown    R. 

Co.  (83  Hun  [N.  Y.],  595),  567,  576, 

580. 
Cregin    v.    Brooklyn    Crosstown    R. 

Co.  (18  Hun  [N.  Y.],  368),  562,  569, 

570. 
Creighton  v.  Evans  (53  Cal.  55),  76. 
Cremer  v.  Town  of  Portland  (36  Wis. 

100),  159. 
Crescent    City    Live    Stock    Co.    v. 

Butchers  Union,  etc.,  Co.    (120  U. 

S.  141),  430,  434. 
Cribbs    v.    Yore    (119     Mich.     237), 

387. 
Crippen  v.  Des  Moines  ( [Iowa]  78  N. 

W.  688),  291. 
Crites  v.  New  Richmond  (98  Wis.  55), 

283. 
Croasdale   v.   Bright    (6   Houst.   52), 

386. 
Croasdale  v.  Tantum  (6  Hous.  [Del.] 

60),  385. 
Crocker   v.    Crocker    (98   Fed.   702), 

458. 
Croco  v.   Oregon   Short  Line  R.  Co. 

(18  Utah,  311),  87. 
Croft  v.   Smith  ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  51 

S.  W.  1089),  558. 
Croker  v.  Chic.  &  Northwestern  Ry. 

Co.  (36  Wis.  057),  380. 
Crone   v.   Chic.  &   N.   W.  R.   R.  Co. 

(102  Wis.  196),  281. 
Cronin   v.  Sharp   (16  Pa.   Super.  Ct. 

78),  78. 
Crooks  v.  Hibbard  (58  111.  App.  568), 

101. 
Crosby  v.  Fitch  (12  Conn.  410),  153. 
Crosby  v.  Humphreys  (59  Minn.  92), 

369. 
Cross  v.  Carter  (100  Ga    632),  370. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


lxi 


R. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Cross  v.Elmira  (86  Hun  [N.Y.],  467),    dimming  v.   Brooklyn  City  R.  Co. 

214,  (104  V  V.  669),  176. 

Cross  v.Grant  (32  N.  H.  675),  460.      jCuinmings  v.   Hyatt  (64   Neb.  635), 

Cross  v.  Gutlircy  (2  Root  [Conn.],  90),  j     501. 
495,  Cummings  v.  Line  (45  N.   Y.  St.  II. 

56),  386,  390,  418. 
Cummings  v.   National   Furnace  Co. 

(60  Wis.  601),  150. 
Cummings  v.  Riley  (52  N.  II.  368),  95. 
Cunningham    v.    Alexander    (58   III. 

A  pp.  296),  106. 
Cunningham  v.   X.  Y.  C.  &  II.  R.  R. 

Co.  (49  Fed.  439),  274. 
Cunningham  v.  Seattle  Elec.  It.  iV-  1'. 

Co.  (3  Wash.  471),  338. 
Cunningham   v.    Wabash   K.  G'i>.    (79 

Mo.  App.  624),  70. 
Curl  v.  Chic.   K.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (63" 

Iowa,  417),  119. 


Cross  v.  Kansas  City,  F.   S.  <V  M 

Co.  (56  Mo.  App.  664),  349. 
Cross  v.  United  States  (1  Gall.  [U.  S.  | 

26),  95. 
douse  v  Chicago  it  X.  W.   Ry.  Co. 

(101  Wis.  473).  17'.'. 
Crouse  v.  Chicago  «S   N 

(102  Wis.  L96),  84,  256 
Crowley    V.    Panama     II. 

Barb.  [N.  Y.j  99),  495. 
Cruden  v.  Fentham  (2  Esp.  685),  63. 
Cruikshank  v.  Gordon  (118  N.  V.  178) 

381,  392,  400,  404. 
Cruse  v.  Aden  (127  111.  231),  472. 
Crutchfield  v.  Richmond,  etc.,  R.  R.    Cm-ran  v.  Folley  (67  111.  App.  543), 


W.   R. 
268. 
R.    Co. 


Co. 


(30 


Co.  (76  N.  C.  320),  154. 


101. 


Cuff  v.  Newark*  N.  Y.  R.  R.  Co.  (35  Curran  v.  A.  II.  Stange  Co.  (98  Wis. 

N.  J.  L.  17),  87.  598),  274.  279,  298. 

Culbertson  v.  Holliday  (50  Neb.  229),  Curran  v.  Warren  Chemical  &  Mfg. 

:,14.  Co.  (36  N.  Y.  153),  161. 

Cullanan  v.  Shaw  (24  Iowa,  111),  103.  Currier  v.  Swan  (63  Me.  324),  133. 

Cullar  v.  Mo.    K.   &  T.    Ry.   Co.  (84  Curtis  v.   Ritzman  <  [City  Ct  N.  Y.] 

Mo.  App.  347),  316,  317.  7  Misc.  254;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  259), 7. 

Culley  v.   Baltimore    &   <  >.    R.  Co.  (1  Curtis   v.    Rochester,  etc.,   R.  R.  Co. 

Hughes,  536),  484.  (20  Barb.  [X.  Y.]  282),  227. 


Culloughv.  Walton  (ii  Ala.  492),  111. 
Cumberland  &  O.  C.   Co.  v.  Hutch- 

ings  (65  Me.  140),  99. 
Cumberland  &   P.    R.   Co.   v.   State, 

Hogan  (4.-)  Md.  234),  540. 
Cumberland,  etc.,  Iron  Co.  v.  Scally 

(27  Md.  589),  152. 
Cumberland  Teleph.  &  Tel.  Co.   v. 

United  Elec.  K.  Co.  (93  Tenn.   192), 

67. 
Cuming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.  (109 

X.  Y.  95),  514. 
dimming   v.    Arrowsmith   (5  C.   H. 

Rec.  [X.  Y.]  62),  401. 
Cumming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(21  Abb.  X.  C.  1).  300,  306. 
dimming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(24  X.  Y.  St.  R.  718),  214,  306. 


Curtis  v.    Rochester,  ete..  R.  Co.  (18 

X.  Y.  534),  150,  215,  24:'.,  244. 
Curtis  v.   Sioux   City  &   II.    P.  R.  Co. 

(  [Iowa]  54  N".  W.  339),  354. 
Cushing   v.   Dill  (2  Scam.   fill.  ]  461), 

501. 
Cushman  v.  Ryan    (1  Story  [U.  S.  C. 

C],   91),  377. 
Custard  v.  Burdett  (15  Tex.  456),  78. 
Cuthbert  v.  Galloway  (35  Fed.  466), 

450. 
Cutler  v.  Smith  (57  111.  252).  1  B. 
Daggett  v.  State  (I  Conn.  61),  501. 
Dailey  v.  Houston  (.-,.",  Mo.  361),  268. 
Daiu  v.  WyckolY  (18  N.  Y.  47).   168. 
Dain  v.  Wycoff  (7  N".  Y.  191),  167. 
Daine  v.  Kenney  (25  N.  II.  318),  415. 
Daisley  v.  Dun  (107  Fed.  218),  391. 


lxii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    Vol,. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Dale  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 

(57  Kan.  601),  508. 
Daley  v.  Norwich,  etc.,  It.  It.  Co.  (20 

Conn.  591),  175,  176. 
Dallas  v.  .Jones  [(Tex.  Civ.  App.]  54 

S.  W.  606),  -254,  310.    ■ 
Dallas  v.   Webb   (22   Tex.   Civ.    App. 

48;  54  S.  W.  398),.65. 
Dallas  &  W.   R.   Co.   v.  Spickei    (63 

Tex.  -127),  515,  527,    528,  531,  532, 

535,  548,  550. 
Dallas  City  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Beeman  (74 

Tex.  291),  159,  522. 
Dallas  Cotusol.  Tract.  It.  Co.  v.  Hurley 

(  [Tex.]  31  S.  W.  73),  522. 
Dallas  Rapid   Transit  R.   Co.   v.   El- 
liott ( [Tex.]  26  S.  W.  544),  523. 
Dalman  v.  Koning  (54  Mich.  320),  408. 
Dalton  v.  Beers   (38  Coun.  529),  111, 

120,  124,  133,  369. 
Dalton  v.  Southeastern  Ry.   (4  C.  B. 

296),  514, 521,  521,  531,  535,  537,  538, 

576,  660. 
Daly  v.  Byrne  (77  N.  Y.  182),  404. 
Daly  v.   Dublin  Wicklow  &  W.  Ry. 

(30  L.  R.  Ir.  514),  523. 
Daly  v.  New  Haven  (00  Conn.  644;  38 

Atl.  397),  65. 
Daly  v.  Stoddard    (66   Ga.    145),  503, 

511. 
Dalzell  v.  Long  Island   R.   R.  Co.   (6 

N.  Y.  Supp.  167),  214. 
Damni   v.  Damm  (109  Mich.  619;  63 

Am.  St.  Rep.  601),  661. 
Dannenberg  v.  Guernsey  (  [Ga.]  7  S. 

E.  105),  103. 
Danner  v.  South  Carolina  R.  R.  Co. 

(4  Rich.  [S.  C]  329),  166. 
Danville  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown  ( [Va. 

1894]  18  S.  E.  278),  214. 
Danziger  v.  Silbertban  (21   Civ.  Pro. 

[X.  Y.]  283),  95. 
Darrigan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (52  Conn. 

285),  290. 
Darrow  v.  Cornell  (12  App.  Div.  [N. 

Y.]  004),  97. 
Dave  v.  Morgans  L.  &   T.  R.  &  S.  S. 

Co.  (47  La.  Ann.  576),  339. 


Davidow  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  (85 

Fed.'943),  504,  505,  506,  509. 
Davidson  v.  Denver  Tramway  Co.  (4 

Col.  App.  283),  171. 
Davidson  v.  (ioodall   (18  N.   H.  423), 

115,  467. 
Davidson  v.  South  Pac.  Co.  (44  Fed. 

476),  251. 
Davies  v.  Lathrop  (12  Fed.  353),  507. 
Davies  v.  Thompson  ( [Tex  Civ.  App.] 

50  S.  W.  1062),  543,  544. 
Davis  v.  Fish  (9  G.  Greene   [Iowa], 

406),  91. 
Davis  v.  Forbes  (171    Mass.  548;  51 

N.  E.  20),  68. 
Davis  v.  Gray  (16  Wall.   [U.  S.]  220), 

507. 
Davis  v.  Griffith  (4  Gill  &  J.   [Md.] 

342),  418. 
Davis  v.  Guarnieri  (45  Ohio  St.  470), 

174,  566. 
Davis  v.    Justice    (31    Ohio  St.  359), 

472. 
Davis  v.  Marxhausen  ( [Mich.]  61  N. 

Y.  504),  420. 
Davis  v.    Nichols   ( [Ark.]    15   S.  W. 

880),  597. 
Davis   v.    Standisb  (26  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

608),  268,  472. 
Davis  v.  St.    Louis,   I.    M.  &   S.    Ry. 

Co.    (53  Ark.    117),    495,   503,   511, 

597,  598,  600,  007,  634. 
Davis  v.  St.  Vincent's   Inst.  (61  Fed. 

277),  515. 
Davis  v.  Tribune   Job   Print  Co.  (70 

Minn.  95),  104. 
Dawson  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 

(6  Ky.  L.  Rep.  668),  139. 
Dawson    v.    Troy    (49  Hun  [N.    Y.], 

322),  240. 
Day  v.    Holland  (15  Oreg.  464),    120, 

122,  143,  145. 
Day  v.  Woodworth  (13  How.    [U.  S.] 

371),  94,  112,  113. 
Dayton  v.  Parke  (142  N.  Y.  391),  78. 
Death   v.    Rapid    R.    Co.   (119  Mich. 

512),  291. 
Deane  v.  Clayton  (7  Taunt.  490),  67. 


TABLE    '»|     casus   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


1  x  i  i  i 


[References  are  to  Sections. 


Debevoisc  v.  N.  V.  L.    E.  .v-  W.  R.  R. 

Co.  (98  \.  V.  877),  195,  505,  508. 
Decatur  v.  (.rami    Rapids   &  T.   R. 

Co.  (I  19  Ind.  .".77),  80. 
Decatur   v.    Hamilton    (89    111.   A pi'- 

561),  224. 
Decatur  v.  Stoops  (21   1ml.  App.  397; 

l  Repr.  516;  52  V  E.  623),  63,  212. 
Decker  v.   BicSorley   (111    Wis.   91), 

648,  655,  657,  671. 
Decoux  v.  Lieux  (33    La.    Ann.  392), 

431,  432. 
Deei>  Min.  &  I).  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald  (21 

Colo.  533),  214. 
Degnan  v.   Brooklyn   City  R.  Co.  (14 

Mis.-.  [X.  V.]  408),  '-'14. 
De    Ham    v.    Mexican     N.    H.    Co. 

( [Tex.]  22  S.  W.  2  19),  508,  500. 
Dehler  v.  State,  Bierck  (22  Ind.  App. 

383),  4(54. 
Deisen   v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  (). 

R.  Co.  (4:;  Mi ii ii.  454),  2G7. 
De  Kalb  v.  Ashley  Oil  HI.  App.  647), 

214. 
De  La  Vergne   Refrigerating  Mach. 

Co.  v.  McLeroth  (00  111.  App.  529), 

207. 
Delaware  &  A.  Teleg.  &  Teleph.  Co. 

v.  Elvins  (  [N.  .1.]  43  Atl.  903),  90. 
Delaware  &  Hudson  C.  Co.  v.  Torrey 

(33  Pa.  St.  14:'.),  74. 
Delaware,   etc.,    R.  K.    Co.  v.  Toffey 

(38  X.  .1.  L.  525),  L61. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.   R.  Co.  v.  Roaiefs 

( [C.  C.  App.  3(1  C]  70  Fed.  21),  279. 
Delaware    State  L.    <ft  M.    Ins.  Co.  v. 

Croasdale  (6  Houst.  [Del.]  40),  381, 

384. 
De   Loge   v.    New  York   Cent.  &  II. 

R.  R.  R.  Co.  (02  Hun   [N.Y.],  1  19), 

172. 
De  Long  V.  Delaware   Lack.  A-  \\".  1.'. 

R.  Co.  (37  Hun  [N.  Y.],  282),  292. 
Demann  v.  Eighth    Ave.    R.  Co.  ( [C. 

P.]  10  Misc.  [X.  Y.]  101),  218. 
Deniarest  v.   Little  (47   X.  J.  I..  28), 

621,    645,    648,    649,  851,  656,  657, 

665. 


Demenstein  v.  Richardson  (2 

Dist.  R.  825),  •-"■'.:. 
Democral  Pub.  <  o.  ■. .  Joni     (83  rex. 

302;  18  s.  W.  652),  87,  391. 
Deni  v.  Pennsylvania  K.  Co.  (lvl    l'a. 

525),  508. 
Denis  v.  ShoultZ    (25  Out.    App.  131), 

440. 
Denison  v.    Hyde  (0  Conn.  57s).  113. 
Denkeu  v.  Canavan  (17  Misc.  j  N.  Y.j 

392;  39  \.  V.  Supp.  1078),  20. 
Dennich  v.  Central  l;.  R.  Co.  (103  U. 

S.  11),  495,  507. 
Denning   v.   Chicago,  H.    I.  &   P.  R. 

Co.  (80  Mo.  App.  152),  219,  221. 
Dennisou  v.  Lewis  (  [D.  C.    App.]  23 

Wash.  L.  Rep.  138),  81. 
Dent   v.     Bournemouth  Corp.  (66  L. 

J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  395),  65. 
Denton  v.   Orderay  (108  Iowa,  487), 

240,  263,  264,  366. 
Denver  v.    Snowies    (17   Colo.    204), 

501. 
Denver  v.  Shcrret  (88  Fed.  226),  248, 

249. 
Denver  v.  Stein  (25  Colo.  125;    I  Am. 

Neg.  R.  125),  212,  21  1. 
Dever  &   R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Bedell  (11 

Colo.  App.  139),  84. 
Deuver   &   R.   G.    K.   Co.   v.    Bourne 

([Colo.]  16  Pac.  839),  104. 
Denver*  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris  (122 

L.  s.  COS),  135,  136,  138,  242. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Lorentzen 

([C.  C.  App.  8th  0.]  79  Fed.  291), 

255. 
Denver  &  K.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Holler  (100 

Fed.  748),  218,  60S. 
Denver  A-  R.   G.    R.    Co.    v.   Schmidl 

([Colo.]  16  Pac.  842),  104. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer  (25 

Colo.  0),  104,  498. 
Denver  &  R.  G.    R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan  (21 

Colo.  302),  200. 
Denver  Consol.  Lice  Co.  v.  Simpson 

(21  Colo.  371),  159. 
Denver  Consol.  Tramway  Co.  v.  Riley 

([Colo.  App.]  59  Pac  476),  316,822. 


Ixiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Denver,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan  (17  Colo. 

98),  166. 
Denver,  T&  <i.    R.  Co.  v.  Hutchins 

(:;i  Neb.  572),  91. 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Cloud  ( [Colo. 

App.    L895]   40Pac.   779),  117,  327, 

342. 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  y.  Re  id  ( [Colo. 

App.]  35  Tar,  269),  274. 
Deobold  v.  Opperman(lll  N.Y.531), 

74. 
Depuy  v.  Cook  (90  Hun  [N.  Y.],  43), 

470. 
Derham  v.  Derham  ( [Mich.]  82  N.  W. 

218),  387,  390,  402. 
Derr  v.    Lehigh  Valley   R.    Co.   (158 

Pa.  365),  508. 
Derrick  v.  Jones  (1  Stew.  [Ala.]  18), 

106. 
Derry  v.  Flitner  (118  Mass.  131),  90. 
Deserant  v.  Cerillos   Coal  R.   R.   Co. 

(  [N.    M.    1898]  5  Am.    Neg.    Rep. 

206),  151. 
De  Sourcey  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (39 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  79),  276. 
Detroit  Daily  Post  v.  McArthur  (16 

Mich.  447),  111,  116,  136. 
Detzer  v.  Stroll   Brew  Co.  (119  Mich. 

282),  214. 
Devendorf  v.  Wert  (42  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

227),  77. 
Devor  v.  Van  Vranken  (29  Hun  [N. 

Y.],  201),  563. 
De  Walt  v.  Bartley  (146  Pa.  529),  501. 
De  Wardener  v.   Nat.   St.   R.    Co.   (1 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y]  240),  214. 
Dewey  v.  Chicago,  M.  A-  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(99  Wis.  455;   7-")  N.  W.  74),  72. 
Dewitt  v.  Greenfield  (5  Ohio  St.  22.".), 

422. 
Deyo  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

(34  N.  Y.  9),  151. 
Dibble  v.  Morris  (26  Conn.  426),  112, 

120. 
Dibble  v.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.   (25 

Barb.  [N.  Y.]  183),  561,  564. 
Dickens  v.  New  York  C.  R.   Co.   (1 

Abb.  Dec.  504),  560,  561,  562,  592. 


Dickens  v.  X.  Y.  Cent.  Rd.  (28  Barb. 

[X.  Y.]  41),  488. 
Dickens  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (23 

N.  Y.  158),  495,  560,  580. 
Dickens  v.   Shepherd   (22  Md.   399), 

393. 
Dickey  v.  McDonnell  (41  111.  62),  370. 
Dickinson  v.  Hart  (142  N.  Y.  183),  75. 
Dickinson  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  (2  H. 

&  C.  735),  523. 
Dickson  v.  Missouri   P.   R.  Co.   (104 

Mo.  491),  172. 
Dickson  v.  Omaha,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (124 

Mo.  140),  161. 
Dieffenbach  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.  (5  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  91),  214. 
Diers   v.    Edwards   (23  Ky.   L.   Rep. 

500),  78. 
Diers  v.   Mallow  (46  Neb.  121),  449, 

454,  455. 
Dietrich  v.  Northampton  (138  Mass. 

14),  308. 
Dietzman  v.   Mullin  ( [Ky.   1900]  57 

S.  W.  247),  458. 
Dillingham  v.  Anthony  (73  Tex.  47), 

136. 
Dillingham   v.   Richards  ( [Tex.  Civ. 

App.]  27  S.  W.  1061),  214. 
Dillingham  v.  Scales  ( [Tex.]  24  S.  W. 

975),  522. 
Dimmey  v.  Ry.  Co.  (27  W.  Va.  32),  556. 
Dinnihan  v.   Lake  Ont.   B.  Imp.  Co. 

(8  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  509),  514,  586, 

589. 
Dinning  v.  State  (123  Cal.  316),  489. 
Dinsmore   v.    Anstil    (Minor    [Ala.], 

89),  106. 
Dise  v.   Met.   St.   Ry.   Co.   (22  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  97),  214. 
Distad  v.  Shanklin  (11  S.  D.  1),  107. 
Distin  v.   Rose  (69  N.  Y.   122),  400, 

404. 
District  of  Columbia  v.   Brewer  (23 

Wash.  L.  Rep.  724),  161. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Dempsey  (13 

App.  D.  C.  533),  84. 
District  of   Columbia  v.  Haller  ([D. 

C.  App.]  22  Wash.  L.  Rep.  761),  280. 


TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


lxv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


District  of  Columbia   v.    Woodbury 

(136  l'.  S.  450),  218,  227. 
Dixon  v.  Hell  (1  Starkie,  287),  255. 
Dixon  v.  Pluns  (98  Cal.  384),  150. 
Dixon    v.    Scott   (74    111.    App.    277), 

214. 
Dobbins  v.  Duquid  (65  111.  464),  L34. 
Dobbins  v.  Wesl    End  St.  R.  Co.  (168 

Mass.  556;  47  N.  E.  428),  63. 
Dobson  v.  Cothran  (34  S.  C.  518),  L08. 
Doe  v.  Filliter  (13  M.  &  W.  47),  111. 
Doedt  v.  Wiswall  (15  How.   Pr.  ([N. 

Y.]  125),  488,  494. 
Doherty  v.  Lord    (8   Misc.      [X.    Y.] 

227),  242. 
Doherty  v.   Shields  (86  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

30.3),  488. 
Dolan   v.  Fagan  (63  Barb.     [X.  Y.J 

73),  375,  377. 
Dolby  v.  Heain  (1  Marv.  [Del.]  153), 

151. 
Dolevin  v.  Wilder  (7   Hob.    [X.  Y.] 

319),  416. 
Dollaid  v.  Roberts  (130  X.  Y.  269), 

243,  305,  306. 
Dollaid  v.  Roberts  (28  X.   Y.  St.    R. 

569),  300. 
Donahew   v.    Kansas    City    (136   Mo. 

657;  38  S.  W.  571),  65. 
Donahue   v.  Wabash,  St.    L.   &   P.  R. 

Co.  (83  Mo.  r,-13),  162. 
Donald  v.  Scott  ([U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  C] 

67  Fed.  854),  65. 
Donaldson  v.  Mississippi,  etc.,  R,  R, 

Co.  (18  Iowa,  280),  328. 
Donnell  v.  Jones  (17  Ala.  689),  81. 
Donnelly  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  (10!) 

N.  Y.  16),  172. 
Donnelly  v.   Harris  (11  111.  126),  111, 

371,  377. 
Donnelly  v.   Hufsebmid   (79  Cal.  71), 

255. 
Donnelly  v.  Rochester  (166  N.  Y.  315), 

It;:1,. 
Donnelly  v.  Swain  (3  Phil.  [Pa.]  03), 

412. 
Donovan  v.  Man  R.  Co.  (49  X.  Y.  St. 

R.  722),  136. 
5 


Donovan    v.    X< m    Orleans    (11    La. 

Ann.  711).  62. 
Doorman   v.    Jenkins  (2  Ad.   &    EI. 

261),  L59. 
Doran   v.    Brooklyn  &    X.    Y.    Ferry 

Co.  (46   N.   V.  St  K.  310;  19  X.  Y. 

Supp.  172).  338. 
Doran   v.  Troy  (22  Wkly.   Dig.  280), 

L76. 
Doremus  v.  Hennessy  (62  111.  App. 

391),  1 15. 
Dorman  v.  Anus  (Gil.  [Minn.]  347), 

74,  7'1. 
Dorman  v.   Broadway  R.  Co.  (16  N. 

Y.  St.  R.  753),  564. 
Dorman  v.  Sebree  (  [Ky.]  52  S.  W. 

809),  4.-.  7,  460. 
Dormer  v.  Alcatraz  Pav.  Co.  (16  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  407),  256,  324. 
Don    v.    McCullough   (8   App.    Div. 

327),  165. 
Donah  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  (65  Miss. 

14),  220,  344,  348. 
Dorris   v.    King    (  [Tenn.    Ch.    App. 

1899]  54  S.  W.  683),  75. 
Dors  v.  Jones  (5  How.  [Miss.]   158), 

401. 
Dorsey  v.  Manlove  (11  Cal.  553),  120, 

12  1. 
Doss  v.    Mo.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  (59  Mo. 

27  i,  L39,  186. 
Doty  v.  Postal  (87  Mich.  143),  472. 
Dougherty   v.   Shown    (48  Tenn.   [1 

Ileisk]  302),  111,  112. 
Dougherty  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co. 

i  15  \.  Y.  St.  K.  154),  214. 
Douglass    v.    MT'allistcr   (3    Cranch 

[U.  S.],  298),  94. 
Dowd    v.    Westinghouse   Air   Brake 

Co.  (132  Mo.  57'.').  107. 
Dowdell  v.  King  (97  Ala.  685),   157. 
Dowdle  v.  Stein  (103  Ga.  94;  29  S.  E. 

595),  102. 
Downend  v.  City  of   Kansas  (156  Mo. 

00:  56  S.  W.  902),  65. 
Downing  v.  Brown  (3  Colo.  571),  401. 
Doyle  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.  (166  Mass. 

492),  359. 


lxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    C1TKD    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Doyle  v.  Levy  (89  Hun  [N.  Y.],  350),  j  Duke  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R. 
382.  347),  252. 


Doyle  v.   Maine  S.  L.   R.   Co.  (  [Me.] 

13  All.  27.")),  104. 
Doyle  v.  Manhattan   Ry.  Co.  (  37  N. 

Y.  St.  R.  004),  215. 
Drake  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  K.  R.  Co. 

(51  Pa.  St.  240),  161., 
Draper  v.  Baker  (61  Wis.  450),  374. 
Dressel  v.   Shipmau   (57  Minn.   23), 

418. 
Drew  v.  Sixth   Ave.  11.  R.  Co.  (26  N. 

Y.  49),  243,  300. 
Drinkwater  v.   Dinsmore   (80  N.  Y. 

390),  215,  218,  227,  231,  251. 
Driscoll  v.  Collins  (31  N.  B.  604),  110. 
Drown  v.  Allen  (91   Pa.  St.  394),  422. 
Drown  v.  Hamilton  ( [N.  II.]  44  Atl. 

79),  109. 
Drum  v.  Harrison  (S3  Ala.  384),  75. 
Druinm  v.   Cessnum   (61   Kan.   467), 

437. 
Drumm  v.  Cessnum  (58  Kan.  331),  109. 
Duberly  v.  Gunning  (4  Term  R.  657), 

457. 
Dublin   Cotton   Oil    Co.    v.    Jarrard 

([Tex.   Civ.  App.]  40  S.   W.  531), 

214,  312. 
Duche  v.  Wilson  (37  Hun  [N.  Y.],  519), 

124. 
Duchesse  D'Auxy  v.  Porter  (41  Fed. 

68),  507. 
Duckworth  v.  Johnson  (4  H.  &  N.  653), 

524,  525,  527,  528,  531,  537,  541,  548. 
Dudley  v.  Camden,  etc.,  Ferry  Co.  (13 

Vr.  [N.  Y.]  25),  159,  161. 
Dudley  v.  Front  St.  Cable  R.  Co.  ([C. 

C.  D.  Wash.]  73  Fed.  128),  246. 
Dudley  v.  Tilton  (14  La.  Ann.  283), 

62,  74,  76. 
Dudley  v.  Westcott  (44  N.   Y.  St.  R. 

882),  176,  514. 
Duffy  v.  Mo.  R.  Co.  (19  Mo.  App.  380), 

177. 
Duggan  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (159 

Pa.  248;  33  W.  N.   C.  381;  28  Atl. 

182;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  X.  S.  13;  39  Am. 

St.  Rep.  672),  7,  448,  449. 


R.  Co.   (99  Mo. 


Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Germain  (12  How. 

St.  Tr.  927),  457. 
Duhiney  v.  St.  Louis  Sugar   Ref.  Co. 

(42  Mo.  App.  659),  77. 
Dull  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Co. 

(21  Ind.  App.  571),  156. 
Dullea  v.  Taylor  (35  Q.  B.  [Ont.]  395), 

91. 
Dun  v.  Maier  (82  Fed.  169),  393. 
Dunbar  v.  Cowger  (68  Ark.  444),  361. 
Duncan  v.   Stalcup   (18    N.    C.    440), 

120. 
Duncan  v.  State  (42  Neb.  804),  65. 
Dunham  v.  Clare  (71  L.  J.  K.  B.  683), 

533. 
Dunlap  v.  Ross  (43  N.  Y.  St.  R.  509), 

214,  380. 
Dunlavey  v.  Watson  (38  Iowa,   398), 

473. 
Dunn  v.  Ballantyne  (5  App.  Div.  483), 

150. 
Dupont  v.  Quebec  S.  S.  Co.  (Rap.  Jud. 

Quebec  11  S.  C.  188),  506,  508. 
Du  Puy  v.  Cook  (90  Hun  [N.  Y.],  43, 

471,  472,  473. 
Durfee  v.  Union  P.   R.   Co.  (9  Utah, 

213),  338. 
Durgin  v.  McNally  (82  Cal.  375),  16. 
Durgin  v.  Neal  (82  Cal.   595;  23  Pac. 

133),  16. 
Durham  v.  Jones  (119  N.  C.  262),  432. 
Durham    v.     Musselman    (2    Blackf. 

[Ind.]  96),  67,  69. 
Durkee  v.  Central  Pac.   R.  R.  Co.  (56 

Cal.  388),  300. 
Durkee  v.  Del.  &  H.    Canal  Co.  (88 

Hun,  471),  165. 
Durrell  v.  Johnson  (31  Neb.  796),  166. 
Duryee  v.   Mayor,  New  York  (76  N. 

Y.  477),  501. 
Dwight  v.   Germania  Life   Ins.   Co. 

(103  N.  Y.  341),  152. 
Dwyer  v.  Buffalo  General  Elec.  Co. 

(20  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  124),  152. 
Dwyer  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R. 

Co.  ([Iowa]  51  N.  W.  244),  498. 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Ixvn 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Dwyer   v.    Hickler  (43   N.   Y.  St  R. 

221),  214. 
Dwyer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  P.  K.  Co.  (52 

Fed.  87),  607,  624,  627. 
Dwyer  v.  Tulane  Ed.  F.  Adm.  (47  La. 

Amu.   1232),  89. 

Dwyer  v.  Wabash  K.  Co.  (60  Mo.  App. 

335),  201. 
Dyer  v.  Cranston  1'rintWorks  Co.  (22 

R.  I.  508),  76. 
Dyer  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  (71  N.  V.  228), 

169,  172. 
Dyer  v.  Talcott  (16  111.  300),  165. 
Dyke  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  (45  N.  Y.  113), 

331. 
Eagle  &  P.   Mfg.    Co.  v.  Gibson   (62 

Ala.  369),  76. 
Eagleton  v.   Kabrich   (66    Mo.   App. 

231),  265,  432,  435,  442. 
Eagon  v.  Eagon  (60  Kan.  597),  462. 
Eakin  v.  Scott  (70  Tex.  442),  97. 
Kan  v.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.  R.  Ry.  Co. 

(95  Wis.  69),  503,  643,  648. 
Earl  v.  Crouch  (131    N.  Y.   613),   150. 
Earl  v.  Tupper  (45  Vt.  275),  144. 
East  Line  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee  ( [Tex.] 

9S.  W.  004),  94. 
East  Line  &  Red  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Smith 

(65  Tex.  167),  528. 
East  Moline  Co.   v.   Weir  Plow    (95 

Fed.  250),  70. 
Easton  v.  Rank  of  Stockton  (66  Cal. 

123),  437. 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Doughtery  (71    111. 

App.  490),  214. 
East  St.  Louis  Connecting  R.  Co.  v. 

Rearaes  (75  111.  App.  28),  214. 
East  St.    Louis  Elect.   St.   R.  Co.  v. 

Burns  (77  111.  App.  529),  514,  605. 
East  Tennessee,   V.   &  G.   R.  Co.   v. 

Fleetwood  (90  Ga.  23),  333,  375,  376, 

377. 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &   G.   R,  Co.  v. 

Hughes  ([Ga.]  17  S.   E.  949),  300, 

305,  514. 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 

King   ([Ga.]    14   S.    E.    708),   207, 

358. 


East  Tennessee,   V.   &  G.   R.   Co.   v. 

Lee  (90  Tenn.  570).  122,  1-7. 
Bast  Tennessee,  V.  &  (>.   B.  Co.   r. 

Lockharl  (79  Ala.  315),  84. 
East  Tennessee,   V.  A:  <;.  R,  Co.  v. 

McClure  (94  6a  658),  -'48. 
East  Tennessee,   V.   &   <•.  It.   Co.   v. 

Miller  (95  Ga.  738;  22  S.  E.  660),  63. 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  <-.    K.    Co.   v. 

Smith  (94  Ga.  5S0),  291. 
Eastwood  v.  Retsoff  Mining  Co.  (86 

Hun  [X.  Y.]  91),  152,  165,  562. 
Echmondson  v.  Kentucky  C.  B.  Co.  ( 16 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  459),  502. 
Ecker.l  v.   Chicago  A:   X.    R.   Co.  (70 

Iowa,  353),  252. 
Eckman  v.  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 

(169  111.  312),  203. 
Ecliff  v.    Wabash  R.   Co.   (64    Mich. 

196),  177. 
Economy  Light  &  P.  Co.  v.  Stephen 

(187  111.  137),  602,  607,  617,  619. 
Eddy  v.  Wallace  ([C.  C.  App.  8th  C] 

49  Fed.  801),  243. 
Edelmann  v.  St.   Louis  Transp.  Co. 

(3  Mo.  App.  503),  122. 
Eden   v.    Lexington,   etc.,  R.  R.   Co. 

(14  B.   Mon.    [Ky.]  204),   227,  322, 

488,  495. 
Eders  v.  Skannal  (35  La.  Ann.  1000), 

83. 
Edes  v.   Boardman  (58   N.  H.  580), 

66. 
Edge  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.    (57  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  29),  262. 
Edgerton  v.  O'Neil  (4  Kan.  App.  73), 

80. 
Edgett  v.  Finn  ([Tex.   Civ.   App.]  36 

S.  W.  S30),  481. 
Edsall  v.  Brooks  (2  Bobt.  [X.  Y.]414), 

382. 
Education.     See  Board  ot 
Edwards  v.  Beach  (3  Day  [Conn.], 

447),   113. 
Edwards  v.    Kansas  City  Times  Co. 

(32  Fed.  813),  385,  41(1,  417. 
Edwards  v.  Leavitt  (43  Vt.  126),  120, 

124,  369,  372. 


lxviii  TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
30  La.  Ann.  926),  I  Ellis  v.  Simonds  (168  Mass.  316),  432. 


Edwards  v.  Kicks 
132. 

Edwards  v.  San  Jose  Printing  &  P. 

Co.  (99  Cal.  4:11),  384,  412,  417. 
Edwards  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  &  S.  It.  Co. 

(79  M.i.  App.  25V),  240. 
Edwards  v.   Three  Rivers   (96  Mich. 

025),  297. 
Egan  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co. 

(12  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  550),  212. 
Egan  v.  Murray  (80  Iowa,  180),  464. 
Eggett  v.  Allen  (106  Wis.  60:)),  443. 
Ehrgott  v.  New  York  (96  N.  Y.  264), 

87,  179,  21."),  229,  237. 
Ehrisman   v.  East    Harrishuig    City 

Pass.  Ry.  Co.  (150  Penn.  St.  180), 

171. 
Eiringer  v.   Brooklyn  II.   R.  Co.  (13 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  389),  214,  274,  278. 
Eilers  v.  Wood  (64  Wis.  422),  503. 
Eiswald  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.  (60  Ca. 

496),  79. 
Elhin  v.  Dean  (33  Md.  135),  111,  125. 
Eldridge  v.  Atlas  Steamship  Co.  (58 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  98),  288. 
Eldredge  v.  Eldredge   (79   Hun   [N. 

Y.],  511),  462. 
Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers  (110  Ala.  331), 

148,  160. 
Electric  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Lefevre  ( [Tex. 

Civ.  App.  1900]  55  S.  W.  396),  551. 
Elfers  v.  Woolley  (116  N.  Y.  294),  379. 
Elgin  v.  Anderson  (89  111.  App.  527), 

229. 
Elgin  v.  Riordan   (21  111.   App.   600), 

194. 
Elgin  J.  &  E.  R.   Co.   v.   Eselin   (68 

111.  App.  96),  214. 
Eliason  v.  Crove  (85  Iud.  215),  122. 
Elkhart  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldorf   (17 

Ind.  App.  29),  100. 
Ellerbee  v.   Carolina  C.   R.  Co.  (118 

N.  C.  1024),  152. 
Elliott  v.  Barry  (34  Hun  [N.  Y.],  129), 

481. 
Elliott  v.  Herz  (29  Mich.  202),  116,  119. 
Elliott  v.  Van  Buren  (33  Mich.   47), 
372. 


Ellsler   v..  Brooks    (22    Jones    &    S. 

[N.  Y.]  73),  77. 
Ellsworth   v.   Chicago,  B.   &   Or.   R. 

( [Iowa]  63  N.  W.  584),  340. 
Ellsworth  v.  Fairbury  (41  Neb.  881), 

211,  294. 
Ellsworth  v.  Fletcher  (59  Kan.  772), 

251. 
Ellsworth  v.  Potter  (41  Vt.  685),  111. 
Ellsworth  v.   Thompson    (13    Wend. 

[N.  Y.]  658),  375. 
Elmer  v.  Fessenden  (154  Mass.  427), 

412. 
El  Paso  Co.  v.  Bish  (18  Colo.  474),  65. 
Elsam  v.  Fawcett  (2  Esp.  562),  460. 
Elsas  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (56 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  161),  276. 
Else  v.  Ferris  Auth.  (N.  P.  [N.  Y.] 

36),  418. 
Elshire   v.    Schuyler   (15   Neb.    561), 

611. 
Eltringham  v.  Earhart  (67  Miss.  488), 

263,  264,  370. 
Ely  v.  Davis  (111  N.  C.  24),  447. 
Emblem  v.   Myers   (6  H.   &    N.   54), 

111. 
Emory  v.  Addis  (71  111.  273),  472. 
Engel  v.   Fischer  (44  111.   App.  362), 

107. 
Engelken  v.   Ililger    (43  Iowa,  563), 

481. 
Engle  v.  Jones  (51  Mo.  316),  119,  127. 
Englert  v.  Kruse  (8  N.  Y.  St.  R.  375), 

265. 
English  v.   Caldwell   (30  Mich.  362), 

79. 
English  v.  State  (31  Fla.  340),  501. 
Ennis  v.  Buckeye  Pub.  Co.  (44  Minn. 

105),  83. 
Enos  v.  Cole  (53  Wis.  235),  79. 
Enos  v.  Enos,  (135  N.   Y.  609),  406, 

425. 
Enquirer  Co.  v.  Johnston  ( [C.C.  App. 

7th  C]  72  Fed.  443),  385,  426. 
Ensor  v.  Bolgiano  (67  Md.  190),  415. 
Ephland    v.  Missouri  P.   R.    Co.   (57 
Mo.  App.  147),  231. 


TABLE   OF   (ASKS   CITED    IN    Vol.. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Ixix 


Epstein   v.  Berkowski  (01  III.   App.    Evans  v.  Evana  (68  Law  J.  Prob.  fO), 


498),  434. 
Erdman  v.  Walkerton  (20  Ont.  App. 

444),  542. 
Erickson    v.    Barker    ([Iowa]    49   X. 

W.  838),  274. 
Erickson  v.   Brooklyn  II.   R.   R.  Co. 

(11  Misc.  [N.  S".]  662),  214. 
Erickson  v.  Pacific  Coast  Steamship 

Co.  (96  Fed.  80),  5(17. 
Erickson    v.    Pomerank     (66    Minn. 

876),  146. 
Erickson  v.  Twenty-third   St.    It.  Co. 

(71  Eun  [N.  Y.],  108),  152. 
Erslew  v.   New  Orleans  &    \.    E.  R. 

Co.  (49  La.  Ann.  86),  514. 
Erwin  v.    Dezell   (64  Hun   [N.    Y.]. 

391),  394. 
Erwin  v.    Neversink   S.    S.  Co.   (23 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  573),  502,  563,  595. 
Erwin  v.  Sumrow  (1  Hawks    [N.  C] 

172),  413. 
Esterly's   Appeal    (54    Pa.    St.    192), 

501. 
Estes  v.  Macon  (103  Ga.  780;  30  S.  E. 

240),  05. 
Etchas  v.  Orena  (121  Cal.  270),  109. 


157,  WO. 

Evans  v.  Foster  (80  Wis.  509),  102. 
Evans  v.    1 1  arris   (I    II.    &    X.   254), 

391. 
Evans  v.  Hoggarl  (  [Kan.  App.  L899] 

59  Pac.  381),  69. 
Evans   v.   Joplin   (7';   Mo.    App.  20), 

206,  252. 
Evans  v.  Missouri  1'.  It.  Co.  (7:;  Mo. 

App.  70).  104. 
Evans  v.  O'Connor  (171   .Mass.  287), 

457. 
Evansville  v.  Senbenn  (151   [nd.  42), 

170. 
Evansville  &  V.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson 

(20  [nd.  App.  5),  347. 
Evansville  <&   T.   11.    R.  Co.  v.   Hol- 

comb  (9  fad.  App.  198),  252. 
Evansville  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Gentry  (117 

Ind.  408),  165,  171. 
Evening   Journal    Assoc,  v.    McDer- 

mott  (15  Vroom  [X.  J.],  430),  104. 
Evening  News  Assoc,   v.  Tryon  (42 

Micb.  549),  385,  413,420. 
Evening  Posl  ( !o.  v.  Hunter  (18  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  726;  82  \.  W.  928),  117. 


Etckberry  v.  Levielle  (2  Hilt.  [N".  Y.]    Evening    Post    Pub.    Co.    v.    Boigbl 


40),  112. 
Etberington  v.    Prospect    Park  &  C. 

T.  R.  Co.   (88  X.  V.  641),  511,  51  I, 

520,   500,   502,   564,  566,   567,  586, 

580. 
Eureka,    City   of,    v.    Merrifield    (53 

Kan.  794),  499,  50:5. 
Eureka  v.  Merrifield  ([Kan.]  37  Pac. 

113),  495. 
Eureka  v.  Wilson  (15  Utah,  67),  501. 
Euslinv.  Euslin  ( [X.  J.  Ch.]  37  Atl. 

442)   515. 
Eustace  v.  Johns  (38  Cal.  3),  503. 
Eva  v.  McMahon  (77  Cal.  107).  07. 
Evans  v.  Cincinnati,  S.  &   M.   R.  Co. 

(78  Ala.  341),  91. 
Evans  v.   Del.  &   II.  (anal  Co.  ([Pa. 

C.  P.]  6  Kulp,  405),  211. 
Evans  v.  Delk  (  [Tex.]   0   S.  W.  550), 

214. 


([C.  C.  App.  2d  C.]i  "2   Fed.  885), 

420. 
Everett  v.  Akins  (8  Okla.  184),  102. 
Evers  v.  Will  (46  Hun  [X.  Y],  022), 

214. 
Everts  v.  Everts  (3  Mich.  580),  377. 
Evey  v.  Mexican  C.  R.  Co.  ([U.  S.  C. 

C.   \.  5th  C]  52  V.  s.  App.  118;  81 

Fed.  294),  32,  500. 
Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.  (38 

Wis.  014),  645,  646,  0  17.  648,  654, 

655,  057.  667,  669,  072. 
Ewing  v.  Pittsburg,  ('.  C.  A  St  L  R. 

Co.  (347  Pa.  St.  40),  221. 
Excelsior  Elec.  Co.  v.  Sweet   (59  X'. 

J.  L.  441),  100. 
Excelsior    Needle   Co.   v.  Smith   (61 

Conn.  56),  76. 
Explorer,  The  (40   L.  J.    Adm.    H), 

522. 


lxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED   IN   VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Fagan  v.  Thomas  (6  J.  &  S.  133),  151. 
Fahey  v.  Jephcote  (2  Ont.  L.  R.  44!), 

rev'g  1  Ont.  L.  R.  18 j,  63. 
Fair    v.    London   &    N.   W.   Ry.   Co. 

(21  L.  T.  Rep.  326),  243. 
Fairbanks   v.    Witter   (18  Wis.  287), 

375. 
Fairbanks     Canning   .Co.    v.     Times 

(24  111.  App.  33),  150. 
Fairchild  v.  Cal.  Stage  Co.  (13  Cal. 

599),  218. 
Fair,   The,   v.   Himmel   (50  111.  App. 

215),  450. 
Fales  v.  Hemenway  (64  Me.  373),  83. 
Falkeuan  v.   Rowland   (70  111.   App. 

26),  598,  602,  614,  619,  626,  637. 
Fall  v.  McRee  (36  Ala.  61),  83. 
Farley   v.  Charleston   Basket  &    V. 

Co.  (51  S.  C.  222),  254. 
Farley  v.     Gate    City   Gaslight   Co. 

(105  Ga.  323),  107. 
Farley  v.   Lavary  (  [Ky.  1900]  54  S. 

W.  840)  70. 
Far  man   v.     Lauman    (73   Ind.   568), 

114,  144,  372. 
Farmers  H.  L.  C.  &  R.  Co.  v.   West- 
lake  (23  Colo.  26),  84. 
Farnsworth  v.  Hoover  (66  Ark.  367; 

50  S.  W.  865),  73. 
Farrand  v.   Aldrich   (85  Mich.   593), 

387,  390. 
Farrand  v.  Marshall  (21  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

400),  67. 
Farwell  v.  Warren  (51  111.  467),  121, 

369. 
Farwell  &   Co.   v.   Zenon  (100  Iowa, 

640),  101. 
Faucitt  v.  Booth  (31  Up.  Can.  Q.  B. 

263),  401. 
Faulks  v.   Iowa  Co.  (103  Iowa,  422), 

65. 
Favorite    v.    Cottrill    (62   Mo.    App. 

119),  123. 
Fawsett  v.  Clark  (48  Md.  494),  426. 
Fay  v.  Davidson  (13  Minn.  523),  273. 
Fay  v.  Parker  (53  N.    H.  [5  Shirley] 

342;  16  Am.   Rep.  270),   1,  2,  111, 

115,  369,  372. 


Fay  v.  Swan  (44  Mich.  544),  116. 
Fay    v.   Williams   ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

41  S.  W.  497),  470. 
Feary    v.    Hamilton    (140   Ind.    45), 

494. 
Feedler  v.  Schroeder  (59  Mo.   364), 

95. 
Feeney    v.    Long    Island    R.    R.    Co. 
(116  N.  Y.  375),  243,  244,  254,  260. 
Feinstein  v.  Jacobs  (15  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

474),  227. 
Fejdouski  v.  Delaware  &  H.    Canal 

Co.  (12  App.  Div.  589),  165. 
Felice  v.  New  York   C.  &  II.  R.  R. 
Co.    (14   App.    Div.    [N.   Y.]   345), 
517,   562,  566,    567,   569,    570,    572, 
581,  582. 
Felix   v.    Griffiths  (56   Ohio  St.  39), 

501. 
Felkner  v.  Scarlet  (29  Ind.  754),  467. 
Fell   v.    Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.    (44 

Fed.  248),  139. 
Fellows    v.    Goodman    (49    Mo.    62), 

452. 
Felton   v.    Newport   (105  Fed.   322), 

76. 
Fenelon  v.  Butts  (53  Wis.   344),  218, 

448,  449,  451. 
Fenstermaker  v.   Tribune    Pub.    Co. 

(13  Utah,  532),  417,  425. 
Fenstermaker   v.   Tribune  Pub.    Co. 

(12  Utah,  439),  413,  416,  432. 
Fentz  v.  Meadows  (72  111.   540),  123, 

477. 
Ferguson  v.  Brent  (12  Md.  33),  153. 
Ferguson  v.  Davis  Co.  (57  Iowa,  601), 

218,  219. 
Ferguson  v.  Ehret  (14  Misc.   [N.  Y.] 

454),  214. 
Ferguson  v.  Evening  Chronicle  Pub. 

Co.  (72  Mo.  App.  462),  398. 
Ferguson  v.  Wilson  (  [Mich.  1899]  80 

N.  W.  1006),  642. 
Fernandez   v.    Sacramento,    etc.,    R. 

Co.  (52  Cal.  45),  161. 
Fero  v.  Roscoe  (4  N.  Y.  165),  401. 
Ferrerro  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.   Co. 
(9  App.  [D.  C]  455),  92. 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


XXI 


Ferristein  v.  Jacobs  |  L5  Misc.  [N.  ST.] 

474),  238. 
Fetter   v.    Beale  (1  Lcl.   Rayra.  339), 

381. 
Fewv.  Killer  ([S.  C.  1902]   41   S.   K. 

85),  76. 
Fickett  v.  Lisbon  Falls  Fibre  Co.  (91 

Me.  litis).  214. 
Fidelity  &  C  Co.  v.  Allibone  (90  Tex. 

660),  102. 
Fidelity  &   C.   Co:    v.  Weise  (80  111. 

A]. p.  499),  106. 
Field  v.  Clark  (143  U.  S.  649),  501. 
Fields  v.   New  York  Central  R.   Co. 

(32  N.  V.  346),  150. 
Fife  v.  Oshkosb  (89  Wis.  540),  318. 
Filer  v.    New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(49  N.  Y.  42),   243,  244,  250,  318, 

322,  328. 
Filer  v.  Smith  (96  Mich.  347),  455. 
Filiatrau.lt  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co. 

(Rap.   Jud.  Quebec,  18  C.  S.  491), 

530. 
Finch  v.  lleermans(5  Luz.  Leg.  Reg. 

125),  1,  2,  89. 
Fine  v.   Xavarre  (  [Mich.]   62  X.  W. 

142),  444. 
Finken    v.    Elm  City   Brass  Co.   (73 

Conn.  423),  229. 
Finley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(71  Minn.  471),  174. 
Finley  v.  Magill  (57  Mo.  App.  481), 

95. 
Fireman's   Ins.  Co.   v.  McMillan  (29 

Ala.  147).  79. 
First  Nat.  Ilk.  v.  Burger  (9  Ohio  S.  A 

C.  P.  Dec.  824),  82. 
First  Nat.  Bk.  v.  First  Nat.  Hk.  (116 

Ala.  520),  76. 
First  Nat.    Bank  v.  Graham  (85  Pa. 

St.  91 ),  159. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kansas  Grain  Co. 

(60  Kan.  30),  123. 
First     Nat.     I  lank    v 

Iowa,  693),  91. 
First  Nat.   Bk.  v.  W 

Ohio  St.  555),  78. 
Fisher  v.  Hamilton  (49  Ind.  341),  438 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Fisber  v.  Jansen  |  L28  111.  549),  228. 
Fisher  v.  Met.  E.  R.  Co.  (34  Bun  [N. 

Y.],  133),  136. 
Fisher  \.  Meyer  |  L2  Fed.  842),  79. 
Fisher  v.   Patterson  (1 1  Ohio,  H8), 

423. 
Fisher  v.  Tice  (20  Iowa,  479),   128. 
Fish    Keek    Co.    v.    Kedlow    (7    Kan. 

App.  93),  101. 
Fiske   v.    Forsythe,    etc.,   Bleaching 

Co.  (57  Conn.  118),  152. 
Fitch  v.  Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (10 

N.  Y.  Supp.  225),  214. 
Fitch  v.    Fitch  (35   N.  V.   Sup.  [3  J. 

&  S.]  302),  11,81. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Donnelly  (  [C.  C. 

App.  7th  C]  87  Fed.  135),  240. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Nichols  (  [C.  C. 

App.  1st  C]  85  Fed.  945),  166. 
Fittsv.  MeGhee  (172  U.  S.  516;  19 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  269;  43  L.  Ed.   536; 

31  Chic.  L.  News,  207),  65. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Chic,   Rock  Island  & 

P.  Ry.  Co.  (50  Iowa,  79),  133,  342. 
Fitzgerald.     See  Gerald. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Dobson  (7s  Me.  359), 

95,  214. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Donoher  (48  Neb.  852), 

470. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Fitzgerald  ([Neb. 

02  N.  W.  899),  87. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Ceils  (84  Bun  [N.  Y.], 

295),  393. 
Fitzgerald  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  R.  R. 

Co.  (88  Bun  [N.  Y.J,  359  |,  562,  .".72. 

586. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Qiiann  i  109  N.  V.  441), 

501. 
Fitzgerald  v.  St.  Paul,  M..&  M.  R.  Co. 

(29  Minn.  336),  176. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Western  In.  T.  Co.  (15 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  L43),   191,  495. 
Fitzgihhon    v.    Brown   |  |:;    Me.    169), 

432,  439. 
Fitzhenry  v.  Consolidated  Trac.  Co. 

([N.  .I.|  12  Atl.  416),  51  I.  667. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Blocker  (23  Tex.  552), 

146. 


Thurman    (69 
U.  Tel.  Co.  (30 


TABLE   OF    (ASKS    CITED    IX    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Fitzpatrickv.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  (84 

Me.  33),  194. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Daily  .States  Pub.  Co. 

(48  La.  Ann.  1116),  413,  417. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Greal  Western  R.  R. 

Co.  (12  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  645),  183. 
Fitzsimotis  v.  Roue  (21  W.  D.  [N.  Y.] 

343),  214. 
Flaherty  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 

([R.  I.]  36  Atl.  1132),  514. 
Flaherty  v.   Powers  (167  Mass.  61), 

281. 
Flanagan  v.    Bait.   &   O.    R.   R.    Co. 

([Iowa]    50  N.  W.  60),  255,  299. 
Flanagan  v.  Womack  (54  Tex.  45), 

373. 
Flannery  v.  Bait,  &  O.   R.   R.  Co.  (4 

Mackey  [S.  C],lll),  139. 
Flatow  v.  Von  Bremsen  ( 19  Civ.  Proc. 

125),  394. 
Fleet   v.    Hollenkemp   (13   B.    Mon. 

[Ky.]  219),  119,  124,  186. 
Fleming   v.    Shenandoah    (67   Iowa, 

508),  318. 
Fleming  v.  Texas  Loan  Agency  (87 

Tex.  238),  522. 
Flemington   v.  Smithers  (2  C.  &  P. 

292),  225. 
Fletcher  v.  Burroughs  (lOIowa,  557), 

422. 
Fletcher  v.   Chic.    &    N.  W.   R.   Co. 

(109  Mich.  363),  437,  443. 
Fletcher  v.  Randall  (Anth.  N.  P.  [N. 

Y.]  267),  468. 
Floetti   v.   Jornson  Engineering  Co. 

(19  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  136),  169. 
Florida  v.  Anderson  (91   U.  S.  676), 

507. 
Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Judge  (100 

Ga.  600;  28  S.  E.  379),  63. 
Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mooney  (40 

Fla.  17),  122,  186. 
Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Scarlett  (91 

Fed.  349),  488. 
Florida  C.  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Foxworth 

([Fla.]  25  So.  338),  515,  516. 
Florida  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Heist  (30  Fla.  1), 

119,  122,  186. 


Flourney  v.  Childress  (Minor    [Ala.], 

93),  106. 
P"lournoy  v.  Shreveport  Belt  Ry.  Co. 

(50  La.  Ann.  491),  213. 
Flower    v.    Witkousky     ([Mich.]    14 

West.  44),  471. 
Floyd  v.  Hamilton  (33  Ala.  235),  111, 

122,  124,  186. 
Flynn  v.  Fogarty  (106  111.  263),  472. 
Flyun  v.  Gallagher  (52  N.  Y.  Super. 

524),  150. 
Flynn  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(78  Mo.  195),  166. 
Flynn  v.   San  Francisco,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(40Cal.  14),  161. 
Foels  v.  Tonawanda  (65  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

624),  580. 
Foels  v.  Tonawanda  (39  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

567),  87. 
Foels  v.  Tonawanda  (48  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

150),  567. 
Foerst  v.  Kelso  (131  Cal.  376),  80. 
Fogarty  v.   Bogart  (60  N.  Y.   St.  R. 

81;  43  App.  Div.  430),  64. 
Fohrmannv.  Consol.  Tract.  Co.  ( [N. 

J.]  43  Atl.  892),  112. 
Foley  v.    East    Flam  borough    Twp. 

([Can.]   26   Ont.  App.  43),   63,  84, 

173. 
Foley  v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  R. 

R.   Co.   (78  Hun  [N.  Y.],  248),  176 

514. 
Foley  v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  R. 

R.  R.   Co.  (76  Hun   [N.  Y.],  455), 

176. 
Folsom  v.  Onderhill  (36  Vt.  580),  251. 
Folwell   v.   Providence   Journal   Co. 

(19  R.  I.  551),  417. 
Fonge  v.  Pac.   Mail  Co.  (1  Cal.  353), 

91. 
Fonuall  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  ( [Mich. 

1901]  86  N.  W.  946),  66. 
Foot  v.  Brown,  (8  Johns.  [N.  Y.]  63), 

392. 
Foot  v.  Card  (58  Conn.  4),  458. 
Foot  v.  Tracy  (1  Johns.   [N.  Y.]  46), 

422. 
Foote  v.  Merrill  (54  N.  H.  490),  99. 


TABLE   OF    (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Ixxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Foote  v.  Nichols  (28  III.  186),  124. 
Forbell  v.  New   Fork  i  IT  App.  Div. 

[N.   V.J  371;  6   V    Y.   Supp.    L005, 

alT'd  164   N.  V.  522;  58    N.  E.  644  |, 

67. 
Forbes  v.  Loftin  (50  Ala.  39G),  310. 
Ford  v.   Buckley  (68   [11.   App.  447), 

432. 
Ford  v.  Charles  Warner  Co.  (  1  Marv. 

[Del.]  88),  122,  L61,  L86,  244. 
Ford  v.   Cheevor  ([Mich.]  2   Det.    L. 

N.  21.0),  480. 
Ford  v.  Ik's   Moines  (100  Iowa,  94), 

244,  246. 
Ford  v.  Hoover  ([C.   P.]  13  Lane.    L. 

Rev.  81),  515. 
Ford  v.  Jones  (62  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  484), 

304,  376. 
Ford  v.   Monroe  (20  Wend.    [N.    V.) 

210),  495,  588,  591. 
Ford  v.  Umatilla  Co.  (15  Oreg.  313), 

161,  166. 
Forde  v.  Skinner  (4  C.  &  P.  239),  111. 
Fordyce  v.   Jackson   (56   Ark.   Uul), 

245. 
Fordyce  v.  Manuel  (82  Tex.  527  i.  338. 
Fordyce  v.   McCants   (55  Ark.    384), 

607,  614,  616,  iil7.  624,  625,  635,  636. 
Fordyce  V.  .Moore  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

22  S.  W.  235),  211.  275. 
Fordyce  v.  Nix  (58  Ark.   136),  346. 
Forhman  v.  Consol.  Tract  Co.  ( [N.  J. 

1900]  4:5  AH.  892),  136. 
Forke  v.  Homann  (II  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

670),  381,  387. 
Formal]  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  ([Mich. 

1901]  86  N.  W.  946),  64. 
Fortier  v.  Moore  (67  V  II.  460).  472. 
Forty-Second  St.  M.  &  St.  X.  R.  Co. 

v.  Bannon  ([('.   C.   App.  2d  C]  85 

Fed.  852),  205. 
Foster  v.   Bellaire    ([Mich.   1901]  86 

\.  W.  383),  267. 
Foster  v.  Elliott  (38  Iowa,  216), 62,  76. 
Foster   v.    Pitts    it'.::    Ark.    387),   431, 

442,  628. 
Foster  v.    Smith   (10  Wend.    [N.    V.  | 

377),  57. 


Foster  v.   United  States  (82  Ct  CI. 

L70),  65. 
Fotheringham    \.    Adams   Exp.   Co. 

Fed.  252),  120. 
Fowler  v.  Baltimore,  etc.,  Et.  Co.  (18 

W.  Va.  579),  161. 
Fowler  v.  Buffalo   Furnace  Co.  (41 

App.  Div.  [\.  Y.J  84),  572,  586. 
Fowler  v.   Fowler   (113    Mich.   575), 

416. 
Fowler  v.   Shook    ([Tex.    Civ.   App. 

1900]  59  S.  W.  282),  B2,  89. 
Fowler  v.  Western  Union  Teleg.  Co. 

(80  Me.  381  |,  149. 
Fowiks   v.   .Southern  R.   Co.   (96   Vt. 

742),  84. 
Fox   v.   Oakland    Consol.   St.   K.   Co. 

(118  Cal.  55),  514. 
Fox  v.  Stevens    (13   Minn.  272),  111, 

467. 
Fox  v.  St.  John  (23  X.  B.  244).  243. 
Fox  v.  Wray  (56  Ind.  423),  75. 
Fox  v.   Wunderlich   (64   Iowa,  187), 

111,  124,  475. 
Francis  v.  Tilyon  (26   App.  Div.  [NT. 

Y.]  340),  432,  454. 
Frank   v.  Curtis  (58   Mo.   App.   349), 

442. 
Frankfort  v.  Coleman  (19   Ind.  App. 

368),  214. 
Fiankforter   v.  Bryan   (12  111.   549), 

145. 
Franklin      v.      MeCorkle      (16     Lea 

[Term.],  609),  164,   167. 
Franklin    v.    Schultz   (23    Mont.    L66; 

57  Pac.  1037),  7::. 
Franklin  v.  Southeastern  Ry.  (8  II. 

A    V   211),  514.  525,  528,  531,  532, 

535,  5:17,  552. 
Franz  v.   II iltei brand  (45   Mo.  721), 

113. 
Fraser  v.  Freeman  (56  Barb.  |  N\  Y] 

234),  594. 
Frazerv.  Berkeley (7C.  &  P  789), 377. 
Frazer    v.    Schroder   (60    111.    App. 

519),  214. 
Frazier  v.  Georgia   K.  &   B.  Co.  (101 

Ga.  70),  514. 


lxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED   IN   VOL.   I. 


Frazier  v.  McClosky  (60  N.  Y.  337), 

404. 
Freeh  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(39  Md.  574),  ICC. 
Frederickson  v.  Johnson  ([Minn.]  62 

N.  \V.  388),  386,  390. 
Freelaiul  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co. 

(54  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  90),  230. 
Fnc man  v.   Clute  (3  Barb.   [N.   Y.] 

424),  17,87. 
Freeman  v.  Hutchinson  (15  Ind.  App. 

639),  284. 
Freeman    v.    Tinsley   (59    111.   497), 

418. 
Freese  v.  Tripp  (70  111.  496),  123, 124, 

474,  477. 
Freidenheit  v.  Edmundson   (36  Mo. 

227),  113. 
Fremont  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  French 

(48  Neb.  638),  214,  215,  328.  . 
Fremont  E.  &  M.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Leslie 

([Neb.]  59  N.  W.  559),  214. 
French  v.  Bent  (43  N.  H.  448),  78. 
French  v.   Masenna  F.   Co.  ([N.  H.] 

20  Atl.  363),  503. 
Friedman     v.     McGowan    (1    Penn. 

[Del.]  436),  215,  322,  326. 
Friel  v.  Plumer  ([N.  H.]  43  Atl.  618), 

438,  444. 
Friend   v.   Burleigh    (53  Neb.    671), 

598,  003,  607,  615,  624,  627. 
Friend  v.  Ingersoll  ([Neb.]  58  N.  W. 

281),  213,624. 
Friend  v.  Woods  (6  Graft.  [Va.]  189), 

153. 
Friess  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.  (67 

Hun  [N.Y.],  205),  282. 
Frink  v.  Coe  (4  Greene  [Iowa],  555), 

135. 
Frink  v.  Schroyer  (18  111.  416),  90. 
Frisbie  v.   United  States  (157  U.  S. 

160;  39 L.  Ed.  657;  15  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 

586),  73. 
Frish  v.  Cutter  (73  Md.  87),  397. 
Frobisher  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Transp.  Co. 

(81  II un  [N.  Y.],  544),  204. 
Frohs  v.  Dubuque  ([Iowa   1899],  80 

N.  W.  341 ),  325. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Frost  v.  Beikely  Phos.  Co.  (42  S.  C. 

402;  20  S.  E.  280),  67. 
Frothingham  v.   Evertou  (12  N.  H. 

239),  78. 
Fruchey  v.   Eagleson  (15  Ind.  App. 

88),  484. 
Fry  v.  Bennett  (28  N.  Y.  324),  382, 

386. 
Fry  v.  Bennett  (4Duer  [N.  Y.],  247), 

114,  406. 
Fry  v.  Bennett  (5  Sand.  [N.  Y.]  54), 

381. 
Fry  v.   Dubuque  &   S.    W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(45  Iowa,  416),  243. 
Fry  v.  Hillan  ([Tex.    Civ.  App.]  37 

S.  W.  359),  252. 
Fry  v.  Kaessner  (48  Neb.  133),  432. 
Fry  v.  Wolf  (8  Pa.  Super.   Ct.  468), 

430,  431. 
Ft.  Scott,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kinney 

(7  Kan.  App.  650),  100,  101. 
Ft.  Scott,  W.   &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Light- 
burn    ([Kan.   App.    1899]    58   Pac. 

1033),  80,  226,  263. 
Ft.  Wayne  &  B.  I.    R.  Co.   v.  Dono- 
van (110  Mich.  173),  108. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.   R.  Co.  v.   Floyd 

(21  S.  W.  544),  515,  531. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.   R.   Co.  v.  Bell  (5 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  28),  214. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.   C.  R.  Co.   v.   Hyatt 

34  S.  W.  677),   528,  535,   537,  549, 

551. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy 

(12  Tex.   Civ.  App.  654),  316,  323, 

548. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Measles 

(81  Tex.  474),  102. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison 

(93  Tex.  527),  532,  535,  537,  548. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.   Robert- 
son   ([Tex.]  16    S.   W.  1093),    214, 

243. 
Ft.  Worth  &    R.  G.   R.    Co.   v.  Kime 

(21   Tex.  Civ.  App.  271),  517,  528, 

532,  536,  537,  540,  542. 
Fulkerson  v.  Eads  (19  Mo.  App.  620), 

76. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    1. 


Ixxv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Fulkerson  v.  Murdock  (53  Mo.  App.  Gaithers  v.    Blowers  (11    Md.  636), 

151),  402.  375,  377,  379. 

Fuller  v.  Bow  ker  (11  Mich.  204),  449.  Galbraith  v.  Fleming  (60  Mich.  K>3), 

Puller  v.  Dean  (31  Ala.  654),  415.  376. 

Fuller    v.    Jackson    (92    Mich.    197),  Galbraith  v.  West    End    R.  Co.  (165 

282.  Muss.  572),  159. 

Fuller  v.  N'augatuek  R.  Co.  (21  Conn.  Gale  v.   Dover  (  [N.  11.    1896]    14  Atl. 

557),  318.  535),  63. 

Fuller    v.     Redding    (13    App.    Div.  Oale  v.  New  York  C.  &    EL   B.,  etc., 

[N.  Y.]  Gl),  443,  455.  B  B  Co.  (76  N.  Y.  594),  21 1. 

Fuller  v.    Redding  (16    Misc.  [N.  V.J  Gale.  v.    N.  V.  Cent.   R.  Co.  (13  Hun 

034),  442.  [X.  Y.],  1),  100. 

Fullerton  v.  Fordyce   (144    Mo.  519),  Galesbury  v.  Hall  (45  111.  App.  290), 


108,  194,  •_'  1  I 
Fillmore  v.  St.  Paul    City   B  Co.  (72 

Minn.  448),  212,279. 
Fulsome    v.    Concord    (40    Vt.   185), 

215,  243,  249. 
Fulton  Co.  v.  Rickell  (100  Ind.  501), 

05. 
Funk  v.  Beverly  (112  Ind.  190),  411. 
Furman  v.    Brooklyn    H.   R.    Co.  (25 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  133),  214. 
Furnish   v.   Mo.  P.    R.  Co.   (102   Mo. 

439),  310. 
Furstenburg  v.  Fawsett  (01  Mil.  184), 

89. 
Fush   v.  Egan  (48   La.  Ann.  00),  119, 

127,  133. 
Fye  v.  Chapin  ([Mich.]  80  X.  W.  797), 

95,  90,  214,  298. 
Gaar  v.  Snook  (1  OhioC.  D.  142), 82. 
Gaar,  Scott  &  Co.  v.  Snook  (1   Ohio 

Civ.  Ct.  R  259),  91. 
Gaertner  v.   Heyl  (179  Pa.  St.  391), 

435. 
Gage  v.  Harvey  (66  Ark.  68),  471. 
Gage  v.  Rogers  (20  Cal.  91),  100. 
Gaggv.  Vetter  (41  Ind.  228),  152. 
Gahagau  v.  Aermotor  Co.  (67  Minn. 

252),  214. 
Gaillard  \.  Cantini  ( [c.  C.  App.  4th 

('.]  76  Fed.  669),  447. 
Gainard  v.  Rochester,  C.  &  13.  R.  Co. 

(50  Hun  [X.   V.l.  22),  82,  251,  276, 

561,  570. 
Gainesville,  11.  &  W.   R.  Co.  v.  Lacy 
(80  Tex.  244),  5:17. 


227,  229. 

Gallon  V.  Lauer  (55  Ohio  St.  392).  203. 
Gallagher  v.  Kingston  Water  Co.  (164 

X.  V.  C02),  70. 
Gallin  v.  London  &  X.   W.  By.  Co. 

(L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  212).  359. 
Galloway  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Co.  (56  Minn.  340;  57  X.  W.  1058), 

214. 
Galloway  v.  Weber  (55  111.  App.  366  ), 

107. 
Galveston  v.  Barbour  (62  Tex.  172), 

225,  522,  524,  526,  527.  530,  532,  535, 

538,  547,  548. 
Galveston,    II.    &    S.    A.     B    Co.    v. 

Arispe  (5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  Oil  i.  528, 

532,  540,  552. 
Galveston,  11.  &  S.  A.  B  Co.  v.  Bon- 
net (38  S.  W.  813).  531,  532,  535, 

536,  537,  550. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark 
(21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  167),  218,  312. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Cody 
(20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  520),  531,554, 
550. 

Galveston,  II.  &  s.  A.  R.  Co.v.  Cooper 
([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  20S.  W.  990),328. 

Galveston,  II.  <S  S.  A.  B  Co.  v.  Cros- 
kell  (6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  160),  21  I. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v,  Davis 
(4  Tex.  Civ.    App.    168),   -.i.  532, 

537,  549,  551. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  B,  Co.  v. 
(Guelm)  Duelin  (86  Tex.  BO),  102, 

252. 


lxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford  Galveston,    H.    &   S.    A.    R.    Co.    v. 

(54  S.  W.  37),  532,  535,  537,  547.  Slinkard  (17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  585), 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  C>>.  v.  Ford  214. 

(4ti  S.  W.  77),  528.  Galveston,  IT.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Stov- 


Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibson 
( [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  38  S.  W.  480),  108. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Goodwin  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  20  8.  W. 
1007),  280. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gorm- 
ley  (35  S.  W.  488),  528,  537. 

Galveston,  IT.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gorm- 
ley  (27  S.  W.  1051),  528,  530,  541. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  (Due- 
lin)  Guelm  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  23  S. 
W.  596),  254. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamp- 
ton ([Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900)  59  S.  W. 
928),  218. 

Galveston,  II.  S.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hughes  (54  S.  W.  264),  535,  547. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  &.  R.  Co.  v.  Hynes 
(21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  34),  102. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son (58  S.  W.  622),  524,  536. 

Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kief 
([Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900]  58  S.  W. 
625),  249. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kutac 
(72  Tex.  643),  522,  523,  544. 

Galveston,  H.  &  8.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Leon- 
ard ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  29  S.  W.  955), 
540. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 
tula  (79  Tex.  577),  529,  530,  543. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler ( [Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900]  57  S.  W. 
702),  542. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pat- 
terson ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  46  S.  W. 
848),  345,  358. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Power 
(54  S.  W.  629),  532,  535,  536,  550. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott 
(21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  24),  214. 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Simon 
( [Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899]  54  S.  W.  309), 
148. 


all   (3   Willson  Civ.  Cas.  Ct.  App. 

[Tex.]  252),  89. 
Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Tem- 

pleton  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.  1894]  25  ,S. 

W.  135),  214,  242. 
Galveston,    II.     &    S.    A.    I!.    Co.    v. 

Turner  (  [  Tex.  Civ.  App.]  23  S.  W. 

83),  345. 
Galveston,  11.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldo 

(  [Tex.  Civ.   App.]  32  S.   W.  783), 

214. 
Galveston,   H.    &    S.    A.    R.    Co.    v. 

Worthy   (87  Tex.    459;    29    S.    W. 

376),  524,   525,   526,    527,   528,  530, 

532,  542. 
Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Zant- 

zinger  (92  Tex.  365),  194. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Zant- 

zinger  (  [Tex.  1898]  48  S.  W.  563), 

82. 
Galvin   v.    Gualala   Mill    Co.    ( [Cal. 

1893]  33  Pac.  94),  95. 
Gambrill.  v.   Schooley    (93   Md.   48), 

397. 
Gannon  v.  Wilson  (60  Cal.  541),  150. 
Ganssly  v.   Perkins    (30  Mich.   492), 

116,  475. 
Garcia    v.    Sanders    (90    Tex.     103) 

558. 
Gardner  v.   Detroit   St.   R.    Co.    (99 

Mich.  182),  280. 
Gardner  v.  Heartt  (2  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

K 15),  67. 
Garden  v.  Neiley  (  [Can.]  31  N.  S.  39), 

80. 
Garland,  The   (  [Ont.]  S.   C.  R.  409), 

522. 
Garland  Monaghan  v.  Horn  (7  S.  C. 

R.  [Ont.]  409),  548. 
Garland  v.  Wholeham  (26  Iowa,  185), 

114. 
Garoui   v.   Compagnie  Nationale    de 

Navigation   (39   N.   Y.  St.   R.   63), 

177. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN     VOl 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Garraux   v.  Greenville  (58  S.  C.  575; 

31  S.  E.  597  |,  65. 
Garrett    v.    Sew.  n    (108    Ala.   521), 

119. 
Garrick    v.   Florida,   C.  <ft  P.  R.  Co. 

(53  s.  C.  148),  523,  526. 
Garrity  v.   Detr  -it   ('.  S.  ft  Co.  i  112 

Mich.  369),  646. 
Gartner  v.  Cohen  (51  X.  J.  I..  125), 

501. 
Gartner  v.  Saxon  (19  R.  I.  161  },  04. 
GaBway  v.  Atlantic  &    W.   P.   R.   R. 

Co.  (58  Ga.  216),  135. 
Gates  v.  Meredith  (7  End.  4  W),  41 1. 
Gaudy   v.   Railroad    (30   Iowa  420), 

72. 
Gavigan  v.  Atlantic   Refining  Co.  (3 

super.  Ct.  [Pa.  ]  628),  300,  305. 
Gaylor  v.  Syracuse  B.  &  N.  Y.  R.  R. 

Co.  (105  N.  Y.  047),  172. 
Geary  v.  Kansas  City  <).  &  S.  R.  Co. 

(137,  251),  251. 
Geer    v.     Durham    Water    Co.    (127 

N.  C.  349),  76. 


Georgia   R.  &    Bkg.  Co,   v.  Crawley 

-7  Ga.  191  i.  106. 
Georgia  K.  &  Bkg.  Co.  v.  Keal  ii 

Ga.  308),  214. 
Georgia  Ry.  Co.  \.  Dougherty  (66  Ga. 

744),  139. 
Georgia  Ry.  I  !o.   v.  Horner  (7:.  Ga 

251 ).  139. 
Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Olds  (77  Ga.  673), 

340,  343. 
Geraghty  v.    New   (7  Misc.   [N.  Y.] 

30),  302,  588. 
Gerald  v.  Quann  |  10  Abb.  N.  C.  31  i, 

501. 
Gerdes  v.  Christopher  &  S.   A.  Iron 

&  V.  Co.  (124  Mo.  347),  215,  227. 
Gerdes  v.  Christopher  &  S.  A.  I.  & 

.  .  Co.  I  [Mo.]  25  S.  W.  557)!  241. 
Gerli  v.  Poidebard  Silk  Mfg.  Co.  (57 

X.  J.  L.  [28  Yi.j  432),  78. 
Gerling  v.    Bait.  &  O.  R  Co.  (151  U. 

S.  673),  495,  503. 
Gernerd  v.  Gcrnerd  (185  Pa.  St.  233), 

458,  4G1. 


Geiler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (11  Misc.    Geroux  v.  Graves  (62  Yt.  280).  710. 


[N.  y.]413),  214,  290. 
Geisberg  v.    Mnt.    Bldg.  &  L.   Assu. 


Gerue  v.  Consol.    Fireworks  Co.   (12 
Ohio  ('.  C.  420),  206. 


;[Tex.  Civ.   Apj>.   1900]  60  S.   W.    Geveke v.  Grand  Rap.  &  I.  R.Co.(57 


478),  213. 


Mich.  589),  218. 


Geminill    v.  Brown  ([Ind.  A  pp.]  56    Giacona   v.    Bradstreel    Co.    (48  La. 


N.  E.  691 ),  464,  466. 
Genay  v.   Morris  (1   Bay    [S.  C]  6), 
111,  190. 


Ann.  1191).  427. 
Gibbons  v.    Phoanix  (39  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
658  I,  281. 


Geoghegan  v.    Atlas  Steamship   Co.  I  Oihbons   v.    United    States   (8  Wall. 


(146  N.  Y.  369).  165. 
Geohegan   v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.  (3  Misc. 

[X.  Y.]  224),  506. 
George  v.  Cypress  Hill  Cemetery  (32 

App.  Div.  281 ),  136,  138. 
George  Kuapp  &  Co.  v.  Campbell  (14 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  199),  422. 
Georgia  v.  Kepford  i  r>  Iowa,  48),  87. 
Georgia    Cotton-Oil    Co.    v.  Jackson 

(112  Ga.  620  1.  7.".. 
Georgia   P.  Co.  v.   Props!   (83  Ala. 

518),  766. 


\V.  S.]  269).  65. 
Gibbons  v.  Wilkes-Barre,  etc.,  R.  R. 

Co.  (155  Pa.  St.  279),  169. 
Gibbons  v.  Williams  t  135  Mass.  333), 

176. 
Gibbs   v.   Randlett   (58    X.    II.     107), 

440. 
Ciblin   v.    Mclntyre  (2   Utah,  384), 

215,  218,  243. 
Gibney  v.  Lewis  (08  Conn.  392),  122, 

186,  451. 
Cihsonv.  Jenney  (15  Mass.  205), 501, 


Georgia  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes  (87  Ala.    Gibson   Co.   v.   Glizozinski   (76    111. 


610).  172. 


App.  400),  214. 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.  1 


Giffen  v.  Gascoigne  ([N.  J.  1900]  47 

Atl.  25),  667. 
Gilbert  v.  Eric  R.  Co.  (97  Fed.  751), 

161. 
Gilbert  v.   Kennedy  (22  Mich.   117), 

24,   17."). 
Gilbert  v.   Rounds  (14  How.  Pr.  [N. 

Y.]40),  375. 
Gilbert  v.  West  End  St.   R.  Co.  (100 

Mass.  403),  280. 
Gilbertson  v.  Forty-Second  St.  N.  Co. 

(14   App.   Uiv.    [N.  Y.]    294),   207, 

215,  226. 
Gilboy  v.  Detroit  (115   Mich.  121;  73 

N.  W.  128;  4  Det.  L.  N.  841),  65. 
Gildersleeve  v.  Hammond  (109  Mich. 

431;  67  N.   W.  519;  3  Det.   L.   N. 

117;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  97),  67,  71. 
Giles  v.  Diamond,  etc.,  Co.  (  [Del.]  6 

Cent.  084),  150. 
Gill  v.  Rochester  &  P.  R.  Co.  (37  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  107),  568,  569,  570,  572,  584. 
Gillau  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S. 

M.  R.  Co.  (91  Wis.  633),  338. 
Gillette  v.  Mo.  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  (55 

Mo.  315),  135. 
Gilley  v.    Gilley   (79   Me.   292),  467, 

633. 
Gilligan  v.   New  York  &  Harlem  R. 

R.  Co.  (1  E.  D.  Sm.  453),  300,  305. 
Gillman  v.  Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (53 

S.  C.  210),  108,218,  335. 
Gillreath  v.  Allen   (10  Ired.  [N.  C] 

67),  112,  113. 
Gilman  v.   Lowell  (8  Wend.   [N.  Y.] 

579),  415. 
Gilman  v.  McClatchy  (111  Cal.  606), 

390. 
Gilpin  v.  Consequa  (Pet.  [N.  S.  C.  C] 

85),  94. 
Ginchard  v.   New  (84  Hun   [N.   Y.], 

54),  514. 
Gintz  v.   Bardley  (53  111.  App.  597), 

478. 
Girard  v.  Kalamazoo  (92  Mich.  610), 

291. 
Girard  Coal  Co.  v.   Wiggins  (52  111. 

App.  69),  289. 


Girot  v.  Graham  (41  La.  Ann.  511), 

431. 
Girst  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  ([Neb. 

1901]  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  414),  148. 
Givens    v.   Berkly    ([Ky.]66   S.    W. 

158),  302,  374. 
Givens  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  (89 

Ky.  231),  498. 
Gleason  v.  United  States  (33  Ct.  CI. 

65),  70. 
Gleeson  v.   Virginia  Midland  R.  Co. 

(140  U.  S.  435),  70. 
Glendale,  The  (81  Fed.  633),  488. 
Glendon  Iron  Co.  v.  Uhler  (75  Pa.  St. 

467),  72. 
Glenn  v.  Adams  ([Ala.  1901]  29  So. 

836),  95. 
Globe  Acct.    Ins.  Co.  v.  Gerisch  (163 

111.  625),  290,  292. 
Globe  Acct.  Ins.   Co.   v.    Helwig  (13 

Ind.  App.  530),  104. 
Glover  v.  L.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  (37  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  57),  87. 
Goddard  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  (57 

Me.  202),  135,  140,  145,  333,  364. 
Godeau  v.  Blood  (52  Vt.  251),  223. 
Goetz  v.  Ambs  (27  Mo.  28),  122. 
Goff  v.  Akers  (49  N.  Y.  St.  R.  615), 

177,  514. 
Goff  v.  Ockers  (49  N.  Y.  St.  R.  615), 

514. 
Goins  v.  Molerly  ([Mo.]  29  S.  W.  985), 

214. 
Golder  v.  Lund  (50  Neb.  867),  362. 
Goldie  v.  Werner  (151  111.  551),  108. 
Goldman  v.  Wolf  (6  Mo.  App.  490),  75. 
Goldsmith  v.  Joy   (61  Vt.   488),  369, 

370,  375,  377. 
Goldstein  v.  Foss  (2  Younge  &  J.  146, 

cited  19  R.  I.  481),  440. 
Gomez  v.  Joyce  (1  N.  Y.  Supp.  337), 

398. 
Gonzales  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 

R.  Co.  (39  How.  Pr.  407),  161. 
Goodall  v.  Thurman  (1  Head  [Tenn.]? 

209),  111. 
Goodell  v.  Bluff  City  Lumber  Co.  (57 

Ark.  203),  91. 


TAI'.l.i:    Hi"    (ASKS    CITED    IN     Vol..    I. 


1 X  X  i  X 


Goodhart  v.  Penna.    R.   R.  Co.  ( 177 

Pa.  St.   1),  181,  215,  235,  249,  251, 

256,  294,  305. 
Goodlander  .Mill  Co.  \.  Standard  Oil 

Co.  (63  Fed.  405),  84. 
Goodson  v.  Sunbury  Gas  ConBumer'B 

Co.  ([20  B.]  7.".    Law  T.   Rep.  --'."-I), 

63. 
Gordon  v.  Brewster  (7  Wis.  355),  83. 
Gordon  v.  Weaver  ([Tenn.  Ch.  A.pp. 

1899]  53  s.  W.  740),  65. 
Gore  v.  Chadwick(6  Dana  [Ky.]477), 

369,  374,  380. 
Gores  v.  Graff  (77  Wis.  17! ),  643,  663, 

665. 
Gorbam  v.    Kansas  City,  etc.,  II.    R. 

Co.  (113  Mo.  408),  243,  255. 
Gorliam  v.  New  York  Cent.   R.  Co. 

(23  Hun  [N.  V.],44!t),  561,  589. 
Gorman   v.   Soutbern    Pac.    Co.    (97 

Cal.  1),  340,  343. 
Gosling  v.  Veley  (4  H.  L.  Cas.  079),  02. 
Gott  v.  Pulsifer  (122  Mass.  235),  428. 
Goucher  v.  Jamieson   ([Midi.  1900] 

82  N.  W.  603),  042. 
Gould  v.  Christiansen  (lilatchf .  &  II. 

Adm.  507),  371. 
Gould  v.  Oliver  (4   B.   N.   C.   142   [33 

E.  C.  L.  R]),  08. 
Gould  v.  Weed  (12  Wend.  [N.  Y.]  12), 

418,  423,  420. 
Gower  v.  Carter  (3  Iowa,  244),  106. 
Grace  v.  Dempsey  (75  Wis.  313),  452, 

454. 
Grace   v.    McArthur    (70   Wis.   641), 

386. 
Graham  v.  Consolidated  Traction  Co. 

(04  X.  J.  L.  10;  44  Atl.   904).  498, 

514,  645,  048,  655,  667,  671,  672. 
Graham  v.    Davis  (4  Obio   St.  363), 

150. 


[References  are  to  Sections.  ] 

Graham  v.  Smith  (1    Edm.  Sel.  Cas, 

[N.  V.J  267),  168. 
Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens  R.  Co. 

(14.S  Mo.  665;  BOS.  W.  305),  71. 
Grand   Lodge   A.  <  >.   &  v  W.Co.  v. 

Baglej  (60  III.  App.  589),  106. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  [ves  (144  U. 

s.  408),  l  19,  152,  161,  653,  655. 
Grand  Trunk    Ry.  Co.  of  Canada  v. 

Jennings    (13    App.    Cas.  800),  516, 

524,  554. 
Graney  v.   St.   Louis,  I.   M.  &   S.  R. 

Co.  (140  .Mo.  39),  90. 
Granl  v.  Armour  ( [C.  P.]  25  Ont  7), 

70. 
Grant  v.  Brooklyn  (41  Barb.  [N.  vi 

381),  227,  229. 
Grant   v.     Dreyfus    ([Cal.]    52    Pac. 

1071),  104. 
Grant  v.  Grant  (109  N.  C.  710).  588. 
Grant  v.   Herald  Co.   |  12  App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  354),    102,  403. 
Grant  v.  Mosely  (29  Ala.  302),  1  18. 
Gratiot  v.  Missouri    P.  R.   Co.  ([Mo.] 

21  S.  W.  1094),  214. 
Grau  v.  Bouston   (45  Neb.  813),  472, 

478,  480,  481,  007. 
Graves   v.    Battle   Creek    (95     Mich. 

206),  288,  293. 
Graves  v.  Glass  (86  Iowa.  261),  89. 
Graves  v.   New  York  &   N.  E.   P.  Co. 

(160  Mass.  402),  205. 
Graves  v.  Severens  l  W  Vt.  636),  13. 
Graves  v.  Sboll  (9Wrigkt  [Pa.],  58), 

70. 
Graves  v.  Tichnor  (6  N.  II.  5:17).  L50. 
Giavetl  v.  Mugge  (89  111.  218),  L34. 
Cray    v.    Oosl.y    I  18   Johns.    [N.  Y.] 

219),  97. 
Cray    v.    Durland     (51     \.    V.    424), 

467. 


Graham  v.  fidelity  Mut.  L.  Assn.  (98    Gray  v.  Ellzroth  |  10  End.   A}>]).  587), 

Tenn.  48),  430,  431,  432,  434. 
Graham   v.    Reno   ([Colo.    App.]   38 

Pac.  835),  71.  428. 
Graham  v.  Roder  (5  Tex.  141),  120. 
Graham  v.  St.  Charles  St.  R.  Co.  (47 

La.  Ann.  214  (16  So.  800),  71,  120. 


115. 

Gray  v.  Griffin  (111  Ga.  361;  3<'>  s.  E. 

792),  65. 
Cray    v.    James   I  Pet    [U.    S.    C.    C] 

394).  95. 
Gray  v.  Little  (127  N.  C.  304).  566. 


lxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    V<)L.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
[Mo.]   16  S.   W. 


Gray  v.  McDonald 

398),  499. 
(.ray  v.    Second    Ave.    R.    R.   Co.  (65 

N.  Y.  561),  161. 

Gray   v.   Times  Pub.    Co.    (74   Minn. 

452),  384,  420: 
Grays  v.  Bibb  Co.  (94  Ga.  608),  65. 
Great   Southern   R.    Co.    v.    Moorer 

(116  Ala.  64-'),  K)0: 
Greef  v.   Brown  (7  Kan.   App.  394), 

148. 
Greeley,   S.    L.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Yeager  (11  Colo.  345),  111,  117. 
Green    v.     Barney    (  [Cal.]     36   Pac. 

1026),  101. 

Green  v.  Craig  (47  Mo.  90),  111,  120,  124. 

Green    v.     Hudson    R.    R.    Co.    (32 

Barb.   [N.   Y.]   25),   511,   520,   560, 

561,  562,  563,  566,  580. 

Green  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.  (28 

Barb.  [N.  Y.]  9),  495. 
Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.  (2  Abb. 

Dec.  [N.  Y.]  277),  567. 
Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.  (16  How. 

Tr.  [N.  Y.]  263),  572,  570. 
Green  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.  (10  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  473),  295. 
Green  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (36  Fed.  66), 

94,  326. 
Green  v.  Weaver  (63  Ga.  302),  78. 
Greene  v.   Martine   (21  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

136),  503. 
Greensboro    v.    McGibbony  (93   Ga. 

672),  75,  228. 
Greenville   Oil  &  C.   Co.   v.   narkey 

(20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  225),  214. 
Greenwood    v.    Greenwood   (28   Md. 

369),  467. 
Greer  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (14 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  876),  267,  268. 
Greer  v.  New  York  (4   Rob.    [N.  Y.] 
675 ;  1  Alb.  Pr.  N.  S.  [N.  Y.]  206),  65. 
Greer,  In  re  (39  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  22; 

56  N.  Y.  Supp.  938),  65. 
Gregory   v.    Brook   (35    Conn.   437), 

83,  87,  93. 
Gregory    v.    Coleman    (  [Tex.    Civ. 
App.]  22  S.  W.  181),  123. 


Gregory  v.  Cotterel  (5  El.  &  Bl.  571), 

361. 
Gregory  v.    N.  Y.    L.   E.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.  (55  Hun  [N.  Y.],  303),  244,  249. 
Griebel    v.    Rochester    Printing   Co- 

(38  N.  Y.  St.  R.  788),  412. 
Gries  v.  Zeck  (24  Ohio  St.  329),  255. 
Griffen  v.  Lewiston,    ([Ida.]   55   Pac. 

545),  63. 
Griffen  v.    N.  Y.   Central  R.   R.  Co. 

(40  N.  Y.  34),  161. 
Griffin  v.  Coher  (16  N.  Y.  489),  17. 
Griffin  Wheel  Co.   v.  Markus  (79  111. 

App.  82),  208. 
Griffith  v.  Utica  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  (43 

K  Y.  St.  R.  835),  278. 
Griffiths  v.    Earl  of  Dudley  (9  Q.  B. 

D.  57),  498,  499. 
Griggs    v.     Fleckenstein    (14   Minn. 

81),  87. 
Grimes  v.  Miller  (23  Ont.  App.  764), 

430. 
Grimmelman   v.   Union  Pac.  R.  Co. 

(  [Iowa,    S.    C.    1897]    1  Am.  Neg. 

Rep.  237),  229. 
Grinnell  v.  Bebb  (126  Mich.  157),  77. 
Grinnell  v.  Wells  (7  M.  &   G.  1033), 

467. 
Grinsted  v.   Toronto  R.  Co.  (24  Ont. 

Rep.  683),  351. 
Grippen  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.  (40  N.  Y.  34),  161. 
Gripton  v.  Thompson  (32  Kan.  367), 

119. 
Griswold  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

(115  X.  Y.  61),  274. 
Groat  v.  Gillespie  (25  Wend.  [N.  Y.] 

383),  46. 
Grogan   v.    Broadway,   etc.,    Co.    (87 

Mo.  321),  514. 
Groman  v.   Kukkuck  (59  Iowa,  18), 

375. 
Grossman  v.    Cosgrove  (75   111.  App. 

385),  214. 
Grosso   v.  Delaware,   etc.,  R.   R.  Co. 

(50N.  J.  L.  317),  495,  664. 
Grosvenor  v.  Danforth  (16  Mass.  74), 

106. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


!  x  \  \  i 


[References  are  to  Sections. 


Grotius   \.  Rosa  i  [lml.  App.]57N. 

E.  46),  388. 
Groundwater    v.     Washington     (92 

Wis.  56),  244. 
Groves  v.  Rochester  (39  I  in  a  [N.  Y.j, 

5),  214. 
Grubbsv.  ThcJoliuC.  Fisher     ([Pa.] 

23  Tills.  L.  .1.  \.s.  122),  '•':;. 
Gruel  v.    Mengler   (74  111.  App.  36), 

437,  tin. 
Gubb   v.  Burford  (98  Va.  553),  91. 
Guberette  v.    BlcKinley  (27  linn  [N. 

Y.|,  320),  37<i. 
Guilford   v.   Anglo-French   S.  S.  Co. 

('.•('an.  303),  12  1. 
Guinard  v.  Knapp,  8.  a-  Co.(  '■>'>  Wis. 

482),  209. 
Gulbertsonv.  Halliday  (50  Neb.  229), 

161. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.    F.    R.   Co.  v.  Beall  (91 

Tex.  310),  548. 
Gulf,    C.    &   S.    F.     R.   Co.     v.    Hell 

(  [Tex.  Civ.    App.   1900]    58  S.  W. 

614),  220. 
Gulf,  C.  &  8.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown  (16 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  93),  87,  27-. 
Gulf,  0.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell 

(76  Tex.  174),  257. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.   F.  R.   Co.  v.  Cleveland 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  :;:;  S.  687),  347. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.    R.    Co.  v.  Comptou 

(75    Tex.  667),  526,    528,    .V.:,.    537, 

540,  54S,  :,  19. 
Gulf,  C.  &   S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Corapton 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  38  S.  W.  220),  70. 
Gulf,  C.  &  8.  F.  R.   Co.  v.   Copeland 

(17   Tex.    Civ.    App.    55),  339,  3  !•".. 

;s:>4. 
Gulf,   C.   &  8.    F.    R.   Co.    v.    Daniels 

(  [Tex.  Civ.    App.]  2'.)    S.    W.   126), 

228,  339. 
Gulf,    C.  &  8.    F.  I!.  Co.    v.    Delaney 

(22  Tex.  Civ.    App.   127),  528,  531, 

532,  537,   •■-■.6. 
Gulf,  C.  &  8.    F.    R.  Co.  v.  Evansich 

(63  Tex.  64),  .".11. 
Gulf,  C.  &  8.  F.    K.   Co.  v.  Caedeeke 

(39  8.  W.  312),  101. 
6 


(.uli.  I  .   &    S.  F.    R.  Co.    v.  Gi 

(  [Te.\. |  7  S.  W.  695),  H>l. 
Gulf,  C.  &  8.  I'.  K.  i  ...   v.   Hamilton 

(17  Tex.  <  iv.  App.  76),  26:;. 
Gulf,  c.  a  >.  I  .  K.   Co.  \.  Hamilton 

j-  S.  W.  906),  51  I.  530,  532,  552. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.    K.   Co.  v.    John  (29 

8.  W.  558),  528. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  K.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (91 

Tex.  569),  311. 
Gulf,  C.  A-   8.    F.  R.  Cm.    v.   Johnson 

(  |  rex.   I  iv.    App.]  31    8.    W.  255), 

540. 
Gulf,  C.  A-  8.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Mannesw  it/. 

(70  Tex.  73),  194. 
Gulf,  C.  A-  S.  F.  R  Co.  v.  McFadden 

([Tex.    Civ.    A]. p.]   •_'.",  8.    W.    151), 

335. 
Gulf,    C.  A-    8.    F.  R.    Co.   v.    Noilleet 

(78  Tex.  321),  394. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Royall  (18 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  86),  51  I.  537,  552. 
Gulf,    C.    *  S.   F.    R.   Co.   \.    Ryan 

([Tex.   Civ.  App.]   IS  8.    W.  866), 

346. 
Gulf,  C.    A-   8.    F.    R,   Co.   v.  Smith 

(  [Tex.  C.  A.]  30  8.  W.  361),  355. 
Gulf,    C.   A-  s.   F.    R.   (o.   v.    Smith 

([Tex.   Civ.   App.]   26  8.  W.  644), 

r.io. 
Gulf,    C  A    s.   F.   R.   Co.   v   South- 
wick   (  [Tex.]  30  s.   W.  592),  524, 

532,  537,  538,  543,  545,  547. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Trotl  (86 

Tex.    112),  220. 

Gulf,  C.  A-  8.   F.  R.  Co.  v.   Warlick 

(  [Ind.  Ter.]  35  8.  W.  235),  298. 
Gulf,   C.    A-   8.   F.    R.   Co.   v   Wieno 

([Tex.    Civ.    A]. p.]   26   S.   W.  230), 

:.is. 
Gulf,  C.  A    8.    F.    K.    Co.  v.  Younuer 

([Tex.   Civ.    A  pp.  J   40  8.    W.   423), 

538,  541,544. 
Gulf,  C.  *  s.    F.   R.  Cm.    v.  Tounger 

(90  Tex.  387),   •">:',(■,.  537,    .Ml.   545, 

;,:,:,.  556,  619,  631,  032,  647. 
Gumb  v.   Twenty-Third    St.  Ry.  Co. 

(114  N.  Y.  411),  257,  258,  261. 


Ixx 


;\n 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Guilder  v.  Tibbits  (153    Ind.    591;  55 

N.  E.  702),  404,  405,  407. 
G undersoil  v.  North  Western  El.  Co. 

(47  Minn.  101),  514. 
Gunn  v.  Felton .  (  [Ky.  1900]  57  S.  W. 

15),  04. 
Gunterv.   Beard    (93   Ala.  227),   89, 

91. 
Gunter  v.  Wicker  (85  N.  C.  310),  101. 
Guntber   v.  Johnson  (30  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  437),  594. 
Gurley  v.  M.  Pac.    R.    Co.  ( [Mo.]   26 

S.  W.  953),  242. 
Gurney  v.  Grand    Trunk   K.   Co.  (37 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  557),  505. 
Guthrie    v.  Gorrecht  (  [Pa.  C.  P.]  8 

Lauc.  L.  Rev.  25),  515. 
Guthrie  v.  Mo.    Pac.  R.  Co.  (51  Neb. 

746),  101. 
Guy  v.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  II.  Co.  (  0  Ohio, 

N.  P.  3),  339. 
Gwinnett   Co.    v.  Dunn  (74  Ga.  358), 

05. 
Gyles   v.   Jefferis  (5    Pa.    Dist.  Rep. 

129),  434. 
Haab  v.  Wise  (3  Leg.  Int.  [Pa.]  322), 

91. 
Haberman  v.   Gasser   (  [Wis.]  89  N. 

W.  105),  145. 
Hackett  v.   Pratt  (52   111.  App.  340), 

107. 
Hackett  v.  Smelsley  (77  HI.  109),  123 

124. 
Haddon  v.  Ayres  (1E.&E.  184  [102 

E.  C.  L.  R.]  ),  08. 
Haden   v.    Sioux   City  &   P.    R.   Co. 

(  [Iowa,  1895]  60  N.  W.  537),  215, 

227. 
Hadley  v.   Baxendale  (9  Exch.  341), 

89. 
Hadley  v.  Haywood  (121  Mass.  236), 

460. 
Hagan  v.  Prov.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (3  R.  I. 

88),  112,  136. 
Hagan   v.    Riley    (13    Gray    [Mass.], 

515),  77. 
Hagelund  v.  Murphy  (54  Neb.  545), 

432. 


Hagenaers  v.   Herbst  (30  App.   Div. 
[N.  Y.]  546;  5:!   X.    V.  Supp.  360), 

68. 
llaggerty  v.    Central  R.   R.    Co.   (31 

N.  J.  L.  319),  350,  503,  643. 
Haggerty  v.  Lewiston  (  [Me.  1901]  50 

Atl.  55),  69. 
Haigh  v.  Eoyal  Mail  S.  P.  Co.  (52  L. 

J.  Q.  B.  640),  522. 
Haile  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  (23  U.  S. 

App.  80;  60  Fed.  557),  221. 
Haines  v.  Barclay  Twp.  (181  Pa.  521; 

40  W.  N.  C.  564;  37  Atl.  560),  63. 
Haines  v.  Schultz  (50  N.  J.   L.  481), 

119,  136,  138. 
Hair  v.  Barnes  (26  111.  App.  580),  75. 
Haley  v.  Earle  (30  N.  Y.  208),  161. 
Halff  v.  O'Connor  (14  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

191),  97. 
Hall,  In  re  (38  Kan.  670),  501. 
Hall  v.  Bruce  (21  111.  161),  464. 
Hall  v.  Cadillac  (114  Mich.  99),  204, 

217. 
Hall   v.   Elgin  Dairy  Co.   (15   Wash. 

542),  411. 
Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 

(39  Fed.  18),  514,  524,  525,  526,  528, 

529,  530,  531,  532,  535,  537,  540,  548. 
Hall  v.  Hollander  (4  B.  &  C.  660),  488. 
Hall   v.   Memphis,   etc.,   R.    Co.    (23 

Fed.  637),  341. 
Hall  v.  Ogden  City  Ry.  Co.  (13  Utah, 

243),  171. 
Hall  v.  South  Carolina  Ry.  Co.  (28 

S.  C.  261),  340. 
Hall  v.  State  (20  Ohio,  7),  501. 
Hall  v.  St.  Joseph  Water  Co.  (48  Mo. 

App.  356),  278. 
Hall   &  P.  Furniture  Co.  v.  Wilbur 

(4  Wash.  644),  95. 
Hallock  v.  Blecher  (42  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

199),  87. 
Halshed  v.  Nelson  (24  Hun  [N.  X".], 

395),  388. 
Hamilton  v.    Brown  (125  Ind.   176), 

494. 
Hamilton  v.  Davey  (28  App.  Div.  [N. 

Y.]  457),  432. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   ciTKD    IN    VOL.    I. 


lx\ 


CXlll 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hamilton  v.  Eno  (81   N.  Y.  116),  111, 

387,397. 
Hamilton  v.  Great  Falls  St   R.  Co. 

(IT  Mont.  334),  214. 
Hamilton   v.    Jones   (125   End.    176), 

499,  503. 
Hamilton    v.    McPherson   (28   N.   Y. 

72),  17.  89. 
Hamilton  v.   Minneapolis   Desk  Mfg. 

Co.  {  [Min.  1899]  so  \.  W.  693),  64. 
Hamilton  v.   Morgan's  L.   &  T.  R.  & 

S.  S.  Co.  (42  La.  Ann.  82-4),  111*.  :.l  1. 
Hamilton  v.   Third   Ave.    K.    R.   Co. 

(53  \.  Y.  25),  119,  135,  218,  342. 
Handy  v.  Johnson  (5  Md.  450),  304. 
Hanenacker  v.   Ferman  (47  111.  App. 

17i.   17.--. 
Haney  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Perkins  (78  Mich. 

1),  381. 
Hanna   v.    Pegg   (1    Blatchf.    [Ind.] 

181),  81. 
Hanover  R.   K.  Co.   v.  Coyle  (55  Pa. 

St.  3!C,),  227,  238. 
Hanrahan  v.  Cochran  (12  App.  Uiv. 

[\.  r.]9i), ,;;:- 

Hansberger  v.  Sedalia  Elec.  R.  L.  & 

P.  Co.  (82  Mo.  App.  566),  215,  218. 
Ilansley   v.    Janesville  &   W.   R.   Co. 

(117  X.  C.  565;  115  X.  C.  602),  335. 
Hanson  v.  European  &  Am.  Ry.  Co. 

(62  Me.  84),  139,  333,  340,  341. 
Hanson   v.   Urbana  &  C.  Elec.   St.  R. 

Co.  I  7.'.  111.  App.   174),  107. 
Harding  v.   Townshend  (43  Vt.  536), 

1  93. 
Hardy   v.    Brooklyn    (7   Abb.  N.   C. 

[X.  S.]   103  |,  501. 
Hardy  v.  Eagle  (23  Misc.  [X.  V.]  141  ), 

r,l.-,. 
I  lardy    v.    Meriden  Twp.  (114  Mich. 

454;  72  X.  W.  251),  63. 
Hardy  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.  (89  Wis. 

183),  24.-,. 
Hardy  v.   Minneapolis,  etc.,   Ry.  Co. 

(36  Fed.  657),  266. 
Hare  v.  Marsh  (61  Wis.  435),  144. 
Hargreaves  v.    Deacon   (25    Mich.  1), 

66. 


Darker  v.  Burlington, C.  B,  a    \.  I;. 

I  o.  (  [Iowa]  55  N.  W.  316),  214. 
Barley  \ .  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R.  < '<>. 

I  7  Baxt.  [Pen n.]  240),  135. 
Harlinger  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  B.  R. 

Co.  (15   Wkly.    Dig.    [X.    V. 

572,  --.so. 
Harman  v.  Cross  (5  Wash.  703),  361, 

379. 
Harman  v.  Cundifl  (82  7a  239),  l  n, 

3!  17.    125. 
Harman   v.    Old   Colony    R.    R.    Co. 

(  [Mass.  S.  .J.  C.    1897]  2    Am.    Xeg. 

Rep.  7171,227.  233,  318. 
Harman  v.  St.   Louis  (137   Mo.    I'M; 

38  S.  W.  1102),  63. 
Harper  v.  Pinkston  (112  X.  C.  293), 

395. 
Harper  v.  Railroad  Co.  (36  Fed.  102), 

507. 
Harpham  v.  Whitney  (77  111.  32),  431. 
Harrington   v.  Eureka   Hill   Min.  Co. 

(17  Utah,  300),  208,  21  I. 
Harris  v.  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  (103 

Da.  495),  109. 
Harris  v.  Kentucky  Timber  &  L.  Co. 

(10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1731).  :.14. 
Harris  v.  Moss  (112  Ga.  '.'•",),  01. 
Harris  v.  Rand  H  X.  II.  259),  153. 
Harris  v.  State  (9  S.  D.  453;  60  \    W 

sic,),  65. 
Harris  v.  Zanone  (93  Cal.  59),  100. 
Harrisburg,  The  (110  1\  S.  199),  495, 

498,  503. 
Harrison  v.  Berkley  (1  Strob.  [S.  S.] 

•-.2.-.),  87,  90. 
Harrison   v.    Denver  A-    R.    G.    W.  R. 

Co.  ( [Utah]  27  Pac.  728),  100. 
Harrison  v.  Ely  (120  111.  83),  111.  124. 
Harrison   v.    I..  X.  W.  Ry.  (1    I  ah.  & 

E.  r>40),  531,  54:',.  :,:,:>. 
Harrison  v.  Trice  (22  Ind.  If.:,).  460. 
Harrison  v.  Sutter  St.  R.  Co.  (116  I  al. 

156),  101.  377. 
Harrold  v.  X.  V.  Kiev.  i;.  i;.  Co.  (24 

Hun  [N.  Y.'.  184),  214. 
Harrold  v.  Winona  £  St.  P.   R.  Co. 

(17  Minn.  17),  286. 


ixxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hart  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (33 

S.  C.  427),  139,  251. 
Hart  v.  Evans  (8  Pa.  St.  13),  81. 
Han  v.  Grennell  (122  X.  V.  371),  1G3: 
Hart  v.  Sliorey  ,(Rep.  Jud.  Quel).  12 

C.  L.  84),  457. 
Hartel   v.    Holland    (19    Wkly.   Dig. 

[N.  Y.]  312),  229.    • 
Harter  v.  Crill  (33  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  2S3), 

460. 
Hartfield  v.  Roper  (21  Wend.  [N.  Y.] 

615),  176. 
Hartigan  v.  Southern   Pac.   Ry.   Co. 

(86  Cal.  142),  503. 
Hartjen    v.     Reubsamen    (19    Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  149),  515. 
Hartman  v.  Morning  Journal  Assoc. 

(46  N.  Y.  St.  R.  181),  390. 
Hartpense  v.  Rodgers  (143  Mo.  623), 

457,  459. 
Hartehorne  v.  Smith  (104  Ga.  235), 

433. 
Harvard  v.  Stiles  (54  Neb.  26),  214. 
Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  v.  Gray  ([Ind.] 

16  N.  E.  787),  108. 
Harvey   v.   Dunlop    (Lalor    [X.  Y.], 

193),  69. 
Harwood  v.  Bennington  &  R.  R.  Co. 

(67  Vt.  664;  32  Atl.  721),  63. 
Harwood  v.  Lowell  (4  Cush.  [Mass.] 

370),  316. 
Haskins  v.   Lumsden  (10  Wis.  359), 

415. 
Hastings  v.  Stetson  (130  Mass.  76), 

387,  412. 
Hastings  v.  Stetson  (126  Mass.  320), 

404. 
Hastings  v.  Stetson  (91  Me.  229),  214. 
Haszlacher  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (26 

Misc.  [X.  Y.]  865),  261. 
Haszlachern  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (60 

XT.  Y.  Supp.  1001),  206. 
Hatch  v.  Fuller  (131  Mass.  574),  467. 
Hatfield   v.  Lasher  (17  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

23),  412. 
Hathaway  v.    Hatchard    (160   Mass. 

296),  376. 
Hatjie  v.  Hare  (68  Vt.  247),  430. 


Halt  v.    Evening   News   Assoc.    (94 

Mich;  419),  394,  397. 
Haug  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.  (8  N. 

D.  23),  511. 
Hausberger  v.  Sedalia,  E.  R.  L.  &  P. 

Co.  (82  Mo.  App.  566),  75. 
Hauser  v.   Griffith   (102  Iowa,  215), 

372. 
Haven  v.  Beidler  Mfg.  Co.  (40  Mich. 

286),  7. 
Havens  v.  Hartford  &   N.   H.   R.  Co. 

(28  Conn.  69),  78. 
Haver   v.    Cent.    R.    R.    Co.    (  [X.    J. 

1900]  45  Atl.  593),  136. 
Havermeyer  v.  Fuller  (60  How.   Pr. 

[X.  S.]  316),  393. 
Haviland  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (40  N. 

Y.  St.  R.  773),  212. 
Hawes  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(103  Mo.  10),  209. 
Hawes  v.   Knowles  (114   Mass.  518), 

111,  116,  139. 
Hawk  v.   Ridgway  (33  111.   475),  119, 

134. 
Hawkins  v.  Front  St.  Cable  R.  Co.  (3 

Wash.  592),  183,  316,322. 
Hawkins  v.  Riley  (117  B.  Mon.  [Ky.] 

101),  139. 
Hawkins  v.  Snow  (28  N.  S.  259),  431, 

442. 
Hawks  v.  Winans  ( 10  J.  &  S.  451 ),  161. 
Haw  ley  v.  Daley  (13  111.  App.  391), 

599. 
Hawn  v.    Banghart   (76   Iowa  683), 

464. 
Hay  v.  The  Cohoes  Co.  (2  N.  Y.  159), 

150. 
Haycroft  v.  Lake  Shore  &  Mich.  S. 

R.  R.  Co.  (2  Hun  [N.  Y.],  489),  177. 
Hayden  v.   Piatt  (84    Hun  [N.   Y.], 

487),  214. 
Hayes  v.  Lease  (51  S.  C.  534),  377. 
Hayes  v.  Smith  (15  Ohio  C.  C.  300), 

214. 
Hayes  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (18  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  582),  246. 
Hayes  v.  Williams  (17  Colo.  465),  152. 

503,  515. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    \'<iL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.  ] 


1  \  \  \  v 


Haymond  v.  Haymond (74 Tex.  ill), 

515. 
Hayner  v.  Cowden  (27  Ohio  St  292), 

111,  111,  402,  400. 
Haynes  v.  Nowlin  (129  Ind.  581),  458. 
Eaynes   v.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.  (114  X. 

('.  20S),  150. 
Hays  v.  Creary  (00  Tex.  445),  451. 
Hays  v.   Dalzell   (21   Mo.  App.  079), 

78. 
Haysv.  Gallagher  (72   Pa.   St.   130), 

106. 
Hayward  v.  United  States  (30  Ct.  CI. 

219),  05. 
Hazard  v.  Israel  (1  Binn.  [Pa.]  288), 

111,  124. 
Hazard  Powder  Co.  v.  Volger  ( [C.  C. 

App.   8th    A.]    58   Fed.    152),    L02, 

323. 
Head  v.  Georgia  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (79  Ga. 

358),  327. 
Eealey  v.  Ballantyne  &  Sons  (  [N.  J. 

1901]  49  Atl.  511),  04,  81. 
Healey  v.  Visalia  &  T.   R.  Co.   (101 

Cal.  585),  274,  275,  280. 
Hearnv.  Erwin(3Cold.  [Teun.]  599), 

501. 
Eearne  v.  De  Young  (132  Cal.  357), 

385,  387. 
Heartie  v.   De  Youug  (119  Cal.  070), 

399,  413. 
Heath  v.  (ileus   Falls,   Sandy   Hill  & 

Fort  Edward  St.   Ry.  Co.  (90  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  500),  169. 
Heatoi  v.  Pearce  (59  Neb.  583),  79. 
Ileeht   v.  Ohio  &  M.   Ry.  Co.  ([Ind.] 

32  \.  E.  302),  499. 
Meddle  v.  City  Elec.  R.  Co.  (112  Mich. 

.547),  230. 
Heddles  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co. 

(77  Wis.   228;  46   N.  W.    115),   224. 

289. 
Hedges  v.   Kansas  City  (18  Mo.  App. 

02),  174. 
Hedgpeth  v.  Robertson  (18  Tex.  858), 

120. 

Hedrick  v.  Ilwaco  R.  &   Nav.   Co.  (4 
Wash.  400),  502. 


Hefley  v.  Baker  i  19  Kan.  9),  76,  111, 

120.    122.    12  1. 

Begericb  v.   Keddie  (99  N.  V. 

488,  194,  495,  500. 
Heigel  v.  Wichita  Co.  (84  Tex.  392), 

65. 

Heil  v.    (Handiug  (42    Pa.   St.  493), 

119,  180. 

Ileim   v.  McCaughao   (32  Miss.  17), 

120,  141.  351. 

Hein  v.  Holdridge  (  [Minn. J  si  X.  \V. 

522  1.  467. 
Heintz   v.  Caldwell    (10  Ohio  C.    C. 

App.  030),  195. 
Heinz   v.  Brooklyn    Heights   R.  Co. 

(91  Hun  [X.  Y.]i  640),  514,  586. 
Heirn  v.   M'Caughan   (32    Miss.   17), 

120,  141.  351. 
Heiser  v.  Loomis  (47  Mich.  16),  375. 
Heister  v.    Fawn  Twp.    (189  Pa.  St. 

253),  84. 
Helmuth  v.  Bell  ( [111.]  37  N.  E.  230), 

470. 
Hemineway  v.  Woods  (1  Pick.  [Mass.] 

524),  81. 
Ilempenstall   v.  X.  Y.  C.  &   II.    R.  R. 

R.  Co.  (82  Hun   [N.  XT],  285,  212, 

502. 

Henderson  v.  Alexander  (2  Ca.  81), 

503. 
Henderson  v.  Canada  Atlantic  R,  Co. 

(1  Ont.  App.  437),  220,  221. 
Henderson  \.  Fox  (83  Ga.  233),  400, 

412. 
Henderson    v.    Henshall  ([U.  S.  C.  C. 

App.  9th  Cir.]  54  Fed.  320),  1st. 
Henderson  v.  Phila.  &    R   R  Co.  (1  14 

Pa.  St.  461;    28  W.   X.  C.  470:  22 

Atl.   851;    11    Alb.   J.   470;  48    Am. 

&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  16),  71. 
Hendriok   v.    Watton   (69  Tex.   192) 

522. 
Hendricks  v.  Fowler  (16  Ohio  C.  C. 

507).  869,  374. 
Hendricks    v.    Haskins    (ill    Mich. 

201).  452. 
Hendrickson  v.  Kingsbury  (21  Iowa, 

379),  112,  114,  372. 


lxxxvi  TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Heneky  v.  Smith  (10  Oreg.  349),  111,  I  Hewitt  v.  Pioneer  Press  Co.  (25  Minn. 

124.  144,  379.  178),  417. 

Hennessy  v.  Brooklyn  City  11.  Co.  (6  |  Hewitt  v.   Prime    (21  Wend.   [N.  Y.] 


App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  206),  176. 
Hennessy  v.  District  of   Columbia  (8 

Mac-key,  220),  102. 
Henning  v.  Caldwell  (45  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

373),  563,  509,  572,  581. 
Ilenning  v.  Western  LTn.   Teleg.  Co. 

(41  Fed.  864),  136,  138. 
Henry  v.  Klopfer  (1  Pa.  Adv.  K.  80), 

316,  322. 
Henry  v.  Southern  Pac.   R.  Co.    (50 

Cal.  176),  58. 
Hentonville  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fields  ([Ind.] 

36  N.  E.  529),  240. 


79),  467. 
Hewlett  v.  George  (68  Miss.  703),  132, 

448,  449. 
Hexter  v.  Cory  ( [Tex.]  18  S.  W.  574), 

107. 
Heyerv.  Salisbury  (7  111.   App.  93), 

614,  619. 
Heyl  v.    Inman    Steamship  Co.  (14 

Hun  [X.  Y.],  564),  153. 
Hibbard  v.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.  (33 

Wis.  558),  79. 
Hickey  v.  Baird  (9  Mich.  32),  77. 
Hickey  v.  Taaffe  (105  N.  Y.  26),  163. 


Ilentze  v.  Marjenhoff  (42  S.  C.  427),  :  Hickinbotton  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 
515.  (15  N.  Y.  St.  R.  11),  212. 

Hickman  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (22 

Mo.  App.  344),  514. 
Hickok  v.  Pittsburgh  (16N.  Y.  161), 

65. 
Hicks  v.  Faulkner   (8   B.   Div.   167), 

432,  434. 
Hicks  v.  Newport,  A.  &  H.  Ry.   Co. 

(4  Best  &  S.  403),  516,  524,  542,  554. 
Hidy  v.  Murray  (101  Iowa,  65),  435. 
Huberwald  v.  Orleans  R.  C.  (50  La. 

Ann.  477),  497. 
Higgins  v.   Butcher  (Yelverton,  89), 

495. 
Higgins  v.  Central  N.  Eng.  &  W.  R. 

Co.    ([Mass.]   48   Am.   &    Eng.   R. 

Cas.  212),  504. 
Higgins  v.  Lansingh  (154  111.  301;  40 

N.  E.  362),  68. 
Higgins  v.  Louisville,  N.   O.  &  Tex. 

R.  R.  Co.  (64  Miss.  80),  111,  135. 
Higgins  Carpet  Co.    v.   O'Keefe  (51 

U.  S.  App.  74),  514. 
Hight  v.   Naylor  (86  111.  App.   508), 

453. 
Hilbrant  v.  Donaldson  (69  Mo.  App. 

92),  430,  440. 
Hilbrant  v.   Simmons  (9  Ohio  C.  D. 

566),  418. 
Hilbrant  v.  Simmons  (18  Ohio  C.  C. 

123),  386,  390. 


Herbst  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.  (40  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  558),  212. 
Hercules  Iron  Works   v.  Elgin   J.  & 

E.  E.  R.  Co.  ([111.]  30  N.  E.  1050), 

107. 
Hermann  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.  (11  La.  Ann.  51),  495. 
Herr  v.  Central  Ky.  L.  Asy.  (17  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  320;  30  S.  W.  971;  41  Cent. 

L.  J.  37),  67. 
Herreshoff  v.  Tripp  (15  R.  I.  92),  119. 
Herrick  v.  Wixom   (121   Mich.   384), 

64. 
Herring  v.   Jester  (2  Houst.    [Del.] 

66),  467. 
Herzog   v.    Campbell    (47  Neb.  370), 

381,  390. 
Hess  v.  Lowery  (122  Ind.  225),  494. 
Hess  v.  Oregon  German  Bkg.  Co.  (31 

Oreg.  503),  432,  440. 
Hess  v.  Sparks  (44  Kan.  465 ),  397. 
Hetherington    v.    Northeastern    Ry. 

(51  L.  J.  Q.  B.  495),  532,  537,  548,551. 
Hetherington  v.  North  Eastern  Ry. 

Co.  (9  Q.  B.  D.  160),  :.2.-),  533. 
Heusner  v.   Houston  W.   St.  &  P.  F. 

Co.  (7  Misc.   [N.  Y.]  48),  514,  586, 

589. 
Hewitt  v.  Eisenbart  (36  Neb.  794), 

251,  252,  280. 


TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IN    VOIi.    I. 


1  x  x  x  vii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hilgendorf  v.  Ostrora  (4G  111.  App. 

466),  73. 
Hill    v.  Anderson    (  [Ohio  Supr.   Ct. 

Cin.  1899]  9  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec. 

480),  81. 
Hill  v.  Bryant  (01  Ark.  203),  697. 
Bill  v.   New  Orleans,  O.  &  G.  W.  R. 

Co.  (11  La.  Ann.  292),  135. 
Hill     v.    Schueider    (13    App.    Div. 

[X.  Y.]  299;  42  V  V.  Supp.  1).  67. 
Bill  v.  Sedalia    (64    Bio.  App.  494), 

214,  293. 
Bill  v.  Ward  (13  Ala.  310),  128. 
Bill  v.  Winsor  (118  Mass.  251),  no. 
Billesum  v.  New  York  (24  J.  &  S. 

[N.  Y.]  596),  292. 
Hillman  v.  Banmback  (21  Tex.  203), 

134. 
Ililson  v.  Foster  (  [U.  S.  C.  C.  S.  I). 

X.  Y.]  80  Fed.  896),  7:1. 
Bindry  v.  Holt  (24  Colo.  464),  495. 
Hinds  v.  Barton  (25   N.  V.  544),  L55. 
Hinkle  v.  Davenport   (38  Iowa,  355), 

410. 
Hinkley  v.  Chicago,   etc.,  K.  li.  Co. 

(38  Wis.  194),  333. 
Hinton   v.  Dibbin   (2  Q.  B.  646),  159. 
Birsch  v.  Feeney  (83  111.  550),  441. 
Hirshfield  v.  Ft.    Worth   Nat.   Bank 

(83  Tex.  452),  387,  393. 
Birth    v.  Indianapolis  (IS   Ind.   App. 

673;  48  N.  E.  876),  71. 
Hitson  v.  Sims  (  [Ark.  1901]  64  S.  W. 

219),  432. 
Hoadley  v.  Watson  (45  Vt.  289),  114, 

122,  372,  373. 
Boag  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

(Ill  N.  V.  L99),  174. 
Bobbs  v.   London  &  S.   W.  Ky.  Co. 

(L.    R.  Ki  C.  B.  ill),  344,  349,  351. 
Hoble  v.  L.  &  S.   Ky.  (44   L.  J.  Q.  B. 

40),  91. 
Boboken   Printing  &  P.  Co.  v.  Kahn 

(58  X.  J.  L.359),  l<)4.  415. 
Bockstrasser    v.    Martin     (62    Hun 

[N.  Y.],  165),  99. 
Hocura  v.  Weitherich  (22  Minn.  152), 

166. 


Bodeckei  V.  Strieker  (39  X.  Y.  Supp. 

515),  463. 
Bodges  v.  Kimball  (91  Fed.  845),  505. 
Bodges   v.    Richards  (30    App.  Div. 

[X.  Y.]  158),  132. 
Bodsoll  v.  Stallebrass  (1 1   Ad.  &  E. 

301),  243,  316,861. 
Hodgson  v.  Dexter   (l  Cranch    U.  s. 

C.  C],  ill).  1  18. 
Hodgson  v.  Millward  (3  Grant  [Pa.], 

406),  HI,  112. 
Boepper  v.  Southern  Hotel  Co.  (142 

Mo.  378),  90. 
Hoey  v.  Felton  (11  C.  B.  [X.  S.]  142), 

91,  449. 
Hoey  v.  Fletcher  (39  Fla.  325),  4 17. 
Hoffman  v.  Northern   P.   K.  Co.  (45 

Minn.  53),  119,  122,  339. 
Hoffman  v.  Kudiman  (5  Misc.  [X.  Y.] 

326),  81. 
Hoffman    v.    Union    Ferry    Co.     (47 

N.  Y.  176),  63. 
Hogan   v.  Citizens  Railway    Co.    (150 

Mo.  36),  108,  175. 
Hogan    v.  Cregan   (G    Robt.   [X.   Y.] 

138),  467. 
Hogan   v.  Pacific    Mills    (158    Mass. 

102),  305. 
Bogan  v.  Prov.  £  W.  R.  R.  Co.  (3  R. 

I.  88),  135,  137. 
Bogan  v.  Regan  (5  X.  Y.  St.  R.  110), 

379. 
Bogan    v.  Taylor    (Hcmpst   [U.  S.  C. 

C.  Ark.]  20),  106. 
Boggins  v.  Coad  (58  111.  App.  58), 

•157,  4G0. 
Ilogle  v.   New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(28  Hun  [X.  Y.],  363),  194. 
Bohngren  v.  St   Paul  City  Ky.  Co. 

(  [Minn.   L895]    5    Am.    Elec.    Cas. 

499),  171. 
Bolden   v.  Penn.  K.   R.  Co.  ([Pa.  C. 

P.]  7  Kulp,  62),  214. 
Boldridgev.  Mendenhall ( 108 Wis.  l ), 

307. 
Holland  v.  Brown  (35  Fed.  23),  498. 
Holland  v.   Railroad    I  144  Mass.  425), 

4ss. 


lxxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Holleman  v.  Harward  (Hit  N.  C.  150), 

321. 
Hollenbeek    v.    Missouri    P.    R.    Co. 

(141  Mo.  07),  214. 
Holleran  v.  Bagnell  (G  L.  R.  Ir.  333), 

548. 
Holleran  v.  Bagwell  (4  L.  R.  Ir.  740), 

522,  524,  525. 
Holliday  v.  Holliday  (122  Cal.  26), 

440. 
Hollingsworth  v.   Saunders  Co.    (36 

Neb.  141),  65. 
Hollock  v.   Miller  (2  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

630),  391. 
Ilollyman  v.   Hannibal  &  St.    J.    R. 

Co.  (58  Mo.  480),  95. 
Holman   v.    Union   St.    R.    Co.    (114 

Mich.  208),  274,  288. 
Holmes  v.  Barclay  (4  La.   Ann.   64), 

62,  75. 
Holmes  v.  Carolina  C.  R.  Co.  (94  N. 

C.  319),  342. 
Holmes  v.  Halde  (74  Me.  28),  236. 
Holmes  v.  Jones  (147  N.  Y.  67),  385, 

386,  397,  400,  401,  402,  422,  423,  424. 
Holmes  v.  Jones  (121  N.  Y.  461),  102, 

124. 
Holmes  v.  Railway  Co.  (94  N.  C.  318), 

120. 
Holmes  v.  State    ([Ala.]  14  So.  51), 

05. 
Holmes  v.   Tennessee  Coal  I.   &    R. 

Co.  (49T,n.  Ann.  1465),  107. 
Holstine  v.   Oregon,    etc.,  R.  Co.   (8 

Oregon),  163),  164. 
Holton  v.   Daly    (106   111.    131),   499, 

503,  597,  598,  602,  003,  609,  625. 
Holton  v.  Hicks  (  [Kan.  App.  1899), 

58Pac.  998),  318. 
Holton  v.  State  (28  Fla.  303),  501. 
Holyoke  v.  Grand  Trunk    Ry.  (48  N. 

H.  541),  115,  211,  243,  328,  362. 
Homanv.  Fleming  (51  111.  App.  572), 

214. 
Homan  v.  Franklin  County  (98  Iowa, 

692),  207. 
Homan   v.    Franklin    Co.  (90   Iowa, 

185;  57  N.  W.  703),  240. 


Home  Bldg.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Roanoke  (91 

Va.  52;  20  S.  E.  895),  71. 
Home   F.  Ins.   Co.    v.    Kahlman   (58 

Neb.  488),  104. 
Homer  v.  Yance  (93  Wis.  352),  462. 
Homestake    Min.    Co.    v.    Fullerton 

( [U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C]  69  Fed.  923), 

108. 
Houaker  v.    Howe   (19  Gratt.   [Va.] 

50),  373. 
Honegsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R. 

Co.  (1  Keyes  [N.  Y.],  570),  177. 
Honey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 

(59  Fed.  423),  174. 
Honey    Grove   v.    Lamaster    (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.],  50  S.  W.  1052),  269. 
Hooker  v.  Newton  (24  Wis.  292),  145. 
Hooper  v.  Creager  (84  Md.  195),  501. 
Hooper  v.  Haskell  (56  Me.  251),  362. 
Hooper  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (112  Ga. 

9),  315. 
Hoosier  Stone  Co.  v.  Louisville,  N.  A. 

&  C.  R.  Co.  (  [Ind.]  31  N.  E.  365), 

81. 
Hooten  v.   Barnard   (137   Mass.  36), 

62,  76. 
Hope  v.  Alley  (9  Tex.  394),  77. 
Hopkin  v.   Hamilton  Elec.   L.  &  C. 

Co.  (2  Ont.  L.  R.  240),  67. 
Hopkins  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.   R.  Co. 

(36  N.  H.  9),  120,  186,  227,  316,  322. 
Hopkins  v.    Drowne   (21   R.  I.   [part 

1],  82,  428. 
Hopkins  v.  Lee  (6    Wheat.    [U.  S.] 

109),  94. 
Hopkins  v.  Railroad  Co.  (110  Ga.  85), 

158. 
Hopkins  v.   Railroad   (36  N.   H.  9), 

115. 
Hopkins  v.  Sanford  (38  Mich.  611), 

89. 
Hoppe  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(61  Wis.  359),  514,  648,  654,  657,  0(>7. 
Horgan   v.   Pacific   Mills  (158  Mass. 

402),  300,  302. 
Horowitz      v.      Hamburg-American 

Packet  Co.  (18  Misc.   [N.  Y.]  24), 

247. 


TABLE    I  >F   (ASKS   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


1 X  X  X 1 X 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hosley  v.  Brooks  (20  HI.  115),  425. 
Hut clikiss  v.    Lothrop  (1  .Julius.  [N. 

V.J  286),  lis. 
Hotchkiss  v.Oliphanl  (2  Hill  [N.  ,> '.), 

510),  420. 
Hotchkiss  v.   Porter  (30  Conn.  414), 

413. 
lloi  springs  K.  Ci>.   v.   Deloney  (65 

Ark.  177),  354. 
Hough   v.    Young  (1    Ham.    [Ohio] 

504),  78. 
Ilouglikirk   v.    Delaware  A    11.   Can. 

Co.  (92   N.  V.   225),  514,561,  563, 

568,  570,  572,  584,  586,  589. 
Houglitaling  v.  Kilderhouse  (1  N.  Y. 

530),  423. 
Houseman  v.  Grossman  (177  Pa.  453; 

39  W.  N.  ('.  276;  35  Atl.  736),  'is. 
Houston  v.  Gran  (38  NTeb.  687),  478. 
Houston  v.  State  (98  Wis.  481;  74  X. 

W.  Ill),  65. 
Houston  &  T.  C.    It.  Co.   v.    Berling 

(14  Tex.  C.  A.  544),  215,  21S,  294. 
Houston  &  T.   C.   R  Co.  v.   Cowser 

(57   Tex.   293,   297),   524,   525,    520, 

527,  52S,  529,  530,  532,  539,  540,  547, 

550. 
Houston  A-  T.  C.   R.  Co.  v.   Kimbell 

(  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]   4:;   S.  \V.  1049), 

252. 
Houston  «.v  T.  C.  It.  Co.  v.  Lipscomb 

(  [Tex.],  62  S.  W.  954),  522. 
Houston  &  T.  ('.   It.  Co.  v.   Loeffler 

( [Tex.],  51  s.  \V.  536 1.  527,  528,  5  12. 
Houston  v.  T.  ('.  It.  Co.  v.  McKenzie 

(  [Tex.   Civ.    A  pp.1    II    S.  W.  s:;i  ,, 

347. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Nixon  (52 

Tex.  19,  24),  527.  547. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.   Pereira 

(  [Tex.  Civ.    App.]  45  S.  W.   707), 

257,  25s. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Red  Cross 

Stock    Farm    (22    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

Ill;  53  s.  \V.  834),  03. 
Houston  A-  T.  C.  K.  Co.  \.  Rogers (15 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  0S0),  491,  522,  529, 

553. 


Houston  a    T.   C.    I:.  <  !o.   \     Rogers 

i  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  39  S.  W.  1 112], 

502. 
Houston  &  T.  < '.    R.  Co.  v.   B 

(92  Tex.  117),  251. 
Houston   &    T.    (  .    R.  <  o.    \.    Rowell 

([Tex.  C.A.J  45  S.  W.  763),  21 
Houston  &  T.  C.  It.  Co.  \.  Sgalinski 

(19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  107),  1  19. 
Houston  &   T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Shirley 

C.i  Tex.  L25),  124. 
Houston  &   T.   C.   R.   Co.  v.  Weaver 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.j  )l  s.  \V.  B46),554. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  White  (23 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  280),  524,  527,  528, 

532,  537,  550,  551. 
Houston  &  T.  C.    R.    R.  Co.  v.  Willie 

(53  Tex.  318),  249. 
Houston  city  st.   R.  Co.  v.  Artusey 

(  [Tex.   Civ.  App.    1895]  31   S.   W. 

319),  228. 
Houston  City  St.  It.  Co.  v.  Medlenka 

(17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  621),  214. 
Houston  City  St.    R.  Co.  v.   Rich  art 

(87  Tex.  539),  173. 
Houston  City  St.   R.   Co.   v.  Sciacca 

(80  Tex.  350),  549. 
Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  It.  Co.  v.   Per- 
kins (21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  50S),  354. 
Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ards (20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  203),  209. 
Houston   Printing  Co.  v.  Dement  (18 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  30),  387,  390. 
Houston  PrintingCo.  v.  Moulden(15 

Tex.  Civ.   App.  571).  381,  385,  387, 

390. 
Howard  v.  Grover  (28  Me.  97),  102. 
Howard  v.  Stiles  (54  Neb.  26),  240. 
Howard  v.  Taylor  (99  Ala.  450),  75. 
Howard  v.  Wilmington  &  S.    R.  Co. 

(1  (Jill  [Md.],311  I.  77. 

Howard    Oil    Co.    v.    I>a\  is    1 76   Tex. 

630),  215.  218,  227. 
Howe  v.  Co.luan  (17  .Minn.  103),  178. 
Howe  v.  M  inneapolis,  St.  1'.  &  S.  S 

M.  R.  Co.  (62  Minn.  71  I,  214. 
Howell  v.  Howell  do  [red.  L.  [N.  C] 

84),  113. 


xc 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 


Howell  v.  Independence  ( 07  Mo.  App. 

817),  228. 
Howell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.  (24  .\[>\>. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  502),  514,  586,  589. 
Howells  v.  North   Ainer.  Transp.   & 

Trad.  Co.  (24' Wash.  689),  317,  323. 
Howes  v.   Knowles  (114  Mass.  518), 

219. 
Howett  v.  Peon.,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (166  Pa. 

St.  607),  152. 
Howland  v.  Howland  (114  Mass.  517), 

407. 
Howland  v.  Oakland  Consol.  St.  R. 

Co.  (110  Cal.  513),  212. 
Howland  v.  Vincent  (10  Mete.  [Mass.] 

371),  07. 
Howlet  v.  Tuttle  (15  Colo.  454),  114, 

372. 
Howserv.  Melcher  (40Mich.  185),  95. 
Hnwson  v.  Mestayer  (3  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

571 ),  194. 
Hoyt  v.   Cleveland,   Cincinnati  &  St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.  (112  Mich.  038),  330. 
Hoyt  v.  Danbury  (69  Conn.  341;  37 

Atl.  1051),  63. 
Hoyt  v.  Hudson  (41  Wis.  105),  100. 
Hubbard  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co. 

(104  Wis.  160),  043. 
Hubbard  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

(80  N.  W.  454),  005. 

Hubbard  (3  Shep.  [Me.] 


W.  U.  Tel.  Co 


Wis. 


Mc Arthur  [D. 


Hubbard  \ 

198),  95. 
Hubbard  a 

55S),  78. 
Huber  v.  Tember   ( 

C]  484),  114,  372. 
Hubgh  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  R.  Co. 

(0  La.  Ann.  495),  495. 
Hnckle  v.  Money  (2  Wils.  205),  111. 
Hudler  v.  Golden  (36  N.  Y.  446),  501- 
Hudson  v.  Archer  (9  S.  D.  240),  75. 
Hudson  R.  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Watervliet 

T.  &  R.  Co.  (01  Hun  [N.  Y.],  140; 

21  C.  P.  204;  39  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  952; 

15  N.  Y.  Supp.  752;  10  Ry.  &  Corp. 

L.  J.  364,  case  rev'd  135  N.  Y.  393; 

48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  417;  32  N.  E.  148), 

71. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Hudson  Valley  Knitting  Co.  (66  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  628),  214. 
Hudspeth  v.  Cray  (5  Ark.  175),  106. 
Huerzelerv.  Central  Crosstown  R.  Co. 

(1  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  136),  514,  586. 
Hueston  Mississippi  &  R.  R.  Boom 

Co.  (76  Minn.  251),  99. 
Huff  v.  Aultman  (09  Iowa,  71),  478. 
Huff  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  ( [W. 

Va.  1900]  95  S.  E.  866),  64. 
Hughes  v.  Anderson   (68  Ala.   280), 

38. 
Hughes  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (73  Wis.  380; 

41  N.  W.  407),  72. 
Hugbes  v.  McDouough    (43  N.   J.  L. 

459),  90. 
Hughes  v.  Orange   Co.    Milk  Assoc. 

(10  N.  Y.  Supp.  252),  214. 
Hughes  v.  Richter  (161  111.  409),  631. 
Hughes  v.   United  States  (  [U.  S.  C. 

C.  D.  Wash.]  86  Fed.  1022),  65. 
Hughey  v.  Sullivan    (36    Ohio    L.  J. 

247),  498. 
Hughkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Can  Co. 

(92  N.  Y.  219),  562. 
Hugill  v.  Reed  (49  N.  J.   L.  [20  Vr.] 

300),  95. 
Hulbert      v.     New     Nonpareil    Co. 

([Iowa]  82  N.  W.  928),  417. 
Hulbert  v.  Topeka  (34  Fed.  510),  499. 
Hulihan  v.  Green   Bay  W.  &  S.  P.  R. 

R.  Co.  (68  Wis.  520),  243. 
Hull  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  (26  L.  R. 

Ir.  289),  528,  532,  537,  544. 
Hull  v.  Summer  (12  Mo.  App.    583), 

134. 
Humble  v.  Shoemaker  (70  Iowa,  223), 

467,  409. 
Humes  v.  Proctor  (73  Hun    [N.  Y.], 

265),  95. 
Humphries  v.  Jobnson  (20  Ind.  190), 

112,  114,  372. 
Humpton  v.  Unterkircher  (97  Iowa, 

509;  66  N.  W.  776),  67. 
Hunn    v.    Michigan    C.    R.  Co.     (78 

Mich.  513),  658,  661. 
Hunt  v.  Bennett  (19  N.  Y.  174),   113. 
Hunt  v.  Booneville  (65  Mo.  620),  142. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Xi'l 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hunt  v.  Chicago,  etc.,   K.   R.  Co.  (26 

[owa,  368),  263,  264,  265. 
Hunt  v.  Chicago,  H.  &  B.  It.  Co.  (121 

111.  644),  501. 
Hunt  v.  Hayes  (64  Vt.  89),  515. 
Hunt  v.  Kile  (98  Fed.  49),  605,  606. 
Hunt  v.  O'Brien   (59   111.    A.pp.  321), 

10(5. 
Hunt  v.  Tibbetts  (TO  Me.  221),  83. 
Hunt  v.  Webber  (22  App.  Div.   [N. 

Y.]  631),  104. 
Hunt  v.  Winfield  (36  Wis.  L54),  316. 
Hunter  v.  Kansas  City  &  M.   R.  &  U. 

Co.  (85  Fed.  397),  84,  148. 
Hunter    v.    Montana    C.    I!.    Co.    (22 

Mont.  525;  57  Pac.  140),  63. 
Hunter  v.  Stewart  (47  Me.  41!)),    81, 

182,  204. 
Hunter  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (21  Misc. 

(  [X.  V.J  1),  281,  298. 
Huntington  v.  Attrill  (14U  V.  S.  657), 

510. 
Huntington  v.  Burke  (21   Ind.   App. 

655),  267. 
Huntington    County     v.   Bonebrake 

(14(1  Ind.  311),  214. 
Huntingdon,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Decker 

(84  Pa.  st.  419),  521. 
Huntley  v.  Bacon  (15  Conn.  2G7),  112. 
Hurfurth  v.    Corp.    of    Washington 

(G  D.  C.  2S8),  111. 
Hnrlburt  v.  Topeka  (34   Fed.  510), 

503,  508. 
Hurley  v.  New  York  A    B.    Brew    Co. 

(13  App.  Div.   [X.   Y.l    167),    152. 
Hurst  v.  Detroit  City   R.   Co.  (84  X. 

W.  44),  662. 
Hurst  v.    Detroit    City    R.    Co.    (84 

Mich.  539),  199,  642,  645,  646,  647, 

648,  651,  655,  667,  672. 
Hurst   v.   Warner  (102  Mich.  238),  76. 
Hurt    v.   St.    Louis,    1.     M.    &   S.    Ry. 

(94  Mo.  255;  7  S.  W.  1  (,  285. 
Huso,,  v.  Dale  (  19  Mich.  17),  Wl,  411. 
Huston  v.    Gilbert    (40    Hun  [X.   V.]. 

Hivtcliiiigs   \.    Ladd   i  16   Mich.  493), 

Ml. 


Iliit.hins  v.  Huteliius(7  Hill  [X.  V.  . 

104),  74. 
Hutchins  \.  St.  Paul,  M.  a  M.  R.  Co. 

i  II  Minn.  5),   102,  514. 
HutchinBon   v.   Chic.   A-    X.    W.    By, 

(o.  i  41  Wis.  541).  93. 
Hutchinson  v.  Hubbard  (21  Neb.  83), 

180. 
Iluteliinson  v.  Snider   (137  I'a.    St.  1: 

20    Atl.    510;    26    W.    X.    C.    531), 

74. 
Iluteliinson   v.    Van    Cleve    (7   Kan. 

App.  676),  255. 
Huxley  v.  Berg  (1  Stark.  98),  361. 
HyatI  \.  Adams  (16  Mich.   180),   119, 

186,  225,  495,  511. 
Hyatt  v.    Hannibal    A-  St.   J.   R.   Co. 

I  19  Mo.  App.  287),  89. 
Hyatl  A-  S.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cray  (111  N. 

C.  '.'2  1,  81. 
Hyland  v.    Burns  (10  X.    Y.    Supp. 

386),  177. 
Hysell  \.  Swift  A-  Co.  (78  Mo.   App. 

39;  2  .Mo.  App.  Kepi-.   124),  69. 
Ilysore   v.   Quigley  (9  Houst.    [Del.] 

348),  HI. 
Iburgv.  Fitch  (57  Cal.  189),  95. 
Ild  v.  Forty-Second  St  R.  Co.  (47  X. 

V.  317),  411,  511,  561,570,  57l\  584, 

586,  588,  589. 
Illinois  &  St.    L.    R.    R.    &   C.   Co.    v. 

Cobb  ('68  111.  53),  Il'O. 
Illinois  A  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen  (19 

111.  App.  116),  Gin,  626,  637. 
Illinois  C.  R.   Co.    v.   Asldiue   (56  111. 

App.  I75i.  602,  603,  606,  617. 
Illinois    C.      R,      Co.    v.      Baches     (55 

111.  379),  G17. 
Illinois  Cent.    K.    Co.   v.    Band]    (88 

111.  App.  629),  617. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrow  (5  Wall. 

[U.  S.]  90),  215.  5(12.  52D.  602,  604, 
t;n:,.  607,  609,  610,  612,  613,61 1.  616, 
G19,  G22.  636,  637,  639. 

Illinois    Cent.    R.     Co.    v.    l'.artle    (94 

111.  App.  57l.  Gil. 
Illinois  C.    R    Co.    v.    Bayse    (  17    Ky 

1..  Rep.  Hi5  i.  380. 


xcn 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Illinois    C.    R.    Co.    v.     Brookliaven 

Mach.  Co.  (71  Miss.  603),  135. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cheek  (152  Ind. 

663),  212. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Title  & 

T.  Co.  (79  111.  App.  623),  598,  602, 

629. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole  (62111.  App. 

480),  214. 
Illinois  C.  R.   Co.  v.  Cozby  (174  111. 

109),  602,  603,  606. 
Illinois  C.   R.  Co.  v.   Cozby  (69  111. 

App.  266),  105. 
Illinois  C.  R.   Co.  v.  Cragin  (71  111. 

177),  151,  165. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Crudup  (63  Miss. 

291),  139. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davenport  (75 

111.  App.  579),  338. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson  (  [C.  C. 

App.  7th- C]  70  Fed.  517),  237. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis  (104  Ttnn. 

442;  58  S.  W.  296),  63. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.   v.    Gilbert  (51  111. 

App.  404),  514,  607,  626. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.    v.  Griffin  (  [C.  C. 

App.  7th  C]  80  Fed.  278),  287,  288, 

294,  299. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammer  (72 

111.  353),  139. 
Illinois  C.  R.   Co.   v.  Harris  (102  111. 

200),  214. 
Illinois  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Heisner  (45  111. 

App.  143),  70. 
Illinois    C.    R.    Co.    v.    Hunter    (70 

Misc.  471),  514. 
Illinois   C.    R.    Co.    v.    Latimer  (128 

111.  163),  282,  352. 
Illinois   C.    R.    Co.    v.    Le  Blanc   (74 

Miss.  626;  21  So.  748),  68. 
Illinois   C.    R.    Co.    v.    Londers  (178 

111.  585),  207. 
Illinois   C.    R.    Co.    v.    McCulip   (70 

Miss.  300:  25  So.  100),  03. 
Illinois  C.    R.   Co.  v.  Minor  (  [Miss.] 

11  So.  101),  207. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mizell  (100  Ky. 

235),  214. 


Illinois  C.    R.   Co.   v.   Nelson  (59  111. 

110),  :)■:». 
Illinois    C.    R.    Co.    v.    Reardon  (157 

111.  372),  603,  607,  634,  035. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson  (58  111. 

App.  181),  212,  214. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross  (31  111.  App. 

170),  139. 
Illinois  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Siddons  (58  111. 

App.  607),  81,  353. 
Illinois  C.  R.   Co.  v.  Slater  (139  111. 

190),  597,  633. 
Illinois  Cent.   R.   Co.   v.    Slater  (129 

111.  91),  514,  635. 
Illinois  C.   R.   Co.  v.  Slater  (28  111. 

App.  73),  605,  617,  634. 
Illinois  C.  R.    Co.  v.   Weldin   (52  111. 

290),  517,  627,  632. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wizell   (100  Ky. 

235),  84. 
Illinois   Steel    Co.    v.    Ostrowski  (93 

111.  App.  57),  197. 
Importers'   &    Traders'    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Christie  (5  Rob.  [N.  Y.]  169),  78. 
Independent  Tug   Line  v.  Jacobson 

(84  111.  App.  684),  69. 
Indiana  B.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnhart 

(115  Ind.  399;  13  West.  425),  150. 
Indiana  B.  &  W.  R.   R.    Co.  v.  Allen 

(113  Ind.  308),  82. 
Indianapolis  v.  Caldwell  (9  Ind.  297), 

161. 
Indianapolis  v.  Gaston  (58  Ind.  224), 

193,  227,  236,  243,  255. 
Indianapolis  Journal  Newspaper  Co. 

v.  Pugh  (0  Ind.  App.  510),  388. 
Indianapolis  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bush 

(101  Ind.  582),  266. 
Indianapolis  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  Keely  (23 

Ind.  133),  495. 
Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoist 

(93  U.  S.  291),  166. 
Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Stables 

(62  111.  313),  219. 
Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Kingan  & 

Co.  (155  Ind.  476),  76. 
Ingersoll    v.    Jones  (5  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

661),  468. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    <  1  PED    IN    \  OL.    1. 


\  ( ■  1 1 1 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Ionian  v.   Ball  (65   Iowa,  543),   119, 

L34 
Inman  v.   Foster   (8  Wend.    (  [N.   Y.J 

002).   Ml.   |  lii. 
Innes  v.  Milwaukee  1 103  Wis.  582), 

514. 
In  re.     See  name. 
Insurance  Co.     See  name. 
Insuranco     Co.    v.    Mosely   (8   Wall. 

[U.S.]  397),  603. 
[nternational    &     G.     X.    R.    Co.    v. 

Brooks  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.    1899]  54 

S.  W.  1050),  64. 
[nternational    &    G.    N.    R.   (Jo.   v. 

Culpepper  (19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182), 

161,  528,  531,  532,  542,  544. 
International    &    G.    N.    R.    Co.    v. 

Downing  (16   Tex.  Civ.  App.   643), 

84. 
International  &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Garcia 

(70  Tex.  207),  136. 
International  &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Green- 
wood (2  Tex.  C.  A.  76),  119. 
International   <fc   G.    XT.    R.    Co.    v. 

Hall  (  [Tex.   Civ.   App.]  21  S.    W. 

1024),  100. 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kin- 
dred (57  Tex.  198),  527,  550. 
International    &    G.     X.    R.    Co.    v. 

Knight   (91     Tex.    660),    528,    532, 

540,  550. 
International    &    G.     X.    R.    Co.    v. 

Knight  (52  S.  W.  640),  514,  531,  536, 

537,  547,  551. 
International    &    G.     X.     R.     Co.    v. 

Kuehn  (70  Tex.  582),  523,  556. 
International     A:     G.     N.    R.    Co.    v. 

Kuehn  (21  S.  W.  58),  528,  540,  542, 

544. 
International  &  G.   X.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald (75   Tex.  41),  136,  524,  525. 

526,  542,  544. 
International  &  G.   \.   R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Neel  (29  S.  W.  L133),  528,  532,  537, 

540,  550,  552. 

International  &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
Miller  (9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  104),  340, 
341. 


International    &     G.     N.     K.    • 
Mitchell   ([Tex.    Civ.    App.    LflOl] 
60  S.  W.  996),  219. 

Internationa]   &.    G.    N.    i;.    Co.    v. 
Mulliken  (10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  663), 

21). 
International   &    (•.    N.    R.  Co.  V.  Or- 

mond  ('W  Tex.   485),  527,528,644, 

547. 
International    &    <>.    X.    R.    Co.  v. 

Rhodes    (21    Tex.    Civ.    App.    159), 
219. 
International  &  G.  X.  K.  Co.  v.  Sein 

(11   Tex.  Civ.  App.  386),  156,  169, 

544. 
International  &  (I.  X".  H.  Co.  v.  Sen- 
cock  (81  Tex.  503),  -".>. 
International  &  G.  X.  K.  Co.  V.  Terry 

(62  Tex.  380),  344,  349. 
International  &  (',.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Zapp 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]49S.  W.673 
Irlbeck  v.  Bierl  (101   Iowa,  240),  379. 
Irlbeck  v.    Bierle  ([Iowa.]  50  N.  W. 

36),  388. 
Iron  v.   Davis  (  [C.  A.  1890]  2  Q.  B. 

330),  239. 
Iron    Mountain    R.    Co.    v.   Dies   (98 

Tenn.  655),  514. 
Irvine  v.  Lowrey  (14  Pet.  298),  507. 
Irving's  Exrs.  v.  Borough  of  Media 

(1!»4  Pa.  St.  i'.js;   i.-,  All.  182),  65. 
Irwin  v.  Askew  (71  <>a.  581  i.  72.  77. 
Irwin  v.  Dearman  (11  Bast.  23),  467. 
Irwin  v.  Yeager  (74  Iowa.  174),  369. 
Isaac  v.  Denver  &  Rio  Grande  R.  Co. 

(12  Daly  [X.  Y.],  340),  588. 
Isbell  v.   New  York,  X.    II.  &  R  Co. 

(27  Conn.  393),  161. 
Isham  v.  Dow's   Estate  (70  Vt  58fi 

84. 
Maud    Coal    Co.    v.    Risher    ([Ind. 

App.]  40  \.  E.  L58),  291. 
Isola  v.Weber  (147  X.   V.  329),  502, 

559. 
Ives    v.    Walden   ([Iowa.  1901]    87    ST. 

W.  408),  63. 
.lack  v.  Sinsheimer  1 125  Cal.  563;  58 

Pac.  130),  34. 


XC1V 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    EN     VOL.    L. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Jackers  v.    Borgman  \2(.)  Kan.   121), 

114,  120,  473,  475. 
Jacks    v.    Bell    (3    Carr.   &    P.  316), 

114. 
.Jackson  v.  Boone  (93  Ga.  662  I,  275. 
Jackson   v.  Consolidated  Tract.   Co. 

(59  N.  J.  L.  [30  Vr.]  25),  646,  047, 

668. 
Jackson  v.  Grace  (3  Okla.  143),  80. 
Jackson  v.   Hall  (84  N.  C.  489),  87, 

88. 
Jackson  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  A  M. 

R.  Co.  (157  Mo.   621;  58  S.  W.  32), 

63,  64. 
Jackson  v.  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 

K.  Co.  (14U  Ind.  241;  39  N.  E.  663), 

495,  504. 
Jackson  v.  Schmidt  ( 14  La.  Ann.  806), 

119,  122,  127. 
Jackson   v.   Stanfield  (137  Ind.  592), 

92. 
Jackson    v.    Stetson    (15    Mass.    48), 

401. 
Jackson  v.  St.   Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.  (87  Mo.  422),  503. 
Jackson  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.   Co.  (74 

Minn.  48),  214. 
Jackson  v.  Wells  (13  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

275),  363,  373,  378. 
Jackson    Co.     Commrs.    v.    Nichols 

([Ind.]  38  N.  E.  526),  290. 
Jacksonville   v.    Doan    (48  111.   App. 

247),  91. 
Jacksonville  v.  Lambert  (62  111.  519), 

122. 
Jacksonville  Journal  Co.  v.  Beymer 

(42  111.  App.  443),  386. 
Jacksonville     S.    R.    Co.    v.    South- 
worth  (32  111.  App.  307),  159. 
Jacksonville,   T.  &  K.   W.   R.  Co.  v. 

Adams  (33  Fla.  608),  501. 
Jacobs  v.  Crum  (62  Tex.  401),  431, 

442. 
Jacobs  v.  Hoover  (9  Minn.  204),  376. 
Jacobs  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.   Co. 

(10  Bush  [Ky.],  263),  119. 
Jacobsen  v.  Dalles  P.  &  A.  Nay.  Co. 

(93  Fed.  975),  84. 


Jacobson  v.    Van   Boening  (48  Neb. 

80;  66   N.  \Y.  993;  ■>■)  Am.  St.  Rep. 

684),  07.  71. 
Jacobus  v.  Congregation  of  C.  of  T. 

(107  Ga.  518),  111,  125. 
Jacquelin  v.  Morning  Journal  Assoc. 

(39  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  515),  386. 
Jacques   v.    Bridgeport  Horse   R.   R. 

Co.  (41  Conn.  61),  236. 
Jacquin  v.  Grand  Ave.  Cable  Co.  (57 

Mo.  App.  320),  208. 
James  v.  Christy  (18  Mo.  162),  495. 
James  v.  Hayes  ( [Kan.  1901]  65  Pac. 

241),  69. 
Jane  Grey,  The  ([U.  S.  C.  D.  Wash.] 

95  Fed.  693),  488. 
Jansen  v.   Jersey   City  (61  N.  J.   L. 

243;  39  Atl.   1025),  65. 
Jarnigan  v.  Fleming  (43  Miss.  710), 

426. 
Jarvis  v.  Manlove  (5  Hair.  [Del.]  452), 

374. 
Jasper  v.  Pumell  (67  111.  358),  133. 
Jauch  v.  Jauch  (50  Ind.  135),  418. 
Jay  v.    Almy  (1  Woodb.  &   M.  262), 

448. 
Jefcoat  v.  Knotts  (1  Rich.  L.  [S.  C] 

649),  111. 
Jefferson  v.   Adams  (4  Harr.   [Del.] 

321),  114,  :;72. 
Jefferson  v.  Brady  (4  Houst.    [Del.] 

626),  166. 
Jefferson  County  Sav.  Bank  v.  Eborn 

(84  Ala.  529),  135. 
Jeffersonville   v.    McHenry   (22   Ind. 

App.  10),  514. 
Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers  (20 

Ind.  1),  139,  339. 
Jelinski  v.  Belt  R.  Co.  (86   111.  App. 

535),  64. 
Jencks  v.   Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  (33 

App.  Div.  635),  165. 
Jenkins  v.  McCarthy  (43  S.  C.  278), 

151. 
Jenkins  v.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Ga.  756), 

158. 
Jenks  v.  Lewis  (3  Mas.   [U.  S.]  503: 

13  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7279),  42. 


T  \l;U.   OF   CABES   «  [TED    in    \  l  >L.    I. 


XC\ 


[References  are  to  Sections.  1 


Jenks   v.   Viscount  Clifden   (1   Ch. 

604),  193. 
Jensoa  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  K. 

Co.  (80  Wis.  580),  L81. 
Jernee  \.  .Monmouth  C<i.  (52  X.  S.  L 

553),  65. 
Jerome  v.  Smith  |  18  \'i.  230),  :;u7. 
JeweU  v.    Cobly  ( [X.    II.]   24   At  I. 

202),  131. 
Jewell  v.  New  Vm-k  r.  &   n.  l;.  R. 

Co.  (27  A  pp.  Div.  |N.  V.|  500),  276. 
Jewett  v.  Whitney  (43  Me.  242),  76. 
Jex  v.  Strauss  (122  V  Y.  293),  82. 
. J . .  1 »  T.  Wilson  (  [U.  S.    1).  C.  D.  Mil.) 

si  Fed.  204),  488. 
John  Brinner  Brew.  Co.  v.  McGill  (23 

Ky.   Law  K.  212),  386. 
John  Morris  Co.  v.    Burgess  (44  111. 

App.  27),  613,  tilt,  617. 
John  Reitson,  The  (35  Fed.  6(33),  50(5. 
Johnson   v.    Allen    (100    X.    C.    131), 

112,  11:),  144,  450. 
Johnson v.Bouton  (35  Xeb.  898),  150. 
Johnson  v.   Brown    (57    Barb.    118), 

lol. 
Johnson  v.   Charleston   &   S.    K.    Co. 

(55  S.  C.  L52),  203. 
Johnson  v.   Chicago*   N.    W.  R.  Co. 

(6  1  Wis.  425  ),  514,  648,  65  I,  657,  672. 
Johnson  v.   Chesapeake,    etc.    It.    R. 

Co.  (36  W.  Va.  73),  L66. 
Johnson  v.  Conant.  (64  N.  II.  109),  70. 
Johnson  v.  Courts  (3  liar.  A-  fit.  [Mil.] 

r.Tii),  no. 
Johnson  v.   Disbrow   (47  Mich.   59), 

116,  457,  450. 
Johnson  v.    Drummond  (16  111.    App. 

641),  87. 
Johnson    v.    Farmer   (89   Tex.    010), 

404,  522,  52:;. 
Johnson  v.  Cram  (72  111.    App.   676), 

171,  472. 
Johnson   v.    Hudson   R.    ltd.    Co.    (40 

N.   V.    155),  501. 
Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.  (20 

X.  Y.  65),  165. 
Johnson   v.   Johnson   ([Mich.]  58  N. 

W.  1115),   I7:k 


Johnson  v.   Long  bland   It.  Co 

Hun  [X.    V.].   306),   562,   570,  571. 

572,  584,  586,  587,  588. 
Johnson    v.    Manhattan    Ky.    Co.    (52 

I  Inn  LX.  V.],  Ill),  220,  2:15. 
Johnson  v.  McCann(61  111.  App.  110), 

182. 
Johnson  v.    McDaniel   (4  Ohio  Leg. 

News,  53),  434,  140,  442. 
Johnson  \.  BtcDaniell  (5  Ohio  S.  &  C. 

P.  Dec.  717i,  436,  437,  438,  (40,442. 
Johnson  v.   Medregor  (157  111.   350)', 

05. 
Johnson    v.    Missouri    P.    R.    Co.   (18 

Neb.  600),  605,  607,  615,   616,  625, 

626,  (127,  634. 
John>on   v.    Northern   Pac.  It.  R.  Co. 

(47  Minn.  4:50),  24:),  279. 
Johnson  v.   Parker  (58  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

332),  104. 
Johnson  v.  Phila.  &  V.   R.   Co.  (163 

Pa.  St.  127),  108,  203. 
Johnson  v.  Reading  City  Pass.  K.  Co. 

(160  Pa.  St.  647),  175. 
Johnson  v.  Schlosser  (146  Ind.  500), 

501. 
Johnson  v.    Schultz   (  [Mich.]   41   X. 

W.  865),  478. 
Johnson  v.  Smith  (64    Me.    553),  114, 

lit.  372. 
Johnson  v.   Steam    Guage  &  L.  Co. 

(146  X.  V.  152),  28S. 
Johnson  v.  Stinger  (39  111.  App.  180), 

76. 
Johnson  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  (67 

Minn.  260),  214. 

Johnson    v.   Superior    Rapid   Trans. 

R.  Co.  (01  Wis.  233),  172. 
Johnson    v.    Yuthrick    (7    Ind.    137), 

114. 
Johnson  v.    Wells  (6  Nev.  224),  210, 

220.  266,  355. 
Johnson    Co.     v.     Hemphill     ([Ind. 

A.pp.]    II   X.    E.  065,  rev'd  11   Ind. 

App.  210;  42  N.  K.  760),  65. 
John  Spry   Lumber  Co.   \.   Duggan 

i  L82  111.  218;  54   N.  E.  102,  aff'g80 

111.  App.  302),  64. 


XCVJ 


X  LBLB    OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 


Johnston  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.   (26 

L.   I;.   Ir.  691),  525,  528,  532,   537, 

544,  547. 
Johnston  v.  Meagler  (14  Utah,  426), 

432. 
Johnston    v.    Missouri    Pac.  Ry.   Co. 

(  [Mo.]  9  S.  W.  790),  214. 
Jolietv.  Conway  (119.111.  489),  263. 
Joliet  v.  Conway  (17  111.   App.  577), 

214. 
Joliet  v.  Johnson  (177  111.  178),  298. 
Jolietv.  Johnson  (71  111.   App.  423), 

214,  299. 
Joliet  v.  Looney  (159  111.  471),  214. 
Joliet  v.  McCraney  (49  111.  App.  381), 

214. 
Joliet  v.  Weston  (22  111.   App.  225), 

605. 
Joliet  St.    R.  Co.   v.    Caul   (143  111. 

177),  293. 
Jones  v.  Bell  (8  Houst.  [Del.]  562), 

215,  218,  227,  256. 
Jones   v.    Brooklyn     II.    R.    Co.    (23 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  141),  184. 
Jones  v.  Chic.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co. 

(  [Minn.]  45  N.  W.  444),  278,  279. 
Jones  v.  Clay  (1   Bos.   &  Pull.   191), 

114. 
Jones  v.  Cooper  (97  Iowa,  735),  146. 
Jones  v.  Deering  (94  Me.  165),  243. 
Jones  v.  Erie   &  W.   V.   R.  Co.  (151 

Pa.   St.  30;  25  Atl.   134;  31  W.  N. 

C.  1;  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  722;  46  Alb. 

L.  J.  467),  71. 
Jones  v.  Estes  (2  Johns.  [N.  Y.]  379), 

501. 
Jones  v.   Greeley  (25  Fla.  629),  386, 

397,  406. 
Jones  v.  Hannovan  (55  Mo.  462),  76. 
Jones  v.  Jenkins  (3  Wash.  17),  437. 
Jones  v.  Jones  (71  Cal.  89),  430. 
Jones  v.  Matthews  (75  Tex.  1),  123. 
Jones  v.  Noe  (71  Ind.  368),  78. 
Jones    v.     Ocean   Coal    Co.    (  [C.   A. 

1899]  2  Q.  B.  124),  239. 
Jones  v.  Rahilly  (16  Minn.  320),  134. 
Jones    v.     Spartinburg    Herald    Co. 

(44  S.  C  526),  522. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Jones  v.  Thompson  (6  C.  &  P.  415), 

460.     • 
Jones  v.   Turpiu   (6  Ileisk.    [Tenn.] 

181),  112. 
Jones  v.   Utica  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  (40 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  349),  316. 
Jones  v.   Utica  &   Black  Kiver  R.  R. 

Co.  (36  Hun  [N.  Y.],  115),  177. 
Jones  v.   Williamsburg  (97  Va.  722; 

34  S.  E.  883),  65. 
Jordan  v.  Bowen  (46  N.   Y.    Super. 

355),  311. 
Jordon  v.  Middlesex  R.   R.  Co.  (138 

Mass.  425),  227,318,  325. 
Jordan  v.  N.  Y.  &  H.   R.  R.  Co.  (30 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  670),  214. 
Jordan  v.  Wyatt  (4Gratt.  [Vt,]  151), 

84. 
Joseph   v.    Ager    (108   Cal.  517;    41 

Pac.  422),  67. 
Joseph    B.  Thomas    (  [D.  C.    N.    D. 

Cal.]  81  Fed.  578),  214. 
Joslin    v.  Grand   Rapids  Ice  Co.   (53 

Mich.  322),  233. 
Josselyn    v.     McAllister    (22    Mich. 

300),  448,  454. 
Judd   v.    Ballard   (66   Vt.   668),   310, 

311. 
Judd    v.   Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 

(  [Ky.]  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  254),  495. 
Judice  v.  Southern  P.   Co.    (47   La. 

Ann.  255),  346,  348,  353. 
Judson    v.    Great   Northern    R.    Co. 

(63  Minn.  248;  65  N.  W.  447),  63. 
Junction     City    v.    Blades    (1    Kan. 

App.  85),  263. 
Juskowitz  v.   Dry  Dock,  E.  B.  &  B. 

R.  Co.  (53  N.  Y.  Supp.  992),   175. 
Jutte  v.  Hughes  (67  N.  Y.  267,  rev'g 

40  N.  Y.  Super.  126),  11. 
Kahl  v.  Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (  [Ala.] 

10  So.  661),  504. 
Kain  v.  Lai  kin  (131  N.  Y.  300),  514, 

588. 
Kain   v.    Larkin    (56    Hun    [N.    Y.], 

79),  594. 
Kalen   v.   Terre   Haute   &  T.  R.  Co. 

(18  Ind.  App.  202),  219,  220. 


TAHLK     ")!•'    (ASKS    CITED    IN     VOL.    I 


\r\  11 


K.ilfur  v.    Broadway    Firry  A:    M.   A. 

K.  Co.  (161  \.  Y.  860),  213. 
Kalfur    v.     Broadway    Perry    &    M. 

Ave.  R.  Co.  (34  App.  Div.  [N.  V.J 

267),  214. 
Kane  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (3  X.  V. 

si.  II.  145),  368. 
Cane   v.    Mitchell    Transp.   Co.    (90 

Hun  [N.  r.],  65),  520,  561,  562,  569, 

572,  584,  586,  592. 
Kane  v.  N.  V.    \.  II.   &   II.   R.  R.  Co. 

(132  \.  V.  160),  243,  244,  250. 
Kane   v.  West  End  St.   R.  Co.  (169 

Mass.  64),  177. 
Kankakee  v.   Steinbach    (SO  111.  App. 

513),  229. 
Kansas  &    A.  V.  R.  Co.   v.  Fitzlmgh 

(61  Ark.  341),  156. 
Kansas  &  T.  Coal  Co.  v.   Reid  (  [Ind. 

Ty.]  40  X.  W.  s()s  i.  102. 
Kansas   City   &    < >.    II.   Co.  v.   Hicks 

(30  Kan.  288;   1  Pac.  396),  2. 
Kansas  City  Car  &  F.  Co.  v.  Sechrisl 

(59  Kan.  778),  84. 
Kansas   City,  Ft.    S.    A:   G.    R   Co.    v. 

Kier  (41  Kan.  071),  122. 
Kansas  City,   Ft.   s.  &    M.  R.  Co.   v. 

Campbell  (0  Kan.  App.  4171,  100. 
Kansas  City,   F't.   S.   &  M.   R.  Co.  v 

Stoner  (  [C.    C.    App.   8th   C]   51 

Fed.  649),  291. 
Kansas  City,    Ft.    S.    &    M.  R.  Co.  v. 

Sinner  (  [C.  C.  App.  8th  C]  40  Fed. 

200),  24.",. 
Kansas    City,    M.     &    B.    K.    Co.    v. 

Lackey  (114  Ala.  152),   214. 
Kansas  City,  S.  &   G.  R.   Co.  v.  Rob- 
erts (0   La.   Ann.  859;  21   So.  030), 

08. 
Kansas  Pac.   Ry.   <'".  v.  Kessler  (18 

Kan.  523),  122. 
Kansas    Pac.    Ry.     Co.    v.    Miller    (2 

Colo.  442),  122. 
Kansas  Pac.    Ry.   Co.  v.   Pointer  (14 

Kan.  50),  159,  243. 
Kansas  Pac.    R.   Co.   v.   Whipple  (39 

Kan.  531  I,  177. 
Karan  v.  Pease  (4:,  111.  App.  282),  172. 
7 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Karasrk  v.  Peiei   (22  Wash.  419;  61 

Pac.  33),  67. 
Earner  \.  Stump  (12  Tex.  Civ.  App, 

401),  448,   150. 
Karr  v.  Parka  ill  Cal.  to),  800. 
Karwowski   v.    Fitass  (-J0  App.   Div. 

[X.  V.]  118),  402. 
Kaspari  v.    Marsh  (74  Wis.  563),  515, 

516,  655,  659,  663. 
Katz  v.  Wolf  i  7:;  N.  V.  st.  R.  242),  77. 
KaulTman  v.    Babcock  (07  Tex.  241), 

44.",. 
KaiitTman  v.   Cleveland,    C.   C.   A   St. 

L  K.  Co.  (144  Ind.  456),  165. 
Kavanaugh    v.    Jauesvillc    (24    Wis. 

618),  322. 
Kay  v.  New  England  Dredging  Co. 

(92  Me.  454),  598. 
Kaysn-  v.  Lindell  (73  Minn.  123),  64. 
Kcar  v.  Garrison  (13  Ohio  C.  C.  477), 

471,  475,  477. 
Kearney  v.  Railroad  (9  (nsh.  [Mass.] 

109),  488,  405. 
Kearney    Electric     Co.    v.    Langhlin 

(45  Neb.  390),  003,  615,  019. 
Keating    v.     Fitts     (13     App.     Div. 

[X.  Y.]  1),  434. 
Keedy  v.  Howe  (72  111.  133),  123. 
Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  K.  Co.  (145 

N.  Y.  348),  503,    500,  570,  571,  572, 

584,  587,  588. 
Keenan    v.    Getsinger   (1    App.    Div. 

[X.  V.]  172),  2S5. 
Keenholts   v.    Becker    (."»  Den.    340), 

404. 
Kehler  v.  Schweuk  (144  Pa.  St.  348), 

207. 
Keigue   v.   Janesville   (68   Wis.  50), 

661. 
Keini  v.  Union  R.  R.  Co.  (90  Mo.  314;  2 

S.  \Y.  427),  63. 
Keirn  v.  Warfield  (00  Miss.  799),  76. 
Keller   v.    Oilman   (93    Wis.  9),   285, 

290,  202. 
Keller    v.     Hassker    (2     App.     Div. 

[N.  Y.]  245),  177. 
Keller    v.    New    York    C.    R.    Co.    (17 

How.  Pr.  [X.  Y.]  102),  500,  501. 


XCV111 


TABLE   OF   (ASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Keller  v.    New    York    C.    R.    Co.    ( 


Abb.  De<\  [NT.  Y.]  480),  561,  569. 
Kellett   v.    K.   R.   Co.    (22  Mo.  App. 

356),  139. 
Kelley  v.  Altemus  (34  Ark.  184),  87. 
Kelley  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.   Co.    (50 

Wis.  381),  646. 
Kelley  v.  Fahrney  (97  Fed.  176),  79, 

82. 
Kelley  v.  MacDonald  (39   Ark.  387), 

134. 
Kelley  v.  New  York,  N.  H.   &  H.  R. 

R.  Co.  (168  Mass.  308),  319. 
Kelley  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  R.  Co.  (14 

Daly  [N.  Y.],  418),   561,   562,  503, 

569,  570,  592. 
Kellogg  v.   Chic.    &  N.  W.     R.    Co. 

(20  Wis.  223),  85. 
Kellogg  v.  New  York,  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (79  N.  Y.  72),  593. 
Kellogg  Newspaper  Co.  v.  Paterson 

(59  111.  App.  89),  104. 
Kellow  v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.  (42  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  813),  100,  214. 
Kelly  v.  Mayberry  Twp.  (154  Pa.  St. 

440),  316,  319. 
Kelly  v.  Valentine  (17  111.  App.  S7), 

123. 
Kellyville  Coal  Co.  v.  Yehuka  (94111. 

App.  74),  83,  219. 
Kelsey  v.  Covert  (15  How.  Pr.  [N.  Y.] 

62;  6  Abb.  Pr.  336),  57. 
Kelsey  v.  Jewett  (34   Hun  [N.  Y.], 

11),  492. 
Kendall  v.  Albia  (73  Iowa,  241),  234, 

255,  256. 
Kendall  v.   Stone  (5  N.  Y.  14),  391, 

428. 
Kendall  v.   Stone   (2   Sandf.   [N.  Y.] 

269),  124. 
Kennard  v.  Burton  (25  Me.  39),  63. 
Kennedy  v.  Busse  (60  111.  App.  440), 

194. 
Kennedy  v.   Cecil  Co.   (69   Md.    65), 

161. 
Kennedy  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Co.   ( [Minn.  1894]  58  N.    W.  878), 

214. 


Kennedy  v.  Gramling  (33  S.  C.  367; 

11  S.  E.  1081),  73. 
Kennedy  v.  Holborn  (16  Wis.  457), 

401. 
Kennedy  v.  Mayor  (73  N.  Y.  365),  84. 
Kennedy  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

(35  Hun  [N.  Y.],  186),  305. 
Kennedy  v.  North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  (36 

Mo.  351),  112,  113. 
Kennedy  v.  Rochester  City  &   B.   B. 

R.  Co.  (54  Hnn  [N.  Y.],  183),  562. 
Kennedy  v.  Ryall  (67  N.  Y.  379),  589. 
Kennedy   v.    Shea   (110  Mass.    147), 

467. 
Kennedy  v.  Sugar  Refinery  ( 125  Mass. 

90),  499. 
Kennedy  v.  Whittaker  (81   111.   App. 

605),  214. 
Kennedy  v.  Woodrow  (6  Hous.  [Del.] 

46),  397. 
Kennedy  v.  Somerville  (68  Mo.  App. 

222),  212. 
Kennet  &  A.  N.  Co.  v.  Witherington 

(18  Q.  B.  531),  71. 
Kenney  v.  New  York  C.   R.   Co.   (49 

Hnn  [N.  Y.],  535),  561. 
Kenney  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (2  N.  Y.  Supp.  512),  561. 
Kennon  v.  Gilmer  (131  U.  S.  22),  218, 

219. 
Kennon    v.    Gilmer   (9    Mont.    108), 

102. 
Kennon  v.   Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co. 

(92  Ala.  399),  77. 
Kent  v.  Brinckerhoff  (8  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

794),  515. 
Kent  v.  Kent  (1  Mo.  App.  Repr.  124), 

73. 
Kentucky  &  Port.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith 

(2  Duv.  [Ky.]  556),  119. 
Kentucky  C.   R.    Co.   v.   Ackley  (87 

Ky.  278),  227. 
Kentucky  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Biddle  (17Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1363),  348. 
Kentucky  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Dills  (4 

Bush  [Ky.],  311),  112,  122,  186,  328. 
Kentucky  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gaste- 

neau  (83  Ky.  119),  160. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I 


XC1X 


[References  are  to  Sections.  1 


Kentucky  Hotel   Co.   v.  Camb  (  [Ky. 

1805]  30  S.  W.  1010),  21  I. 
Kentucky  Lumber  ('<>.  v.  Miracle  I  10] 

Ky.  :W4:  19  Ky.  L.   Rep.  508;  41  S. 

W.  25),  72. 
Kenyon  v.    Cameron   (17    R.    I.    122), 

111,  118,  145. 
Kenyon  v.  Mondovi  (98  Wis.  50),244, 

245. 
Kenyon  v.  Western  Un.   Telef;.   Co. 

(100  Cal.  454;  35  Pao.  75),  7:5. 
Kerkon  v.   Bauer  (15  Neb.  150),  (510, 

019. 
Kerns  v.  Hagenbukcle  (28  J.  &  S.  [N. 

Y.]  228),  404,  467. 
Kerr  v.  Atticks  (20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  233), 

386,  390. 
Kerr  v.  Forgue  (54  111.  482),  243. 
Kerrigan    v.    Force    (68   N.   Y.   381), 

501. 
Kerrigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  (194 

Pa.  98),  268. 
Kerrigan   v.    Penn    R.   R.    Co.   ([Pa. 

1899]    44  At!.  10(19),  267. 
Kerry  v.  England  ([P.  C.  1898]  A.  C. 

742).  543,  544. 
Kerry  v.  England  (67  L.  J.   P.   N.  S. 

150),  527. 
Kerry  v.  Pacific  M.  S.  Co.  (121  Cal. 

564),  102,  100. 
Kesler  v.   Smith  (66   N.  C.   154),   560, 

563,  569,  570.  575. 
Kessler  v.    Brooklyn   Heights  R.   R. 

Co.    (3    App.    Div.    [N.    Y.]  426), 

172. 
Ketcham   v.    Fox    (52    Hun    [X.  V.|. 

284),  475. 
Ketchum  v.  Merchants  Union  Transf. 

Co.  (52  Mo.  390),  150. 
Keyes  v.  Cedar  Falls  (107  Iowa,  509), 

195,  227,  283,  267. 
Koyes  v.  Devlin  (3  E.  D.  Sm.   [N.  V.  | 

518),  371. 
Keyes  v.   Minneapolis,    etc.,  R.    Co. 

(36  Minn.  290),  219. 
Kidder  v.  Aaron  (10  S.  I).  250),  102. 
Kidder  v.  Dunstable  (11  Gray  [Mass.], 

342),  63. 


Kiefer   v.   Crank  Trunk    R.   Co.   (12 

A  pp.   Div.    [X.   V.j    28),    504,   506, 

595. 
Kin-nan  v.  Chicago,  8.  I'.  &  C.   B. 

('...  (123  111.  188),  82. 
Kierzenkowski  v.  Philadelphia  Trac- 
tion Co.  (184  Pa  459),  155. 
Kiff  v.  Voumans  (86  N.  V.  324),  133, 

134,  371. 
Kilburn  v.  Coe  (4s  How.  Pr.  [X.  Y.] 

144),  471. 
Kimball  v.  Friend  (95  Va.  125),  166. 
Kimmer  v.  Weber  (81  Hun.  599),  563. 
Kinnaird  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (11  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  692;  12  S.  W.  9:17:  41  Alb. 

L.  .!.  229;  30  Cent.  L.  J.  267),  71. 
Kinnare  v.  Chicago  (70  111.  App.  100), 

603. 
King  v.    Black   Diamond  C.  Co.   (99 

(ia.  103),  102. 
King  v.  C.  C.  Bendall  Commission  Co. 

(7  Colo.  App.  507),  107. 
King  v.  Cohoes  (77  NT.  Y.  83),  85. 
King  v.  Colvin  (11  R.  I.  582),  439. 
King  v.   Havens  (25  Wend.   [N.  Y.] 

420),  95. 
King  v.   Miles  City   Irrig.  D.  Co.  (16 

Mont.  403),  110. 
King  v.  Root  (4  Wend.   [X.  Y.]  113), 

113. 
King  v.  Sassaman  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

54  S.  W.  304),  397. 
King  v.  Shepherd  (3  Story,  349),  15:5. 
Kingman  &  Co.  v.  Stoddard   ([U.  S. 

C.  C.  A.  7th  C]  57  U.  S.  App.  379; 

29  C.  C.  A.  413;  85  Fed.  740),  68. 
Kingsbury  &  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

(156  Mo.  379;  57  S.  W.  547),  63. 
Kinney  v.  Crooker  (18  Wis.  74),  227, 

233,  235. 
Kinney  v.    Folkerts    (84  Mich.   610), 

227. 
Kinney    v.    Kinney    (104  Iowa,  703; 

74  X.  W.  08S),  71. 
Kinney  v.  Tolkerta  (84  Mich.  616), 

249. 
Kinsley   v.   Pratt  (148  N.  Y.  372;  42 

X.  E.  986),  08. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Kirby  v.  West.   Un.    Teleg.    Co.   ([S. 

D.]  37  X.  W.  202),  501. 
Kirchner  v.  New  Home  S.  M.  Co.  (16 

X.  V.  Supp.  7(51),  95. 
Kirk  v.  Garrett  (84  Md.  383),  449. 
Kirk  v.  Hower  (77  Hun  [X.  Y.],459), 

214. 
Kirkser  v.   Jones   (7  Ala.   022),    111, 

124. 
Kitchellv.    Brooklyn   H.    R.   Co.  ( 10 

Misc.  [X.  Y.]  277),  214. 
Kitchen  v.  Carter  (47  Neb.  776),  86. 
Klatt  v.  Foster  Lumber  Co.   (92  Wis. 

322),  80. 
Klatt  v.    Houston  Elec.    Lt.   R.    Co. 

([Tex.]  57  S.  W.  1112),  522. 
Klauber  v.  American  Express  Co.  (21 

Wis.  21 ),  153. 
Klein  v.   Jewett   (26  N.   J.  Eq.  474), 

215,  318,  325,  320. 
Klein  v.  Second  Ave.   B.    R.  Co.  (22 

J.  &  S.  [X.  Y.]  164),  227. 
Klein  v.  Thompson  (19  Ohio  St.  569), 

255,  362. 
Kleiner   v.    Third    Ave.    R.    Co.    (36 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]   191),  172,  299. 
Klemm  v.   New  York,  C.  &  H.    R.  R. 

Co.  (78  Hun  [N.  Y.],  277),  502,  269, 

580,  581. 
Kleven  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.  (70 

Minn.  79),  338. 
Kliment  v.   Corcoi'an   (51  Neb.  142), 

470,  473. 
Klinck  v.  Colby  (46  N.  Y.  427),  401. 
Klingman   v.    Holmes  (54  Mo.  304), 

369. 

Bromme   (20   Wis 


372), 
Dunn   (66  Pa.   St.    141), 


Klopper  v 

467. 
Klumph  v 

425. 
Knapp  v.  Fuller  (55  Vt.  311),  426. 
Knappv.  Railroad  Co.  (20  Wall.  117), 

507. 
Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  (71 

Iowa,  41),  243. 
Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  R.  Co.  (05  Iowa, 

91),  169. 
Knee  v.  Lizardi  (8  La.  26),  137. 


Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Scott  (76 

111.  App.  645),  432. 
Knight  v.  Foster  (39  X.  H.  576),  115. 
Knight  v.  Wilcox  (14  N.  Y.  413),  87. 
Knight  v.  Wilcox  (18  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

212),  467. 
Knittel  v.  Schmidt  (16  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

7),  362,363,  309. 
Knoll  v.   Third  Ave.  R.   Co.  ([N.  Y. 

1901]  60  N.  E.  1113),  274. 
Knopf  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R. 

Co.    (  [Del.   Super.    1900)   2    Penn. 

392;  46  Atl.  747),  63. 
Knowles  v.  Norfolk  N.  So.  R.  R.  Co. 

(102  N.  C.  86),  120,  139. 
Knupfle   v.    Knickerbocker   Ice   Co. 

(84  N.  A'.  448,  rev'g  23  Hun,  159),  63. 
Koebig    v.    Southern   Pac.    Co.    (108 

Cal.  235),  107. 
Koehler  v.  Manufacturing  (12   App. 

Div.  50),  163. 
Koenigsberger    v.    Richmond  S.    M. 

Co.  (158  U.  S.  41),  102. 
Koerner  v.  Oberly  (56  Ind.  284),  114. 
Koetter  v.  Man.   R.  Co.  (30  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  011),  244. 
Kohler  v.  Fairbaven  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

(8  Wash.  455),  102. 
Kohn  v.  Collison  ( [Del.]  27  Atl.  834). 

501. 
Kohn  v.  Melcher   ( [C.   C.  D.  Iowa] 

43  Fed.  641),  471. 
Kolb  v.  Bankhead  (18  Tex.  228),  120. 
Koll  v.  O'Brien  (86  111.  211),  119. 
Kolka  v.  Jones  (6  N.  D.  461),  430,  431, 

432. 
Rolling  v.  Bennett  (18  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

R.  425),  473,  479. 
Kolme  v.    White    ( [Wash.]    40   Pac. 

794),  110. 
Kolzen    v.    Broadway  &  S.   Ave.  R. 

Co.  (48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  656),  452. 
Kooserowska   v.    Glasser    (8    N.    Y. 

Supp.  197),  516,  572. 
Koscinsko     v.    Slomberg    (68   Miss. 

469),  76. 
Kountz  v.  Brown  (16  B.   Mon.    [Ky.] 

577),  122,  187. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    t. 


CI 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Kowalski  v.  Chic.  Q.    W.    J:.  Co.  (84 

Fed.  58G),  84,  214. 
Kraft  v.  Kice  (01  N.  Y.  Supp.  368),  81. 
Cramer  v.    Market   si.   Rd.    Co.   (25 

Cal.  284),  495. 
Kramer  v.  Waymark  (4  H.  a-  C.  427), 

547. 
Kraut  v.  Ry.  Co.  (lf,n  Pa.  327),  -'08. 
Kreiter  v.    Nichols   (28    Mich.   496), 

475,  477. 
Kreuger  v.  Sylvester  (100  Iowa.  647), 

878. 
Kroener  v.    Chicago,  M.   it   St.    I'.  B. 

Co.  (88  Iowa,   10).  -_'14. 
Krom   v.  Schoonmaker   (3  Barb.  [X. 

Y.]  047),  131. 
Krueger  v.    Le   Blanc  (02  Mich.    70), 

87. 
Krug  v.  Pitass  (102  X.  Y.  102),  397, 

407. 
Krug  v.  Sassaman  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

54  S.  W.  304),  382. 
Krulder  v.  Woolvertou  (11  Misc.   [N. 

Y.]  537),  563. 
Krutz  v.    Bobbins    (12  Wash.    7:    40 

Pac.  415),  :'.:;,  97. 
Kubic  v.  Zeke  (105  iowa,  269),  514. 
Kucera   v.    Merrill    Lumber    Co.    (91 

Wis.  637),  244,  245. 
Kuclii'iuiu'ister  v.  O'Connor  (  [Ohio] 

8  Wkly.  L.  Bull.  257),  122. 
Kuhl  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  I!.  Co.  (101 

Wis.  42;  77  N.  W.  15:.),  71. 
Kuhn  v.  Chic.  M.  &  S.  B.  Ry.  Co.  (74 

Iowa,  137),  128. 
Kuhn  v.  Freund  (87  Mich.  515).  298. 
Kuhn  v.  Neeb  (32  \.  .1.  Eq.  047  I.  87. 
Kullman  v.  G-reenebaum  (92  Cal.  403; 

28  Pac.  074).  73. 
Kunz  v.  Troy  (104  X.  Y.  344),  177. 
Kupferschmid    v.  Southern    Klec.   K. 

Co.  (70  Mo.  App.  438),  254. 
Kutner  v.    Fargo    (-".4    App.    Div.    [X. 

Y.]  317),  454. 
Kutner   v.    Fargo    (20   Misc.    [X.    Y.] 

207),  145. 
Kyle   v.  Ohio    River   Co,   ([W.   Va. 
1901]  38  S.  E.489),  83. 


Labro  v.  Campbell  (50  X.   V.  Super. 

70),  '.>:.. 
Lacas  v.  Detroit  C.  R.  Co.  (92  Mich. 

412;  52  \.  \V.  745),  255,325. 
Lacey  v.  Mitchell  12:;  End.  67),  432. 
Ladd    \.   Granite    State    Brich 

([X.  II.]  37  All.   1041),  07. 
La    Fave    \.   Cit)    of    Superior   (104 

\V,s.  154;  80  V  W.  742),  246. 
Lafflin   v.    Railroad   Co.   (106    N.    V. 

L36),  L63. 
LaHer  v.    Fisher   (  [Mich.]   79   N.  W. 

934),  472,  475. 
Lagley  v.  Mason  (69  Vt  175).  362. 

Lago  v.  Walsh  (98  Wis.  348),  -_>74. 
Laible  \.  Xew  fork  <'.  &  n.  B.  B.  Co. 

(13  App.   Div.  [X.  Y.J  57  1,.  84. 
Laidlawv.  Sage  (150  X.  Y.  73),  84, 

205. 
Laird   v.  Chic.  &    A.   B.  Co.   (78  Mo. 

App.  27::  I.  119. 
Laird  v.  Chicago,   R.    I.  A-   B.  B.  Co. 

I  100  Iowa,  336),  243. 
Laird    v.     Pittsburgh    Traction    Co. 

(100  Ba.  St.  41.  339. 
Lake  v.  Merrill  (10  X.  .1.  L.  288),  106. 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  B.  Co.  v.  Christ  ison 

(39  111.  App.  4951,  62,  83,  112.  186. 
Lake  Erie  A-  W.  B.  I  ...  v.  <  loes  (•".  End. 

App.  ill  i.  349. 
Lake  Erie  A-  W.   B.  Co.  v.  Craig  (37 

U.  S.  App.  654  i.  86. 
Lake  Erie  A  W.    B.  Co.  v.    Fremont 

([U.  S.  C.  c.  A.  6th  C]  31  C.  C.  A. 

625;  92  Fed.  721,  rev'g  5  Ohio  L.  R. 

140),  07. 
Lake  Erie  A  W.  B.  Co.  v.  Mackey  (58 

Ohio  St.  370),  177. 
Lake   Krie   A  W.    R.   Co.  v.  Wills  <:;•.• 

111.  App.  649),  274. 
Lake  Lighting  Co.  v.   Lewis  (  [Ind. 

App.  1902]  04  X.  E.  35),  275. 
Lake    Shore   &     M.    S.    R  Co.  V.    An- 
drews (14  Ohio  C.  C.  564),  504. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  s.  B.  Co.  v.  Bode- 

mer  (139  HI.  596),  159. 
Lake  Shore  A-    M.   S.    B.  Co.  v.  Con- 
way (169  111.  -".05),  75. 


en 


TABLE    <>F    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Lake   Shore  &  M.  S.  R.   Co.   v.   I)y- 

linski  (67  111  A  pp.  114),  50:3,  597. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.   R.  Oo.  v.  Frantz 

(127  Pa.  St.  297),  227. 
Lake  Shore  &   M.  S.   R.  Co.  v.   Hes- 

sion  (150  111.  546),  598. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Orvis 

(1  Ohio  Dec.  492), .495. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ouska 

(51  III.  App.  334),  607,  r,14,  627. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker 

(131  111.  557),  606. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Pren- 
tice (147   l".   S.   107),  112,  135,  136, 

137,  18(5. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Rohlfs 

(51    111.   App.   215),   602,   003,   005, 

606. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Rosen- 

zweig  (113  Pa.  St.  519),  122,   139, 

344. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.   Ryan 

(70  111.  App.  45),  214. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Teed  (2 

Ohio  Dec.  662),  338,  354. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Topliff 

(2  Ohio  Dec.  522),  214. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.   R.  Co.  v.  Wins- 
low  (10  Ohio  C.    C.  193),  214. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.   R.  Co.  v.  Yokes 

(12  Ohio  C.  0.  499),  278,  292. 
Lake  St.   El.   Ry.  Co.  v.   Brooks  (90 

111.  App.  173),  71. 
Lake  St.  El.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (20  111. 

App.  413),  214. 
Lamh  v.  Baker  (34  Neh.  485),  87. 
Lamb  v.  Camden  &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co. 

(46  N.  Y.  271),  151. 
Lamb    v.    Cedar    Rapids  (108  Iowa, 

029),  209,249,250. 
Lamb  v.    Ilarbaugh   (105   Cal.   080), 

123. 
Lamb  v.  Stone  (11  Pick.  [Mass.]  527)- 

62,  06. 
Lamb  v.  Stone  (95  Wis.  254),  369. 
Lamb  v.  Taylor  (67  Md.  85),  407. 
Lambeck  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

(106  Mich.  512),  84. 


Lambert  v.  Pharis  (3  Head.  [Tenn.] 

62  2  >,  415. 
Lambert  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.  (70 

N.  Y.  104),  63. 
Lammiman  v.  Detroit  Citizens  St.  R. 

Co.  (112  Mich.  602),  255,  325. 
Lamphear  v.  Buckingham   (33  Conn. 

237),  503. 
Lampher  v.   Clark   (149  N.  Y.   472), 

422. 
Lampman  v.  Gainsborough  (17  O.  R. 

191),  523,  547. 
Lampman  v.  Lochran  (19  Barb.   [N. 

Y.]  338),  97. 
Lamport  v.  Lake  Shore  &    M.  S.«  R. 

Co.  (142  Ind.  209),  165. 
Lanark  v.    Dougherty   (45   111.   App. 

206),  214. 
Lancaster   v.    Langston    (18   Ky.    L. 

Rep.  299),  432,434. 
Landrum  v.  Flannigan  (00  Kan.  436), 

470. 
Landrum  v.  Wells  (  [Tex.  C.  A.]  20 

S.  W.  101),  451,454. 
Lane  v.   Atlantic  Works  (111  Mass. 

136),  03. 
Lane  v.    Lewiston   (91   Me.   292),  39 

Atl.  999),  72. 
Lane  v.  Missouri  P.   R.  Co.  (132  Mo. 

4),  160. 
Lane  v.  Ruhl  (103  Mich.  38),  95. 
Lang  v.   Houston  St.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(75  Hun  [N.  Y.],  151),  503. 
Lang  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(51  Hun  [X.  Y.],  603),  300. 
Langdon   v.    Shearer  (43  App.   Div. 

[N.  Y.]  007),  393,  394. 
Langworthy  v.  Green  Twp.  (88  Mich. 

207),  201,  274,297. 
Lane  v.   Wilcox   (55    Barb.    [N.    Y.] 

015),  369. 
Lannahan  v.  Hearer  (79  Md.  413),  91. 
Lannen  v.  Albany  Gas  Light  Co.  (44 

N.  Y.  459),  161. 
Lansing:  v.  Stone   (37  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

15),  155. 
Lansing  v.   Wisnall  (5  Den.    [N.  Y.] 

216),  81. 


TABLE  OF   CASE8   CITED    IN    VOL.    1. 

[References  are  to  Sections,  j 


cm 


Lantz  v.  Frey  (19  Pa.  366),  L02. 
Lapsley  v.  Union   1'.  I;  Co.  (50  Fed. 

172),  198. 
Laraway  v.  Perkins  (10  X.  Y.  :;T1), 

11,  80. 
Larkin  v.  Burlington,  etc.,  It.  C>>.  (85 

[owa,  492),  172. 
Larkin  v.  \.    V.   4    X.   R.   R-  Co.  (40 

N.  Y.  St.   i;.  658),  -'14. 
Larkin   v.    O'Neil  (119    X.    Y.   221), 

163. 
Lamed    v.    Buffington  (3  Mass.  546), 

426. 
La   Rue  v.   Smith   (153  X.  Y.  428), 

99. 
Larzelere  v.  Kirchgessner  (73  Mich. 

270).  475,  478. 
La  Salle  v.  Porteriield   (38   111.   App. 

553),  214. 
Lathrop  v.  Adams  (133  Mass.  471), 

407. 
Laughlin  v.  Harvey  (24   Ont.    App. 

438),  297. 
Lauter  v.  Duckworth   (19  Ind.  App. 

585),  212. 
Lauter  v.  Simpson  (2  Ind.  App.  293), 

106. 
Lavender  v.  Hudgens  (32  Ark.  763), 

448. 
Lavcry  v.  Crooke  (52  Wis.  612),  407. 
Law  v.  Western   R.  of  Ala.    (91  Fed. 

817),  504. 
Lawrence  v.  Church  (129  N.  Y.  035), 

102. 
Lawrence  v.  Hagerman  (56   111.  OS), 

437,  442. 
Lawrence  v.  Porter  (93  Fed.    62),  81, 

94. 
Lawrence  v.  Samuels  (20  Misc.  [N.Y.] 

15),  293,  296. 
Lawrence  v.  Samuels  (17  Misc.  [N.Y.] 

55;i|,  296. 
Lawrence  v.  Samuels  (10  Misc.  [X.Y.] 

501),  290. 
Lawrence   &    Ottawa    K.   W.    Co.   v. 

Lett  (11  S.  C.  R.  [Out.]  122),  5  15. 
Lawson  v.  Chicago,  St.  1'.  M.  a-  <>.  R. 

Co.  (i;4  Wis.  448),  515,  05.-,,  859,  663. 


Lawson  v.  Bggleston  (28  App.  Div. 

[X.  V.j  52),  472,  478. 
Lawyer   v.  Fritcher  i  ISO  X.  V.  239), 

464,  107. 
Lay  v.  Bayles  1 1  Cold.   [Tenn.]  246), 

78. 
Lazelle  v.  Xcwfaue  (70  Vt.  440 

626. 
Leach     v.     Detroit     Elec.     By.     Co. 

([Mich.  1900]   84  X.    W.  310),  267. 
Leach  v.  Leach  (11    Tex.   Civ.   App. 

699),  302. 
Leahy  v.  Davis  (121  Mo.  222),  122. 
Lease  v.  Penn.  Co.  (10  Ind.  App.  47), 

203. 
Leavenworth,  L.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice 

(10  Kan.  426),  122. 
Leavenworth,  X.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Meyer 

(58  Can.  305),  102. 
Leber  v.  Stores  (64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  464). 

76. 
Le  Boutilier  v.  Fiske  (47  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

323),  518. 
Leclerc  v.  Montreal  ( Rap.  Jud. Quebec 

15  C.  S.  205),  217,227. 
Ledgewood  v.   Elliott  (  [Tex.]  51  S. 

W.  872),  419. 
Ledlie  v.  Waller  (17  Mont.  150 1.  394. 
Ledue  v.  Graham  (Montreal   L.  Rep. 

5  B.  B.  511),  411. 
Lee  v.  Burlington  (11:1  Iowa.  356  I,  75, 

92. 
Lee  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (21  .1.  &  S. 

[N.  Y.]  260),  208. 
Lee  v.  Publishers  (137  Mo.  385),  514. 
Lee  v.   Woolsey  (19  Johns.  [X.  Y.] 

319),  375. 
Lee  Co.  v.  Yarbrough  (85  Ala.  590), 

65. 
Leeds  v.  Metropolitan  Gas  L.  <'<>.  (90 

N.  Y.  20).  215,  227,228. 
Leeds  v.  New  York  Teleph.  Co.  (  [N. 

Y.  1901]  01  App.  Div.  [N.  V.;  184), 

85. 
Leen   Kir  A-  Co.  V.  Smith  (35  La  Ann. 

518).  119. 
Leep  v.  st.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 
(58  Ark.    107).  501. 


CIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN   VOL.    I. 


Leffingwell  v. Gilchrist,  (40  Iowa,  416), 

91. 
Le  Frois  v.  Monroe  Co.  (88  Hun,  109), 

562. 
Legare  v.   Esplin  (Rap.  Jud.  Quebec 

12  C.  S.  113),  i93. 
Legg  v.  Britton  (64  Vt.  652),  499,  503. 
Legg  v.  Mutual  L.  Ins.  Co.  (53  N.  Y. 

394),  97. 
Leggo  v.  Welland  Mfg.  Co.  (2  Ont. 

R.  45),  78. 
Leggott  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co. 

(1  Q.  B.  D.  599),  499,  547. 
Leggott  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co. 

(45  L.  J.  Q.  B.  557),  488,  523,  542. 
Lehigh  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Marchant  ( [C. 

C.  App.  2d   C]   84  Fed.  870),  220, 

277. 
Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Rupp  (100  Pa.  St. 

95),  514. 
Lehman  v.   Brooklyn  (30  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  305),  84. 
Lehman  v.  Brooklyn  (29  Barb.  [N.Y.] 

234),  514,  560,  561,  564,  566,  567,  586, 

589. 
Lehman  v.  Farwell  (95  Wis.  185),  642. 
Lehman  v.  McQuown  (31  Fed.  138), 

91. 
Lehrer  v.   Elmore  (100  Ky.  56),  387, 

390. 
Leighton  v.  Sargent  (31  N.   H.  119), 

251. 
Leiter  v.  Kinnare  (68  111.  App.  558), 

514,  607,  014,  636. 
Leith  v.  Pope  (2  Wm.  Bl.  1327),  111. 
Lellis  v.  Lambert  (24  Ont.  App.  653), 

458. 
Lemmin   v.   Lorfeld   (107  Wis.   264)-, 

667. 
Lemon  v.  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  (C. 

C.  S.  D.  [Miss.]  52  Fed.  262),  342. 
Lemser  v.  St.  Joseph  Furniture  Co. 

(70  Mo.  App.  209),  214. 
Lencker  v.  Steilen  (89  111.  545),  467. 
Lenzen  v.  Miller  (53  Neb.  137),  102. 
Leonard  v.  Pope  (27  Mich.  145),  404. 
Letson  v.   Brown  (11  Colo.  App.   11), 

494. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Lett  v.  St.  Lawrence  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (11 

Ont.  App.  1),  521. 
Leuppie  v.  Osborn  (52  N.  J.  Eq.  687; 

29  Atl.  433),  515. 
Levitt  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co.  (14  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  83),  214. 
Lewis  v.  Atlanta  (77  Ga.  756),  325. 
Lewis  v.  Chapman  (19  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

252),  406. 
Lewis  v.  Clegg  (120  N.  C.  292),  452. 
Lewis  v.  Humphreys   (64  Mo.   App. 

466),  413,  426. 
Lewis  v.  Jannoupoulo  (70  Mo.  App. 

325),  119,  186. 
Lewis  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  (162  N. 

Y.  52;  56  N.  E.  548,  rev'g  32  App. 

Div.  627;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  1107),  63. 
Lewis   v.    Thompson    (3   App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  329),  95. 
Lewis  v.  Wilson  (151  U.  S.  551),  102. 
Lexington  &  C.  County  Min.  Co.    v. 

Stephens  (20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  696),  166. 
Lexington  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyons  (20 

Ky.  L.  Rep. ),  516,  339. 
Lexington  Ry.   Co.  v. .  Cozine  ( [Ky. 

1901]  64  S.  W.  848),  138. 
L'Herault  v.   Minneapolis   (69  Minn. 

261),  244. 
Libby  v.  Towle  (90  Me.  262),  386. 
Lieberman  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (25 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  296),  314. 
Lienkauf  v.  Morris  (66  Ala.  406),  120, 

122. 
Lierman  v.  Chicago,  M.  &   St.  P.   R. 

Co.  (52  N.  W.  91),  643,  645,  663,  665. 
Lightfoot  v.  West  (93  Ga.  546),  92. 
Ligon  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (3  Wil- 
son Civ.  Cas.  Ct.  App.  sec.  2),  81. 
Lilly  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (32 

S.  C.  142),  523,  531,  537. 
Limblech  v.  Gerry   (15  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

663),  431,  448,  452,  455. 
Limekiller  v.   Hannibal   &   St.  J.  R. 

Co.  (33  Kan.  83),  508. 
Lincoln  v.   Beekman  (23  Neb.  677), 

229. 
Lincoln  v.  Com.  (164  Mass.  368;  41  N. 

E.  489),  71. 


TAU.I.    "I     <  ASKS    CITED    IN     \'<>L.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Lincoln  v.  O'Brien  (56  Nob.  .  * •  1  i,  65. 
Lincoln  v.    Power  (151    IT.   S.  486), 

268. 
Lincoln  v,  Saratoga  A:  S.   R.  Co.  (23 

Wend.  [N.  Y.]  425),  93,  238,  328. 
Lincoln  St.   K.  Co.  v.   McClellan  (54 

Neb.  872;  74  \.  \V.  1407),  63. 
Lindev.  Elias  (4  Alb.  L.  J.  76),  375. 
Lindeman  v.  Fry  (77  111.   App.  89), 

104. 
Lindsey  v.  Danville  (40  Yt,  144),  322, 

323. 
Link  v.  Sheldon  |  136  X.  V.  1 ),  582. 
Link  v.  Sheldon  (18  X.  Y.  Supp.  815), 

284. 
Liuskie  v.  Kerr  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.J  34 

S.  W.  705),  544.  548. 
Linsley  v.    Bushnell   (15  Conn.  236), 

112,  113,  215. 
Linss   v.    Chesapeake   &  O.    R.    Co. 

([U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Ky.]  91  Fed.  964), 

107. 
Linton  Coal  &  M.  Co.  v.   Persons  (15 

Ind.  App.  69;  43  X.  E.  651),  119, 

186,  215,  227.* 
Lipe  v.  Eisenberd  (32  X.  Y.  229),  124, 

467. 
Lipp  v.  Otis  Brothers  &  Co.  (161    X. 

Y.  559),  572.  57::.  587. 
Lipscomb  v.  Houston  (64  S.  \V.  '.till). 

522. 
Lisonbee   v.    Monroe    Errig.    Co.    (18 

Utah.  343;  54  Pac.  1009),  70. 
List  v.  Miner  (74  Conn.  50),  369. 
Lister  v.  McKee(79  Ell.App.210),  374. 
Litchfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor  (81  111. 

590),  599. 
Litten  v.  Detroit  (119  Mich.  495),  217. 
Little  v.  Hacked  (lit)  (J.  S.  371),  161. 
Little  v.   Munson  (54    111.    A.pp.  437), 

452. 

Little  v.  Stanback  (63  X.  C.  285),  76. 
Little  v.  Young  (5  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  205), 

470. 
Littlebale  v.    Dix    (11    Cnsh.    [Mass.] 

364),  266. 
Litthjohn  v.    Fitchburg    R.   Co.  (148 

Mass.  478),  503,  511. 


Littlejohn  v.  Greeley  (18  Abb.   Pr. 

[\.  V.]  ID,  381. 
Little  Lock  &  Ft.  s.  l;.  Co.  v.  Barker 

(39  Ark.  191),  805,  607. 
Little  Rock  &  It.  s.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barker 

(33  Ark.  350),  495,  602,  610,  617,  618, 

623,  634,  635. 

Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Eu- 
banks  (48  Ark.  460),  166. 

Little  Lock  &  Ft.  S.  B,  Co.  v.  Town- 
scud  (41  Ark.  382),  598. 

Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Voss 
([Ark.]  18  8.  W.  172), 514, 607,  619, 

624,  636. 

Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Barry  (58 

Ark.  198),  252. 
Little  Hock,  M.    R,   &   T.   R.   Co.   v. 

Leverett   (48  Ark.  333),   614,    617, 

631,  632. 
Littlewood  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  X.  V.  (89 

X.  Y.  24),  499,  503,  564. 
Livingston  v.  Adams  (8 Cow.  [X.  Y.] 

175),  67. 
Llewellyn  v.  Levy  (10:1,   Pa.  047  I.  515. 
Lloyd  v.  Albermarle  &  K.  R.  Co.  (118 

X.  C.  1010),  150. 
Lloyd  v.   City  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co. 

(110  Ga.  107).  158. 
Lloyd    v.    Kelly    (48   111.    App.    554), 

473. 
Lobdell  v.  New  Bedford  (1  Mass.  158), 

96. 
Lochte   v.  Mitchell   (  [Miss.  1900]  28 

So.  877),  369. 
Locke  v.   International   &    <•.    X.    R. 

Co.  ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  60S.  W.  314), 

75,  93. 
Lockporl  v.    Richards  (81    111.   App. 

5::::).  214. 
Lockwood  v.   Belle  City   R,   Co.  (92 

Wis.  97),  170. 
Lockwood    v.    Lockwood    (07    Minn. 

470).  458,  402. 
Lockwood  v.  X.   Y.   L.    E.  &  \v.   i;. 

Co.  (98  \.  V.  523),  511, 520, 561, 562, 

563,  568,  569,  570,  572,  581. 
Lockwood     v.    Thomas    (12     Johns. 

[N.  V.]  248),  515. 


cvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Lockwood  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  K.  R. 

Co.  (23  N.  Y.  St.  K.  16),  214. 
Loeb  v.  Karrak  (1  Mont.  152),  91. 
Loeser  v.  Humphrey  (41  Ohio  St.  378), 

195. 
Loftus  v.  Ferry  Co.   (84  N.  Y.  445), 

163. 
Logan  v.   Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  R.  Co. 

(77  Mo.  663),  342. 
Lombard  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &P.  R.  Co. 

(47  Iowa,  494),  102,  214. 
Lombard  &  S.   St.   Pass.   R.   Co.  v. 

Christian  (124  Pa.  114),  289. 
Lombardi  v.  California  Street  Cable 

R.  Co.  (124  Cal.  311),  235,  261. 
London  v.  Cunningham  (1  Misc.   [N. 

Y.]  408),  316,  319. 
Londoun  v.   Eighth  Ave.   R.  Co.   (16 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  152),  277. 
Londsdale  Co.  v.  Moies  (2  Cliff.  [U. 
S.  C.   C.   D.   R.  I.]  538;  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  8,497),  62,  76. 
Long  v.   Booe  ([Ala.]   17   So.   716), 

457. 
Long  v.  Morrison  (14  Ind.   595),  189, 

225,  495. 
Long  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  (147  Pa. 

343),  70. 
Long  v.   Trexler  ([Pa.]  8  Atl.  620), 

121. 
Long  v.   Tribune   Printing  Co.   (107 

Mich.  207),  387. 
Lopez  v.  Central  Arizona  Min.  Co.  (1 

Ariz.  464),  166. 
Lorangerv.  Dominion  Transport  Co. 
(Rap.  Jud.  Quebec,  15  C.  S.   195), 
217. 
Lord  v.  Mobile  (113  Ala.  360),  266. 
Lord  v.  Thompson  (9  J.  &  S.  [N.  Y.] 

115),  515. 
Lorence  v.    Ellensburgh    (13   Wash. 

341 ),  214. 
Losee  v.  Buchanan  (51   N.   Y.    476), 

155. 
Lossman  v.  Knights  (77  HI.  App.  670), 

470,  473. 
Louder  v.  Henson  (4  Jones  L.  [N.  C] 
369),  111,  124,  186. 


Louisiana  W.  E.    R.   Co.    v.  Carstens 
(19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  190),  525,  528, 
542. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Ballard 

(85  Ky.   307),  120,  139,  140,  141. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballard  (10 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  735),  348. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry  (96 

Ky.  604),  521. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Binion  (107 

Ala.  645),  215,  263. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Blanks  (17 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1065),  214. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Breckin- 
ridge (99  Ky.  1),  338. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Constantine 

(14  Ky.  L.  Rep.  432),  122. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.  v.  Creighton 

(20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1691),  514. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Donaldson 

(19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1384),  100. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gower 

(85  Tenn.  465),  263. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Greer  ([Ky. 

1895]  29  S.  W.  337),-215,  218. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.  v.  Guy    (18 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  750),  346. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.  v.  Hine  (121 

Ala.  234),  327,  338,  354,  488. 
Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.   v.    Howard 

(90  Tenn.  144),  193. 
Louisville  &  N.    R.    Co.   v.   Jackson 

(18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  296),  340,  346. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.  v.  Kelly  (100 
Ky.  421;  19  Ky.  L.   Rep.  70;  40  S. 
W.  452),  3. 
Louisville  &   N.  R.   Co.   v.   Kemper 

(153  Ind.  618),  100. 
Louisville  &  N.    R.  Co.  v.   Kingman 

(18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  82),  139,  193. 
Louisville  &  N.    R.  Co.  v.    Keller  (20 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  957),  340,  351. 
Louisville  &    N".     R.    Co.    v.    Long 

(94  Ky.  410),  139. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mattingly 

(38  S.  W.  686),  214. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Maybin  (66 
Miss.  83),  340. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


CV1J 


Louisville*  X.  R.  Co.  v.  McCoy  (81 

Ky.  303),   139. 
Louisville  &    X.  R.  Co.   \.  McElroy 

(100  Ky.  153),  201. 
Louisville  &  V  I.'.    Co.  v.    McElwain 

(98  Ky.  7(H)).  495,  503. 
Louisville  <S    X.    It.    Co.   v.    McEvan 

([Ky.jL'l  Ky.  L.  Rep.  487),  214. 
Louisville  &   X.   R   Co.  v.    Mitchell 

(87  Ky.  327),  187,  214. 
Louisville  &  V  R.  Co.  v.  Sander  (19 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1941  i.  198,  503. 
Louisville*   N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sawanl  (16 


References  are  to  Sections.] 

Louisville,    v    A   A    C.    R.   Oo.   v. 

Creek  (130  lud.  139),  174. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  <  .  R  Co.  v.  Pahey 

(104  In.l.  409),  194,  251, 
Louisville,    N.    A.   &     C.     R     Co.    v. 

Goben  (15    End.     App.    123),   838, 

340,  343,  354. 
Louisville,  \.  A.  A- C.  R  Co.  v.  Heck 

(151  ln«l.  292),  84. 
Louisville,  V  A  &  C.  R  Co.  v.  Pat- 

chen  (66  111.   App.  208),    517,  ''>(»7. 

619. 
Louisville,    N.    A.    &    C.    R   Co.  v. 

Rinicker  (17  Ind.  App.  619),  346. 

v. 


Ky.  L.  Rep.  545),  214. 

Louisville  &  N.    R  Co.  v.  Snivell  (13  Louisville,    X.    A.   &    C.  R.    Co. 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  902),  504.  Shanks  (94  Ind.  598),  119,  122. 

Louisville  &   X.  R  Co.  v.  Trammell  Louisville,    X.  A.    &    C.  R.    Co.  v. 


(93  Ala.  350,  354),  515,  516. 
Louisville  &  X.  R  Co.  v.Vittitoe  (19 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  612),  156. 
Louisville  &  X.     R.   Co.   v.    Wallace 

([Tenn.]  17  S.  W.  882),  192. 
Louisville  &    X.   R  Co.   v.  Webb  (97 

Ala.  308),  1G0. 
Louisville  &  X.    R   Co.   v.   Whitley 

Co.    Ct.    (20    Ky.    L.    Rep.    1367), 

101. 
Louisville   &   X.    R.   Co.    v.  Whitlow 

14:;  s.  W.  711),  161. 
Louisville  &    X.    R.    Co.   v.    Williams 

(20  Ind.  App.  576),  243,  247. 
Louisville  &  X.  R  Co.  v.   Williams 

(113  Ala.  402),  508. 
Louisville  &  X.  R  Co.  v.  Woods  (105 

Ala.  561),  152. 
Louisville  &  X.  K.  Co.  v.  Woods  (115 

Ala.  527),  229. 
Louisville   &   X.   R   Co.   v.   Yniestia 

(21  Fla.  700),  166. 
Louisville  &    Portland   Canal   Co.    v. 

Murphy  (9  Bush  [Ky.],  522),  119. 
Louisville  &   Portland   R    R   Co.  v. 

Smith  (2  Duv.  [Ky.]  556),  122. 
Louisville,   etc.,   Ry.   Co.   v.   Orr  (91 

Ala.  ->\s).  511. 
Louisville.  N.  &  Ct.  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Guinan  (11    Lea  [Tenn.],    98),  112, 

184,  342. 


Snider  (117   Ind.  435),  279. 
Louisville,     X.    A.   &    C.     R.    Co.    V. 

Wood  (113  Ind.  544;  14  X.  B.  572), 

82,  90,  274,  280,  281,  283. 
Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wurl 

(62  111.  App.  381  i.  122. 
Louisville   Press    Co.  v.  Sennelly  (20 

Ky.   L.  Rep.   1231),  387,  397,  402, 

413. 
Louisville,    St.    L.    &  T.    R.   Co.   v. 

Wafus  (13  Ky.  L.  Rep.  951),  80. 
Louisville  s.  W.   R.    Co.  v.  Dobbins 

(60  Ark.  481),  243. 
Louisville,   Tex.  &  Cin.  R.  R  Co.  v. 

Case  (9  Bush   [Ky.],  718),  119. 
Lounsbury   v.   Bridgeport   (Of,  Conn. 

360),  316. 
Love  v.  Atlanta  (95  Ga.  129),  65. 
Love  v.  Humphrey  (9  Wend.  [N.  Y.] 

500),  57. 
Lovett  V.  Thomas  (81  Va.  245),  7:'.. 
Low  v.    Archer  (12    X.   V.    [2  Kern] 

•_'77).   16. 
Low  v.   Herald    Co.   (6    Utah,   176), 

100. 
Lowe  v.  .Moss  i  12  111.   177).  158. 
Lowell  v.  Short(4Cush.  [Mass.]  27.".). 

112. 
Lower   v.    Legal    (60    X.    J.    L.    99), 

508. 
Lowry  v.  Coster  (91  111.  182),   111. 


CV111 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Lowry  v.  Mt.  Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  P.    Lyman  v.   Philadelphia,  etc.,   R.  R. 
R.  Co.  (  [C.  C.  S.  D.  Ohio]  68  Fed.  !      Co.  (4  Houst.  [Del.]  583),  161. 
827),  214.  Lyman  Co.  v.   State  (9  S.  D.  413;  CO 


Loyacano  v.    Jurgens  (50  La.   Ann. 

44;  23  So.  717),,  63,  265. 
Lubrano  v.  Atlantic  Mills  ([R.  I.]  32 

Atl.  205),  499. 
Lucas    v.    Michigan  .C.   R.    Co.    (98 

Mich.  1),  340. 
Lucas  v.  New    York   C.    R.    Co.  (21 

Barb.    [N.  Y.]  245)  569. 
Luck  v.  Ripon  (53  Wis.  196),  241. 
Lucker  v.  Liske  (111  Mich.  683),  474. 

477. 
Lucy  v.  Chic.  G.  W.  R.  Co.  (64  Minn. 

7),  357. 
Ludden  v.  Columbus  &  C.  M.  R.  Co. 

(7  Ohio   N.  P.  106;  9  Ohio   S.  &  C. 

P.  Dec.  793),  64. 


N.  W.  601),  65. 
Lynch  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Go.  (5  X. 

Y.  Supp.  311),  233. 
Lynch  v.  Knight   (9  II.  L.   Cas.  577), 

91,  220. 
Lynch  v.    Metropolitan,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(112  Mo.  420),  177. 
Lynch  v.  Smith  (104  Mass.  52),  170. 
Lynch    v.   Southwestern     Tel  eg.     & 

Teleph.  Co.  ( [Tex.]   32  S.  W.  776), 

522. 
Lynd  v.   Pickett  (7  Minn.   184),  111, 

120,  121,  124. 
Lyon  v.  Donaldson  (34  Fed.  789),  95. 
Lyon  v.   Manhattan   R.  Co.   (142  N. 

Y. 298),  295. 


Ludlow  v.  Mackintock  ( [Ky.    1899]  |  Lyons  v.  Allen  (11  App.   D.   C.  453), 

53  S.  W.  524),  100.  201. 

Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.  V.Indian   Orchard  j  Lyons  v.  Second    Ave.    R.    Co.   (89 

Co.  (177  Mass.  61),  76.  Hun,  374),  562,  563,  572,  580. 

Luessen  v.    Oshkosk  Elec.   L.   &  P.    Lyons  v.  Third  Ave.  Rd.  Co.  (7  Rob. 

Co.  (109  Wis.  94),  648,  671.  [N.  T.J  605),  492. 

Luft   v.   Lingane   (17  R.  I.  420),  386,    Lyons  v.  Woodward  (49  Me.  29),  495. 

390,  403.  !  Lytton  v.  Baird  (95  Ind.  349),  448. 

Lumley  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  ( [C.  C.  E.  |  Mac.     See  Mc. 

D.  Mich.]   71  Fed.  21),  198,  202.        j  Mace  v.  Reed  (89  Wis.  440),  136,  138. 
Lund  v.  New  Bedford  (121  Mass.  286),  '  Macerv.  Third   Ave.  R.  K.  Co.  (15  J. 


62,  75. 
Lung  Chung  v.  Northern   P.  R.  Co. 

(19  Fed.  254),  505. 
Lunsford    v.  Dietrich   (86  Ala.   250), 

436,  438 


&  S.  [N.  Y.]  461),  243. 
Mack  v.  South   Bound  R.  Co.  (52  S. 

C.  323),  139,  186,  220,  221,  222. 
Mackay  v.   Central    R.   Co.    (4    Fed. 

617),  508. 


Lunt  v.  Philbrick  (59  N.   H.  59),  407.  j  Mackay  v.  McGuire  (  [1891]   1  Q.  B 
Lusk's   Admrs.  v.   Kimball  (87  Fed.        250),  73 


545),  505. 
Lustig  v.   New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.    (65    Hun    [N.    Y.],   547),  561, 

563,  572. 
Lutcher  &  M.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Dyson 

([Tex.    Civ.    App.]   30  S.    W.  61), 

305. 
Lyddon  v.   Dore  (81  Mo.    App.  64), 

369. 
Lyddon  v.    Dose   (2    Mo.   App.  668), 

362. 


Mackin  v.  Blythe  (35  111.  App.  216), 

134. 
Maclennau  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  (20 

J.  &  S.  [N.  Y.]  22),  236. 
Macomber  v.    Thompson  (Fed.   Cas. 

No.  8919;  1  Sumn.  [U.  3.]  384),  91. 
Macon  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  '&  S.  R.  Co. 

(75  Mo.  App.  1),  236. 
Macon  &  Indian  Springs  Electric  St. 

Ry.   Co.  v.  Holmes  (103  Ga.   655), 

158. 


TABLE    <»F    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


rix 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Macon  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.   Johnson  (38 

Ga.  409),  L58,  511. 
Macon,  Consol.  St.    K.  Co.  v.  Barnes 

i  L13  Ga.  212).  2:;::. 
Macon   D.  a-   s.   R.  Co.  v.  Moore  (99 

Ga.  229),  249,  269. 
Madden  v.  Mo.   Pac.  K.  Co.  (M  Mo, 

Aj>|>.  (itlt'i ),  S>'>. 
Madison  v.  Missouri    P.    K.    Co.    (60 

Mo.  App.  44),  255. 
Maffit  v.  Chic.  R.  I.  &    P.  R.  Co.  (57 

Kan.  912),  441. 
Ma^ee  v.  Holland  (27  N.  J.  L.  86),  111. 
Magee  v.  Troy  (48  Hun  [N.  Y.],  383), 

276. 
Magner  v.  Renk  (65  Wis.  164),  444. 
Mahar  v.  New  York   C.    &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (20  App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  161 ),  277. 
Maher  v.  Louisville,  NO.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

(40  La.  Ann.  64),  94. 
Maher  v.  Philadelphia  Trac.  Co.  (181 

Pa.  391),  502,  511. 
Mahler  v.   Norwich  &  N.  Y.  Trans. 

Co.  (45  Pari).  [N.   Y.]  226),  508. 
Mahon  v.    New  York  C.   R.   Co.  (24 

N.  Y.  658),  99. 
Malioney   v.    Dank  wart    (106    Iowa, 

321),  219,  220.  221. 
Mahoney  v.  Robbins  (49  Ind.  146),  79. 
Mahood  v.  Pleasant  Valley  Coal  Co. 

(8  Utah,  85),  214. 
Mahood  v.  Pleasant  Valley  Coal  Co. 

(8  Utah,  85;  30  Pac.  149  i.  214. 
Mai  mono  v.  Dry  Dock  E.   P.  &  B.  R. 

Co.  (58  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  383),  246. 
Maine    v.    Chic.     P.     &     Q.     R.   Co. 

([Iowa]  70  N.  W.  630),  203. 
Mairs  v.  Manhattan  Real  Est.  Assoc. 

(80  N.  Y.  498;  15  J.    &  S.  [N.  Y.] 

31 ),  67. 
Maisenbacker  v.   Society   Concordia    Manning  v.   \\'clls  <s    Misc.    [  \.    Y.] 

(71  Conn.  369).  215,  364,  369.  646),  588. 

Maitland   v.   Gilbert    Paper  Co.   (97    Manning  v.  Weal   End    Ky.  Co.  (166 

Wis.  476),  298.  Mass.  230),  150. 

Mallard  v.  Ninth   Ave.  R.   R.  Co.  (15    Mansfield  v.  Hunt   (19  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Daly  [N.  \.\.  376),  177.  R.  488),  99. 

Malloy  v.  Fayetteville(122N.  C.  480),    Mansur-Tehhetts  I.  Co.  v.  Smith  (65 

501.  111.  App.  319),  119. 


Malmstrom  v.  Northern  P.  R.  ( 

Wash.  L95),  199. 
Malone  v.  Hawley  (46  Cal.  409),  248. 
Malone  v.  Murphy  (2  Kan.  246),  111, 

120,  369. 
Malone  v.  Pittsburg  &  L.  E.   R.  Co. 

(162  Pa.  390),  349,  361. 
Malonee  v.  New  York  C.   R.  Co.  (20 

Wkly.  Dig.  [N.  V.]  252),  ."-7:;.  580, 
Maloney  v.  Dailey  (67  111.   App,   127), 

17:;. 
Malott  v.  Shimer  (15:;  End.  36),  496, 

499,  517,  602,  f>07,  (109,  <>10. 
Maney  v.  Chicago,  Ii.  a-  q.  V,.  Co.  (49 

111.  App.  id:,),  609. 
Manford  v.  McVeigh  (92  Va.  416;  23 

S.  E.  857),  68. 
Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(36  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  239),  176. 
Manger  v.  Renk  (65  Wis.  364),  437. 
Manget  v.  O'Neill  (51  Mo.  App.  35), 

386. 
Manheira  v.  Carlton  College  (68  Minn. 

531;  71  N.  W.  705),  7:5. 
Manire  v.  Hubbard  (23  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

1753),  393. 
Manistee  A   N.  K.  It.  Co.  v.  Commrs. 

of  Rds.  (US  Mich.  349).  501. 
Manley  v.  N.  Y.  C.  A  II.  R.  R.  R.  Co. 

(18  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  502),  214. 
Manly  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (71 

N.  C.  655),  177. 
Mann  v.  Cowan  (S  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  30), 

134. 
Mann   Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.  Dupre  (54 

Fed.  646),  184. 
Manning  v.  Port  Henry  Iron  Ore  Co. 

(91  X.  Y.  664),  595. 
Manning  v.  Wells  (<il   N.   Y.  St  R. 

59),  514. 


ex 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Mansur-Tebbetts    Imp.   Co.    v.    Wil- 

lett  (  [Okl.  1900],  61  Pac.  1066),  77. 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Smith  (9  Pick. 

[Mass.]  12),  211. 
Marble  v.  City  of  .Worcester  (4  Cray 

[Mass.],  412),  85. 
March  v.  Walker  (48  Tex.  375,  377), 

529,  558. 
Mark  v.  Hudson  R.   B.  Co.  (56  How. 

Br.  [N.T.]  108,  affd  103  N.  Y.  29), 

67. 
Markey   v.    Queens   Co.    (154   N.   Y. 

675;  49  N.  E.  71,  aff  g  9  App.  Div. 

627),  65. 
Maikham  v.  Houston,  etc.,  Nav.  Co. 

(73  Tex.  247),  172. 
Markly  v.   Kirby  (6  Kan.  App.  494), 

431. 
Marks  v.  Long  Island  B.   R.  Co.   (3 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  562),  235. 
Mailer  v.  Springfield  (65    Mo.    App. 

301),  293. 
Marsh  v.  Arizona  (164  U.  S.  599;  41 

L.  Ed.  567;  17  Sup.   Ct.   Rep.  193), 

73. 
Marshall  v.  Laughran   (47   111.   App. 

29),  472,  607. 
Marshall  v.  McAllister  (18  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  159),  491,  502,  532. 
Marshall  v.   McAllister  (22  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  214;  54  S.  W.  1068),  65. 
Marshall  v.  Wabash  R.   Co.   (46  Fed. 

269),  508. 
Marshall  v.  Wellwood  (38  N.   J.   L. 

339),  147. 
Martin  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (58 

Kan.  475;   49  Pac.  605),  499,  503, 

597. 
Martin    v.  North  Salem  L.    Co.    (97 

Va.  349),  501. 
Martin  v.    Payne   (9  Johns.    [N.   Y.] 

387),  467. 
Martin  v.  Price    (Minor  [Ala.],  68), 

57. 
Martin  v.   Sherwood    ([Conn.   1902] 

51  Atl.  526),  290. 
Martin  v.  Shoppee  (3  C.  &  P.  373), 

364. 


Martin  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  (51  S.  C. 

150),  161. 
Martin  v.  South  Salem  L.  Co.  (94  Va. 
'     28),  501. 
Martin    v.    Sunset     Teleg.     Co.    (18 

Wash.  260),  92. 
Martin  v.  Wood  (23  N.  Y.  St.  R.  457), 

164,  290,  291,  305. 
Marvin  v.  Maysville  St.  R.   &  I.   Co. 

(49  P^ed.  436),  497,  504. 
Marx  v.  Press  Pub.   Co.   (134  N.  Y. 

501),  397. 
Mason  v.  Bertram  ( 18  Ont.  R.  1  Chy. 

D.),  525,  528,  535,  550. 
Mason  v.  Ellsworth  (32  Me.  271),  218. 
Mason  v.  Hawes  (52  Conn.  12),  111. 
Mason  v.  Hill  (3  Barn.  &  Ad.  304;  5 

Barn.  &  Ad.  1),  76. 
Mason  v.  Southern  Ry.  (58  S.  C.  70), 

524,  525,  531,  541. 
Mason  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 

(75  Mo.  App.  1),  236. 
Mason  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (  [Utah] 

24  Pac.  796),  499. 
Mason  v.  Wierengo  (113  Mich.   151), 

70. 
Masser  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(68  Iowa,  602),  514. 
Massie  v.  Bailey  (33  La.  Ann.  485), 

119. 
Massnere  v.  Dickens   (70  Wis.    83), 

418. 
Masters  v.  Stratton  (7  Hill  [N.  Y.], 

101),  489. 
Masters  v.  Warren   (27  Conn.  293), 

215,  218,  219,  227. 
Masterson  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.  Co.  (84  N.  Y.  247),  172. 
Masterton  v.   Mount  Vernon  (58  N, 

Y.  391),  227,  233,  235,  236. 
Matheis  v.  Mazet  (164  Pa.   St.   580), 

144,  457. 
Matherson  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  & 

M.  R.  Co.  (61  Kan.  667),  508. 
Mathews  v.   Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P.  R. 

Co.  (63  Mo.  App.  569),  156. 
Matlick  v.  Crump  (62  Mo.  App.  21), 

434. 


TABLE   OF   tasks   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Blatter  "f.    See  Name. 

Matterson  v.  New  Fork  Cent   R.   R. 

Co.  (62  Barb.  [N.  V.|  364),  -J is. 
Matthews  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.  (36S.  W. 

SSI  i,  lu.;. 
Matthews  v.   Mo.   Pac.   Ry.  Co.   (26 

Mo.  App.  75),  300,  us. 
Matthews   v.    Teny    (10    Coon.  455), 

377. 
Mattice  v.  Brinkman  (71  Mich,  in:,), 

L23. 
Mattice  v.  Wilcox  (117  X.    V.  636), 

383,  392,  4 lti. 
Matlis  v.   Philadelphia  Traction    Co. 

(f,  Pa.  Dist.  K.  94),  196,  214. 
Mattson  v.  Albert  (97Tenn.  232  |,  381. 
Matz  v.   Chicago   &    A.    R.     Co.    (85 

Fed.  180),  49:,. 
Mauerman  v.  St.  Louis,   1.   M.  &  S. 

Ry.  Co.  (41  Mo.  App.  349),  :500. 
Maxwell    v.    Wilmington    City    Ry. 

Co.  (1  Marv.  [Del.]  199),  161. 
May  v.  Anderson  (14  Ind.  A.pp.  251  I, 

428. 
May  v.  Carter  (67  Mo.  App.  323),  81. 
May  v.    Halm  (  [Tex.   Civ.    App.]   54 

S.  W.  416),  256. 
May  v.  Wesl  Jersey  *  S.  R.  Co.  (62 

X.  J.  L.  6.°,,  67,    90),   514.    645,    646, 

648,  654,  •».-,:,.  662,  664,  665,  t":;. 
Mayer  v.  Probe  (40  W.  Va.246),  111, 

112. 
Mayer   v.    Liebmanii  (16   App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  54),  214. 
Mayer       v.      Tliompson-Hutuhinson 

Bldg.  Co.  (116  Ala.  634),  84. 
Mayers  v.  Smith  (121  111.  442),  614, 

618. 
Mayhew  v.  Burns  (10:1  [nd.328),  503. 
Mayhew  v.    Thatcher  (6  Wheat.   [U. 

S.]  129),  57. 
Maynard  v.    Beardsley  (7  Wend.    [  X. 

Y.]  560),  4 IS,   122,  42:;. 
Maynard   v.    Berkeley   (7  Wend.  [X. 

Y.]  560),  377. 
Mayo  v.  Boston,  etc.,   R.  R.    Co.  (104 

Mass.  137),  It '>•">. 
Mayor.     See  Xame  of  place. 


Mayoi    \.  Lewis   (92   Ala.  352),    142, 

22  1. 
McAfee  v.  Crawford  i  1:;  How.  [I",  s.  | 

447),  90. 
McAlister  v.  Hammond  (6  Cow.    [X 

V.]  342),  I-'.'. 
McAllen  \.   Western  In.  Teleg.  Co. 

(79  Tex.  243),  82. 
Bit  Arthur  v.  Sears  (21  Went.  [X.  V.] 

L90),  153. 
McAulay  v.    Birkhead   (13  Ired.   L. 

[X.  C]  2-i.  113. 
BicAvoj  \.  Wright  (25  lnd.  22),  120. 
McBean  v.   McCullum  (89  Hun     \. 

Y.],  95),  107. 
McBride  v.  St.  Paul   City  R.  Co.  (72 

Minn.  291),  244. 
McCabc  v.  Cuinness  (  [Ir.    1!.]  9  C.  L. 

510),  52:;. 
McCabe  v.  Third  Ave.  Co.  (22  Misc. 

[X.  Y.]  707).  275. 
McCafferty    v.    Pennsylvania    R.   Co. 

(  [Pa.]  44  Ail.  435),  199.  503. 
McCabill  v.   Detroit  City  R.  Co.  (96 

Mich.  156),  668. 
McCall  v.  Brock   (5   Strobh.   [S.   I  .] 

119),  153.  . 
McCall  v.  McDowell  (1  Abb.  [X.  s.] 

212),  452. 
McCall    v.    McDowell    (Deady,    233), 

451. 
McCallum  v.   Long  Island  R.  R.  Co. 

(38  Hun  [X.  Y.],  96),  172. 
McCann  v.  Newark  &  S.  O.   R.    Co. 

(58  X.  J.  L.  642).  84. 
McCarry  v.   Loomis  (63  X.  Y.   104), 

176. 
McCarter  v.  Orphan  Asylum  of  X.  Y. 

(9  Cow.  437),  501. 
McCarthy    v.    DeArmit   (99   La.   63), 

130. 
McCarthy  v.  Miller  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

57  s.  W.  97:;  i.  387. 
McCarthy  v.  Niskern  (22  Minn.  90), 

111.  144.  145. 
McCarthy  v.   Railroad  Co.  (18  Kan. 

46).  499,  503. 
McCarty  v.  Beach  ( 10  Cal.  461 ),  77. 81. 


Cxii  TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN*    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

McCarty   v.   Lambley  (20  App.  Div.  |  McCreery  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  (  [W 
[N.  Y.]  264),  404. 


McCarty  v.    Lockport  (13  App.   Div. 

[X.  Y.]  494),  87. 
McCarty  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.  (62  Fed. '437),  505. 
MeCarvel  v.  Sawyer  (173  Mass.  540), 

04. 
McClary  v.  Warner  (69  111.  App.  223), 

515. 
McClean  v.   New  York  Press  Co.  (19 

N.  Y.  Supp.  262),  412. 
McClellan  v.  Hein  (56  Neb.  600),  473. 
McClendon  v.  Wells  (20  S.  C.  514), 

128. 
McCloskey  v.  Pulitzer  Pub.  Co.  (152 

Mo.  339),  411,  413. 
McClure  v.  Alexander  ( 15  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

732),  502. 
McClurg  v.  McKercher  (56  Hun  [N. 

Y.],  305),  588. 
McCluskey  v.    Cromwell   (11   N.   Y. 

593),  501. 
McConnell  v.  Kibbe  (33  111.  174),  62 

76,  94. 
McCooey  v.  Forty-Second   St.  &  G. 

St.  Ferry  R.  Co.  (79  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

255),  214,  274. 
McCord  v.  Williams  (2  Ala.  71),  35. 
McCormack  v.  Nassau  Elec.   R.  Co. 

(18   App.   Div.    [N.   Y.]   333),    172, 

562,  563. 
McCormick  v.  Conway  (12  La.  Ann. 

53),  430. 
McCormick  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R. 

Co.  (57  Mo.  533),  67. 
McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Wesson  (41 

S.  W.  725),  102. 
McCoy  v.  Elder  (2  Blackf.  [Ind.]  183), 

57. 
McCoy    v.    Milwaukee    St.    R.    Co. 
(  [Wis.  1894]  59  N.  W.  453),  214,  226, 
230,  311. 
McCoy  v.  Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (5 

Houst.  [Del.]  599),  122,  136. 
McCoy  v.  Trucks  (121  Ind.  292),  464. 
McCraw  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  (  [Neb.  1899]  81  N.  W.  306),  148. 


Va..  1901]    10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  500), 

156,  161. 
McCruden   v.    Rochester   R.    Co.    (5 

Misc.  [N-  Y.]  59),  95. 
McCullough  v.  Walton  (11  Ala.  492), 

124. 
McCurry  v.  McCuiry  (82  N.  C.  296), 

415. 
McCutchen  v.   McGahan   (11   Johns. 

[X.  Y.]  281),  515. 
McDaniel  v.  Baca  (2  Cal.  329),  428. 
McDermott  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

( [Wis.]  55  N.  W.  179),  211. 
McDevitt  v.  St.  Paul   (66  Minn.   14), 

316,  322. 
McDonald  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (26 

Iowa,  124),  249,  267. 
McDonald    v.  Eagle  &  P.  Mfg.    Co. 

(67  Ga.  761),  111. 
McDonald    v.     Illinois     C.     R.     Co. 

([Iowa]  155  N.  W.  102),  254. 
McDonald    v.     Illinois     C.     R.     Co. 

(  [Iowa]  55  N.  W.  102),  281. 
McDonald  v.  Long  Island  R.   R.  Co. 

(6  N.  Y.  St.  R.  691),  212. 
McDonald  v.   McDonald   (16  Ky.   L. 

Rep.  412),  504. 
McDonald  v.  Montgomery  St.  R.  Co. 

(110  Ala.  161),  166. 
McDonald  v.  New  York  C.  &  St.   L. 

R.  R.  Co.  (13  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  651),  281. 
McDonald   v.    United  States  (33  Ct. 

CI.  209),  65. 
McDonnell    v.     Cambridge    R.     Co. 

(151  Mass.  159),  78. 
McDonnell  v.  Henry  Elias  Brew.  Co. 

(16  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  223),  214. 
McDonnell  v.  Pescadero  &  S.   M.  S. 

Co.  (120  Cal.  476),  98. 
McDowell  v.  Ga.  R.  Co.  (60  Ga.  320), 

495. 
McFadden  v.    Dietz   (115    Cal.   697), 

102. 
Mcl"arland  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  (125 

Mo.  253),  198. 
McFarland   v.    Muscatine    (98   Iowa, 

199),  240. 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    IN     Vol,.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


cxni 


McFarland  v.  Roly  (4  Ohio  Dec.  211),    McGuire  v.  <. olden  Catc  (McAllister 


80. 


U.S.]   104),  136. 


McFee  v.  Vickshnrg.  s.  a-    P.  i;.  Co.    BicGuire  \.  Kiveland  (.".»;  \'i  62),  <;»'.. 


(12  La.  Ann.  790),  139,  510,  51  I. 
McGanaban  v.   New    Xork,  X.   II.  & 


McHenry  Coal    Co.    \.   Sneddon 
Ky.  684),  122,  1ST. 


II.  R.  Co.  (171    Mass.    211).  90,  196,     McHugh  v.   New  York  El.  B.   Co.   (47 


230,  251,  204. 


X.  V.  St.  R.  7.;),  108. 


McGann  v.   Hamilton  (58  Conn.  69),     Mcllngli   v.   Schlosser   (159    Pa.   St. 

480),  22s. 
Mcintosh    v.   Johnson  (51    Neb.   33), 

501. 
Mclntyre  v.  New  York  C.  K.  Co.  (47 
Barb.[N.  ST.]  515),  563, 566, 572 


79. 

Miliar  v.    Bristol    (71    Coon.    652;  42 

Atl.  1000),  65. 
McGarry  v.  Mo.   Tar.  R.  Co.  (36  Mo. 

App.  340),  442. 


McGaw  v.  Lancaster  ( [C.   P.   Pa. J  14    Mclntyre  v.  X.  V.  C.  R.  B.  Co.  (37  M. 


Lane.  L.  Rev.  276),  214. 


Y.  280),  221 1.  ..tit). 


McGee  v.   Baumgartner  (  [Mich.]  80    Mclntyre  v.  New  York  C.   R.  Co.  (37 


X.  W.  21),  390. 
McGee  v.  Penn.  K.  Co.  (  [Pac.  P.]  33 
W.  X.  C.  15),  214. 


\.  Y.  -_--7  (.  521,  561,  562,  563,  567, 

582. 
Mclntyre  v.  Sholty  (121  111.  660),  131. 


Mel, lone   v.    New   Jersey   K.    Co.    (8    Mclntyre    v.    Weinert  (195    Pa.    52), 

Vr.  [X.  J.]  304),  646.  392. 

McGovern  v.  Hope  (63  X.  J.   L.  76;    McKay   v.    New    England    Dredging 

Co.  (92  Me.  454),  198,  602,  612,  613, 

614,  616. 
McKeigue  v.  Janesville  (68  Wis.  50), 

643,  657,  662,  665,  666. 
McKeon  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  S.  P.  R.  R. 

Co.  (94  Wis.   177i.  21  1.  280. 
McKeon  v.  Citizens  St.   Ry.  Co.  (42 

Mo.  79),  113. 
McKeuna   v.    Brooklyn     Heights    R, 

Co.    (41    App.    Div.    [N.    Y.]  255), 

252,  260. 
McKenzie  v.   Allen  (3  Strob.  [S.  C] 

546),  266,  375. 


42  Atl.  830),  294. 
McGovern  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co. 

(67  X.  Y.  417),  514,  586,  588,  589. 
McGovern  v.   Standard    Oil   Co.    (11 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  588),  152. 
McGowan  v.   Boston  (170  Mass.  384; 

49  X.  E.  633),  65. 
McGowan  v.  Giveen  Mfg.  Co.  (54  App. 

Uiv.  [X.  Y.]  233),  213. 
McGowan   v.    Interstate   Cousol.   St. 

R.  Co.  (20  R.  I.  264),  211. 
McGowan  v.   McGowan   (122   N.   C. 

145),  430. 


McGowan  v.  Metropolitan  L.  Ins.  Co.   McEinley  v.  C.  &  X.  W.  B.  Co.  (44 


(60  N.  J.  L.  198),  501. 


Iowa.  314),  227,  :;<;4. 


MoGown  v.  International  *  (..  X.  B.    McEinney  v.  Juhman   (38   Mo.   App. 


Co.  (85  Tex.  289;  20  s.  W.  80),  524, 

525,526,528,  530,  535,  5  11.  543. 
McGown   v.    Wheeler   (20   Tex.  372), 

74. 
McGrath  v.   Donnelly   (131   Pa.   549), 

515. 
McGregor  v.  Reed  M.  &  Co.  (178   111. 

4(14),  84. 


344),  515. 
McEnight    v.    Ratcliffe    (14  Pac.  St. 

L68),  ill. 
McKormick    v.    West    Bay    City   (110 

Mich.  21  ;5  1,  229,  241. 
McEue  v.  Klein  (60  Tex.   168),  522. 
McLain  v.  Van  Zandl   (48  How.    Br. 

fX.  Y.)  80),  176. 


McGuire  v.   Brooklyn  11.   R.  Co   (30   McLamb  v.  Wilmington  4  W.  B.  Co. 


App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  227),  281. 


(122  N.  C.  862),  157. 


CX1V 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


McLane  v.  Kelly  (72  Minn.  395),  488. 
McLane   v.    Perkins    (  [Maine,  1898] 

42  Atl.  256),  165. 
McLauchlin  v.  Charlotte  &  S.  C.  R. 

Co.  (5  Rich.  [S.  ('.]  583),  67. 
McLaughlin  v.   Cony  (77  Pa.    109), 

227,  243. 
McLaughlin   v.    New    Orleans,   etc., 

R.  Co.  (48  La.  Ann.  23),  177. 
McLean  v.  City  of   Kansas  City  (81 

Mo.  App.  72),  325. 
McLean   v.    Kansas   City   (2   Mo.   A. 

Rep.  681),  254. 
McLean   v.    McLean    (15  Wkly.  Dig. 

[N.  Y.]  181),  97. 
McLean   Coal  Co.   v.   McVey  (38  111. 

App.  158),  514,  605,  616,  635. 
McMahon  v.   Bennett  (31  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  16),  421. 
McMahon  v.  Eau  Claire  Waterworks 
Co.  ([Wis.  1897]  95   Wis.  640),  214. 
McMahon  v.  Field  (7  Q.  B.  Div.  591), 

349. 
McMahon  v.   Mayor  (33  N.   Y.  642), 

569,  586. 
McMahon   v.    New   York   News  Co. 
(51  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  488),  397,  402. 
McMahon  v.  New  York  Elev.   R.  R. 

Co.  (18  J.  &  S.  [N.  Y.]  507),  151. 
McMahon  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co. 

(39  Md.  438),  219,  243. 
McMahon    v.   Sankey   (133  111.  636), 

475. 
McMaster  v.   Dyer  (44  W.  Va.  644), 

470. 
McMillan   v.   Union  P.  B.  W.  (6  Mo. 

App.  434),  309. 
McNair  v.    Manhattan   Ry.    Co.    (22 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  840),  255. 
McNamara  v.  King  (7  111.  432),  111, 

263,  369. 
McNeil  v.  Lyons  (20   R.  I.   672),  211. 
McNulta   v.    Jenkins    (91    111.    App. 

309),  605. 
McNnlty  v.  Walker  (64  Miss.    198), 

430. 
McPeck  v.   Central  Vt.    R.    Co.    (79 
Fed.  596),  161. 


McPherson    v.   Ryan   (59   Mich.   33), 

116. 
McPheters  v.  Moore  River  L.  D.  Co. 

(78  Me.  329),  83. 
McQueen   v.  Hale  (1  Coldw.  [Tenn.] 

212),  448. 
McQueen  v.  Heck  (1  Coldw.  [Tenn.] 

212),  448. 
McQueen   v.   Middletown    Mfg.    Co. 

(16  Johns.  [N.  Y.]  7),  501. 
McQuigan   v.   Del.   L.   &   W.   R.  Co. 

(129  N.  Y.  50),  295. 
McRickard  v.  Flint  (114  N.  Y.  222), 

63. 
McWilliams  v.    Bragg  (3  Wis.  424), 

111,  112. 
McWilliams  v.    Hoban  (42  Md.  56), 

437,  442. 
Mead  v.  Haskius  (6  Ohio  N.  P.  522), 

463. 
Mead    v.    Strattou    (87   N.    Y.    493), 

472. 
Meade  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.  (3  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  432),  214. 
Meade  v.  Chicago,  R,  T.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(72  Mo.  App.  61),  300,  305. 
Meagher  v.   Driscoll  (99  Mass.  281), 

125. 
Medbury    v.   N.   Y.   &  E.   R.  Co.  (26 

Barb.  [N.  Y.]  564),  83,  87,  91. 
Medinger   v.    Brooklyn    Heights   R. 
Co.  (6  App.   Div.   [N.  Y.]  42),  559, 
560,  562,  563,  572,  580. 
Meehan  v.  Chicago  &   N.  W.  R.  Co. 

(67  111.  App.  39),  633. 
Meek  v.  Carlettsburg  &  P.  P.  Co.  (22 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318),  76. 
Meeks   v.    Southern  R.    Co.   (52  Cal. 

602),  176. 
Meeks   v.   St.    Paul    (64  Minn.    220), 

100. 
Meers  v.  McDowell  (23  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

461),  300. 
Meeter  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (63  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  533),  244,  245. 
Mehrof  Bros.  B.  M.  Co.  v.  Delaware, 
L.  &  W.  B.  Co.  ( [N.  J.  ]16  Atl.  12), 
81. 


TABLE   <>!•    CASES   CITED    IN     VOL. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


i'\\ 


Mchroff    v.    Mehroff    (26    Fed.     13), 

458. 
Meibus  v.  Dodge  (38  Wis.  300),  L22, 

188.  265. 
Meidel  v.  A.nthis  (7!  III.  241  |,  123. 
Meigs    v.    Buffalo    (23    Wkly.    Dig. 

[N.  V.|  197),  316. 
Meiners  v.  St.  Louis   (130  Mo.  274), 

214. 
Mellor  v.  Spateman  (1   Wins.   Saun- 
ders, 346),  74. 
Melhvitz   v.    Manhattan    R.    Co.    (43 

N.  V.  St.  U.  354),  299. 
Melody  v.  Real)  (1  Mass.  471),  501. 
Melville  v.  State  (121  Cal.  16),  65. 
Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin  (117 

Ala.  367),  160. 
Memphis   &  C.  Packet  Co.    v.  Nagel 

(97  Ky.  «.);  10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  748),  139", 

348. 
Memphis  &  C.  P.  Co.  v.  Pikey  ( [Ind.] 

40  N.  E.  527),  504,  50G. 
Memphis  &   C.    R.   Co.  v.  Tennessee 

(101  U.  S.  337;  25  L.  Ed.  960),  65. 
Memphis,   &    C.  R.  Co.  v.    Whitfield 

(44  Miss.  466),  215,  219,  227,  243, 

251,  328. 
Memphis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Green  (52  Miss. 

783),  119. 
Mendel  v.  Wheeling  (28  W.  Va.  233), 

65. 
Mendenhall  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co. 

(12:5  \.  ('.  275),  563,  575. 
Mentzer   v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co. 

(93  Iowa,  572),  90. 
Merchants    Ins.    Co.    of    Newark    v. 

Buckner  (98  Fed.  222),  385. 
Merest    v.    Harvey    (5    Taunt.   442), 

111. 
Mergenthaler  Linotype  Co.  v.  Kansas 

Stale  P.  Co.  (  [Kan.]  59  Pac.  106G), 

75. 
Merkle  v.  Bennington  Twp.  (58  Mich. 

156),  503. 
Menihew  v.  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  (92 

111.  App.  346),  597. 
Merrill    v.    Crossman    (68   Me.    412), 

501. 


Merrill   v.    Dibble   (12    Bradw.   [111. 

App.  j  85),  76 
Merrill    v.    .St.    Louis   (12    Mo.    App. 

166),  215. 
Merrill   v.   Western    Mo.  Tel.  Co.  (78 

Me.  97),  78. 
Merrills  v.  Tariff  Mfg.  Co.  (10  Conn. 

384),  112. 
Merritt  v.  Earle  (29  N.  Y.  117),  153. 
Merritt  v.   Earle   (31    Barb.   [N.    V. 

38),  153. 
Merritt  v.  Ilepenstal   (25  Can.   S.  ('. 

150),  177. 
Mesker  v.  McCourt  (lfl  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1897),  440. 
Mesnager  v.  Englehardt  (108  Cal.  68; 

41  Pac.  20),  71. 
Messinger  v.  Dennie  (137  Mass.  197), 

514. 
Messinger  v.  Dunham  (62  Ark.  326), 

104. 
Metcalf    v.    Baker    (57   X.    Y.    662), 

251. 
Metcalf  v.  Roberts  (23  0nt.  Rep.  130), 

457. 
Metcalf  v.  Tiffany  (106  Mich.  504), 

458. 
Metropolitan  Accdt.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Froi- 

land  (161  111.  30),  106. 
Metropolitan  St.    R.   Co.  v.  Johnson 

(90  Ga.    500),   215,    316,    3 17,    318, 

326. 
Metropolitan  St.   R.   Co.  v.   Kennedy 

(  [C.  C.  App.  2d  ('.]   82   Vv<\.    158), 

266. 
Met.  West  Side  Kiev.    R.  Co.  V.  Ker- 
sey (80  111.  App.  301),  214. 
Metzer    v.  Western   I'u.    Teleg.    Co. 

(93  Iowa,  752),  90. 
Mexican  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gehr  (66  111. 

App.  17::  I,  450,  455. 
Mexican  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Goodman  (20 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  104,  109),  495,  505. 
Mexican     C,     R.    Co.    v.     Lauricella 

([Tex.  Civ.    App.]  26  S.   W.  301), 

21  1. 
Mexican*'.  R,  Co.  V.  Mitten  (13  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  653),  214. 


CXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Mexican  Nat.  Hank  v.  Misette  ([Tex. 

Civ.  App.  1894]  --'4  S.  \V.  520),  214. 
Mexican  Nat.   R.   Co.    v.  Finch    (27 

S.  W.  1028),  532,  .-340,  552. 
Mexican    Nat.   R,  Co.  v.    Slater  (115 

Fed.  593),  509,  550. 
Meyer  v.  Bohlflng  (44  [nd.  23S),  114. 
Meyer  v.   Butterbrudt  (140  111.  131), 

472. 
Meyer  v.  Hart  (23  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.] 

131),  562,  563,  571,  576,  580. 
Meyer  v.    Haven  (37  App.   Div.    [N. 

Y.]  194),  84. 
Meyer  v.   Richmond   (172  U.  S.  582; 

19  Sup.  Rep.  100),  71. 
Meyers  v.  Litts  ( [C.  P.  Pa.]  3  Lack. 

L.  News,  303),  4:17,  440. 
Michael  v.  Curtis  (60  Conn.  363;  22 

Atl.  949),  27. 
Michael    v.    Matheis    (77    Mo.    App. 

556),  387. 
Michaels  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.  (30  N.  Y.  504),  153,  154. 
Michan  v.  Walsh  (0  Mo.  346),  95. 
Miehenor  v.  Harrison  (116  Iud.  300), 

501. 
Michigan  v.  Detroit  Cent.   Mills  Co. 

(31  Mich.  274),  166. 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman  (28 

Mich.  440),  163. 
Michigan  L.  &  T.   Co.  v.  Deer  Lake 

Co.  (60  Mich.  143),  95. 
Mickie  v.  McGehee  (27  Tex.  134),  123, 
Middleton  v.  Jerdee  (73  Wis.  39;  40 

N.  W.  629).  73. 


Middleton   v.    Moore    (30    Mo.    App. 

027),  77. 
Midland   R.  Co.  (10  C.  B.  N.  S.  287), 

135. 
Miendorff   v.    Manhattan    R.    Co.    (4 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  40),  228. 
Miffin  v.  Commrs.  (5  Serg.  &  R.  [Pa.] 

09),  57. 
Mighell  v.  Stone   (74  111.  App.   129), 

467. 
Milburn  v.  Beach  (14  Mo.  104),  113. 
Milford    v.    Berkely    (1    Burr.    609), 

457. 


Miles  v.   Chic  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co. 

(76  Mo.  App.  484),  194. 
Miles  v.  Postal  Teleg.   Cable  Co.  (55 

S.  C.  403),  90. 
Miles  v.  Salisbury   (21   Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

R.  333),  432. 
Miley  v.    Broadway  &   Seventh  Ave. 
R.  R.  Co.  (29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  107),  244, 
276. 
Millard  v.  Brown  (35  N.  Y.  297),  112, 

113,  133. 
Miller  v.  Ashcraft  (98  Ky.  314),  448, 

450. 
Miller  v.   Bait.  &   O.   R.   Co.   (  Fed. 

Cas.  9,560),  119. 
Miller  v.  Boone  Co.   (95  Iowa,  5;  63 

N.  W.  352),  214,  218,  243. 
Miller  v.  Del.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  (29  Vr. 

•  [N.  J.]  428),  211. 
Miller  v.  Donovan  (16  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

453),  385,  397. 
Miller  v.  Erie  R.  Co.  (34  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  217),  214. 
Miller  v.  Ft.  Lee  Park  &  Steamboat 

Co.  (73  Hun  [N.  Y.],.  150),  244. 
Miller  v.  Gleason  (18  Ohio  C.  C.  374), 

471,  475. 
Miller  v.  Grice  (2  Rich.   [S.  C]  27), 

448. 
Miller  v.   Hammer  ([Iowa,   1895]    61 

N.  W.  1087),  475. 
Miller  v.  Jones  (26  Ala.  247),  78. 
Miller  v.  Kirby  (74  111.  242),  119. 
Miller  v.  Louisville,  etc.,   R.   R.  Co. 

(128  Inch  97),  172. 
Miller   v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (73  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  512),  214,  229. 
Miller  v.  Potter  (59  111.  App.  725), 

442. 
Miller  v.  Smyth e  (95  Ga.  288),  193. 
Miller  v.  Steamship  Co.   (6  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  664),  181. 
Miller  v.   St.   Paul   City  R.    Co.   (66 

Minn.  192),  214. 
Miller  v.   Terre  Haute   &  T.   R.  Co. 

(144  Ind.  323;  43  N.  E.  257),  63. 
Milliganv.  Tex.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  ([Tex. 
Civ.  App.   1902]  66  S.  W.  896),  148. 


TABLE   >>l     CASES   CITED    IN    v*01 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Milliken  v.   Long  (188  Pa.  St.  411), 

464,  468. 
Miller,  Matter  of  (HON.  V.  216,  222), 

501. 
Millison  v.  Hook  (17  ind.  227),  120. 
Mills  v.   Paul   ([Tex.  C.  A.   1895]  30 


CXV11 


8.  W.  558),  33. 
Mills  v.   Wilmington  City  R.  Co.  (1 

Marv.  [Del.]  269),  215,  227. 
Milton   v.  State    (3  Humph.   [Teun.] 

389),  422. 
Milwaukee  &   Miss.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  1'in- 

nej  i  10  Wis.  388),  130. 
Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anus 

(19  l'.  S.  489),  112. 
Milwaukee,  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Arms  (91 

U.  S.  489),  94,  113,   119,   122,    135, 

136,  159. 
Mi  nek  v.  Martin  (22  J.  &  S.  [N.  V.J 

136),  515. 
Minick  v.  Troy  (19  Hun  [N.  Y.],  253), 

212,  318. 
Minneapolis  v.  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Beck- 

with  (129  U.  S.  26),  95. 
Minneapolis  II.  W.  Co.  v.  Cummings 

(26  Kan.  307),  91. 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Macli.  Co.  v. 

Regier  (51  Neb.  402),  430. 
Minster  v.  Citizens   Ry.    Co.    (53  Mo. 

App.  270).  173,  255. 
Minter  v.  Swain  (52  Miss.  174),  74. 
Mississippi    Logging  Co.   v.    Robson 

(69  Fed.  773),  70. 
Missoula  Elec.  L.  Co.  v.  Mogan  (13 

Mont.  394),  95. 
Missouri  &  I.  Coal  Co.   v.   Schwalb 

(74  111.  App.  567),  599. 
Missouri.    K.    &   T.    R.   Co.    v.    Ann- 
strong  ([Tex.C.  A.  |   38  s.  W.368), 

354. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.   Canlena 

( [Tex.  Civ.   App.    1899]  54   S.    W. 

312),  63. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.   R.  Co.  v.   Cham- 
bers (17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  487),  211. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.   R.    Co.   v.    Cook 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  37  S.   W.  769), 

299. 


Missouri,  K.  A  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook  (12 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  203),  214. 

Missouri.  K.   &  T.    I;.  <  '•>.   v.   Dickej 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]    in  S.  W.  626), 

254. 
Missouri,    K.  A  T.    R.  Co.    v.    Bdling 

(18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  171),  298. 
Missouri,   K.  &  T.   R.  Co.  v.   Elliott 

(102  Fed.  96),  608,  041. 
Missouri.    K.    &    T.    K.    Co.  v.   Elliott 

(51  S.  W.  1067),  609. 
Missouri,  K.  &   T.    R.  Co.  v.   Evans 

(16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  68),  538. 
Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    of  T.    v. 

Ferris    (23     Tex.     Civ.     App.    215), 

542. 
Missouri.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ft.  Scott 

(15  Kan.  491),  91. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilmore 

(  [Tex.]  53  S.  W.  61),  51  I.  528,  540, 

548,  552,  586,  589. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.  R.  Co.   v.   Cordon 

(11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  072),  214. 
Missouri,   K.  <ft  T.   1!.  Co.  v.   Hannig 

(91  Tex.  347),  215. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.   R.  Co.   v.  Hanson 

(13  Tex.  C.   A.  552),  215,  216,  254, 
Missouri.  K.    &  T.    R.    Co.    V.    Hauer 

([Tex.  Civ.   App.]  33  S.  W.   1010), 

21  I. 
Missouri,   K.  &   T.   R.   Co.  v.    Hines 

(  [Tex.  I  40  S.  W.  152),  515,  52  I,  532, 

536,  540,  542. 
Missouri.  K.  &  T.   R  Co.  v.  Holmon 

(15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  16),  250. 
Missouri,    K.   &   T.    R.    Co.    v.    I  lull" 

([Tex.   Civ.   App.]  32  S.  W.   551), 

21  I. 
Missouri.  K".  &  T.    R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

i  [Tex.    Civ.    App.]   37  S.  W.    771 1, 

214,  242. 
Missouri.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  \.   Kirkland 

11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  528),  214. 
Missouri.  K.  &  T.  1!.  Co.  v.  Little  (19 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  357),  351,  491,  498, 

502. 
Missouri    K.  &  T.    R.  Co.  v.    MeF.lree 

(16  Tex.  Civ.  App.    182),  208. 


rxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED   IN   VOL.   I. 


W.   383), 

Rose  (19 

Saunders 


Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.   Co.  v.   Miller 
([Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901]  61  S.  W.  978), 
224. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.  R.  Co.  v.   Parker 

(20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  470),  214. 
Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.  v.    Rain 
( [Tex.   Civ.   App.]   40  S.   W.  635), 
554. 
Missouri,   K.   &  T.  R.  Co.   v.  Ranson 
(15  Tex.    Civ.   App.   689),  517,  527, 
528,  532,  539,  540,  542,  544. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.   Rodgers 
(  [Tex.   Civ.  App.]   39  S 
300,  305. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  470),  275. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 

(12  Tex.  Civ.    App.  5),  290,  291. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Settle  (19 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  357),  529. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Simmons 

(12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  501),  206,  267. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Clair 

(21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  345),  267. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Tonahill 

(16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  625),  311. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Truskett 

(  [Ind.  T.  1899]  53  S.  W.  444),  70. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Walden 
(  [Tex.   Civ.   App.]   46   S.   W.    87), 
299. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Warren 

(90  Tex.  566),  102. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.   Warren 
(  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  39  S.  W.  652), 
208. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver 

(16  Kan.  456),  227. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright 

(19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  47),  286. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Baier  (37  Neb. 

235;  55  N.  W.  913),  607,  616,  624. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond  (30  S.  W. 

930),  528,  532,  542. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dwyer(36Kan. 

58),  102,  214. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Geist  (49  Neb. 
489:  68  N.  W.  640),  63. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry  (75  Tex. 
220),  514,  524,  525,    527,    528,    530, 
531,  532,  537,  547,  550,  551. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Humes  (115  U. 

S.  512,  523),  30,  95,  129. 
Missouri  P.   R.  Co.  v.    Johnson   (72 

Tex.  95),  122,  153. 
Missouri  P.   R.  Co.  v.   Lee  (70  Tex. 

503),  532. 
Missouri  P.  R.   Co.  v.  Lee  (70  Tex. 
496),  514,   524,  527,   528,  530,   532, 
535,  537,  540,  547,  551,  552. 
Missouri  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg  (75 
Tex.   61),   511,  517,   524,  525,    527, 
528,  537,  542,  544,  551. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyde  (57  Tex. 

505),  263. 
Missouri   P.    R.   Co.   v.    McCally  (41 

Kan.  639),  166. 
Missouri  P.   R.   Co.   v.    Mitchell    (75 

Tex.  77),  244. 
Missouri  P.    R.    Co.    v.    Moffatt   (60 

Kan.  113),  859. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mosely  (57  Fed. 

925),  84. 
Missouri   P.    R.   Co.    v.  Prewitt  (59 
Kan.  734;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  29),  157. 
Missouri   P.    R.    Co.    v.    Shuford  (72 

Tex.  165),  159. 
Missouri  Valley  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kelso 

(16  Kan.  481),  78. 
Mister  v.  Brown  (59  Fed.  909),  522. 
Mitchell  v.  Bradstreet  Co.  (116  Mo. 

244),  427. 
Mitchell  v.  Broadway  &  S.  Ave.  R.  R. 

Co.  (70  Hun  [N.  Y.],  387),  214. 
Mitchell  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (51 

Mich.  236),  165. 
Mitchell  v.  Clarke  (71  Cal.  163),  89. 
Mitchell  v.  Logan  (172  Pa.  349),  434. 
Mitchell  v.  Malone  (77  Ga.  301),  454. 
Mitchell  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.  (2  Hun   [N.  Y.],  535),  561,  563, 
580. 
Mitchell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.  (151  N. 

Y.  107),  183,  220,  221. 
Mitchell   v.    Spradley  (23  Tex.    Civ. 
App.  43),  411,  423. 


TABLE    <>F    CASES    (TTKI»    IN    VOL,    I. 


CX.X 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Mitchell  v.  Tacoma  R.  &   M.  Co.  (13 

Wash.  5(50),  277,  281. 
Mitchell   v.  Torrington  Union  (Q.  B. 

76  L.  T.  Rep.  724),  515. 
Mize  v.  Glenn  (38  Mo.  App.  98),  76. 
Mizell   v.  McGowau   (120  N.  C.  134), 

7.;. 
Mizner  v.  Frazier  (40  Mich.  592),  91. 
Afobile,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Crenshaw  (65 

Ala.  5G6),  177. 
Mobile  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brarae  (95  I".  S. 

754),  495. 
Moffatt  v.  Fisher  (47  Iowa,  473),  444. 
Moffatt  v.  Kenney  (174  Mass.  311;  54 

N.  E.  850),  64. 
Moffet  v.  Ayres  (X.   J.  L.  [2  Penn.] 

655),  103. 
Mogle  v.  Blatch  (5  Ohio  C.  C.  .",1 ).  94. 
Mogowan  v.  Rickey  (  [N.  J.]   45  Atl. 

804),  430. 
Mohoney   v.    Dankwart    (108    Iowa, 

321),  221. 
Mollie    Gibson    Consol.    Min.   Co.   v. 

Sharp  (5  Colo.  App.  321;  38  Pac. 

850),  514. 
Moloney  v.  Dailey  (07  111.  App.  427), 

471. 
Monaghan  v.  Horn  ( [Ont.]  7  S.  C.  R. 

409),  522. 
Monaghan   v.  School   Dist.  No.  1   (38 

Wis.  100),  667. 
Monje     v.    City    of     Grand     Rapids 

I  122  Mich.  045:  SI   X.  W.  571).  65. 
Monroe  v.  Connecticut  River  L.  Co. 

(68  N.  H.  89;  39  Atl.  L019),  72. 
Montana  Co.  v.  I  i r bring  (  [U.  S.  C.  C. 

A.  9th  C]   44  U.  S.   App.  629;  75 

Fed.  384),  G7. 
Montaugh  v.  N.  V.  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  R. 

Co.  (23  N.  Y.  St.  R.  03G),  214. 
Monterey  Co.  v.  Abbott  (77  Cal.  5  11 ), 

501. 
Montgomery  v.    Knox    (23   Fla.  595), 

397. 
Montgomery  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co. 

(6  X.  Y.  Supp.  178),  214. 
Montgomery  v.  Willis  (  [Neb.]  G3  N. 

W.  41)4),  110. 


Montgomery  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Mallette 

(92  Ala.  209),  231. 
Montgomery  Co.  X.  A.  Soc.   v.   Har- 

wood  i  126  In. I.  440),  01. 
Montreal    v.     Gauthier    (Rap.    Jud. 

Quebec  B.  R.  100).  63. 
Montreal     v.    Labelle     (14    S.    C.    R. 

[Ont.]  741),  524,  530. 
Montreal   v.   Mulcair  (28  Can.  S.  C. 

458),  65. 
Montreal  Gas  Co.  v.  St.  Laurent  (20 

Can.  S.  C  176),  104. 
Montreal    Rolling   Mills  Co.   v.   Cor- 
coran (2G  Can.  S.  ('.  595),  151,  522. 
Moody  v.  McDonald  (4  Cal.  207),  122, 

186. 
Moody  v.  Osgood   (50  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

G28),  263,  2G5,  325,  374. 
Moody  v.  Osgood  (60  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

644),  63. 
Mooney  v.  St.  Marys  (15  Ohio  C.  C. 

446),   63. 
Moore  v.  Anderson  (30  Tex.  224),  78. 
Moore  v.  Bowman  (47  X".  H.  494),  115. 
Moore  v.  City  of   Huntington   (31  W. 

Va.  842),  263. 
Moore  v.  Central   R.  Co.  (24  N.  J.  L. 

268),  166.     . 
Moore  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  (47  Iowa, 

688),  264. 
Moore  v.  Crose  (43  Ind.  30,  34),  111, 

119. 
Moore  v.   Drayton    (40  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

933),  187. 
Moore  v.  Francis  ( 121  N.  Y.  199),  391, 

412. 
Moore  v.  Hammons  (  [Ind.]  21  N.  E. 

1111),  460. 
Moore  v.   Kalamazoo  (109  Mich.  176), 

105,  227. 
Moore  v.  Large  (20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  409), 

430,  432. 
Moore   v.    Leader    Pub.    Co.    (8   Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  152),  381. 
Moore  v.  Schultz  (31   Md.  423),  119, 

127. 
Moran  v.  Racine  Wagon  Co.  (74  Hun 

[X.  Y.],  454),  150. 


cxx 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


Morehead  v.  Bittuer  (20  Ky.  L 

1986),  404. 
Morenus  v.  Crawford  (51  Hun  [N.  V], 

89),  471. 
Morey  v.   Metropolitan  G.  L.  Co.  (6 

J.  &  S.  [N.  Y.]  185),  17,  92. 
Morey   v.    Morning    Journal   Assoc. 

(17  N.  Y.  St.  K.  266),  412. 
Morgan  v.  Andrews  (107  Mich.  33), 

397. 
Morgan  v.  Bartels  (Rap.  Jud.  Quebec 

12  C.  S.  1),  515. 
Morgan    v.    Bennett    (44   App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  323),  421. 
Morgan    v.  Bones    (62   Hun  [N.  Y.] 

623;  17   N.  Y.   Supp.  22;  42  X.  Y. 

St.  R.  791),  67. 
Morgan   v.   Curley  (142    Mass.    107), 

364,  451. 
Morgan  v.  Durfee  (69  Mo.  469),  374. 
Morgan   v.   Pacific  Mills  (158   Mass. 

402),  305. 
Morgan  v.   Rice  (35   Mo.  App.   591), 

412,  413. 
Morgan  v.  Ross  (74  Mo.  318),  467. 
Morgan  v.   Southern  P.   Co.  (95  Cal. 

510),  209,  300,  498. 
Morley  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  ( 16  Q. 

B.  [Ont.]  504),  528,  544. 
Morning   Journal   Assoc,  v.   Ruther- 
ford   (51   Fed.   513),   111,   124,  386, 

402,  403. 
Morris  v.   Chicago,    etc.,   R.  Co.   (45 

Iowa,  20),  215,  218. 
Morris  v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.    R. 

Co.  (26  Fed.  23),  859. 
Morris  v.  Curtis  (20  Ky.  L.  56),  393. 
Morris  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.  (68  Hun 

[N.  Y.],  39),  214. 
Morris  v.    Grand    Ave.    R.    Co.   (144 

Mo.  500),  211,  2."5. 
Morris  v.    Lindauer  (4  C.  C.  A.  162), 

507. 
Morris  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  (51 

App.   Div.   [N.  Y.]   512),  563,  572, 

587,  588. 
Morris  v.   N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (73 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  560),  214. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Rep 


Morris  v.  Piatt  (32  Conn.  75),  69. 
Morris  v.   Savannah,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co. 

(23  Fla.  182),  153. 
Morris  Canal  Co.  v.  Ryerson  (27  N.  J. 

L.  457),  153. 
Morris,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Newark  (10  N. 

J.  Eq.  352 ),  72. 
Morrison  v.  Davis  (20  Pa.  171),  863. 
Morrison  v.   Erie  Ry.  Co.   (56  N.  Y. 

302),  177. 
Morrison-Jewell     Filtration    Co.    v. 

Lingane  (19R.  I.  316),  413. 
Morrison  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  (3 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  205),  249. 
Morrison  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  (38  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  357;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  131),  386, 

404. 
Morrissey  v.  Westchester  Elec.  Ry. 

Co.  (30  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  424),  211. 
Morrow  v.  Wheeler  &  W.   Mfg.  Co. 

(165  Mass.  349),  433. 
Morse  v.  Auburn  &   Syracuse  R.   R. 

Co.  (10  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  621),  243. 
Morse  v.  Morse  (65  Vt.  112),  515. 
Morsemann  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (16 

Daly  [N.  Y.],  249;  10  N.  Y.  Supp. 

105),  254,  258,  576. 
Morton  v.  Frankfort  (55  Me.  46),  72. 
Morton  v.  Smith  (48  Wis.  265),  63. 
Mosby  v.  Cleveland  Street  R.  Co.  (15 

Ohio  C.  C.  501),  200. 
Moses  v.  Newburgh  Elec.  R.  Co.  (91 

Hun,  278),  295,  296. 
Mosher  v.   Russell  (44  Hun   [N.  Y.], 

12),  246. 
Moskovitz  v.  Light  (68  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

102),   561,   563,   572,   573,  578,  586, 

589. 
Mott  v.  Comstock  (8  Wend.    [N.  Y.] 

544),  515. 
Mott  v.  Detroit  ( [Mich.]  79  N.  W.  3), 

267,  290. 
Mott  v.  Mott  (11  Barb.   [N.  Y.]  127), 

97. 
Mousler  v.    Harding   (33   Ind.    176), 

418. 
Mount.     See  Mt. 
Mowbry  v.  Mowbry  (64  111.  383),  633. 


TABLE    OF    <  A.SES   CITED    IN    VOL.    r.  CXXI 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Mowreyv.  Central  City  Ry.  Co.  (tit; '  Mum Ho  v.  Bill  Mfg.  Co.  (86  Me. 400; 


Barb.  [N.  Y.]  43),  148 


30    Ul.  16),  68. 


Mt.   Adams  &   E.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Isaacs    Munger  v.  Tonawanda  R.    R  I 


(18  Ohio  C.  C.  177  i.  234. 
Mi.  Adams  A  E.  P.  R  R.  Co.  v.  W> 
song  (8  Ohio  C.  C.  -11  |,  325 


\.  V.  349),  161. 
Munos  v.  Southern  P.  H.  Co.  (51  Fed. 
506. 


Mt.  Pleasanl  Overseers  v.  Wilcox  (12    Munro   v.    Pac.  Coast,  etc.,  I 


Pa.  Co.  Ct.  447),  514. 
Mt.  Sterling  v.  Crummj  (73  111.  App. 

.'i,  194. 


Cal.  515),  499. 
Munroe  v.  Stickney  (48  Me.  462),  62, 
76. 


Muckle  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.  (78  Hun,    Murdoch   v.  Boston  &  Albany  it.  B 


32),  136,  342 


Co.  I  133  Mass.  16),  349. 


Mud  River  Coal,  C. &   I.  Co.  v.  Wil-    Murdock    v.  N.  V.  &    B.   Desp 


liauis  (15  Ky.  L.  Rep.  847),  122 
Muetze  v.  Tuteur  (77  Wis.  236),  391. 
Mulcahey  v.  Givens  (115    Cnd.   286), 

47:3. 
Mulcahey  v.   Wheel  Co.    (145    Mass. 

281),  499. 
Mulcairns  v.  Zanesville  (67  Wis.  24), 

263,  648,  654,  657,  661,  663. 
Muldowney  v.   Illinois,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(36  Iowa,  402),  169. 
Mulford  v.  Clewell  (21  Ohio  St.  191), 

,7:;.  474. 
Mulford    v.    Panama    II.    R.   Co.   (23 

\.  Y.  465),  499. 
Mulhall    v.   Fallon   (176    Mass.    266), 

51  is. 
Mullen  v.  St.  John   (57  X.   Y.  567), 

150. 
Muller  v.   Brooklyn   II.    R    Co.   (18 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  177).  177. 
Muller  v.  Ryan  (2    X.  V.  Supp.  736), 

104. 
Muller   v.    St.    John  (.".7   X.    Y.   567), 

150. 
Mullin  v.  Spangenberg  (112  111.  140), 

144. 
Mullison  v.  Boch  I  17  [nd.  227),  111. 


(  [Mass.  s.  J.  C.  1897]  1  Am.  Heg. 

Rep.  263),  229. 
Murphy  v.    Hoard  of  Ch.  F.  (28  Vr. 

[X.  .J.  L.J  244,  250),  503. 
Murphy  v.  Cent  Hark  X.  &  K.   H.  H. 

R,  Co.  (16    J.   &    S.    [N.   Y.J  96), 

L36. 
Murphy   v.  City  of  Daytou   (8  Ohio 

S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  354),  148. 
Murphy  v.  Curran  1  24  111.  App.  47."»), 

475. 
Murphy    v.   Deane   (101  Mass.   455), 

161. 
Murphy   v.    Fond    du    Lac   (23   Wis. 

365),  62,  70. 
Murphy  v.  Bobbs  (7  Colo.  541),  111, 

117,  372. 
Murphy   v.    McGrath    (79  111.  594), 

375. 
Murphy     v.    Mercer     County    Free- 
holders (31  Ail.  229),  644. 
Murphj    v.  \.  Y.  &    X.  11.  H.  Co.  (29 

Conn.  496),  198. 
Murphy  v.  X.  V.  Cent  H.   R.  Co.    B8 

N.  Y.  145),  498,  576,592. 
Murpby  v.  NVw  Fork  Central,  etc., 

K.  Co.  (lis  \.  V.  527),  161. 


Mulvehall  v.  Millward(ll  X.  r. 343),    Murphy  v.  Rementer,  Pa.  (7  Del.  Co. 


407. 


Rep.  203),  104,  107. 


Mummery  v.  Grand    Trunk    R.    W.    Murphy  v.  Weidman  Cooperage  Co. 


Co.  (1  Ont.  L.  R.  022),  547 


.  1  App.  Div.  [X.  Y.J  283),  214. 


Munal     v.    Brown    t[U.    S.J    70    Fed.     Murphy    v.  Western   &    A.  R.  Co.  (23 


967),  494. 


Fed.  637),  342. 


Munday  v.  Laudry  (51  La.  Ann.  303),    Murray  v.  Brooklyn  City   R.   R.  Co 


210. 


1  7  V  Y.  Supp. 900), 214. 


Cxxii  TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Murray  v.  Forty-Second  Street  M.  & 

St.   N.  K.  Co.  (9  App.  Div.  [N.  V.| 

610),  152. 
Murray    v.   Leonard    (11  S.   I).   22), 

380. 
Murray  v.  Mo.'  Pac.  R.   R.   Co.  (101 

Mo.  236),  256. 
Murray  v.  Salt  Lake  City  K.  Co.  (10 

Utah,  456),  104. 
Murray    v.   Usher    (117  N.  Y.  542), 

576,  577. 
Murray  v.  Woodson  Co.  (58  Kan.  1; 

48  Pac.  554),  63. 
Murtaugh  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R. 

Co.  (49  Hun  [N.  Y.],  456),  91. 
Musick  v.  Kausas   City  S.  &   M.  R. 

Co.  (114  Mo.  309),  487. 
Musick  v.   Latrobe    (184    Pac.  375), 

215. 
Musser  v.  Lancaster  City  St.  R.  Co. 

(15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  430),  102,214. 
Mutual  L.   Ins.   Co.   v.  Hillman  (145 

U.  S.  296),  603. 
Myerle  v.  United  States  (33  Ct.  CI.  1 ), 

98. 
Myers   v.  Holborn    (58  N.   J.  L.  [29 

Vr.]  193),  495,  514,  645. 
Myers  v.  Moore   (3  Ind.    App.  22G), 

380. 
Myers    v.     Raynolds    (3    Ohio  Leg. 

News,  127),  462. 
Myers  v.  San  Francisco  (42Cal.  215), 

142. 
Myhan  v.  Louisiana,  E.   L.  &  P.  Co. 

41  La.  Ann.  964),  511,  514. 
Mynning  v.   Detroit,  L.  &   N.  R.  Co. 

(59  Mich.  257,  261),  152,  521,  645, 

650,  651. 
Mynning  v.  Detroit,  L.  &  N.   R.  Co. 

(64  Mich.  93),  165. 
Nagle   v.   Missouri    Pac.   R.   Co.    (75 

Mo.  653),  514. 
Nagle  v.    Mullison  (34   Pa.  48),  111, 

120. 
Nailorv.  Ponder  (1  Marv.  [Del.]  408, 

398,  406,  415. 
Nally  v.   Burleigh  (91   Me.   22),  386, 

390. 


Nanticoke    v.   Warne  (106  Pa.   373), 

171. 
Nappanee  v.   Kuckinan  (7  Ind.  App. 

361),  2  1:;. 
Nash  v.  Sharp  (19  Hun  [N.  Y.],  365), 

236. 
Nashville  &  Chattanooga  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Starnes  (!)  lieisk.   [Tenn.]  52),  136, 

138. 
Natchez,  J.  &  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Cook  (63 

Miss.  38),  495. 
National  Syrup  Co.  v.   Carlson   (155 

111.  210),  200. 
Nave  v.  Flack  (00  Ind.  205),  154. 
Neary  v.    Bostwick   (2  Hilt.    [N.  Y.] 

514),  17. 
Neberv.  Putter  (81  Hun  [N.  Y.],  244), 

386. 
Nebraska  v.  Campbell   (2   Black  (U. 

S.],  590),  227,  233,  236. 
Needliam  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co. 

(38  Vt.  294),  495,  499. 
Neel  v.  Deans  (1  Nott.  &  McC.  [S.  C] 

310),  119. 
Neese    v.    Radford    (83     Tex.    585), 

134. 
Neet  v.   Burlington,  C.   R.   &  N.   R. 

Co.  (100  Iowa,  248),  156. 
Nehr  v.    Dobbs   (47    Neb.   863),   433, 

434,  447. 
Neill  v.   Newton  (24  Tex.   202),  119, 

120. 
Nellis  v.  Cramer  (80  Wis.  337),  423. 
Nelson  v.  Chesapeake  &   O.    R.   Co. 

(88  Va.  971),  504. 
Nelson  v.  C.  R.  T.  Co.  (38  Iowa,  564), 

165. 
Nelson  v.  Galveston,  H.   &  S.   A.  R. 

Co.  (78  Tex.  621),  523,  544. 
Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 
(104  Mich.  582),  645,  646,  651,  653, 

657,  661,  062,  664. 
Nelson  v.  Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.  (61 

Minn.  107),  202. 
Nelson  v.  Wallace  (48  Mo.  App.  193), 

412. 
Nelson  v.  Wallace  (57  Mo.  App.  397), 
422. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITHD    IN    Vol..    I. 


CXXU1 


[References  are  to  Sections.  ] 


Nelson  v.   West   Duluth   ([Minn.]  57 

\.  W.  1  19),   107. 
Netherland  A.mer.  Steam.  Co.  v.  Hol- 
lander (59  Fed.   117),  S06. 
Nettles  v.  Somerrell  (6  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

027),  425. 
Neville  v.  Gile  ([Mass.]  54  \.  E.  841), 

463. 
New  v.   McKechnie   (95   X.    V.  632), 

114,  472. 
Newark,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.   Block  (55  N. 

J.  605),  152. 
Newbury  v.  Getchel  A-  M.  Lumber  & 

Mfg.  Co.   (100  Lowa,  441),  L02,  180, 

213,  224,  310. 
Newcomb  v.  Butterfield  (8  .Johns.  [N. 

V.J  342),  95. 
Newdoll  v.  Young  (80   Bun   [X.  V.], 

364),  165. 
Newell  v.  Woolfolk  (91  Bun  [N.  V.|, 

211;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  129;  36  N.  Y. 

Supp.  327),  07. 
New  Jersey  Exp.  Co.  v.  Nichols  (32 

X.  J.  L.  100),  166,  236. 
New   Jersey  Exp.  Co.  v.    Nichols  (33 

N.  J.  L.  434),  233. 
New  Jersey  R.   R.  Co.  v.  West  (3  X. 

L.  91),  214. 
Newkirkv.  Tracey  (61  Mich.  174),  95. 
Newman  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.  (54  Hun  [X.  Y.],  335),  4:,::.  154. 
Newman  v.    Phillipsburg  Horse  Car 

R.  Co.  (52  X.  J.  L.  446),  170. 
Newman  v.  Stein  (75  Mich.  402),  111, 

4  IS. 
New  <  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Schneider 

([C.  C  App.  5th  C]   00  Fed.   210), 

214. 
New  Orleans  A    \.    E.    R.  Co.  v.    Mc- 

Eweu  (40  La.  Ann.  1 184;  2  So.  07-".), 

69. 
New  Orleans  &   X.  1!.  Co.  v.  Thomas 

([U.  S.  C.  C.   A.  5th  C]   80  Fed. 

379),  68. 
New  Orleans,   J.   &   G.   N.   R.  Co.  v. 

Allbritton  (38  Miss.  242),  139,  362. 
New  Orleans,    .1.   &   G.   N.    R.   Co.  v. 

Bailey  (40  Miss.  395),  135. 


New  Orleans,  .1.  a-  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hursl  (36  Mis-.  660),  141,  340,  348. 
New  Orleans,  J.  A  G.   N.  R.  Co.  v. 

Statham  (42  Miss.  607),   112,  119, 

122. 
New  Orleans,   St.    L.   &   C.  R.  Co.  v. 

Burke  (58  Miss.  200),  lis,  :;:;:;. 
Newport  News  v.  o.    P.    R,  a-    Elec. 

([Va.  1902]  40  S.  E.  900),  lul. 
Newsom   v.    Norfolk   &    W.    R.  Co. 

([U.  s.  C.  C.  W.   I).  Va.]  81    Fed. 

L33,  affd  2:;  s.  c.  C.  A.  669),  42  U. 

S.  App.   282;   78    led.  94;   2  Va.  L. 

Reg.  882),  0:;. 
New  sun  v.    New  York  Central   R.    R. 

Co.  (29  N.  V.  383),  101. 
Newton  v.  Lochlin  (77  111.  103),  4:>4. 
New  Whatcom  v.  City  of  Fairhaven 

Land   Co.   ([Wash.    1901]   04   Pac. 

7:;:.),  70. 
New    World,  Steamboat,    v.   King   (10 

How.    [U.   S.]   469,    174),    159,   243; 

488. 
New  York  v.   Brady  (151   X.  Y.  Gil), 

272. 
Xew  York  v.  Lloyd  (  17  Wend.  [N.  V.] 

285;  is  id.  1201.  72. 
New  York  v.Stone  (20 Wend.  [N.Y.] 

139),  72. 
New  Fork  Academy  of  Music  v.  Hil- 
ton (2  Hilt.  [N.  Y.j  217i.  B8. 
New  York  &  L.   I.  15.  Co.  v.  Smith 

(14S  N.  V.  :.40),  501. 
N.w   Fork  A-   N.  .1.  Teleph.   Co.  v. 

Bennett  (02  N.  .1.  L.  712).  L95. 
New    York   C.  A-     Min.  Sign   Co.  v. 

Frazer  (130  U.  S,  oil  1,  91. 
New   York    C.   &   St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 

Doane  (115  End.  4:;:.).  846. 
Now  York  C.  A-  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  II  un- 
let Hay  Co.  (149  I  ml.  344),   101. 
Xew  York  C.  A-  St.  I..  K.  Co.  v.  Kist- 

ler  (16  Ohio  C.  C.  316),  >•■:'.. 
New  York  C.  &  St.   L.    \l.    R.   (',..  \. 

Luebeck  (54  111.  App.  551  I,  211. 
Xew    York    C.    &   St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 

Musbrush  (11  I  ml.  App.  192;  37  X. 

E.  954),  514. 


cxxiv  TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IX    VOL.   I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
New  York  Health  Dept.   v.  Trinity  I  Nickerson  v.  Hairiman  (38  Me.  277), 


Church  (145  N.  V.  32;  04  N.  Y.  St 

R.  507;  39  N.  E.  833),  71. 
New  York,  L.  &  W.   Ky.  Co.  v.  Ben- 
nett (50  Fed.  49(5),  111. 
New  York,  Lake  Erie,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 

Atlantic  Refg.  Co.  (129  N.  Y.  597), 

161. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Win- 
ter (143  U.  S.  50),  214. 
New   York,   N.   H.  &   H.    R.   Co.    v. 

Bridgeport  Tract.  Co.  (65  Conn.  416 ; 

32  Atl.  953),  71. 
New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper 

(85  Va.  939),  172. 
New  York    Ruhber   Co.    v.    Rothery 

(132  N.  Y.  293),  62,  76. 
New  York,  T.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Lander 

(  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  46  S.  W.  843 ),  358. 
Neys  v.  Taylor  (12  S.  D.  488;  81   N. 

W.  901),  437. 
Nicholas  v.  Burlington,   C.   R.   &  N. 

R.  Co.  (  [Minn.]  80  N.  W.  776),  504. 
Nicholds  v.    Crystal  Plate   Glass  Co. 

([Mo.]  27  S.  W.  516),  214. 
Nichols  v.  Brabazon  (94  Wis.   549), 

180,  224,  362,  364. 
Nichols  v.    Bronson  (2  Day  [Conn.], 

211),  444. 
Nichols  v.  Crystal   Plate   Glass   Co. 

(  [Mo.  1895]  28  S.  W.  991 ),  214. 
Nichols  v.   Dubuque,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co. 

(68  Iowa,  732),  318. 
Nichols  v.   Marsland   (L.  R.   10  Ex. 

225),  153. 
Nichols   v.    Nichols   (134    Mo.    187), 

458,  462. 
Nichols  v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.  (120 

N.  C.  495;  26  S.  E.  643),  36. 
Nichols  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co.  (  [Utah] 

27Pac.  693),  339. 
Nichols  v.  Winfrey  (90  Mo.  403),  515. 
Nichols  v.  Winfrey  (79  Mo.  545),  558. 
Nicholson  v.   Rust  (  [Ky.]   52  S.  W. 

933),  415,  416. 
Nickerson  v.  Bigelow  ([U.  S.  D.   C. 

E.  !>.   Wis.]  62  Fed.  900),  645,  648, 

663,  665. 


495. 

Nicolans  v.  Snyder  (56  Neb.  531),  633. 
Nicosia  v.  Vallone  (37  L.  L.  T.  106), 

91. 
Niendorff   v.   Manhattan  Ry.  Co.   (4 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  46),  75,282,  380. 
Nightingale  v.  Scannell  (18Cal.  315), 

83,  111,  124. 
Niles  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (14 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  58),  87. 
Nimick   v.    Troy  (19    Hun   [N.    Y.], 

253),  319. 
Nipp  v.  Wiseheart  (7  Ind.  App.  642), 

362. 
Nixon   v.  Hannibal  &    St.   J.    R.  Co. 

(141  Mo.  425),  252. 
Nixon  v.   Ludlam   (50111.  App.  273), 

623,  629. 
Njus  v.  Chicago,   St.  P.  &  M.  R.  Co. 

(47  Minn.  22),   506. 
Noble  v.   City  of   Seattle   (19  Wash. 

133),  507. 
Noble   v.   Portsmouth   (  [N.    II.]    30 

Atl.  419),  205. 
Noble  v.  White  (103   Iowa,  352),  431, 

443. 
Nohrden  v.  Northeastern    R.  Co.  (54 

S.  C  492),  523. 
Nolan  v.  N.   Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co. 

(40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  848),  212. 
Nolen  v.  Kaufman  (70  Mo.  App.  051), 

432. 
Nolle  v.    Herter  (65  111.   App.   430), 

381,  384,  413,  426. 
Noonan  v.  Bradley  (9  Wall.  394,403), 

507. 
Noonan    v.    Olermeyer     &    Liebman 

Brew.   Co.    (50  App.   Div.  [N.    Y.] 

377),  83. 
Nordin  v.  Kjos  (13  S.  D.  497),  470. 
Nordhans  v.  Peterson  (54   Iowa,  68), 

120. 
Norfolk  v.  Jonakin  (94  Ara.  285),  214. 
Norfolk  &  W.   R.    Co.   v.  Ampey  (93 

Pa.  108),  214. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.   Co.  v.  Groseclose 

(88  Va.  267),  162,  176. 


TABLE    OV    CASES    CITED    IN     Vol..    I. 


CXXV 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.    Co.   \.    Lipscomb 

(90  Va.  137),  348. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R  Co.  v.  Neely(91  Va. 

539),  342. 

v.   Shote  (92 


Co. 


Norfolk  &   W.  K 

Va.  34),  100. 
Norfolk  &   W.    K.  Co.   v.  Wysor  (82 

Va.  250),  124. 

Norfolk  &  W.  S.  B.  Co.  v.  Davis  (12 
App.  I).  C.  306),  385. 

North  &  S.  Rolling  Stock  <'•>.  v. 
O'Hara  (7::  111.  App.  691 },  1301. 

North    Amer.    Ace  Asso.    v.    W 1- 

son  ([C.  C.  App.  7th  C]  64  Fed. 
680,  691  ),  292,  <i(>:;. 

North  Amer.  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Colo- 
Dial  .v  U.  s.  M.  Co.  (28  C.  C.  A. 
ss;  83  Fed.  796),  102. 

North  Carolina  v.  Temple  (1:54  U.  S. 

22),  <;:>. 

North    Chicago,    L.    &     R.    Co.    v. 

Barber  (77  111.  App.  277),  229. 
North    Chicago     R.   M.  Co.    v.    Mor- 

risey  i  ill  111.  040),  tin,;. 

North  Chicago  St.  K'.Co.  v.  Aunerson 

(70  III.  App.  336),  102. 
North  ChicagoSt.  R.  Co.  v.  BarberC77 

111.  App.  257),  204. 
North  Chicago  St.  RCo.v.  Brodie(156 

111.  317),  607,  612,  626,  627,  629,  637. 
North  Chicago  St.    R.  Co.    v.    Rroms 

(Di'  111.  App.  127),  214. 
North  Chicago  St.   R.   Co.  v.  Brown 

(76  111.  App.  654),  211. 
North  Chicago   St.    R.  Co.  v.  Brown 

(17s  111.    187),  241. 
North  Chicago   St.   R.   Co.  v.  Cotton 

(29  N.  E.  899),  217. 
North    Chicago   St.    It.    Co.    v.    Eld- 
ridge  (51  111.  App.  430),  21  1. 
North  Chicago  St.    R.  Co.  v.  Fitzgib- 

bons  (180  111.  466),  21:..  248. 
North  Chicago  St.    R.  Co.    v.  Gillow 

(166  111.    IN).  280. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bousin- 

ger  (17--.  HI.  318),  206. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.   Co.  v.  Lehman 

(82  111.  A pi>.  238),  226. 


North  ChicagoSt.   K.  <  o.  v.  Schwartz. 

(82  111.  App.  493),  214. 
North  Chicago  St  R.  Co.  v.   Sbreve 

(171  111.  448),  243. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wiswell 

111.  App.  443),  211. 
North    ChicagoSt.    R.  Co.  v.  Wi  ixon 

(51  III.  App.  307),  514,  605. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.   Co.    v.   Zeigei 

(78  111.  App.  463),  212,  261. 
Northern  Cent.    Ry.  Co.    v.    Mills  I'll 

Md.  355),  322. 
Northern    l'ac     R     Co.    v.    Babcock 

(154  (J.  S.  L90),  506. 
Northern  l'ac.    R.    R.   Co.  v.  O'Brien 

(1  Wash.  599),  166. 
Northern    P.  R.  Co.  v.  Urlin  (158U. 

S.  271),  288,  291. 
Northern   Trust  Co.  v.   Palmer    I  171 

111.  383),  503. 
North  Jersey  St.    R.    Co.  v.    Morhatt 

(64  N.  J.  L.236),  647,  648,  652,  654, 

657,  668,  672. 
Northwestern  &  P.  II.    Rank  v.  State 

(18  Wash.  7:1;  50  l'ac.  586),  65. 
Norton  v.  Kumpe  (121  Ala.  446),  91. 
Norton   v.   North    Carolina    R.     Co. 

(122  N.  C.  910),  07.  166,  214. 
Norton  v.  St.  Louis  &  II.   R.  Co.  (40 

Mo.  App.  (142).  293. 
Norton  v.  Third  Ave  R  Co.  (26  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  60),  140. 
Norton  v.  Volzeke  (158  111.   W2),  177. 
Norton  v.  Warner  (9  Conn.  172).  160. 
Norwell  v.  Thompson  (2  Hill  L.  [S. 

C]  470),  7(5. 
Norwood  v.  Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  K. 

Co.  (12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  561  |,  356. 
Nossaman  v.    Rickerl   (18  End.  350), 

114. 
Nourse  v.  Snow  (6  Greenl.  |  Me. 

94. 
Noxonv.  Bill  (2  Allen  [Mass.],  215), 

87. 
Noyes  v.   Boscawen  (64  N.  II.  361), 

172. 
Noyes  v.  Phillips  (60  N.  V.  408),  97. 
Noyes  v.  Ward  (  19  Conn.  250),  362. 


CXXV1 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections." 


Nunnally     v.    Taliaferro     (82      Tex. 

286),  386. 
Nutt  v.  Southern  P.   K.  Co.   (  [Oreg.] 

35  Pac.  653),  263. 
Nye  &  S.  Co.  v.  Snyder  (56  Neb.  754), 

110. 
Nye  v.  Merriam  (35  Vt.  438),  111,  120. 
Oakes  v.  Maine  Cent.  11.  Co.  (95  Me. 

103),  604,  607,  609,  610,  616. 
Oakland  Ky.  Co.   v.   Fielding  (48  Pa. 

St.  320),  300,  305. 
O'Boyle  v.  Shirley  (65  111.  App.  278), 

437. 
O'Brien  v.  Chic.   M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(89  Iowa,  644),  201. 
O'Brien  v.  La  Crosse  (75  N.  W.  81), 

293. 
O'Brien  v.  Loomis  (43  Mo.  App.  29), 

131,  228. 
O'Brien  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 

R.  Co.  (36  N.  Y.  St.  R.  801),  27G. 
O'Brien  v.  Semple  Mont.  L.  Rep.   (6 

Super.  Ct.  344),  398. 
O'Brien  v.  Times  Pub.   Co.  (21  R.  I. 

256),  381. 
O'  Byrne  v.  Campbell  (15  Ont.  R.  339), 

87. 
O'Callaghan  v.   Bode  (84  Cal.   489), 

514. 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Williams  (69 

Ga.  251),  45,  448. 
Och  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (130 

Mo.  27),  200,  201,  202,  208. 
Ockerhausen  v.  Tyson  (71  Conn.  31; 

40  Atl.  104),  67. 
O'Connell  v.  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W. 

R.  Co.  (106  Mo.  482),  214.    . 
O'Connor  v.  Nat,  Ice  Co.   (21  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  907),  242. 
O'Connor  v.  Nolan  (64  111.  App.  357), 

89. 
O'Connor  v.   North  Trucker  Co.  (17 

Nev.  245),  161. 
Oddie  v.  Mendenhall  ([Minn.    1901] 

86  X.  W.  881),  63. 
Oden  v.  Stubblefield  (2  Ala.  684),  76. 
Odin   Coal   Co.  v.  Denman   (185  111. 

413),  599. 


O'Donnell  v.  American  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co.  (-11  App.  Div.  [N.  V.]  307), 

-14. 
O'Donnell  v.  Maine  C.  R.  Co.  (86  Me. 

552),  607. 
O'Donnell   v.    Mclntyre  (2  N.   V.   St. 

R.  689),  95. 
O' Donovan,  Ex  parte  (24  Fla.  281 ),  501. 
O' Flaherty   v.    Nassau   Elec.    R.   Co. 

(165  N.  V.  ti2l),  83. 
()' Flaherty   v.    Nassau   Elec.   R.   Co. 

(••54  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  74),  219,  220, 

221,  274. 
Ogle  v.  Cumberland   (90  Mo.  59;  44 

Atl.  1015),  05. 
Ogle  v.  Jones  (1(5  Wash.  319),  214. 
O' Grady  v.    Baltimore  &  O.   R.   Co. 

( [Pa.  C.   P.]  28  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 

110),  03. 
O' Grady  v.  Julian   (34  Ala.  88),  444. 
O'Harrav.  New  York  Cen.  &  H.  R. 

R.  Co.  (92. Hun  [N.  Y.],  56),  152. 
Oh  Chow  v.  Hallett  (  [U.  S.]  72  Sawy. 

259),  77,  81. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Cosby  (107  Ind. 

32),  325,  326. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Selby  (47  Ind. 

171),  359. 
Ohio  &  M.   R.  Co.  v.  Simms   (4:)  111. 

App.  260),  615,  616,  627. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Tiudall  (13  Ind. 

366),  495. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin  (152 

111.  138),  520,603,607,  637. 
Ohio  &   M.   R.  Co.   v.   AVangelin,  (43 

111.  App.  324),  615,  619,  637. 
Ohio,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickerson  (59 

Ind.  317),  493. 
Ohio,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kasson  (37  N.  Y. 

218;  1  "  Cyc  "  L.  &  P.  645),  66. 
Oklahoma    City   v.    Welsh  (3   Okla. 

288),  214. 
Ohliger  v.  Toledo  (20  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

R.  142),  83,  257,  258. 
O'Horo  v.  Kelsey  (60  App.  Div.   [N. 

Y.]  604),  76.  77. 
Oldfather  v.  Zent  (21  Ind.  App.  307), 

436. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL,.    I. 


CXXVU 


[References  are  to  Sections.  1 

Oldfiehl  v.   New  York  &  Harlem  R.    O'Reilly  v.  Utah,  Nev.  &  I 
i  I   \.   V.  310),  560,  561,  562, 


564,  566,  568,  569,  570,586,  589,592. 
Oldman  v.  Lost  (62  .Minn.  261  I,  515. 
Olga,  The  (32  Fed.  229),  508. 
O'Learj  v.  Brooks  Elevator  Co.  (TN. 

D.  554;  75  N.  W.  919),  64,  67. 
O'Leary  v.    Erie   R.  Co.  (64    N.    V. 

Supp.  511;  51  A.pp.  Div.  25),  64. 
Oliver  v.  Chapman  I  15  Tex.  400),  120, 

L24. 
oliv.r  v.  LaValle(36  Wis.  592),  183. 
Oliver  v.   North   Pac,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (8 

Oreg.  84),  215,  227,  251 


Co.  (87  Hun  |  ST.  Y.  |,  106,  457),  199, 

559. 

..  McGlasker  (74  Cal.  1 18),  111. 
Orgall  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  E.  R,  Co.  I  W 

Neb.),  603,  625. 
i  >i  iental  v.  Barclay  ( 16  Tex.  Civ.  A.pp. 

in;;),  135,  139,  201,  254. 
Oi  man  v.  Mannix  (17  <  !olo.  56  I),  514, 
Ormond  v.  Hayes  (60  Tex.  180),  527. 
Ormsby  v.  Douglass  (37  N.  A.  477), 

427. 
Orrasby  v.  Johnson  (1  B.  Hon.  [Ky.] 

80),  114. 


Olmstead  v.  Brown  1 12  Barb.  [N.  Y.]    Orr  v.  Seiler  (1  Penny.  [Penu.J  445), 

652),  393. 
Olmstead  v.  Burke  (25  III.  86),  81. 
Olson  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.  (G8 

Minn.  155),  214. 
Olwell  v.  Milwaukee  Street  R.  Co.  (92 

Wis.  330),  149. 
Omaha  v.  Richards  (49  Neb.  244),  514, 

605. 


441. 
Orscheln  v.  Scott  (79  Mo.  A  pp.  534), 
255. 

Orsor  v.  Metropolitan    Crosstown  K. 

Co.  (78  Hun  [N.  V.].  1159),  328. 
Osbornv.    Bank  (9  Wheat.  [U.  S.] 

738),  507. 
Osborn  v.  Detroit  (32  Fed.  36),  194. 


Omaha  &  R.   V.   R.    Co.  v.   Cook  (42    Osborn  v.  Gillett  (L.  R.  8  Exch.  88), 

Neb.  :,77),  514. 
Omaha  &   R.   V.   R  Co.  v.  Crow  (54 

Neb.  747),  598,  615. 
Omaha   &    R.    V.    R.    Co.    v.    Ryburn 

(  [Neb.]  58  N.  w.  541),  230. 
Omaha  &   R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Talbot  (48 

Neb.  (527;  67  N.  W.  599),  63,  172. 
Omaha  Coal  C.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Fay  (30 

Neb.-),  206. 
Omaha  II.  R.  Co.  Cable  T.  Co.  (  [U. 

S.  C.  C.  D.  Neb.]  32  Fed.  727  |,  75. 
Omaha  St.  R.  Co.   v.  Emminger  (57 

Neb.  240),  255,  290,  297,  330,  355. 
Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin  (48  Neb. 

65),  166. 


195. 
Osbornv.  Gillett  (42  L.  J.  Ex.53),  538. 
<  tsborne  v.  Jenklnson  (100  Iowa.  423), 

214. 
Osman  v.  Dewey  (107  Mich.  07),  411. 
Ostranderv.  Lansing  (115  Mich.  224), 

227. 
( »ties  v.  Cowles  E.  s.  &  A.  Co.  (7  X.  Y. 

Supp.  251),  214. 
Otis  v.  Sweeney  (48  La.  Ann.  940), 

430. 
Ott  v.   Kaufman  (68  M<1.  50:  11  Atl. 

580),  497,  523. 
Ott  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  Ms 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  395),  508. 


O'Maley  v.  South  Boston  Oas  Light  |  Ottawa  v.  Sweely  (65  111.  434),  142. 
Co.  (158Mass.  L35;  32  N.  E.  1119),    Oursler    v.    Baltimore  &   O.   R.   Co. 
68.  (00  Md.  358),  L22. 

Overpeek  v.  Rapid  City  (  [S.  D.  1901] 

85  N.  W.  990),  82. 
Owen  v.  Brock  Schmidt  (54  Mo.  285), 

576. 
Owen  v.  Dewey   (107   Mich.   07).    411, 
II-;. 


O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R.  P.  Co.  (38  N. 

V.  445),  514,  561,  570.  586,  588,589. 
O'Neal  v.   McKenna  (116  Ala.  606), 

440. 
O'Neil  v.   Dry  Dock   E.   B.  &    B.  R. 

Co.  (30  N.  Y.  St.  R.  934),  218. 


CXXV111 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IX    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Owens  v.  Bait.  &  0.   R.  Co.  (35  Fed. 

715),  203. 
Owensboro  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Barclay 

(19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  997),  502. 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Dunden  (37  Kan.  1), 

514. 
Pack    v.    Mayor,    etc.    (3    X.    Y.   [3 

Comst.]  489),  576. 
Paddock  v.  Atchison,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(37  Fed.  841),  344. 
Paddock  v.  Somes  (51  Mo.  App.  320), 

121. 
Paddock    v.   Watts    (116    Ind.   140), 

431,  440,  444. 
Paetzig  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.   R.  Co. 

(12  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  573),  214. 
Page  v.   Delaware    &  H.  Canal  Co. 

(34  App.  Div.  par.  Y.]  618),  252. 
Page  v.  Mitchell  (13  Mich.  63),  448. 
Page  v.  New  York  (57  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

123),  281,  283. 
Paine  v.  Fair  (118  Mass.  74),  376. 
Painter  v.  Ives  (4  Neb.  122),  454. 
Painton  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co. 

(83  N.  Y.  7),  151,  152. 
Pakalinsky  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

R.    Co.    (82    Barb.     [N.  Y.]  424), 

148. 
Pallett  v. 

401. 
Palmer  v, 

338),  63. 
Palmer   v.   Chicago,  etc.,  R 

(112  Ind.  250),  164. 
Palmer  v.  Conant 

33),  229. 
Palmer    v.    Crook 

418),  460. 
Palmer    v.    Degan 

70. 
Palmer  v.  llaskins 

90),  406. 
Palmer  v.  Leader  Pub.  Co. 

Ct.  594),  107. 
Palmer  v.  Long  (7  Daly  [N.  Y.],  33), 

418. 
Palmer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.   R.   R.   Co.  (5 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  436),  497,  569. 


Sargent  (36  N.  H.  497), 
Barker  (2  Fairf.  [11  Me.] 
R.  Co. 
58  Hun  [N.  Y.], 
(7  Gray  [Mass.], 
(58  Minn.  505), 
(28  Barb.  [N.  Y.J 
(7  Pa.  Sup. 


Palmer  v.  New   York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (26  Wkly.  Dig.  26),  578. 
Palmer  v.  New  York  News  Pub.  Co. 

(31  App.  Div.    [N.  Y.]  210),  387, 

403,  412. 
Palmer     v.    Palmer    (8    App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  331),  447. 
Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (3  S.  C.  580), 

135,  139,  141,  340. 
Palmer   v.    Reynolds    (3    Cal.    396), 

106. 
Palmer    v.    Winona    Ry.    &   L.   Co. 

(  [Minn.   1899]  80   N.   W.  869),  220. 
Panton  v.  Holland  (17  Johns.  [N.  Y.] 

02),  67,  72. 
Papineau  v.  Taber  (Mont.  L.  R.  2  Q. 

B.  107),  364. 

Paris  Mountain  W.  Co.  v.  Greenville 

(53  S.  E.  82;  30  S.  E.  699),  71. 
Park  v.  O'Brien  (23  Conn.  339),  165. 
Park  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Bushnell  ( [U.  S. 

C.  C.  A.  2d  C]  60  Fed.  583),  73. 
Parke  v.  Frank  (75  Cal.  364),  110. 
Parker  v.  Burgess   (  [Vt.]  Atl.  743), 

298. 
Parker  v.  Coture  (63  Vt.  155),  468. 
Parker  v.  Griswold   (17   Conn.  288), 

76. 
Parker    v.   Jenkins    (3  Bush   [Ky.], 

587),  227,  251. 
Parker  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  (13 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  310),  119. 
Parker  v.  McGlin  (52  La.  Ann.  1514), 

453. 
Parker  v.   Monteith    (7    Oreg.  277), 

467. 
Parker  v.  Parker   (102    Iowa,  500), 

431,  443. 
Parker  v.   So.   Car.   &  Ga.    Ry.    Co. 

(  [S.  C.  1897]  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  681), 

255. 
Parkhurst    v.    Masteller    (57    Iowa, 

474),  112,438,442. 
Parkhurst  v.  Staples   (91   Wis.  196), 

95. 
Parrot  v.  Wells  (15  Wall.  524),  155. 
Parshall  v.   Minneapolis,  etc.,  R.  R. 

Co.  (35  Fed.  649),  229,  236. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN     VOL.    I. 


CXX1X 


Parsons  v.  Hardy  1 1 )  Wend.  [N.  V.j 

215),  153. 
Parsons  v.   Harper  i  If.  Gratt.  [Va.  | 

64  i.  448,   151,  452. 
Parsons  \.  Lindsay  I  26  Kan.  426),  122. 
Parson   v.  Missouri    Pac.   R.   Co.  (94 

Mo.  286),  514. 
Paschal  v.  Owen  (77  Tex.  583;   1 4  S. 

W.  203),  515,  523,  528,  540. 
Pasley   v.  Freeman  (3  T.  R.  51),  62. 
Passaic  Prinl  Work  v.  Ely  &  Walker 

I).  (;.  Co.  I  [U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  Mo.]  44 

('.  ('.  A.  420;  in.-)  Fed.  163),  72. 
Passamaneck v.  Louisville  K.  (o.  (98 

Ky.  193),  162. 
Paster  v.  Kegan  (1)  Misc.  [X.  Y'.]547), 

449. 
l'astorius   v.    Fisher  (1    Rawle   [Pa], 

27  I,  76. 
Pater  v.  Haker  (3  C.  B.  869  I,  428. 
Patent   Brick   Co.    v.  Moore  (75  Gal. 

205),  '.»7. 
Paterson  v.  Wallace  (1   Mac.   II.   L. 

748),  524,  530. 
Patsy  v.  Chic.  St.   P.    M.  *  C.  R.  Co. 

(77  Wis.  218),  340. 
Patton  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  ([U.  S.  C. 

C.  App.  4th  0.]  42  U.  S.  App.  567), 

148. 
Patrick    v.    Colorado   Smelting   Co. 

(20  Colo.  268),  75. 
Patterson   v.  Chic.  &  G.   T.   Ry.  Co. 

(40  Mich.  184),  122. 
Patterson  v.  Hayden  (17  Oreg.  238), 

464. 
Patterson  v.   South  &   X.  A.  R.  Co. 

(89  Ala.  'MS),  122. 
Paul    v.    Leydenberger   (17    Bradw. 

[111.  App.]  167).  7'.». 
Paul  v.  Omaha  &    St.    L.    Ky.  Co.  (82 

Mo.  App.  500),  237. 
Paul  v.   Slason  (22   Vt.    231  :  5  1    Am. 

Dec.  75  I,  I '>2,  7»'>. 
Pauley   v.   Steam   Gauge   &    L.    Co. 

(131  X.  V.  90;  42  N.  V.  St.  K.  636; 

29  N.    E.  999;  :10  X.  E.  865,  rev'g 

61    Hun.  25  1;  40  X.    Y.  St.    R.  855; 

16  N.  Y.  Supp.  820),  68. 
9 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Paulmier  v.  Erie   R.  Co.  (34   X.  .1.  L. 

151.    158),   51  i.  521,  645,  654,   655, 

657,  'nil.  074. 
Pawlowski  v.  Jenks  i  115  Mich.  275), 

I  in. 

Paxton  v.  Boyei  (67  111.  132),  o67. 
Paxton  v.   Vincennes  BIfg.  Co.  (20 

End.  App.  253),  107. 
Payne  v.  Chicago  &    A.    EL  Co.   (136 

Mo.  562;  38  S.  W.  308),  63. 
Payne   v.    Rouss  (46   App.    Div.    [N. 

Y.J  315),  390,  402. 
Payne  v.   Western,   etc.,    R.   Co.   |  13 

Lea  [Tenn.j.  507),  «"»«"»,  67. 
Peacock  v.  Oaks  (85  Mich.  578),  475. 
Pearce  v.  Xeedham  (:i7  111.  App.  90), 

452. 
Pearl   v.   Benton  Twp.  ([Mich.  1900] 

82  X.  W.  226),  65. 
Pen  son   v.   Elmer   (5  Redf.   [X.   Y.] 

181),  501. 
Pearson  v.  Lemaitre  (5  M.  &  G.  700), 

111. 
Pearson  v.  Zehr  (1:38  111.  48),  100. 
Pearslee    v.    Chatham    (69    Hun    (X. 

Y.],  389),  165. 
Pease  v.   Shippen  (80  Pa.  513),  415, 
Peavy  v.  Ooss  i  90  Tex.  89),  470. 
Peck  v.  Clark  (142  Mass.  4;;»i),  76. 
Peck  v.  Corning  (2  How.  Pr.  [XT.  Y.] 

84),  57. 
Peck  v.  New  York  C.  A-  II.  R.  R.  Co. 

(4  Hun  [X.  Y.],  2:;C),  212,  562. 
Peck  v.  Xew  York.  X.  II.  &  H.  R.  R. 

(o.  (50  Conn.  379),  174. 
Peckham    Iron    Co.    v.    Harper    (11 

Ohio  St.  100),  111,  120. 
Peek   v.    Traylor    (17    Ky.    L.    Pep. 

1312),  457. 
Pegram  v.  Stortzir;i  W.  Va.220),2, 

28,  55,  112.  471.  475.  483. 
Peirce  v.  Jones   (22   Inch   App.  163), 

290. 
Pellardia  v.  Journal  Printing  Co.  (99 

Wis.  156),  381,  386,  390. 
Pellet    v.    Manufacturers   &    M.   Ins. 

Co.  (Kil  Fed.  502i.  77. 
Pendergastv.McCaslin  (2  Ind.  87),  38. 


CXXX  TABLE    <>F    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Pennington  v.    Smith    (24   C.    C.   A. 

145),  507. 
Penn.  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Adams  (55  Pa.  St. 

499),  495,  514. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bantou  (54  Pa.  St. 

495),  576. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coon  (111  Pa.  St. 

430),  159. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dolan  (6  Fed.  App. 

109),  198. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Files  ([Ohio,  1901] 

62  N.  E.  1047),  17. 
Penn.   R.   R.  Co.  v.  Goodenougli   (55 

X.  J.  L.  [26  Vroom]  577),  174. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson  (51  Pa. 

St.  315),  359,  516. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hont  (110  Pa.  St. 

226),  152. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Keller  (67  Pa.  St. 

300),  521. 
Penn.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Kelly  (31  Pa.  St. 

372),  177,  225,  300,  305,  309,  312. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Kerr  (62  Pa.  St. 

353),  85. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marion  (104  Ind. 

239),  255. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McCloskey  (23  Pa. 

526),  511. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier  (35  Pa.  60), 

527. 
Penn.   R.  Co.  v.  Vanderveer  (36  Pa. 

St.  303),  527. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Weber  (76  Pa.  St. 

157),  166. 
Penn.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Wilson  (132  Pa. 

St.  27),  215. 
Penn.  &  Ohio  Canal  Co.   v.  Graham 
63  Pa.  St.  290),  215,  218,  227,  362. 
Pennsylvania  Co.   v.   Bray  (125  Ind. 

229),  354. 
Pennsylvania  Co.   v.  Conlan  (101  111. 

93,  63. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Connell  (127  111. 

419),  354. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Finney  (145  Ind, 

551),  165. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.  Greso   (79  111 
App.  127),  100. 


Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton  (132  Ind.- 

189),  63. 
Pennsylvania   Co.   v.   Lilly   (73  Ind. 

252),  300. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Xewrneyer   (129 

Ind.  401),  294. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.   Roy  (102  U.  S. 

451),  263,  617. 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.   v.  Sanderson 

(113  Pa.  126;  6  Atl.  453),  67. 
Pennsylvania,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Keaue(143 

111.  172),  515,  614,  618,637. 
Penny,  In  re  (7  E.  &  B.  660),  72. 
Penny  v.    Rochester  R.  Co.   (7  App. 

Div.  [X.  Y.]  595),  177,  277. 
People.     See  State. 
People  v.   Albany   (5   Lans.    [X.  Y.] 

524),  87. 
People  v.  Asten  (6  Daly,  18),  501. 
People  v.  Buffalo  (76  X.  Y.  558),  72. 
People  v.   Burtlesen   (14  Utah,   258; 

47Pac.  87),  67. 
People  v.  Butter  (147  N.  Y.  164),  501. 
People  v.  Dover  &   O.    H.    Commrs. 

(158  111.  197;  41  N.  E.  1105).  65. 
People  v.  Foglesong  (116  Mich.  556), 

290. 
People  v.  Gibbs  (9  Wend.  [X.  Y.]  20), 

488,  495. 
People  v.  Kipley  (171  111.  44),  501. 
People  v.  Lacombe  (99  X.  Y.  4:'.  |,  501. 
People  v.  Martin  (178  111.  611).  501. 
People  v.   Palmer    (109   X.   Y.   110), 

501. 
People  v.  Pettit  (74  X.  Y.  320),  515. 
People  v.    Raymond  (18   Colo.   242), 

501. 
People  v.  Rosenberg  (136  N.  Y.  510), 

501. 
People  v.  Simmons  (176  111.  165),  501. 
People  v.  Starkweather  (3  J.   &  Sp. 

[X.  Y.]  453),  488. 
People  v.  Supervisors  of  Green  Co. 

(13  Abb.  [X.  C]  421),  501. 
People  v.   Thompson   (155  111.   451), 

501. 
Peoria  &  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Peoria  &  F. 
R.  Co.  (105  111.  110),  75 


TABLE   OF    «'.\si:s   CITED    IN    VOL.    I.  CXXX1 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Peoria  Bridge  Assoc,  v.  Loomis  (20    Peteraon  v.  Western  In.  Teleg.  Co. 
III.    235),    H-.    120,    L60,    L86,   215,        (73  Minn.  368),  409 


227,  251. 
Peoria,   J».  &.    E.   R.  Co.  v.  Hardwik 

;,;;  111.  App.  161),  214. 
Peoria,  l».  &  E.  R.  Co.  \.   Rice  I  L44 

111.  227),  L69,  293. 
Peoria,  etc.,  K.   R.  Co.  v.  Johns  (43 

111.  App.  83),  256. 
Pepin  v.    M.  Main. n  (154   111.   141;  39 
N.  E.  4S4.  aff'g53  111  App.  L89),  67. 
Peppercorn  v.  Black   River   Falls  (80 

Wis.  38),  310,  311. 
Percival  v.  Hickey  (18  Johns.  [N.  Y.] 

432),  489. 
Peri  v.   N.  Y.  C.  «S    U.   R.   K.   R.  Co. 

(87  Hun  [N.Y.],  400),  214. 
Perkins  v.  Eastern,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (20 

He.  307),  165. 
Perkins  v.  Mo.  K.  R.  Co.  (55  Mo.  201), 

1 39. 
Perkins  v.  Philadelphia  (156  Pa.  554), 

501. 
Perkins  v.  stein  (15  Ky.  L.  Rep.  203), 

494. 
Perkins   v.    Towle    (4:)    N.    II.    220), 

115. 
Perrine  v.  Blanchard  (15  La.   Ann. 

133),  134. 
Perry    v.    Ga.    K.    &    B.    Co.    (85    Ga. 

193),  495. 
Perzell  v.  Shook  (21  J.  &  S.   [X.    V.] 

501),  07. 
Peshine    v.  Shepperson    (17    Gratt. 

[Va.  1  485),  119. 
Pessini  v.  Wilkins  (8  N.  Y.  St.  R.  89), 

492,  494. 
Peters  v.  Lake  (60  111.  206),  462. 
Peterson  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

Go.  (38  Minn.  .".11  |,  274,  275. 
Peterson  v.  Dakin  ([D.  C.  S.  I>.  Ala.] 

31  Fed.  682),  123. 
Peterson  v.  Morgan  (116  Mass.  350), 

415,  422. 
Peterson  v.  Reisdorph  (49  Neb.  529), 

441. 
Peterson    v.     Seattle     Traction    Co. 
([Wash.  1001]  65  Pac.  543),  229. 


on  \.  Western  in.  Teleg.  Co. 

(72  Minn.  41  ),  122. 
Peterson  \.  Western  l'n.  Tele-.  Co. 

(65  Minn.  18),  100. 
Pen ie  v.  Columbia  &  G.   N-   R-  ('"- 
(29  s.  c.  303),  524,  531, 
544. 
Petry  v.   Schillo  (61    111.    App.   286), 

134. 
Pettingill  v.  Town  of  Olean  (48  X.  Y. 

St.   R.  96),  172. 
Peyton  v.  Texas  &   P.   R.  Co.  i  11  La. 

Ann.  861 ),  102. 
Plan  v.  Alteiia  (23  Misc.  [N.  X".] 693), 

289. 
Pfefferv.    Buffalo  Ky.  Co.   (54   N.  Y. 

m.  K.  342),  214. 
Pfeffer  v.  Buffalo  R.  Co.  (4  Misc.  [X. 

Y.]  465),  214. 
Phalenv.  Rochester  R.  Co.  (31  App. 

Div.  [X.  Y.]  448),  569,  570,  581. 
Pl.a.is  v.Gere  (31  Hun  [X.  Y.],   143), 

05. 
Pharr  v.  Southern   R.  Co.  (110  N.  C. 

751).  157. 
Pheliu   v.    Klinderdine    (20    Pa.    St. 

354),  467. 
Phelps  v.  Cogswell  (70  Cal.  201),  102. 
Phelps  v.  Nbwlen  (72  N.  V.  30),  67. 
Phelps  v.  Owens  (11  Cal.  22),  124. 
Phila.  Tract.  Co.  v.  Orbann  (110  Pa. 

St.  37),  189,  140,  342. 
Phila.  W.  A-  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Eoeflich  (62 

Md.  300),  133. 
Phila.  W.  &    I'..    R.   Co.  v.  Larkin  I  17 

Md.  15.M.  112.  135,  L39,  340,  341. 
Phila.  VY.  A-    B.  R.  Co.  v.  Quigley  (21 
Bow.     [U.    S.]    213).    94,    120.    121, 
135,  186. 
Phila.   \V.  A-   B.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (58 

Md.  372),  522,  540. 
Philips  v.  Terry  (3  Abh.  Dec.  [X.  Y.] 

607),  99. 
Phillips    v.    Dickerson    (85    111.   11), 

is:;.  220. 
Phillips  v.  Kelly  (29  Ala.  628  I,  372,878. 


cxxxn 


TABLE    OF   ('Asks    CITED    IN    VDL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Phillips  v.  L.  &  S.  W.   Ry.  Co.  (5  Q. 

B.  Div.  78),  236. 
Phillips  v.  Malone  (Minor  [Ala.]  110), 

57. 
Phillips  v.   New  York  C.  &   II.  R.  R. 

Co.  (127  X.  V.  657),  85. 
Phillips  v.  Peoples  Pass.  R.  Co.  (190 

Pa.  St.  222),  170. 
Phillips  v.   Southern    U.    R.  Co.    (5  C. 

P.  Div.  280),  229. 
Phillips  v.  Southwestern  Ry.  Co.  (4  Q. 

B.  D.  40G),  211,  215,  227,  286,  24:3. 
Philpot  v.  Lucas  (101  Iowa,  478),  435. 
Phillpot  v.  Ry.  Co.  (34  Atl.  850),  556. 
Phoenix  v.  Clark  (2  Mich.  328),  78. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Charleston  Bridge 

Co.  (65  Fed.  632),  184. 
Phyfe  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (30  Hun 

[X.  Y.],  377),  227. 
Pickard  v.  Collins  (23  Barb.    [X.  Y.] 

444),  67. 
Pickens  v.   South  Carolina  &  G.    R. 

Co.  (54  S.  C.  498),  80. 
Pickett  v.  Crook  (20  Wis.  358),  122, 

188. 
Pickett    v.    West    Monroe    (47   App. 

Div.  [X.  Y.]  629),  78. 
Pickett  v.  Wilmington   &  W.    R.   Co. 

(117  X.  C.  616),  161,  560,  563,  575. 
Piedmont,  etc.,   R.   Co.  v.   McKenzie 

(75  Md.  458),  153. 
Pierce  v.  Conners  (20  Colo.  182),  511. 
Pierce  v.  Hosmer  (66  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

345),  76. 
Pierce  v.  Lutesville  (25  Mo.  App.  317), 

285. 
Pierce  v.    Millay   (44    111.    189),   119, 

122,  127,  186,  215,  227. 
Pierce  v.  Van  Dusen   (78   Fed.  693), 

101,  502. 
Pierce  v.  Walters  (164  111.  500),  156, 

157. 
Pike  v.  Dilling  (48  Me.  539),  111,  120, 

124,  180,  186,  369. 
Pike  v.  Jenkins  (12  N.  H.  255),  501. 
Pill  v.   Brooklyn   Heights   R.  Co.  (6 

Misc.  [X.  Y.]  267),  24:1. 
Pine  v.  Xew  York  (103  Fed.  337),  76. 


Pine  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.  ([Minn.] 
16  L.  R.  A.  347),  339. 

Pineo  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co.  (34  Hun 
[X.  Y.],  80),  562,  563,  569,  592. 

Pinkerton  v.  Snyder  (87  111.  App.  76), 
450. 

Pitts.  A.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Donahue 
(70  Penn.  St.  119),  243. 

Pitts.  &  L.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Blair  (11  Ohio 
C.  C.  579),  214. 

Pitts.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hine  (25 
Ohio  St.  629),  503. 

Pitts.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyon 
(123  Pa.  St.  140),  112,334. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox  (55 
Ohio  St.  497),  203. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Dahlin 
(67  111.  App.  99),  605. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  En- 
sign (10  Ohio  C.  C.  21),  340,  341. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hosea 
(152  Ind.  412),  495,  499. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 
honey  (148  Ind.  196),  198. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Mont- 
gomery (152  Ind.  lj,  215,  218. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Reyn- 
olds (55  Ohio  St.  370),  337. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Russ, 
(67  Fed.  662),  339,  354. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Russ, 
(57  Fed.  322),  488. 

Pitts.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaw 
(15  Ind.  App.  173;  43  X.  E.  957), 
63. 

Pitts.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Slusser  (19 
Ohio  St.  157),  135. 

Pitts.,  etc.,   R.    R.   Co.  v.   Smith   (26 

Ohio  St.  124),  164. 
Pitts.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomson  (56 

111.  138),  193,  638. 
Pitts.  F.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Powers 

(74  111.  341),  263. 
Pitts.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor  (104  Pa.  St. 

306),  192. 
Pixley  v.  Clark  (35  X.  Y.  520),  150. 
Plaisted  v.  B.  &  K.  Steam  Xav.  Co. 
(27  Me.  132),  153. 


TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


CXXXlll 


Planters1  Oil  Co.  v.   Mansell   ([Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  48  s.  W.  913),  93. 
Planters1  oil  .Mill  v.   Monroe  Water- 
works A:  L.  Co.  (52   La  Ann.  1243; 

_>7  S...  684),  o.">. 
Plath  v.    Baunsdurff  |  W   Wis.    1UT). 

448. 
Plato  v.  Turrill  (IS  111.  273),  106. 
Platl  v.  Brown  (30  Conn.  336),  PJ4. 
Piatt  v.  Waterbury  (72  Conn.  531;  45 

Atl.  154),  65. 
Plata  v.  Cohoes  (24   Hun    [V   V.j, 

101),  174. 
Pleasants  v.    North    Beach    it    M.    It- 

Co.  (34  Cal.  586),  484. 
Ploof  v.  Burlington  Traction  Co.  i  To 

Vt.  509),  175,  176. 
Plonty  v.   Murphy  ([Minn.    1901]  S4 

N.  W.  1005),  :'»6.->. 
Plume  v.  Lockwood   (10  N.  .1.   L.  J. 

119),  642. 
Plumleigh  v.    Dawson  (1  Gilm.   [111.] 

544  |,  76. 
Plummer  v.    Haskel    (5    Iowa,  :!08), 

133. 


Popp  v.    <  iminnati.    EL.  A    I  >.    It.  *  !o. 

(96  Fed.  165),  507. 
Popp  v.   New  Fork  Central  Railroad 

(26  N.  V.  St.  K.  639),  242. 
Portei  v.  Cobb  (22  Hun  [N.  V.j.  278  . 

99. 
l'oricr  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joseph  K. 

R.  <  o.  ,71  Mo.  66),  218. 
Porter  v.  Johnson  (99  <.a.  275),  430. 
Poller  v.    Seihr  I-':'.  Pa.  St.  424),  114, 

370. 
Posl  v.  Olmstead  i  47  Neb.  893),  514, 

605,607,  615,  619. 
Posi    v.  <  (moon    1 7    lleisk.    [Tenn.] 

167),  91. 
Postal   Teleg.   Cable  Co.  v.   Hulsey 

I  115  Ala.  193),  263. 
Postal   Teleg.  Cable  Co.  v.  Louisiana 

\V.    R.    Co.    |  19     La.    Ann.     1270), 

102. 
Postal  Teleg.  Cable  Co.  v.  Zopli  (48 

P.  S.  App.  141  i.  86. 
Postlewaite  v.  Parkes  (3  Burr.  1879), 

4(17. 
Posi  Pub.  Co.  v.  Hallam  ( [C.  C.  App. 


Plummer  v.  Milan  (79  Mo.  App.  4:59),        6th  C]  59  Fed.  530),  425. 


194,  215,  218,  243,  297. 


Potter  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (21 


Plummer    v.     Milan    (70    Mo.    App.        Wis.  372,  374,  472),  527,  645,  651, 


598),  318. 


054.  057.  663,  672. 


Poissenet  v.    Reuther  (51    La.   Ann.    Potter  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  It.  Co.  (22 


965),  4 lit. 


Wis.  615),  055. 


Polakv.    Met.   St.    R.  Co.   (58  X.  V.    Potter  v.  Hopkins  (25  Wend.  [N.T.] 


Supj,.  U33),  212. 


417i.  562. 


Polk    v.    Paucher    (1     Head    [Tenn.],     Potter  V.  Metropolitan   Hist.   Ry.  Co. 


336),  112. 
Pollard  v.  Lyon  (91  U.  S.  225),  393. 
Pollard   v.Porter  (3   Gray    [Mass.], 

312),  78. 
Pond  v.  Merrifield  (12  Cush.   [Mass.] 

181),  70. 


(30  L.  T.  X.  S.  705).  488. 
Potter  v.    Prescotl    (2    Hun    [Mass.], 

686),  106. 
Potter  v.  Stamph  (2   Kan.  App.  788  - 

119. 
Potter  v.  Swindle  (77  Ga.  noi.  449. 


Pope   v.    Barretl    (1    Mason    [U.   s.].    Potter  v.  Thompson  (22  Barb.  [N.T.] 


1771,  94. 
Pope  v.    Farmers1  Union  &    M.   Co. 

([Cal.  looo]  62  Par.  384),  44. 
Pope  v.   Lake  Co.   ([U.  S.  C.   C.    I). 

Ind.]  51  Fed.  768),  68. 
Pope  v.  Salsmon  (35  Mo.  362),  106. 
Pope  v.  Welsh  (  IS  Ala.  631),  422. 


87),  502. 

Potis  v.  Chic.  City  Ry.  Co.  (33  Fed. 

810).  136. 
Pouilin  v.   Canadian    P.   It.  Co.   (47 

Fed.  858).   188. 
Powell  v.   Augusta  it  S.   K.  Co.  (77 

Ga.   192),  2>s. 


CXXX1V 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Powell  v.  Southern  K.  Co.  (125  N.  C.  I  Trice  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co  (38  S. 


370),  563. 
Powers  v.   Manhattan  Ry.   Co.    (120 

N.  Y.  178),  11!),  122. 
Powers  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.  (GOHuu  [N.  Y.],  19),  152. 
Powers  v.   Presgrove  (38   Miss.  227), 

418. 
Powers  v.  Rich  (184  Pa.  325),  109. 
Powers  v.  Shepard  (48  N.  Y.  540),  .r,01. 
Pratt  v.  Harape  ( [Iowa,  1901]  86  N. 

W.  292),  444. 
Pratt  v.  Pratt  (Rapports'  Judic.  Que- 
bec, 10  C.  S.  134),  514. 
Pratt  Coal,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Brawley  (116 

Ala.  509),  175. 
Pratt  Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley  (83  Ala. 

371),  176. 
Prelm  v.  Royal  Bk.  of  Liverpool  (L. 

R.  5  Exch.  Cas.  92),  7,  11,  13,  81. 
Prendergast  v.   New  York  Cent.  R. 

Co.  (58  N.  Yr.  652),  561,  586. 
Prentiss  v.   Shaw   (56  Me.  427),  218, 

377. 
Prescottv.  Toucey  (18  J.  &  S.  [N.  Y.] 

1),  425. 
Press  Co.  v.  McDonald  (63  Fed.  238), 

402,  403. 
Press   Co.    v.    Stewart   (119   Pa.   St. 

584),  411. 
Pressman  v.    Mooney    (5   App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]    121),  514,  572,  586,  588. 
Press  Pub.   Co.  v.  Monroe   (73  Fed. 

201),  112,  120,  123,  136. 
Prettyman   v.   Williamson    (1    Penn. 

[Del.]  224),  457,  459,  460. 
Price  v.  Charles  Warner  Co.  (1  Penn. 

[Del.]  462),  289. 
Price  v.  Dearborn  (34  N.  H.  481),  57. 
Price  v.  Hartshorn  (44  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

655),  153. 
Price  v.   Marsden  ( [C.  A.  1899]    1  Q. 

B.  493),  239. 
Price   v.    Murray  (10  Bosw.    [N.   Y. 

Super.]  243),  134. 
Price  v.  Price  (91  Iowa,  693),  458. 
Price  v.  Price  (11  Hun   [N.  Y.],  299), 
494. 


C.  199),  528,  537. 
Price  v.  Richmond  &  I).  R.  Co.  (33  S. 

C.  556),  523. 
Price  v.  Roy  (29  Can.  S.  C.  494,  rev'g 

in   part  Rep.   Jud.  Queb.  8  B.   R. 

170),  08. 
Priestly  v.   Maclean  (2  F.  &   F.  288), 

91. 
Prime  v.    Eastwood   (45  Iowa,  640), 

404. 
Prince  v.    Brooklyn   Daily   Eagle  (16 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  186),  397,  398. 
Prince    v.    Socialistic    Co-op.    Pub. 

Assoc.  (64  N.  Y.   Supp.  285),  402. 
Pritchard   v.  Savannah  St.  &   R.   R. 

Co.  (87  Ga.  294),  502. 
Pritchett  v.    Poole   (  [Q.  B.]  76   Law 

T.  Rep.  472),  68. 
Proctor  Coal  Co.  v.  Moses  (19  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  419),  431. 
Propson  v.    Leathen   (80  Wis.    008), 

214. 
Piosser  v.  Montana  Cent.  R.  Co.  ( 17 

Mont.  372),  166. 
Pruitt  v.  Cox  (21  Ind.  15),  467,  468. 
Pruitt  v.  Hannibal  &   St.   J.   R.   Co. 

(62  Mo.  527),  89,  153. 
Prussing  v.    Jackson    (85    111.    App. 

324),  397,  420. 
Pryor  v.  Chadwick  (86  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

75),  380. 
Pryor  v.  Met  St.  Ry.  Co.  (85  Mo.  App. 

367),  227. 
Puckerton  v.  Le  Beau  (  [S.  D.]  54  N. 

W.  97),  501. 
Pueblo  Elec.   St.   R.  Co.  v.  Sherman 

(25  Colo.  114),  177. 
Pugh  v.  McCarty  (40  Ga.  444),  418. 
Pullen  v.  Glidden  (68  Me.  500),  440. 
Pulling  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  (9  Q.  B. 

D.  110),  538. 
Pullman    v.    Illinois    C.    R.    Co.    (75 

Miss.  027;  23  So.  359),  63. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Barker  (4 

Colo.  344),  351. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  Bluhm  (109 

111.  20),  194,  195. 


TABLE   OF   CA8E8   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


CXXXV 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Pullman    Palace   Car   <'<>.    v.    Booth I  Quigley  v.  Cent   Pac 


|  [Tex.   Civ.   App.]  28  S.   W.  719), 

356. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Fowler  (6 

Tex.  (  iv.  A|>p.  755),  856. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  (  <>.  \ .  Law  rence 

(74  .Miss.  782),    139,    140,    144,   333, 

870,  374. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  McDonald 

rex.  C.  A]  21  S.  W.  945),  354. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Reed  (75 

111.  KIT).  139. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Smith  (79 

Tex.  478),  323. 
Pullman   Palace  Car  Co.   v.  Trimble 

I  [Tex.  C.  A]  28  S.  W.  96),  853. 
Pulver  v.  Harris  (61  Barb.  [N.  V.]  78), 

379. 
Pundman  v.  St.  Charles  Co.  (110  Mo. 

594  I,  65. 
Purcell  v.   Lauer  (14   A]>]>.   Div.    [X. 

Y.]  33),  514,  569,  572,  578,  586. 
Purcellv.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  (108 

N.  C.  421),  80,  139,  141,  334. 
Purcellv.  St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.  (48  Minn. 

L34),  94,  183,  219,  220,  221. 
Purdy  v.  Manhattan  El.  R.  Co.  (36  X. 

V.  St.  R.  43),  74. 
l'utli  v.  Zimbleman  (99  Iowa,  641), 

457. 
Putnam  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (21 

Or.  230),  503. 
Pymv.  Greal  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (1  Q. 

15.  D.  599),  499. 
Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (4  B. 

&    S.   400),    521,   522.    52  1.  5:;:,.  537, 

542,  544,  545,  555. 

Pym  v.  Great  Northern   Ry.  Co.   (2 

Best  &  S.  759),  511,  535. 
Quackenbusta  v.  Chic  &   N.   \V.  Ry. 

Co.  (73  Iowa,  458),  329. 
Quackenbusta    v.    United   states   (33 

Ct.  CI.  355),  501. 
Quainv.  Russell  (8Hun[N.  V.|.  319), 

472. 
Queen,  The  (40  Fed.  004).  219,  220. 
Queen   v.    Dayton  Coal  &   I.  Co.  (95 

Tenn.  458),  177. 


R.  R.  Co.  (11 
Nev.  350),  139,  218. 
Quill    v.    New    York    (36    App.    Div. 
470;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  889),  65. 

Quill    v.     New     York    Cent.    R.    R.   Oo. 

(16  Daly  [N.  V.J.  813),  169. 
Quimby  v.  Carter  (20  tie.  218),  96. 
Quinby   v.    Minnesota    Tribune  Co. 

(38  .Minn.  528),   H9. 
Quincy  Coal  Co.  v.  Hood  (77  111.  OS), 

199,  597,  598,  626. 
Quincy  Horse  R., etc.,  Co.  v.  Schulte 

(  [C.  C.  App.  7th  ('.]  71    Fed.  487), 

209. 
Quinlen   v.    Welch  (69  Hun  [N.  V.], 

584),  470. 
Qninn  v.   Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  (34 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  331),  218. 
Quinn   v.    Lowell   Elec.    L.    Co.   I  144 

Mass.  476),  '.".•. 
Quinn  v.  Moore  (15  N.  Y.  435),  499, 

561,  501.  569. 
Quinn  v.   O'Keefe   (9  App.   Div.  [N. 

Y.J  08),  229,  236,  280,  288. 
Quinn  v.  Pietro  (38  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.J 

484),  514,  586. 
Quinn    v.    Power    (29    Hun   [X.   V.], 

183),  50s. 
Quinn  v.   So.   Car.   Ry.  Co.  (29  S.  C. 

381),  111,  135,  139. 
Quirk  v.  Siegel-Cooper  Co.  (00  \.  V. 

St.  R.  228;   13  App.    Div.  464,  afiPg 

56  N.   V.   Supp.    IM;  20  Misc.  244), 

64,  214,  2  14. 
Radio  v.  Detroit  ([Mich.]  51  \.  '\Y. 

300),  503,  643. 
RadclilT  v.  Mayor  (4  Const.  [4  N.  Y.J 

195),  07,  72. 
Radley  v.  Seider  i  [Mich.]  58  N.  \Y. 

366),  474. 
Radman  v.  Haberstro  (1  N.  V.  St.  R. 

561),  194. 
Rafferty  v.  Buckman  (46  Iowa.  195), 

472. 
Railroad  Co.     See  name. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Attaway  (90  Ga.  657, 

661),  158. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Austin  (69  111.420),  000. 


i-XXXVl  TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Kailroad  Co.   v.   Babcock   (154  U.  S. 

190),  507. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Barry  (58  Ark.  198), 


Kailroad  Co.  v.  Blocker  (27  Md.  277), 

135. 
Kailroad    Co.    v.    Bloomingdale    (74 

Ga.  604),  158. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bradford  (  [Ga.]  38  S. 

E.  823),  158. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Carr  (71  Ind.  135), 

181. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dorsey  (106  Ga.  826), 

158. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Gladman  (15  Wall. 

[U.  S.]  401),  166,  177. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harris  (76  Ga.  508), 

158. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holmes  (103  Ga.  658), 

158. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones  (95  U.  S.  442), 

148. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Luckie   (87  Ga.  6), 

158. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Markee  (103  Ala.  160), 

160. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Neily  (56  Ga.  544), 

158. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Prince    (2    Heisk. 

[Tenn.]  580),  498. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Putnam  (118  U.  S. 

545),  248. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Roy  (102  II.  S.  451), 

263. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith  (78  Ga.  700), 

158. 
Railway  v.  Fuller  (63  Tex.  469),  1. 
Railway  Co.     See  name. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Garr  (57  Ga.  277),  556. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lee  (92  Ala.  272),  160. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Need  ham    (52   Fed. 

371),  248. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Rogers    (  [Tex.]    39 

S.  W.  1112),  491. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Whitten  {74  Tex.  202), 

311. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wood  (113  Ind.  544), 

275. 


Raines   v.  New  York   Press   Co.  (92 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  515),  387. 
Rajnowski  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  &  A.  R. 

Co.  (74  Mich.  15),  661,  667,  669. 
Rambant  v.  Irving  Nat.  Bk.  (42  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  143),  79. 
Ramsburg   v.  Kline  (96  Va.  465;  31 

S.  E.  608;  4  Va.  L.  Reg.  584),  73. 
Ramsdell  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 

Co.  (151  Mass.  245),  870. 
Ranch  v.  Lloyd  (31  Pa.  St.  358),  177. 
Rand   v.   Binder   (  [Iowa]  75   N.  W. 

505),  102. 
Randall  v.  Dailey  (66  Wis.  288),  73. 
Randall  v.  Evening  News  Assoc.  (97 

Mich.  136),  406. 
Randlette  v.  Judkins  (77  Me.  114),  66. 
Randolph   v.   O'Riordan    (155   Mass. 

331),  172. 
Ransom  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co. 

(15  N.  Y.  415),  215,  362. 
Ransome  v.  Christian    (49   Ga.   -4 0 1 ) . 

401. 
Rapson  v.  Cubitt  (1  Car.  &  Marsh.  64), 

249. 
Ratcliff  v.  Louisville  Courier-Journal 

Co.  (99  Ky.  416),  411. 
Ratteree   v.  Chapman    (79  Ga.  574), 

192. 
Rausch  v.  Anderson  (75  111.  App.  526), 

404. 
Ravenga  v.  Mackintosh  (2  B.  &   C. 

393),  440. 
Rawlins  v.  Vidvard  (34  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

205),  119. 
Rawson  v.  State  (19  Conn.  292),  501. 
Ray  v.  Cortland  &  H.  Traction  Co. 

(19  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  530),  354. 
Rayburn  v.  Central  Iowa  Ry.  Co.  (74 

Iowa,  637),  229. 
Raycroft  v.  Tayntor  (68  Vt.  219;  35 

Atl.  53;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  222),  71. 
Raymond  v.  Cowdrey  (42  N.  Y.  Supp. 

557),  515. 
Raymond  v.  Haverhill  (168  Mass.  382), 

191. 
Raynor  v.  Kinney  (14  Ohio  St.  283), 

401. 


TABLE   OF   casks   CITED    IN    VOL. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Raynorv.  Kims  (37  Mich.  84),  134,  14."). 

Be.    See  Dame, 

Elea  v.  Harrington  (58   Vt.  181),  111, 

144,  377. 
Bea-Patterson     Mill    Co.    v.    Siyrick 

(  [Kan.    App.    1901]    03    Par.    162), 

213. 
Read  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.  (32 

App.  Div.  503),  if.'.'.  563. 
Head  v.  Case  |  i  Conn.  166),   121. 
Read  v.  Clearfield  Co.  (12  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  419),  T'.i:.. 
Read  v.  Greal    Eastern    Ry.    (!)  B.  & 

S.  714).  :.•_'•_'.  .v_':;. 
Read  v.  Creat  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  (L.  R. 

3  Q.  B.  555 ),  498,  499. 
Read  v.  Railway    Co.  (L.    R.    3  Q.  B. 

1),  499. 
Read  v.   Spaulding  {'>    Bosw.  [N.  Y.J 

395),  153. 
Read  v.    Spaulding   (30  X.     V.  630), 

154. 
Reading  v.  Donovan  (0  La.  Ann.  491), 

91. 
Reading  Twp.   v.    Telfer    (57     Kan. 

798;  48  Pac.  134),  63,  174. 
Readdy  v.  Shamokin  (1:57  Pa.  St.  98), 

316. 
Reade  v.    Sweetzer    (6   Abb.    Pr.    X. 

S.  [N.   V.J  9),  117. 
Reagan  v.  Farmers1  Loan   &   T.  Co. 

(154  U.    S.  362;  14   Sup.    ct.    Rep. 

1047:  3  L.  Ed.  1014;  4  Inters.  Com. 

K.  560),  65. 
Reardon  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  ([Mo] 

21  S.  \V.  731),  280. 
Reath   v.   State,    Johnson    (10   Ind. 

App.  14(i),  472. 
Record  v.  Saratoga   Springs  (46  Hun 

[X.  V.],  44S),  243,  247. 
Reddin  v.  Gates  (52    Iowa,  210),  372, 

376. 
Redding  v.  South  Carolina  It.  Co.  (5 

s.  C.  [5  Rich.]  67),  484. 
Redfield  v.  Oakland   Consol.    St.    R. 

Co.  (112  Cal.  220).  .llti. 
Redfield  v.   Red  fled   (7">    Iowa.    435), 

111.  12:.,  :',7.->. 


rXXXVll 


•  '. 


Redwood   v.   .Met.    11.   ('...    (6   D. 

302),  136. 
Reed  v.  Augusta  i  25  '.a.  386),  91. 
Reed  v.   Chic.    B.    I.    &   K.   Co.  (-".7 

Iowa.  23),  S,\l,  2:.7. 
Reed  v.  Chicago    .V    Si.     P.     \ .  &    < ). 

By.    Co.   (  [Iowa]    37    \.    W.    149), 

214. 

Reed  v.  Detroit  |  Ki-.  Mich.  224),   L95. 
Beed  \.  Keith  (99  Wis.  672),  102,  386, 
397. 

Reed   v.  .Madison  (83  Wis.  171).  177. 
Reed  v.  Madison  (85  Wis.  667),  288. 
Reed  v.  Northeastern  R.   Co.    (;;7  S. 
C.  I2).:,22,  523. 

Reed  v.  Samuels  122  Tex.  114).  120. 
Reed  v.  Williams    (5    Sneed  [Tenu.], 

580),  468. 
Reed  Lumber  Co.  v.   Lewis  (94    Ala. 

62G),  91. 
Reeder  v.    Purdy  (4S   111.  261),    120, 

12  1. 

Reedy  v.  Weakley  (  [Tenn.  Ch.  App.] 

39  S.  W.  739),  107. 
Reeve  v.  Wilkesbarre  A-    W.  V.  Trac- 
tion Co.  ( [C.  P.]  9  Kulp  [Pa.],  182), 

178. 
Reeves  v.  Andrews  (7  Ind.  207),  81. 
Reeves  v.  Delaware,   etc.,  R.   Co.   (30 

Pa.  si.  454),  161. 
Reeves  v.  Winn    (97  N.  C.  246),    112, 

11:1,  120.    lor,,  425. 
Reg  v.  Hopkin's  C.  C.  P.  ( [1899]  1  Q. 

B.  652),  98. 
Regan  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  P.  Co. 

(:.l  Wis.  599),  646,  662. 
Roger  v.  Rochester    Ry.  Co.    (2  App. 

Div.  [X.  V.]  5),  589. 
Regel  v.  Bell  (77  111.  593),  481. 
Reeder    v.    Moore    (95    .Midi.    594), 

tif,7. 
Beich  v.  Peck  (83  Hun  [\.  V.],  214), 

17::. 
Reichmanv.  Second  Ave.  Ry.  Co.  (15 

V  Y.  si.   B.  928),  270. 
Beid  \.  Johnson  (132  Ind.  410),  81. 
Beid  v.  Terwilliger   (llti   X.  Y.  530), 

175. 


CXXXV111 


TABLE   OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Reinhardt  v.  Fritzscher  (69  Hun  [N. 

Y.],  565),  470. 
Reinach  v.  Railroad  Co.  (58  Fed.  33), 

507. 
Reining  v.  New  York,  L.  &    W.    R. 

Co.  ( 128  N.  Y.  157),  71. 
Reiss  v.  X.  Y.  Steam  Co.   (128  N.  Y. 

103),   154. 
Reiss  v.  Town  of   Pelham   (65  N.  Y. 
Supp.   1033,  aft'g  62  N.   Y.  Supp. 
607),  65. 
Reisterer  v.   Lee   Sum   (  [C.  C.  App. 

2d  C]  94  Fed.  343),  434. 
Reizenstein  v.  Clark  (104  Iowa,  287), 

369. 
Reinsen  v.  Bryant  (47  App.  Div.    [N. 

Y.]  503),  422. 
Remsen  v.  Bryant  (24  Misc.    [X.  Y.] 

238),  381,  384. 
Renck  v.  McGregor  (32  N.  J.   L.  70), 

454. 
Reune  v.  United  States   Leather  Co. 

(107  Wis.  305),  100. 
Renner  v.  Marshall  (1  Wheat.  [U.  S.] 

215),  57. 
Replogle    v.    Frothiugham    (16    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  374),  440. 
Republican    Pub.   Co.   v.    Conroy  (5 

Colo.  App.  262),  381,  410. 
Republican  Pub.  Co.  v.  Mosman  (15 

Colo.  399),  415. 
Requer  v.  Glens  Falls  S.  H.   &  F.  E. 

St.  R.  Co.  (74  Hun,  202),  338. 
Reuhl  v.  Sperry  (  [C.  C]    Ohio  C.  D. 

688),  104. 
Reusch  v.  Roanoke  Cold  Storage  Co. 

(  [Va.]  22  S.  E.  358),  391. 
Rex  v.   Sewer  Commrs.  (S   B.  &    C. 

355),  67. 
Reynolds  v.  Braithwaite  (131  Pa.  St. 

416),  111. 
Reynolds  v.  Niagara  Falls  (81   Hun 

[N.  Y.],  353),  255,274. 
Reynolds   v.   Railway   Co.    (13   Ohio 

C.  C.  39),  327. 
Reynolds  v.   Van   Beuren   (10  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  703),  214. 
Rhine  v.  Morris  (96  Ind.  81),  78. 


Rhines  v.  Royalton  (40  N.  Y.   St.   R. 

662),  277. 
Rhoades  v.  Varuey  (91  Me.  222),  214. 
Rhodes   v.   Baird  (16  Ohio  St.  573), 

91. 
Rhodes  v.  Rogers  (151  Pa.  St.  634), 

369,  372,  373. 
Rice  v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co.   (51   La. 

Ann.  108),  108,514. 
Rice  v.  Des  Moines  (40  Iowa,  638), 

195. 
Rice  v.  Houston   (13  Wall.    [U.    S.] 

66),  507. 
Rich  v.  Mayer  (26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  107), 

386. 
Rich  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  Rd.   Co. 

(87  N.  Y.  382),  487. 
Richard  v.  Jones  (1  Nev.  405),  78. 
Richards    v.   Richards    (2    Wood.    & 

Rob.  557),  415. 
Richardson  v.    Barker  (7   Ind.   567), 

412. 
Richardson  v.  Dyledahl  (  [S.  D.  1900] 

84  N.  W.  486),  431. 
Richardson  v.   Fonts  (11    Ind.  466), 

468. 
Richardson  v.  Huston  (10  S.  D.  484), 

453. 
Richardson  v.  Kier  (31  Cal.  63),  148. 
Richardson  v.   North  rop    (66    Barb. 

[N.  Y.]  85),  99. 
Richardson  v.   Northrop    (56    Barb. 

[N.  Y.]  105),  418. 
Richardson    v.    Richardson    (38   La. 

Ann.  641),  501. 
Richardson  Fueling  Co.  v.  Peters  (82 

111.  App.  508),  639. 
Richfield  v.  Michigan  C.  R.   Co.   (110 

Mich.  406),  169. 
Richlands  Iron  Co.  v.  Elkins  (90  Va. 

249;  17  S.  E.  890),  214. 
Richmond   v.    Chicago  &  W.   M.   R. 
Co.  (87   Mich.  374),   645,   648,  653, 
055,  657,  061,  670,  674. 
Richmond  v.  Schickler  (57  Iowa,  486), 

124. 
Richmond  v.  '-econd  Ave.  R.  Co.  (76 
Hun  [N.  Y.J.  233),  214. 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    \'<>r..    I.  CXXX1X 

[References  are  to  Sections.  | 
Richmond  &  I).  K.  Co.  v.  Elliott  (149    Riley  v.  Eastchester  (18  App.  Div.  94; 


T.  s.  266),  232. 


I.".   V  Y.  Supp.   148  .  63. 


Riohmonrl  &  I).  R.  Co.  v.  Parmer  (97    Riley  v.  Grand   Island   Receivers  (72 


Ala.  141),  159,  -Ji  I. 


Mo.  App.  280),  504. 


Richmond  &   D.    R.    Co.  v.  Freeman    Riley  v.    Harris  |  [Mass.  1900    58    V 


([Ala.]  11  So.  800),   502. 


E.  584)-,  95. 


Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Greene 1  Riley  v.    Lidtke  (49   Neb.   139),  316, 

l  [Ala. J  14  So.  495),  293.  319. 

Richmond   &   I>.   R.  Co.    v.    FTissong  Rimmer  v.  Blasingame  (94  Cal.  139), 

(97  Ala.  1ST:   13  So.  209),  267.  95. 

Richmond  &   I).  R.   Co.   v.   Jefferson  Ringle  v.   Penn.   K.  Co.  (164  Pa.  St. 


(80  Ga.  554),  357. 


529),  203. 


Richmond  &    I).  R.   Co.   v.    Norment    Ringlehaupt  v.  Young  (55  Ark.  128), 

(84  Va.  HIT).  251.  79. 

Richmond  &   D.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance  (93    Ripley  v.  Leverenz  (83  111.  App.  60S), 


Ala.  14-1),  122. 


227. 


Richmond  <&    I).  R.   Co.   v.    Williams    Rippe  v.   Met.   St.   R.  Co.   (35   App. 


[[Ga.]  14  S.  E.  120),  214. 


Div.  [N.  Y.]  321),  214. 


Richmond    Gas    Co.    v.    Baker  (146    Rippey  v.  Miller  (11  Ired.  L.   [N.  C] 


lad.  GOO),  105,  2i;«>. 


247),  132. 


Richmond  R.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Bowles  (92    Ritchie  v.    Stenins   (73    Mich.   503), 

Va.  738),  318,  325.  4 IS. 

Richmond  R.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Garthright    Ritger  v.   Milwaukee  (99  Wis.   190), 


(92  Va.  627),  214. 


172. 


Ricker  v.   Freeman  (50  N.   H.  420),    Rittenhouse   v.    Wilmington    St.    R, 


84. 


Co.  (120  N.  C.  544),  08,  502. 


Ricketts  v.  Chesapeake  ^   < ).    R.  Co.    Ritter   v.    Ewing   (174   Pa.    St.   341), 


(33  W.  Va.  133),  136. 


432,  435. 


Ricketts  v.   Markdale   ([Can.    1900, 1  Ritter  v.  Sieger  (105  Pa.  400),  38. 


Div.    Ct]    31    Ont.   610),   535,  551, 

041. 
Riddle  v.  Delaware  Co.  (156  Pa.  643), 

65. 
Riddle  v.   McGinnis  (22  W.  Va.  253), 

407. 
Ridenhorn  v.  Kan.  City  Cable  K.  Co. 

(102  Mo.  270),  215. 
Ridge  Ave   Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia (181  Pa.  59-2).  81. 
Ridley  v.  Seaboard  &   R.  R.  Co.  (118 

N.  C.  996),  36,  38. 
Ki.ss  v.  Delles  (45  Wis.  662),  79. 
Riewe  v.   McCormick  (11    Neb.  264), 

111,  117. 
Rigdon   v.  Temple   Waterworks  Co. 

(  II  Tex.  Civ.  App.  512),  522. 
Rigden  v.  Walcott  (6  Gill.  &  J.  [Md.] 

419),  400. 


Kitz    v.    Austin    (1    Tex.    Civ.    App. 
455),  522. 

Kitz  v.  City  <»f  Wheeling  (45  W.  Va. 

262),  04. 
Rives  v.   City  of  Columbia  (80  Mo. 

App.   17:;:  2   Mo.    App.    Rep.   537), 

65*. 
Roach  v.  Caldbeck  (64  N't.  593  i,  369, 

372,  373. 
Roach  v.    Consolidated    1.    M.   Co.  (7 

Fed.  09s  i.  511. 
Roach  v.  Western  &   A.    \i.  Co.   (93 

Ga.  785),  172. 

Roades   v.    Larson    (50    \.   V.    St.    R, 

551).   380. 
Roanoke  v.  Shull  (  [Va.   1899]  34  S. 

E.  34),  214. 
Robards  v.   Wabash    K.  Co.  (84  111. 

App.  177 1.  04. 


cxl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    TX    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Robbins  v.   Mount  (4  Rob.    [N.  Y.] 

553),  151. 
Robbins   v.   Springfield   St.   Ry.   Co. 

(165  Mass.  30),  171. 
Roberts  v.  Hettman  (45  W.  Va.  143), 

102. 
Roberts  v.    B reckon    (31    App.    Div. 

[N.   Y.]  131),  394. 
Roberts  v.  Graham" (6  Wall.   [U.   S.] 

578),  80. 
Roberts  v.  Hackney  (  [Ky.]  59  S.  W. 

328),  454. 
Roberts  v.  Heim  (27  Ala.  678),  121. 
Roberts    v.    Hopper   (55   Neb.    599), 

471. 
Roberts  v.  Mason  (10  Ohio  St.  277), 

114,  370,  372. 
Roberts    v.    Ogdensburgh    &    Lake 

Champlain    R.    R.     Co.    (29    Hun 

[N.  Y.],  154),  295. 
Roberts  v.    Rigdon   (  [Ga.]    7  S.    E. 

742),  107. 
Roberts  v.  Taylor  (  [1899]  21  Ont.  R. 

10),  63. 
Robertson    v.     Cornelson    (34    Fed. 

716),  215,  218,  243,  263. 
Robertson  v.  Mayor  of  N.  Y.  (7  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  645),  514. 
Robertson  v.  New  York  Press  Co.  (2 

App.  Div.  49),  389. 
Robertson    v.    Wabash     R.    R.    Co. 

([Mo.  1899]  53  S.  W.  1082),  251,  255. 
Robertson   v.  Youghiogheny  Riv.   C. 

Co  (172  Pa.  566;  27  Pitts.  L.  J.  N. 

S.  67;  33  Atl.  706),  67. 
Robinson  v.   Burton  (5  Harr.   [Del.] 

335),  111,  124. 
Robinson  v.    Canadian    Pac.    R.    Co. 

([1892]  App.  Cas.  481),  922. 
Robinson  v.  Cone  (22  Vt.  224),  176. 
Robinson  v.  Detroit  &  C.  S.  Nav.  Co. 

(73  Fed.  883),  506. 
Robinson    v.     Drummond    (24    Ala. 

174),  401. 
Robinson  v.  Dun  (24  Ont.  Rep.  287), 

427. 
Robinson  v.  Evening  Post  Pub.  Co. 
(39  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  525),  417. 


Robinson  v.  Gary  (28  Ohio,  241),  166. 
Robinson  v.   Goings  (63  Miss.   500), 

124. 
Robinson  v.   Masino  (3   Wash.   434), 

214,  215,  218,  223. 
Robinson    v.    Met.    St.    Ry.    Co.    (34 

Misc.  R.  [N.  Y.]  795),  322. 
Robinson  v.   Met.  St.   Ry.  Co.  (63   N. 

Y.  Supp.  969),  100. 
Robinson  v.   New  York  Cent.   R.   R. 

Co.  (66  N.  Y.  11),  172. 
Robinson  v.  Simpson  (8  Houst.  [Del.] 

398),  63,  251. 
Robinson  v.    Superior   Rapid   Trans. 

R.  Co.  (94  Wis.  345),  136,  138. 
Robinson  v.  Western  Pac.   R.  R.  Co. 

(48  Cal.  409),  166. 
Robison  v.   Rupert  (23  Pa.   St.  523), 

371,  377. 
Roche   v.   Redington   (125   Cal.    174), 

214,  229. 
Rock  v.   Denis  (4  Mont.  L.  R.  356), 

220. 
Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  De- 

laney   (82  111.   198),   602,   607,  625, 

634,  635. 
Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells 

(66  111.  321),  139. 
Rockland   Water   Co.   v.   Tillsun   (69 

Me.  255 ),  83. 
Rockwell  v.  Eldred  (7  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

95),  224. 
Rockwood  v.  Allen  (7  Mass.  252),  62. 
Rodenbaugh,  Young,  v.  Rodenbaugh, 

(  [C.  P.]  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  477),  515. 
Rodgers  v.  Fergusou  (36  Tex.  544), 

124. 
Rodney  v.   St.    Louis   S.   W.   R.   Co. 

(  [Mo.]  30  S.  W.  150),  213. 
Roeder  v.  Ormsby  (22  How.  Pr.  270), 

576. 
Roeder  v.  Ormsby   (13  Abb.  [X.  Y.] 

334),  576. 
Rogan   v.    Montana    C.    R.    Co.    (20 

Mont.  503),  227,  233. 
Roger  v.    Rochester   R.    Co.   (2  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.],  5;  73  N.  Y.  St.  R.  209), 

586. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN     VOL.    I. 


cxli 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Rogers  v.   Dutt  (13   Moore  P.  C.   C.  |  Kosedale  (  [D.  O.S.  I).  N.  Y.]  88  Fed. 

200),  71.  324),  320. 

Rogers  v.    Ferguson    (36    Tex.    544),  j  Rosekrautz  v.   Ba'rker  (115  111.  333), 

112.  i.;1-'. 

Rogers  v.  Henry  (32  Wis.  328),  145.      Rosen  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co.  (  [C. 
Rogers  v.   Mullen  ([Tex.   Civ.    App.  |      C.  App.  8th  C]  49   l.  S.  A.pp.  847; 

1900]  63  S.  W.  897),  441.  83  Fed.  300),  1  18. 

Rogers  v.  Orion  (116  Mich.  324),  325. 1  Rosenbaum  v.    McThomas   (34  Ind. 

331),  77. 
Rosenbaum    v.    Shoffner    (98    Tenn. 

624),  859. 
Rosenfeld  v.  Stix  (67  Bio.  App.  582), 
443. 
Rolin  v.  Steward  |  14  ('.  15.  p.  005;  23  '  Rosenfield  v.  Express  Co.  (1  Wood. 

L.  J.  C.  P.  p.  151),  11.  [U.  S.]  131. 

Roll  v.  Davison  (165  Pa.  392),  515.         Rosenkranz  v.  Lindell  Ry.  Co.  (  [Mo.] 
Rolling  v.  Chambers  (51  Vt.  592),  467.        18  S.  \V.  890),  312. 
Romaine   v.    Decker   (11    App.   Div.    Rosevelt  v.  Man.  R.  Co.  (37  N.  Y.  St. 

[X.  Y.]  20),  458.  R.  894),  240. 

Rombough   v.    Balch  (27   Ont.   App.    Rosenwald  v.  llammerstein  (12  Daly 


Rohling  v.   Rich  (23  App.  Div.    179; 

48  N.  Y.  Supp.  892),  63. 
Rohrbough  v.  Bailer  Co.  (39  W.  Va. 

472),  65. 
Roland  v.  McGuire  (64  Ark.  412),  033. 


32),  535,  541,  551. 

Rompillon  v.   Abbott  (1  N.  Y.  Supp. 

662),  100. 
Rooney  v.  X.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 

(173  Mass.  222),  249. 
Roose  v.    Perkins  (9   Neb.  304,  315), 

111,  117,  607,  622. 
Root  v.  Butte,  A.  &    P.    R.    Co.    (20 

Mont.  354),  80. 
Knot  v.  Des  Moines  City  Ry.  Co.  (113 

Iowa,  675;  83  X.  W.  904),  181. 
Root  v.   King  (7  Cow.    [X.   Y.]  613), 

381,  401,  422. 
Root  v.  Loundes  (6  Hill,  518),  404. 
Root  v.   Monroeville  (  [Ohio  C.  C]  1 

Toledo  Leg.  Xews,  208),  244. 
Root  v.   Rose  (0  X.  D.  575),  432,  433. 
Root  v.  Sturdivant  (70 Iowa.  55),  112, 

124.  145,218. 
Rose  v.  Gallup  (33  Conn.  338),  78. 
Rose  v.  McCook  (70  Mo.  App.  183), 

208. 
Rose  v.  Mitchell  (21  R.  I.  270),  4G2. 
Rose  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.  (106 

N.  C.  168),  139,  141,  340. 
Rosecrans  v.  Osay  i  19  Neb.  512),  si. 


[X.  Y.],  377),  404. 
Rosewater  v.  Hoffman  (24  Xeb.  222), 

406,  410. 
Ross  v.  Fickling  (11  App.  D.  C.  442), 

102. 
Ross   v.   Kansas  City   (48  Mo.   App. 

440),  240,  203. 
Ross  v.  Leggett  (01    Mich.    445),  111, 

116,  448,  451,  452. 
Ross  v.   Xew  Home  Sew.  Mach.   Co. 

(24  Mo.  App.  353),  94. 
Ross  v.  Texas  &   P.  Ry.  Co.  (44  Fed. 

1 1  ..  51  I.  527,  528,  "'37.  548,  551. 
Ross  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.   Co.  (81 

Fed.  676),  84. 
Rost  v.  Brooklyn  II.  R.  Co.  (10  App. 

Div.  [X.  V.]  477).  207. 
Kmli   v.    Kppy  (80    111.  283),  111,  12:',, 

124. 
Roth  v.  Union   Depot  Co.  (13  Wash. 

525),  176,  214. 
Rothschild  v.  Mark  (115 N.  Y.  1),488. 
Rothschild    v.    Williamson    (83    Ind. 

387),  81. 
Rouse  v.  Detroit  Elec.  1!.  t\>.  i  [Mich. 

1901]  87  X.  W.  <*\,  657,  <i63. 


Rosecrants   v.   Shoemaker   (Go   Mich.     Rouse   v.    Horusby  (  [C.  C.  App.   8th 
4),  475.  C]  07  Fed.  219),  215,  227. 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Ruper  (23  Ind.  App.  27), 
v.  McGuire  (64  Ark.  412), 

Railroad  Co.   (63  Conn. 

Samuel  (11  Q.  B.  39), 
Ross  (  [Va. 


v. 


Rouse  v.   Melsheimer  (82  Mich.  172), 

473,  475. 
Rouse   v.   Met.  St.   Ry.  Co.    (41  Mo. 

App.  298),  135. 
Rowan  v.  Lee  (3  J.   J.  Marsh.    [Ky.] 

97),  106. 
Rowe    v.    Mores    (9  Rich.  L.  [S.   C] 

423),  370. 
Rowe  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.   R.  Co. 
(82  Hun  [N.  Y.],  153),  100,  212,  562. 
Rowe   v. 

660. 
Rowland 

514. 
Rowland 

415),  290. 
Rowland   v 

438. 
Rowland  Lumber  Co.  v. 
1902]  40  S.  E.  922),  103. 
Rowley  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  (42 

L.  J.  Ex.  153),  524,  540. 
Rowley  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.   Co. 
(L.  R.  8  Exch.  221),  511,  537,  539, 
542,  547. 
Rowley  v.  London  &   N.   W.  Ry.  (L. 

R.  21  W.  R.  869),  528. 
Royal   Ins.    Co.   v.    Crowell   (77   111. 

App.  544),  104. 
Roza  v.  Smith  (  [D.  C.  N.  D.  Cal.]  65 

Fed.  592),  452. 
Rucker  v.  Smoke  (37  S.  C.  377),  139. 
Rudd  v.  Rounds  (64  Vt.  432),  457,  460. 
Rudiger  v.   Chicago,   St.  P.  M.  &  O. 

R.  Co.  (94  Wis.  191),  505. 
Rudiger  v.  Chicago,    St.   P.  M.  &  O. 
R.    Co.    (101    Wis.    292),   648,  655, 
661,  663. 
Rue  v.  Alter  (5  Denio,  119),  501. 
Ruffner   v.  Hooks   (2  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

278),  430,  432,  435. 
Rundell     v.     La     Compagnie     Gen. 

Trans.  (94  Fed.  366),  488. 
Russell  v.  Bradley  (50  Fed.  515),  100. 
Russell  v.  Chambers  (31   Minn.  54), 

467. 
Russell  v.  Corning  Mfg.  Co.  (63  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  640),  80. 


New  York  (2  Denio  [N. 
,  72. 
Pacific  R.   Co.   (113  Cal. 

Shuster   (8  W.  &  S.  308), 


Russell  v.  Corning  Mfg.  Co.  (49  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  610),  80. 
Russell  v.  Kelley  (44  Cal.  641),  426. 
Russell  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.  (35  Misc. 

Rep.  [N.  Y.]  293),  241. 
Russell    v.    Minneapolis    St.    R.    Co. 

(  [Minn.    1901]  86  N.  W.  346),  171, 

241. 
Russell  v. 

Y.],  461) 
Russell   v. 

258),  508 
Russell  v. 

455. 
Russell  v.  Sunbury  (37  Ohio  St.  372), 

494,  495. 
Russell   v.    Windsor   Steamboat  Co* 

(126  N.  C.   961),  563,  578,  584,  586, 

588,  589,  634,  667. 
Rutherford      v.     Morning     Journal 

Assoc.    (47    Fed.    487),   386,    390, 

403. 
Rutherford   v.   Shreveport  &   H.   R. 

Co.  (41  La.  Ann.  793),  139,  227. 
Ryalls  v.  Mechanics  Mills  (150  Mass. 

190),  501. 
Ryan  v.  Armour  (166  111.  568),  154. 
Ryan  v.  Benger  &  H.  Brew.   Co.  (37 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  287),  391. 
Ryan  v.  Bristol  (63  Conn.  26),  165. 
Ryan  v.  Carter  (93  U.  S.  78),  501. 
Ryan  v.   Louisville,  etc.,  R.   Co.  (44 

La.  Ann.  806),  165. 
Ryder  v.  Mayor  (50  N.  Y.  Supr.  220), 

214. 
Sabine  &  E.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ewing  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  26  S.  W.  638),  274. 
Sabine  &  East  Tex.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawks 

(73  Tex.  323),  522. 
Sachs   v.    City   of    Sioux    City   (109 

Iowa,  224),  642. 
Saffer  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co. 

(5  N.  Y.  Supp.  700),  240. 
Safford  v.  Drew  (3  Duer  [N.  Y.],  627), 

488,  561,  569. 
Saint.     See  St. 

Salem  v.  Harvey   (29  111.  App.  483), 
605,  607,  614,  618,  631,  636,  637. 


CABLE    OF    «    ^.SES    CITED    IN     Vol..    I. 


cxlii 


[References  are  to  Sections.  J 

Salem    Bedford   Stove  Co.  v.  Hobos  San  Antonio  &  A.  I'.  R.  Co,   v.  Grier 

([Ind.]38N.  E.  538),  515,  885.  (20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  L88),  139. 

Salida   v.    McKinna   (16  Colo.   523),  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin 

323,  (20  l'.x.<  Lv.  App.  91),  431,  449,455. 

Salinav.  Trosper  (27  Kan.  544),  220.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hard- 

Salina    Mill  &    Elev.    Co.   v.    Hoyne  ing  (11  Tex.  Civ.  App.    497),  528. 


(  [Kan.    App.    1900]     63    Pa.   660), 
215. 

Salisbury  v.  Herchenrodee  ( 10(3  Mass. 

458),  63. 
Salladay  v.  Dodgeville  (85  Wis.  318), 

193. 
Salter  v.  Utica  &  Black   River   R.  K. 

Co.  (88  N.  Y.  42),  161. 
Salter  v.  Utica  &  Black  R.  K.  Co.  (86 

N.  Y.  401),  595. 
Saltus  v.  Kipp  (•")  Ducr  [X.  Y.],  040), 

375. 
Saltzman  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.  (7:5    San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Long 

Hun  [N.  Y.J,  567),  --'74.  ([Tex.    Civ.    App.    1895]  28   S.    W. 

Salville  v.  Roberts  (1  Ld.  Raym.  374),        214),  214. 

43(5.  San  Antonio   &    A.   P.  P..  Co.  v.  Parr 

Salyers  v.  Monroe  (104  [owa,74),  166.        ([Tex.  Civ.  App.]26S.  vV.  861),  214. 
Sampson  v.  Henry  (11   Pick.   [Mass.]  |  San   Antonio    &    A.    P.    R.    Co.    v. 


San  Antonio  &  A.  1'.  R.  Co.  \.  Keller 

(11   Tex.   Civ.    A  i»i>.  569),  215,  218. 

227,  254. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  K.    Co.  v.  Long 

(87  Tex.    L48),   524,   527.  528,  532, 

51 15 . 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Long 

I  in  Tex.  Civ.    App.   649),  528,  544, 

5")."). 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  \.  Long, 

(87Tex.  148;  27  S.  W.  113),  536,  544, 

551,  555. 


379),  376. 

Samuels   v.   California  St.   Cable    R. 

Co.  (124  Cal.  274).  299. 
Samuels  v.  Evening  Mail  Assoc.  (75 

N.  Y.  004),  124,  397. 
Samuels  v.  Richmond  &  T.  R.  Co.  (35 

S.  C.  493),  112,  348. 
San  Antonio  v.  Kreusel  (17  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  594),  220. 
San  Antonio  v.  Mackey  (14  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  210;  36  S.  W.  700),  31. 
San  Antonio  v.  Mullally  (11  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  596),  03. 
San  Antonio  v.  Porter   ([Tex.   Civ. 

App.  1900]  59  S.  W.  922),  253. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  I!.  Co.  v.  Beam 

([Tex.   Civ.   App.]   50  S.   W.  411), 

242. 
San  Antonio  <fe  A.   P.  R.  Co.  v.  Belt 

([Tex.  Civ.   App.    1000]  59  S.    W. 

607),  316. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Green 

(20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  5;  49  S.  W.  672), 

214. 


Vaughn    (5    Tex.    Civ.    App.    195), 

537. 
San    Antonio    &    A.    P.    R.    Co.     v. 

Wergers  (22  Tex.  Civ.   App.  344), 

80. 
San    Antonio  Gas   Co.    v.    Harber    (1 

White    &   W.  Cir.   Cas.   Ct.    App. 

[Tex.]  1125).  91. 
San    Antonio   St.    R.   Co.  V.  Cailloute 

(79  Tex.  341),  5  17.  556. 
S;tn    Antonio     St.     R.    Co.     v.     Mntli 

([Tex.   Civ.    App.    L895]  27  S.    W. 

752),  300,  305,306. 
San    Antonio   St.    R.  Co.  v.   Renken 

(15  Tex.  Civ  App.  229;  38S.  W.  829), 

157.  523,  524,  528,  530,  532,  536,542, 

547. 
San  Antonio  St.  R.    Co.    v.    Watzlav- 

zick  (  [Tex.  |  28  s.  W.  115),  552. 
San     \nlonio  Tract.  Co.  v.  White  (60 

S.  W.  323).  532,  549. 
San    Antonio    Tract.   Co.    v.     White 

(  [Tex.]  61  S.  W.  706  |,  52  I.  529,  530, 

535,  548. 


cxliv  TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

San  Antonio  Waterworks  Co.  v. 
White  (  [Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.]  44  S.  W. 
181),  177. 
Sanborn  v.  Fickett  (91  Me.  364),  386. 
Sandell  v.  Sherman  ( 107  Cal.  391 ),  440. 
Sanderson  v.  Caldwell  (45  N.  Y.  398), 

381,  385,  426. 
Sanderson  v.  Hall  (22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

282),  384. 
Sanderson   v.    Sanderson    (36    L.    I. 

847),  532,  537. 
Sandersville  v.   Hurst  (111  Ga.  453; 

36  S.  E.  757),  65. 
Sandy  River    C.    C.    Co.   v.   Candell 
(  [Ky.  App.  1901]  60  S.  W.  180),  168. 
Sanford  v.  Augusta  (32  Me.  536),  227, 

251. 
Sanford  v.  Eighth  Ave.   R.   Co.   (23 

N.  Y.  343),  164. 
Sanford  v.  Rowley  (93  Mich.  119),  423. 
Sanson  v.  Conaway  (37  W.  Va.  159), 

280. 
Saperstone  v.   Rochester  R.  Co.   (25 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  285),  211. 
Sapp  v.  Northern  Cent.    Ry.  Co.   (51 

Ind.  115),  119,  134. 

Sarasohn    v.     Workingmen's      Pub. 

Assn.  (44  App.  Div.   [N.  Y.]  302), 

414. 

Sargent  v.  Carnes  (84  Tex.  156),  369. 

Sargent    v.   Hampden    (38  Me.  581), 

192. 
Sarver  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  ( 104 

Iowa,  59;  73  N.  W.  498),  63. 
Satchwell  v.  Williams  (40  Conn.  371), 

75. 
Satterlee  v.  United  States  (30  Ct.  CI. 

31),  70. 
Saul  v.  Everet  (4  J.   J.  Marsh.  [Ky.] 

10),  97. 
Sauter  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (66 

N.  Y.  50),  268,  563. 
Sauter  v.  New   York  C.  &  H.   R.  R. 

Co.  (6  Hun  [N.  T.],  446),  578. 
Savannah  A.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  McLeod 

(94  Ga.  530),  248,  267. 
Savannah  &  O.  C.  Co.  v.  Bourquin  (51 
Ga.  378),  38. 


Savannah,      F.      &     W.    R.      Co.   v. 

Beavers  (  [Ga.  1901]  39  S.  E.  82),  64. 

Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis 

(25  Fla.  917),  99. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard 

(91  Ga.  99),  214. 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wain- 

wright  (99  Ga.  255),  292,  293. 
Savannah,  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  McLeod 

(94  Ga.  530),  269. 
Saville  v.  Roberts  (1  Ld.  Raym.  374), 

429. 
Sawyer  v.  Perry  (88  Me.  42),  597,  600. 
Sawyer  v.  Richards  (65   N.   H.    185), 

515. 
Sawyer  v.  Rumford  Falls   Paper  Co. 

(90  Me.  354),  214. 
Sawyer  v.  Sawyer  (10  Kan.  466),  120. 
Sayen  v.  Ryan  (9  Ohio  C.  C.  631),  376. 
Sayre  v.  Sayre  (25  N.  J.  L.  235),  422. 
Scarborough  v.   State   (24  Ark.  20), 

78. 
Scarlett  v.  Norwood  (115  N.  C.  284; 

20  S.  E.  459),  68. 
Schaabs  v.  Woodburn  Sarven  Wheel 

Co.  (56  Mo.  173),  160. 
Schadelwald  v.   Milwaukee,   L.  S.  & 

W.  R.  Co.  (55  Wis.  569),  643. 
Schafer  v.  New  York  (12  App.  Div. 

384),  165. 
Schafer  v.  St.  Louis  &  H.  R.  Co.  (65 

Mo.  App.  201 ),  63. 
Schaffer  v.  Baker  Trans.  Co.  (29  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  459),  63,  514,  586. 
Scheffer   v.  Railroad   Co.   (105    U.  S. 

249),  161. 
Scheffler  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.,  Ry.  Co. 

(32  Minn.  125),  495. 
Scheldrup  v.  Farwell  Co.  (67  111.  App. 

630),  430. 
Schell  v.  Plumb  (55  N.  Y.  592),  268. 
Schenkel  v.  Pittsburg  &  B.  Traction 

Co.  (  [Pa.  1899]  44  Atl.  1072),  215. 
Schiek  v.  Sanders  (53  Neb.  664),  471. 
Senile  v.  Brokhhaus  (80  N.  Y.  614), 

83. 
Schillinger  v.  United  States  ( 155  U.  S. 
167),  65. 


TABLE    OF    <ASKS    CITED    IN     Vol..    I. 


cxlv 


[References  are  to  Sections 
Schimpf   v.  Sliter  (04  Hun  [\.  V.],  I  Schrier  v.  Milwaukee.  I,.  S.  A-  W.  B 

463),  258. 
Schindel    v.  Schindel   i  12  Md.  208), 


119. 


Co.  (65  Wis.  457),  514,  648,  667. 
Schuetl    v.  Stillwater  (80  Minn.  287; 
83  \.  W.  180),  65. 


Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.,  K.  Co.    Scbug  v.  Ry.  Co.  (102  Wis.  515),  64 
is?  Mich.  400),  176.  Schuhle  v.  I  unningham  (13  X.  V.  st 

Schindler  v.  X.  V.  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  (1 


X.  Y.  St.  R.  289),  ITU. 
Schippel  v.  Norton  (38 Kan. 567),  118, 

123,  442. 
Schlerth    v.    Missouri     1'.    R.   K.  Co. 

(  [Mo.]  19  S.  W.  1134),  207. 
Sclilichting    v.     Wintger     (25    Hun 

[X.  Y.],  620),  913. 
Sehlossen  v.  Fox  (14  tod.  365),  377. 
Schmidt  v.  Deegan  (69  Wis.  300),  043, 

663,  6<;r>. 
Schmidt    v.   Menosha  Wooden  Ware 

Co.  (99  Wis.  300),  642,  663. 


R.  si).  ;;iti. 
Schulerv. Third  Ave.  R.Co.  (44  X.  V. 

Si.  R.  744),  214. 
Schum  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  (107  Pa. 

si.  8),  L66. 
Schumaker  v.   Mather  (38  X.  Y.  St. 

R.  542),  L64. 
Schumaker  v.  St.  Paul  &  I).  K.  Co. 

I  46  Minn.  39).  344. 
Schwamler  v.  Birge  I  3:',  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

186),  63. 
Schwanzen  v.  Brooklyn  H.  K.  Co.  (18 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.l  20.",  |,  263. 


Schmit  v.  Dry  Dock   E.  B.  R.  Co.  (3  Schwartz   v.  Davis   (90  Iowa,  324;  57 

N.   Y.    St.    R.    257),    SI,    204,   257.  X.  W.  849),  79.  107. 

258.  Sell  wart  z  v.  North  Jersey  St.  Ry.  Co. 

Schmitt  v.  Metropolitan  L.  Ins.  Co.  '  ([X.    V.   Supp.   1901]   49  Atl.  676), 

(13  App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  120),  562.  233. 

Schmitt   v.    Milwaukee    K.    Co.    (89  Schwartz  v.  Shull  (45  W.  Va.  405), 

Wis.  195),  354,  364.  86,  292. 

Schmitz  v.St.  Louis,  I.  M.  A  S.   R.  Schwartzschild  &  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah, 

Co.  (46  Mo.  App.  381),  300,  305.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (76  Mo.    App.  623; 

Schmitz  v.  St.   Louis,  I.  M.  A-  S.    II.  1  Mo.  A.  Repr.  588),  68. 

Co.  (119  Mo.  256;  24  S.  W.  472;  23  J  Schweinfurth   v.  Cleveland.  C.   C.   & 

L.  R.  A.  250),  218,  224,  240,  312. 
Schoepflin  v.  Coffey  (49  X.  Y.  Supp 


627),  402. 
Schofield  v.  Territory  Anier.  Valley 

Co.  (9  N.  M.  526),  108. 
Scholes  v.  North   London  Ry.  (21  L. 

I.  835),  91. 
Schollield  O.  &    I'.  Co.  v.  Scholfield 

(71  Conn.  1),  102. 
Schondorf  v.  Griffith  (13  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  580),  430. 
Sclioneman  v.  Fiegley  (7  Pa.  Si.  433), 

31. 
Schooner.     See  name. 
Schorn  v.  Berry  (63  Hun  [X.  Y.],  110), 

460. 
Schriener  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (12  App.  Div.  [X.  Y.J5.M  i.  360. 

10 


St.    L.    R.    Co.   (60  Ohio  St.  215), 
161. 
Schwingschlegl  v.  Monroe  (113  Mich. 

683),  217. 
Scott  v.  Hanks  (60  X.  Y.  Supp.   397), 

257. 
Scotl  v.  Hay  (3  Md.  431  i.  67. 
Scotl  v.  Bryson  i7l  111.  420),  11'.'.  131. 
Scotl  v.  (arothers  ( 17  Ind.  App.  673), 

515. 
Seoii  v.  Central  It.   Co.   (77  <ia.  450), 

888. 
Scott  v.  Chesapeake  A-  <  >.    It.   Co.  (43 

W.  Va.    is  I  |,  334. 
Scotl  v.  Donald  (165   D".  S.  58),  111, 

126. 
Scott  \.  Flowers  (60  Neb.   675),   449, 
155 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    IN     VOL. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Scott  v.  London  Dry  Docks  Co.   (3 

Hurlst.  &  C.  396),  150. 
Scott  v.   Montgomery  (95.Penn.   St. 

444),  218,  227,  245. 
Scott  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (30  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

843),  94. 
Scott  v.  Shepherd  (2  W.  Bl.  892),  84. 
Scougale  v.  Sweet  (124  Mich.  311;  82 

N.  W.  1061),  384.' 
Scripps  v.  Reilly  (38  Mich.  23),   116. 
Scullane  v.  Kellogg  (169  Mass.  544), 

252. 
Scullin  v.  Harper    ([C.   C.  App.   7th 

C]  78  Fed.  460),  416,  426. 
Seaboard  Mfg.  Co.  v.   Woodson  (98 

Ala.  378),  228,  248. 
Seabridge  v.  McAdam  (119  Cal.  460), 

440. 
Seabrook  v.  Hicker  (4  Rob.   [N.  Y.] 

344),   149. 
Seaman  v.  Farmers  L.  &  T.   Co.    (15 

Wis.  578),  672. 
Seamans  v.  Hoge  (105  Ga.  159),  430. 
Searight  v.  Austin  (  [Tex.]   42  S.  W. 

857),  522. 
Searles  v.   Cronk  (38  How.   Pr.   [N. 

Y.]  320),  74. 
Sears  v.  Hathaway  (12  Cal.  277),  436. 
Sears  v.  Lyons  (2  Stark.   X.  P.  317), 

111. 
Seat  v.  Morelaud  (7  Humph.  [Teun.] 

575),  77. 
Seaver  v.  Adams  (66  N.  H.  142),  458. 
Second  Ward  Sav.   Bk.  v.  Schranck 

(97  Wis.  250),  102. 
Secor  v.  Taylor  (41  Hun  [N.  Y.],  123), 

478. 
Secord  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  (15  Q. 

B.  [Ont.]  631),  527,  542,  544. 
Security  Title  &  T.  Co.  v.  West  Chi- 
cago St.  R.  Co.  (91  111.  App.   332), 

633. 
Seeley  v.  Alden  (61  Pa.  St.  302),  119, 

120. 
Seeley  v.  Citizens  Tract.  Co.  (179  Pa. 

St.  334),  198. 
Seeley  v.   N.  Y.  C.   &  H.  R.   Co.   (8 

App.  Div.  402),  514,  563,  572,  586. 


Seeman  v.  Feeney  (19  Minn.  79),  111. 
Seger  v.  Barkhamsted  (22  Conn.  290), 

218. 
Seifter  v.    Brooklyn    Heights  R.  Co. 

(66  N.  Y.  Supp.  1107),  563,  569. 
Seip  v.  Deshler  (170  Pa.  St.  334),  382. 
Seitz  v.  Dry  Dock  E.   B.  &  C.  H.  Co. 

(32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  56),  228. 
Selden  v.  Cushman  (20  Cal.  56),  119, 

134. 
Selden  v.  Jacksonville  (28  Fla.  558; 

10  So.  457),  71. 
Sellars  v.  Foster  (27   Neb.  118),  478 

624. 
Selleck  v.  Janesville  (100  Wis.    157), 

195,  316. 
Selleck  v.  Janesville  (104  Wis.  570), 

323. 
Sellers  v.  Arie  (99  Iowa,  515),  471. 
Selma  R.  Co.  v.   Lacey  (49  Ga.  106), 

495. 
Selsby  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.  (95  Mich. 

204),  233. 
Seltzer  v.  Saxton  (71  111.  App.  229), 

214. 
Senior  v.  Ward  (1  El.  &  El.  385),  68, 

522. 
Serensen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (45 

Fed.  407),  561,  598,  602,  603,  607, 

626,  637. 
Serwe   v.    Northern   P.    R.    Co.    (48 

Minn.  78),  351,  354. 
Sesler  v.  Rolfe  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  ( [W. 

Va.  1902)  41  S.  E.  216),  263. 
Sess  v.  Richey  (58  N.  Y.  Supp.  1148), 

79. 
Seward  v.  The  Vera  Cruz  (10  App. 

Cas.  59),  498,  499. 
Seward     v.    Wilmington     (2    Marv. 

[Del.]  189),  208. 
Sewell  v.  Butler  (16  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.] 

77),  295. 
Seybold  v.  Morgan  (43  111.  App.  39), 

515. 
Seybold  v.  New  York,  Lake  Erie,  etc., 

R.  Co.  (95  N.  Y.  562),  150. 
Shaber  v.    St.   Paul,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(28  Minn.  104),  264. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED    IN     VOL 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


cxlvii 


Shafer  v.  Lacock  |  168  Pa.  197  \,  L50. 

Shaffer  v.  Dry  Dock    R,   <'<>.  (5  X.  Y. 

Supp.  700),  240. 
Bhaler  v.  Bdwy.  Imp.  Co.  (162  V   V. 

641),  243,  250. 
Shallow   v.    Vernon   (Ir.   R.  it  C.  L. 

L50),  523,  544. 
Shanfelter  v.  Baltimore  (80  Md.    183; 

:;i  Ail.  139),  71. 
Shanks  v.  Stunipf  (23   Misc.    [N.   Y.j 

264  i,  :;:»T. 
Sharp   v.    Bowlar   (1!)   Ky.    L.    Rep. 

2018),  404. 
Sharp  v.  Hull  (81  111.   App.  400),  73. 
Sharp  v.  Powell  (41  L.  J.   C.  P.  95), 

91. 
Sharpe  v.  Johnston  (76  Mo.  060),  433. 
Sharpe  v.  Larson  (74  Minn.  323),  413. 
Sharpley  v.  Brown  (43  IIuu  [X.  Y.], 

374),  478. 
Shartle  v.  Hutchinson  (3  Oreg.  337), 

401. 
Shatto  v.  Crocken  (87  Cal.  629),  438. 
Shattuck  v.  Hammond  (40  Vt,    466), 

460. 
Shattuck  v.  McArthur  (20  Fed.  136), 

387. 
Shaw   v.  Boston,  etc.,  R.   R.   Co.  (8 

Gray  [Mass.J,4:>),  263. 
Shaw  v.   Brown  (41  Tex.  446,   499), 

111,  120,  124. 
Shaw  v.  Hoffman  (25  Mich.    102),  05. 
Shaw  v.  R.   R.  Co.  (101  U.  S.   557), 

501. 
Shaw  v.  Webler  (79  Hun  [X.  Y.],  307), 

201. 
Shay  v.   Camden  &   S.   Ry.  Co.  (  [X. 

Y.  1001]  40  Atl.  517),  S3,  218. 
Shay  v.  Thompson  (59  Wis.  540),  133. 
Shea   v.    Potrero,  etc.,   Railroad   Co. 

(44  Cal.  414),   263. 
Shea  v.    St.   Paul   City  Ry.   Co.   (50 

Minn.  305),  171. 
Shear  v.  Hiles  (07  Wis.  350),  142. 
She  Atv.  Hallett  (12  sawy.   [U.  S.] 

250),  77,  81. 
Sheedy  v.   Union  Press  Brick  Works 
(25  Mo.  App.  527),  75. 


Sheehan  v.  ( litizens   R.    Co.  1 72   Mo. 

App.  524).    156. 

Sheehan   \.    Edgar   (58  N.    Y.  631), 

227.   251. 

Sheehan  v,   Pierce  (70  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

22),     II'.'. 

Sheehan  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R,  Co.  i  [U. 
S.C.  C.  A.  Ttli  C]  22  Q.S.C.  C.  A. 

121;  40    U.    S.   App.    408;    70  Fed. 

201),  03. 
Sheehy  v.  Cokleyi  13  Iowa.  L83),  425. 
Sheets  v.  Ohio   River  R.   R.  Co.   (39 

W.  Va.  175  |,  . 
Sheik  v.  Hohson  (04  Iowa.  1  16),  L32. 
Shelby  v.  Castetter  (7  1ml.  A  pp. 

325. 
Shelby  v.  Clagett   (40  Ohio  St.  549), 

289. 
Shelby    Co.,  Board  of,  v.  Scearce  (2 

Duv.  [Ky.]  570),  503. 
Sheldon   v.    Carpenter   (4    N.    Y.    [4 

Comst.]  578),  436,  137. 
Shelton  v.   Simmons    i  12   Ala.  466), 

401. 
She  pan  1  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(77  Iowa,  54  i,  354. 
Shepard  v.  Creamer   (160  Mass.  496), 

150. 
Shepard  v.  Gates  (50  Mich.  495),  95. 
Shepherd  v.  Hampton  (3  Wheat.   [U. 

S.]  200),  94. 
Sheridan  v.    Brooklyn  City  &  X.   R. 

Co.    (36  X.  Y.  39),  84,  85. 
Sheridan  v.  Hibbard   (119   111.   307), 

227,  24:',. 
Sherman  v.  Dutch  (16  111.  283),  111. 
Sherman    v.    Johnson    (58    N't.    40), 

405. 
Sherman  v.  Kortrighl    (52   Barb.  [X. 

T.]  2(17),  375. 
Sherman  v.  Stage  Co.  (24   Iowa.  515), 

199. 
Sherwood  v.  Chicago,    etc.,  R.   Co. 

(82  Midi.  374),  2ls.  224,  251. 
Sherwood  v.  Chic.  &  W.  M.  K.  R.  Co. 

(88  Mich.  L08),  278. 
Sherwood  v.  Grand  Ave.   R.  Co.  (132 
Mo.  339),  206. 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN    \'<>L.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Sherwood  v.  Kyle  (125  Cal.  662),  386.  |  Simmons  v.  White  (  [C.  A.] 


Sherwood  v.  Tetman  (55  Pa.  St.  77), 

468. 
Sherill  v.  Connor  (107  N.  C.  543),  95. 
She  waiter  v.  Bergman  (123  ind.  155), 

464,  466. 
Shidet  v.  Jules  Dreyfuss   Co.  (50  La. 

Ann.  280),  214. 
Shields  v.  Youge  (15  Ga.  349),  495. 
Shilling  v.  Carson  (27  Ind.  175),  422. 
Ship.     See  name  of. 
Shipman  v.  Learn  (92  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

568),  434. 
Shirk  v.  City  of    La  Fayette  (52  Fed. 

857),  507. 
Shoaff  v.   Funk  (182  111.  224),  390. 
Shonwiler  v.  Stewart  (104  Iowa,  67). 

501. 
Shores  v.  Brooks  (81  Ga.  468),  133. 
Short  v.  Skipworth  (1  Brock.  [U.  S.] 

103,  114),  94. 
Shortsleeves  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.   R. 

Co.  (40  N.  Y.  Supp.  1105),  214. 
Shultz  v.    Griffith  (103   Iowa,    150), 

240. 
Shumway  v.    Walworth    &   M.    Mfg. 

Co.  (98  Mich.  411),  217. 
Shurtleff  v.  Porker   (130  Mass.  293), 

404. 
Shutev.  Hamilton   (3  Daly  [N.  Y.]» 

462),  33. 
Sibley  v.  Smith  (2  Mich.  486),  501. 
Sickra  v.  Small  (87  Me.  493),  414,  422. 
Siddallv.  Jansen  (160   111.   43:  48  X. 
E.  191,  rev'g  67  111.  App.  102),  63. 
Sieber  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.  (76 

Minn.  209),  514. 
Siefke  v.  Siefke  (6  App.  Div.  [X.  Y.] 

472),  432. 
Siegel  C.   &    Co.    v.    Connor   (70  111. 

App.  116),  450. 
Siegle  v.  Rush  (173  111.  559),  146,  479. 
Sikes  v.  Tippins  (85  (4a.  231),  460. 
Silberstein  v.  H.  W.  S..  etc.,  R.  Co.  (22 

X.  Y.  St.  R.  452),  213. 
Silberstein  v.  Wicke  Co.  (29  Abb.  N. 

C.  [N.  Y.]  291),  514,  586,  589. 
Silsby  v.  Mich.  Car  Co.  (95  Mich.  204 
233,  235. 


s. 


L.  J. 

07  [1899]  ),    532,  533, 


Q.  B.   N. 
548. 
Simonin  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.  (36  Hun  [N.  Y.],  214),  229. 
Simons  v.  Burnham   (102  Mich.  189), 

412. 
Simons  v.  Busby  (119  Ind.  13),  464. 
Simons  v.  Lewis   (51   La.  Ann.    327), 

418. 
Simons  v.  Monier  (29  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

419),  155. 
Simpkins  v.  Ward  (45  Mich.  559),  501. 
Simpson    v.  Grayson   (54  Ark.   404), 

467,  468. 
Sinford  v.  Lake  (3  H.  &  N.  275),  377. 
Singer    Mfg.    Co.  v.  Holdfodt  (86  111. 

455),  135,  139,  141. 
Singer    Mfg.    Co.   v.   June  Mfg.   Co. 

(163  U.   S.  169;  41   L.   Ed.  118;  16 

Sup.    Ct.    Rep.   1002;  75   Off.    Gas. 

1703),  67. 
Singleton  v.  Kennedy  (9  B.  Mon.  [Ky.] 

222),  124. 
Sinne    v.    Mayor,   etc.  (8   Civ.    Proc. 

[N.  Y.]    252),  595. 
Sioux  City  &   P.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlajson 

(16  Neb.  578),  102,  214. 
Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (22 

Neb.  775;  36  N.  W.  285),  215,  243, 

24*. 
Sipev.  People,  Milliken  (26  Colo.  127; 

56  Pac.  571),  501. 
Sissing  v.  Beach  (99  Mich.  439;  58  N. 

W.  364),  474.     , 
Skala  v.  Rus  (60  111.  App.  479),  434. 
Skinner  v.  Tinker  (34  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

333),  83. 
Skirm  v.  Hilliker  (  [N.  J.  Supp.  1901] 

45  Atl.  679),  89. 
Skottone  v.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  N.  N.  R. 

Co.  (  [Oregon]    30  Pac.  222),  214. 
Skull  v.  Gleinster  (33  L.  J.  C.  P.  185), 

111. 
Slater  v.  Rink  (18  111.  527),  361. 
Slater  v.  Sherman  (5  Bush  [Ky.],206), 

120,  369. 
Slater  v.  South  Carolina  R.   Co.   (29 
S.  C.  96),  153. 


TABLE   OF   (ASKS    CITED    IN    VX>L. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


cxlix 


[Slaughter  v.  First  Nat.  Ilk.  i  109  Ala. 

L57;   19  So.  130),  7:'.. 
Slaughter  v.  Met.  St.  It.  Co.  (110  Mo. 

269),  241. 
Slaven  v.  Germain  (04  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

506),  178. 
Slavin  v.  State  (152  X.  Y.  45),  108. 
Slayton  v.  Hemken  (91  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

582),  393. 
Slette  v.  Great  Northern   K.  Co.  (53 

Minn.  341;  55  N.  W.  137),  214. 
Sloan  v.  Edwards  (01   Bid.  89,90),  DO, 

120,  144.  218,  374. 
Shan  v.  Petrie  (15  III.  425),  401. 
Sloan  v.  Speaker  (63  Mo.  App.  321 ). 

369. 
Sloane  v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co.  (Ill 

Cal.  00S),  221,  222,  299,  338,  352. 
Sloggy  v.  Crescent  Creamery  Co.  (72 

.Minn.  316;  75  N.  W.  225),  73,  79. 
Sloggy  v.  Dilworth    (38   Minn.   179), 

99. 
Sloman  v.  Mercantile  ( '.  G.  Co.  (112 

Mich.  258,  204),  102. 
Sloniker  v.   Great    Northern   R.   Co. 

(70  Minn.  300),  214. 
Smalling    v.    Kreech    ( [  Tenn.    Ch. 

App.]  40  S.  W.  1019),  910. 
Smawley  v.  Rutheford  Co.  I  122  N.  C. 

007;  29  S.  E.  904),  71. 
Smedley    v.    Hestonville,    M.    &    P. 

Pass.  R.  Co.  (1S4  Pa.  St.  620),  215, 

243,  251. 
Smeizel    v.    Odanah    Iron    Co.    (110 

Mich.  149),  84. 
Smelting  &  K.  Co.  v.  Lieh  (48  X.  Y. 

Super.  Ct.  508),  91. 
Smid   v.    Bernard   (31    Misc.    [X.  Y.] 

35),  391,  393,  394. 
Smiley  v.   St.   Louis   &    II.    Ry.   Co. 

(100    Mo.   029;  01    S.    W.    007).     17. 

244. 
Smith  v.  Allen  (5  Daly  [Conn.],  857), 

100. 
Smith  v.  Bagwell  (19  Fla.   117),  114, 

372. 
Smith  v.  Baker  ([II.  of    L.    1891]    L. 

R.  1  App.  Cas.  325),  68. 


Smith  \.  Bolles  ( 132  U.  S.  125),  82, 

89. 
Smith    v.    Brooklyn    (18    App.    Div. 

[X.  Y.]  340:  40   N.    V.   Supp.    L41), 

07. 
Smith  v.  Chicago  &   A.  R.  Co.  (119 

Mo.  240),  318. 
Smith  v.   Chicago  &  A.   R.  Co.  (108 

Mo.  243),  252. 
Smith  v.  Chicago  Herald  (  [111.  C.C.] 

50  Alb.  L.  J.  23),  386. 

Smith  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R,  Co. 

([S.  I).]  02  X.  \V.  907),  884. 
Smith    v.    City    of    Antonio    ([Tex. 

1900]  57  S.  W.  881),  82. 
Smith  v.  City  of  Sedalia(152  Mo.  283; 

53  S.  W.  907),  65. 
Smith  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph  (55   Mo. 

450),  316,323. 
Smith  v.  Clarke   Hardware  Co.   (100 

Ga.  163;  28  s.  K.  73).  67. 
Smith   v.   Dawley    (92   Iowa,   312:  00 

X.  W.  025),  290. 
Smith  v.  Des  Moines  (84  Iowa,  685; 

51  X.  W.  77),  214. 

Smith  v.  Dye  (21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  002), 

123. 
Smith  v.  East  Mauch  ( 'hunk  i  3  Super. 

Ct.  [Pa.]  495),  181,  251. 
Smith  v.  Flannery  (69  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

615),  380. 
Smith   v.  Ft.  W.  &   C.   R.  R.  Co.  (23 

Ohio  St.  10),  111. 
Smith  v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  (92 

Pa.  St.   I50i.  175. 
Smith    v.    Holcomb   (99    Mass.    552), 

111,  116,  218,  219,  362. 
Smith  v.    [ngersoll    Sergeanl    Rock 

Drill  Co.  I  12  Misc.  [X.  Y.]  5  X.  Y. 

St.  R.  727  1.  178. 
Smith  v.   Louisville,  etc.,  R.   R.   Co. 

(75  Ala.  449),  499,  503. 
Smith  v.  Lynch  (12Civ.  Proc.  [X.  Y.J 

348),  492. 
Smith  v.  Masten   (15  Wend.    [X.    V.] 

270),  457,  460. 
Smith    v.    Matthews   (152  X.  Y.  152), 

402,  403. 


cl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED    TN   VOL.   I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Smith  v.  Matthews  (2  Misc.   [N.  Y.] 

150),  390,  423. 
Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.   (T 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  253),  152. 

Smith   v.    Metropolitan    St.    Ky.   Co. 

(15   Misc.    [N.   Y.]   158),    497,   502, 

559,  561,  564. 

Smith   v.  Meyers  (51  Neb.  857),  460. 

Smith  v.  Michigan  Buggy  Co.  (66  111. 

App.  516),  430. 
Smith  v.  Milburn  (17  Iowa,  30),  468. 
Smith  v.  Munch  (65  Minn.  256),  432. 
Smith  v.  Myers  (52  Neb.  70),  457. 
Smith  v.  Newark  Ice  &  C.  S.  Co.  (8 

Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  283),  64. 
Smith  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

(24  N.  Y.  222),  159. 
Smith  v.  New  York  Central,  etc.,  R. 

R.  Co.  (38  Hun  [N.  Y.],  33),  172. 
Smith  v.  New  YTork  Central  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.  (4  App.  Div.   [N.  Y.]  493), 
169. 
Smith  v.  North  American  Tr.  Co.  (20 

Wash.  580;  56  Pac.  372),  70. 
Smith  v.  Nova  Scotia  Teleph.  Co.  (26 

U.  S.  275),  207. 
Smith  v.  Overby  (30  Ga.  241),  362. 
Smith  v.  Parker  (148  Ind.  127),  79. 
Smith  v.  Phila.  W.  &  B.   R.   Co.  (87 

Ind.  48),  342. 
Smith  v.  Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (23 

Ohio  St.  10),  218. 
Smith  v.   Pittsburg  &  W.   R.  Co.  (90 

Fed.  783),  100,  180,  182,  214. 
Smith  v.  Rackliffe  ( [U.  S.  Sup.  Cal.] 

87  Fed.  964;  31  C.  C.  A.  328),  65. 
Smith  v.   Railroad  Co.  (82  Ga.  801), 

158. 
Smith  v.  Reeves  (178  U.  S.  436;  20  S. 

Ch.  919;  44  L.  Ed.  1140),  65. 
Smith  v.   Reynolds  (8  Hun   [N.  Y.], 

128),  477. 
Smith  v.  Sherman  (4  Cush.    [Mass.] 

408),  13. 
Smith  v.  Sherwood  (2  Tex.  460),  120. 
Smith  v.  Smith  (98  Tenn.  101),  458. 
Smith  v.   Spokane   (10  Wash.    403), 
214,  293,  294. 


Smith  v.  Sun  Pub.  Co.  ( [N.  Y.]  50 

Fed.  399),  390,  423. 
Smith  v.  Sun    Printing  Co.  (55  Fed. 

240),  385,  386,  403. 
Smith  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (10  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  409),  214. 
Smith  v.  Weed   Sew.   Mach.  Co.   (26 

Ohio  St.  562),  79. 
Smith  v.  Western  R.  Co.  of  Ala.  (91 

Ala.  455),  70,  153. 
Smith  v.   Whittier    ([Cal.]    30   Pac. 

529),  214. 
Smith  v.  (People)  Williamson  (31  N. 

E.  425),  478. 
Smith  v.  Wilson  (21  R.  I.  327),  376. 
Smith   v.  Wright   (27  Barb.    [N.  Y.] 

621),  65. 
Smith  v.  Wrightsville,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(83  Ga.  671),  169. 
Smith  v.  Young  (26  Mo.   App.  575), 

467. 
Smithson  v.  Chic.  G.  W.  R.  Co.  (71 

Minn.  216),  84. 
Smithson  v.  United  States  Teleg.  Co. 

(29  Md.  162),  98.     . 
Smithwick  v.  Ward  (7  Jones  [N.  C], 

64),  113. 
Smock  v.  Carter  (6  Okla.  300),  98. 
Smoot  v.   Schooler  (  [Ky.]  8  S.   W. 

202),  57. 
Smyth  v.  Ames  (169  U.  S.  466;  42  L. 

Ed.  819;  18  Sup.  Ct.   Rep.  418;  30 

Chic  L.  News,  243,  mod'd  171  U.  S. 

361;  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  888),  65. 
Sncdeker,    Matter   of,    v.    Snedeker, 

(164   N.  Y.  58),  561,  564,  568,  569, 

572,  580,  587,  592. 
Snelling  v.  Garfield  (114  Mass.  443), 

95. 
Snow  v.  Carpenter  (49  Vt.  426),  118. 
Snow  v.   Grace   (25   Ark.   570),   119, 

127,  128. 
Snyder  v.   Fulton  (34  Md.   128),  385, 

397. 
Snyder  v.  Lexington  (20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

1562;  49  S.  W.  765),  68. 
Snyder  v.   Wheeling   Electrical    Co. 

(43  W.  Va.  661),  150,  155. 


TABLE   OF   CASKS    CITED    IN    VOL.    L 


Cli 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Soderman  v.  Troy  Steel  &  I.  Co.  (TO 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  449),  214. 
Sohns  v.  Lias  (16  Abb.   [N.  V.j  311), 

80,  81. 
Solarz  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  (8  Misc. 

[X.  Y.]  656),  214. 
Sonneborn  v.  Stewart  (2  Woods,  599), 

444. 
Sorensen  v.   Balaban  (11   App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  164),  588. 
Sornberger  v.  Canadian   Pac.   R.  Co. 

(24  Ont.  App.  263),  297. 
Soule  v.    X.  Y.  &  N.   H.   R.   Co.   (24 

Conn.  575),  488,  503. 
Souter  v.   Sea   Witch   (1    Cal.   162), 

501. 


Southern   Kan.   R.   Co.  v.    Isaacs  (20 

Tex.  (iv.  App.  L97;    \S  S.  \V.  690), 

63. 
Southern  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Michaels  (57 

Kan.  474),  293. 
Southern    Kan.    R.   Co.  v.   Rice   (38 

Kan.  398),  340,  343,  354. 
Southern    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Johnson 

(  [U.   S.  C.  C.  A.  9th  C]  44  U.  S. 

1;  C.  C.  A.  317;  69  Fed.  559),  68. 
Southern   P.  R.  Co.  v.   Rauh   (  [C.  C. 

App.  9th  C]  49  Fed.  696),  263. 
Southern    P.    R.    Co.    v.    Tomlinson 

(163  U.  S.  369),  523,  527,  537,  541. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Barlow  (104  Ga. 

213),  342. 


South  v.  Thompson   (1  Penu.   [Del.]  |  Southern  R.   Co.  v.  Bryant  (105  (4a. 


Ed. 


149),  322. 
South  &   North   Ala.   R 

bama  (101  U.  S.  832;   25   L 

973),  65. 
South  &  North  A.  R.  Co.  v.  McLen- 

don  (63  Ala.  266),    122,  218,  227, 

243. 
South  Boston  Iron  Works  v.  United 

States  (34  Ct.  CI.  174),  65. 
South  Chicago  City  R.   Co.  v.  Wal- 
ters (70  111.  App.  271),  246. 
Southcombe  v.  Armstrong  (28  N.  Y. 

St.  R.  753),  390. 
South  Covington  &  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bolt  (22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  906),  248. 
South  Covington  &  C.   St.   R.  Co.  v. 

Herrklotz  (47  S.  W.  2(i.->),  176. 
Southerland  v.  Troy  ct  Boston  R.  R. 

Co.  (74  Hun  [N.  Y.],  162),  165. 
Southern  Bell  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Jordan 

(87  Ga.  (59),  180. 
Southern  Cotton  Press,  etc.,  Co.  v. 

Bradley  (52  Tex.  587),  159. 
Southern  Cotton   P.   &    Mfg.  Co.  v. 

Brandley  (52  Tex.  001),  529. 
Southern    Exp.    Co.    v.     Brown    (67 

Miss.  2(i0),   139. 
Southern    Exp.    Co.    v.    Platten   (93 

Fed.  936),  364. 
Southern  Kan.  K.  Co.  v.  Hinsdale  (38 

Kan.  507).  354. 


316),  346,348. 
Co.  v.  Ala-    Southern  R.   Co.  v.   Bryant  (95  Va. 

212),  166. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Hardin  (101  Ga. 

263),  348. 
Southern    R.    Co.    v.    Kendiick   (40 

Miss.  374),  122,  145,  335. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  North  Carolina  R. 

Co.  (  [U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  N.  C]  81 

Fed.  595),  65. 
Southern    R.   Co.  v.  Smith  (95  Va. 

187),  22. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.   Smith  (86  Fed. 

292),  133. 
South   Omaha    Waterworks    Co.    v. 

Vocasek    ([Neb.]   87  N.   W.  536), 

618. 
South  Royalton  Bk.  v.  Suffolk  Bk.  (27 

Vt.  50:0,  67. 
Southwestern    H.    Co.    v.   Paulk  (24 

Ga.  356),  L69. 
Southwestern    Tel.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Rob- 
inson (50  Fed.  813),  70. 
Southwest  Va.  M.  L.  Co.  v.  Chase 

(95  Va.  50;  27  S.  E.  826),  7:'.. 
Sowardv.  Chicago  &   X.  W.  R.  Co. 

(33  Iowa,  386),  <i:l. 
Sowers   v.    Sniff   (15    La.  Ann.   30), 

76. 
Sowers  v.  Sowers  (87  N.  C.  303),  114, 

124,  372,  422. 


clii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Soyer  v.  Great  Falls   Water  Co.   ( 15 

Mont.  1),  607. 
Spade    v.    Lynn    &    C.   It.    Co.    (168 

Mass.  282),  219,  220,  221. 
Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Newton  (57  N.  J. 

Eq.  367;  41  Atl.  385),  73. 
Spaulding  v.  Cook  (48  Vt.   145),  95. 
Spear  v.  Hiles  (67  Wis.  350),  111,  432. 
Spear  v.    Hubbard  (4   Pick.    [Mass.] 

143),  111,  116. 
Spear  v.  Sweeney  (88  Wis.  545),  369, 

374,  380. 
Speck  v.  Gray  (14  Wash.  589),  457. 
Spencer  v.  Cramblett  (56  Kan.  794), 

436. 
Spencer  v.  Murphy  (6  Colo.  App.  453; 

41  Pac.  841),  70,  119. 
Spink  v.    Corning  (61   App.  Div.    [N. 

Y.]  84),  76. 
Spirk  v.    Chic.    B.    &   Q.    R.   Co.  (57 

Neb.  565),  211. 
Spitze  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.   Co.  (75 

Md.  162),  203. 
Spitzer  v.  Friedlander  (14  App.  D.  C. 

556),  430,  434. 
Spokane  Truck  &  Dray  Co.  v.  Hoefer 

(2  Wash.  St.  45),  111,  117. 
Spooner  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.   R.  Co. 

(54  N.  Y.  230),  161. 
Sprague  v.   Birdsall  (2  Cow.  [N.  Y.] 

419),  501. 
Sprenger  v.  Tacoma  Traction  Co.  (15 

Wash.  660),  338. 
Springer  Transp.    Co.  v.    Smith   (16 

Lea  [Tenn.],  498),  119. 
Springett  v.   Balls   (6   B.   &  S.   477), 

527,  544. 
Springfield  Consol.  R.   Co.  v.  Hoeff- 

ner  (175  111.  634),  208,  215. 
Springfield  Consol.  R.  Co.  v.  Welsh 

(155  111.  511),  274,  514. 
Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Keeseville  (148  N.  Y.  56;  42 

N.    E.  405,  rev'g  80  Hun,   162;  61 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  711;  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1130),  65. 
Spring  Valley  v.  Gavin  (182  111.  232; 

54  N.  E.  1035),  214. 


Spring  Valley  v.  Spring  Valley  Coal 

Co.  (173  111.  497),  102. 
Sproul   v.    Seattle   (17   Wash.    256), 

214. 
Squires  v,  Gould   (14  Wend.    [N.  Y.] 

159),  81. 
Staal  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (57 

Mich.  239,  245),  647,  657,  663. 
Staal  v.  Grand  St.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  (107 

N.  Y.  625),  228,  246,  561,  570. 
Stabenaw   v.    Atlantic   Ave.    R.    Co. 

(155  N.  Y.  511),  170. 
Stack  v.   New  York,  N.   H.  &  H.  R. 

Co.  (177  Mass.  155),  294. 
Stacy  v.    Portland  Pub.  Co.  (68  Me. 

288),  123. 
Stafford   v.    Maddox    (97   Ga.   537), 

94. 
Stafford  v.  Morning  Journal  Assoc. 

(142  N.  Y.  598),  425. 
Stafford  v.   Oskaloosa  (64   la.  251), 

227,  236,  263,  264. 
Stafford  v.  Rubens  (115  111.  196),  603, 

607,  625,  634. 
Stallings  v.  Whittaker  (55  Ark.  494), 

397. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney  ( 13  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  626),  214,  263. 
Standlee  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  R.  Co. 

(  [Tex.    Civ.   App.   1901]  60  S.  W. 

781),  553. 
Stanley  v.  Bircher  (78  Mo.  245),  495. 
Stanley  v.  Leahy  (87  111.  App.  465), 

473. 
Stanley  v.  Webb   (21   Barb.    [N.    Y.] 

148)r  411. 
Stansell  v.  Jollard  (Selw.  N.  P.  435), 

72. 
Stanwood  v.  Whitmore  (63  Me.  209), 

406. 
Staples  v.  Schmid  (18  R.  I.  224),  136, 

138. 
Stapleton  v.  Newburg  (9  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  39),  214. 
Starbird  v.  Barrows  (62  N.  Y.  615), 

108. 
Starbird   v.    Frankfort  (35   Me.  89), 

316. 


TABLE   OF    ('ASKS   CITED    IN    Vol..    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.  1 


cliii 


Starr  Cash-Car  Co.  v.   Reinhart  (49 

N.  Y.  St.   R.  288),  488. 
State.     See  also  name  of. 
State.      See     Commonwealth  ;     see 

People. 
State  (Coughlan)  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 

K.   Co.  (24    Md.    84),   .',24,  527,  530, 

551. 
State  v.    Bait.    cV:   O.  R.  Co.  (24   Md. 

10(5),  866. 
state  v.    Bockstruck  (136  Mo.   335), 

501. 
State  (Scott)  v.  Bowen  (54  Neb.  211), 

501. 
State  (Wilmot)  v.    Buckley  (GO  Ohio 

St.  27:1),  501. 
State  v.  Burdge  (95  Wis.  390),  76. 
State   (Brady)   v.    Consolidated   Gas 

Co.  (85  Md.  637),  151. 
State  (Grice)  v.  County  Com  mis.  (54 

Ind.  426),  528,  542,  5)4. 
State  v.  Dart  (29  Conn.  75:',),  290. 
State  v.  Detroit  (113  Mich.  04:!),  325. 
State  (Lamar)  v.  Dillon  (32  Fla.  545  i, 

501. 
State  (Gray)  v.    Dover  (62  1ST.  J.    L. 

40),  501. 
State  (Aull)v.   Field    (119   Mo.  593), 

501. 
State  (Crow)  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins. 

Co.  (152  Mo.  1),  501. 
State  (Hartlove)  v.  Fox  (79  Md.  574) 

522. 
State  v.  Gerhardt  (145  Ind.  439),  501. 
State  v.  Ginger  (80  Iowa,  57  I),  281. 
State   v.    Godwin    (123    X.    C.    697), 

501. 
State  v.  Grand  Trunk  EL  Co.  (58  Me. 

176),  000. 
State  v.  Grand  Trunk  EL  Co.  (60  Me. 

145),  GOO. 
State  v.  Grand  Trunk  EL  Co.  (61  Me. 

114),  597. 
State  v.  Griffin  (07  N.   II.  1;  39  Atl. 

200),  67. 
State  v.  Harrington   (68  Vt.  622;  35 

Atl.  515),  67. 
State  v.  Hogriever  ( 152  Ind.  652),  501. 


State     v.     Indiana    &     I.    S.    K.    Co. 

([Ind.]  18  I..  I."    A.  502),  501. 
State  (Brown)  v.  Klein  (lid  Mo.  259), 

501. 
State  v.  Lowell  (23  Iowa,  304),  501. 
siatc  (Jones)  v.  Mark  (23  Nev.  359), 

501. 
Stair    v.    Maine  C.    EL    Co.    (GO    Me. 

490),  597,  600. 
State  v.   Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.  (7G  Me. 

357),  600,  605. 
stair  v.  Manchester,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (52 

X.  II.  557),  159. 
State  v.   Newell  (140  Mo.  282),  501. 
State  v.  Rayburn  (22  Mo.  App.  303), 

79. 
State  v.  Ruth  (9  S.  I).  84),  84. 
State  v.   Schweitzer  (57   Conn.  532), 

515. 
State  v.  Sloss  (83  Ala.  93),  501. 
State  (Comstock)  v.  Stewart  (52  Neb. 

243),  501. 
State  v.  Street  (117  Ala.  203),  501. 
State  (Wheeler)    v.    Stuhl    (52    Neb. 

209),  501. 
State  v.  Tierney  (1  Penn.  [Del.]  116), 

515. 
State  v.Vaughn    (77    Miss.  681;  27 

So.  999),  65. 
State  v.  Weinel  (13  Mo.   App.  583), 

83. 
State    (Cocking)   v.    Wade   (87    Md. 

529),  522. 
State  v.  Ward  (9  Ileisk.  [Tenn.]  100), 

78,  79. 
Staton  v.   Norfolk  &  C.   R.  Co.  (Ill 

N.  C.  278;   16  S.  E.  181),  67. 
St.  (lair  v.   Missouri   P.   R.   Co.  (29 

Mo.  App.  76),  340,  341. 
St.  Clair  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Eadie  (43  Ohio 

St.  91),  176. 
Steamboat.     See  name  of. 
Steamer.     See  name  of. 
Stearns  v.   Atlantic,  etc.,   R.   Co.  (46 

Me.  95).  62. 
Steel  v.  Kurtz  (28  Ohio  St.  191    .  --7 
Steele  v.  Greal    Northern  Ry.  (26  I>. 

R.  lr.  96),  542. 


cliv 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IX    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
(53  S.   C 


Stehmeyer   v.   Charleston 

259;  31  S.  E.  322),  65. 
Stein  v.  Belanger  (Rap.  Jud.  Qneb.  9 

C.  S.  535),  111. 
Stein  v.  Burden  (24  Ala.  130),  76. 
Steinbrunner  v.  Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.R. 

Co.  (146  Pa.  St.  504),  267,  268. 
Stell  v.  Pascball  (40  Tex.  640),  111. 
Stemmerman  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co. 

(36  App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  218),  109. 
Stephen  v.   Hannibal  &  S.   J.  K.  R. 

Co.  (96  Mo.  207),  227. 
Stephens  v.   Nashville,  etc.,   R.    Co. 

(10  Lea  [Tenn.],  448),  916. 
Stephens    v.     Wallace     (  [Tex.     Civ. 

App.]  30  S.  W.  1099),  558. 
Sterling  Iron  &  Z.  Co.  v.  Sparks  Mfg. 

Co.  (  [N.  J.]  38  Atl.  426),  67. 
Sternenberg  v.  Mailhos  (99  Fed.   43), 

526,  548. 
Stetlar  v.   Nellis  (60  Barb.    [N.   Y.] 

524),  375,  377. 
Stevens  v.   Cheney  (36  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

1),  473. 
Stevens  v.  Dudley  (56  Vt.  158),  90. 
Stevens    v.    Kelley   (66   Conn.    570), 

95. 
Stevens  v.    Missouri    P.    R.    Co.    (67 

Mo.  App.  356),  166. 
Stevens  v.    Nichols   (155    Mass.  472; 

29  N.  E.  1150),  64. 
Stevens    v.     O'Neill    (51    App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  364),  453. 
Stevens  v.   Sonto    (18    N.    Y.  St.    R. 

929),  81. 
Stevens  v.  Yale  (113  Mich.  680),  79. 
Stevenson   v.  Lord  (15   Colo.  131;  25 

Pac.  313),  73. 
Stevenson  v.  Belknap  (6  Iowa,  97), 

124,  464. 
Stever  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.   R.  R.  Co.  (7 

App.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  392),  274,  277. 
Stewart  v.    Baltimore  &  O.  R.    Co. 

(23  Wash.  L.  Rep.  247),  507,  508. 
Stewart  v.   Butts  (61  111.  App.  483), 

101. 
Stewart  v.  Cole  (46  Ala.  646),  442. 
Stewart  v.  Lanier  (75  (ia.  582),  89. 


Stewart  v.  Lapsley  (7  La.  Ann.  456), 

79.  • 
Stewart  v.  Madox   (63  Ind.  51),  114, 

180,  448,  451. 
Stewart  v.  Pa tton   (65  Mo.  App.  21), 

83. 
Stewart  v.   Railroad  Co.   (168   U.   S. 

445-450),  507,  508. 
Stewart  v.  Ripon  (38  Wis.   584),  311. 
Stewart  v.  Terre   Haute,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

(103  Ind.  44),  503. 
Stickler  v.  Yager  (29  Fed.  244),  121. 
Stille  v.    Jenkins    (15  N  .  J.  L.   302) 

83. 
Stilphen  v.  Ulmer  (88  Me.  211),  448. 
Stilson  v.  Gibbs  (53  Mich.   280),  116. 
Stilwell  v.  Barnett  (60  111.   219),  119. 
Stimpson   v.    Railroad   (1    Wall.    Jr. 

[U.  S.]  164),  95,  164. 
Stimpson  v.   Wood   (57  L.    J.   Q.   B. 

484),  515,  531. 
Stitzell  v.   Reynolds   (67  Pa.   St.  54), 

385,  404. 
St.  John  v.  New  York  (6  Duer  [N. 

Y.],  315),  83. 
St.  John  Young  Men's   C.    Assn.  v. 

Hutchison  (18  N.  B.  523),  67. 
St.  Lawrence  &  Ottawa  R.  W.  Co.  v. 
Lett  (11   S.   C.   R.  [Ont.]  422,  affd 
C.  A.  11  A.  R.  1),  528,  530,  543. 
St.  Louis  &  P.  R.   Co.  v.   Barnes  (2 

Ind.  App.  213),  192. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown  (62 

Ark.  254),  504,  508. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.   Farr  (  [C. 

C.  App.  8th  C]  56  Fed.  594),  249. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hicks  (79 

Fed.  262),  609,  610,  626. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.   Co.  v.  Neal  (66 

Ark.  543),  339. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Townsend 

([Ark.]  63  S.  W.  994),  632. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver  (35 

Kan.  412),  166. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.   R.  Co.   v.   Whittle 
(20  C.  C.  A.  196;  74  Fed.  296),  161. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.   Woolum 
([Tex.]  19  S.  W.  782),  214. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

|  References  are  to  Sections.  ] 


civ 


St.  Louis  &  S.  \V.  R.  Co.  v.  Dingman 

(62  Ark.  245;  35  S.  W.  219),  63. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  R.   Co.  v.    Thomas 

(  [Tex.   Civ.    App.]   ^7  S.  W.    419), 

349. 
St.  Louis  &  W.   K.   Co.   v.  Germany 

([Tex.  Civ.   App.    1900]    56   S.    W. 
586),  100. 
St.  Louis  &  \V.  R.  Co.  v.  Benson  (58 

Fed.  531),  G02,  604,  tilO,  630. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  C.  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Dalby 

(lit  ill.  353),  139. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &T.  H.  II.  Co.  v.  Bauer 

(53  111.  App.  525),  014,  617,  619. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Odum 

(52  111.  App.  519),  200. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  II.   R.  Co.  v.  Rea- 
gan (52  111.  App.  488),  340,  341. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston 

(78    Tex.  536),  517,   524,   525,   527, 

528,  531,  532,  535,  537,  542,  5  1 1.  551. 
St.  Louis.   A.  &  T.  R.   Co.  v.  Taylor 

(5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  668),  523,  550. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd  (36 

111.  409),  159. 
St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.    Miller  (138 

111.  405),  293. 
St.    Louis  C.  R.   R.  Co.   v.    Hall  (53 

Ark.  7),  186. 
St.  Louis,   I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bragg 

([Ark.  1901]  (54  S.  W.  226),  220. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.   R.  Co.  v.  Davis 

(56  Ark.  51 ;  19  S.  W.  107),  343,  005, 

614,  616,  635. 
St.  Louis,    I.    M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis 

(55  Ark.   462),  343,   005,   014,    010, 

635. 
St.  Louis,   I.   M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Daw- 
son (68  Ark.  1).  597,  009. 
St.  Louis,  I.   M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v.  Free- 

man(  30  Ark.  41  I,  300. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.   R.  Co.  v.  Free- 
man (30  Ark.  41).  616,  634,  635. 
St.     Louis,     I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co.   v. 

Leathers   (62   Ark.    235;   35   S.    W. 

216),  63. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Li  nam 

(  [Ark.  1901]  60  S.  W.  951),  76. 


St.  Louis.  1.   M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Mad- 
dry  (57  Ark.  506), 607,  011,  010,  027, 
632,  640. 
St.  Louis,    I.   M.   iS   s.   R.  Co.  v.   Mc 
Cain  1 07    Ark.   377).   007,  009.   612, 
627,  029. 
St.  Louis,  I.    M.  &   S.  R.   Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cormick  (  [Tex.]  9  S.  W.  540).  508. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v.  Need- 
ham  (32  L.  S.  App.  635),  B6. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Need- 
ham  (52  Fed.  373),  598,  005,  609, 
610,  624,627,  628. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Need- 
ham  (3  (J.  S.  C.  C.  A.  129),  511. 

St.  Louis.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Rob- 
bins  (57  Ark.  377),  517,  607,  609, 
014,  027. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet 
(63  Ark.  503),  597,598,  607,  623. 

St.  Louis.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet 
(60  Ark.  550),  517.  612,  014,  622,  024, 
(127,  632. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.Waren 
(65  Ark.  619),  214. 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  s.  R.  Co.  v.  Yoeum 
(34  Ark.  493),  598,  639. 

St.  Louis,  P.  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Dorsey 
(189  111.  251).  014. 

St.  Louis,  P.  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Rawley, 
(90  111.  App.  653),  002.  017. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Berger  (64 
Ark.  613),  379. 

St.  LouisS.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bishop  (14 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  504),  532,  530,  544. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dobbins  (60 
Ark.  4S1),  ISO,  215,  218,  293. 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Freedman 
(18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  553),  281. 

St.  Louis  s.  \V.  R.  Co.  v.  Mahoney 
(67  Ark.  617),  597,  609,  633. 

St.  LouisS.  W.  K.  Co.  v.  McCullough 
([Tex.  Civ.  A]> p.]  33  S.  W.  285), 
347. 

St.  Luke's  Hospital  v.  Foster  (86  111. 
App.  2S2).  598,  603. 

Stock  v.  Boston  (149  Mass.  410), 
489. 


clvi 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED    IX    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Stock  Quotation  Tel.  Co.  v.  Board  of 

Trade  (44  App.  :;:>S),  77. 
Stockton  v.  Frey  (4  Gill  [Ind.],  406), 

215,  227,  263,  642. 
Stodghill  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 

(53  Iowa,  341),  38,  99. 
Stoher  v.  St.    Louis,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co. 

(91  Mo.  509),  122,.  511. 


.Stouter  v.   Manhattan  R.  Co.  (38  N. 

Y.  St.  R.  162),  281. 
Stouter  v.  Manh.  R.  Co.  (25  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  083),  214. 
Stovall    v.    Smith   (4   B.    Mon.  [Ky.] 

378),  95. 
Stovei-  v.  Inhabitants  of  Bluehill  (51 

Me.  439),  195. 


Stokes     v.     Salstontall    (13     Peters  Stowe  v.  Hey  wood  (7  Allen  [Mass.], 

[U.S.],  181),  150.  119),  111. 

Stoltz  v.    Baltimore  &  O.    R.  Co.   (7  St.     Peter's    Church    v.    Beach    (26 

Ohio,  514),  924.  Conn.  355),  122,  186. 

Stomne  v.  Hanford  Produce  Co.  (108  Strader  v.  Snyder  (67  111.  404),  415. 

Iowa,  437),  267.  Strange  v.  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  (1  Mo.  App. 
Stone  v.  Billings  (167  111.  179),  102.  Rep.  209),  353. 

Stone   v.   Boston    &    A.   R.   Co.  (171  I  Straus  v.  Young  (30  Md.  246),  431. 


Mass.  536),  84. 
Stone  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.   R.  Co. 

(115  N.  Y.  104),  177. 
Stone  v.  Grotore  Bridge  &  Mfg.   Co. 

(77  Hun  [N.Y.],  99),  508. 
Stone  v.  Hey  wood   (7  Allen  [Mass.], 

119),  116. 
Stone  v.   Moore  ( [Iowa]  49  N.  W.  76), 

278. 
Stone  v.   Poland  (81    Hun   [X.   Y.], 

132),  229. 
Stone  v.  Swift  (4  Pick.  [Mass.]  389), 

440. 
Stone    v.   Varney   (7    Mete.    [Mass.] 

86),  422. 
Stoneseifer  v.   Sheble  (31   Mo.  243), 

111,135. 
St.  Ores  v.  McGlashen  (74  Cal.  148), 

145. 
Storey  v.  Early  (86  111.  461),  386,  406, 

416. 
Storey  v.  New  York   (29  App.  Div. 

[3  N.  Y.]  316),  84. 
Storey  v.  Wallace  (60  111.  51),  420. 
Storm  v.  Green  (51  Miss.  103),  120. 
Storrie  v.  Marshall    (27    S.  W.  224), 

530. 
Storrs  v.   Grand    Rapids  (110  Mich. 

483),  249. 
Stnudtv.  Shepherd  (73  Mich.  588;  41 

N.  W.  (!96),  466,  467,  468. 
Stout  v.  Prall  (1  N.  J.  L.  79),  464. 


Strauss  v.  Newburgh  Elec.  R.  Co.  (6 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  264),  172. 
Streeter  v.  Marshall  Silver  Min.  Co. 

(4  Colo.  535),  87. 
Strehlow  v.  Pettit  (96  Wis.  22),  432. 
Streng  v.   Frank  Ibert  Brewing  Co. 

(04  X.  Y.  St.  R.  34),  24,  75,91. 
Strieker  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (60  N.  J.  L. 

230),  430,  432,  454.. 
Strickland  v.  Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co. 

(99  Ga.  124),  375. 
Strickler  v.  Yager  (29  Fed.  244),  121. 
Stroll m  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.  (90  X.  Y.  305),  17,  91,  244. 
Strong  v.   Iowa  C.  R.  Co.  (  [Iowa]  62 

N.  W.  799),  214. 
Strong  v.  Stevens  Point  (62  Wis.  255), 

514,  054,  057. 
Strong  v.  United  States  ( [U.  S.  C.  C. 

D.  Conn.]    93  Fed.  257),  65. 
Strother  v.  South  Carolina  &  G.  R. 

Co.  (47  S.  C.  375),  63,  542. 
Struble  v.  Xodwift  (11  Ind.  64),  114. 
Struby-Estabrook  Mercantile  Co.  v. 

Keyes    (9    Colo.    App.    190),  440, 

441. 
Strndgeon  v.  Sand  Beach  (107  Mich. 

496),  194,292,  294. 
Strutzel  v.  St.   Paul  City  R.  Co.   (47 

Minn.  543),  514. 
Struve  v.  Droge  (62  How.  Pr.  [N.  Y.] 

233;  10  Abb.  X.  C.  [X.  Y.]   142),  72. 


TABLE    OF   (ASKS   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


lvii 


Stuart  v.   Haw  ley  (22  Barb.   [N.    V.| 

619),  67. 
Stuart  v.  Lovell  (2  Stark.  84),  404. 
Stuart  v.  Trotter  ([Iowa]  39  X.  W. 

212),  7!». 
Stuber  v.  McEntee  (142   X.  Y.  200), 

561,  5(54,  577. 
Studgeon  v.  Studgeon  ([Ind.  App.] 

30  N.  E.  805),  361. 
Stuebing   v.   Marshall  (2  Civ.  Proc. 

[N.  Y.]  77),  576,  588. 
Stumn  v.   Hummell    (39   Iowa,  478), 

460. 
Stumps  v.  Kelly  (22  111.  140),  67. 
Stuppy  v.    Hof   (82  Mo.   App.    272), 

362,  364,  377. 
8tutz  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.  (73 

Wis.  147),  243,  352. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Wilcox  (  [Mich.]  'rl  X. 

W.  465),  194. 
Submarine  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Dickson  (15 

C.  B.  [N.  S.]  759),  148. 
Suburban  Elec.  Co.  v.  Nugent  (58  XT. 

J.  L.  658),  150. 
Suffolk  v.  Woodward  (5  X.J.  Law  J. 

287),  362. 
SuffolkG.  M.  &M.  Co.  v.  San  Miguel 

Con.    M.   &    M.  Co.    (!»  Colo.    App. 

407;  48  Pac.  828),  67. 
Sullings   v.    Shakespeare    (46    Mich. 

408),  412. 
Sullivan  v.  Horner  (41  X.  J.  Eq.299), 

660. 
Sullivan  v.    Lowell  &    I).  St.    R.  Co. 

(162  Mass.  536),  316. 
Sullivan  v.  Oreg.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  (12 

Oreg.  392),  112,  136,  137,  139. 
Sullivan  v.   St.    Louis   S.  W.    R.   Co. 

(  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  36  S.  W.   1020), 

157. 
Sullivan  v.   Tioga  R.    R.  Co.  (112   N. 

V.  643),  195. 
Sullivan  v.  Union   P.   1!.  Co.  (1  Mc- 

Crary  [U.  S.  C.  ('.]  301).  495. 
Sullivan  v.  Vicksburg  S.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(39  La.  Ann.  800),  94. 
Sullivan  Co.  v.  Ruth  (106  Tenn.  85), 

82. 


Summit  Co.  v.  (iustaveson  (18  I  rtah, 

351  |,  501. 
Sumner  v.   Buel   (12   Johns.    [X.    V.| 

475),  393. 
Sun   Print.  &  Pub.  Assn.  v.  Scheuck 

(98  Fed.  925),  400,  414. 
Sutton  v.  Chicago,  si.  P.  M.  &  O.  R. 

Co.  (98  Wis.  157;  73  X.  W.  99! 
Suydam  v.  Grand  St  &  Newton  R.  R. 

Co.  (41  Barb.  [N.  Y.J  375),  161. 
Swan  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  (86  Hun 

[X.  Y.],  265),  212. 
Swan  v.   Long   Island   R,   R.  Co.  (79 

Hun  [X.  Y.],  612),  214. 
Swan  v.   Thompson   (124  Cal.    193), 

415,  423. 
Swan  v.  Worvell  (107  Wis.  025  I.  643. 
Swarthout  v.    New  Jersey,  etc.,  Co. 

(46  Barb.  [X.  Y.|  222),  328. 
Sweet  v.  Excelsior  Elec  Co.  ( [X.  Y.] 

31  Atl.  721),  98. 
Sweet  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.  (18 

Misc.  [X.  Y.]  355),  488,  580. 
Sweetland   v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R,  Co. 

(117    Mieh.  329;*43   L.   R.  A.  568), 

503,  642,  650,  655. 
Swenson   v.    Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.    (15 

Misc.  [X.  Y.]  69),  288. 
Swift  v.    Applebone   (23   Mich.    252), 

95. 
Swift  v.  Eastern  Warehouse  (86  Ala. 

294).  89. 
Swift  v.    Foster  (55  111.   App.  286), 

607,  615. 
Swift   v.    Raleigh    (54    111.    App.  44), 

244. 
Swift  v.  Hutkouski  (82  111.  App.  L08), 

297. 
Swift   &  Co.   v.    Foster  (163  111.50), 

614,  618,  627. 
Swift  &  Co.  v.   Ilolonheek   (55  Neb. 

288),  267,  269,  312. 
Swigett    v.    United   states   (78   Fed. 

156),  65. 
Swinfin    v.    Lowry    (37     Minn.    345), 

171. 
Swolm  v.  Wal bourn  (  [Pa.]  15  Lane. 
L.  R.  118),  404. 


clviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    1. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Sykes  v.  Northeastern  By.  (23  W.  R.    Taylor  v.  Church  (8  N.  Y.  452,  460), 


473),  528. 
Sykes  v.   Northeastern   Ky.  (44  L.  J. 

C.  P.  191),  525,   531,   532,   534,537, 

547. 
Sykora  v.  Case  Mach.  Co.   (59   Minn. 

130),  912. 
Sylvester  v.   Maag  (155   Pa.  St.  225), 

214. 
Symonds  v.   Carter  (32   N.  H.  458), 

115. 
Symons  v.  Met.   St.  R.  Co.  (58  X.  Y 

Supp.  327),  229. 
Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Syra- 
cuse (116  X.  Y.  167),  501. 
Taber  v.   Ilutson   (5  Ind.   322),   111, 

114. 
Tainter  v.  Worcester  (123  Mass.  311), 

65. 
Talbot  v.  West  Va.  R.  Co.  (42  W.  Ya. 

560),  24,  119,  122. 
Talbott  v.  Great  Western  Plaster  Co. 

(86  Mo.  App.  558),  430. 
Tallinau  v.  Syracuse  &  X.   Y.  R.  Co. 

(Keyes,  128;  4  Abb.  Dec.  351),  501. 
Tampa  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Cline  (37 

Fla.  586;  20  So.  780),  67. 
Tanner  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (60 

Ala.  621),  164. 
Tappan  v.  Harwood  (2  Speer  [S.  C], 

536),  91. 
Tarbutton  v.  Town  of  Tenville  (110 

Ga.  90;  35  S.  E.  282),  65. 
Tate  v.  Booe  (9  Ind.  13),  78. 
Tatnall  v.  Courtney  (6  Houst.  [Del.] 

434),  369,  374. 
Tavenner   v.    Morehead    (41   W.  Ya. 

116),  430,  447. 
Taylor  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (33 

W.  Ya.  39),  263. 
Taylor  v.   Baltimore  &  O.   S.   W.  R. 

Co.  (18  Ind.  App.  692),  430. 
Taylor  v.   Bradley*  (39   N.    Y.    129). 

75. 
Taylor  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  (41 

W.  Va.  704).  300,  303. 
Taylor  v.   Chicago  &  X.  W.   R.   Co. 
(103  Wis.  27),  214. 


113,  413.  414. 
Taylor  v.  City  of  Ballard  (24   Wash. 

191),  275. 
Taylor  v.  Grand  Trunk  By.  (48  N.  H. 

303,  304),  111,  115,  122,  187. 
Taylor  v.    Granger  (19   R.  I.    410;  37 

Atl.  13),  67. 
Taylor  v.    Hearst   (107  Cal.   262;  40 

Pac.  394),  410. 
Taylor  v.  Hearst  (118  Cal.  366),  414. 
Taylor   v.    Long   Island   R.    Co.    (16 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  1),  562,  563,  570, 

57S. 
Taylor    v.    Monroe    (43    Conn.    36), 

240. 
Taylor  v.  Xew  York  &  H.  R.  Co.   (27 

App.  Div.    [X.  Y.]    190;    50  N.   Y. 

Supp.  697),  71. 
Taylor  v.  Pullen  (152  Mo.  434),  406. 
Taylor  v.  Read  (4  Paige  [X.  Y.],  561), 

89. 
Taylor  v.  Scherpe  &  K.  Architectural 

Iron  Co.  (133  Mo.  349),  243,  245. 
Taylor  v.  Welch  (92  Hun  [X.Y.],  272), 

588. 
Taylor.  B.  £  II.  B.  Co.  v.  Taylor  (79 

Tex.  104),  522,  524,  526,  527. 
Taylor,    B.    &    H.  R.   Co.   v.  Warner 

([Tex.]  31  S.  W.  66),  514,  528,  530, 

552. 
Teagarden  v.  Hetfield   (11   Ind.  522), 

81. 
Telfer  v.  Northern  R.  Co.  (30  X.  J.  L. 

188),   514,  642,   645,  646,  648,   650, 

651,  660,  664,  668,  672. 
Telton  v.  Aubrey  (20  C.  C.  R.  436;  43 

U.  S.  App.  278;  78  Fed.  350),  63. 
Templeton  v.    Linn  Co.  (22  Or.   313), 

65. 
Tenant  v.  Gray  (5  Munf.    [Va.]  494), 

102,  106. 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Del.  &  R.  Canal  Co.  (18 

X.  J.  L.  200),  87. 
Tennessee  Coal,  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Hern- 
don  (100  Ala.  451),  520. 
Tenney   v.   Tuttle   (1  Allen    [Mass.], 

185),  149. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED    IN     Vol..    I. 


rlix 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Terliuno  v.  Koellisch  ( [X.  J.]  43  Atl. 

655),  214. 
Terre    Haute   v.     Farmers'   Loan   & 

Trust  Co.   ([U.  S.  C.  C.  A.   Ind.] 

40  C.  C.  A.  117;  99  Fed.  838),  65. 
Terre  Haute  &  T.  K.  Co.  v.  Williams 

(69  111.  App.  292),  63. 
Terry  v.  Beatrice  Starch  Co.  (43  Neb. 

866),  83. 
Terry   v.   Jewett   (17    Bun    [X.    V.], 

395),  571,  574. 
Terry  v.    Munger   (121    X.    Y.    161), 

488. 
Terry  v.  Xew  York  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

(22  Barb.   [X.  Y.]  574),  101. 
Terwilliger  v.  Wands   (IT  X.  Y.  .".4), 

303,  404. 
Tesch  v.   Milwaukee    Elec.  K.    &  L. 

Co.  (108  Wis.  593),  168. 
Tetherow  v.  St.  Joseph  &  D.  M.  II. 

Co.  (98  Mo.  74),  478. 
Texarkana  &  Ft.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson (  [Ark.]  53  S.  W.  673),  219. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.   Brown  (39 

S.  W.  140),  535. 
Texas  &  X.  O.   R.  Co.  v.   Brown  (14 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  607),  525,  532,  536, 

544. 
Texas    &    X.   O.    R.  Co.  v.  Carr  (01 

Tex.  332),  192. 
Texas  &  X.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Crouder  (70 

Tex.  222),  548,  540,  551. 
Texas  &  N.  O.   R.  Co.  v.  Echols  (17 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  077),  214. 
Texas  &  X.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Syfan  ( [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  43  S.  W.  551),  214. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Syfan  (91  Tex. 

562),  102. 
Texas    &    X.    O.    R.   Co.    v.    Wood 

([Tex.  Civ.    App.    1894]    24  S.    W. 

560),  214. 


Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Beckworth  (11 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  153),  313. 
Texas  &  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Bledsoe  |  [Tex.] 

20  S.  W.  1135),  522. 
Texas  &   P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowlin  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.  |  32  S.  W.  918),  21  I. 
Texas  A-   P.  R.  Co.  v.  Brick  (83  Tex. 

598),  214. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Brick  ([Tex.] 

18  S.  W.  047),  214. 
Texas   &    P.     II.    Co.    v.    Buckalew 

([Tex.  Civ.  App.]  34  S.  W.   165), 

240. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  30  S.  W.  491),  214. 
Texas  &  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Cody  (  [U.  S.  S. 

C.  1897]  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  763),  148. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cody  (  [U.  S.  C. 

C.  A.  5th  C.J  07  Fed.  71),  110. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins  (84  Tex. 

121),  522. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cornelius  ( [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  30  S.  W.  720),  305. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox  ( [Tex.]  145 

U.S.  503).  504. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger  (79  Tex. 

13),  522,  528. 
Texas  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Gott  (20  Tex. 

C.  A.  335).  353. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall  (  [Tex.]  10 

S.  W.  121),  547. 
Texas*    P.    R.  Co.  v.   Heimble  (181 

U.  S.  57 ),  310.  320. 
Texas  &   P.   R.  Co.  v.   Hill  (71  Tex. 

451).  522. 
Texas   &    P.    R.    Co.  v.   Hoffman    (83 

Tex.  286),  207. 
Texas  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.   Horn  (151  U. 

S.  110).  102. 
Texas  &  P.  I!.  Co.  v.  James  (82  Tex. 

306),  339,  354. 


Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong  (93    Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (  [Tex. 
Tex.),  355.  Civ.   App.]  34  S.  W.  186),  214. 


Texas  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Barrett  ( [Tex. 

Civ.  App.  1000]  57  S.  W.  002),  64. 
Texas   &    P.    B.    Co.   v.    Beckworth 

(  [Tex.   Civ.    App.]   32  S.   \V.  809), 

194. 


Texas  &    P.    B.  Co.  v.   Jones  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.  I  29  s.  W.  499),  L36. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester  (75  Tex. 

50).  51  1,524,527,528,  529,  532,  5.;:, 

540,  550. 


clx 


TABLF    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Malone  (15  Tex. 

C.  A.  56),  215,309. 
Texas  &  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Mansell  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  23  8.  W.  549),  346. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin  (  [Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1900]   60  S.  W.  803),  533, 
544. 
Texas  &  P.   R.  Co..  v.    Moody  (23  S. 

W.  41),  532. 
Texas  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Moore  (  [Tex. 
Civ.    App.    1900)    56    S.    W.   248), 
63. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Morin  (60  Tex. 

133,  225),  300,  301,  311. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphy  (46  Tex. 

356),  166. 
Texas  &  P.    R.    Co.  v.   Neal   (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  33  S.  W.  693),  194. 
Texas  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Orr  (40  Ark. 

182),  166. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips  (91  Tex. 

278),  514. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Putnam  (  [Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1901]  63  S.  W.  910),  300, 
303. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson  (82 

Tex.  657),  528,  544. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherbert  (  [Tex. 

Civ.  App.]  42  S.  W.  639),  356. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spence  ( [Tex.] 
52  S.  W.  562),  514,  528,  532,  537, 
552. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner  (37  S. 

W.  643),  104. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Volk  (151  U.  S. 

73),  229. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (92  Fed. 

953),  514,  528,  531,  535,  537.  549. 
Texas  Brew.  Co.  v.   Dickey  (20  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  606),  208,215. 
Texas  Coal  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Arnstein 

(22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  441),  366. 
Texas  Loau  Agency  v.   Fleming  (18 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  668),  523. 
Texas  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Crowder  (64 

S.W.  90),  537. 
Texas  Trunk  R.   Co.  v.  Johnson  (86 
Tex.  421),  102. 


Tlieroux  v.   Northern  P.   R.  Co.  (64 

Fed.  84),  506. 
Thibaultv.  Sessions  (101  Mich.  279), 

422. 
Thickstun    v.     Howard    (8    Blackf. 

[Ind.]  535),  49. 
Thill  v.  Polman,  (76  Iowa,  638),  111, 

124,  515. 
Thillman  v.   Neal  (88  Md.  525),  369, 

370. 
Third  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Nat.  Bk.  (30  C.  C. 

A.  436;  86  Fed.  852),  101. 
Third  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Boudron   (92  Pa. 

St.  475),  161. 
Thisler    v.     Hopkins    (85    111.    App. 

207),  79. 
Thomas  v.  Brooklyn  (58  Iowa,  438), 

318. 
Thomas  v.  Consolidated  Traction  Co. 

(62  N.  J.  L.  36),  214. 
Thomas  v.  Crosswell  (7  Johns.  264), 

404. 
Thomas  v.   Dansby   (74  Mich.   389), 

471. 
Thomas  v.  Dingley  (70  Me.  100),  87. 
Thomas  v.  Gates  (  [Cal.  1899]  58  Pac. 

315),  208,  218. 
Thomas  v.  Harris  (3  H.  &   N.  961), 

111. 
Thomas  v.   Merry  ( [Ind.]   15  N.  E. 

244),  108. 
Thomas  v.  Rouse  (2  Brev.  [S.  C]  75, 

444. 
Thomas  v.   Southern  R.  Co.  (122  N. 

C.  1005),  335. 
Thomas  v.  Snyder  (20  111.  App.  146), 

104. 
Thomas  v.   Union  Ry.  Co.  (18  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  185),  214,  234. 
Thomas  v.  Utica  &  Black  River  R. 
Co.  (6  Civ.  Proc.  [N.  Y.]  353),  561, 
570,  571. 
Thompson  v.  Bell  (11  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

1),  431. 
Thompson     v.    Boyd    Mills    (Const. 

[S.  C]  80),  418. 
Thompson  v.   Chicago,  M.  &   St.  P. 
R.  Co.  (104  Fed.  845),  634. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED    IN     VOL.    I. 


I  ■  1  X  I 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Thompson  v.  Crocker  (9  Pick.  [Miss  ' 

59),  73. 
Thompson    v.    Ellsworth    (39    Mich. 

719),  449. 
Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros.  Co.  (86 

Wis.  r.Td),  514,  854,  657,  672. 
Thompson     v.     National     Exp.    Co. 

(  [Vt.]  29  Atl.  311),  215,  216. 
Thompson  v.  North.  Mo.   R.  K.  Co. 

(31  Mo.  100),  166. 
Thompson  v.  Powning  (15  Nev.  195), 

388. 
Thompson  v.  Salt  Lake  Rap.  Trans. 

Co.  (16  Utah,  281),  84,  161. 
Thomson-Houston   Klec.  Co.  v.   Du- 

rant  L.  Imp.  Co.  (144  N.  Y.  34),  70. 
Thoresen  v.   La  Crosse  City  R.  Co. 

(04  Wis.  129),  657. 
Thorn  v.  Knapp  (42  N.  Y.  474),  404. 
Thorp  v.  Carvalho  (14  Misc.  [N.  Y.] 

554),  450,  456. 
Thorpe  v.  Wray  (68  Ga.  350),  452. 
Thrall  v.  Knapp  (17  Iowa,  468),  377. 
Thrikfield  v.  Mountain  View  Ceme- 
tery Assn.  (12  Utah,  76),  100,  125. 
Throckmorton  v.  Evening  Post  Pub. 

Co.  (35  A  pp.  Div.  [N.  Y.]  306),  79. 
Throckmorton  v.  Missouri,   K.  &  T. 

R.    Co.    (14    Tex.    Civ.  App.  222), 

194. 
Thrussell  v.  Handyside  (  [Q.   B.   D. 

1888]  L.  R.  20  Q.  B.  D.  359),  68. 
Thurber  v.  Eastern  Bldg.  &  L.  Assoc. 

(118  N.  C.  120),  434. 
Thurber  v.   Railroad  Co.    (60   N.   Y. 

326),  177. 
Thuiinger  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.   R. 

R.  Co.  (71  Hun   [N.  Y.],  526),  318. 
Thurn   v.   Alta  Tcleg.    Co.   (15   Cal. 

472),  501. 
Thurston  v.  St.  Joseph  (51  Mo.  510; 

11  Am.  Rep.  463),  65. 
Tiblerv.  Alford  (12  Fed.  262),  112. 
Tierney  v.  Syracuse,  B.  &  N.  Y.  R. 

Co.  (85  Hun  [N.  Y.],  146),  214. 
Tietz  v.  Philadelphia  Tract.  Co.  (169 

Pa.  516),  101. 
Tiffin  v.  Ward  (5  Oreg.  450),  83. 
11 


TilTt  v.  Culver  (:;  Hill   [N.  Y.],  180), 

112,  113. 
Tilley  v.  Hudson  1;.  I;.  Co.  (24  N.  V. 

471,  474),   :,21.  537,    "''m.  566,  567, 

569,  570,  571,  575,  581,  582,  592. 
Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.  ( [20  N.  V. 

252,  285]  ),  520,  560,  561,  563,   575, 

583. 
Tillotson  v.  Cheetham  (3  Johns.  [N. 

Y.]  56),  124,  412. 
Times  v.  Milwaukee  (103  Wis.  582), 

652,  654,  657,  (S70. 
Times  Pub.    Co.   v.  Carlisle  (  [C.  C. 

App.  8th  C]  94  Fed.  762),  385,  397, 

402,  403,  410,  413,  417,  420. 
Tindal  v.  Wesley    (167  U.  S.  264;  17 

Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    770;    29    Chic.   L. 

News,  337),  65. 
Tindall  v.  Wesley  (65  Fed.  731),  65. 
Tipton  v.  Schuler  (87  111.  App.  517), 

473. 
Tisdale  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Can.  Co. 

(4  N.  Y.  St.  R.  812),  212,  562. 
Tisdale  v.  Major  (100  Iowa,  1),  438. 
Titus  v.  Corkins  (21   Kan.  722),  112, 

145. 
Titus  v.  Sumner  (44  N.  Y.  266),  404. 
Tobin   v.   Fairport   (12  N.  Y.   Supp. 

224),  299. 
Tobin  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  ( [Mo.]  18 

S.  W.  996),  514. 
Tobin   v.    Sykes   (71    Hun    [N.    Y.], 

469),  :l8Ch  300,  400. 
Tobler  v.  Austin  (22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

99),  75. 
Toledo  v.  Clopeck  (9  Ohio  C.  D.  432), 

209,  214. 
Toledo    v.    Higgins    (12   Ohio    C.  C. 

64(1),  214. 
Toledo  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rohner 

(9  Ohio  C.  C.  702),  214. 
Toledo  Elec.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Tucker  (13 

Ohio  C.  C.  441),  101,  194. 
Toledo  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold  (4;1, 

111.  418,  419),  122,  142. 
Toledo  P.  &  \Y.  R.  <,,.    v.  Chisholm 

([C.  C.  App.  8th  C]  83  Fed.  652), 

166. 


clxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 


Toledo  P.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnston 

(74  111.  83),  122. 
Toledo   Real   Estate    &  Inv.    Co.  v. 

Putney  (44  Ohio  Cir.   Ct.   R.  486; 

10  O.  C.  D.  698),  64. 
Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks  (81 

111.  245),  627,  639. 
Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddy  (72 

111.  138),  194. 
Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.   Co.  v.  Grable 

(88  111.  441),  162. 
Toledo,  Wabash  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon (75  111.  298),  139. 
Toledo,   Wabash   &   W.    Ry.    Co.  v. 

Smith  (57  111.  517),  265. 
Tomlinson  v.  Derby  (43  Conn.   562), 

13,  240,  241. 
Tompkins  v.  Clay  St.  R.  Co.  (66  Cal. 

163),  172. 
Tompkins  v.    West  (56   Conn.  478), 

322,  325,  326. 
Toorney  v.   Del.    L.   &  W.  R.  Co.  (40 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  392),  448. 
Toomey    v.   Del.     L.     &  W.    R.    Co. 

(53  N.  Y.  St.  R.  567),  450. 
Topeka  v.   Bradshaw  (5  Kan.  App. 

879),  214. 
Topeka  v.  Tuttle  (5  Kan.   311),  87, 

88. 
Topping  v.    St.    Lawrence   (86  Wis. 

526),   499,  642,  643,   645,   646,   660, 

663,  665. 
Toronto  R.   Co.  v.  Grinsted  (24  Can. 

S.  C.  570),  351. 
Tottleben    v.    Blankenship    (58    111. 

App.  47),  381,  413. 
Tourgee  v.  Rose  (19  R.  I.  432),  468. 
Towle  v.   Blake  (48  N.    H.  92),  115, 

120. 
Town.     See  name  of. 
Townsend   v.    Briggs    (88  Cal.   230), 

107. 
Townsend  v.  Briggs  ( [Cal.]  32  Pac. 

307),  267. 
Townsend  v.  Fisher  (2  Hilt.  [N.  Y.] 

47),  33,  97. 
Townsend  v.  Fontenot  (42  La.  Ann. 

890),  119. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Townsend  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 

R.  R.  Co.   (56   N.  Y.  295),   135,  136, 

138. 
Townsend   v.    Paola   (41   Kan.  591), 

243. 
Tozer  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(105  N.  Y.  617),  244. 
Trabing  v.  California  Nav.  &  T.  Co. 

(121  Cal.  137),  136,  218. 
Tracy  v.  Hacket  (19  Ind.  App.  133), 

381,  410,  422. 
Trainer  v.  Wolff  (58  N.  J.  L.  381), 

120. 
Transfer,  The,  No.  4,  &  The  Car  Float 

No.  16  ([U.  S.  C.   C.  2d  Cir.]  61 

Fed.  364),  488. 
Trapnell     v.     Red     Oak     Junction 

(  [Iowa],  39  N.  W.  884),  256. 
Trauermann  v.   Lippincott   (39   Mo. 

App.  478),  122. 
Travelers  Protect.  Assoc,  of  Ameri- 
ca v.    West  (102  Fed.  226),  603. 
Traver  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.   R.  Co.  (6 

Abb.  N.  S.  46),  300. 
Travers  v.  Kan.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (63  Mo. 

421),  139. 
Travis  v.  Barger  (24  Barb.   [N.  Y.] 

614),  468. 
Travis  v.   Carolton   (26  N.   Y.  St.  R. 

821),  161. 
Travis  v.  Skinner   (72  Mich.  152),  65. 
Treadwell    v.   Tillis   (108   Ala.    262), 

77. 
Treat   v.    Browning    (4   Conn.    408), 

422. 
Trelawney  v.  Coleman  (2  Stark.  191), 

460. 
Trenwith  v.  Gilvery  (50  N.  J.  L.  18), 

94. 
Trigg  v.   St.    Louis,  K.   C.   &  N.  Ry. 

Co.  (74  Mo.  147),  353. 
Trimble  v.  Com.  (96  Va.  818),  501. 
Trimble  v.  Spiller  (7Mon.  [Ky.]  394), 

225. 
Trimble   v.    Tantlinger    (104   Iowa, 

665),  393. 
Trinity  &  S.   R.   Co.    v.   O'Brien  (18 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  690),  188   223,  263. 


TAMA-:    OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


clxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Tripp  v.  Grouner  (60  111.  470),  119. 
Trompen  v.  Verhage   (54  Mich.  o04), 

95. 
Troth   v.   Wills   (8   Pa.  Super.   Ct.  1; 

42  W.  N.  C.  504),  07. 
Trow  v.  Thomas  (70  Vt.  580),   155, 

305. 
Troy  v.  Cheshire  K.  Co.   (23  X.  H. 

83),  38. 
Trudel  v.  La  Campagnio  DTmprime- 

rie  et  de  Publication  (  [Montreal  L. 

Rep.]  5  Sup.  Ct.  297),  411. 
Trudel  v.  La  Campagnie  D'lmprime- 

rie  et  de   Publication   du   Canada 

(  [Montreal  L.  Rep.]  5  Q.  B.   510), 

419. 
Trudel  v.  Vian  ( [Montreal  L.  Rep.]  5 

Q.  B.  502),  419. 
Truth  Pub.   Co.  v.  Reed  (13  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  323),  412. 
Tucker  v.  Chaplin  (2  Car.  &  K.  730), 

522. 
Tucker  v.   Draper   (  [Neb.    1901]    86 

N.  W.  917),  64. 
Tucker  v.  Ferguson  (22  Wall.  [U.  S.] 

527),  66. 
Tucker  v.  Green  (27  Kan.  357),  120. 
Tucker  v.   Norfolk    &  W.  R.  Co.  (92 

Va.  549),  156. 
Tucker  v.  Parks  (7  Colo.  62),  81. 
Tucker  v.   State  ( [Johnson]  89   Md. 

471),  523,  558. 
Tucker  v.  Tucker  (74  Miss.  93),  461. 
Tucker  v.  Tucker  (24  Mich.  426),  8:;. 
Tufts  v.  Bennett  (163  Mass.  398),  78. 
Tullis  v.  Rankin  (6  X.  D.  44),  281. 
Tully  v.  N.  Y.  &  T.  S.  S.  Co.  (10  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  463),  214. 
Tully  v.  Phila.    W.   &  B.    R.    R.   Co. 

( [Del.  1901]  50  Atl.  95),  149. 
Tunnicliffe  v.   Bay  Cities  Consol.  R. 

Co.  (107  Mich.  261),  183,  215. 
Tunstall  v.  Robinson  (  [U.  S.  C.  C. 

Ark.]  229),  103. 
Turner  v.    Boston   &   M.   R.    R.    Co. 

(158  Mass.  261),  256. 
Turner  v.  Eddy  (83  Tex.  218),  522. 
Turner  v.  Footman  (71  Me.  218),  375. 


Turner  v.  Great  Northern  R,  Co.  (15 

Wash.  213),  354. 
Turner  v.  Hearst  (115  CaL  394),  417, 

420. 
Turner  v.  Newburgh  (109  N.  Y.  301), 

281. 
Turner  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  ( [W. 

Va.]  22  S.  E.  83),  514. 
Turner  v.   North   Beach,  etc.,    K.  It. 

Co.  (34  CaL  594),  342. 
Turpie  v.  Lowe  (114  Ind.  37),  78. 
Turton    v.    New    York    Recorder   (3 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  314),  386,  403.  404. 
Turton   v.   New   York  Recorder  Co. 

(114  N.  Y.  144),  420. 
Tuteur  v.  Chicago  &  N.   W.  R.  Co. 

(77  Wis.  505),   648,  654,   655,   657, 

659,  661,  665. 
Tuthill  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  (81 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  616),  214. 
Tuttle  v.  Chic,   etc.,   R.    R.   Co.   (42 

Iowa,  518),  316,  322. 
Tuttle  v.   Farmington  (58  N.  H.  13), 

195. 
Tuttle  v.  Hannegan  (4  Daly  [N.  Y.], 

92),  83. 
Twist   v.    Rochester  (37    App.   Div. 

[N.  Y.]  307),  65,  514,  563,  569,  586. 
Twomley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (69  N.  Y. 

158),  169. 
Tyler  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (18  Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  165),  108,  240. 
Tyler  S.   E.  R.  Co.   v.   McMahon  (34 

S.  W.  796),  517,  528,  532. 
Tyler   S.   E.   R.   Co.    v.   Rasberry  (13 

Tex.   Civ.  App.  185),  528,  540,  546, 

554. 
Tynberg  v.  Cohen  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 

24  S.  W.  314),  444. 
Tyson  v   Booth  (100  Mass.  258),  375, 

377. 
Tyson  v.  Ewing  (3.1.  J.  Marsh.  [Ky.] 

185),   111. 
Uertz   v.   Singer  Mfg.   Co.   (35  Hun 

[X.  Y.],  116),  212. 
Uhlig  v.  Barnum  (43  Neb.  584),  77. 
Ullrich  v.  New  York    Press  Pub.  Co. 

(28  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  168),  385,  402. 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


R.  Co.  v.  Evans   (52  Neb. 
v.  Hause    (1   Wyo. 


Co. 


Ulshowski  v.  Hill  (61   N.   J.  L.  375), 

149. 
Union  Bank  v.  Rideau   Lumber   Co. 

(3  Ont.  L.  Rep.  269),  124. 
Union  Mill.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Uaughberg 

(81  Fed.  73),  67. 
Union   News  Co.  v.  Morrow  (20  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  302),  300,  303. 
Union   P.  R.    Co.  v.  Artist  (19  U.   S. 

App.  612),  202. 
Union  P.  R.   Co.  v.  Botsford    (141  U. 

S.  250).  294. 
Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunden  (37  Kan. 

1),  514. 
Union   P. 

50),  84. 
Union   P.  I 

27),  111. 
Union   P.    R.   Co.   v.  Jones  (49  Fed. 

343),  243. 
Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Jones    (21    Colo. 

340;    40     Pac.   891),  305,   316,   322, 

323. 
Union  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Lapsley  (51  Fed. 

174),  172. 
Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell  (56  Kan. 

324),  213. 
Union   P.    R.    Co.  v.  McDonald   (152 

U.  S.  262),  110,  514. 
Union  P.  R.    Co.  v.  O'Brien    (161  U. 

S.  451),  166. 
Union  P.  R.    Co.   v.    Shook   (3   Kan. 

App.  710),  87,  337. 
Union  P.    R.    Co.  v.  Young  (57  Kan. 

168),  263. 
Union  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Shacklett  (19111. 

App.  145;  8  West.  63),  598. 
Union   Ry.    Co.  v.  Callahan  (56  Fed. 

992).  84. 
Union  Show    Case   Co.    v.  Blindauer 

(75  111.  App.  358),  214. 
Union  Street    R.    Co.    v.   Stone    (54 

Kan.  83),  218,  318. 
Upton  v.  Hume  (24  Oreg.  420),  417. 
Upton  v.  Upton   (51    Hun    [N.  Y.], 

184),  133,  408. 
United  Elec.  L.  &    P.  Co.  v.  Brenne- 

man  (21  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  41),  97. 


United  Press  v.  New  York  Press  Co. 

(164  N.  Y.  406),  78. 
United  States  v.  Athens  (35  Ga.  344), 

501. 
United  States  v.  Berdan  Fire  Arms 

(156  U.  S.  566),  65. 
United   States  v.  Dumplin   Island  (1 

Barb.  [N.  Y.]  24),  43. 
United  States  v.  Ellis  ([Ark.]  51  Fed. 

808),  501. 
United   States   v.  Hartwell   (6  Wall. 

[U.  S.]  385),  501. 
United  States  v.  Madrozo  (  [LT.  S.  C. 

C.  A.  2d  Cir.]    38  U.  S.  A.  515;  73 

Fed.  505),  65. 
United  States  v.  Reed  (86   Fed.  308), 

28. 
United  States  v.  Taylor  (35  Fed.  484), 

111,  125. 
United     States     v.     Wiltberger     (5 

Wheat.  [U.  S.]  76),  501. 
United  States  v.  Winchester  &  P.  R. 

Co.    (163   U.    S.    244;  16  Sup.    Ct. 

Rep.  993;  41  L.  Ed.  145),  65. 
United  States   Trust   Co.  v.  O'Brien 

(46  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  238),  74,  90. 
Unterberger  v.   Scharf  (51  Mo.  App. 

102),  104. 
Updegrove  v.  Zimmerman  (13  Pa.  St. 

619),  401. 
Uransky  v.  Dry  Dock   E.  B.  &  B.  R. 

R.  Co.  (118  N.  Y.  304),  318. 
Vail    v.  Broadway   R.   Co.    (6   Misc. 

[X.  Y.]  20),  214. 
Valentine  v.  Broadway,  etc.,  R.    Co. 

(14  Daly  [N.  Y.],  540),  214. 
Vallo   v.    United     States     Exp.    Co. 

(147  Pa.  St.  404),  169,  194. 
Van  Alstine  v.    Kaniecki  (109   Mich. 

318),  479. 
Van   Auken  v.  Clute  ( 13   App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  622),  101. 
Van  Brunt  v.  Cincinnati,   J.  &  M.  R. 

Co.  (78  Mich.    530),    644,  645,  646, 

652,  653,  657,  662,  670,  674. 
Vance  v.  Towne  (13  La.  225),  83. 
Van  Cleef  v.  Lawrence  (2  C.  H.  Rec. 

[N.  Y.]  41),  404. 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


clxv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Van   Clief   v.  Van   Vechten  (130  N. 

Y.  571;  42  N.    Y.  St.  K.  736;  29  N. 

E.  1017),  73. 
Vanderberg    v.    Connoly     (18   Utah, 

112),  448. 
Vanderburg  v.  Truax  (4  Den.  [N.  Y.] 

04U),  82. 
Vanderslice  v.  Newton  (4  N.  Y.  130), 

80. 
Van   Derveer  v.  Sutphin   (5  Ohio  St. 

293),  382. 
Van    Deventer    v.    New    York    &  N. 

II.  R.  Co.   (27  Barb.    [N.   Y.]  244), 

508. 
Van  Doren   v.    Pennsylvania    K.   Co. 

(93  Fed.  260),  504,  505. 
Van  Dusan    v.  Grand    Trunk   K.   Co. 

(97  Mich.  439),  338. 
Vangundy   v.    Berkenmeyer   (19  111. 

App.  229),  119. 
Vanhoru    v.    Des    Moines    (63  Iowa, 

447;  19  N.  W.  293),  65. 
Van  Ingen  v.  Mail  &  E.  Pub.  Co.  (14 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  32G),  397,  417. 
Van  Ingen  v.  Star    Co.  (1    App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  429),  402,403.  412. 
Van  Olienda  v.  Hall  (88  Hun  [N.  Y]. 

452,  458. 
Van    Pelt   v.    McOraw  (4  N.   Y.  110), 

67. 
Van    Keeden   v.  Evans    (52    111.  App. 

209),  380. 
Van  Velsor  v.  Seeberger  (35  111.  App. 

598),  7. 
Vanwart  v.  New  Brunswick  Ry.  (27 

Sup.  Ct.  Jud.  [N.  B.]  59),  532,  547. 
Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 

R.  R.  Co.   ([Iowa],  61   N.  W.  929), 

279. 
Varillat  v.  New  Orleans  &  Carrollton 

K.  R.  Co.  (10  La.  Ann.  88),  135. 
Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs,  52  Iowa, 

098),  255,  256. 
Vaughn  v.  Clarksnn  (19  R.  I.  497),  462. 
Von  v.  Creaton  ( 138  Pa.  St.  48),  471. 
Vergiii  v.  City  <>f  Saginaw  (  [Mich. 

1901]  84  \.  W.  1075),  253. 
Vcrry  v.  Watkins  (7  C.  &  P.  308),  408. 


Vesberg  v.  Putney  (7s  Wis.  84),  281. 

Vessel.     See  name  of. 

Vessel  Owners  Towing  Co.  v.  Wilson 

(11  C.  C.  A.  366;  63  Fed.  626),  17:;. 
Vetaloro  v.  Perkins  (101   Fed.  393), 

508. 
Vicksburg   v.   McLain    (61  Miss.   4), 

514.  521. 
Vicksburg  &   J.  R.  Co.  v.  Patton  (31 

Miss.  [N.  Y.]  156),  L20,  139. 
Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Putnam 

(  lis    f.  S.  545),  215,  227,  243,  251. 
Vicksburg  &   M.   R.   R.  Co.  v.  Rags- 
dale  (46  Miss.  45S),  91. 
Vicksburg  &    Meridian   R    K.  Co.  v. 

Scaulou    (63  Miss.    413),    111,    119, 

135. 
Victorian    Ry.    Commrs.    v.   Coultas 

(L.   R.   13  App.   Cas.   222).   82,   87, 

183,  220,  221. 
Victory  v.  Baker  (07  N.  Y.  366),  07. 
Village.     See  name  of. 
Vinal  v.  Core  (18  W.  Va.  1),  431,  438. 
Vincent  v.  Cook  (4  Hun  [N.  Y.],  318), 

150. 
Vincent  v.  Steinhauer  (7   Vt.  62;  29 

Am.  Dec.  45),  09. 
Vinson  v.  Flynn  (04  Ark.  453),  434. 
Vittum    v.    Oilman    (48   N.    H.   410), 

487. 
Vogel  v.  McAuliffe  ([R.  I.]  31  Atl.  1), 

100. 
Volans  v.  Owen  (74  N.  Y.  520  I.  47:'.. 
Volkman   v.    Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (134 

X.  Y.  418),  150,  156. 
Voltz  v.  Blackmar  (04  N.  Y.  440,  444). 

Ill,  112.  113. 
Von  Fragstein  v.  Windier  (2  Mo.  App. 

588),  113. 
Vorass  v.   Rosenberry  (85  111.   App. 

623),  623. 
Vosblirg  v.  Putney  (78  Wis.  84).  204. 
Vosburg  v.  Putney  (80  Wis.  523  ),  361. 
Wabash  v.  Carver  (129   Iiul.  453),  65. 
Wabash   Pr.  &  Pub.  Co.  v.  Crumrine 

(  123  I  ml.  89;  21  N.  E.  904),  114,410. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Fox  (04  Ohio  St 

133),  504. 


clxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED   IX    VOL.   I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Miller  (18  Ind.  App. 

549),  148. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (162  111.  583), 

606,  610. 
Wabash    R.  Co.   v.   Zerwick    (74  111. 

App.  670),  164. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rector 

(104  111.  296),  118. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shack- 

lett  (10  111.  App.  404),  503. 
Wabash  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan  ( [Ind.] 

31  N.  E.  661),  215,  218,  243. 
Wade  v.  Columbia  Elec.  St.  R.  L.  & 

P.  Co.  (51  S.  E.  296),  111,  118,  209. 
Wade  v.  Leroy  (20  How.   [U.  S.]  34), 

215,  227,  229,  233,  236,  241,  251,  328. 
Wadhams  v.  Swan  (109  111.  46),  79. 
Wadsworth  v.    Treat  (43  Me.    103), 

361,  362. 
Wager  v.  Troy  M.  R.  Co.   (25  N.  Y. 

526),  99. 
Wagner  v.  National  L.  Ins.   Co.  (  [U. 

S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  C),  61   U.  S.   App. 

691;  33  C.  C.  A.  121;  90  Fed.  395), 

68. 
Wahl  v.  Shoulder  (14  Ind.  App.  665), 

285. 
Waine  v.  Stanton  (12  App.  Div.   [X. 

Y.]  623),  107. 
Wainright    v.    Satterfield    (52    Neb. 

403),  100,  102. 
Wakely  v.  Johnson  (115  Mich.   285), 

435,  441. 
Wakeman  v.  Robinson  (8 Moore,  63), 

154. 
Wald  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.   L.   R. 

Co.  (162  111.  545),  70. 
Waldele  v.  Xew  York  C.  &  H.   R.  R. 

Co.  (29  Hun  [X.  Y.],  35),  569,  572, 

586. 
Waldhier  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co. 

(87  Mo.  37),  214. 
Walden  v.  Skinner  (101  U.  S.  589), 

507. 
Waldo  v.  Goodsell  (33  Conn.  432).  857. 
Waldron  v.  Marcier  (82  111.  550),  134. 
Waldron  v.  Waldron   ([111.]   45  Fed. 

314,  315),  459,  462. 


Walker  v.  Borland  (21  Mo.  289),   113. 
Walker  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.  (63  Barb.  [N. 

Y.]  260),  218,  227,  229,  233,  236,  243, 
328. 
Walker  v.  Fuller  (29  Ark.   448),  133, 

134. 
Walker  v.    Great  Northern    R.    Co. 

(  [L.  R.  It.]  28  C.  L.  69),  308. 
Walker  v.  Herrow  (22  Tex.  55),   165. 
Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 

(  [Mich.]  62  N.  W.  1032),  643. 
Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.   S.   R. 

Co.  (Ill  Mich.  518),  632,  645,  666. 
Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.   R. 

Co.  (104  Mich.  606),  646,  647. 
Walker  v.  Pittman  ( 108  Ind.  341 ),  437. 
Walker  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.  6  N. 

Y.  Supp.  536),  309. 
Walker  v.  United  States  (34  Ct.  CI. 

345),  65. 
Walker  v.  Westfield  (39  Vt.  246),  166. 
Walker  v.  Wickeus  (  [Kan.]   30  Pac. 

181),  400. 
Walker  v.  Wilson  (8   Bosw.   [N.  Y.] 

586),  111,  119,  186. 
Wall  v.  Cameron  (6  Colo.  275),  122. 
Wall  v.  Livezay  (6  Colo.  465),  215. 
Wall  v.  Posey  (105  Ga.  484),  102. 
Wallace  v.  Ali  Sam  (71  Cal.   197),  91. 
Wallace  v.  Bennett  (1  Abb.  N.  C.  478), 

393. 
Wallace  v.  City    of  New   York    (18 

How.  Pr.  [N.  Y.]  169),  119. 
Wallace  v.  Jameson  (179  Pa.  St.  98), 

382. 
Wallace  v.  Mayor  (2  Hilt.  [N.  Y.]  440), 

65,  112,  120,  186. 
Wallace  v.  New  York  (2  Hilt.  [N.  Y.] 

169),  65,  112,  120,  186. 
Wallace  v.  Rodgers  (156  Pa.  St.  395), 

391. 
Wallace  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (36  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  57),  132,  152,  562,  572, 

581. 
Wallace  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  ( [S. 

0.   N.   Y.   App.   Div.   1899]  5   Am. 

Neg.  Rep.  215),  132,  152,   562,   572, 

581. 


TABLK   OF   CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


clx 


vn 


Wallace  v.  Western,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (104 

X.  C.  442),  215,  218,  227,  229,  243. 
Wallace  v.  Williams  (59  Hun  [N.  Y.J, 

028),  119. 
Waller  v.  Hebron   (5  App.   Div.   577; 

39  N.  Y.  Supp.  381),  03. 
Waller  v.  Stale  I  144  N.  V.  579;  39  X. 

E.  080;  04  X.  Y.  St.  R.  220),  65. 
Waller  v.  Waller  (TO  Iowa,  513),  134. 
Waller  Bros.  v.  Waller  (70  Iowa,  513), 

119. 
Wallis  v.  City  of   Westport  (82   Mo. 

App.  522),  318. 
Wallis    Iron    Works     v.   Monmouth 

Park  Assoc.    (55  X.   J.    L.    [26  Vr.] 

132:  20  Atl.  140), :;.;. 

Walls  v.   Rochester   R.   Co.   (92   Hun 

[X.  Y.],  581),  562,  581. 
Walrath  v.  Radfield  (11  X.  Y.  212), 

87. 
Walrath  v.  Whittekind  (20  Kan.  482), 

91. 
Walrod  v.  Webster  Co.  (  [Iowa,  1900] 

SI  X.  W.  598),  65. 
Walsh  v.   Boston  &  M.    R.   Co.   (171 

Mass.  52),  105,  166. 
Walsh  v.  Chic,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  (42  Wis. 

23),  327. 
Walsh  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  ( [Ir.  R.] 

6  C.  L.  532),  508. 
Walter  v.  Post  (6  Duer  [N.  Y.],  363), 

17,  83. 
Wambold  v.  Vick  (50  Wis.  450),  667. 
Wanamaker  v.  Bowers  (30  Md.    42), 

119,  127. 
Wanck  v.   City  of  Winona  (  [Minn.] 

80  N.  W.  S51),  293. 
Wanzer  v.    Bright   (52   111.   35),   120, 

442. 
Ward   v.   Blackwood    (41    Ark.   295), 

133,  375. 
Ward  v.  Congress  Court  Co.  (  [U.  S. 

C.  C.   A.   111.]  33  C.   C.   A.  009;  99 

Fed.  598),  05. 
Ward  v.  Deaue  (32  X.  Y.  St.  R.  270), 

387. 
Ward    v.   Dick    (47  Conn.   300),   401 

404. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Ward  v.  St.  Vincent's  Hospital  (39 

App.  Div.  [X.  Y.]  024),  487. 
Ward   v.    Ward    (41   Iowa,   080),  112, 

114. 
Ward   v.    West  Jersey   &   S.  R.   Co. 

( [X.  J.  Sup.  1900]  47  Atl.  501),  220. 
Warden  v.  M cConnell  ( [Neb.]  36  N. 

W.  278),  470. 
Wardle   v.   New  Orleans  City  R.   R. 

Co.  (35  La.  Ann.  202),  243. 
Wardrobe  v.  Cal.   Stage  Co.  (7  Cal. 

118),  136. 
Warder  v.  Henry  (117  Mo.  530),  102. 
Ware  v.  Cartledge  (24  Ala.  622),  406. 
Warner   v.    Chamberlain    (7    Houst. 

[Del.]  18),  215,  227,  254,  250. 
Warner  v.   Lockerby  (31   Minn.  421), 

418,  422. 
Warner  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  (132  X.  Y. 

181),  111,  124,  397,  402. 
Warner  v.  So.  Pac.   R.  Co.  (113  Cal. 

105),  136. 
Warner  v.  Western  N.   C.  R.  Co.  (94 

N.  C.  250),  569. 
Warren    v.    Boston    &    M.    R.    Co. 

( [Mass.]  40  N.  E.  896),  220. 
Warren  v.  Dennett  (17  Misc.  [X.  Y.] 

86),  430,  455,  456. 
Warren  v.  Doolittle  (5    Cow.  [X.  Y.] 

678),  90. 
Warren  v.  Englehart  (13  Xeb.  283), 


Warren  v.  Sheer  (  [Pa.]  12  Atl.  204), 

57. 
Warren    v.   Warren   (89   Mich.    123), 

458. 
Warrior  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Mabel  fit 

Co.  (112  Ala.  024),  107. 
Warsaw  v.   Fisher  ( [Lad.  App.  1899] 

55  X.  E.  42),  230. 
Wartelsky    v.    McGee    ([Tex.     Civ. 

App.]  30  S.  W.  09).  470. 
Wartmau    v.    Sundell    1 54    X'.     J.    L. 

[25  Vt.]  589;  25  Atl.  356),  73. 
Warwick   v.    Frouke   (12    M.    &    W. 

507),  452. 
Warwick  v.  Hutcbiusou  (45  N.  J.  L. 

01),  87. 


elxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED   IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Washington  v.   Missouri,  K.  &  T.  K. 

Co.  (90  Tex.  314),  152. 
Washington  &  G.  R.   Co.  v.  Amer. 

Car  Co.  (5  App.  U.  C.  524),  91. 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Gladmon 

(15  Wall.  [U.  S.]  401),  514. 
Washington  &  G.   R.   Co.  v.  Hickey 

(12  App.  D.  C.  269),  192,  316,  322. 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson 

(9  App.  D.  C.  423),  254. 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson 

(25  Wash.  L.  Rep.  36),  215,  227. 
Washington,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon 

(147  U.  S.  571),  166,  244. 
Washington  Gas   Light  Co.  v.   Lans- 

den(172  U.  S.  534),  406. 
Washington  Gas   Light  Co.  v.   Lans- 

den   (  [D.    C.    App.]    24  Wash.   L. 

Rep.  807),  385. 
Washington  Twp.  v.  Coler  ( [U.  S.  C. 

C.  A.  8th  C]  51  Fed.  362),  501. 
Waterman  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(82  Wis.  613;  52  N.  W.  247),  243, 

267. 
Waters   v.    Brown    (3  A.   K.  Marsh. 

[Ky.],  557),  375. 
Waters  v.   Dumas  (75  Cal.   564),  111, 

124. 
Waters  v.  Greenleaf,  Johnson  L.  Co. 

(115  N.  C.  648),  119. 
Waters   v.    Stevenson  (3  Nev.    157), 

119. 
Waters-Pierce  Oil   Co.   v.    State   (19 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  1:  44  S.  W.  936),  67. 
Watkins  v.  Gaston  (17  Ala.  664),  375. 
Watson   v.  Hastings  (1  Penn.   [Del.] 

47),  369. 
Watson  v.  Loop  (12  Tex.  11),  523. 
Watson  v.   Rheinderknecht   (  [Minn. 

1901]  84  N.  W.  798),  82,  90,  368. 
Watt  v.    Nevada    Cent.    R.    Co.    (23 

Nev.  154),  91. 
Watt  v.  Potter  (2  Mason  [U.  S.],  77), 

94. 
Wattenberg  v.    Bernhard   (26    Misc. 

[N.  Y.]  659),  402. 
Watter  v.   Kensinger  (2  Pa.  Dist.  R. 

728),  366. 


Watts  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.   Co.  (39 

W.  Va.  196),  78. 
WTax  v.  State  (43  Neb.  18;  61  N.  W. 

117),  103. 
Weaver  v.    Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co. 

(  [D.  C]  21  Wash.  L.  Rep.  179),  504. 
Weaver  v.  Page  (6  Cal.  681),  444. 
Webb  v.   Oilman  (80»Me.   177),  111, 

118,  119,  124,  145,  369. 
Webb  v.  Gross  (79  Me.  224),  78. 
Webb  v.  Portland  Mfg.  Co.  (3  Sumn. 

[U.  S.]   189,  196),  55,  62,  74,  76,  94. 
Webb  v.  Rothchild(49  La.  Ann.  244, 

369. 
Webb    v.    Union   Ry.    Co.    (44    App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  413),  244. 
Webber  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  (97 

Fed.  140),  487. 
Webber  v.  Vincent  (29  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

603),  408. 
Weber  v.   Butler  (81  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

244),  390,  402. 
Weber  v.  Creston  (75  Iowa,  16),  280. 
Weber  v.  Squier  (51  Mo.  App.  601), 

75. 
Weber  v.   Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (12 

App.   Div.    [N.  Y.j  512;  42  N.   Y. 

Supp.  789;  76  N.   Y.  St.    R.   789), 

502,  559. 
Webster  v.  Symes  (109  Mich.  1),  148. 
Webster  Mfg.   Co.   v.  Mulvaney  (68 

111.  App.  607),  514,  607,  636. 
Webster  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Nisbett  (87  111. 

App.  551),  69. 
Weed  v.  Lee  (50  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  354), 

106. 
Weeks  v.  State  (63  N.  Y.  Supp.  203; 

48  App.  Div.  357),  65. 
Weems  v.  Mathieson  (4  Macq.  H.  L. 

215),  531,  535,  547. 
Weightman  v.  Washington  (1  Black 

[U.  S.],  39)  65. 
Weil  v.  St.    Louis  S.  W.   R.  Co.  (64 

Ark.  535;  43  S.  W.  967),  67. 
Weinberg  v.   Met.   St.   Ry.    Co.    (139 

Mo.  286),  178,  211,  330. 
Weirs  v.   Jones  Co.   (80  Iowa,    351), 

65. 


TABLK    <»K    CASKS    CITED    IN    V«»I..    I. 


clxix 


Weisenberg  v.  Appleton  (26  Wis.  56), 

24a 

Weiser  v.    Broadway  &  N.  St.  R.  Co. 

(10  Ohio  C.  C.  14),  290. 
Weiser  v.  Welch  (112  Mich.  134),  473, 

476. 
Weiss  v.    Hunsicker  (14  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

398),  494. 
Weiss  v.  Whittemore  (28  Mich.  373), 

391. 
Weitz  v.  Ewen  (50  Iowa,  570),  473. 
Welch  v.  Cheek  (115  X.  C.  310),  434. 
Wellman  v.  Sun  Print.  &  Pub.  Assu. 

(66  Hun  [X.  Y.],  331),  495. 
Wells  v.   National   L.  Assn.  (99  Fed. 

222),  75. 
Wells   v.    New  York  Central  R.   R. 

Co.  (24  N.  Y.  181),  159. 
Welsh  v.    Anthony   (4   Harris   [Pa.], 

254).  95. 
Welch  v.  Durand  (36  Conn.  182),  120. 
Wendell  v.   Pratt  (12  Allen  [Mass.], 

464),   153. 
Wendt  v.  Craig  (17  N.  Y.  Supp.  748), 

390. 
Wentworth   v.    Black  man  (71    Iowa, 

255),  119,  134. 
Wentz   v.    Bernhardt   (37    La.    Ann. 

636),  448. 
Werner   v.   Chic.   &  N.   W.    Ry.    Co. 

([Wis.]  81  N.  Y.  416),  264. 
West  v.  Forrest  (22  Mo.  344),  215,  218, 

867. 

West    v.    Southern    R.    Co.    (  [U.   S. 

C.  C.  A.  8th  C],  56  U.  S.  App.  323; 

29  U.  S.  C.  A.  219;  85  Fed.  392),  68. 
West   v.    Steamboat    Berlin  (3  Iowa, 

332),  153. 
WVstbrook  v.  Mobile,  etc.,  R.    R.  Co. 

(66  Mass.  560),  175,  170. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.    Co.  v.  Bode  (51 

111.  App.  440),  214. 
West   Chicago  St.   R.  Co.   v.  Boeker 

(70  111.  App.  67),  165. 
West  Chicago  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Carr  (67 

111.  App.  530),  318.  325. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr  (170 

111.  478),  215,  227,  233,  251,  280. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

West   Chicago  St.  R.  Co.   Dooley  (70 

111.  App.  424),  607,  616,  636. 
West  Chicago  St.    K.   Co.    v.    Foster 

(175  111.  396),  215,  218. 
West  Chicago  St.  R,  Co.  v.  James  (69 

111.  App.  609),  224. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

(77  111.  App.  142),  214. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy 

(165  111.  496),  280. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Levy  (182 

111.  525),  80,  298. 
West   Chicago  St.    R.    Co.  v.  Lyons 

(157  111.  593),  206. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mabie  (77 

111.  App.  176),  514,  598,  602,  603,  605. 
West   Chicago  St.   R.   Co.   v.   Maday 

(188  111.  308),  229. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison 

A.  &  A.  Co.  (160  111.  288),  104. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Musa  (180 

111.  130),  213. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Reddy  (69 

111.  App.  53),  282. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlon 

(Chic.  L.  J.  WTkly.  113),  514. 
West   Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlon 

(08  111.  App.  628),  607,  625,  634. 
West  Chicago  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Wauiata 

68  111.  App.  481),  514,  605. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler 

73  111.  App.  368),  109. 
Wist    Cumberland    Iron,  etc.,  Co.  v. 

Kenyon  (11  Ch.  I).  782,  rev'g  6  Ch. 

D.  733),  67. 
Westerberg  v.  Kinzua  Creek  &  K.  R. 

Co.  (142  Pa.  471),  102. 
Westerfield  v.  Levis  (  [La.]  9  So.  52), 

514. 
Westerfield  v.  Scripps  (119  Cal.  007). 

400. 
Western   &    A.    R.    Co.   v.   Ferguson 

(  [Ga.]  39  S.  E.  300),  150,  171. 
Western   &    A.    R.    Co.  v.  Ledbetter 

(99  Ga.  318),  340. 
Western  ct    A.    R.   Co.   v.  Young  (81 
Ga.  397;  7  S.  E.  912),  63,  177,  180, 
192,  215,  312. 


clxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Western    Brewery  Co.    v.   Meredith  I  Weston  v.  Barnicoat  (  [Mass.]  56  N. 


(166  111.  306,  309),  218,  226. 
Western  Gas    Coust.   Co.   v.   Danner 

(  [U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  Cal.],  77  Fed.  882), 

258. 
Western  Ry.  V.  Sistrunk  (85  Ala.  352; 

5  So.  79),  63. 
Western  Ry.  of  Alabama  v.  William- 
son (114  Ala.  131),  166. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Birchfield 

(14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  664),  77. 
Western  Un.   Teleg.  Co.  v.  Breshaus 

(8  Ind.  App.  563),  114,  139. 
Western  Un.    Tel.  Co.  v.  Brown  (58 

Tex.  170),  136. 
Western   Un.    Teleg.   Co.   v.   Cooper 

(71  Tex.  507),  183. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Cunning- 
ham (99  Ala.  344),  111. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Engler  [  (C. 

C.  App.  9th  C.  ]  75  Fed.   102),  214. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Hall  (124 

U.  S.  444),  75. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Harding, 

(103  Ind.  505),  501. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Hoffman 

(80  Tex.  424),  176. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  McGill  (57 

Fed.  699),  630. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Morrison 

(83  Fed.  992),  246. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.   v.   Poe  (61 

Fed.  449),  501. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Putchett 

(108  (la.  411),  391. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Seed  (115 

Ala.  670),  139,  141,  145. 
Western  Union  Teleg.  Co.  v.  State  (82 

Md.  293),  150. 
Western  Un.    Teleg.   Co.   v.   Waxel- 

baum    ([Ga.    1901]    39   S.   E.  443), 

94. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Woods  (88 

111.  App.  375),  311. 
Westlake  v.  Westlake  (34  Ohio  St. 

621),  458. 
West  Memphis  Packet  Co.  v.  White 
(99  Teun.  256),  214. 


E.  619),  385,  391. 
Westphal  v.  Austin  (39  111.  App.  230), 

472,  615. 
Wetmore  v.  Pattison  (45  Mich.  439), 

89. 
Whalen    v.  Citizens  Gas  Light  Co. 

(151  N.  Y.  70),  165. 
Whalen  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 

(60  Mo.  323),  215,  227. 
Whalls  v.  Same  (1  Ont.  L.  R.  622), 

547. 
Wharton  v.  Winch  (140  N.  Y.  287;  55 

N.    Y.   St.   R.  652  ;  35  N.   E.  589, 

rev'g  46  N.  Y.  St.  R.  187;  19  N.  Y. 

Supp.  477),  17. 
Whatley  v.  Catlett  (  [Tenn.]  53  S.  W. 

131),  499. 
Wheatley  v.  Thorn  (23  Miss.  62),  114, 

373. 
Wheeler  v.    Boone   (108  Iowa,   235), 

246. 
Wheeler  v.  Hanson  (161  Mass.  370), 

436,  437. 
Wheeler  v.  Nesbitt  (24  How.   [U.  S.] 

544),  432. 
Wheeler  v.   Tyler  S.  E.  R.   Co.   (91 

Tex.  356),  257,  258. 
Wheeler  &  Wilson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Boyce 

(36  Kan.  350),  135,  448. 
Wheelockv.  Noonan  (108  N.  Y.  179), 

99. 
Whelan  v.   N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.  (38  Fed.  15),  251,  254,  267. 
Whilty  v.   City  of   Oshkosh   ( [Wis. 

1900],  81  N.  W.  992),  65. 
Whimark  v.  Lorton  (8  N.  Y.  Supp. 

480),  78. 
Whipple  v.  Cumberland  Mfg.  Co.  (2 

Story,  661),  39,  62,  76,  100. 
Whipple  v.   Walpole  (ION.  H.  130), 

115,  122. 
White   v.    Blanchard   (164  Pa.   345), 

110. 
White  v.  Gaedinger  (Rap.  Ju.  Que- 
bec, B.  R.  156),  63. 
White  v.   Griffin  (4  Jones  L.  [N.  C] 

139),  76. 


TABLE   OF   <ASKs   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


■lxxi 


White  v.  Henry  (24  Me.  531),  633. 
White  v.  Muitlaud  (71    111.  250),  467, 

168, 
White  v.  Naerop  (51  111.   App.   114), 

119,  134. 
White  v.   Wilis   (31    Barb.    [X.   V.j 

279),  467. 
White   v.   Riley  Twp.    ([.Mich.  1899] 

BO  N.  W.  124),  85. 
White  v.  Sander  (108  Mass.  290),  219, 

220. 
White  v.  Suffolk  &  S.   Carolina  K.  R. 

Co.  ( |N.  C.  1897]  5   Am.  Neg.  Rep. 

457),  100. 
White   v.   Tucker  (16   Ohio  St.  408), 

441. 
White   v.   West  End    St.  K.  Co.  (105 

Mass.  522),  330. 
Whitesell  v.  Hill  (66  N.  W.  894),  165. 
Whitfield  v.  W<stbrook(40Miss.311), 

443. 
Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.  (23  N. 

Y.  465),  4S8,  49.">,  498,  499,  508,  511, 

500,  501,  504. 
Whitman    v.    Egbert  (27    App.    Div. 

[N.  Y.]  374),  458. 
Whitmore  v.  Bischoff  (5  Hun  [N.  Y.], 

170),  99. 
Whitney  v.  Bartholomew  (21  Conn. 

213).  07. 
Whitney   v.   Clarendon  (18   Vt.  252), 

243. 
Whitney  v.  Hitchcock  (4  Den.  [Nr.  Y.] 

461),  361,371. 
Whitney  v.  New  York  Casualty  Ins. 

Assoc.  (27   App.  Div.  [X.  V.J   320), 

440. 
Whitney  &  S.   Co.    v.    O'Kouike    (172 

111.  177).  199. 
Whiton  v.  Chicago  &   X.  W.  R.  Co. 

(2    Bliss  [U.   S.   C.   C.    Wis.)   282), 

511,  047.  648,  651,  004. 
Wholey  v.  Coldwell  (los  Cal.  95),  70. 
Wichita  v.  Stallings   (5fl    Kan.    770), 

214. 
Wier  v.  Allen  (51  X.   II.  177),  417. 
Wier  v.  Bradford  (1  Colo.  14),  95. 
Wiese  v.  Kennne  (140  Mo.   289),  175. 


Wiggin  v  Coffin  (3  Story  [U.  s.j,  1), 

no. 
Wigton  v.  Met  St   R.  Co.     38  App. 

Div.  [N.   Y.j  207),  340. 
Wilber  v.    Dwyer  (69   Hun  [X.  Y.], 

507),  475. 
Wilbur    v.   Crane    (13    Pick.   [Mass. J 

290),  501. 
Wilcox   v.   Wilmington   City    R.    Co. 

(  [Del.]  44  Atl.  080),  203.  489. 
Wilde    v.    Xew    Orleans   (12  La.  Ann. 

15),  75. 
Wiley  v.  Long  Island    K.    R.  Co.  (70 

Hun  [N.  Y.],  29),  169. 
Wilhelm   v.  Brooklyn  Q.  C.  &  S.  li. 

Co.   (32  App.    Div.    LX.    Y.]    037), 

212. 
Wilker  v.  Follansbee  (97  Wis.  577),  90. 
Wilkie    v.   Releigh  &   C.    F.    K.    Co. 

(127  X.  C.  203),  230. 
Wilkins   v.    Gilmore  (21  Tenn.  140), 

120. 
Wilkins  v.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  K.  &  B.  Co. 

(90  Iowa,  668),  214. 
Wilkins  v.  Wainright  (173  Mass.  212), 

132. 
Wilkinson  v.  Drew  (75  Me.  300),  111, 

120. 
Willard  v.  Holmes  (2   Misc.   [X.  Y.]. 

303),  436,  437. 
Willard  v.  Press  Pub.   Co.  (52  App. 

Div.  [X.  Y.]  44S),  401. 
Willett  v.   St.  .Albans  (69  Vt.  330;  38 

Atl.  72),  07. 
William  Bianfoot.  The  (48  Fed.  914), 

249. 
Williamette,  The  (  [U.  S.  C.  C.  App. 

9th  Cir.]  70  Fed.  874),  488. 
Williams    v.   Brimingham,   B.  &  M. 

Co.  (OS  L.  J.   Q.   B.  X.  S.  018  [C.  C. 

1899]  2Q.  B.  :V.)S),  68. 
Williams  v.  Brooklyn   (33  App.  Div. 

|N.  V.|  539),  196,  214. 
Williams    v.    Brown    (70    Iowa,   643), 

75. 
Williams   v.    Camden    &    A.     R.     Co. 

(  [X.   J.]   37    Atl.    1107),  517.    648, 

f>.">7.  050. 


clxxii  TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED   IN   VOL.   I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Willis  v.  Second  Ave.  Traction  Co. 


Williams  v.   Casebeer  (120  Cal.  77), 

450. 
Williams  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 

R.  Co.  (102  Mich.  537),  299. 
Williams  v.   Edmouds  (75  Mich.  92), 

161. 
Williams   v.    Frnzier   (41    How.    Pr. 

[N.  Y.]  428),  81. 
Williams    v.    Grant    (1    Conn.   487), 

153. 
Williams   v.    Harrison   (3  Mo.  411), 

404. 
Williams   v.   Oregon  Short   Line  R. 

Co.  (18  Utah,  210),  298,  359. 
Williams   v.    Reil  (20   111.   147),   119, 

122,  180. 
Williams  v.    Ry.   Co.   (68  Minn.  55), 

290. 
Williams  v.  Sargeant  (46  N.  Y.  481), 

562. 
Williams  v.  Southern  R.  Co.  (121  N. 

B.  512),  303. 
Williams  v.  Underbill   (63  App.  Div. 

[N.  Y.]  223),  83,  219. 
Williams   v.    Vanderbilt    (28   N.    Y. 

217),  351. 
Williams  v.  Vanderbilt  (145  111.  238), 

501. 
Williams  v.  West  Bay  City  (119  Mich. 

395),  285. 
Williams  v.  Williams  (20   Colo.  51), 

459. 
Williamson  v.  Brandenburg  (133  Ind. 

594),  91. 
Williamson   v.   Stage  Co.  (24   Iowa, 

171),  112,  119. 
Willing  v.  Consequa  ( [Pet.  U.  S.  C. 

C]  172),  94. 
Willing  v.  La  Ban  (35  Fed.  302),  95. 
Willingliam   v.   Macon   &  B.  R.  Co. 

(113  Ga.  374;  38  S.  E.  843),  168. 
Willis  v.  Forrest   (2    Duer  [N.   Y.], 

310),  376. 
Willis  v.  McNeill  (57  Tex.  465),  136, 

138. 
Willis  v.  Miller  (29  Fed.  238),  121. 
Willis  v.    Prov.   Teleg.   Pub.  Co.   (20 

R.  I.  285),  84. 


(189  Pa.  St.  430),  208. 
Wilmertou  v.   Sample  (39  111.  App. 

60),  437. 
Wilson  v.  Alabama  G.  S.  H.  Co.  (77 

Miss.  714),  76. 
Wilson  v.   Barnes  (13  B.  Mon.  [Ky.] 

330),  78,  81. 
Wilson  v.  Bowen  (64  Mich.  133,  141), 

111,  116,  432. 
Wilson  v.   Brett  (11  M.  &  W.   113), 

159. 
Wilson  v.  Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 

(8  Misc.  [N.  Y.]  450),  214. 
Wilson  v.  Coulter  (29  App.   Div.   [N. 

Y.]  85),  458,  462. 
Wilson  v.    Darwin   (I    Hill  [N.   Y.], 

670),  57. 
Wilson  v.  Dean  (10 Iowa,  432),  81. 
Wilson  v.  Goit  (17  N.  Y.  442),  393. 
Wilson  v.  Granby  (47  Conn.  47),  209. 
Wilson  v.  McEvory  (25  Cal.  169),  94. 
Wilson  v.  Middleton  (2  Cal.  54),  114, 

369,  472. 
Wilson  v.   Morgan  (58  N.   J.   L.   [29 

Vt.]  426),  107. 
Wilson   v.    Northern    R.    R.   Co.  (5 

Wash.  021),  354. 
Wilson  v.  Panne  (1  Kan.  App.  721), 

106. 
Wilson  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  (132  Pa.  St. 

27),  251. 
Wilson  v.  Shepler  (86  Ind.  275),  406, 

425. 
Wilson  v.  Smith  ( 18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  927), 

104. 
Wilson  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (13 

Utah,  352,  354),  255. 
Wilson  v.  The  John  Ritson  (35  Fed. 

663),  508. 
Wilson  v.  Tootle  (55  Fed.  211),  504, 

508. 
Wilson  v.  Town  of  Granby  (47  Conn. 

59),  290. 
Wilson  v.  Vaughn  (23  Fed.  229),  123. 
Wilson  v.  Vick  (  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  51 

S.  W.  45,  rev'd  53  S.  W.  576),  73. 
Wilson  v.  Wagar  (26  Mich.  452),  78. 


TABLE   OF   0ASE8   CITED    IN    70L.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


clxxiii 


Jfoung  (31  Wis.  574),  377. 
Webster  (7  C.  &  T.  198), 

Tilden  (77  Wis.   152),  843, 
7,   648,   652,   654,   057,    667, 


Wilson  v.  Wheeling  i  19  W.  Va.  350), 

1  12. 
Wilson  v, 
Wilton  v 

157. 
Wiltsc  v. 

640,   04 

670. 
Wimbish  v.    Hamilton  (47  La.  Ann. 

246),  416. 
Windham  v.  Rbame  (11  Rich.  L.  [S. 

C]  28:}),  120. 
Windisch-Muhlhausei'    Brew.  Co.   v. 

Bacon  ([Ky.]  53S.  W.  520),  387. 
Wing  v.  Hibbert  (9  Ohio  C.  P.  Dec. 

65  I,  633. 
Wing  v.  Now  York  &  Erie  K.  R.  Co. 

(1  Hilt.  [X.  Y.]  235),  154. 
Wingert  v.  Carpenter  (  [Mich.]  59  S. 

W.  662),  50(5. 
Winn  v.  Peckham  (42  Wis.  493).  442. 
Wmne  v.  Kelly  (34  Iowa,  330),  91. 
Winnegar  v.  Cent.  Passgr.  Ry.   Co. 

(85  Ky.  547),  488. 
Winner  v.   Lathrop  (07  Hun  [X.  Y.], 

511),  295. 
Winnt  v.  International  &  G.  X.  R.  Co. 

(74  Tex.  32;  11  S.  W.  907),  526,  531, 

532,  535,  550,  551. 
Winons    Point  S.   Club  v.   Bodi   (10 

Ohio  C.  D.   544;  20  Obio  C.   C.  D. 

U.  637),  76. 
Winship  v.   Enfield  (42  N.    II.   197), 

161. 
Winstead   v.    Hulnie  (32    Kan.    568), 

119,  127. 
Winswore  v.  Greenback  ( Willes,  577), 

62. 
Winter  v.  Ilenn  (4  C.  &  P.  494),  460. 
Winter  v.  Peterson  (24  X.  J.  L.  524), 

111,  125. 
Winters  v.  Cowen  (90   Fed.  99),  338. 
Winters  v.  Kansas  City  Cable  R.  Co. 

(99  Mo.  509),  170. 
Winters  v.  State  (  [Id.]  47  Pac.  855) 

70. 
Wintuska  v.   Louisville  &  X.   R.  Co. 

(14  Ky.  L.  R.  579),  504. 


Wisconsin,  M.  A  X.  R.   Co.   v.   Wese- 

lins  (119  Micb.  505),  642. 
Wise  v.  Covington,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (91  Ky. 

537),  152. 
Wise  v.  McNichols  (63  Mo.  App.  141), 

432. 
Wise  v.   Teerpenning  (2  Edw.   S.    ' 

[N.  Y.]  112),  560,  565. 
Wisner  v.  Barber  (10  Ore.  342),  11,  13. 

13. 
Wiser  v.  Cbesley  (53  Mo.  547),  150. 
Wiswell  v.  Doyle  (160  Mass.  42).  IT... 
Witcber  v.    Jones   (17    X.    Y.   Supp. 

491),  416. 
Withers   v.    North    Kent.  R.    Co.    (3 

Ilurlst.  &  N.  909),  153. 
Wiwirowski  v.  Lake  Shore  &  Mich. 

South.  Ry.  Co.  (124  N.  Y.  420),  165. 
Woeckner  v.   Erie  Elec.    Motor  Co. 

(187  Pa.  St.  206),  305. 
Wolcott  v.  Mount  (36  X.  J.  L.  262), 

75. 
Wolf  v.  Cohen  (8  Rich.  L.  [S.  C]  144], 

114. 
WTolf  v.  Krunk  (92  Md.  138),  462. 
Wolf  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.   R.   Co.   (55 

Ohio  St.  517),  161,  162. 
Wolf  v.  Trimble  (103  Ind.  355),  218. 
Wolfe  v.   Great  Xortbern  Ry.  (26   L. 

R.  Ir.  548),  548. 
Wolfe  v.  Johnson  (45  111.  App.   122), 

475. 
Wolfe  v.  Johnson  (152  111.  280),  475. 
Wolff  v.  Smith   (112  Mich.  359).  415. 
Womack  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  (80  Ga. 

132),  495. 
Womack  v.   Fudiaker   (47  La.    Ann. 

33),  440. 
Wood  v.    Amer.    Xat.     Bank    ( [Va. 

1902]  40  S.  E.  931),  119. 
Wood  v.  Barker  (37  Ala.  00),  128. 
Wood   v.    Bartholomew    (122    X.    C. 

177),  166. 
Wood  v.    City   of    Hurton    ([W.  Va. 

1990]  85  S.  E.  824),  65. 
Wood  v.  Lentz  (116  Micb.  275),  483. 
Wood  v.   Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (88 

Fed.  44),  214. 


clxxiv  TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED    IN    VOL.    I. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Wood  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  R.  Co. 

(58  Mo.  109),  95. 
Wood  v.  Watertown  (34  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

808),  228. 
Woodall  v.  McMillan  (23  Iowa,  450), 

454. 
Wooden  v.   Western   N.   Y.   &  P.  R. 

Co.  (126  N.  Y.  10),  506. 
Woodgei*&  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (36  L.  J. 

C.  P.  177),  91. 
Woodman  v.   Nottingham  (49  N.  II. 

387),  1,  62,  115. 
Woodring  v.  Forks  Twp.   (28  Pa.  St. 

355),  67. 
Woods  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.  (108 

Mich.  396),  214. 
Woods  v.  Pangburn  (75  N.  Y.  495), 

405. 
Woodward  v.  Boscobel  (84  Wis.  226), 

227. 
Woodward   v.   Paine  (15  Johns.    [N. 

Y.]  493),  562. 
Woodward    Iron   Co.    v.    Cook    (124 

Ala.  349),  303,  304. 
Woolheatherv.  Risley  (38  Iowa,  486), 

480. 
Woolley  v.  Grand   Street  &  Newton 

R.   R.   Co.    (83  Barb.  [N.  Y.]   121), 

148. 
Woolsey  v.  Ellenville  (39  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  744),  318. 
Wooster  v.  Western   N.  Y.  &  P.   R. 

Co.  (40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  844),  214. 
Wootters  v.   Crockett  (11  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  474;  33  S.  W.  391),  71. 
Worley  v.  Cin.  R.    R.  Co.  (1   Handy, 

481),  495. 
Wormald  v.   Hill  (4  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

723),  134. 
Wort  v.   Jerkins  (14  Johns.    [N.  Y.] 

351),  111,  125. 
Worth  v.  Edmonds  (52  Barb.  [N.  Y.] 

40),  153. 
Worth   &   N.    O.   Ry.   Co.  v.    Smith 

(  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]   25  S.  W.  1032), 

83. 
Wortham  v.   Basket  (99  N.   C.   70), 

501. 


Wragge  v.  South  Carolina  &  G.   R. 

Co.  (74  S.  C.  105;  24  S.  E.  76;  235 

L.  R.  A.  191),  63. 
Wright  v.    Boiler   (20   N.   Y.   St.   R. 

874),  161. 
Wright  v.  Clark  (50  Vt.  130),  159. 
Wright   v.    Compton    (53  Ind.   337), 

218. 
Wright  v.   Detroit,   etc.,   R.   Co.   (77 

Mich.  123),  177. 
Wright  v.  Donnell  (34  Tex.  291),  132, 

146. 
Wright  v.  Gregory  (9  App.   Div.   [N. 

Y.]  85),  382,  386,  390,  404. 
Wright  v.  Hayter  (5  Kan.  App.  638), 

430,  431. 
Wright   v.     Midland    Ry.    (51    L.    J. 

539),  522. 
Wright  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.  ( [C.  C. 

W.  D.  Tenn.]  80  Fed.  85),  380. 
Wright  v.  State  Board  of  Liquidation 

(49  La.  Ann.  1213;  22  So.  361),  65. 
Wright  v.  Williams  (2  Wend.  [N.  Y.] 

632),  57. 
Wright  v.  Wiight  ( [N.   J.]   43  Atl. 

447),  68. 
Wrightman  v.    Devere  (33  Wis.  570), 

473. 
Wuest  v.  American  Tobacco  Co.  (10 

S.  D.  394),  432. 
Wunsch  v.  Weber  (31  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

365),  295. 
Wyatt  v.  Rome  (105  Ga.  312;  31  S.  E. 

188),  65. 
Wyatt  v.  Williams  (43  N.   H.   102), 

02,  495. 
Wyman  v.  Leavitt  (71  Me.  227,  229), 

218,  219,  220. 
Wymond  v.  Amsbury  (2  Colo.  213), 

95. 
Wymore  v.   Mahaska  Co.   (78  Iowa, 

396,  398),  162,  176. 
Wynn  v.  Central  Park,  North  &  East 

River  R.    R.  Co.   (133  N.  Y.  575), 

120,  169. 
Wynne  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (14 

Misc.  [N.  Y.]  394),  214,  228. 
Wynne  v.  Parsons  (57  Conn.  73),  111. 


TAIJLK   OF   OASES    CITED    IN    Vol,. 
[References  are  to  Sections.] 


clxxv 


Yaeger  v.   Southern   Cal.   R.   R.   Co. 

(  [Cal.]  51  Pac.  190),  276. 

i  v.  Exchange  Nat.  Bk.  (57  Neb. 

310),  Hit. 
Fahn   v.   Ottumwa   (GO    Iowa,    429), 

174. 
Vi  I.'  College  v.  Sanger  (62  Fed.  177), 

66. 
Yarmouth  v.  France  (19  Q.  B.  D.  647, 

i..  i;.),  68. 

Yates  v.   Joyce   (11   Johns.    [N.   Y.] 

140),  62. 
Yates  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co. 

(67  N.  Y.  100),  133. 
Yates  v.  White  (4  Bing.  [N.  C]  272), 

554. 
Yeager  v.   Berry  (82   Mo.   A  pp.  534), 

375. 
Yeates  v.  Reed  (4  Blackf.  [Ind.]  463) 

414. 
Yerian   v.  Linkletter   (80   Cal.    135), 

119,  122,  187. 
Yerkes  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  ( [Wis. 

1901]  88  N.  W.  33),  149. 
Yertore    v.    Wiswall    (16    How.    Pr. 

[V.  Y.]  8),  488,  494,  569. 
York   v.   Canada  Atlantic  S.  S.   Co. 

(22  S.  C.  167),  100. 
lost  v.  Tracy  (13  Utah,  431 ),  450,  455. 
Young  v.    Citizens   St.    R.   Co.   (148 

In.].  :>4),  165. 
STouiig  v.   Condon  (08  Tenn.  577;  40 

S.  W.  1088),  63. 
Young  v.  Fox  (26  App.  Div.  [N   Y  1 

261),  402. 


Young  v.  Webb  (ity  i  150  Ko 

65,  -l  14. 
Youngblood  v.  So.  Car.  &  <,.  r,  Co. 

(60  S.  0.  9),  268. 
Yount  v.  Carney  (91   Iowa,  559)    448 

451. 

Youqua  v.  Nixon  (Pet.   [U.  S    <     c  ] 

221),  94. 
Yuhoola  R.  &  C.  C.  Hydraulic  11.  M. 

Co.  v.  Irby  (40  Ga.  479),  134. 
Yule  v.  City  of  New  Orleans  (25  La. 

Ann.  304),  65. 
Yundt  v.  Ilartrunft  (41  111.  9),  457. 
Zabriskie  v.  Smith  (13  N.  Y.  322),  495. 
Zanesville   v.  Fanman    (53    Ohio   St. 
005;  35  Ohio  L.  J.  51 ;  42  N.  E.  703) 
63. 
Zantzinger  v.  Weight  man  (2  Cranch, 

C.  Ct.  478),  436. 
Zebley    v.   Storey    (117  Pa.  St.  478). 

437. 
Zerfing  v.   Mourer  (2    Greene    [la.] 

520),  468. 
Ziech  v.  Hebard  (67111.  App.  97),  151. 
Zieglerv.  Powell  (54  Ind.  173),  4:)7. 
Zimmerman  v.  Bonzar  (  [Pa.]  16  Atl. 

71),  104. 
Zimmerman  v.   Helser  (32  Md   274) 

120. 
Zimmerman  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  (  [App. 
Div.  N.  Y.  1898]  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
665),  172. 
Zingrebe  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  (56  App. 

Div.  [N.  Y.]  555).  278. 
Zinn  v.  Rice  i  154  Mass.  1).  444. 


Young  v   Johnson  (46  Hnn  [N.  Y.],    Zion  v.  Southern  >>.  C„  ,,7  Fed.  5 


164),  376. 
Young  v.  Kulm  (71  Tex.  645),  lot;. 
Young  v.Spencer  (10  B.&  C.  145),  71 


:;:;s. 


00), 


Zipperlein  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 

Ry.  Co.   is  Ohio  S.  &  C.   p   r)ec 
587),  192. 


TITLE  I. 

GENERAL  AND  PARTICULAR  TERMS  AM)  DEFINITIONS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


5. 
6. 

7. 
8. 
9. 

10. 
11. 
12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 
1G. 

17. 
18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 


Damage  defined. 

Damages  defined. 

Damages  defined — Codes    and 
constitution. 

Damnum    absque    injuria   de- 
fined. 

Measure  of  damages  defined. 

Measure    of   damages   defined 
— Codes. 

Civil  damages  defined. 

Nominal  damages  defined. 

Nominal     damages     defined — 
Codes. 

Constructive  damages  defined. 

General  damages  defined. 

General     damages     defined — 
Code. 

Special  damages  defined. 

Special      damages      defined — 
Code. 

Direct  damages  defined. 

Direct       damages      defined — 
(Odes. 

Prospective  damages  defined. 

Consequential      damages     de- 
fined. 

Consequential      damages      de- 
fined— Code. 

Resulting  damages  defined. 
Remote  damages  defined. 


22.  Contingent  or  too  remote  dam- 
ages defined — Code. 

2-'!.   Contingent  damages  defined. 

24.  Speculative    damages    defined. 

2.").  Actual  or  single  damages  de- 
lined. 

2(3.  Compensatory  damages  de- 
fined. 

27.  Substantial  damages  defined. 

28.  Punitive,   vindictive  or  exem- 

plary damages  defined. 

29.  Punitive,   vindictive   or  exem- 

plary     damages      defined — 
<  'odes. 

30.  Double,    treble,   triple    or    in- 

creased damages  defined. 

31.  Double  and  single  or  joint  and 

several  damages  defined. 

32.  Additional  damages  defined. 
:',:;.   Liquidated  damages  defined. 

34.  Liquidated  damages  defined — 

Codes. 

35.  Unliquidated  damages  defined. 

36.  Temporary  or  permanent  dam- 

ages de  lined. 

37.  Continuing  damages  defined. 

38.  Entire  damages  defined. 

39.  Excessive,    inadequate    or   in- 

sufficient damages  defined. 

40.  Reasonable      damages  —  Code 

provisions. 


§  1  TERMS   AND   DEFINITIONS. 

§  1.  Damage  defined Damage  means  every  loss  or  diminu- 
tion of  what  is  a  man's  own  occasioned  by  another's  carelessness, 
fraud,  design,  default  or  fault.  It  includes  acts  of  omission  as 
well  as  of  commission.  It  is  not  confined  to  the  loss  of  a  man's 
goods  but  includes  all  which  is  a  man's  own  in  a  strict  and 
proper  sense.'  Nor  was  the  word  originally  synonymous  with,  nor 
collateral  to,  the  terms  fine,  penalty,  revenge,  chastisement,  or 
punishment,  even  though  its  meaning  in  this  respect  has  been 
extended  somewhat  as  will  appear  hereinafter  in  connection 
with  the  consideration  of  exemplary  damages  generally.1 


1  Damage  means  every  loss  or  dimi- 
nution of  what  is  a  man's  own  occa- 
sioned by  the  fault  of  another. 
Aggs  v.  Shackelford  Co.,  85  Tex.  145, 
149;  19  S.  W.  1085,  per  Tarlton,  J., 
citing  Railway  v.  Fuller,  63  Tex.  469. 
"Damage.  The  loss  caused  by  one 
person  to  another,  or  to  his  property 
either  with  the  design  of  injuring 
him,  or  with  negligence  and  care- 
lessness, or  by  inevitable  accident." 
1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  491. 
"A  synonym  of  damage,  when  ap- 
plied to  a  person  sustaining  an  in- 
jury, is  loss.  Loss  is  a  generic  term. 
Damage  is  a  species  of  loss.  Loss 
signifies  the  act  of  losing,  or  the 
thing  lost.  Damage — in  French, 
dommage  ;  Latin,  damnum  from 
demo,  to  take  away — signifies  the 
thing  taken  away, — the  lost  thing 
which  a  party  is  entitled  to  have  re- 
stored to  him  so  that  he  may  be 
made  whole  again  .  .  .  When  used 
to  signify  the  money  which  a  plain- 
tiff ought  to  receive,  damage  is 
never,  nor  in  any  sense,  synonymous 
with  nor  collateral  to  the  terms  ex- 
ample, fine,  penalty,  punishment, 
revenge,  discipline,  or  chastisement 
.  .  .  'By  damage,  we  understand 
every  loss  or  diminution  of  what  is  a 
man's  own,  occasioned  by  the  fault 
of  another.'  Ruth.  Inst.  B.  I.,  ch. 
xxii,  sec.  1;  Grotius,  Lib.  II,  cap. 
xxii,  2.     '  The  definition  of   damage 

2 


extends  the  notion  of  it  beyond  a 
man's  goods.  His  life,  his  limbs, 
his  liberty,  and  exemption  from  pain, 
his  character  or  reputation  are  all 
of  them  his  own,  in  a  strict  and 
proper  sense;  so  that  the  loss  or  dim- 
inution of  any  of  them  gives  him  a 
right  to  demand  reparation  from 
those  by  whose  fault  they  have  been 
lost  or  diminished.'  ibid."  Fay  v. 
Parker,  53  N.  H.  (5  Shirley)  342,  354, 
356,  362,  16  Am.  Rep.  270,  per  Fos- 
ter, J.  "  Damage  is  the  loss  caused 
by  one  person  to  another,  either  to 
his  person,  property  or  relative 
rights,  through  design,  carelessness 
or  default."  Finch  v.  Heermans,  5 
Luz.  Leg.  Reg.  125.  In  a  statute  pro- 
viding for  damages  for  defects,  etc., 
in  bridges  the  words  damage  which 
shall  happen  to  any  person,  etc.,  nec- 
essarily imply  "all  injury  to  prop- 
erty as  well  as  person,  the  pecuniary 
loss  to  the  pocket,  as  well  as  the 
bodily  loss  of  bone  or  flesh  and 
blood."  Woodman  v.  Nothingham, 
49  N.  H.  387,  392,  6  Am.  Rep.  526, 
per  Nesmith,  J.  "Damnum,  Lat. : 
In  the  Civil  Law.  Damage ;  the 
loss  or  diminution  of  what  is  a 
man's  own, either  by  fraud,  careless- 
ness or  accident.  In  pleading  and 
old  English  law;  damage,  loss." 
Black's  L.  Diet.  See  also  Anderson's 
Diet,  of  Law. 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§2 


§  2.  Damages  defined. — Damages  is  the  compensation  or  in- 
demnity recoverable  by  or  awarded  to  the  one  who  has  sustained 
damage  ;  the  compensation  or  indemnity  due  from  or  awarded 
against  the  wrongdoer  or  the  person  who  has  occasioned  the 
damage.  The  word  is  also  used  as  defining  the  amount  averred 
in  the  ad  damnum  clause  as  that  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  recover.  And  it  is  not  infrequently  used  as  synonymous  with 
the  term  injuries  as  the  ground  of  damages.2 


-"'Damages'  '  Damna  in  the  com- 
mon law  hath  a  special  signification 
for  the  recom pence  that  is  given  by 
the  jury  to  the  plaintiff  or  defend- 
ant' (demandant)  'for  the  wrong 
the  defendant  hath  done  unto  him.' 
2  Coke  Litt.  257a."  Coke  Litt.  ( But- 
ler &  Hargraves,  notes,  1853)  257a; 
Macon  &  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Winn,  26 
Ga.  250,  271,  per  Benning,  J.  "  Dam- 
ages are  the  indemnity  recoverable 
by  the  injured  party  from  the  party 
who  has  caused  the  injury."  Finch 
v.  Heermans,  5  Luz.  Leg.  Reg.  125. 
"  Damages  sometimes  signifies  the 
clause  or  passage  in  a  declaration  in 
which  the  plaintiff  alleges  or  Mays' 
the  sum  or  amount  which  he  claims 
to  recover;  and  the  word  is  some- 
times used,  loosely,  in  the  sense  of 
injuries;  causes  for  a  recovery  of 
damages."  1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed. 
1879)336.  "Damages  1.  A  pecuni- 
ary recompense  awarded  by  judicial 
tribunals  to  indemnify  one  who  has 
sustained  an  injury  through  some 
wrongful  act  or  neglect;  a  sum  re- 
coverable as  amends  for  a  tort."  1 
Abbott's  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  335. 
"  Damages.  The  indemnity  recover- 
able by  a  person  who  has  sustained 
an  injury  either  in  his  person,  prop- 
erty or  relative  rights  through  the 
act  or  default  of  another.  The  sum 
claimed  as  such  indemnity  by  a 
plaintiff  in  his  declaration;  the  in- 
jury or  loss  for  which  compensation 
is  sought."     1    Bouv.    L.   Diet.    (ed. 


1897)  491;  see  also  Black's  L.  Diet. 
"  Damages  are  a  sum  of  money  ad- 
judged to  be  paid  by  one  person  to 
another  as  compensation  for  a  loss 
sustained  by  the  latter  in  conse- 
quence of  an  injury  committed  by 
the  former.  Co.  Litt.  257a;  Mayne 
on  Dam.  1 ;  "  Sweet's  Diet,  of  Eng. 
L.  (ed.  1882)  239.  "  Damages  in  the 
ordinary  legal  sense  means  the  com- 
pensation which  the  law  will  award 
for  an  injury  done.  If  the  law  will 
give  no  compensation  there  is  cer- 
tainly no  legal  claim  for  damages." 
Kansas  City  &  ().  R.  Co.  v.  Hicks, 
30  Kan.  288,  292,  1  Pac.  396,  per 
Brewer,  J.  Damages  "in  legal  par- 
lance means  the  indemnity  recover- 
able by  a  person  who  has  sustained 
an  injury  either  in  his  person,  prop- 
erty or  relative  rights  through  the 
act  or  default  of  another.  To  con- 
stitute a  right  to  recover  damages, 
the  party  claiming  damages  must 
have  sustained  a  loss;  the  party 
against  whom  they  are  claimed  must 
be  chargeable  with  the  loss."  Col- 
lins v.  East  Tenn.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  9 
Ileisk  (Tenn. )  841,  850,  per  Sneed,  J., 
citing  1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  "  Damages. 
The  compensation  which  the  law 
will  award  for  an  injury  done.  A 
species  of  property  given  to  a  man 
by  a  jury  as  a  compensation  or  satis- 
faction for  some  injury  sustained." 
Anderson's  Diet,  of  Law.  "'Dam- 
ages,' says  Prof.  Greenleaf,  '  are 
given    as     a     compensation,   recom- 


§§  3,  4  TERMS    ANT)    DEFINITIONS. 

§  3,  Damages  defined  —Codes  and  constitution — In  four 
states  damages  are  denned  as  follows  :  Every  person  who  suffers 
detriment  from  the  unlawful  act  or  omission  of-  another  may- 
recover  from  the  person  in  fault  a  compensation  therefor  in 
money,  which  is  called  damages ; 3  and  in  Georgia  damages  are 
given  as  a  compensation  for  the  injury  done.4  Under  the  Ken- 
tucky constitution  providing  that  "  damages  may  be  recovered  " 
for  death  resulting  from  injury  inflicted  by  negligence  or  wrong- 
ful act,  the  word  is  used  in  its  broadest  sense,  and  includes  all 
damages  known  to  the  law,  and  covers  all  compensatory  and 
exemplary  damages.5 


§  4.  Damnum  absque  injuria  defined. — Damnum  absque  in- 
juria is  injury  without  damage ;  that  is,  a  damage  may  be  sus- 
tained by  the  plaintiff,  but  it  is  a  damage  not  occasioned  by  any- 
thing which  constitutes  such  an  injury  in  the  law  as  that  an 
action  can  be  maintained  therefor.'1 


pense,  or  satisfaction  to  the  plaintiff, 
for  an  injury  actually  received  by 
him  from  the  defendant.  They 
should  be  precisely  commensurate 
with  the  injury;  neither  more  nor 
less;  and  this  whether  it  be  to  his 
person  or  estate.  All  damages  must 
be  the  result  of  the  injury  complained 
of.1  2  Greenl.  Ev.  sees.  253-4,  266- 
7,  272.  .  .  .  Mr.  Tidd  defines  dam- 
ages as  '  a  pecuniary  compensation 
for  an  injury.'  Tidd's  Pr.  870." 
Fay  v.  Parker,  53  N.  H.  (5  Shirley) 
342,  354,  356,  362,  16  Am.  Rep.  270, 
per  Foster,  J.  "  Damna  (Lat.  dam- 
num). Damages  both  inclusive  and 
exclusive  of  costs."  1  Bouv.  L. 
Diet.  (ed.  1897)  494.  See  also  Pegram 
v.  Stortz,  31  W.  Va.  220,  229,  for  defi- 
nition of  damages. 

3Cal.  Civ.  Code  (1899),  sec.  3281; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  4270;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  4971;  2 
Grantham's  Annot.  Stat.  S.  D.  (1901) 
sec.  5777. 

4  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3905 
(3065). 

4 


5  "  Worcester  defines  the  word  as 
'  the  indemnity  or  pecuniary  satisfac- 
tion awarded  for  an  injury.'  Defini- 
tions of  this  class  would  clearly  in- 
clude all  kinds  of  damages  which 
might  be  awarded  for  an  iujury,  and 
we  think,  as  used  in  section  241  of  the 
constitution,  the  word  is  used  in  its 
broadest  sense  and  includes  all  varie- 
ties of  damages  known  to  the  law.  No 
limitation  is  put  upon  it  so  far  as  we 
have  been  able  to  find  in  any  other 
part  of  the  constitution,"  and  it 
covers  compensatory  and  exemplary 
damages.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kelly,  100  Ky.  421 ;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
78;  40  S.  W.  452  ;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
249,  251,  per  Du  Relle,  J.  Denying 
rehearing,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  69  ;  7  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  165. 

6  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  ed. 
1874)  *195,  196.  "  Damnum  absque 
injuria  is  a  loss  which  does  not  give 
rise  to  an  action  of  damages  against 
the  person  causing  it."  Sweet's 
Diet,  of  Eng.  L.  (ed.  1882)  240.  See 
also  1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  337; 


TERMS    ANH    DEFINITIONS. 


§*  5-7 


§  5.  Measure  of  damages  defined. — .Measure  of  damag< 
the  compensation  based  upon  Law,  <>r  upon  law  and  fact  for  the 
injury,  wrong  or  damage  sustained  :  or  the  test,  rule  or  method 
for  ascertaining  the  amount  of  damages.7 

§  0.  Measure  of  damages  defined     ('odes. — The  Codes  of 
four  states  provide  as  follows  :  ••  For  the  breach  of  an  obligation 

arising  from  contract,  the  measure  of  damages,  except  where 
otherwise  expressly  provided  by  this  Code,  is  the  amount  which 
will  compensate  the  party  aggrieved  for  all  the  detriment  proxi- 
mately caused  thereby,  or  which  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things  would  be  likely  to  result  therefrom."  s  "  For  the  breach 
of  an  obligation  not  arising  from  contract,  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages, except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  by  this  Code, 
is  the  amount  which  will  compensate  for  all  the  detriment  prox- 
imately caused  thereby,  whether  it  could  have  been  anticipated 
or  not,"  !>  while  the  Code  of  Georgia  reads  :  "  Damages  are  given 
as  compensation  for  the  injury  done,  and  generally  this  is  the 
measure  where  the  injury  is  of  a  character  capable  of  being  es- 
timated in  money.  If  the  injury  be  small,  or  the  mitigating 
circumstances  be  strong,  nominal  damages  only  are  given."  10 


^  7.  Civil  damages  defined.— Civil  damages  are  such  as  ac- 
crue to  a  person  for  violation  of  his  rights  as  a  citizen,  or  for  an 
injury  to  his  person  or  property,  or  to  his  relative  rights  by  virtue 
uf  the  domestic  relations,  being  snch  rights  as  exist  under  cer- 
tain constitutional  ami  statutory  provisions,  guaranteeing  what 
are  known  as  civil  rights  to  persons  of  African  descent,  and  also 
the  rights  to  damages  under  the  civil  damage  laws  of  some 
states,  covering  the  injury  caused  by  the  sale  of  intoxicating 


Anderaon'8  Diet.  Law  (1893),  310; 
Black's  L.  Diet.;  1  Houv.  L.  Diet. 
(eel.  1879)  494. 

7  .Measure  of  damages  is  "the  tesl 
by  which  the  amount  of  damages  is 
ascertained.'1  Sweet's  Diet,  of  Eng. 
L.  (ed.  L882)  2:19.  See  also  Ander- 
son's Diet.  I..  (18931  668;  _'  Bonv. 
I..  Diet.  (ed.  L897)  385. 

8  Civ.  Code  Cal.  (1899)  sec.  3300; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  4300;   lav. 


Codes,  N".  D.  (1899)  sec.  4978  (with 
additional  clause);  2  Grantham's 
Annot.  Stats.  S.  D.  (1901)  sec.  57S4. 

'■'  Civ.  Code  Cal.  (1899)  BBC.  3333:  1 
Mont.  Codes  (189.",),  sec.  4330;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  4997;  2 
Crant  ham's  Annot.  Stats.  S.  D.  (1901) 
sec.  5803. 

"  -2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3905 
(3065). 


§§8,9 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


liquors,  etc.  Civil  damages  may  arise  for  discrimination  as  to 
jury  service ;  as  to  public  accommodations  ;  as  to  public  school 
privileges,  etc.11 

§  8.  Nominal  damages  defined.— Nominal  damages  are  a 
small  and  trivial  sum  awarded  for  a  technical  injury  due  to  a 
violation  or  invasion  of  some  legal  right,  and  as  a  consequence 
of  which,  some  damages  must  be  awarded  to  determine  the 
right.12 

§  9.  Nominal  damages  defined— Codes.— When  a  breach  of 
duty  has  cuused  an  appreciable  detriment  to  the  party  affected, 
he  may  yet  recover  nominal  damages.13     Another  provision  is  : 


11  See    Anderson's  Diet,    of    Law 
(1893),  305,  306. 

12  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  943.  Nominal  damages  are 
"when  a  trivial  sum  of  six  and  a 
quarter  cents  is  allowed  in  recogni- 
tion that  a  mere  right  of  plaintiffs  has 
been  infringed,  but  without  import- 
ant loss  sustained."  1  Abb.  L.  Diet, 
(ed.  1879)  336.  See  Anderson's  Diet, 
of  Law,  "Damages' ' ;  Black's  L.  Diet. 
"Damages."  "Nominal  damages 
are  damages  to  such  a  small  amount 
(e.  g.  a  farthing)  as  to  show  that  they 
are  not  intended  as  any  equivalent  or 
satisfaction  to  the  party  recovering 
them.  They  are  given  when  the 
plaintiff,  in  an  action  for  the  invasion 
of  a  right,  establishes  his  right,  but 
does  not  show  that  he  has  sustained 
any  damage."  Sweet's  Diet,  of  Eng. 
L.  (ed.  1882)  240,  citing  Beaumont 
v.  Greathead,  2  C.  B.  494  ;  Leake  on 
Contracts,  567.  Where  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion exists,  at  least  nominal  damages 
will  be  presumed  and  must  be  al- 
lowed, nor  does  the  fact  that  the 
plaintiff  insists  upon  substantial 
damages,  and  neither  tried  his  case 
upon  a  claim  of,  asked  for,  or  would 
have  been  satisfied  with  nominal 
damages,  alter  the  rule.  Van  Velsor 
v.  Seeberger,  35  111.  App.  598,  602. 

6 


Nominal  damages  are  those  recover- 
able where  a  legal  right  is  to  be  vin- 
dicated from  an  invasion  that  has 
produced  no  actual  present  loss  of 
any  kind.  Duggan  v.  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  159  Pa.  248;  33  W.  N.  C. 
381;  28  Atl.  182,  186;  25  Pitts.  L.  J. 
N.  S.  13.  Nominal  damages  are 
those  which  occur  in  cases  where  the 
judge  is  bound  to  tell  the  jury  only 
to  give  such.  Prehn  v.  Royal  Bk.  of 
Liverpool,  L.  R.  5  Exch.  Cas.  92,  99, 
per  Martin,  B.  Where  there  exists 
only  a  technical  right  of  action, 
nominal  damages  can  be  collected. 
Haven  v.  Beidler  Mfg.  Co.,  40  Mich. 
286;  Curtis  v.  Ritzman  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.), 
7  Misc.  254;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  259. 

Nominal  damages  may  be  given 
where  the  evidence  shows  damages, 
but  furnishes  no  basis  for  ascertain- 
ing the  amount.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  (111.),  29  N.  E. 
1109;  4  Am.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  697; 
50  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  150.  Every 
violation  of  a  right  imports  some 
damage,  and  if  none  other  be  proved 
nominal  damages  are  recoverable. 
Fullam  v.  Stearns,  30  Vt.  443,  455- 
457,  per  Bennet,  J.  There  must  be 
both  an  injury  and  a  damage.     Id. 

13Cal.  Civ.  Code  (1899),  sec.  336; 
1    Mont.    Codes    (1895),     sec.  4367; 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§§  10, 11 


"If  the  injury  be  small  or  the    mitigating    circumstanci 
strong,  nominal  damages  only  are  given."  14 

§10.  Constructive  damages  defined.     Constructive   dam- 
ages are  such  "as  are  imputed  in  law  from  an  act  of  wron 
another  person.'"  15 

§  11.  General  damages  defined. — General  damages  are  those 
which  the  law  implies  or  presumes  to  have  been  occasioned  by 
the  act  of  which  the  injured  party  complains.  They  do  not 
depend  upon  evidence  of  any  particular  amount  or  loss,  but  rest 
upon  the  opinion  and  judgment  of  reasonable  men,  or  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  jury,  and  not  upon  any  measure  of  assessment 
which  the  judge  may  point  out.16 


Rev.  Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  5016; 
2  Grantham's  Annot.  Stats.  S.  D. 
(1901)   sec.  5822. 

14  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3905 
(3065). 

15  Anderson's  Diet.  of  Law, 
"Damages." 

16  "  The  second  kind  is  general 
damages  and  their  nature  is  clearly 
stated  by  Crosswell,  J.,  in  Rolin  v. 
Steward,  14  C.  B.  p.  605;  23  L.  J.  C. 
P.  p.  151.  They  are  such  as  the 
jury  give  when  the  judge  cannot 
point  out  any  measure  by  which  they 
are  to  be  assessed  except  the  opinion 
and  judgment  of  a  reasonable  man." 
Prehn  v.  Royal  Bk.  of  Liverpool,  L. 
R.  5  Exch.  Cas.  92,  99,  per  Martin,  B. ; 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Goos,  39  Neb. 
437;  23  L.  R.  A.  190,  193;  10  Bkg. 
L.  J.  352;  58  X.  \Y.  84,  per  Ryan,  C. 
Where  a  valid  contract  has  been 
broken,  plaintiff  must  be  entitled  to 
recover  such  damages  as  necessarily 
ensue  from  the  breach.  These  are 
general  damages,  and  need  not  spe- 
cially be  alleged.  Fitch  v.  Fitch,  .'!."> 
N.  Y.  Super.  (3  J.  &  S.)  302,  303. 
See  also  Jutte  v.   Hughes,  67  N.  Y. 


267,  rev'g  40  N.  Y.  Super.  126;  Lara- 
way  v.  Perkins,  10  N.  Y.  371;  Alfaro 
v.  Davidson,  40  N.  Y.  Super.  (8  J.  & 
S.)  87,89,  per  Friedman,  J.,  citing 
Chitty  on  Contracts  (ed.  1860),  985. 
"  Damages  are  termed  general,  mean- 
ing those  which,  by  implication  of 
law,  result  from  a  tort,  ami  are 
awarded  in  the  sound  discretion  of 
the  jury,  and  without  calling  for  evi- 
dence of  any  particular  loss.''  1  Ab- 
bott's L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  335.  See  also 
Anderson's  Diet,  of  Law,  "  Dam- 
ages." "General  damages:  Those 
which  necessarily  and  by  implication 
of  law  result  from  the  act  or  default 
complained  of."  1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed. 
1897)  491.  "General  damages  are 
such  as  necessarily  result  from  the 
injury  complained  of.  and  may  be  re- 
covered without  W'ing  specially  al- 
leged." 2  Wait's  Act.  &  Def.  434. 
General  damages  "are  Buch  as  the 
law  implies  or  presumes  to  have  ac- 
crued from  the  wrong  complained 
of."  Wisner  \.  Barber,  10  <  >re.  342, 
344,  per  Lord,  .1.  See  also  1 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201, 
211,  212,  per  Ellsworth.  J. 


RC  -|0^  ^3  TERMS    AM>    DEFINITIONS. 

§  12.  General  damages  defined— Code.— General  damages 
are  defined  by  the  Georgia  Code  as  "  such  as  the  law  presumes 
to  flow  from  any  tortious  act,  and  may  be  recovered  without 
proof  of  any  amount."  " 

§  13.  Special  damages  defined.— It  is  often  very  difficult  to 
distinguish  special  from  general  damages  ;  the  former  may,  how- 
ever, be  defined  as  those  which  are  not  implied  or  presumed  in 
Law,  but  are  such  as  actually  and  directly  flow  from  the  injury 
as  the  consequence  thereof,  and  must  be  alleged  and  proven  in 
order  to  be  recovered.  Special  damages  may  constitute  of  them- 
selves a  ground  of  action,  or  may  be  shown  in  addition  to  or  in 
aggravation  of  other  damages.18 


"2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.   3910 
(3070). 

18  Special  damage  is  that  which  the 
law  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
the  plaintiff  has  sustained  from  the 
act  complained  of.     It  is  often  very 
difficult  to  distinguish  general  from 
special  damage.     The  necessary  re- 
sult of  an  injury  is  often  and  neces- 
sarily confounded  with  the  natural 
and  proximate  result,   and  all  legal 
damage,  whether  general  or  special, 
must  naturally  and  proximately  re- 
sult  from   the   act  or  default  com- 
plained of.    It  is  difficult  to  lay  down 
any  general  rule  hy  which  to  deter- 
mine when  the  law  implies  the  dam- 
age, and  when  it  does  not.     It  would 
seem,  however,  that  when  the  conse- 
quences of  an  injury  are  peculiar  to 
the  circumstances  and  conditions  of 
the  injured  party,  the  law  could  not 
imply  damage  simply  from  the  act 
causing    the    injury.     Tomlinson  v. 
Derby,     43     Conn.     562,     567,     per 
Loomis,   J.     See    also   Bristol  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201,  211,  212, 
per  Ellsworth,   J.     Special   damage 
is  some  damage  of  such  a  character 
that  it  may  be  given  in  evidence  to 
aggravate  the  damages  in  an  action, 
or  be  itself  the  substantive  cause  of 


action.     Smith  v.  Sherman,  4  Cush. 
(Mass.)    408,    413,   per   Shaw,    C.    J. 
"  Special   damages   we    believe   are 
such  as  by  competent  evidence  are 
directly  traceable   to  a   defendant's 
failure  to  perform  his  contract  obli- 
gation, or  such  duties  as  are  imposed 
upon  him  by  law."     Bank  of  Com- 
merce v.  Goos,  39  Neb.  437;  23  L.  R. 
A.  190, 193, 10  Bkg.  L.  J.  352.;  58  N.  W. 
84,  per  Ryan,  C.     "Special  damages 
are   given    in   respect  of  any  conse- 
quences reasonably  or  probably  aris- 
ing from  the  breach  complained  of." 
Prehn  v.  Royal  B'k  of  Liverpool,  L. 
R.  5  Exch.  Cas.  92,  99,  per  Martin,  B. 
"Special    when    they    are   such   as 
really  took  place  and  are  not  implied 
by  law,  and  are  superadded  to  gen- 
eral damages  arising  from  an  act  in- 
jurious in  itself."     Wisnerv.  Barber, 
10  Ore.  342,  344,  per  Lord,  J.     Spe- 
cial  damages   are    "  the    indemnity 
allowable    for    the     specific     losses 
which    plaintiff  alleges   and   proves 
that  he  sustained."     1  Abbott's  L. 
Diet.  (ed.  1879)  335.     See  also  An- 
derson's   Diet.    Law,    "  Damages." 
"  Special  damages,  such  as  arise  di- 
rectly but  not  necessarily,  or  by  im- 
plication of  law  from  the  act  com- 
plained of."     1  Bouv.   L.   Diet.  (ed. 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§§14-17 


§  14.  Special  damages  defined — Code. —Special  damages  are 
such  as  actually  flow  from  the  act  and  must  be  proved  in  order 
to  be  recovered.19 

§  15.  Direct  damages  defined. — Direct  damages  are  those 
which  are  the  direct,  immediate  or  proximate  result  of  some  act 
or  fault  without  the  intervention  of  some  other  act  or  cause.'-1' 

§  16.  Direct  damages  defined — Codes.  — Direct  damages  are 
such  as  follow  immediately  upon  the  act  done.21 

§  17.  Prospective  damages  defined. — Prospective  damages 
are  such  as  arise  from  the  loss  of  those  benefits  which  it  can  be 
shown  would  have  been  reasonably  probable  or  certain  to  have 
accrued  except  for  the  complained  of  injury,  fault  or  tort,  and 
which  are  a  direct,  natural  or  necessary  consequence  thereof  or 
actually  or  proximately  caused  thereby,  and  not  such  as  are 
merely  conjectural,  speculative  or  remote.22 


1897)  491.  "Special  damages:  The 
damages  recoverable  for  the  actual 
injury  incurred  through  the  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  individual  case, 
above  and  beyond  those  presumed  by 
law  from  the  general  nature  of  the 
wrong.1'  2  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897) 
392.  "  Special  damage  may  be  itself 
a  distinct  ground  of  action,  or  it  may 
be  given  in  evidence  to  aggravate  the 
damages  sued  forinan  action  already 
pending.  .  .  .  But  if  the  declaration 
be  framed  in  reference  to  some  spe- 
cial ground  only,  evidence  cannot  be 
introduced  of  any  loss  or  damage 
beyond  what  is  expressly  alleged. 
Graves  v.  Severeus,  40  Vt.  636."  2 
Wait's  Act.  and  Def.  (1877)43.-). 

l»2  (ia.  Civ.  Code  (1895),sec.  3910 
(3070). 

-°  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  94.-).  Direct  or  immediate 
damages  are  "  such  as  result  from  the 
operation  of  the  tort  without  the  in- 
tervention of  intermediate  causes." 
1    Abb.     L.    Diet.     (ed.     1S79)    335. 


"  Such  damages  as  result  from  an  act 
without  the  intervention  of  any  inter- 
mediate, controlling  or  self-efficient 
cause."  Anderson's  Diet.  Law, 
"  Damages."  See  also  Black's  L. 
Diet.;  Bristol  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28 
Conn.  201,  211,  212,  per  Ellsworth,  .1. 
-1  1  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3911 
(3071).  Damages  are  confined  in 
Civ.  Code,  sec.  3333,  to  compensation 
for  detriment  proximately  caused  by 
breach  of  obligation  not  arising  from 
contract.  Durgin  v.  Xeal.  82  Cal. 
595;  23  Pac.  133;  Durgin  v.  McNally, 
82  Cal.  375. 

-'-  Strohra  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 
R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  305.  300,  per  Rapallo, 
I..  ease  reverses  32  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  20. 
See  the  numerous  citations  of  the 
principal  case  cited  in  'l  Silver  nail's 
X.  V.  Citations.  Griffin  v.  Colver,  10 
N.  Y.  489,  491:  Chicago,  etc.,  Ry. 
(o.  v.  Henry,  62  111.  142.  The  jury 
in  assessing  prospective  damages 
should  he  confined  to  such  as  were 
reasonably  certain  to  follow  from  the 


§§   18-21  TERMS    AM)    DEFINITIONS. 

§  18.  Consequential  damages  defined.— Consequential  dam- 
ages are  those  in  which  some  other  circumstance,  act  or  cause 
intervenes  to  produce  them,  even  though  they  result  from  or  are 
traceable  to  the  complained  of  act,  fault  or  tort  as  the  primary 
and  ellicient,  though  not  the  immediate,  cause.23 

§  19.  Consequential  damages  defined— Code.— Consequen- 
tial damages  are  such  as  are  the  necessary  and  connected  effect 
of  the  tortious  act,  though  to  some  extent  depending  upon 
other  circumstances.'-4 

§  20.  Resulting  damages  defined. — Resulting  damages  is  a 
term  used  generally  to  indicate  consequential  damages.18 

§  21.  Remote  damages  defined. — Remote  damages  are  those 
which  do  not  directly  flow  from  an  act,  but  are  the  result 
of  the  intervention  of  some  intermediate  cause  without  which 
no  injury  or  loss  would  occur,  although  such  cause  may  be  at- 
tributable to  the  original  act.26     Remote  and  consequential  dam- 


i  ii jury  complained  of.  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.  v.  Files  (Ohio,  1901),  62  N.  E. 
1047,  an  action  for  personal  injury. 
Again  "when  it  appears  that  the  in- 
jury is  permanent  and  further  pain 
to  body  or  mind  is  reasonably  certain, 
a  sufficient  basis  is  laid  for  compen- 
sation for  these  elements."  Smiley 
v.  St.  Louis  &  H.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  1901) 
61  S.  W.  667;  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  514, 
518,  per  Brace,  P.  J.  See  Anderson's 
Diet,  of  Law  (1893),  307;  Wharton  v. 
Winch,  140  N.  Y.  287;  55  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  052;  35  N.  E.  589,  rev'g  46  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  187;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  477; 
Hamilton  v.  McPlierson,  28  N.  Y.  72; 
Neary  v.  Bostwick,  2  Hilt.  (X.  Y. ) 
514;  Freeman  v.  Clute,  3  Barb.  (N. 
V.)  424;  Walter  v.  Post,  6  Duer  (X. 
Y. ),  3G3;  Morey  v.  Metropolitan  G.  L. 
Co.,  6  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  185. 

^"Consequential  damages,  those 
which  though  directly  are  not  im- 
mediately consequential  upon  the 
act   or   default   complained   of."'     1 

10 


Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  491.  See 
also  Black's  L.  Diet.  See  Bristol 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201, 
211,  212,  per  Ellsworth,  J.  See  defini- 
tion of  remote  damages  herein. 

24  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3911 
(3071). 

25 "Resulting  damages;  used  to 
denote  consequential  damages."  1 
Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  491.  De- 
fendants are  liable  for  resulting  dam- 
ages from  blasting  on  their  own 
premises  when  the  work  is  negli- 
gently done.  Denken  v.  Canavan, 
17  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  392  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1078. 

26  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  946.  Consequential  or  remote 
damages  are  "  such  as  the  tort  might 
not  produce  without  the  concurrence 
of  other  events  and  these  last  are 
generally  disallowed."  1  Abb.  L. 
Diet.  (  ed.  1879)  336.  "Conse- 
quential or  resulting,  indirect  or  re- 
mote damages  not  produced  without 


TEEMS    AND    DEFINITIONS.  22,23 

ages  have  been  used  as  synonymous  terms,  but  then-  is  this 
distinction:  "All  remote  damages  are  consequential,  but  all 
consequential  damages  are  not  remote." " 

§  22.  Contingent  or  too  remote  damages  defined — (ode. — 
Under  the  Georgia  Code,  "if  the  damages  are  only  the  imag- 
inary or  possible  result  of  the  tortious  act,  or  other  and  contin- 
gent circumstances  preponderate  largely  in  causing  the  in- 
jurious effect,  such  damages  are  too  remote  to  be  the  basis  of 
recovery  against  the  wrongdoer,"-*"  and  a  "  rule  to  ascertain  "  is 
given  as  follows  :  "  Damages  which  are  the  legal  and  natural 
result  of  the  act  done,  though  contingent  to  some  extent,  arc  not 
too  remote  to  be  recovered.  But  damages  traceable  to  the  act, 
but  not  its  legal  or  natural  consequence,  are  too  remote  and  con- 
tingent,"29 while  the  "exception  to  tbe  rule"  reads:  "If,  how- 
ever, the  tort  is  committed,  or  the  contract  broken,  or  the  duty 
omitted,  with  a  knowledge  and  for  the  purpose  of  depriving  the 
party  injured  of  such  benefits  as  are  specified  in  the  last  para- 
graph, then  the  remote  damages  arc  made  by  such  knowledge 
and  intent  a  proper  subject  for  consideration  by  the  jury."80 

§  23.  Contingent  damages  defined. — Contingent  damages 
are  those  which  may  follow  from  the  wrongful  act,  but  are  not 
certain  to  do  so  and  may  possibly  not  happen,  for  the  said  act 
may  or  may  not  operate  to  produce  such  damages,  since  the 
connecting  event  may  or  may  not  occur.31 

the  concurrence  of  some  other  event  I  ages,  and  after  an  exhaustive  exami- 
attributable  to  the    same   origin    or  '  nation  of  the  authorities,  we  find  an 


cause."      Anderson'    Diet,    of    Law. 
"  Damages." 

27 1  Sedgwick  on  Dam.  (8th  ed.) 
sec.  110.  See  sees.  22,  24,  58,  post, 
herein. 

28  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3912 
(3072). 

29  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3913 
(3073). 

302  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3914 
(3074). 

31  The  doctrine  of  proximate  cause 
is  at  the   basis  of  contingent    dam- 


excellent  illustration  of  the  above  in 
1  Sutherland  on  Dam.  (2d  ed.Jsee. 
28,  as  where  one  wrongfully  opens  ;t 
fence,  such  act  may  or  may  not  lead 
to  injurious  results  and  damages  by 
reason  of  injury  to  animals,  crops, 
etc.  "  Contingent  damages;  such 
damages  as  may  or  may  not  occur, 
or  be  Buffered;  such  as  depend  upon 
an  event  which  may  or  may  not 
happen."  1  Anderson's  Diet.  Law 
(1893),  p.  300. 

11 


$§  24-27  TERMS    ANli    DEFINITIONS. 

§24.  Speculative  damages  defined.— Speculative  damages 
are  those  which  resl  upon  conjectural  circumstances  or  conse- 
quences, which  arc  contingent  or  merely  problematical,  possible 
or  apprehended,  and  concerning  which  the  degree  of  probability 
of  their  occurring,  as  a  result  of  the  original  injury,  does  not 
amount  to  a  reasonable  certainty.82 

§  25.  Actual  or  single  damages  defined.— Actual  damages 
are  such  as  the  plaintiff  can  actually  prove  he  has  sustained,  and 
are  a  conpensation  conmensurate  with  the  actual  loss  or  injury.33 

§  26.  Compensatory  damages  defined.— Compensatory  dam- 
ages are  those  by  which  the  actual  loss  sustained  is  measured 
and  the  injured  party  recompensed  therefor.34 

§  27.  Substantial  damages  defined.— Substantial  damages 
are  generally  where  a  considerable  sum  is  awarded  as  a  com- 
pensation;  although  where  a  sum  is  given  in  excess  of  nominal 
damages  such  sum  is  denominated  substantial  damages.35 


82  See  Streng  v.  Frank  Ibert  Brew. 
Co.  (App.  Div.  N.  Y.  1900),  64  N.  Y. 
Supp.  34;  7  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  650,  per 
Woodward,  .1;  Anderson's  Diet.  Law 
(1893],  p.  308. 

:ii  .Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  942.  "  Actual  damages  are  such 
as  the  plaintiff  can  actually  prove 
he  has  sustained  as  contra-distin- 
guished from  vindictive  damages." 
Bacon's  Abr.  (Bouv.  1854)  "Dam- 
ages" (I),  p.  82.  "Actual  or  single 
damages:  compensation  for  the  real 
loss  or  injury."  Anderson's  Diet. 
Law  (1893),  305.  Damages  "are 
actual  or  single.  Avhen  the  jury  find 
the  amount  to  be  awarded  and  judg- 
ment is  immediately  rendered  there- 
for." 1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  336. 
The  term  "  single  damages  "  has  also 
been  used  in  connection  with  joint 
and  several  damages,  as  in  case  of 
suit  against  several  or  a  number. 
Viner's  Abr.  "Damages"  (X),(Y). 
See   also   definitions  of  double   and 

12 


treble  damages,  post,  herein,  and  sec. 
55,  post,  herein. 

34  "  Damages  should  be  such  as 
adequately  to  compensate  the  actual 
loss  or  injury  sustained."  Gilbert  v. 
Kennedy,  22  Mich.  117,  129,  130,  per 
Christiancy,  J.  Compensatory  dam- 
ages are  such  as  measure  the  actual 
loss,  and  are  given  as  amends  there- 
for. Talbott  v.  West  Virginia  C.  & 
P.  R.  Co.,  42  W.  Va.  560;  26  S.  E.  311. 
Compensatory  damages  are  "such  as 
are  measured  by  the  loss  sustained 
by  the  plaintiff  and  are  allowed 
him  as  a  just  amends  therefor."  1 
Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  336.  "  Com- 
pensatory damages,  those  allowed  as 
a  recompense  for  the  injury  actually 
received."  1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed. 
1897)  491.  See  also  Anderson's 
Diet.  Law  (1893),  306.  Black's  L. 
Diet.;  Beck  v.  Thompson,  31  W.  Va. 
159;  7  S.  E.  447;  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  870. 
Examine  sec.  55,  post,  herein. 

35  Substantial  damages  are  "when 


TERMS    ANI>    I  >  hi  I  Ml 


§  28.  Pnnitive,  vindictive  or  exemplary  damages  defined. 
— Punitive,  vindictive  or  exemplary  damages  are  those  in  ex 
of  the  actual  loss,  nol  intended  as  a  compensation,86  but  rather 
designed  as  a  punishment  for  the  grossly  negligent,  wanton  or 
malicious  conduct,  or  act,  or  evil  motive  of  one  person  towards 
another,  as  a  result  of  which  the  latter  has  sustained  some  in- 
jury, loss  or  damaged 


a  considerable  sum  is  found."  1 
Abb.  L.  Diet.  led.  L879)  336.  See  j 
also  Anderson's  Diet.  Law  (1893), 
307;  Block's  L.  Diet.  Damages, 
though  very  small,  are  substantial, 
and  not  nominal,  wbere  a  real  legal 
right  is  involved.  Michael  v.  Curtis, 
60  Conn.  363;  22  Atl.  049. 

m  But  see  sees,  under  chap.  V 
herein  entitled,  "  not  as  punishment 
but  as  compensation."  "Doctrine 
of  exemplary  damages  denied,"  and 
see  sec.  55,  post,  herein. 

37  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  944.  See  Pegram  v.  Stortz,  31 
W.  Ya.  220,  2150-237,  6  S  E.  485,  per 
Green,  J.  Exemplary,  punitive  or 
vindictive  damages  are  those  "al- 
lowed in  excess  of  a  simple,  compen- 
sation for  the  loss,  and  upon  atheory 
of  punishing  the  wrongdoer  for  the 
wrong  inflicted  upon  plaintiff."  1 
Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  336.  See 
Anderson's  Diet.  Law,  "Damages." 
"  Exemplary  damages.  Those  al- 
lowed for  torts  committed  with 
fraud,  actual  malice  or  deliberate 
violence  or  oppression,  as  a  punish- 
ment to  the  defendant  and  as  a  warn- 
ing to  other  wrongdoers."  1  Bouv. 
L.  Diet.  (ed.  L897)  491.  "Exem- 
plary damages.  Those  allowed  as  a 
punishment  for  torts  committed  with 
fraud,  actual  malice  or  deliberate 
malice  or  oppression.  .  .  .  This 
allowance  is  termed  •  smart  money' 
or  'exemplary,'  -vindictive'  or  -pu- 
nitive' damages."  2  Bouv.  L.  Diet. 
(ed.  1897)  391.     "  Exemplary  or  vin- 


dictive damages  are  damages  given 
not  merely  asa  pecuniary  compensa- 
tion tor  the  loss  actually  sustained 
by  the  plaintiff,  bu1  likewise  as  a 
kind  of  punishment  to  the  defendant, 

wiili  the  view  of  preventing  similar 
wrongs  in  the  future,  as  in  actions 
of  malicious  injuries,  fraud,  .seduc- 
tion, oppression,  continuing  nuisan- 
ces," etc.  Sweet's  Diet,  of  Eng.  L. 
(ed.  1882)  240,  citing  Broom's  C.  C. 
L.  855  :  2  Smith's  L.  Cas.  540.  In 
actions  of  tort  the  damages  are  left 
very  much  to  the  discretion  and 
judgment  of  the  jury,  and  in  all  cases 
of  malicious  injuries  and  trespasses, 
accompanied  by  personal  insult  or 
oppressive  ami  cruel  conduct,  juries 
are  told  to  give  what  are  called  ex- 
emplary damages,  although  the  ac- 
tual  persona]  injury  recovered  by  a 
pecuniary  standard  may  be  but 
small.      Harlow   v.    Lowder,   35   Ark. 

492,  404,  per  English,  C.  J.     Where 

a  trespass  is  committed  deliberately 
in  wilful  violation  of  the  plaintiffs 
rights,  in  a  manner  and  under  cir- 
cumstances of  aggravation,  showing 
a  violent,  reckless  and  lawless  spirit, 
the  law  allows  damages  beyond  the 
strict  measure  of  compensation  by 
way  of  punishment.  Champion  \. 
Vincent,  20  Tex.  811,  815,  defendant 
shot  plaintiff's  hogs.  Malice  is 
the  wilful  purpose,  the  wilful  doing 
of  an  act  which  one  knows  is  liable 
to  injure  another,  regardless  of  the 
COnBequenceS,  alt  hough  there  may  he 
no  specilic    intention  to  hurt  a  par- 

13 


§§  29,  30 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§  >9.  Punitive,  vindictive  or  exemplary  damages  defined— 
Codes.— In  four  states  the  Codes  provide  that  "  In  any  action 
for  the  breach  of  an  obligation  not  arising  from  contract,  where 
the  defendant  has  been  guilty  of  oppression,  fraud,  or  malice, 
actual  or  presumed,  the  jury,  in  addition  to  the  actual  damages, 
may  give  damages  for  the  sake  of  example,  or  by  way  of  pun- 
ishing the  defendant."  ffl  So  in  Georgia,  it  is  enacted  that,  "  In 
.very  tort  there  may  .be  aggravating  circumstances,  either  in 
the  act  or  the  intention,  and  in  that  event  the  jury  may  give  ad- 
ditional damages,  either  to  deter  the  wrongdoer  from  repeating 
the  trespass,  or  as  compensation  for  the  wounded  feelings  of  the 
plaintiff,"38  while  another  section  of  the  Code  reads  as  follows  : 
"  Vindictive  damages.  In  some  torts  the  entire  injury  is  to  the 
peace,  happiness  of  feelings  of  the  plaintiff;  in  such  cases 
no  measure  of  damages  can  be  prescribed  except  the  enlightened 
conscience  of  impartial  jurors.  The  worldly  circumstances  of 
the  parties,  the  amount  of  bad  faith  in  the  transaction,  and 
all  the  attendant  facts  should  be  weighed.  The  verdict  of  a 
jury  in  such  a  case  should  not  be  disturbed,  unless  the  court 
should  suspect  bias  or  prejudice  from  its  excess  or  its  inade- 
quacy.    *° 

§  30.  Double,  treble,  triple  or  increased  damages  defined. 

— Double,  treble,  triple  or  other  increased  damages  are  those 
given  by  statute  in  certain  specified  cases,  being  a  double,  treble 
or  other  increased  sum  given  for  the  better  prevention  of  in- 
juries, the  actual  damages  from  which  might  otherwise  be  very 
small." 


ticular  individual  or  class  of  indi- 
viduals. United  States  v.  Reed  (C. 
C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.).  86  Fed.  308.  See  also 
Anderson's  Diet.  Law  (1893),  648. 

38  Civ.  Code.  Cal.  (1899)  sec.  3294; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  4290;  Rev. 
Codes,  X.  D.  (1899)  sec.  4977;  2 
Grantham's  Annot.  Stats.  S.  D. 
(1901)  sec.  5783. 

39  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3906 
(3066). 

40  2  Ga.  Civ.  Code  (1895),  sec.  3907 
(3067).      Under  the   Georgia  Code, 

14 


sec.  2943,  exemplary  damages  can 
never  be  allowed  in  cases  arising  on 
contract.  Chase  v.  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.,  44  Fed.  554;  3  Am. 
Elec.  Cas.  817.  Although  the  West 
Virginia  Code  allows  damages  for 
mental  anguish  and  grief  to  be  re- 
covered against  telegraph  companies. 
Supp.  Code  W.  Va.  (1900)  p.  78,  act 
approved  March  2,  1900. 

41  "  By  double  or  treble  damages  is 
understood  twice  or  three  times  as 
much  as  single  damages.     Statutes 


TEBMS    ANI»    I-KITNITIONS. 


§§  31-38 


§  31.  Double  and  single  or  joint  and  several  damages  de- 
fined.— Double  and  single  or  joint  and  several  damages  are 
those  formerly  awarded  in  case  of  a  joint  suit  against  a  number, 
as  in  actions  of  joint  tenancy,  <>r  in  trespass  for  assault  and  cut- 
ting timber,  or  in  trespass  against  two  or  three,  or  in  several  re- 
plevins against  several.1-' 

§  32.  Additional  damages  defined. — Additional  damages  are 
those  which  may  be  recovered  in  a  new  suit  when  they  accrue 
after  the  first  judgment  for  injuries  caused  by  negligence.43 

§  33.  Liquidated  damages  defined — Liquidated  damages  are 
those  which  are  definitely  fixed  by  an  act  of  the  parties  ;  or 
those  specified  by  agreement  as  the  amount  of  damages,  under 
such  circumstances  and  in  such  terms  as  do  not  constitute  a 
penalty;  or  such  damages  as  are  fixed  by  a  judgment  of  the 
court." 


giving  such  damages  have  been  lib- 
erally construed.  The  construction 
has  been  different  from  that  given  to 
double  or  treble  costs.  When  double 
or  treble  damages  are  given  by  a 
statute,  tbe  demand  of  such  damages 
must  be  expressly  inserted  in  the 
declaration,  which  must  either  re- 
cite the  statute,  or  conclude  to  the 
damage  of  the  plaintiff  against  tbe 
form  of  the  statute.1'  Bacon's  Abr. 
(Bouv.  1854)  "Damages"  (G),  p. 
81.  Increased  double  or  treble  dam- 
ages are  where  "  upon  some  wrongs 
the  statute  authorizes  the  court  to 
pass  judgment  for  an  increased 
amount  as  for  twice  tbe  sum  or  tbree 
times  the  sum  found  by  tbe  jury." 
1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)  336. 
"Single  damages  as  found  by  the 
jury  enhanced  by  the  court."  An- 
derson's Diet.  Law  (1893),  305. 
"Double  or  treble  damages.  In 
some  actions  statutes  give  double  or 
treble  damages,  and  tbey  have  been 
liberally  construed  to  mean  actually 
treble     damages.  .  .  .  Single     dam- 


ages may  be  recovered  if  tbe  claim 
under  the  statute  is  not  made  out." 
2  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  393^ 
See  1  Stovers  X.  Y.  Anno.  Civ.  Code, 
sec.  1020,  p.  1047;  2  id.  sec.  1901, 
p.  1746;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Humes,  115  U.S.  523,  per  Field,  J. 

4- Viner's  Abr.  "Damages"  (X), 
(Y).  See  San  Antonio  v.  Mackey, 
14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  210;  36  S.  W.  760; 
Schoueman  v.  Fiegley,  7  Pa.  St.  433; 
note  46  Cent.  L.  J.  387. 

4:1  So  under  the  law  of  Mexico  (Evey 
v.  Mexican  C.  K.  Co.  [U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
5th  C],  52  C.  S.  App.  118;  81  Fed. 
294;  38  L.  K.  A.  387),  such  right  to 
recover  is  a  matter  of  remedy  only. 
■•  I  damages  ultra:  additional  damages 
claimed  by  a  plaintiff  not  satisfied 
with  those  paid  into  court  by  the  de- 
fendant." Black's  L.  Diet.  See  also 
definitions  herein  of  punitive,  etc., 
damages. 

•"Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  947;  1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879) 
336;  And.  Diet.  Law  (1893),  307; 
Black's  L.  Diet.  See  also  Mills  v.  Paul 

15 


§§  34-37 


TERMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§  84.  Liquidated  damages- (odes.— "  Every  contract  by 
whicli  the  amount  of  damage  to  be  paid,  or  other  compensation 
to  be  made,  for  the  breach  of  an  obligation,  is  determined  in 
anticipation  thereof,  is  to  that  extent  void,  except  as  expressly 
provided  in  the  next  section."45  The  "next  section"  reads  as 
follows :  "  The  parties  to  a  contract  may  agree  thereon  upon 
the  amount  which  shall  be  presumed  to  be  the  amount  of  dam- 
age sustained  by  a  breach  thereof,  when,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  it  would  be  unpracticable  or  extremely  difficult  to  fix  the 
actual  damage."46 

§  35.  Unliquidated  damages  defined. — Unliquidated  dam- 
ages are  those  where  the  amount  is  neither  fixed  by  act  of  the 
parties  nor  by  judgment  of  the  court,  nor  made  definite  by 
agreement.17 

§  36.  Temporary  or  permanent  damages  defined. — Tempo- 
rary or  permanent  damages  are  terms  not  infrequently  used  to 
denote  the  character  of  the  damages  to  be  assessed  with  relation 
to  the  nature  of  an  injury  to  land,  as  whether  it  is  temporary  or 
permanent.48 

§37.  Continuing  damages  defined. — "Damages  incurred 
or  suffered  between  two  dates  as  the  beginning  and  end  of  the 
act,  and  more  or  less  separated  in  time,"  are  continuing  damages.* 


(Tex.  C.  A.  1895),  30  S.  W.  558;  Burk 
v.  Dunn,  55  111.  App.  25 ;  Kiutz  v.  Rob- 
bins,  12  Wash.  7;  40  Pac.  415,  28  L. 
R.  A.  676;  Townsend  v.  Fisher,  2 
Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  47;  Shute  v.  Hamilton, 
3  Daly  (N.  Y.),  462;  Wallis  Iron 
Works  v.  Monmouth  Park  Assoc, 
55  N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  132;  26  Atl.  140; 
19  L.  R.  A.  456.  Liquidated  dam- 
ages, in  so  far  as  they  depend  upon 
agreement  or  are  fixed,  are  also  called 
stated  or  stipulated  damages. 

45Civ.  Code  Cal.  (1899)  sec.  1670; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  2243;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  3923;  2 
Grantham's  Annot.  Stats.  S.  D. 
(1901)  sec.  4769. 

46  Civ.  Code.  Cal.  (1899)  sec.  1671; 

16 


1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  2244;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  3924;  2 
Grantham's  Annot.  .Stats.  S.  D. 
(1901)  sec.  4770.  See  Jack  v.  Sin- 
shimer,  125  Cal.  563;  58  Pac.  130, 
holding  that  a  clause  is  void  in  a 
lease  which  fixes  a  certain  sum  as 
liquidated  damages  in  case  the  prem- 
ises are  vacated,  under  the  above 
Code  provision. 

47  See  definition  ante,  herein,  of 
liquidated  damages  and  note  thereto. 
See  also  McCord  v.  Williams,  2  Ala.  71. 

48  See  Ridley  v.  Seaboard  &  R.  R. 
Co.,  US  N.  C.  996;  24  S.  E.  730;  32  L. 
R.  A.  708;  Nichols  v.  Norfolk  &  C. 
R.  Co.,  120  N.  ('.  495;  26  S.  E.  643. 

49  Anderson's  Diet.  Law  ( 1893),  307. 


TEEMS    AND    DEFINITIONS. 


§S  38-40 


§  38.  Entire  damages  defined.-    Entire  damages  are  tl 
recoverable  in  one  action,  even   though  a  part  thereof  are  oc- 
casioned or  result  after  action  brought  ;  or  where  the  injury  is 
of  a  permanent  or  continuing  character  and  successive  actions 

will  not  lie  for  the  past  or  future  damages  ;  or  where  the  dam- 
ages are  prospective  as  well  as  present.30 

§  39.  Excessive,  inadequate  or  Insufficient  damages  de- 
fined.— Excessive  damages  are  those  which  are  so  largely  in 
excess  of  what  the  circumstances  or  facts  of  the  case  and  the 
law  justify  as  to  demonstrate  that  the  jury  have  acted  against 
the  rules  of  law  or  have  suffered  their  partiality,  passions,  pre- 
judices or  perverse  disregard  of  justice  to  mislead  them,  or  which 
are  based  upon  ignorance  or  corruption.51  Inadequate  or  insuf- 
ficient damages  are  those  where,  by  a  like  test,  the  sum  awarded 
is  manifestly  and  grossly  less  than  is  justified.® 


§40.  Reasonable  damages— Code  provisions. — "Damages 
must  in  all  cases  be  reasonable,  and  where  an  obligation  of  any 
kind  appears  to  create  a  right  to  unconscionable  and  grossly 
oppressive  damages,  contrary  to  substantial  justice,  no  more  than 
reasonable  damages  can  be  recovered."53 


60  Hughes  v.  Anderson,  68  Ala.  280; 
Savannah  &  O.  C.  Co.  v.  Bourquin, 
51  Ga.  378;  Peuder^ast  v.  McCaslin,  2 
Ind.  87;  Stodghill  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  34;  Benson  v.  Chicago 
&  A.  K.  Co.,  78  Mo.  504;  Troy  v. 
Cheshire  K.  Co.,  23  N.  H.  83;  Ridley 
v.  Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  C. 
996;  24  S.  E.  730,32  L.  R.  A.  708; 
Ritter  y.  Sieger,  105  Pa.  400. 

51  Whipple  v.  Cumberland   Mfg.,  2 

2 


Story  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Me.).  661;  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  17,516;  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law 
(ed.  1900),  §949. 

52  Civ.  Code  Cal.  (1899)  sec.  3369; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  Bee.  4366;  Rev. 
Codes,  X.  I).  ( 1899)  see.  5015;  2  Gran- 
tham's Aunot.  Stats.  S.  I).  (li»01)sec. 
5821. 

ss  ,l,,Vrc  ..ii  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  950;  1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  L879) 
336. 

17 


§§  41-43    PARTICULAR   TERMS,  MAXIMS   AND    PHRASES. 


CHAPTER  II. 


PARTICULAR    TERMS,    MAXIMS    AND    PHRASES. 


§  41.   Actio  non  datur  non  damnifi- 
cato. 

42.  Ad  damnum. 

43.  Ad  quod  damnum;  writ  of. 

44.  "  Damage  by  the  elements." 

45.  Damage  feasant. 

46.  "Damages,      costs     and     ex- 

penses." 

47.  Damni  injuriae  actio. 

48.  Damnify. 

49.  Damnum  fatale. 

50.  Damnum  infectum. 


51.  Damnum  rei  amissae. 

52.  Damnum     sine     injuria     esse 

potest. 

53.  De  minimis  non  curat  lex. 

54.  Indemnity. 

55.  Indeterminate  and  determinate 

damages. 
5(3.  Injuria  sine  damno. 

57.  Inquiry  of  damages;  writ  of. 

58.  Proximate  damages. 

59.  "  Sound  in  damages." 


§  41.  Actio  non  datur  non  damniflcato.— These  words 
mean  an  action  is  not  given  to  one  who  is  not  injured.1 

§  42.  Ad  damnum.— These  words  mean  "to  the  damage," 
and  are  used  to  indicate  the  clause  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
plaintiff's  declaration,  wherein  he  states  the  extent  or  amount 
of  damages  claimed.  In  libels  in  admiralty  the  same  term  is 
used.2 

§  43.  Ad  quod  damnum  ;  writ  of. — These  words  mean  "  to 
what  damage."  Under  the  New  York  Code  the  writ  ad  quod 
damnum  is  now  styled  the  '*  writ  of  assessment  of  damages," 
and  is  a  mode  of  ascertaining,  by  an  inquisition  of  damages  by 
the  jury,  the  sum  to  be  paid  by  the  people  of  the  state  for  tak- 
ing real  property  therein,  whenever  the  governor  thereof  is 
authorized  by  law  to  take  possession  of  the  same  and  he  cannot 
agree  with  the  owners  thereof  for  its  purchase.  The  Code  also 
provides  as  to  the   disposition  of  such  damages  and  the  claim- 

1  1  "Cyc."  of  L.  &  P.  633.  i  Lewis,   3   Mas.  (U.  S. )  503;  13   Fed. 

2  See  1  "  Cyc."  of  L.  &  P.  703,  cit-  Cas.  No.  7,279.  See  also  Anderson's 
ing    Abbott's    L.    Diet.;    Jenks    v.  |  Diet.  Law  (1893),  309. 

18 


PABTICULAB    TERMS,    MAXIMS    AND    PHBASES.    §§44     18 


ant's  procedure  for  obtaining  them.  The  writ  further  applies 
where  the  Legislature  consents  to  the  taking  of  any  real  property 
within  the  state  for  the  use  of  the  people  of  the  United  Sta 

§  44.  "  Damage  by  the  elements." — These  words  are  de- 
clared to  be  equivalent  to  act  of  (Jod.1 

§4.").  Damage  feasant. — "  (French  faisant,  damage,  doing 
damage)  a  term  usually  applied  to  the  injury  which  animals  be- 
longing to  one  person  do  upon  the  land  of  another  by  feeding 
there,  treading  down  his  grass,  corn  or  other  production  of  the 
earth."  5 

§  46.  "  Damages, costs  and  expenses." — "  When  given  as  a 
penalty  against  a  party  for  the  nonperformance  of  a  contract. 
means  the  necessary,  natural  and  proximate  damages  resulting 
from  such  nonperformance,  and  not  some  remote,  accidental  or 
special  injury  to  the  party  to  whom  the  right  of  action  accrues. 
Wherever  special  damages  are  recovered,  it  must  be  on  a  dis- 
tinct and  definite  statement  in  the  complaint."1 

§47.  Dainni  injnriae  actio. — ••(Latin)   In  civil  law:   An 

action  for  the  damage  done  by  one  who  intentionally  injured 
the  beast  of  another."  ' 

§  48.  Damnify. — "To  cause  damage  or  injurious  loss  to  a 
person." 


8  Stover's  Annot.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
N.  Y.  sees.  2103-2119.  See  United 
States  v.  Dumplin  Island,  1  Bail). 
(N.  Y. )  24.  "A  writ  which  ought 
to  be  issued  before  the  owner  grants 
further  liberties  ;is  a  fair  market, 
etc.,  which  may  be  prejudicial  to 
others.  It  is  addressed  to  the  sheriff 
to  inquire  what  damage"  (a  loss) 
"  it  may  do  to  make  such  grant.  It 
is  also  used  to  inquire  of  lands 
given  in  mortmain  to  any  house  of 
religion,"  etc.  1  "  Cyc."  L.  &  P.  938. 
Anderson's  Diet.  Law  (1893),  309;  2 
Black.  Com.  (1  Cooley)  »271. 

4  Pope  v.  Farmers'  Union  &  M.  Co. 
(Cal.  1900),  62  Pac.  384  ;  8  Am.  \.  _ 


Rep.  364,  used  in  this  case  in  con- 
tract to  deliver  wheat,  etc. ;  ware- 
housernaa. 

•  1  IJouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  191. 
See  also  Mack's  L.  Diet. 

0  Low  v.  Archer,  12  X.  V.  (2  Kern) 
_'7T.  282,  per  Dean.  .1.,  citing  Groat  v. 
Gillespie,  25  Wend.  (  X.  V.  |  383;  Arm- 
strong v.  Percy,  5  Wend.  (  N.  Y. )  535. 

'  1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897 1  494. 
'' Damni  injnriae  actio:  an  action 
given  by  the  civil  law  for  the  dam- 
age done  by  one  who  intentionally 
injured  the  slave  or  beast  of  another. 
Calvin."     Black's  L.  Diet. 

8  Sweet's  Diet,  of  Eng.  L.  (ed.  1882 
240. 

lit 


§8  49-54    PARTICULAR   TERMS,   MAXIMS    AND    PHRASES. 

§  49.  Damnum  fatale.— "  Injury  from  a  cause  beyond  human 
control.  In  the  civil  law  injury  caused  by  a  fortuitous  event  or 
inevitable  accident.  The  phrase  was  used  to  distinguish  a  class 
of  losses  for  which  bailees  were  not  held  liable.  Among  these 
were  included  losses  by  shipwreck,  lightning  or  similar  cas- 
ualty; even  losses  by  fire,  by  pirates,  by  robbery,  but  theft  was 
not  included.  The  term  is  sometimes  used  by  common-law 
writers  in  the  same  sense.  "  9 

§  50.  Damnum  infectum. — "  In  Roman  law  damage  not  yet 
committed  but  threatened  or  impending.  A  preventive  inter- 
dict might  be  obtained  to  prevent  such  damage  from  happening, 
and  it  was  treated  as  a  quasi  delict  because  of  the  imminence 
of  the  danger."  10 

§51.  Damnum  rei  amissae. — "In  the  civil  law  a  loss 
arising  from  a  payment  made  by  a  party  in  consequence  of  an 
error  of  law.  "  u 

§52.  Damnum  sine  injuria  esse  potest. — "There  may  be 
damage  or  injury  inflicted  without  any  act  of  injustice. " 12 

§  53.  De  minimis  non  curat  lex. — This  maxim  means  that 
the  law  does  not  concern  itself  about  trifles.13  * 

§  54.  Indemnity. — Indemnity  is  where  a  compensation  is 
agreed  upon  or  awarded  as  a  satisfaction  commensurate  with 
the  damage  sustained  or  liable  to  accrue.14 


9  1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1879)337, 
citing  Thickstun  v.  Howard,  8 
Blackf.  (Intl.)  535.  "Damnum  fa- 
tale.  In  civil  law  damages  caused  by 
a  fortuitous  event  or  inevitable  ac- 
cident; damages  arising  from  tbe  act 
of  God.  Among  tbese  were  included 
losses  by  sliipwreck,  lightning  or 
other  casualty  ;  also  losses  by  pirates, 
or  by  vis  major,  by  lire,  robbery  and 
burglary  ;  but  theft  was  not  num- 
bered among  these  casualties.  In 
general  bailees  are  not  liable  for  such 

20 


damages  ;  Story,  Bailees,  471.'" 
1  Bouv.  L.  Diet.  (ed.  1897)  494.  See 
also  Black's  Law  Diet.  ;  Anderson's 
Diet.  Law. 

10  Black's  Law  Diet. 

11  Black's  Law  Diet. 

12  Black's  Law  Diet.  (Lofft.  112.) 

13  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7  Am.  ed. 
1874)142,  143,  145,  146,  165  n.  See 
sees.  71,  72,  post,  herein. 

14  Examine  Anderson's  Diet.  Law 
(1893),  534. 


PARTICULAR    TERMS,    MAXIMS    A  M  >    PHRASES.    §§  55-67 

§  55.  Indeterminate  and  determinate  damages.— These 
terms  have  been  applied  to  a  certain  class  of  damages  t<>  dis- 
tinguish them  from  those  known  as  exemplary,  punitive  or  vin- 
dictive, the  basis  for  those  designated  as  "  indeterminate  "  being 
the  fact  that  they  can  be  admeasured  by  the  pecuniary  loss, 
while  those  which  are  specified  as  "determinate  "  rest  upon  no 
definite  and  exact  pecuniary  compensation.13 

§  56.  Injuria  sine  damno. — If  an  injury  is  done  and  no 
legal  damage  results  therefrom,  it  is  injuria  sine  damno,  a  wrong 
for  which  no  action  lies  in  law.";  But  it  is  declared  that  "  it  is 
impossible  to  imagine  any  such  thing  as  injuria  sine  damno. 
Every  injury  imparts  damage  in  the  nature  of  it."  n 

§  57.   Inquiry  of  damages  ;  writ  of. — A  writ  of  inquiry  of 

damages  was  a  process  issued  after  interlocutory  judgment  in 
cases  where  the  defendant  did  not  confess  the  whole  damages 
laid  in  the  declaration,  commanding  the  sheriff  to  inquire  into 
the  damages  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men  and  return  such  inquisi- 
tion into  court.     The  sheriff  sat  as  a  judge  and  tried  by  jury, 


16  The  court  specifies  three  classes: 
the  first  being  designated  as  "  de- 
terminate, pecuniary  loss,  such  as  pe- 
cuniary loss  directly  sustained,  as  by 
the  destruction  of  property;  or  con- 
sequently sustained,  as  for  instance 
the  pecuniary  value  of  time  Inst  by 
the  plaintiff  from  injuries  inflicted 
on  him,  the  expenses  incurred  by 
him  "  for  medicine,  physicians'  bills, 
etc.;  "determinate  pecuniary  loss  is 
often  but  inappropriately  .  .  .  des- 
ignated actual  loss  or  remunerative 
or  compensatory  damages,11  and  the 
court  then  mentions  "  indeterminate 
damages"  as  distinguished  from 
"determinate  damages,1'  and  con- 
tinuing it  says  as  to  the  latter  that 
it  can  be  recovered  for  a  tort  of  any 
description,  and  "  must  always  he 
the  natural  and  proximate  c.>iis<- 
quenees  of  the  act  complained  of  by 
the  plaintiff.11  "  Indeterminate  dam- 
ages11 are  "such  as  from  their  na- 


ture cannot  be  ascertained  exactly 
with  any  sort  of  approximation  to 
exactness.  .  .  .  Damages  of  this  sort 
have,  I  think,  been  generally  hut 
very  inappropriately  called  vindic- 
tive damages,  exemplary  damages  or 
I  Hi  nil  ive  damages,"  holding  also  that 
compensation  only  is  meant.  Pegram 
v.  Stort/..  :M  W.  Va  220,  230,  J:i7:  6  S. 
E.  S.  485,  per  <Jreen,  .).;  Beck  v. 
Thompson,  :ll  W.  Va.459;7S.  h.  447; 
1:;  Am.  St.  Rep.  870.  These  two 
which  allow  exemplary  damages  only 
under  t lie  designation  of  compensa- 
tory damages,  are  overruled. 

w  See  "  Damnum  absque  injuria," 
ante:  Anderson's  Diet,  Law  (1893), 
310. 

17  Webb  v.    Portland    Mfg.    Co.,  3 

Story  (  [J.  S.l,  ISO.  per  Story.  .!.. 
quoted  in  Blanchard  v.  Burbank,  16 
Bradw.  (10  111.  A.pp.)  375,  383,  per 
Bailey.  J. 

21 


§§58,59   PARTICULAR    TERMS,   MAXIMS   AND   PHRASES. 

subject  to  nearly  the  same  law  and  conditions  as  at  trial  by  jury 
at  nisi  prius,  and  the  plaintiff  upon  return  of  the  inquisition 
and  its  entry  was  entitled  to  recover  the  damages  assessed  which 
were  required  to  be  in  some  amount,  and  in  like  manner,  upon 
demurrer  determined  for  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  damages, 
a  writ  of  inquiry  was  necessary.18 

§  58.  Proximate  or  immediate  damages. — Proximate  dam- 
ages are  those  which  result  from  an  injury  or  wrong,  as  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  damage.19  Proximate  or  immediate  dam- 
ages are  the  ordinary,  natural  and  usual  results  of  an  injury 
which  might  have  been  expected.* 


§  59.  "  Sound  in  damages." — A  term  used  to  designate 
the  character  of  an  action  as  distinguished  from  one  where  the 
suit  is  to  recover  the  thing  itself  instead  of  a  money  compensa- 
tion.'1 


i»3  Black.  Com.  (2  Cooley)  *  398. 
As  to  inquisitions  and  inquests  and 
the  practice  as  to  assessing  damages 
in  law  or  equity,  see  Martin  v.  Price, 
Minor  (Ala.),  08;  Phillips  v.  Malone, 
Minor  (Ala.),  110;  Auditor  v.  Crise, 
20  Ark.  540 ;  Smoot  v.  Schooler  (  Ky. ), 
8  S.  W.  202;  Ballard  v.  Purcell,  1  Nev. 
342;  Love  v.  Humphrey,  0  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  500;  Wright  v.  Williams.  2 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  632;  Wilson  v.  Dar- 
win, 1  Hill  (N.  T.),  070;  Peck  v. 
Corning,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)84;  Fos- 
ter v.  Smith,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  377; 
Abeel  v.  Wolcott,  Cole  &  Caines  ( N. 
Y.),  229;  1  Caines  (N.  Y.),  250;  Kel- 
sey  v.  Covert,  15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y. )  02; 
6  Abb.  Pr.  330;  note  29  Abb.  N.  C. 
(N.  Y.)  432;    Renuer  v.  Marshall,  1 

22 


Wheat.  (U.  S.)  215;  May  hew  v. 
Thatcher,  6  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  129;  Mc- 
Coy v.  Elder,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  183; 
Begg  v.  Whittier,  48  Me.  314;  Price 
v.  Dearborn,  34  N.  H.  481;.  Warren  v. 
Sheer  (Pa.),  12  Atl.  264;  Mifflin  v. 
Comm'rs,  5  Sesg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  09. 

19  See  direct,  consequential,  re- 
mote, etc.,  damages,  ante,  herein,  and 
see  proximate  cause,  post,  herein. 

20  Billman  v.  Indianapolis,  C.  &  L. 
R.  Co.,  70  Ind.  166;  40  Am.  Rep.  230; 
Henry  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  50 
Cal.  170. 

21  Examine  Anderson's  Diet.  Law 
(1893),  959,  and  see  Bradshaw  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  114  111.  172,  cited 
id.  900. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§GU 


TITLE  II. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  LIABILITY  AND  DAMAGES. 

CHAPTER  III. 


GENERAL  Pill  NCI  I'LES  OF   LIABILITY. 


§  CO.  General      statement — Distinc- 
tion   between     damage    and 
damages,  liability  and  meas- 
ure of  damages. 
61.  Damages  generally. 
(12.   Fundamental  law — Ubi  jus  ibi 
remedium. 
Same     subject— Violation     of 

statutory  duty. 
There  must  be  a  breaeh  of 
some  legal  duty. 
65.  Same  subject—  Governmental, 
judicial,  discretionary  and 
police  duties  and  powers — 
Liability. 


63. 


(>4. 


GO.   Moral  obligations,  duties   and 

wrongs. 
(17.   Lawful  acts. 
08.   Volenti  non  fit  injuria. 

69.  Accident  or  casualty. 

70.  Act   of   God — Inevitable   acci- 

dent. 

71.  Damnum  absque  injuria — Gen- 

erally. 

72.  Same   subject— Application  of 

the  doctrine  continued. 

73.  De  minimis  non  curat  lex. 

74.  Injuria  sine  damno. 


§60.   General  statement— Distinctions   between   damage 
and  damages,  liability  and  measure  of  damages.     There  are 

certain  underlying  principles  upon  which  the  right  to  recover 
damages  in  any  given  case  must  rest,  for  damages  are  the  result 
of  or  occasioned  by  certain  factors  which  must  exist,  else  the 
law  does  not  recognize  any  legal  liability  even  though  there 
may  be  an  injury.  As  will  be  apparent  from  the  preceding 
definitions,  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  terms  damage  and 
damages  and  between  liability  and  measure  of  damages.  The 
question  of  liability  embraces,  if  it  is  not  strictly  limited  to, 
that  of  rights  and  remedies,  negligence  and  contributory  negli- 
gence and  the  like.  To  legally  know  that  a  person  lias  caused 
damage  to  another  is  but  one  step  towards  determining  whether 
or  not  he  is  liable  for  any  damages  and  if  so  to  what  extent. 
We  shall  therefore  not  enter  into  any  extended  discussion  of 

23 


§  61  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 

the  doctrine  of  liability  alone,  considering  it  only  in  so  far  as  it 
is  necessary  to  elucidate  the  law  of  damages  or  measure  of  dam- 
ages. 

§  61.  Damages  generally — Whenever  by  virtue  of  a  lawful 
contract,  some  right,  duty  or  obligation  is  created  or  assumed,  or 
where  by  common  law  or  by  statute  some  legal  duty  exists  or 
is  imposed  with  reference  to  the  rights  of  others,  then  a  legal 
rio-ht  of  action  for  damages  will  accrue  from  the  breach  of  such 
contractual  obligation,  or  from  the  violation  by  negligence,  wil- 
fulness, etc.,  of  such  legally  imposed  duty,  having  regard  to 
those  rules  of  law  which  constitute  exceptions  to  the  general 
rule,  and  which  we  have  fully  considered  elsewhere  in  this 
treatise.1 


1  See  also  as  to  general  rule,  Joyce 
on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900),  sec.  941. 
"  By  the  common  law  in  all  actions, 
personal  and  mixt  damages  were  re- 
coverable, 2  Inst.  286,  and  though  the 
plaintiff  recovers  the  thing  itself 
demanded,  yet  he  also  recovers  dam- 
ages ;  as  in  detinue.  ...  So  in  all 
actions  upon  statutes  winch  give 
damages  to  the  party  grieved,  or  a 
certain  penalty,  the  plaintiff  recovers 
damages  over  and  above  the  penalty, 
so  in  an  action  upon  a  statute  winch 
prohibits  anything.  But  by  the 
common  law  no  damages  were  re- 
coverable in  a  real  action,  2  Inst.  286; 
10  Co.  116a,  nor  in  an  assise  except 
against  the  disseisor  himself,  2  Inst. 
284,  nor  in  quare  impedit,  2  Inst.  362, 
or  partition,  1  Rol.  575, 1.  14  .  .  .  nor 
in  disceit  upon  a  recovery  by  de- 
fault, 1  Rol.  575,  1.  23,  nor  in  account, 
1  Rol.  575,  1.  8,  11,  nor  in  warrantia 
chartae  .  .  .  nor  in  scire  facias  or 
other  writ  of  execution  ...  In  per- 
sonal actions,  damages  are  allowed 
only  to  the  time  of  the  action  com- 
menced .  .  .  and  it  is  now  settled  as 
a  general  rule  that  when  a  new  ac- 
tion may  be  brought  and  a  new  sat- 
isfaction obtained  on  that  for  duties 

24 


or  demands  arisen  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  depending  suit; 
these  shall  not  be  included  in  the 
judgment  on  the  former  actions.  .  .  . 
But  on  real  actions  the  demandant 
shall  not  count  of  damages:  For  he 
shall  recover  till  the  time  of 
the  verdict."  Comyn's  Dig.  "  Dam- 
ages." "  Sir  Edward  Coke  in  his  Com- 
mentary on  the  Stat,  of  Gloucester,  2 
Inst.  286,  observes  that  regularly  in 
personal  and  mixed  actions,  damages 
were  to  be  recovered  at  the  common 
law,  but  that  in  real  actions  no 
damages  were  to  be  recovered  at  the 
common  law,  because  the  court 
could  not  give  the  demandant  that 
which  he  demanded  not;  and  the 
demandant  in  real  actions  demanded 
no  damages  either  by  writ  or  count." 
Coke  Litt.  (Butler  &  Hargraves' 
Notes,  1853 )  355  ( 1 ).  In  personal  ac- 
tions plaintiff  recovers  no  more 
damages  than  he  counts  for  but  in 
real  actions  he  recovers  damages 
pending  the  suit,  and  therefore  never 
counts  to  his  damage.  Bacon's  Abr. 
(Bouv.  1854)  "Damages"  (D)  2. 
pp.  66-68.  "  By  the  common  law  a 
man  could  not  recover  damages  in  a 
j  real  action.     But  in  mixed  and  per- 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    LIABILITY. 


§  62 


§  62.  Fundamental  law— Ubi  jus  ibi  remedinm. — It  is  a 

well  known  and  constantly  asserted  maxim  of  the  law  that 
"  There  is  no  wrong  without  a  remedy."  This  is  a  funda- 
mental legal  principle,2  which  runs  through  all  the  decisions 
wherein    damages    are    sought.5     But    this    maxim   is   limited 


sonal  actions  lie  might.  "  Viner's 
Abr.  "Damages1'  (P)  44,  45.  "  At 
the  common  law  no  damages  were 
recoverable  in  any  real  action;  for 
the  detention  of  the  possession,  etc., 
being  the  cause  of  damages,  till  the 
right  to  the  land  was  determined, 
the  party  could  not  be  Baid  to  suffer 
any  wrong;  also  the  burden  of  the 
feudal  duties  lay  upon  the  tenant  in 
possession,  and  consequently,  he 
was  to  receive  the  mesne  profits 
until  some  other  made  out  a  better 
right,  who  after  recovery  might 
have  maintained  the  action  of  tres- 
pass." 3  Bacon's  Abr.  "  Damages" 
(A). 

a  Broom's  Leg.  Maxims  (7th  Am. 
ed.  1874),  191.  "  Jus  in  the  sense 
in  which  it  is  here  used  signifies  '  the 
legal  authority  to  do  or  to  demand 
something.'  Remedinm  may  be  de- 
fined to  be  the  right  of  action  or  the 
means  given  by  law  for  the  recovery 
of  a  right,  and  according  to  the 
above  elementary  maxim,  whenever 
the  law  gives  anything,  it  gives  a 
remedy  for  the  same:  lex  semper 
dabit  remedinm.  If  a  man  has  a 
right,  he  must,  it  has  been  observed 
in  a  celebrated  case,  have  a  means  to 
vindicate  and  maintain  it,  and  a  rem- 
edy if  he  is  injured  in  the  exercise 
and  enjoyment  of  it  ;  and  indeed,  it 
is  a  vain  thing  to  imagine  a  right 
without  a  remedy,  for  want  of  right 
and  want  of  remedy  are  reciprocal 
(per  Holt,  C.  J.,  Ashby  v.  White,  2 
Ld.  Raym.  953;  per  Willes,  C.  J.; 
Winswore  v.  Greenbank,  Willes,  577; 
Vaugh.  R.  47,  253).  It  appears  then 
that  remedium,  although  sometimes 


used  as  synonymous  with  actio,  has 
.  .  .  a  more  extended  significa- 
tion than  the  word  '  action  '  in  its 
modern  sense."  Id.  191.  See  sec.  76 
herein. 

a "  Every  wrong  imports  a  dam- 
age." Adams  v.  Robinson,  t;.">  Ala. 
586,  591,  per  Somerville,  J.  Some 
damages  are  always  presumed  to 
flow  from  the  violation  of  any  right. 
Barlow  v.  Lowder,  35  Ark.  492,  493, 
per  English,  C.  J.  A  violation  of  a 
right  is  attended  with  some  legal 
damage  of  course.  Bristol  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201,  210,  per 
Ellsworth,  J.  The  law  infers  dam- 
age from  every  infringement  of  a 
right.  The  right  infringed  is  prop- 
erty. McConnell  v.  Kibbe,  33  111. 
174,  179;  85  Am.  Dec.  265.  The  in- 
dignity suffered  by  reason  of  the  un- 
lawful act  of  another  is  a  proper  sub- 
ject of  compensation,  whether  the 
act  was  wanton,  malicious  or  wilful. 
or  whether  it  was  merely  negligent 
or  mistaken.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Christison,  39  111.  App.  495. 
Damages  may  be  recovered  where 
a  right  is  invaded  or  a  wrong  done, 
even  though  no  actual  damage  be 
proved.  Foster  v.  Elliott,  33  Iowa, 
216,  223.  Wherever  a  right  is  in- 
vaded the  law  presumes  damage. 
Munroe  v.  Stickney,  48  Me.  462. 
"  The  plaintiff  first  proving  the  de- 
fendant to  be  in  fault,  or  a  wrong- 
doer, then  it  legitimately  follows 
that  it  should  be  held  liable  for  the 
natural,  proximate  and  direct  conse- 
quences of  its  default."  Woodman 
v.  Nottingham,  49  X.  H.  387,  392;  6 
Am.  Rep.  526,  per  Nesmith,  J.     "  In 

25 


8  63  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 

to  legal  rights  and  wrongs,  '  although  it  applies  to  common  law 
and  statutory  rights,3  and  as  in  cases  relating  to  the  use  of 
electricity,  there  may  be  many  instances  where  the  wrong  is 
new  in  character,  nevertheless,  the  remedy  is  by  the  adaptation 
of  old  or  analogous  principles  in  enforcing  the  right  or  in 
obtaining  redress  for  the  wrong.6  Again  the  fact  that  there 
was  no  injury,  hut  a  benefit  conferred,  does  not  operate  against 
the  maxim's  application.7  It  is  also  a  general  and  sound  rule 
of  Law  that  where  the  law  gives  a  remedy  for  an  injury,  such 
remedy  shall  be  commensurate  to  the  damage  sustained;* 

§  63.  Same   subject— Violation   of  statutory   duty — The 

above  rule  has  also  been  extended  to  a  violation  of  a  statutory 
duty  to  the  extent  at  least  of  a  prima  facie  liability/'  There  is, 
however,  a  doubt  as  to  this  rule  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  prima 
facie  liability,  for  upon  this  point  the  question  of  burden  of 


law  for  every  wrong  there  is  a  rem- 
edy. 3  Black.  Com.  123:  Ashby  v. 
White,  1  Salk.  21.  Whenever  the 
law  creates  or  recognizes  a  private 
right,  it  also  gives  a  remedy  for  the 
violation  of  it.  1  Chit.  PI.  83;  Yates 
v.  Joyce,  11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)140;" 
Lamb  v.  Stone,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  527, 
532,  per  Morton,  J.  "  Every  infrac- 
tion of  legal  right  causes  injury. 
...  If  the  infraction  is  estab- 
lished, the  conclusion  of  damage  in- 
evitably follows."  N.  Y.  Rubber 
Co.  v.  Rothery,  132  N.  V.  293;  44 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  557;  30  N.  E.  841; 
rev'g  62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  905;  10  N.  Y. 
Supp.  609.  For  every  infraction  of 
a  man's  legal  rights,  the  law  gives  a 
remedy.  Champion  v.  Vincent,  20 
Tex.  811,  815.  See  also  Dudley  v. 
Tilton,  14  La.  Ann.  283,  285;  Holmes 
v.  Barclay,  4  La.  Ann.  64;  Webb  v. 
Portland  Mfg.  Co.,  3  Snmn.  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  D.  Me.)  189;  3  Law  Rep.  374; 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,322,  per  Story,  J.; 
Whipple  v.  Cumberland  Mfg.  Co., 
2  Story  (U.S.  C.C.I).  Me.),Wl:  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  17,516,  per  Story,  J.;  But- 
26 


man  v.  Hussey,  3  Fairf.  (12  Me.)  407; 
Hooten  v.  Barnard,  137  Mass.  36; 
Lnnd  v.  New  Bedford,  121  Mass. 
2S6;  Appleton  v.  Fullerton,  1  Gray 
(Mass.),  186,  194;  Londsdale  Co.  v. 
Moies,  2  Cliff.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  R.  I.) 
538;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8,497,  per  Clifford, 
Cir.  J.;  Paul  v.  Slason,  22  Yt.  231, 
238;  54  Am.  Dec.  75,  per  Poland.  J.; 
Murphy  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  23  Wis. 
365,  and  see  sees.  8,  9,  herein  as  to 
nominal  damages.  N 

*  See  Wyatt  v.  Williams,  43  N.  H. 
102;  Donovan  v.  New  Orleans,  11 
La.  Ann.  711. 

5  Stearns  v.  Atlantic,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
46  Me.  95. 

G  See  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed. 
1900),  ''Preface";  examine  sec.  14, 
note  14,  et  seq.  See  also  Gosling  v. 
Veley,  4  11.  L.  Cas.  679,  768,  per 
Coleridge,  J.;  Pasley  v.  Freeman,  3 
T.  R.  51,  per  Ashhurst,  J. 

7  Murphy  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  23  Wis. 
305. 

8  Rockwood  v.  Allen,  7  Mass.  254, 
256,  per  Sedgwick,  J. 

9  Fahey  v.   Jephcote,  2  Ont.  L.  R. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY 


proof  rests.  To  say  that  for  every  violation  of  a  statutory  duty 
there  is  a  remedy  is  in  general  as  true  in  relation  to  statute 
atconimon  law  ;  nevertheless  there  may  be  a  violation  of  a  statu- 
tory obligation  for  which  oo  right  of  arti.ni  can  be  maintained, 
as  where  contributory  negligence  is  of  a  character  to  preclude 
any  recovery  even  to  the  extent  that  there  is  no  ground  of  ac- 
tion. Again,  the  violation  of  duty  imposed  by  statute  may  be 
perse  negligence  or  merely  evidence  thereof;  it  may  constitute 
prima  facie  evidence  and  not  be  conclusive,  or  it  may  operate  to 
merely  shift  the  burden  of  proof;  it  may  be  a  legal  wrong  and 
the  proximate  cause  of  injury,  and  yet  not  of  necessity  constitute 
an  actionable  ground  for  damages  to  the  extent  that  some  dam- 
ages must  be  given  by  reason  alone  of  the  noncompliance  with 
the  statute  and  the  consequent  injury.  In  other  words  a  person 
cannot  rely  entirely  upon  another's  violation  of  a  statutory  duty 
as  a  ground  of  damages  for  an  injury  and  ignore  the  legal  duties 
imposed  upon  himself  with  reference  to  avoiding  the  injury. 
If,  however,  a  person  is  injured  without  any  act  of  omission  or 
commission  of  his  contributing  in  any  degree  to  the  injury  and 
such  injury  is  a  legal  result  of  the  wrong,  then  a  different  ques- 
tion is  presented  and  the  rule  of  liability  would  probably  apply. 
The  above  distinctions  will  be  apparent  from  the  appended  cita- 
tions. What  we  have  said  is,  however,  to  be  qualified  to  the 
extent  that  the  statute  imposing  the  duty  may  also  provide  ex- 
pressly for  liability.10 


449:  violation  of  sec.  14  of  Out.  Fac- 
tories Act,  R.  S.  ( ).  L897,  <li.  256,  rev'g 

1  Out.  L.  R.  18,  overruling  Roberts  v. 
Taylor  (1899),  :'.l  Ont.  R.  10. 

10  See  Western  Ry.  v.  Sistrunk,  85 
Ala.  852;  5  So.  79.  Contributory 
negligence  defeats  recovery  for  viola- 
tion by  railroad  of  Arkansas  Act. 
April  8, 1891,  sec.  1,  as  to  keening  look- 
out, etc.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co. 
v.  Leathers.  62  \rk.  235,  35  S.  W.  216; 
St.  Louis  &  s.  W.  R.  (o.  v.  Dingman, 

02  Ark.  24:.;  :::.  S.  W.  219.  As  to  de- 
fective sidewalk  under  Conn.  Gen. 
Stat.  sec.  2073,  sec  Hoyt  v.  Danbury, 
09  Conn.  341;  37  Atl.  1051.  That 
there  is  a  liability  for  violation  of 


statute,  see  Knopf  v.  Philadelphia.  W 
A-  B.  R.  Co.  i  Del.  Super.  1900), 2  Penn. 
392;  46  Atl.  717.  See  further  Robin- 
son v.  Simpson,  s  Houst.  (Del.  I  398. 
Violation  of  statutory  duty  is  negli- 
gence per  se.  Central  6a.  1!.  Co.  v. 
Bond,  111  Ga.  13;  ::«;  S.  E.  299;  Bar- 
field  v.  Southern  It.  Co..  1<»-  Ga,  744; 
:',:;  S.  E.  988.  Only  liable  to  "ownev 
of  land"  for  failure  of  railroad  to 
maintain  cattle  guards,  etc.  See 
Florida  C.  A  1'.  R.  Co.  v.  Judge,  LOO 
Ga.  00(1;  28  S.  E.  :'.7'.».  As  to  liability 
under  Ga.  Code.  sec.  3033,  for  person- 
al injuries,  see  Smith  v.  Savannah  F. 
A-  W.  K.  Co..  LOO  <.a.  96;  27S.  E.  725. 
Railroad  company  Liable  fornoncom- 

27 


§  64 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§  (>+.  There  must  be  a  breach  of  some  legal  duty. — To  re- 
cover damages  there  must  be  a  breacli  of  some  legal  duty  owing 


pliance  with  Ga.   Code,  sec.  708,  re- 
quiring   signals    at   highway   cross- 
ing.     Bowen    v.    Gainesville    J.    & 
S.  R.    Co.,  9.")  Ga.  (5,88;   22  S.   E.   695. 
A.s   to   cure  and   diligence   required 
of  railroad  company  under  Ga.  Code, 
sees.  2067,  3033,  see   East  Tennessee 
V.  &    G.    R.    Co.   v.    Miller,  95  Ga. 
738;  22  S.   E.  660;  2  Am.  &  Eng.  K. 
Cas.  N.   S.    216.     Violation    of  stat- 
utory   duty    is     negligence    per   se. 
Western,  etc.,   R.   Co.   v.   Young,  81 
Ga.  397;  7  S.  E.  912.     Municipal  cor- 
poration is  not   deprived  of  defense 
of   contributory   negligence    for   in- 
jury from  defective  sidewalk  because 
of  charter  provision  making  it  liable. 
Griffen  v.   Lewiston  (Ida.),   55  Pac. 
545.     Owner  is  liable   for   failure  to 
comply  with    ordinance     respecting 
elevator   doors.     Siddall  v.    Jansen, 
160  111.  43;  48  N.  E.  191:  39  L.  R.  A. 
112;    rev'g   (37    111.    App.    102.      See 
further   as  to   principle,   Pennsylva- 
nia Co.  v.  Conlan,  101   111.  93;   Bart- 
lett  v.  Roach,  68   111.   174.     Railroad 
company  is  liable  for  death  of  engi- 
neer   through    failure    to    maintain 
cattle  guards  as  required  by  statute. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams, 
09  111.  App.  392.     As  to  violation  by 
railroad  company  for  violation,  Ind. 
Rev.  Stat.  189,  sec.  2293,  and  sec.  5156; 
as  to  crossings,    etc.,  see  Cleveland, 
C.    C.   &  St.    L.    R.  Co.   v.   Gray.  148 
Ind.  260;  46  X.  E.  75;  8  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  48.     Railroad  company 
not  liable  for  failure  to  signal  where 
one  driving  on  tracks  is  negligent. 
Miller  v.  Terre   Haute  &  I.  R.  Co., 
144  Ind.    323;  43    N.   E.   257.     As  to 
requirement  of    Horner's   Ind.    Rev. 
Stat.  1897,    sec.    5087,  requiring  pas- 
sage   to    the    right    by  vehicles    on 
streets,    see    Decatur   v.    Stoops.    21 
Ind.  App.  397;  1  Repr.'516;  52  X.  E. 
28 


623.     Violation  of  statute  requiring 
signals,    etc.,  at   railway   crossing  is 
negligence   per  se.     Ind.  Rev.    Stat. 
1894,  sees.  5307,    5308;    Pittsburgh, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  15  Ind. 
App.  173;  43  N.  E.  957.     See  further 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton,  132  Ind. 
189.     Violation  of  statutory  duty  is 
negligence  per   se.     Ives  v.  Walden 
(Iowa,  1901),  87  N.   W.   408;  10  Am. 
Xeg.  Rep.  590.     Railroad  company  is 
liable    under  Iowa  Code,    1873,  sec. 
1289,  for  live  stock   killed  on  unin- 
closed  right  of  way.     Sarver  v.  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  104  Iowa,  59; 
73   N.  W.  498,  dist'g  Soward  v.  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  33  Iowa,  386. 
Failure  of    driver   to   turn  to   right 
on     public      highway    as     required 
by  Code,  1873,  sec.    1000,    is    prima 
facie        evidence       of       negligence. 
Cook    v.    Fogerty,    103     Iowa,  500; 
72    N.     W.  677;    39  L.  R.    A.    488; 
County   is   only   bound    to   exercise 
reasonable  and  ordinary  care  and  dili- 
gence under  Laws,  1887,  ch.  237,  as  to 
defects,  etc.,  in  bridges.     Murray  v. 
Woodson  Co.,  58  Kan.  1;  48  Pac.  554. 
As  to  defective  highways  under  Gen. 
Stat.    1889,    par.    7134,   and  liability 
for   injuries,    see   Reading   Twp.    v. 
Telfer,  57  Kan.  798;  48  Pac.   134;  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  138.     Statutory  duty 
does  not  change  the  burden  of  proof. 
Id.     As  to   measure  of   damages  to 
owner  of  inclosed  lands  for  neglect 
of  railroad  company  to  build  cattle 
guards  under  Kan.  Gen.  Stat.  1889, 
par.   1259,  see  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.  Co.  v.  Billings,  7  Kan.  App.  399; 
10  Am.   &  Eng.   R.   Cas.   N.  S.  740; 
52  Pac.    61.     Driver  not  chargeable 
with     contributory     negligence    for 
driving  to  left  on  highway.     Loya- 
cano  v.   Jurgens,  50   La.   Ann.  441; 
23  So.  717.     Not  obligated  to  strictly 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY 


§  '11 


from  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,"  although  "while  it  is  true  in 
general  that  where  do  duty  is  owed  no  Liability  arises,  this  rule 

comply    with    statute    requiring    to    igan,  etc.,     K.    Co.,    83    Mich.     564. 
drive   to  right  on   highway.     (Rev.    Under  Code,  1892,  sec  3548,  the  right 

Stat.  ch.    26);    Kennaid    v.    Burton,    to    damages     for    personal     injuries 


25  Me.  39.  See  Palmer  v.  Barker, 
2  Fairf.  (11  Me.)  338.  As  to  lia- 
bility for  violation  of  statute,  see 
Baltimore  K.  Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43 
Md.  552.  That  street  railway  com- 
pany is  not  liable  for  neglect  to  re- 
pair between  tracks  as  required  by 
Pub.  Stat.  ch.  52,  sec  19,  and  that 
notice  is  a  prerequisite  to  an  ac- 
tion (Pub.  Stat.  ch.  52,  sees.  19,  18), 
sec  Dobbins  v.  West,  End  St.  R.  Co., 
168  Mass.  55(5;  47  X.  E.  428.  This 
case  qualifies  the  general  proposition 
as  to  a  violation  of  a  statutory  duty 
in  that  if  there  is  a  statutory  wrong, 
the  right  to  an  action  may  be  quali- 
fied by  a  statutory  condition  prec- 
edent. A  violation  of  a  statute. 
Rev.  Stat.  ch.  51,  sees.  2,  3,  requiring 
sleighs  to  have  bells,  does  not  render 
one  liable  unless  his  negligence  con- 
tributed to  the  injury.  Kidder  v. 
Dunstable,  11  Gray  (Mass. ),  342.  See 
further  as  to  liability  for  violation  of 
statute,  Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works,  ill 
Mass.  136:  Saulsbury  v.  Hirschen- 
rader,  106  Mass.  458.  Thattownship 
is  liable  under  the  statute  for  failure 
to  repair  highway,  sec  Handy  v. 
Meriden  Twp.,  114  Mich.  454;  7^  X. 
W.  251;  4  Det.  L.  X.  628.  Under 
a  statute,  Annot.  Stat.  sees.  9110, 
9113,  to  prevent  the  careless  use  of 
firearms,  one  is  per  se  guilty  of 
negligence,  and  is  liable  when  he 
points  a  loaded  gun  towards  an- 
other and  wounds  him.  Bahel  v. 
Manning.  112  Mich.  24;  3  Det.  L.  X. 
819;  70  X.  W.  327;  36  I..  R  A.  523. 
That  one  who  violates  statutory 
duty  is  liable,    see   Grand    v.    Mich- 


caused  by  railroad  company's  mak- 
ing flying  switch  is  not  precluded  by 
contributory  negligence  but  only  by 
wilful  and  wanton  or  reckless  con- 
duct. Pulliman  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co., 
75  Miss.  627;  1  Miss.  Dec.  (Xo.  19) 
165;  2:;  So.  359;  As  to  liability  for 
noncompliance  with  statute,  see 
also  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  McCulip,  70 
Miss.  360;  25  So,  166.  Xegligence 
per  se  not  to  observe  ordinance. 
Jackson  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  157  Mo.  621;  58  S.  W.  32. 
Liability  attaches  where  statute 
provides  for  liability  for  nonobserv- 
ance.  Kingsbury  v.  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.,  156  Mo.  379;  57  S.  W.  547; 
Boggs  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  156 
Mo.  389;  57  S.  W.  550.  City  is  not 
liable  to  a  citizen  for  permitting 
building  of  a  character  prohibited 
by  ordinance  to  be  erected.  Harman 
v.  St.  Louis,  137  Mo.  494;  38  S.  W. 
1102.  Bailroad  company  is  not  liable 
for  running  at  prohibited  rate  of 
speed  through  city  where  injured 
person  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence. Payne  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R,  Co., 
136  Mo.  562:  38  S.  W.  308.  See  fur- 
ther as  to  liability  for  nonobservance 
of  statute,  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  108  Mo.  439;  18  S.  W.  1103; 
Keim  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  90  Mo.  314; 
2S.  W.  427:  Schaferv.  St.  Louis  & 
II.  R.  Co.,  (35  Mo.  App.  201.  Viola- 
tion of  statute  is  evidence  of  negli- 
gence but  not  conclusive,  oddie  v. 
Mendenhall  (Minn.  1901),  S6  X.  W. 
881;  in  Am.  N"eg.  Rep.  297.  Failure 
to  give  statutory  signals  at  county 
crossing    is    negligence    per   se,  but 


11  For  note  11  see  page  32. 


29 


8  64  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    <>F    LIABILITY. 

varies  with  circumstances,"  unci  the  question  of  duty  may  be- 
come one  for  the  jury  "  to  be  determined  upon  all  its  facts  of 


company  not  liable  where  there  is 
contributory  negligence.  .Imlson  v. 
Great  Northern  R. Co.,63  Minn.  248; 
ii.">  N.  W.  447.  Noncompliance  with 
statute  is  negligence.  Hunter  v. 
MontanaC.  R.  Co.,  22 Mont.  525;  57 
Pac.  140;  16  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X. 
s.  615.  Nebraska  statute  providing 
for  liability  of  railroad  companiesfor 
injuries  inflicted  on  passengers  does 
not  apply  to  street  railroads  or  to  one 
whose  injury  was  in  part  due  to  his 
own  negligence.  (Neb.  Comp.  Stat. 
18(.»7.  ch.  72.  sec.  3  I ;  Lincoln  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  McClellan,  5  I  Neb.  672;  74  N.  W. 
1074.  Neb.  Comp.  Stat.  ch.  16,  sec. 
104,  makes  railroad  company  liable 
for  failure  to  give  statutory  signals 
for  penalty  or  for  damages.  Missouri 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Geist,  49  Neb.  489;  68N. 
W.  6  10;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  421. 
Hut  the  failure  must  be  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury.  Omaha  & 
R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Talbot,  48  Neb.  627; 
67  N.  W.  599.  Presumption  of  negli- 
gence arises  under  Comp.  Stat.  ch. 
72.  art.  1,  sec.  3,  making  railroad 
companies  liable.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hague,  48  Neb.  97;  66  N. 
W.  1000,  4  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
476.  Town  liable  for  defective  high- 
ways under  Laws,  1893,  ch.  59,  sec.  1 ; 
Gale  v.  Town  of  Dover  (N.  H.  1896), 
44  Atl.  535.  Noncompliance  with 
statute  may  constitute  actionable 
negligence  and  is  negligence  per  se. 
Lewis  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  162  N. 
Y.  52;  56  N.  E.  548,  rev'g  32  App. 
Div.  627;  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  1107.  See 
further  as  to  liability  for  noncom- 
pliance with  statutory  requirement, 
Pauley  v.  Steam  Gauge  &  L.  Co.,  131 
N.  Y.  90;  42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  636;  29  N. 
E.  999;  30  X.  E.  805;  rev'g  til  Hun, 
254;  40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  855:  16  N.  Y. 
Supp.  820;   McReckard   v.    Flint,  114 

so 


N.  V.  222;  23  X.  Y.  St.  R.  100;  21 
N.  E.  153;  aff'g  13  Daly,  541;  Con- 
nolly v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  114 
X.  Y.  104;  22.  X.  Y.  St.  R.675;  21 
X.  E.  101 ;  aff'g  8  X.  Y.  St.  R.  901 ; 
Knupfle  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co., 
84  N.  Y.  488,  rev'g  23  Hun,  159; 
Lambert  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  70 
N.  Y.  104;  Carroll  v.  Staten  Island 
R.  Co.,  58  X.  Y.  126.  Imputes  negli- 
gence, but  not  conclusive.  Caldwell 
v.  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  47  X.  Y.  282, 
aff'g  56  Barb.  425;  Hoffman  v. 
Union  Terry  Co.,  47  X.  Y.  176.  Vio- 
lation of  ordinance  does  not  prove 
negligence,  but  is  a  circumstance  to 
be  considered.  Schaffer  v.  Baker 
Transfer  Co.,  29  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
459;  51  X.Y.  Supp.  1092.  See  further, 
Rohling  v.  Eich,  23  App.  Div.  179;48 
X.  Y.  Supp.  892;  Riley  v.  Eastches- 
ter,  18  App.  Div.  94;  45  X.  Y.  Supp. 
448;  under  N.  Y.  Laws,  1890,  ch.  568, 
sees.  16,  17;  Hanrahan  v.  Cochran,  12 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  91;  Waller  v.  Heb- 
ron, 5  Af>P-  Div.  577;  39  X.  Y.  Supp. 
381,  under  X.  Y.  Laws,  1890,  ch.  508, 
sec.  16;  Schwander  v.  Birge,  33  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  186;  Moody  v.  Osgood,  60 
Barb.  (X.Y.)  644.  Violation  of  stat- 
ute is  negligence:  Bradley  v.  Ohio, 
R.  cv  C.  R.  Co.,  126  X.  C.  735;  36  S. 
E.  181.  City  liable  for  omission  to 
keep  streets  free  from  nuisance  after 
notice  as  required  by  Rev.  Stat.  sees. 
1878,  2640.  Zanesville  v.  Fannan,  53 
( >hioSt.  605;35  Ohio  L.  J.  51;  42  X.  E. 
703.  Violation  by  street  car  com- 
pany of  statute  (Ohio  Act,  May  4, 
1891;  88  Ohio  Laws,  582),  as  to  care, 
caution  and  signals  at  railroad  cross- 
ing is  negligence  at  least  in  the 
absence  of  extraordinary  circum- 
stances, and  company  is  liable. 
Cincinnati  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray, 
53  Ohio  St.  570,  35  Ohio  L.  J.  22;  42 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


s  <;i 


the  probability  of  danger  or  the  grossness  df  the  ads  complained 
of,"  '-  and  in  a  Georgia  case  it  is  held  that  the  owner  of  hind 


N.  E.  596;  30  I,.  R.  A.  50S.  Failure 
to  maintain  statutory  sign  does  not 

render  company  liable  where  injured 
person  knew  thai  crossing  existed. 
New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Kist- 
l.i.  if,  Ohio  C.  C.  :'>16.  City  liable 
for  neglect  to  comply  with  statute 
(Rev.  Stat.  sec.  2640),  as  to  bridges. 
Mooney  v.  St.  Marys,  15  Ohio  C.  C. 
4-46.  The  duty  to  keep  highways 
free  from  impediments  under  Pa. 
Act,  June  13,  1836,  does  not  extend 
to  those  upon  lands  of  abutting 
owners.  Haines  v.  Barclay  Tup.,  181 
Pa.  521;  40  W.  X.  C.  564;  37  Ail.  560. 
See  further  as  to  liability  for  non- 
compliance with  statute,  Johnson  v. 
Brown,  61  Pa.  St.  58;  O'Grady  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (Pa.  C.  P.), 
28  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  110.  Liable  for 
violation  of  statute,  Oen.  Laws,  ch. 
74,  sec.  1;  providing  for  driving  to 
the  right  over  highway,  Angell  v. 
St.  Louis,  20  K.  I.  391;  39  Atl.  521;  46 
Cent.  L.  J.  287.  Cause  of  action  is 
not  given  to  one  injured  by  violation 
of  Pub.  Laws,  1878,  ch.  688,  sec.  25, 
providing  for  protection  of  elevators. 
Behler  v.  Daniels  (R.  I.),  31  Atl.  582. 
Violation  of  statute  is  negligence 
per  se.  Bo  wen  v.  Southern  R.  Co. 
(S.  C.  1000),  36  S.  E.  590.  Failure  to 
give  statutory  signals  contributes  to 
injury,  even  though  not  the  efficienl 
cause  thereof  (Rev.  Stat.  1893, 
sec.  1692),  Wragge  v.  South  Carolina 
&  o.  R.  Co.,  74  S.  ('.  lo:,;  25  S.  E.  76; 
33  L.  R.  A.  191;  4  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  X.  S.  639;  and  company 
is  liable  for  collisions  to  which  such 
neglect  contributed  even  though 
not  the  proximate  cause  (id.)  un- 
less the  person  injured  was  guilty 
of   "gross    or    wilful    negligence.11 


Strother  v.  South  Carolina  A-  Gr.  R. 
Co.,  47  S.  C.  375  ■  25  S.  E.  272  ;  5  Am. 
&  Eng.  K.  Cas.  N.  S.  430.  Right  of 
action  is  absolute  for  statute  is  im- 
perative. Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
104  Tenn.  442  ;  58  S.  W.  296.  When 
no  liability  for  violation  of.  shan- 
non's Code,  sees.  1601,  1603,  1605. 
Providing  for  driving  to  the  right  ou 
highway.  Young  v.  Conden,  98  Tenn. 
577  ;  40  S.  W.  loss.  Violation  of 
statute  is  negligence.  Texas  &  P. 
R  Co.  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ.  A  pp. 
1900),  56  S.  W.  248.  Violation  oi 
statute  is  actionable  when  it.  occa- 
sioned the  injury.  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  nf  Tex.  v.  Cardena  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  312.  Is  liable. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Red  Cross 
Stock  Farm,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  114  ; 
53  s.  \V.  834.  Railroad  company 
liable  for  failure  to  construct  cattle 
guard  (Rev.  Stat,  is1,):,,  an.  4527). 
Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Isaacs.  20 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  107;  40  S.  \V.  690. 
See  further,  Central  Tex.  &  X.  \V. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bush,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  291  ; 
.34  S.  \V.  133  ;  3  Am.  A-  Eng.  K.  Cas. 
X.  S.  264.  Company  liable  for  fail- 
ure to  construct  fences  and  cattle 
guards  even  though  contributory 
negligence  ( R.  L.  sec.  3412).  Har- 
wood  v.  Bennington  A-  P.  R.  Co.,  67 
Vt.  664;  32  Atl.  721.  Xegligeuce 
per  se  but  not  necessarily  actionable 
negligence.  Brown  v.  Chicago  A-  X. 
W.  R.  Co.  (Wis.  1001).  S:,  X.  W.  271  ; 
0  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  403.  Xot  liable 
when  failure  to  construct  fence  in 
DO  way  contributed  to  injury.  Sut- 
ton v.  Chicago,  st.  P.  m.  a-  O.  I:.  Co., 
98  Wis.  157  :  7:'-  X.  W.  993  ;  LO  Am. 
A  Eng.  R  Cas.  \.  s.  100.  Liable. 
Morton  v.  Smith,  48  Wis.  265.     City 


12  For  note  12  see  pae;e  32. 


31 


8  (54 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY 


owes  no  legal  duty  to  trespassing  children  to  so  guard  an  exca- 
vation on  said  land  as  to  prevent  injury  to  them  when  they  come 
thereupon  without  his  invitation,  express  or  implied,  and  the 
court,  per  Fish,  J.,  in  the  course  of  an  exhaustive  opinion  says: 
"  Under  the  facts  stated  was  the  defendant  company  liable  in 
damages  to  the  plaintiff  for  the  death  of  his  child  ?  This  ques- 
tion turns  upon  another  ;  that  is,  whether  or  not  the  company 
owed  the  child  any  legal  duty  which  it  neglected  to  perform, 
for  there  can  be  no  actionable  negligence  without  breach  of  a 
legal  duty."  1;i  So  a  person  incurs  no  duties  towards  others  by 
not  warning  or  driving  them  from  his  premises,  and  they  go 
there,  if  mere  volunteers,  at  their  own  risk  ;  and  tacit  permis- 
sion to  go  upon  premises  is  not  sufficient  as  a  ground  for  dam- 


liable  in  Florida  for  neglect  to  re- 
pair streets  as  required  by  statute 
(U.  S.  C.   C.   A.  5th  C. ),  24  C.  C.  A. 
97;  41  U.  S.  App.  657  ;  78  Fed.  292, 
citing  several   Florida  cases.     Com- 
pany not  liable  to  trespasser  for  its 
noncompliance  with  ordinance  regu- 
lating rate  of  speed.     Sheehan  v.  St. 
Faul  &   D.   R.   Co.   (U.  S.    C.  C.  A. 
7th     C),  22   C.   C.   A.    121;  46  U.  S. 
App.  498;    76   Fed.  201;   Felton  v. 
Aubrey  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  C),  20 
C.  C.  A.  436;   43  U.  S.  App.  278;  74 
Fed.   350.     Violation    of   Va.    Code, 
sec.  1258,  as  to  erection  of   fences, 
does  not  make   company  liable  for 
death  of  employee   resulting  there- 
from.   Nevvsom  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Va.),  81  Fed. 
133,  aff'd  23  C.  C.  A.  669  ;  42  TJ.  S. 
App.    282  ;    78    Fed.    94  ;    2    Va.    L. 
Reg.  882.     See  The  Pennsylvania,  19 
Wall.     (U.     S.)     136.      Although    a 
statute  provides  for  daily  forfeiture 
against  gas  companies  for  failure  to 
restore  street,  yet  a  gas  company  is 
liable  for  injury  resulting  from  neg- 
ligently  filling   up  a  trench    where 
the  statute  also  provides  that  noth- 
ing   shall    prevent    said    company's 
liability  to  legal  proceedings  in  con- 
sequence of  making  or  supplying  gas 

32 


(English  Gas  Works  Clauses,  Acts 
1847,  sees.  11,  29);  Goodson  v.  Sun- 
bury  Gas  Consumers'  Co.  (Q.  B. ),  75 
Law  T.  Rep.  251.  When  much 
traveled  highway  is  not  in  state  of 
repair  within  the  fatal  accidents  act. 
R.  S.  O.  ch.  166  ;  Foley  v.  East  Flam- 
borough  Twp.  (Can.),  26  Ont.  App. 
43.  City  is  liable  for  loss  of  revenues 
from  failure  to  perform  statutory 
duty  of  widening  and  prolonging  a 
street.  Montreal  v.  Gauthier,  Rap. 
Jud.  Quebec,  7  B.  R.,  100.  See  gen- 
erally Chaplin  v.  Hawes,  3  Car  & 
P.  554  ;  Cruden  v.  Fentham,  2  Esp. 
685  ;  White  v.  Gnaedinger,  Rap.  Jud. 
Quebec,  7  B.  R.  156.  See  further  as 
to  acts  done  in  violation  of  law  or  or- 
dinance, note,  53  Am.  Rep.  52-55. 
nHealeyv.  Ballantine  &  Sons  (N. 
J.  1901),  49  Atl.  511;  10  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  155,  159,  per  Depue,  Ch.  J., 
quoting  Erie,  Ch.  J.,  in  Cox  v.  Bur- 
bridge,  13  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  430.  As  to 
duty  as  essential  element  of  negli- 
gence, see  note  12,  L.  R.  A.  322. 

12  Tucker  v.  Draper  (Neb.  1901), 
86  N.  W.  917;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
307,  313,  per  Sedgwick,  C. 

13  Savannah,  Fla.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beavers  (Ga.  1901),  39  S.  E.  82;  10 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  8,  12,  13. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


6  64 


ages  for  injuries  to  children  occasioned  by  the  negligent  condition 
of  such  premises."  But  if  one  expressly  or  impliedly  invites 
another  upon  his  land  and  such  person  is  injured  by  failure  of  the 
owner's  duty  to  keep  the  premises  in  ;i  reasonably  safe  condi- 
tion, the  owner  is  liable  in  damages.13 


"Formal!  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (Mich. 
1901),  86  N.  W.946;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 

402.  See  also  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  K.  Co.  v.  Ballantine  (U.  S.  C.  C.  \ 
7th  C),  56  U.  S.  App.  260;  28  C.  C.  A. 
572; 84  Fed.  935;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  735. 
16  Tucker  v.  Draper  I  Neb.  L901),  86 
N.  W.  917;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  307, 
case  of  death  of  child  from  falling 
into  well.  See  O'Leary  v.  Brooks 
Elevator  Co.,  7  N.  I).  554;  75  \.  W. 
919;  41  L.  R.  A.  077;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Kep.  451.  As  to  liability  of  railroad 
companies  for  accidents  to  children 
on  turntables,  see  note  9  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  611,616;  note  14  L.  R.  A.  781. 
As  to  duty  to  trespassers  and  liabil- 
ity to  children  trespassing  on  rail- 
road tracks,  see  Alabama  G.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Moorer,  110  Ala.  042;  22  So. 
900;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  V  s. 
742;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  317,  and  note. 
See  further  as  to  duty  as  to  trespass- 
ers, licensees  and  invited  persons. 
Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cumberland 
(U.  S.  Sup.  D.  C),  176  C.  S.  232;  20 
S.  Ct.  380,  affg  12  App.  D.  C.  598; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  182 
111.  267;  54  N.  E.  979,  aff'g  80  111. 
App.  675;  John  Spry  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Duggan,  182  111.  218;  34  X.  E.  102, 
aff'g  80  111.  App.  392;  Jelinski  v. 
Belt  R.  Co.,  86  111.  App.  535;  Ro- 
bards  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  84  111.  App. 
477;  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  11.  Co 
v.  Tartt  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  III.).  39 
C.  C.  A.  568;  99  Fed.  309;  Biggs  v. 
Barb  Wire  Co.,  60  Kan.  217;  44  L. 
R.  A.  655;  Gunn  v.  Felton  (  Ky.  1900), 
57  S.  W.  15;  Moffatt  v.  Kenuey,  174 
Mass.  311;  54  N.  E.  850;  6  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  564;  McCarvel  v.   Sawyer,   173 

3 


Mass.  ">4o;  Stevens  v.  Nichols,  155 
Mass.  472;  29  N.  E.  1150;  15  L.  R.  A 
459;  1 1  ii  ink  v.  Wixoin,  121  Mich. 
384,  389;  Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v 
Carter,  77  Miss.  611;  27  So.  993; 
Jackson  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  s.  &  M.  K. 
Co.,  157  Mo.  021:  58S.  W.  32;  Ham- 
ilton v.  Minneapolis  Desk  Mfg  Co, 
(Minn.  1899),  80  N.W.  093;  Kayserv. 
Lindell,  7::  Mum.  123;  Buck  v.  Mfg. 
Co..  09  N.  11.  257;  O'Leary  v.  Erie 
R.  Co..  04  N.  V.  Supp.  511;  :>1  App. 
Div.  25;  Quirk  v.  Siegel-Cooper  Co., 
00  N.  Y.  St.  R.  228;  4:;  App.  Div. 
404.    aff'g    56    N.     V.    Supp.    49;    26 

'  Misc.  244;  Fogarty  v.    Bogart,  on   X. 
St.    R.  81;  43  App.    Div.   430;    Arro- 

j  wood  v.  South  Carolina  A-  G.  E.  R. 
Co.,  120  N.  C.  029;  36  S.  E.  151?  To- 
ledo Real  Estate  &  Inv.  Co.  v.  Put- 
ney, 44  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  480;  10  O.  C. 
D.  698;  Ludden  v.  Columbus  &  C. 
M.  R.  Co.,  7  Ohio,  N.  P.  10C);  9Ohi0 
S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  793;  Smith  v.  New 
ark  Ice  &  C.  S.  Co.,  8  Ohio  S.  &  C. 
P.  Dec.  283;  Brady  v.  Prettyman, 
193  Pa.  St.  628;  44  Atl.  919:  Brague 
v.  Ry.  Co.,  192  Pa.  St.  242:  Texas  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrett  (Tex.  Civ.  App 
1900),  57S.  W.  602;  International  & 
<;.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  1056;  Huff  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  ( W.  Va. 
1900),  35  S.  E.  86(5;  Ritz  v.  City  of 
Wheeling,  45  W.  Va.  262;  Schug  \ 
Ry.  Co.,  102  Wis.  515.  See  also  as  to 
liability  of  owner  of  premises  for 
defective  condition,  notes,  5  L.  R.  A. 
580;  7  id.  620;  as  to  trespasser  or  li- 
censee, note,  9  L.  K.  A.  640;  as  to 
dangerous  condition  of  private 
grounds,  etc.,  note,  26  I..  R.    \.  686. 

3a 


§65 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    LIABILITY. 


§  65.  Same  subject— Governmental,  judicial,  discretionary 
and  police  duties  and  powers— Liability.— It  may  be  generally 
stated  that  there  must  be  some  breach  of  a  duty  imposed  upon 
a  municipal  corporation  by  law  to  render  it  liable  for  a  mere  non- 
feasance,16 and  where  a  city  is  under  no  duty  to  keep  up  a  bridge, 
its  failure  to  do.  so  is  not  negligence  entitling  one  injured  by  its 
being  defective  to  damages.17  In  considering,  however,  what 
duties  are  imposed  upon  a  municipality  with  reference  to  a 
right  of  action,  both  statutory  obligations  and  implied  liability 
are  important  factors ;  the  next  division  is  that  of  liability  upon 
contracts  and  of  liability  in  actions  of  tort ;  while  next  in  order 


16  Montreal  v.  Mulcair,  28  Can.  S. 
C.  45a 

17  Crawford  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Griffin  (Ga.  1901),  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
26,  2S;  38  S.  E.  988.  As  to  liability 
of  cities,  counties,  etc.,  for  defective 
bridges,  see,  Lee  Co.  v.  Yarbrongh,  85 
Ala.  590;  El  Paso  Co.  v.  Bisk,  18 
Colo.  474;  Daly  v.  New  Haven,  60 
Conn.  644;  38  Atl.  397;  City  of  San- 
deraville  v.  Hurst,  111  Ga.  453;  36 
S.  E.  757;  Cook  v.  De  Kalb  Co.,  95 
Ga.  218;  Grays  v.  Bibb  Co.,  94  Ga. 
698;  Arnold  v.  Henry  Co.,  81  Ga.  730; 
Arline  v.  Laurens  Co.,  77  Ga.  249; 
Gwinnett  Co.  v.  Dunn,  74  Ga.  358; 
People,  Corey  v.  Dover  &  O.  H. 
Commrs.,  158  111.  197;  41  N.  E. 
1105;  Johnson  Co.  v.  Hemphill 
(Ind.  App.),  41  N.  E.  965,  rev'd  14 
Ind.  App.  210;  42  N.  E.  760;  Bone- 
brake  v.  Huntington  Co.,  141  Ind.  62; 
Allen  Co.  Commrs.  v.  Creviston,  133 
Ind.  39  ;  Wabash  v.  Carver,  129  Ind. 
453  ;  13  L.  R.  A.  851  ;  Fulton  Co.  v. 
Rickell,  106  Ind.  501  ;  Walrod  v. 
Webster  Co.  (Iowa,  1900),  81  N.  W. 
598;  47  L.  R.  A.  480;  Faulk  v.  Iowa 
Co.,  103  Iowa,  442;  Weirs  v.  Jones 
Co.,  80  Iowa,  351 ;  Cooper  v.  Mills  Co., 
09  Iowa,  350;  Commrs.  of  Worcester 
Co.  v.  Ryckman,  91  Md.  36;  46  Atl. 
317;  Pearl  v.  Benton  Twp.  (Mich. 
1900),  82  N.  W.  226;  White  v.  Riley  I 

34 


Twp.  (Mich.  1899),  80  N.  W.  124;  Tra- 
vis v.  Skinner,  72  Mich.  152;  Ander- 
son v.  City  of  St.  Cloud  (Minn.  1900), 
81  N.  W.  746;  State  v.   Vaughn,  77 
Miss.  681;  27  So.  999;  Cohea  v.  Cof- 
feesville,  69  Miss.  561;  Pundman  v. 
St.  Charles  Co..  110  Mo.   594;  Dun- 
can v.  State,  42  Neb.  804;  Hollings- 
worth  v.   Saunders  Co.,  36  Neb.  141; 
Jernee  v.  Monmouth  Co.,  52  N.  S.  L. 
553;    11    L.    R.    A.   416;    Markey   v. 
Que'ens  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  675;  49  N.  E. 
71;  39  L.  R.  A.  46,  aff'g  9  App.  Div. 
627;  Reiss  v.  Town  of   Pelham,   65 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1033,  aff'g  62  N.  Y.  Supp. 
607;  Cooley  v.  Trustees  of  N.  Y.  &  B. 
Bridge,  45  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  243;  61 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1;  Allen  v.  Queens  Co., 
84Hun(N.Y.),399;  Smith  v.  Wright, 
27    Barb.     (N.    Y.)    621;    Board    of 
Commrs.  of  Hardin  Co.  v.  Coffman 
00  Ohio  St.  527;  54  N.  E.  1054;  48  L 
R.  A.   455;  18   Ohio   Cir.   Ct.  R.  254 
10  O.  C.  D.  91;  Templeton  v.  Linn 
Co.,  22  Or.   313;    15    L.    R.    A.   730 
Riddle  v.  Delaware  Co.,  156  Pa.  643 
Cope  v.   Hampton  Co.,  42  S.  C.    17 
Brown  v.   Laurens  Co.,  38  S.  C.  282 
Bailey  v.  Lawrence  Co.,  5  S.  D.  393 
Heigel  v.  Wichita  Co.,  84  Tex.  392 
City    of    Marshall  v.   McAllister,   22 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  214;  54  S.  W.    1068 
Rohrbougk  v.  Barber  Co.,  39  W.  Va 
472. 


(JKNEKAL    PRINCIPLF.S    o|      I.I  A  1:1  L1TV. 


§  65 


is  the  distinction  between  municipal  corporations  strictly  exist- 
ing as  such  and  whirl)  are  organized  under  special  charter  or  the 
general  law  and  those  which  exist  under  the  general  designation 
of  counties,  towns,  school  districts,  etc.,  and  which  are  desig- 
nated as  quasi  corporations.  These  questions,  however,  are  only 
briefly  noticed  here  as  they  are  not  within  the  scope  of  this  trea- 
tise except  in  a  general  way.15  Again  municipal  corporations  may 
become  liable  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of  others,  which  it  may 
be  helpless  to  prevent,  and  their  responsibility  is  not  to  be 
measured  by  that  rule  which  applied  to  individuals  in  regard  to 
their  own  acts,19  and  while  they  are  not  liable  for  the  manner 
in  which  they  exercise  their  discretionary  powers  of  a  public, 
legislative  or  quasi  judicial  nature,  nevertheless  where  their 
powers  become  ministerial  duties,  and  there  is  a  negligent  per- 
formance thereof,  there  is  a  remedy  in  an  action  for  damages.* 


18  See  as  to  civil  actions  and  liabil- 
ities and  as  to  the  general  divisions 
above,  note,  2  Dillon  on  Munic.  Corp. 
(4th  ed.)  sees.  935  et  seq.,  948etseq., 
961  et  seq,  980  et  seq. ;  Tiedeman  on 
Munic.  Corp.  (ed.  1900)  sees.  324,  325 
et  seq. 

19Greerv.  New  York.  4  Rob.  (N.Y.J 
675;  1   Abb.   Pr.   N.    S.   ( N.  Y. )   206,' 
and  see  Wallace  v.  New  York,  2  Hilt. 
(N.   Y.)  440;    IS   How.    Pr.  (N.   Y.) 
169. 

20  Chicago  v.  Seben,  165  111.  371; 
46  N.  E.  244,  aff'g  62  111.  App.  248. 
."A  municipal  corporation  is  not  im- 
pliedly liable  to  an  action  for  dam- 
ages, either  for  the  nonexercise  of, 
or  for  tbe  manner  in  which  in  good 
faith  it  exercises  discretionary  pow- 
ers of  a  public  or  legislative  charac- 
ter .  .  .  There  may  be  however  .  .  . 
an  implied  liability  for  the  negligent 
or  unskilful  manner  in  which  strictly 
corporate  powers,  as  distinguished 
from  public  powers,  are  carried  into 
execution,  although  there  was  no 
perfect  duty  resting  on  the  corpora- 
tion to  enter  upon  tbe  works,  or  un- 
dertakings involving  the  exercise  of 


such  powers.  But  the  liability  in 
such  cases  attaches  only  when  the 
duties  cease  to  be  judicial  in  their 
nature  and  become  ministerial.  This 
is  tbe  principle;  its  application,  as 
will  be  hereafter  seen,  is  oftentimes 
extremely  difficult."  2  Dillon  on 
Munic.  Corp.  (4th  ed. )  sec.  949.  See 
also  Tiedeman  on  Munic.  Corp 
(ed.  1900)  sees.  327  et  seq.  The 
powers  with  which  municipal  corpo- 
rations are  generally  invested,  within 
the  scope  of  their  charter,  are  "gen- 
eially  regarded  as  discretionary, 
because  in  their  nature  they  are  legis- 
lative, and  although  it  is  the  duty  of 
such  corporations  to  carry  out  the 
powers  so  granted,  and  to  make 
them  beneficial,  it  has  never  been 
held  that  an  action  would  lie  against 
the  corporation  at  the  suit  of  an  in- 
dividual for  a  failure  on  their  part  to 
perform  such  duty.  Hut  when'  a 
duty  of  general  interest  is  enjoined, 
and  it  appears  that  the  burden  was 
imposed  in  consideration  of  the  priv- 
ileges  granted  and  enjoined,  and  the 
means  to  perform  the  duty  are  placed 
at  the  disposition  of  tbe  corporation, 

36 


§65 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


So  the  construction  of  a  sewer  has  been  decided  to  be  a  min- 
isterial work  for  which  a  liability  arises,  if  in  the  construction 
there  is  carelessness  or  negligence  and  an  injury  is  caused 
thereby,21  and  if  injury  results  to  plaintiff  through  defective 
construction  of  a  sewer,  and  consequent  flooding  of  his  land,  it 
constitutes  a  taking  of  his  property  without  compensation 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.23  So  one  is  not  es- 
topped from  a  recovery  for  the  reduction  of  a  grade,  the  necessity 
of  which  she  should  have  foreseen,  as  where  she  places  her  house 
on  the  top  of  a  ridge,23  and  although  a  municipal  corporation 
acts  judicially  when  it  selects  and  adopts  a  plan  for  public  im- 
provement, yet  it  acts  ministerially  in  executing  the  work,  and 
must  carry  it  on  in  a  reasonably  safe  and  skillful  manner.24 
Again  where  an  injury  results  to  a  person  by  reason  of  negli- 
gence of  contractors  in  executing  a  work  under  contract  with  a 
city  which  has  solely  to  do  with  the  business  functions  of  the 
municipality,  but  which  is  in  no  sense  in  furtherance  of  a  pub- 
lic duty,  the  city  is  liable  ; £  although  in  so  far  as  a  city  dis- 
charges a  governmental  function  in  causing  arrests  to  be  made 
by  its  police  officers,  it  is  not  liable  therefor,26  nor  is  a  munici- 
pality liable  for  the  negligence  of  officers  of  the  board  of  health 
in  performing  their  duty,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  function  of  the 
municipality,  by  reason  of  being  a  political  division  of  the  state.27 


they  are  clearly  liable  to  the  public 
if  they  unreasonably  neglect  to  com- 
ply with  the  requirements  of  the 
charter,  and  where  all  the  foregoing 
conditions  concur,  like  individuals, 
they  are  also  liable  for  injuries  to 
person  or  property  arising  from  neg- 
lect to  perform  the  duty  enjoined, 
or  from  negligence  or  unskilfulness 
in  its  performance.''  4  Wait's  Act. 
and  Def.  631,  632  et  seq. 

21  Donahewv.  Kansas  City,  136  Mo. 
657  ;  38  S.  W.  571. 

22  Thurston  v.  St.  Joseph,  51  Mo. 
510;  11  Am.  Rep.  463. 

28  McGar  v.  Bristol,  71  Conn.  652;  42 
Atl.  1.000  ( Conn.  Gen  Stat.  sec.  2703). 

24  Chicago  v.  Seben,  165  111.  371;  46 
N.  E.  244.  afTg  62  111.  App.  248. 

36 


26  Twist  v.  Rochester,  37  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  307;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  850. 

26  Colely  v.  Statesville,  121  N.  C. 
301 ;  28  S.  E.  482,  and  see  note,  15  L. 
R.  A.  283. 

2?Gilboy  v.  Detroit,  115  Mich.  121; 
73  N.  W.  128;  4  Diet.   L.  N.  841,  cit- 
ing numerous  cases.     See  further  as 
to  general  principles  involved  in  the 
above  text  as  to  liability  of  munici- 
pal,   etc.,    corporations,    and    as   to 
governmental,  judicial,  discretionary 
and    police  duties  and    powers,  Mel 
vin  v.  State,  121  Cal.  16;  53  Pac.  416 
Piatt  v.  City  of  Waterbury,  72  Conn 
531;   45   Atl.   154;   Carswell  v.    Wil 
mington,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  360;  43  Atl 
169;  Gray  v.  City  of  Griffin,  111  Ga 
361;  36  S.  E.  792;  Tarbutton  v.  Town 


OKNEIJAI.    PRINCIPLES    <»F    LIABILITY. 


6   65 


Again  matters  which   come  within  the  police  powers  or  police 
regulations  of  a  municipality  may  operate  to  relieve  such  cor- 


of  Tennille,  110  Ca.  90;  85  S.  E.  282; 
Wyatt  v.  Koine,  105  Ga.  312;  31  S.  E. 
188,  42  L.  R.  A.  180;  Estes  v.  Macon, 
L03  (ia.  780;  30  S.  E.  24(5;  Love  v. 
Atlanta,  95  Ga.  12'.);  Biinkmeyer  v. 
Kvansville,  29  Ind.  187;  Vanlnnn  v. 
Des  Moines,  63  Iowa,  447;  19  N.  W. 
29:!;  Planters'  Oil  Mill  v.  .Monroe 
Waterworks  &  L.  Co.,  52  La.  Ann. 
1243;  27  So.  684;  Yule  v.  City  of 
New  Orleans,  25  La.  Ann.  394;  Com- 
missioners v.  Dnckett,  20  Md.  468; 
Bent  v.  Emery,  173  Mass.  495;  53  N. 
E.  910;  McGowan  v.  Boston,  170 
Mass.  384;  49  N.  E.  033;  Tainter  v. 
Worcester,  123  Mass.  311;  Monge  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids  (Mich.  1900), 
81  N.  W.  574;  Burridge  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  117  Mich.  557;  Sehuett  v. 
Stillwater  (Minn.  1900),  83  X.  \V. 
180;  Boye  v.  City  of  Albert  Lea,  74 
Minn.  230;  Itives  v.  City  of  Colum- 
bia, 80  Mo.  App.  173;  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  537;  Downend  v.  City  of  Kan- 
sas City,  150  Mo.  60;  56  S.  W.  902; 
Smith  v.  City  of  Sedalia,  152  Mo. 
283;  53  s.  W.  907;  Young  v.  Webb 
City,  150  M<>.  333;  Ogle  v.  City  of 
Cumberland,  90  Mo.  59;  44  Atl.  1015; 
Bowman  v.  City  of  Omaha,  59  Neb. 
84;  80  N.  W.  259;  City  of  Lincoln  v. 
O'Brien,  50  Neb.  761;  Clark  v.  Eliza- 
beth, 61  N.  J.  L.  565;  49  Atl.  616, 
737;  Jansen  v.  Jersey  City,  61  N.  J. 
L.  243;  39  Atl.  1025;  Re  Oreer,  39 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  22;  56  N.  Y.  Supp. 
938;  Quill  v.  New  York,  36  App.  Div. 
.476;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  889;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  423:  Springfield  E.  &  M.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Yillage  of  Keeseville,  148  N. 
Y.  56;  42  N.  E.  405,  rev'g  80  Hun, 
162;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  711;  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1130;  Barton  v.  Syracuse,  37 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  292,  aff'd  36  N.  Y.  54; 
Hickok  v.  Plattsburgh,  16  N.  Y.  161, 


note;  Betham  v.  Philadelphia,  196 
Pa.  St.  302;  4«i  Atl.  448;  Irving's 
Exrs.  v.  Borough  of  Media,  194 
Pa.  St.  648;  45  Atl.  482;  Kaiksdale 
v.  City  of  Laurens,  5>s  s.  C.  413;  3t> 
s.  E.  661;  Garrauz  v.  Greenville,  53 
S.  C.  575;  31  S.  E.  597;  Connelly  v. 
Nashville,  100  Tenn.  262;  46  S.  W. 
566;  City  of  Dallas  v.  Webb,  22  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  48;  54  S.  W.  398;  Jones  v. 
City  <>f  Williamsburg,  97  Va.  722; 
34  S.  E.  883;  Wood  v.  City  of  Ilin- 
ton  (\V.  Va.  1900),  35  S.  E.  824;  Men- 
del v.  Wheeling,  28  W.  Va.  233; 
Whilty  v.  City  of  Oshkosh  (Wis. 
1900),  81  N.  W.  992;  Weightman  v. 
Washington,  1  Black  (U.S.),  39;  Dent 
v.  Bournemouth  Corp.,  66  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
\.  S.  395.  As  to  judicial  and  min- 
isterial powers  of  such  corporations, 
see  note,  79  Am.  Dec.  475-477.  As 
to  their  liability  for  neglect  of  con- 
tractor, see  note  to  22  Am.  Rep.  510, 
511.  As  to  liability  where  damages 
are  occasioned  in  execution  of  sover- 
eign powers,  see  note,  66  Am.  Dec. 
434-442.  As  to  their  liability  for  neg- 
ligence or  unskillfulness  of  agents, 
sec  note.  5:!  Am.  Dec.  320-322.  As 
to  their  liability  for  grading  and  re- 
grading  streets,  see  note,  43  Am.  Dec. 
723-725.  As  to  their  liability  for  in- 
juries through  want  of  repair  or  de- 
fects in  public  buildings,  see  note,  5 
Am.  Dee.  43-45;  for  insufficient  sys- 
tem of  drainage,  see  note,  54  Am. 
Rep.  671,  672;  for  neglect  to  repair 
streets,  see  note,  63  Am.  Dec.  350- 
357;  for  injuries  caused  by  horses 
becoming  frightened  in  streets,  see 
note.  98  Am.  Dec.  608-612;  for  prop- 
erty destroyed  by  mobs,  see  note,  56 
Am.  Dec.  580-590;  as  affected  by  em- 
ployment of  contractors,  74  Am.  Dec. 
761,  762 ;  for  unauthorized  acts  of  offi- 

37 


§  65  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 

poration  from  liability.88  In  addition,  notwithstanding  the  gen- 
eral principle  which  applies  under  the  maxim  that  for  every 
wrong  there  is  a  remedy,  the  acts  of  congress  *  extended  pro- 
tection to  all  persons  for  acts  they  committed  in  subordination 
to  the  military  authorities  engaged  in  conducting  the  war,  and 
conferred  upon  them  the  same  exemption  from  liability  to  suit 
which  belonged  to  the  president,  the  secretary  of  war  and  the 
department  commanders ; x  and  it  is  also  determined  that  the 
government  is  not  liable  on  implied  assumpsit  for  the  torts  of 
its  officer  committed  while  in  its  service  and  apparently  for  its 
benefit.  To  admit  such  a  liability  would  involve  the  govern- 
ment, in  all  its  operations,  in  embarrassments,  losses  and  diffi- 
culties subversive  of  the  public  interests.31  In  conclusion :  "It 
is  an  established  principle  of  jurisprudence  in  all  civilized  na- 
tions, that  the  sovereign  cannot  be  sued  in  its  own  courts  or  in 
any  other  without  its  consent  and  permission,  but  it  may,  if  it 
thinks  proper,  waive  this  privilege  and  permit  itself  to  be  made 
a  defendant  in  a  suit  by  individuals  or  by  another  state." 3"-' 


cers,  see  note,  100  Am.  Dec.  358-360; 
for  negligence  notes,  2  L.  R.  A.  500; 
4  id.  325;  5  id.  143,  253;  for  false  im- 
prisonment and  unlawful  arrest,  note, 
44  L.  R.  A.  795;  47  id.  593;  36  id. 
293;  for  torts  of  agents,  officers,  etc., 
notes,  1  L.  R.  A.  608,  844;  2  id.  366, 
500,  712;  3  id.  257;  4  id.  325;  6  id. 
270;  9  id.  205;  11  id.  416;  for  acts  of 
mob,  note  24  L.  R.  A.  592. 

28  Caldwell  v.  Prunelle,  57  Kan. 
511;  46  Pac.  949.  As  to  the  general 
subject  of  police  powers,  see  Prentice 
on  Police  Powers  (ed.  1894).  As  to 
police  powers  of  state,  see  note,  1  L. 
R.  A.  51;  13  id.  131;  that  rights  of 
corporations  subject  to  same,  see 
note,  9  L.  R.  A.  33;  that  private  in- 
terests subservient  to  same,  see  note, 
8  L.  R.  A.  854;  see  as  to  general 
subject  of  police  powers,  notes  1  L. 
R.  A.  51;  6  id.  621;  10  id.  135;  13  id. 
131;  16  id.  400;  32  id.  853;  30  id. 
609;  38  id.  330. 

For  definition  of  police  power,  see 

38 


Stehmeyer   v.    Charleston,   53  S.   C. 
259;  31  S.  E.  322. 

29  March  3,  1863  (12  Stat.  756),  and 
May  11,  1866  (14  Stat.  46). 

30  Beard  v.  Burts,  95  U.  S.  434. 

31  Gibbons  v.  United  States,  8 
Wall.  (U.S.)  269,  cited  in  Belknap 
v.  Schild,  161  U.  S.  17  ;  United  States 
v.  Berdan  Fire  Arms,  156  U.  S.  566  ; 
Schillinger  v.  LTnited  States,  155  U.  S. 
167.  For  further  citations  see  1 
Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus  Digest, 
p.  1517. 

32  Ball  v.  Halsell,  161  U.  S.  83.  See 
Ayres,  ex  parte,  123  U.  S.  443  ;  North 
Carolina  v.  Temple,  134  U.  S.  22. 
See  also  Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus 
Digest  for  citations  of  tbese  cases. 
That  state  cannot  be  sued,  except 
with  its  own  consent,  see  Melvin  v. 
State,  121  Cal.  16;  53  Pac.  416;  Car- 
ter v.  State,  49  La.  Ann.  1487:  22  So. 
400;  Wright  v.  State  Board  of  Liqui- 
dation, 49  La.  Ann.  1213;  22  So.  361; 
Columbia    Water  Power  Co.   v.  Co- 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    LIABILITY. 


S  65 


But  while  tlie  United  States  cannot  be  sued  on  its  property 
rights,  affected  by  a  judgment,  without  the  express  authority  of 
Congress,  nevertheless  it  has  been  decided  that  its  rightof  prop- 
erty may,  under  certain  circumstances,  be  made  subject  to  the 
results  of  litigation,83  and    a   state    institution    may   be   sued.*1 


lumbia  Elec.  St.  R.  L.  &  P.  Co. 
(S.  C),  20  S.  E.  10(12;  Sun tli  &  North 
Ala.  R.  Co.  v.  Alabama,  101  U.  S. 
832;  25  L.  Ed.  973;  Memphis  &  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Tennessee,  101  U.  S.  337;  25 
L.  Ed.  960. 

*J  Ward  v.  Congress  Const.  Co.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  111.),  39  C.  C.  A.  669;  99 
Fed.  598;  and  see  Tindall  v.  Wesley 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  4th  ('.),  13  C.  C.  A. 
160;  25  U.  S.  A.  124;  65  Fed.  731. 

34  Bank  of  Hopkinsville  v.  Western 
Ky.  Asylum  i  Ky.  1900),  56  S.  W. 
925.  As  to  claims  and  suits  against 
the  United  States,  see  generally 
United  States  v.  Winchester  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  163  U.  S.  244;  16  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
993;  41  L.  Ed.  145;  Ward  v.  Con- 
gress Const.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
111.),  33  C.  C.  A.  669;  99  Fed.  598; 
Strong  v.  United  States  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
D.  Conn.),  93  Fed.  257;  Hughes  v. 
United  States  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Wash.), 
86  Fed.  1022;  Swigett  v.  United 
States  ( U.  S.  D.  C.  D.  Mont. ),  78  I  '•  id. 
456;  United  States  v.  Madrazo  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.),  38  U.  S.  A.  515; 
73  Fed.  505;  South  Boston  Iron 
Works  v.  United  States,  34  Ct.  CI. 
174;  Act,  March  3,  1887  (24  Stat. 
505);  McDonald  v.  United  States,  33 
Ct.  CI.  209;  Foster  v.  United  States, 
32  Ct.  CI.  170;  Hay  ward  v.  United 
States,  30  Ct.  CI.  219.  As  to  the 
right  to  recover  under  the  Bowman 
Act  for  property  taken  by  the  army, 
etc.,  see  Walker  v.  United  States, 
34  Ct.  CI.  345;  Blanchard  v.  United 
States,  32  Ct.  CI.  444;  Board  of  Edu- 
cation v.  United  States,  30  Ct.  CI. 
160. 

As  to  suits  and  claims  against  the 


state,  see    Holmes   v.    State    (Ala.), 

I  I  So.  51;  Melville  v.  State,  121  Cal. 
16;  53  Pac.  416;  Bloxham  v.  Florida 
C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Fla.),  17  So.  902; 
Cayuga  Co.  Superv.  v.  State,  153 
\.  Y.  279;  47  N.  E.  288;  Waller  v. 
State,  144  N.  V.  579;  39  N.  E.  680; 
64  X.  Y.  St.  R.  22<);  Weeks  v.  State, 
63  N.  Y.  Supp.  203;  48  App.  Div. 
357;  State  Blount  v.  Simmons,  119 
N.  C.  50;  25  S.  E.  789,  aff'd  26  S.  E. 
649:  Cope  v.  Hastings,  183  Pa.  300; 
4  1  W.  \.  C.  173;  28  Pitts,  L.  J.  N.  S. 
175;  38  Atl.  717;  Re  Moore's  Case 
(Atty.  Genl.),  6  Pa.  Hist.  R.  396; 
Harris  v.  State,  9  S.  U.  453;  69  X.  W. 
825;  Lyman  Co.  v.  State,  9  S.  D.  413; 
69  N.  W.  601 ;  Gordon  v.  Weaver  (Teun. 
Ch.  App.  1899),  53  S.  W.  740;  North- 
western &  P.  H.  Bank  v.  State,  18 
Wash.  73;  50  Pac.  586;  42  L.  R.  A.  33, 
and  note;  Houston  v.  State,  98  Wis. 
481;  74  N.  W.  Ill;  42  L.  R.  A.  39;  un- 
der Rev.  Stat.  sec.  3200;  Smith  v. 
Reeves,  17S  U.  S.  436;  20  S.  Ch.  919; 

II  L.  Ed.  1140,  affg Smith  v.  Rackliffe 
(U.  S.  Sup.  Cal.),  87  Fed.  964;  31  C. 
C.  A.  328.  When  suit  is  not  a  suit 
against  the  state,  see  Donald  v. 
Scott  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  C),  67  Fed.  854; 
City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Farmers' 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
Ind.),  40  C.  C.  A.  117;  99  Fed.  838; 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Citizens-  St.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  I).  End.  i.  80  Fed.  218; 
29  Chic.  L.  News,  297;  Cobb  v.  Clough 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Minn.),  83  Fed.  604; 
Smyth  v.  Aims.  169  V.  S.  466;  42  L. 
Ed.  819;  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  418;  30 
Chic.  L.  News,  243;  mod'd  171  U. 
S.  361;  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  888.  When 
action   against   state    officer   is   suit 

39 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§  66.  Moral  obligations,  duties  and  wrongs.— Legal  obliga- 
tions should  not  be  confounded  with  those  sentiments  which  are 
independent  of  the  law  and  rest  merely  on  grounds  of  feeling 
or  moral  considerations.5  For,  as  has  been  declared  in  a  Massa- 
chusetts case,  "  It  is  very  clear  that  there  may  be  many  moral 
wrongs  for  which  there  can  be  no  legal  remedy,  and  there  may 
be  legal  torts  in  which  the  damage  to  individuals  may  be  very 
great,  and  yet  so  remote,  contingent  or  indefinite  as  to  furnish 
no  good  ground  of  action."  *  Again,  rights  have  been  classified 
into  natural,  moral  and  legal,  but  a  practical  definition  which 
may  be  applied  with  certainty  is  most  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  formulate.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  there  exist  many 
moral  rights,  claims  or  duties,  for  the  nonperformance  of  which 
there  can  be  no  legal  redress.  "  Many  duties  are  by  nature  or  by 
circumstances  imposed  upon  human  beings,  which  the  state  never 
attempts  to  enforce,"  while  "  by  legal  rights  are  intended  those 
to  which  the  state  gives  its  sanction,"  which  "is  the  sanction  of 
remedies.  So  that  a  legal  right  may  be  said  to  be  a  claim  which 
can  be  enforced  by  legal  means  against  the  persons  or  the  com- 
munity whose  duty  it  is  to  respect  it.  .  .  .  There  is  no  neces- 
sary identity  or  even  relation  of  legal  right  and  moral  right  .  .  . 
many  moral  claims,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  be  converted  into 
legal  demands."37     It  is  also  a  maxim  that  ex  nudo  pacto  non 


against  the  state,  see  Fitts  v.  Mc- 
Ghee,  172  IT.  S.  516;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
269;  43  L.  Ed.  535;  31  Chic.  L.  News, 
207.  When  action  against  state  offi- 
cer is  not  suit  against  the  state,  see 
Tindal  v.  Wesley,  107  U.  S.  264;  17 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  770;  29  Chic.  L.  News, 
337;  Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &  T. 
Co.,  154  U.  S.  362,  420;  14  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  1047,  1062;  38  L.  Ed.  1014,  1031; 
4  Inters.  Com.  R.  560,  578;  Yale  Col- 
lege v.  Sanger  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Conn.), 
62  Fed.  177.  For  illustration  of  suit 
where  state  strips  herself  of  sover- 
eignty and  acts  in  capacity  of  a  pri- 
vate person,  see  Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
North  Carolina  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W. 
D.  N.  C),  81  Fed.  595. 

MFormall    v.     Standard     Oil   Co. 
(Mich.  1901),  86  N.  W.  946;  10  Am. 
40 


Neg.  Rep.  402,  413,  per  Grant,  J., 
quoting  from  Hargreaves  v.  Deacon, 
25  Mich.  1. 

36  Lamb  v.  Stone,  11  Pick,  (Mass.) 
527,  532,  per  Morton,  J.  See  Roman 
Catholic  Church  v.  Martin,  4  Rob. 
(La.)  62;  Raudlette  v.  Judkins,  77 
Me.  114;  52  Am.  Rep.  747;  Common- 
wealth v.  McDuffy,  126  Mass.  469; 
Payne  v.  Western,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  13 
Lea  (Tenn. ),  507;  49  Am.  Rep.  666; 
McGuire  v.  Kiveland,  56  Vt.  62;  Ohio, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kasson,  37  N.  Y.  218, 
224;  1  "Cyc."  L.  &  P.  645. 

37 1  Blackstone's  Comm.  (1  Cooley's 
Black.  4th  ed.)  *  122-*  124,  note  2. 
See  also  1  Wait's  Act.  &  Def.  (1877) 
p.  12  et  seq. ;  Edes  v.  Boardman,  58 
N.  H.  580,  per  Doe,  C.  J. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§67 


oritur  actio,  that  is,  that  no  cause  of  action  arises  from  a  bare 
promise,  and  oven  though  such  gratuitous  promise  may  consti- 
tute a  mural  obligation,  no  Legal  responsibility  is  created,  for  a 
contract  must,  as  a  rule,  be  based  upon  some  consideration  in 

law  other  than  a  merely  moral  one  in  the  ethical  sense.1* 

§  67.  Lawful  acts. — It  is  a  maxim  of  the  law  that  one  should 
enjoy  his  own  property  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  injure  that 
of  another  person — Sic  utere  tuo  ut  alienum  non  laedas*' — 
and  the  cases  to  which  this  maxim  is  applicable  are  very  num- 
erous, and  it  is  said  that  the  exceptions  are  few.40  In  its  appli- 
cation this  maxim  is  not,  however,  intended  to  take  away  from 
an)-  person  the  right  to  improve  his  own  property  in  a  lawful 
manner,  but  the  law  requires  that  when  he  shall  attempt  to  do 
so  he  must  use  it  with  a  due  regard  for  the  rights  of  other  people 
and  in  every  way,  legally  possible,  he  must  avoid  injury  to  those 
rights.  If  he  goes  beyond,  he  makes  himself  liable  to  respond 
to  his  neighbor  in  damages.41  Again  it  is  a  general  principle  of 
law  that  a  person  is  entitled  to  the  reasonable  exercise  of  a  legal 


38  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  ed. 
1874)  745-751,  *  752  et  seq.  See  as  to 
moral  obligations  and  exceptions  to 
rule,  Anson's  Law  of  Contracts 
(8th  ed.  1805),  89.*  75;  2  Blackstone's 
Comm.  (1  Cooley's  Black.  4th  ed. ) 
*  445;  1  Wait's  Act.  &  Def.  (1877)  104; 
Tucker  v.  Ferguson,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
527.  "  Nor  is  a  mere  moral  obliga- 
tion in  the  ethical  sense  of  the  term, 
without  any  pecuniary  benefit  to  the 
party  or  previous  request,  a  sufficient 
consideration  to  support  even  an  ex- 
press promise;  unless  where  a  legal 
obligation  once  existed,  which  is 
barred  by  positive  statute  or  rule  of 
law,  such  as  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions, or  of  bankruptcy,  or  the  law 
of  infancy,  coverture  or  the  like.  2 
Greenl.  on  Ev.  (10th  ed.)  sec.  107. 
As  to  distinction  between  "moral 
obligation"  in  the  "broad,  ethical 
sense,"  and  when  "  used  merely  to 
denote  those  duties  which  would  be 


enforced  at  law  through  the  medium 
of  an  implied  promise,"  see  note,  id. 
89  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.  1874)  364.  "  The  maxim  that  a 
man  must  so  make  use  of  his  own 
property  as  not  to  injure  his  neigh 
bor  is  undoubtedly  to  be  so  limited 
in  its  application  as  not  to  restrain 
the  owner  of  property  from  a  pru- 
dent and  reasonable  exercise  of  his 
right  of  dominion.  If  in  such  an 
exercise  of  bis  right,  another  sus- 
tains damage,  it  is  damnum  absque 
injuria."  Gardner  v.  Heartt.  2  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  165,  168,  per  Harris.  .1. 

40  Hill  v.  Schneider.  13  App.  Div. 
IN.  Y.)  29!);  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  1;  1  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  141,  per  Ramsey,  .1. 

41  Hill  v.  Schneider.  13  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  299;  42  X.  Y.  Supp.  1:  1  Am. 
Nog.  Rep.  141,  per  Rumsey,  J.,  citing 
Morgan  v.  Bowes,  62  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
623;  17  N.  V.  Sup]..  22;  42  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  791;  Booth  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  T. 

41 


§o7 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    LIABILITY. 


right  and  is  not  answerable  in  damages  therefor  in  the  absence  of 
negligence  or  malice.4''  So  a  man  is  entitled  to  do  any  lawful  act 
upon  his  own  land,  and  to  lawfully  use  the  same  in  the  manner 
most  advantageous  to  himself,  provided  he  violates  no  duty  owing 
to  others  or  to  the  state,  and  that  he  is  not  guilty  of  negligence, 
recklessness  or  wantonness ;  this  includes  the  paramount  right 
of  others  to  the  use  and  undisturbed  possession  of  their  own 
property,  and  by  rights  of  others  is  understood  generally  their 
rights  under  the  law.  So  the  use  of  one's  own,  means  a  reason- 
able and  ordinary  use.  This  principle  further  extends  to  per- 
sons legally  designated  as  such,  and  it  includes  municipal 
corporations,  the  state,  etc.43 


R.  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  267;  55  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
656;  35  N.  E.  592,  which  rev'd  44  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  9;  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  336. 

**  Panton  v.  Holland,  17  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)92;  Calkins  v.  Barger,  44  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  424;  Stuart  v.  Hawley,  22 
Barb.  (N.  Y. )  619;  Livingston  v. 
Adams,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y. )  175. 

43  "It  may  be  stated,  as  a  general 
proposition,  that  every  man  has  the 
right  to  the  natural  use  and  enjoy- 
ment of  his  own  property,  and  if 
whilst  lawfully  in  such  use  and 
enjoyment,  without  negligence  or 
malice  on  his  part,  an  unavoidable 
loss  occurs  to  his  neighbor,  it  is 
damnum  absque  injuria,  for  the 
rightful  use  of  one's  own  land  may 
cause  damage  to  another,  without 
any  legal  wrong."  Pennsylvania 
Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson,  113  Pa.  St. 
126,  146;  6  Atl.  453;  57  Am.  Rep.  445, 
per  Clark,  J.  "  The  maxim  sic  utere 
tuo  ut  alienum  non  laedas  is  not  of 
universal  application;  for  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  a  man  who  exercises  proper 
care  and  skill  may  do  what  he  will 
with  his  own  property.  He  may  not, 
however,  under  color  of  enjoying  his 
own,  set  up  a  nuisance  which  de- 
prives another  of  the  enjoyment  of 
his  property  .  .  .  There  is  another 
class   of    cases  .  .  .  where    a    man 

42 


must  answer  for  the  consequences  of 
an  act  lawful  in  itself,  because  it  was 
done  in  so  negligent  or  unskillful  a 
manner  as  to  cause  an  injury  to  an- 
other ...  But  a  man  may  do  many 
things  under  a  lawful  authority,  or  in 
his  own  land,  which  may  result  in  an 
injury  to  the  property  of  others 
without  being  answerable  for  the 
consequences.  Indeed,  an  act  done 
under  lawful  authority,  if  done  in  a 
proper  manner,  can  never  subject  the 
party  to  an  action,  whatever  conse- 
quences may  follow:  nor  will  a  man 
be  answerable  for  the  consequences 
of  enjoying  his  own  property  in  the 
way  such  property  is  usually  en- 
joyed, unless  an  injury  has  resulted 
to  another  from  the  want  of  proper 
care  or  skill  on  his  part."  Radcliff 
v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y. 
(Comstock)  195,  198-200;  53  Am. 
Dec.  357n,  per  Brouson,  Ch.  J.  See 
also  O'Leary  v.  Brooks  Elevator  Co., 
7  N.  D.  554;  75  N.  W.  919;  41  L.  R. 
A.  677;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  451,  457. 
"  The  defendant  did  a  lawful  act  on 
his  own  premises  and  we  cannot  hold 
him  responsible  for  injurious  conse- 
quences that  may  have  arisen  by 
reason  of  it,  unless  it  was  so  done  as 
to  constitute  actionable  negligence," 
but  an  act  may  be  lawful  but  so  neg- 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    UAUILITY. 


§08 


§  68.  Volenti  non  fit  injuria. — It  is  a  legal  maxim  that  that 
to  which  a  person  as.sen.ts  is  not  esteemed   in  law  an  injury,  for 


ligently  done  that  an  injury  immedi- 
ately follows  to  the  property  or 
person  of  another  and  so  render  him 
liable.  How  hind  v.  Vincent,  lOMetC. 
(  Mass.  j  .",71,  373,  374 ;  4;!  Am.  Dee.  442, 
per  Hubbard,  .1.  In  this  case  the  in- 
jury was  to  a  person  by  falling  into 
an  excavation  made  by  one  on  his 
own  land  near  to  a  public  street. 
Where  the  vibrations  from  the  work- 
ing of  the  engines  of  an  electric  light 
company  rendered  the  plaintiffs 
house  almost  uninhabitable  and  cre- 
ated a  nuisance,  even  though  no 
actual,  structural  injury  was  done, 
the  right  to  an  injunction  and  to 
have  damages  assessed  exists,  al- 
though no  statutory  compensation 
was  provided  for  injuries  of  such 
character,  and  the  company  had  no 
compulsory  power  to  take  lands. 
Hopkin  v.  Hamilton  Elec.  L.  &  C. 
Co.,  2  Ont.  L.  R.  240.  The  plaintiff 
had  bad  no  opportunity  of  objecting 
to  the  location  of  defendant's  works. 
The  company  was  incorporated 
under  Ont.  Cos.  Act,  K.  S.  Ont.  1897, 
ch.  200.  See  generally  as  to  the 
maxim  and  as  to  the  principles 
stated  in  the  text  and  the  modifica- 
tions thereof,  Weil  v.  St.  Louis  S. 
W.  R.  Co.,  04  Ark.  535;  43  S.  W. 
907:  9  Am.  &  Eug.  R  Cas.  N.  S.  721. 
Briscoe  v.  Alfrey,  01  Ark.  190;  32  S. 
W.  505;  30  L.  R.  A.  007;  The  Mal- 
iug;  The  S.  A.  McCaulley  (U.  S.  D. 
C.  D.  CaL),  110  Fed.  227:  10  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  357,  307,  per  Bradford, 
Dist.  J.;  Joseph  v.  Ager,  108  Cal, 
517;  41  Pac.  422;  Suffolk  <;.  M.  A:  M. 
Co.  v.  San  Miguel  Con.  M.  A  M.  Co., 
9  Colo.  App.  407;  48  Pac.  828;  Ocker- 
hausen  v.  Tyson,  71  Conn.  31;  40 
Atl.  104;  Whitney  v.  Bartholomew, 
21  Conn.  213;  Bailey  v.  Philadelphia, 
etc.,    K.   Co.,  4   Hair.  (Del.)  389;  44 


Am.  Dec.  593;  Tampa  Waterworks 
Co.  v.  Cliue,  37  Fla.  586;  20  So.  780; 
33  L.  R.  A.  376;  smith  v.  Clarke 
Hardware  Co.,  100  Ga.  10:;:  28  S.  E. 
73;  39  L.  R.  A.  007;  Arave  v.  Idaho 
Canal  Co.  (Id.),  40  Pac.  L024;  Pepin 
v.  McMahon,  154  111.  141;  :;;•  X.  K. 
184;  27  L.  U.  A.  286,  aff'g  53  111. 
App.  1S9;  Stumps  v.  Kelly,  22  111. 
140;  Durham  v.  Musselman,  2 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  90;  IS  Am.  Dee.  133; 
Humpton  v.  Unterkircher,  97  Iowa, 
509;  00  X.  W.  770;  Herr  v.  Central 
Ky.  L.  Asy.,  17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  320;  30 
S.  W.  '.»71 ;  41  Cent.  L.  J.  37;  28  L.  R. 
A.  394;  Scott  v.  Bay,  3  Md.  431;  Gil- 
dersleeve  v.  Hammond,  100  Mich. 
431 ;  ii7  N.  W.  519;  3  Det.  L.  N.  117; 
43  Cent.  L.  J.  97;  33  L.  R.  A.  46; 
Cabill  v.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324;  10 
Am.  Rep.  1S4;  McCormick  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc.,  R.  Co..  57  Mo.  533;  .Jacob- 
son  v.  Van  Boening,  48  Neb.  80;  66 
X.  W.  993;  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  084:  32 
L.  R.  A.  229;  Union  Mill  A  M.  Co.  v. 
Daughberg  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Nev. ),  81 
Fed.  73;  State  v.  Griffin,  09  X.  H.  1 ; 
39  Atl.  200:  41  L.  R.  A.  177:  Ladd 
v.  Granite  State  Brick  Co.  (N.  H.), 
37  Atl.  1041;  Sterling  Iron  &  Z.  Co. 
v.  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  i  X.  J.),  38  Atl. 
426;  Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
54  X  J.  L.  2:53;  2:1  At!.  810;  Forbell 
v.  New  York,  47  App.  Div.  i  X.  V.  | 
371;  0  X.  V.  Supp.  1005:  aff'd  104 
X.  Y.  522;  58  X.  E.  644:  Smith  v. 
Brooklyn.  IS  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)340; 
Jo  X.  Y.  Supp.  141;  Xewell  v.  Wool- 
folk.  91  Hun  iX.  Y.l.  211:  71  X.  Y. 
Si.  i;.  129;  30  N.  Y.Supp.  327;  Mairs 
v.  Manhattan  Real  Est.  Assoc,  80  V 
Y.  498;  15  J.  &  S.  t  X.  Y.)  31;  Phelps 
v.  Nowlen,  72  \.  Y.  39;  Victory  v. 
Baker,  07  N.  Y.  300;  Bellinger  v. 
New  York  C.  R.  Co.,  23  X.  Y.  42;  Van 
Pelt  v.  McGraw,  4  N.  Y.  110;  Pick- 
43 


§68 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


if  a  man  consents  to  the  act  which  occasions  his  loss,  he  can 
maintain  no  action  for  the  wrong  committed,  and  this  maxim  has 
been  applied  to  the  doctrine  of  contributory  negligence.44  So 
in  a  case  which  has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion,  it 
is  said  that  "  the  maxim,  volenti  non  fit  injuria,  is  applicable 
in  actions  for  negligence,  as  in  other  cases.  The  doctrine  of  the 
assumption  of  risk  is  merely  a  formal  statement  of  this  maxim 
in  its  application  to  concrete  cases."  m  And  where  a  person  went 
upon  the  premises  of  a  railroad  company  to  witness  a  conflagra- 
tion upon  its  grounds,  in  the  face  of  an  obvious  danger  of  ex- 


ard  v.  Collins,  23  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  444; 
Farrand  v.  Marshall,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
400  ;  Gardner  v.  Heartt,  2  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)l(55;  Mark  v.  Hudson  R.  B. 
Co.,  50  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  108,  aff'd 
103  N.  Y.  29;  Norton  v.  North  Caro- 
lina R.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  910;  29  S.  E. 
880;  Staton  v.  Norfolk  &  C.  C.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  278;  16  S.  E.  181;  52 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  686;  Robertson 
v.  Youghiogheny  Riv.  C.  Co.,  172  Pa. 
566;  27  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  67;  33  Atl. 
706;  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  San- 
derson, 113  Pa.  St.  126;  6  Atl.  453; 
Woodring  v.  Forks  Twp.,  28  Pa.  St. 
355;  70  Am.  Dec.  134;  Troth  v.  Wills, 
8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  1;  42  W.  N.  C.  504  ; 
Taylor  v.  Granger,  19  R.  I.  410;  37 
Atl.  13;  Frost  v.  Berkely  Phos.  Co., 
42  S.  C.  402;  20  S.  E.  280;  26  L.  R. 
A.  693;  McLauchlin  v.  Charlotte,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  5  Rich.  (S.  C.)  583;  Cumber- 
land Teleph.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United 
Elec.  R.  Co.,  93  Tenn.  492;  29  S.  W. 
104;  27  L.  R.  A.  236;  10  Am.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  549;  Payne  v.  Western, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  13  Lea  (Tenn.),  507;  49 
Am.  Rep.  666;  Waters-Pierce  Oil 
Co.  v.  State,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  1;  44 
S.  W.  936;  People  v.  Burtlesen,  14 
Utah,  258;  47  Pac.  87;  Willett  v.  St. 
Albans,  69  Vt.  330;  38  Atl.  72;  State 
v.  Harrington,  68  Vt.  622;  35  Atl. 
515;  34  L.  R.  A.  100;  Chatfield  v. 
Wilson,  28  Vt.  49;  South  Royal  ton 
Bk.  v.  Suffolk  Bk.,  27  Vt.  505;  Ka- 

44 


rasek  v.  Peier,  22  Wash.  419;  61  Pac. 
33;  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  June  Mfg.  Co., 
163  U.  S.  169;  41  L.  Ed.  118;  16  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  1002;  75  Off.  Gaz.  1703; 
Montana  Co.  v.  Gehring  ( U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  9th  C),  44  U.  S.  App.  629;  75  Fed. 
384;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Fre- 
mont (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  C.)i  34 
C.  C.  A.  625;  92  Fed.  721,  rev'g  5 
Ohio  L.  R.  140;  West  Cumberland 
Iron,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Kenyon,  11  Ch.  D. 
782,  rev'g  6  Ch.  D.  773;  Rex  v.  Sewer 
Commrs.,8  B.  &  C.  355;  Deane  v. 
Clayton,  7  Taunt.  490,  529;  St.  John 
Young  Men's  C.  A.  v.  Hutchison,  18 
N.  B.  523.  See  also  note,  9  L.  R.  A. 
910;  1  "Cyc."  L.  &  P.  647  et  seq.  and 
note,  id.,  "  Strictures  upon  common 
law  maxim."  See  also  sees,  post, 
herein,   "  Damnun   absque  injuria." 

44  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  ed. 
1874)  267,  citing  Gould  v.  Oliver, 
4  B.  N.  C.  142  (33  E.  C.  L.  R.),  per 
Tindal,  J. ;  Haddon  v.  Ayres,  1  E.  & 
E.  148  ( 102  E.  C.  L.  R. ) ;  Byam  v.  Bul- 
lard,  1  Curt.  (U.  S.)  101,  per  Curtis, 
J.;  Caswell  v.  Worth,  6  E.  &  B.  849 
(85  E.  C.  L.  R.);  Senior  v.  Ward,  1  E. 
&  E.  385,  393  (102  E.  C.  L.  R.). 

45  Davis  v.  Forbes,  171  Mass.  548; 
51  N.  E.  20;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  289, 
298,  per  Knowles,  J.,  in  dissenting 
opinion.  See  32  Am.  L.  Rev.  57. 
See  as  to  assumption  of  risk,  1 
Bailey's  Pers.  Inj.,  Master  &  Ser- 
vant (ed.  1897),  sec.  455  et  seq. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


plosion,  it  was  decided  that  he  assumed  the  risks  of  the  situa- 
tion. "  He  went  without  inducement  or  invitation,  and  without 
legal  right,  and  assumed  the  perils  of  the  situation.  He  vol- 
untarily  and  negligently  exposed  his  person  to  danger, — 'Vo- 
lenti non  fit  injuria/  The  railway  company  owed  him  no  active 
duty  —only  the  duty  to  abstain,  during  his  presence  on  the 
premises,  from  positive,  wrongful  act  which  might  result  in  an 
injury  to  him."  Mi  The  cases,  however,  are  numerous  wherein  this 
maxim  is  involved,  and  as  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  treatise 
to  consider  other  than  general  principles  of  liability  underlying 
the  law  of  damages,  we  shall  only  cite  certain  decisions  wherein 
the  rule  volenti  non  fit  injuria  has  been  applied.17 


«  Cleveland,  C.  C.  *  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ballentine  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  7th  c.  i, 
56  U.  S.  App.  266;  28  C.  C.  A.  572;  84 
Fed.  935;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  735,  739, 
per  Jenkins,  Cir.  J. 

47  Bridges  v.  Tennessee  Coal  I.  & 
R.  Co.,  109  Ala.  287;  19  So.  495; 
Churchill  v.  Baumann,  95  Cal.  541; 
10  Pac.  770;  Higgins  v.  Lansingh, 
154  111.  301;  40  N.  E.  362;  Pope  v. 
Lake  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Ind.  I,  51 
Fed.  769;  40  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
646;  Anderson  Foundry  it  M.  Works 
v.  Meyer,  15  Ind.  App.  385;  44 
N.  E.  193;  Snyder  v.  Lexington, 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1562;  49  S.  W.  765; 
Board  of  Ad  mis.  v.  McKowen,  48 
La.  Ann.  251;  19  So.  328,  553;  Kan- 
sas City,  S.  it  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberts,  9 
La.  Ann.  859;  21  So.  630;  Mundle  v. 
Hill  Mfg.  Co.,  m  Me.  400;  30  Atl. 
16;  O'Maley  v.  South  Boston  (las- 
light  Co.,  158  Mass.  135;  32  N.  E. 
1119;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Le  Blane, 
74  Miss.  626;  21  So.  748;  Coxwell  v. 
Prince  (Miss.),  19  So.  237;  Baker  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  P.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
W.  D.  Mo.),  92  Fed.  117;  Aufdenberg 
v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  132 
Mo.  565;  34  S.  W.  485;  :'.  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  323;  Schwartz- 
schild  *  S.  Co.  v.  Savannah,  F.  &  W. 
R.   Co.,  76  Mo.   App.   623;  1   Mo.    A. 


Repr.  588;  Wright  v.  Wright  I  X.  J.), 
43  Atl.  447;  Knisley  v.  Pratt,  148 
N.  Y.  372;  42  N.  E.  986;  32  L.  K.  A. 
367;  rev'g  75  Hun  (N.  Y.),  32:'.;  ::i 
Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  V.I  289;  58  N.  V.  St. 
R.  213;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1010;  Hagen- 
aers  v.  Herbsi,  30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
546;  52  X.  Y.  Supp.  360;  Rittenhouse 
v.  Wilmington  St.  R.  Co.,  120  X.  C. 
544;  26  X.  E.  922;  Scarlett  v.  Xor- 
wood,  115  X.  C.  284;  20  S.  E.  459; 
Allegheny  Co.  v.  Grier,  179  Pa.  639; 
27  Pitts.  L.  J.  X.  S.  427;  36  Atl.  353; 
Houseman  v.  Grossman,  177  Pa.  453: 
39  W.  X.  C.  276;  35  Atl.  736;  Man- 
ford  v.  McVeigh,  92  Va.  446;  23 
S.  E.  857;  1  Va.  Law  Reg.  734; 
Wagner  v.  Xational  L.  Ins.  Co.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  C),  61  U.  S.  App.  691; 
33  C.  C.  A.  121;  90  Fed.  395;  King- 
man &  Co.  v.  Stoddard  (I'.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  7th  C),  57  U.  S.  Apr.  :',7'.':  20 
C.  C.  A.  413;  85  Fed.  740:  West 
v.  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
8th  C.),56  U.  S.  App.  32:'.:  29  C.  C. 
A.  219;  85  Fed.  392;  Cleveland.  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballentine  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  7th  C. ),  56  U.  S.  App. 
266;  28  C.  C.  A.  572:  M  Fed.  '.<:'>•">: 
Carolan  v.  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  (U.S. 
C.  C.X.  D.  Cal.),  84  Fed. 84; Southern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.   9th  C),  44   U.   S.   A.    1;  16  C.  C. 

45 


§69 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§  69.  Accident  or  casualty. — An  accident  or  casualty  which 
results  from  the  doing  of  a  lawful  act  in  a  lawful  manner  and 
which  could  not  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  human  care  or  fore- 
sight have  been  foreseen  or  prevented,  constitutes  as  a  rule  no 
ground  of  liability,  although  it  has  also  been  determined  that 
there  must  be  an  extraordinary  degree  of  care  to  have  pre- 
vented the  accident.  These  distinctions,  however,  as  to  the  de- 
gree of  care  imposed,  ought  to  depend  upon  the  circumstances, 
having  in  view  the  use  of  the  thing  or  property  and  its  danger- 
ous or  harmless  character.18  Thus  one  may  become  responsible 
for  the  results  of  an  accidental  explosion  where  he  has  knowl- 
edge of  the  dangerous  character  of  the  explosives,  and  by  reason 
thereof  his  acts  are  held  to  be  reckless  and  careless.'9  But  where 
servants  of  the  defendant  opened  a  box  of  nitroglycerine  and 


A.  317;  69  Fed.  559;  New  Orleans 
&  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas  ( U.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  5th  C),  60  Fed.  379;  Williams 
v.  Birmingham.  B.  &  M.  Co.,  68  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  N.  S.  918  (C.  A.  1899),  2  Q.  B. 
338;  Smith  v.  Baker  (H.  of  L.  1891), 
L.  K.  1  App.  Cas.  325;  Thrussell  v. 
Handyside  (Q.  B.  D.  1888),  L.  R.  20 
Q.  B.  D.  359;  Yarmouth  v.  France,  19 
Q.  B.  D.  647  L.  R;  Pritchett  v.  Poole 
(Q.  B.),  76  Law  T.  Rep.  472;  Canada 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurdman,  25  Can.  S.  C. 
205;  Price  v.  Roy,  29  Can.  S.  C.  494, 
rev'g  >n  Part  Rep.  Jud.  Queb.  8  B. 
R.  170. 

48  Where  plaintiff  and  his  helper, 
a  fellow-servant,  were  working  to- 
gether and  the  plaintiff  sustained  a 
personal  injury. which  was  the  result 
of  a  mere  accident,  it  was  held  error 
to  refuse  to  charge  that  for  such  an 
accident  there  could  be  no  recovery. 
Webster  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Nisbett,  87  111. 
App.  551.  Where  an  accident  to  an 
employee  could  not  have  been  fore- 
seen by  the  master,  the  latter  is  not 
liable.  Independent  Tug  Line  v.  Ja- 
cobson,  84  111.  App.  684.  An  injury 
occasioned  by  a  slight  inequality  in 
a  sidewalk,  which  is  not  defective, 
and  which  is  the  result  of  a  simple 

46 


accident,  may  not  be  the  ground  of 
an  action.  Haggerty  v.  City  of  Lew- 
iston  (Me.  1901),  50  Atl.  55;  10  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  394.  Where  bacteria,  ger- 
minated from  animal  matter  in  a  beef 
packing  house,  lodged  in  an  em- 
ployee's eye  and  destroyed  his  sight, 
the  master  was  held  not  liable. 
-Hysell  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  78  Mo.  App. 
39;  2  Mo.  App.  Repr.  124.  But 
the  injury  cannot  be  attributed  to 
inevitable  accident,  as  in  case  of  a 
collision  between  vessels  where  there 
was  nothing  in  the  action  of  the 
elements  which  contributed  to  pro- 
duce the  same.  The  Chicago  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  N.  Y.),  40  C.  C.  A.  680; 
100  Fed.  999,  aff '  d  71  Fed.  537.  If  ac- 
cident  could  not  have  been  foreseen 
by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  human 
care  and  foresight,  no  action  lies. 
Harvey  v.  Dunlop,  Lalor  (N.  Y. ),  193. 
That  an  extraordinary  degree  of  care 
is  required,  see  Vincent  v.  Stein- 
hauer,  7  Vt.  62 ;  29  Am.  Dec.  45.  For 
definition  of  "accident,"  "acci- 
dental" see  3  Joyce  on  Ins.  (ed.  1897) 
sec.  2863,  note.  See  further  sec.  70 
post,  herein. 

49 Evans  v.    Hoggart    (Kan.    App. 
1899),  59  Pac.  381. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§  70 


it  exploded,  injuring  certain  person,  including  the  plaintiffs, 
and  defendant  had  no  knowledge  of  or  reason  to  suspect  the 
dangerous  character  of  the  contents  of  said  box,  it  was  decided 
that  they  were  not  liable  for  the  accident;  "  and  it  was  deter- 
mined in  the  same  case  that  the  measure  of  care  against  acci- 
dents which  one  must  take  to  avoid  responsibility  is  that  which 
a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  and  caution  would  use  if  his  own 
interests  were  to  be  affected  and  the  whole  risk  were  his  own. 
Again,  while  a  person  is  not  generally  liable  for  damages  for  an 
injury,  which  is  the  result  of  an  accident,  yet  if  one  has  threat- 
ened another  with  a  loaded  gun  in  a  controversy  about  a  dis- 
puted boundary  and  injury  results  by  the  discharge  of  the  gun, 
either  by  reason  of  the  careless  handling  and  without  intention 
or  on  purpose,  the  injured  one  would  be  entitled  to  recover  at 
least  compensatory  damages.51 

§  70.  Act  of  God — Inevitable  accident. — It  is  a  constantly 
asserted  maxim  that  the  act  of  God  is  so  treated  in  law  as  to 
affect  no  one  injuriously, — actus  Dei  nemini  facit  injuriam.  The 
act  of  God  signifies  any  inevitable  accident  occurring  without  the 
intervention  of  man.®  Again,  accidents  are  divided  into  those 
which  occur  without  any  human  agency  and  those  which  are  the 
result  thereof.53  This  term  has  been  variously  defined,  but  the 
principal  elements  of  the  definitions  are  that  the  thing  which 
happens  is  inevitable,  and  that  which  man's  foresight,  industry  or 
care  could  not  have  prevented,  something  independent  of  and 


60  The  Nitro  Glycerine  Case,  15 
Wall.  (U.  S.)524. 

51  James  v.  Hayes  (Kan.  1901),  65 
Pac.  241;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  5G,  58. 
"  Where  one  is  engaged  in  a  lawful 
act,  an  act  not  mischievous,  rash, 
reckless  or  foolish,  or  naturally  liable 
to  result  in  injury  to  others,  he  is 
not  responsible  for  damages  due  to 
unavoidable  accident  or  casualty. 
1  "  Cyc."  L.  &  P.  652,  citing  Iiizell  v. 
Booker,  16  Ark.  308;  Morris  v.  Piatt, 
32  Conn.  75;  Durham  v.  Musselman, 
8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  96;  18  Am.  Dec  183; 
Brown  v.  Kendall,  6  Cush.  (Mass.) 
292,    and    other  decisions.     English 


Fa,tal  Accidents  Acts  1846,  1864.  do 
not  apply  for  benefit  of  aliens  abroad. 
Adam  v.  British  *  F.  S.  Co.  (1898), 
2  Q.  B.  430:  67  L.  J.  Q,  B.  N.  S.  844. 
Party  not  liable  for  accident,  etc.,  if 
without  fault  under  La.  Rev.  Civ. 
Code,  art.  2754 :  New  Orleans  A-  N. 
E.  R.  Co.  v.  McEwen,  49  La.  Ann. 
1184;  2  So.  675;  38  L.  R.  A.  134;  7 
Am   A-  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  742. 

M  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.  1874)  229. 

68  3  Joyce  on  Ins.  (ed.  1897) 
sec.  2863,  note,  p.  2811,  where  defini- 
tions of  "  accident  "  are  considered. 

47 


8  70 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


opposed  to  the  act  of  man.  A  distinction  has  also  been  made  be- 
tween "  act  of  God  "  and  inevitable  accident,"'1  and  there  must 
be  no  negligence  or  want  of  skill,  diligence  or  judgment,  for  in 
an  act  of  God  no  amount  of  skill,  judgment  or  wisdom  can  pre- 
vent the  damage  or  injury.55  So  it  is  declared  that  the  injury 
must  not  be  such  as  could  have  been  prevented  by  human  fore- 
sight, care  or  skill,  but  must  have  been  exclusively  occasioned 
by  natural  causes.  Nor  in  case  of  carriers  must  the  property  have 
been  unnecessarily  exposed  to  the  destructive  force,  nor  have  been 
brought  in  contact  therewith  through  any  previous  negligence 
or  act  of  the  carrier,  which  his  foresight  or  industry  and  skill 
could  have  prevented,  as  in  case  of  unnecessary  and  negligent 
delay.30  Thus  a  landslide  in  a  railway  cut,  caused  bw  an  ordi- 
nary fall  of  rain,  is  not  an  "  act  of  God  "  which  exempts  a  rail- 
way company  from  liability  for  injuries  to  passengers  caused 
thereby,57  and  the  sickness  of  a  tenant  is  not  an  "  act  of  God  " 
excusing  his  legal  obligations  under  a  lease.53  Nor  is  a  heavy 
dew  which  delays  a  railway  train  an  "  act  of  God."  59  But  fire 
may  be,60  or  a  sudden  snowstorm,"1  or  storms  of  such  unusual 
violence  as  to  surprise  cautious  and  reasonable  men,02  or  a  sudden 


54  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.  1874)230;  1  "Cyc."  of  L.  &  P.  7584 
where  numerous  cases  are  cited  with 
their  application  to  the  various  sub- 
jects. Anderson's  Diet,  of  L.  (1893) 
23.  See  also  Anson  ou  Contracts 
(8th  ed.),  top.  pp.  339,  340;  Desty's 
Shi  pp.  &  Admr.  (ed.  1879)  sees.  250. 
259;  Elliott  on  Rds.  (ed.  1897) 
sees.  941,  1455-1457,  1481,  1534,  1651, 
1695  ;  Hutchinson  on  Carriers  (2d 
ed. ),  sees.  174-178  et  seq. ;  1  Shearman 
&  Redf.  on  Neg.  (5th  ed. )  sees.  16. 
31);  Thomas  on  Neg.  (ed.  1895)  129- 
134;  notes,  11  L.  R.  A.  615;  30  id.  820; 
notes,  97  Am.  Dec.  408-411;  46  id. 
592.  As  to  act  of  God  or  accident 
being  an  excuse  for  nonpayment  of 
premium  of  insurance,  see  2  Joyce 
on  Ins.  (ed.  1897)  sec.  135. 

55  Smith  v.  North  American  Tr.  Co., 
20  Wash.  580 ;  56  Pac.  372 ;  44  L.  R.  A. 
557;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  738,  740. 

48 


au  Wald  v.  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  It.  Co.,  162  111.  545;  44  N.  E.  888; 
43  Cent.  L.  J.  423;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  70;  35  L.  R.  A.  356. 

57  Gleeson  v.  Virginia  Midland  R. 
Co.,  140  U.  S.  435.  See  Southwestern 
Tel.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  50  Fed. 
813. 

58  Mason  v.  Wierengo,  113  Mich. 
151;  71  N.  W.  489;  4  Det.  L.  N.  250. 

59  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Truskett  (Ind.  T.  1899),  53  S.  W. 
444. 

60  Farley  v.  Lavary  (Ky.  1900),  54 
S.  W.  840.  But  see  Spencer  v.  Mur- 
phy, 6  111.  App.  453;  41  Pac.  841. 

61  Cunningham  v.  Wabash  R.  Co., 
79  Mo.  App.  524;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep. 
465. 

62  Lisoubee  v.  Monroe  Irrig.  Co., 
18  Utah,  343;  54  Pac.  1009.  But  see 
Grant  v.  Armour  (C.  P.),  25  Ont.  7. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


5  71 


and  severe  whirlwind,  the  like  of  which  had  never  before  oc- 
curred in  that  locality.63  Again  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to 
escape  liability  for  nonperformance  occasioned  by  an  act  of  God, 
to  provide  against  such  a  contingency,"  and  if  a  contract  pro- 
vides for  its  fulfillment,  "wind,  tide  and  other  acts  of  God  per- 
mitting," nevertheless,  if  such  act  of  God  does  not  prevent  the 
execution  of  such  contract  by  other  reasonable  and  available 
means,  performance  is  not  excused  thereby.1'"' 

§  71.  Damnum  absque  injuria— Generally. — This  doctrine 
is  extensive  in  its  application.  It  lies  in  reality  at  the  basis  of 
liability  to  the  extent  that  damage  without  an  injury  precludes 
liability  ;  no  right  has  been  invaded  in  law  and  there  is  no  rem- 
edy, and  thus,  even  though  a  loss  or  damage  has  actually  been 
sustained  for  the  act  occasioning  the  same,  is  neither  unjust  nor 
illegal.88  Thus  the  maxim  applies  to  the  use  of  streets  by  two 
electric  companies,  since  the  one  necessarily  inflicts  some  inci- 
dental damage  upon  the  other,67  and  where  there  is  a  diversion  of 
business  by  the  laying  of  tracks  of  a  rival  company  in  the  street, 
the  maxim  is  applicable.68     It  has  also  been  applied  to  the  case 


«3  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Comp- 
ton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38  S.  W.  220. 
See  as  to  Hood,  Smith  v.  Western  R. 
Co.  of  Ala.,  91  Ala.  455;  11  L.  R.  A. 
619;  Winters  v.  State  (Id.),  47  Pac. 
855;  Wald  v.  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.,  162  111.  545;  44  N.  E. 
888;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  423;  5  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  70;  35  L.  R.  A.  356;  Il- 
linois C.  R.  Co.  v.  Heisner,  45  111. 
App.  143;  Long  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co..  147  Pa.  343;  14  L.  R.  A.  341; 
Satterlee  v.  United  States,  30  Ct.  CI. 
31.  As  to  rights  of  riparian  pro- 
prietor where  water  course  diverted 
by  act  of  God,  sec  Wholey  v.  Cald- 
well, 108  Cal.  95;  41  Pac.31;  49  Am. 
St.  Rep.  64;  30  L.  R.  A.   820. 

64  So  held  in  Gleason  v.  United 
States,  33  Ct.  CI.  65.  See  Allen  v. 
Quann,  SO  111.  App.  547.  But  ex- 
amine Mississippi  Logging  Co.  v. 
Robson  (U.  S.  C.    C.  A.    8th   C),  16 


C.  C.  A.  400;  32  U.  S.  A.  520;  69  Fed. 
773. 

65  Adams  v.  Ames,  19  Wash.  125; 
53  Pac.  54(5.  See  Mississippi  Logging 
Co.  v.  Robson  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th 
C),  16  C.  C.  A.  400;  32  U.  S.  App. 
520;  69  Fed.  773. 

66 See  Kennet  &  A.  X.  Co.  v.  With- 
erington,  18  Q.  B.  531;  Backhouse  v. 
Bononie,  9  II.  L.  Cas.  503;  Rogers  v. 
Dutt,  13  Moore  P.  C.  C.  209.  237,  241 ; 
Blaymire  v.  Ilealey,  6  Mees.  &  W.  55. 
See  sec.  76,  herein. 

f'7  Birmingham  Tract.  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Bell  Teleph.  &  Teleg.  Co..  119 
Ala.  114;  24  So.  731.  See  Consolidated 
Tract.  Co.  v.  South  Orange  &  M. 
Tract.  Co.,  36  N".  J.  Eq.  569;  40  Atl. 
15,  cited  in  Joyce  on  Electric  Law 
(ed.  1900),  sec.  405,  and  see  id.  sees. 
295-321. 

68 Grand  Ave.  K.  Co.  v.  Citizens  R. 
Co.,  148  Mo.  665;  50  S.  W.  305. 

49 


8  71  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 

of  a  grade  crossing  of  a  railroad  and  electric  road  ; m  to  conse- 
quential damages  caused  to  one  tract  of  land  by  taking  another 
for  public  purposes ; TO  to  the  building  of  railroad  bridges  over 
streets  and  liability  to  the  fee-owner;71  to  electric  street  rail- 
roads and  telephone  companies  and  injury  to  business  of  the  one 
by  electric  currents ; 7i  to  riparian  owners'  rights ; ra  to  the  ob- 
struction of  a  public  street  by  an  elevated  railway  structure  ; T4 
to  lateral  support ; *  and  in  numerous  other  cases.76 


69  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeport  Tract.  Co.,  65  Conn.  416; 
32  Atl.  953;  29  L.  R.  A.  367,  cited  in 
Joyce  on  Electric  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sees.  348,  409,  414,  as  to  the  rights 
of  the  different  parties  in  such  case. 

™Kuhl  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
101  Wis.  42;  77  N.  W.  15:,. 

"i  Jones  v.  Erie  &  W.  V.  R.  Co., 
151  Pa.  St.  30;  25  Atl.  134;  31  W.  N. 
C.  1;  17  L.  R.  A.  758:  31  Am.  St. 
Rep.  722;  46  Alb.  L.  J.  467;  6  Am.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  563. 

72  Hudson  R.  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Water- 
vliet  T.  &  R.  Co.,  61  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
140;  21  C.  P.  204;  39  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 
952;  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  752;  10  Ry.*& 
Corp.  L.  J.  364,  case  rev'd  135  N.  Y. 
393;  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  417;  32  N.  E. 
148.  See  citations  of  this  case  in 
Joyce  on  Elect.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
where  it  is  considered  fully. 

73  Mesnager  v.  Englehardt,  108  Cal. 
68;  41  Pac.  20. 

7*  Lake  St.  El.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brooks, 
90  111.  App.  173. 

75Gildersleeve  v.  Hammond,  109 
Mich.  431;  67 N.  W.  519;  3 Del.  L.N. 
117;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  97;  33  L.  R.  A. 
46. 

76 Graham  v.  Reno  (Colo.  App.), 
38  Pac.  835,  a  case  of  invalid  levy  of 
attachment.  Selden  v.  Jacksonville, 
28  Fla.  558;  10  So.  457;  14  L.  R.  A.  370, 
eminent  domain;  change  of  grade  of 
street  and  right  of  ingress,  egress  of 
abutting  owner.  Albany  v.  Sikes,  94 
Ga.  30;  26  L.  R.  A.  653,  maxim  ap- 
50 


plicable  to  property  damaged  by  pros- 
ecution of  public  work  before  adop- 
tion of  present  constitution  of  state. 
Burrows  v.  Sycamore,  150  111.  588;  37 
N.  E.  1096;  25  L.  R.  A.  535,  rev'g 
49  111.  App.  590,  erection  of  stand- 
pipe  in  city  street.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Durke,  148  111.  226; 
35  N.  E.  750;  57  Am.  &.Eng.  R.  Cas. 
577;  Barnard  v.  Shirley,  151  Ind. 
160;  47  N.  E.  671;  41  L.  R.  A.  737,  a 
case  of  sinking  an  artisian  well  on 
one's  own  land  and  flowing  into 
another  stream  on  other  land. 
Hirth  v.  Indianapolis,  18  Ind.  App. 
673;  48  N.  E.  876,  change  of  street 
grade,  Kinney  v.  Kinney,*  104  Iowa, 
703;  74  N.  W.  688;  40  L.  R.  A.  626, 
not  liable  for  natural  growth  of 
partition  hedge.  Clemens  v.  Speed, 
93  Ky.  284;  19  S.  W.  660;  19  L.  R.  A. 
240,  a  case  of  party  walls  and  injury 
to  building;  no  recovery.  Kinnard 
v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
692;  12  S.  W.  937;  7  L.  R.  A.  451; 
41  Alb.  L.  J.  227;  30  Cent.  L.  J. 
267,  springs  of  water  were  injured 
by  percolating  oil  and  recovery  had. 
Graham  v.  St.  Charles  St.  R.  Co.,  47 
La.  Ann.  214;  16  So.  806;  27  L.  B.  A. 
416,  injury  to  plaintiff's  business  by 
influencing  others  to  cease  relations. 
Shaufelter  v.  Baltimore,  80  Md.  483; 
31  Atl.  439;  27  L.  R.  A.  648,  delay 
or  failivre  to  purchase  or  condemn 
land  for  courthouse  site  gives  no 
right  of  action.  Lincoln  v.  Com., 
164  Mass.  368;   41    N.   E.  489,  land 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§72 


§  72.  Same  subject — Application  of  doctrine  continued.— 

Damage  done  to  a  neighbor's  house  by  the  jarring  of  the  ground 
or  concussion  of  the  air,  due  to  blasting  carefully  done  upon 
adjoining  premises,  is  a  case  of  damnum  absque  injuria,71  and 
if,  in  the  legitimate  and  proper  use  of  a  machine  or  appliance 
which  is  a  necessary  means  to  a  lawful  end,  or  the  performance 
of  a  duty  imposed  by  law,  such  as  a  steam  roller  to  keep  streets 
in  repair,  an  injury  is  occasioned  to  one  of  the  public,  and  there 
is  reasonable  notice  to  the  public  of  such  use,  such  injury  is 
damnum  absque   injuria."     So  a  technical  breach  of  trust  may 


taken  for  sewer.  Beck  v.  Railway 
T.  P.  U.,  118  Mich.  -107;  77  X.  W.  13; 

5  Det.  L.  X.  599;  42  L.  R.  A.  407, 
may  interfere  with  employer's  busi- 
ness by  peaceable  means  without 
coercion  but  may  not  boycott.  Davis 
v.  Shaefer  (TJ.  S.  C.  C.  W.  U.  Mo. ), 
50  Fed.  764;  Jacobson  v.  Van  Boen- 
ing,  48  Neb.  80;  (It;  X.  W.  993;  32  L. 
I;.  A.  229,  a  case  of  surface  waters. 
Andrews  v.  Bay  Creek  R.  Co.,  00  X. 
J.  L.  010;  36  Atl.  826,  expenses  of 
litigation  incident  to  condemnation 
proceedings  not  recoverable.  New 
York  Health  Dept.  v.  Trinity  Church, 
14.",  X.  Y.  32;  64  X.  V.  St.  R.  507,  512; 
39  X.  E.  833;  27  L.  K.  A.  710,  police 
regulations  regulating  improvement 
or  use  of  property  for  public  health 
and    benelit.     Taylor   v.   Xew   York 

6  H.  R.  Co.,  27  App.  Div.  (X.  ST.) 
190;  50  X.  Y.  Supp.  697,  a  case  of 
eminent  domain,  railroads  and  use 
of  street.  Reining  v.  New  York,  L. 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157;  40  X.  V. 
St.  R.  392.  401;  28  N.  E.  640;  14  L. 
R.  A.  133;  10  Hy.  &  Corp.  L.  .1.  462 
(40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  401.  affirms  27  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  69;  7  X.  Y.  Supp.  516);  a 
case  of  railroads  and  change  of 
grade  and  appropriation  of  street. 
Smawley  v.  Rutherford  Co.,  122  X. 
C.  607;  29  S.  E.  904,  constitutional 
law;  minorities  must  submit  to  a 
majority,  and  there  is  no  wrong 
done.     Columbus  &  H.  C.  &  1.  Co. 


v.  Tucker,  48  Ohio  St.  41;  26  N.  E. 
630;  25  Ohio  L.  J.  105;  12  I..  R.  A. 
:.77;  43  Alb.  L.  J.  289,  a  case  of  pol- 
lution of  water  and  riparian  i 
Henderson  v.  Phila.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  1  14 
Pa.  St.  461;  28W.  X.  C.  479;  22  Ail. 
851;  44  Alb.  L.  J.  47!);  4S  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  16,  setting  tires  by 
sparks  from  locomotive  engine, 
Paris  Mountain  \V.  Co.  v.  Green 
ville,  53  S.  C.  82;  30  S.  E.  699,  alter- 
ation of  streets:  statutory  remedy  is 
nol  within  maxim.  Chattanooga  v. 
Xeely,  97  Tenn.  527;  37  S.  W.  281, 
alteration  of  streets.  Wootters  v. 
Crockett,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  474;  33 
S.  W.  391,  alteration  of  highways. 
Raycroft  v.  Tayntor,  68  Vt.  219;  35 
AH.  53;  33  1>.  R.  A.  225;  4:1  Cent.  I.. 
.(.  222,  no  liability  for  causing  ser- 
vant's discharge.  Hume  Bldg.  & 
C.  Co.  v.  Roanoke.  91  Ya.  52;  20  S. 
E.  895;  27  L.  R.  A.  551.  change  .>f 
street  grade;  no  damage  to  abutters. 
See  further  Meyer  v.  Richmond.  172 
I".  S.  582;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  106;  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  <',,.  v.  Nebraska, 
170  U.  S.  57;  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  513; 
42  L.  Ed.  948. 

77  Hennerv.  Atlantic  Dredging  Co.. 
134  V  V.  156;  45  X.  V.  St.  R.  774: 
31  X.  E.  328;  and  see  note.  10  Am. 
Neg.  Kep.  94  et  seq.  as  to  blasting, 
etc.     See  sec.  67.  ante,  herein. 

7*  District  of  Columbia  v.  Monlton 
(U.   S.    Supr.  Ct.    1901  i.   21    Sup.   Ct. 

51 


§72 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


come  within  the  doctrine,79  and  it  includes  injuries  resulting 
from  the  frightening  of  horses  by  the  sight  of  moving  cars, 
trains  or  locomotives,  or  the  usual  noises  and  incidents  of  their 
ordinary  operation.*  So  acts  lawful  in  themselves,  even 
though  done  with  malicious  motives,  are  covered,81  and  what 
the  law  authorizes  to  be  done  cannot  be  considered  either  illegal 
or  wrongful.  So  damage  or  loss  resulting  from  the  making 
with  proper  care  and  prudence  of  a  public  improvement  pur- 
suant to  law  is  damnum  absque  injuria.  But  contractors  for 
such  an  improvement  to  avoid  liability  for  resultant  damage  must, 
as  far  as  practicable,  employ  reasonably  safe  means  and  methods. 
The  doctrine  of  damnum  absque  injuria  is  wholly  inapplicable 
where  loss  results  to  third  persons  from  the  negligent  employ- 
ment of  unsafe  methods  unnecessary  to  the  conduct  of  the  work.^ 
Again  one  may,  where  he  uses  the  legal  care  required,  lawfully 
sink  the  foundation  of  his  house  helow  that  of  adjacent  owners,** 
and  he  may  in  certain  cases  obstruct  his  neighbor's  lights  or 
prospect,84  or  exercise  his  lawful  rights  under  legislative  au- 
thority.85 So  the  value  of  property  in  a  building  lost  through  its 
destruction  to  prevent  the  spreading  of  a  conflagration  could 
not  be  recovered  at  the  common  law  in  an  action  against  the  city, 
since  the  only  remedy  was  by  an  assessment  under  the  statute.'* 

840;  10  Am.  Neg.  Kep.  220.  222. 
rev'g  15  App.  D.  C.  363,  per  Mr.  Jus- 
tice White,  citing  Lane  v.  Lewiston. 
91  Me.  292,  294;  39  Atl.  999;  Morton 
v.  Frankfort.  55  Me.  46;  Cairncross 
v.  Pewaukee,  78  Wis.  66;  47  N.  W. 
13,  commenting  upon  and  explaining 
Hughes  v.  Fond  du  Lac.  73  Wis.  380; 
41  N.  W.  407. 

w  Atkins  v.  Gamble,  42  Cal.  86;  10 
Am.  Rep.  282. 

so  Dewey  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.,  99  Wis.  455;  75  N.  W.  74;  11 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  275;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  92. 

81Glendon  Iron  Co.  v.  Uhler,  75 
Pa.  St.  467. 

82  The  Maling;  The  S.  A.  Mc- 
Caulley  (U.  S.  D.  C.  Del.),  110  Fed. 
227;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  357,  367,  per 
Bradford,      Dist.     J.,     collision     of 


steamer   with   dredge  employed   by 
United  States  government. 

83  Panton  v.  Holland,  17  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  92.  See  also  Stansell  v. 
Jollard,  Selw.  N.  P.  435;  Brown  v. 
Robins,  4  H.  &  N.  186. 

84  Re  Penny,  7  E.  &  B.  660,  671. 

8a  Morris,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Newark, 
10  N.  J.  Eq.  352.  See  sec.  67,  ante, 
herein. 

86  Russell  v.  New  York,  2  Denio 
(N.  Y. ),  461.  See  also  Struve  v. 
Droge,  62  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y. )  233;  10 
Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  142;  People  v. 
Buffalo,  76  N.  Y.  558.  But  see  New 
York  v.  Stone,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  139; 
New  York  v.  Lloyd,  17  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)285;  18  id.  126.  As  to  tires 
set  by  a  railway  locomotive  without 
negligence,  being  no  ground  of  ac- 
tion, see  Gaudy  v.  Railroad.  30  Iowa, 


52 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


';; 


Again  in  admiralty,  where  parties  Litigate  and  there  is  probable 
ground  for  the  suit  or  defense,  and  the  proceedings  are  in  the 
ordinary  course  to  vindicate  a  supposed  legal  title,  and  there  is 
no  pretense  to  say  that  the  suit  was  conducted  in  a  malicious 
or  oppressive  manner,  the  court  considers  the  only  compensation 
to  which  the  party  is  entitled  is  costs  and  expenses,  and  if  he 
has  suffered  any  loss  beyond  that  it  is  damnum  absque  injuria. s~ 
Another  instance  is  that  of  opening  a  street  by  reason  of  which 
the  landowner  may  sustain  a  heavy  loss  for  which  no  compen- 
sation in  the  law  may  be  had  within  the  doctrine  here  being  dis- 
cussed.88 But  damnum  absque  injuria  does  not  apply  to  the 
contract  of  sale/'  Nor  in  connection  with  the  use  by  the 
owner  of  his  land  is  it  applicable  to  the  damming  of  the  waters  of 
a  stream  so  as  to  set  them  back  upon  the  lands  of  another  and 
so  overflowing  them.30  But  one  has  the  right  to  offer  property 
for  sale  and  to  fix  the  price  therefor,  since  it  is  an  incident  to 
ownership,  and  it  cannot  be  construed  into  an  actionable  wrong 
by  an  averment  that  such  offer  was  made  with  the  intention  of 
depreciating  the  market  value  of  another's  property,  and  if  a 
loss  is  suffered  by  a  third  person  by  such  Lawful  exercise  of  said 
right,  it  constitutes  damnum  absque  injuria."' 

§  73.  I)e  minimis  non  curat  lex. — This  maxim  relates  to 
matters  of  such  trifling  importance  that  no  action  Lies  therefor.® 
It  applies  where  no  permanent  right  is  involved  and  the  action 
would  only  entitle  plaintiff  to  recover  nominal  damages  with- 
out costs;113  to  slight  imperfections  in  the  performance  of  a  con- 
tract;91 to  a  reservation  of  a  small  excess  of  interest  above  the 


420,     and    cases    considered    under 
this  section,  post,  herein. 

87  Canter  v.  American  Ins.  Co..  :'. 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  307. 

88  Radcliff  v.  Mayor.  4  Comst. 
(4  N.  Y.)  195,  20:),  206,  and  numerous 
citations  of  this  case  in  Silvernail's 
New  York  citations. 

89  Irwin  v.  Askew,  74  Ga.  581. 

90  Poloney  v.  Farrow,  91  Bun 
(N.  Y.),  82;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  100;  36 
N.  Y.  Supp.  164.  See  4  Thompson 
on  Corp.  sec.  5432;  Kentucky  Lum- 


ber Co.  v.  Miracle.  101  Ky.  364;  19 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  508;  41  S.  W.  25;  Mon- 
roe v.  Connecticut  River  L.  Co. 
(N.  II.  |.  39  Atl.  1019.  See  sec.  76, 
herein. 

91  Passaic  Print  Works  v.  Ely  & 
Walker  D.  G.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  \. 
Mo.),  44  C.  C.  A.  426;  10:,  Fed.    163. 

M  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.)*  143.    See  sec.  76.  herein. 

'"  Kcnvoii  v.  Western  l"n.  Teleg. 
Co..  100  Cal.  4.j4  ;  35  Pac.  7.'.. 

94  Franklin    v.    Sohultz,    23    Mont. 

53 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


regular  rate;95  to  an  unimportant  irregularity  in  posting  notice 
of  a  foreclosure  sale;96  to  an  appeal  where  the  damages  are 
slight;  and  a  common  illustration  is  the  right  of  riparian 
owners  to  the  use  of  waters  of  a  stream,  for  a  right  of  action 
does  not  necessarily  arise  to  the  proprietor,  below  or  above, 
where  there  has  been  a  reasonable  use  thereof  by  the  other 
owners,  and  the  water  has  not  thereby  been  rendered  useless,  or 
materially  affected  in  its  flow,  or  otherwise.95  But  even  though 
the  damage  is  small  to  the  right  of  a  mill-owner  by  the  acts  of 
another  on  the  same  stream,  it  is  decided  that  an  action  will 
lie  ;  *  and  although  damage  done  to  personal  property  is  slight, 
yet,  if  it  is  capable  of  estimation,  there  can  be  a  recovery.™  Nor 
does  the  maxim  apply  to  the  positive  and  wrongful  invasion  of 
another's  property,  even  though  the  actual  injury  is  not  great.1 


165  ;  57  Pac.  1037  ;  Van  Clief  v.  Van 
Vechten,  130  N.  Y.  571  ;  42  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  736  ;  29  N.  E.  1017. 

95  Slaughter  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.,  109 
Ala.  157  ;  19  So.  430. 

96  Farnsworth  v.  Hoover,  66  Ark. 
367  ;  50  S.  W.  865. 

y7  Chicago,  W.  &  V.  Coal  Co.  v. 
Streator,  172  111.  435  ;  50  N.  E.  167  ; 
Sloggy  v.  Crescent  Creamery  Co.,  72 
Minn.  516  ;  75  N.  W.  225.  See  2 
"Cyc.  "  L.  &  P.  p.  542. 

98  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Newton,  57 
N.  J.  Eq.  367  ;  41  Atl.  385  ;  Blanch- 
ard  v.  Baker,  8  Greenlf.  (Me.)  253, 
266.  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.)*  144,  145;  Weeks'  Damnum  Abs- 
que Injuria  (ed.  1879),  sec.  11.  See 
sec.  76,  herein. 

99  Thompson  v.  Crocker,  9  Pick. 
|  Mass.)  59.     See  sec.  76,  herein. 

ioo  Fullam  v.  Stearns,  30  Vt.  443. 

1  Waitman  v.  Swindell.  54  N.  J. 
L.  (25  Vr.)  589;  25  Atl.  356;  18  L. 
R.  A.  44.  See  further  as  to  the  ap- 
plication of  the  maxim,  Kullman 
v.  Greenebaum,  92  Cal.  40:)  ;  28 
Pac.  674,  a  case  of  conversion  of 
stock,  and  that  small  item  of  in- 
terest was  not  paid  or  tendered,  held 
of    no    importance.      Stevenson    v. 

5-4 


Lord,  15  Colo.  131  ;  25  Pac.  313, 
replevin,  slight  difference  in  value 
of  property  as  found  by  jury  and 
amount  of  note  of  no  importance. 
Manheim  v.  Carlton  College,  68 
Minn.  531  ;  71  N.  W.  705,  amount  of 
mortgage  tendered  in  full  except 
small  sum  and  new  trial  refused. 
Re  Oneida  Street,  37  App:  Div.  266; 
55  N.  T.  Supp.  959,  rev'g  22  Misc. 
235;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  828,  proceedings 
to  open  streets;  notices  which  are 
not  legally  defective  as  to  substan- 
tial matters  are  sufficient.  Athens 
v.  Carmer,  169  Pa.  St.  426;  32  Atl. 
422,  a  case  of  public  improvements 
and  sidewalk.  Carpenter  v.  Frank- 
lin, 89  Tenn.  142;  14  S.  W.  484,  con- 
veyance by  husband  to  wife,  entire 
purchase  money  paid  by  wife  ex- 
cept trifling  amount.  Examine  also 
as  to  the  maxim,  Sharp  v.  Hull, 
81  111.  App.  400;  Hilgendorf  v.  Os- 
trom,  46  111.  App.  465;  Kent  v.  Kent, 
1  Mo.  App.  Repr.  124;  Hilson  v. 
Foster  (U.  S.  C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.), 
80  Fed.  896;  The  France  (U.  S.  D.  C. 
D.  N.  Y.),  50  Fed.  125;  York  v. 
Stiles,  21  R.  I.  225;  Adler  v.  Cloud, 
42  S.  C.  272:  22  S.  E.  393;  Kennedy  v. 
Gramling,  33  S.  C.  367;  US.  E.  1081; 


(JKNKIIAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


§74 


§  74.  Injuria  sine  damno. — An  injury  to  a  right  is  action- 
able even  though  the  damage  is  inappreciable,  for  an  invasion 
of  a  right  may  import  damage  although  pecuniary  loss  results 
therefrom.  This  is  well  settled,  especially  where  the  doing  of 
the  wrongful  act  may  by  time  become  an  enforceable  claim  ; 
or  where  the  act  is  a  continuing  tortious  one,  which  may  by  its 
doing  ripen  into  a  right,2  as  where  grass  is  cut  and  appropriated 
under  a  claim  of  right.3  But  the  rule  docs  not  extend  to  a 
merely  theoretical  injury,1  although  it  is  sufficient  if  only  prac- 
tical inconvenience  is  suffered  ; 5  for  it  is  only  necessary  to  show 
a  violation  of  a  right  to  sustain  an  action,  since  actual,  percep- 
tible damage  is  not  necessary  therefor,  the  presumption  being 
that  some  damage  has  accrued.0  These  principles  apply  to  the 
unauthorized  use  of  another's  land  over  which  he  has  aright  of 
way.7  So  if  a  water  course  is  unlawfully  diverted,  there  is  a 
right  to  recover  without  proof  of  actual  damage."  But  the  mere 
backing  up  of  water  in  a  channel  does  not  constitute  a  legal  in- 
jury where  there  is  no  appreciable  damage.9  The  rule  applies, 
however,  to  acts  which  might  in  the  future   be  favorable  evi- 


Wilson  v.  Vick  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51 
S.  W.  45,  rev'd  53  S.  W.  570;  Bragg 
v.  Laraway,  65  Vt.  073;  27  Atl.  492; 
Ramsburg  v.  Kline,  96  Va.  465;  31 
S.  E.  608;  4  Va.  L.  Reg.  584;  South- 
west Va.  M.  L.  Co.  v.  Chase,  95  Va. 
50:  27  S.  E.  826;  Lovett  v.  Thomas, 
81  Va.  24.-) ;  Randal]  v.  Dailey,  60 
Wis.  288;  Middleton  v.  Jerdee,  73 
Wis.  39;  40  N.  W.  629;  .Maish  v. 
Arizona,  10  1  O.  S.599;  11  L.  Ed.  567; 
17  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  L93;  Frisbie  v.  Uni- 
fcedStates,  157  U.S.  L60;  39  L.  Ed.  657; 
15  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  586;  Park  Bros.  & 
Co.  v.  Bushnell  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.2dC), 
00  Fed.  583;  .Mark ay  v.  McGuire 
(1891),  1  Q.  B.  250. 

2  Cole  v.  Drew,  44  Vt.  49,  53;  Dela- 
ware &  Hudson  C.  Co.  v.  Torrey, 
33  Pa.  St.  14:;,  14!),  citing  and  consid- 
ering Mellor  v.  Spateman,  1  Wms. 
Saunders,  346,  note  by  Mr.  Sergeant 
Williams;  Young  v.  Spencer,  10  B.  & 


C.  145,  per  Lord  Tenderden ;  Blanch- 
aid  v.  Baker,  8  Greenlf.  (Me.)  253; 
Angell  on  Water  Courses,  sec.  135, 
note  4,  sec.  428  et  seq.  See  sec.  76, 
herein. 

8  Cole  v.  Drew,  44  Vt.  49,  53. 

1  Dormanv.  Ames,  Gil.  (Minn.)  347. 
See  Ilutchins  v.  Hutchins,  7  Hill 
I  V.  ST.),  104;  Minter  v.  Swain,  52 
Miss.  174;  Hutchinson  v.  Snider,  137 
Pa.  st.  l;  20  Atl.  510;  26  W.  N.  C. 
531. 

■"'Delaware  &  Hudson  C.  Co.  v. 
Torrey,  33  Pa.  St.  1  13,  1  19,  150. 

»  Webb  v.  Portland  Mfg.  Co.,  3 
Sumn.  (U.  S. )  1S9;  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
17,322. 

7  Appleton  v.  Fullerton,  1  Gray 
(  Mass.),  18G. 

*  Blanchard  v.  Maker,  8  Greenlf. 
(Me.)  256.     See  sec.  70,  herein. 

•  Chalk  v.  M.-Alily,  11  Rich.  L. 
(S.  C.)  153.     See  sec.  76.  herein. 

55 


§  74 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    LIABILITY. 


dence  for  the  wrongdoer,10  or  to  the  violation  of  right  in  using 
wrongfully  another's  property."  So  the  unlawful  detention  of 
a  deed  may  give  a  right  of  action.12  And  where  there  is  a  wrong, 
it  is  said  that  it  is  no  answer  to  say  that  it  will  inflict  no  injury 
upon  the  plaintiff,  or  that  it  will  even  be  beneficial  to  him,  and 
equity  will  give  the  remedy  to  prevent  its  being  referred  to  in- 
juria absque  damno  or  some  other  maxim  which  may  defeat  a 
recovery  at  law.13  But  it  is  decided  that  it  is  of  the  very  es- 
sence of  an  action  of  fraud  or  deceit  that  the  same  should  be 
accompanied  by  damage  and  that  neither  damnum  absque  in- 
juria nor  injuria  absque  damnum  by  themselves  establish  a  good 
cause  of  action.14  It  is  also  declared  that  the  principle  that  for 
every  wrong  there  is  a  remedy  is  not  of  universal  prevalence, 
but  is  qualified  by  those  other  maxims,  De  minimis  non  curat 
lex  and  Injuria  sine  damno.15 


10  Seniles  v.  Cronk,  38  How.  Pr. 
( N.  Y. )  320. 

11  Dudley  v.  Tilton,  14  La.  Ann. 
283. 

12  McCown  v.  Wheeler,  20  Tex.  372. 

13  So  held  in  United  States  Trust 
Co.  v.  O'Brien,  46  N.  Y.  SiS  Rep. 
238;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  708,  a  case  of 
injunction  to  prevent  interference 
with  eovenant  rights.  That  the  text 
statement  is  somewhat  too  broad 
except  in  its  application  to  the  par- 
ticular case,  see    Purdy  v.  Manhat- 

56 


tan  El.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  St.  R.  43;  13 
N.  Y.  Supp.  265;  Birmingham  Tract. 
Co.  v.  Southern  Bell  Teleph.  & 
Teleg.  Co.,  119  Ala.  144;  24  So.  731, 
734,  per  Haralson,  J. 

14  Deobold  v.  Oppermann,  111  N. 
Y.  531;  20  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  81,  89;  19 
N.  E.  94;  2  L.  R.  A.  644;  7  Am.  St. 
Rep.  760,  affg  4  N.  Y.  St.  R.  512;  26 
Wkly.  D.  157. 

15  Purdy  v.  Manhattan  El.  R.  Co., 
36  N.  Y.  St.  R.  43;  13  N.  Y.  Supp. 
265. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    UF    DAMAGES. 


§  75 


CHAPTER  IV. 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  DAMAGES. 


75.  Certainty  as  a  requisite. 

76.  Nominal  damages — Generally. 

77.  Nominal  damages — Breach  of 

contract. 

78.  Nominal  damages  only,  unless 

substantial  damage  proved. 

79.  Nominal  damages — New  trial 

and  reversal. 

80.  General  damages. 

81.  Special  damages. 

82.  Direct  damages. 

83.  Consequential  damages. 

84.  Proximate  cause. 

85.  Proximate  cause  continued. 

86.  Proximate  cause  for  jury. 

87.  Natural  and  proximate  result 

of  act  complained  of. 

88.  Proximate  consequences  illus- 

trated. 

89.  Natural  and   probable  conse- 

quences— Those  in  contem- 
plation of  parties  —  Con- 
tracts. 

90.  Natural   and  probable  conse- 

quences— Torts. 

91.  Remote,  contingent  and  spec- 

ulative damages. 

92.  Application    of     rule     as    to 

remote  or  speculative  dam- 
ages. 


93.  Same  subject  continued. 

94.  Actual,      compensatory     and 

subtantial  damages. 

95.  Double,    triple    or    treble,  tir 

other  increased  damages. 

96.  Same  subject — How  fixed. 

97.  Liquidated       damages— Pen- 

alty. 
'.is.   Unliquidated  damages. 
99.  Continuing  damage  and  dam 

ages — Entirety  of  damages. 

100.  Excessive     or      unreasonable 

damages. 

101.  Same  subject  continued. 

102.  Voluntarily  remitting  excess 

—  Remittitur  by  court. 

103.  Where  excess  is  small. 

104.  Kvidence  as  a  factor. 

105.  Two  or   more    exeessive  ver- 

dicts. 
100.   In  excess  of  amount  claimed 
or  of  ad  damnum  clause. 

107.  Inadequate  damages. 

108.  Excessive      and       inadequate 

damages — Power  of  court. 

109.  Excessive      and      inadequate 

damages—  Trial  court. 

110.  Jury   and    instructions — Gen- 

erally. 


§75.  Certainty  as  a  requisite.— This  principle  is  so  fully 
considered  in  this  treatise  under  the  particular  subjects  to  which 
it  belongs  that  it  will  only  be  briefly  noticed  here.  It  may  be 
generally  stated,  however,  that  even  though  the  elements  are  un- 
certain and  problematic  from  which  the  jury  are  to  admeasure  the 
damages,  nevertheless,  they  may  be  sufficient  to  constitute  the 

57 


$75 


i;kni:ual  principles  of  damages. 


basis  of  a  verdict.1  Therefore,  the  want  of  certainty  is  of  itself 
not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  refusal  of  damages.'  But  the  jury 
should  consider  only  such  elements  thereof  as  they  believe  are 
established  by  the  evidence,  and  it  is  also  true  that  the  damages 
should  ordinarily  be  such  as  are'  reasonably  or  necessarily  cer- 
tain to  result  from  the  alleged  injury;3  and  evidence  which  is 
too  vague  to  furnish  any  basis  for  assessment  thereof  should 
not  be  considered.4  .  So  an  instruction  should  not  be  given  as  to 
elements  of  compensation  where  there  is  no  evidence  to  warrant 
it.3  Again,  certainty  as  to  the  amount  may  be  a  determining 
factor,  upon  the  question  whether  the  damages  are  liquidated 
or  a  penalty,''  and  in  case  of  a  claim  for  profits  they  ought  to 
be  proved  with  reasonable  certainty  to  warrant  a  recovery 
therefor.7  It  is  apparent,  therefore,  from  the  preceding  state- 
ments that  proof  must  be  given,  not  only  of  the  injury  or  loss 
sustained,  but  that  the  extent  thereof  must  also  be  proven  with 
reasonable  certainty,  and  this  is  the  general  rule.8  It  is  de- 
clared, however,  that  damages  must  be  capable  of  definite  as- 
certainment, and  must  be  certain  and  definite  in  character.^ 
This  last  assertion  is,  however,  open  to  criticism.10     Some  cases, 


1  Dickinson  v.  Hart,  142  N.  Y.  183; 
58  N.  Y.  St.  R.  645;  36  N.  E.  801, 
aff'g50N.  Y.  St.  R.  504;  21  S.  E.  307. 

2  Omaha  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Cable  T.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Neb.),  32  Fed.  727, 
733,734. 

3  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Conway,  169  111.  505;  48  N.  E.  483, 
aff'g  67  111.  App.  155.  See  also  Lee 
v.  City  of  Burlington,  113  Iowa,  356; 
85  N.  W.  618;  Hausberger  v.  Sedalia, 
E.  R.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  566; 
Streng  v.  Frank  Ibert  Brewing  Co., 
64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  34;  50  App.  Div.  542. 

4  Locke  v.  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60S. 
W.  314.  See  Satchwell  v.  Williams, 
40  Conn.   371. 

6  Georgia  Cotton-Oil  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 112  Ga.  620;  37  S.  E.  873. 

6Tobler  v.  Austin,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  99;  53  S.  W.  706.  This  question 
is,  however,   more   fully  considered 


under   the    discussion    herein  as  to 
liquidated  damages  and  penalty. 

7  Wells  v.  National  L.  Assn.  ( U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  Tex.  1900),  39  C.  C.  A.  476; 
99  Fed.  222.  Tins  point  is,  however, 
more  fully  considered  elsewhere 
herein. 

8  Mergentbaler  Linotype  Co.  v. 
Kansas  State  P.  Co.  (Kan.  1900),  59 
Pac.  1066.  See  Wolcott  v.  Mount, 
36  N.  J.  L.  2(52,  271 ;  Booth  v.  Spuyten 
Duyvil  R.  M.  Co.,  60  N.  Y.  487. 

9  Connelly  v.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co. 
(Va.  1902),  2  No.  Car.  L.  Jour.  294; 
7  Va.  L.  Reg.  704,  per  Cardwell,  J. 

10  It  is  open  to  criticism  in  that  it 
states  the  rule  too  broadly.  Cen- 
erally  and  substantially  it  is  correct 
to  a  certain  degree,  but  it  is  mis- 
leading, especially  so  if  it  should  be 
applied  to  causes  of  action  for  dam- 
ages for  personal  injuries,  and  to 
those  to  recover  for  loss  from  death 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    <>]■'    DAMAGES. 


§  to 


it  is  true,  furnish  in  themselves,  by  reason  of  their  nature  and 
circumstances,  an  obvious  rule  for  ascertaining  what  constitutes 
an  adequate  compensation  for  the  actual  loss  or  injury  sustained, 
whether  the  action  be  in  contract  or  tort.  But  to  deny  the  in- 
jured party  the  right  to  recover  any  actual  damages  in  cases  of 
torts  because  they  arc  of  such  a  nature  as  cannot  be  thus  cer- 
tainly measured,  would  be  to  enable  parties  to  profit  by  and 
speculate  upon  their  own  wrongs  ;  such  is  not  the  law.'-1  Such 
criticism  as  we  have  made  does  not,  however,  exclude  the  rule 
that  necessitates  proof  of  actual  damages,  in  cases  other  than 
of  nominal  recovery,  by  some  data  upon  which  to  base  the  same, 
being  shown  with  some  reasonable  certainty  where  the  damage 
is  susceptible  of  proof,1'-  for  where  it  is  clear  that  damages  have 
resulted  to  the  property  of  plaintiffs  the}''  are  entitled  to  be 
reimbursed  ;  but  in  ascertaining  the  extent  thereof  they  should 


through  the  negligent  or  wrongful 
act  of  another,  for  in  a  large  major- 
ity of  these  latter  causes  it  is  impos- 
sible to  approximate  in  proof  to  a 
"  definite  ascertainment,"  or  to  pro- 
duce evidence  of  damage  or  injury 
which  is  '•  certain"  or  "definite" 
in  character.  This  is  clearly  evident 
from  the  numerous  decisions  consid- 
ered by  us  under  the  chapter  herein 
covering  those  subjects.  This  criti- 
cism also  applies  to  other  actions  for 
damages  than  those  above  stated  as 
appears  fnun  the  following  citations: 
Drum  v.  Harrison,  8:5  Ala.  384;  3  So. 
715;  Bagby  v.  Harris,  9  Ala.  IT:'.; 
City  of  Greensboro  v.  McGibbony, 
93  Ga.  072;  20  S.  E.  37;  Brent  v. 
Kimball,  GO  111.  211;  14  Am.  Rep.  35; 
Fox  v.  Wray,  56  End.  423;  Weber  v. 
Squier,  51  Mo.  App.  601;  Goldman 
v.  Wolff,  0  Mo.  App.  400;  Niendorff 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  4  App.  Div.  (  \. 
Y. )  46;  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  090.  See  also 
Burkitt  v.  Lanata,  15  La.  Ann.  337; 
Allen  v.  Conrad,  51  Pa.  St.  (1  P.  F. 
Smith)  487. 

11  Gilbert    v.     Kennedy,    22    Mich. 
117,    129,    130,    per    Christiaucy,   J. 


Again,  it  is  said  concerning  an  ac- 
tion for  personal  injuries:  "  Incases 
of  this  cbaracter  there  can  be  no  di- 
rect evidence  of  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages sustained  or  the  amount  of 
money  which  will  be  a  compensa- 
tion for  the  injury,  but  it  is  sutli- 
cient  to  show  to  the  jury  the  extent 
of  the  injury."  Clare  v.  Sacramento 
Elec.  PowerA  L.  Co.,  122  Cal.  504; 
55  Pac.  320. 

12  Howard  v.  Taylor,  99  Ala.  450; 
13  So.  121;  Patrick  v.  Colorado 
Smelting  Co.,  20  Colo.  268;  38  Pac. 
236;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cicero,  157  111.  48:  41  X.  E.  640; 
Peoria  &  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Peoria  &  F. 
R.  Co.,  105  111.  110;  Hair  v.  Barnes, 
20  111.  App.  58U:  Williams  v.  Brown, 
70  Iowa.  043;  41  X.  W.  377;  Wilde  v. 
Xew  Orleans,  12  La.  Ann.  15;  Barrie 
v.  Seidel,  30  Mo.  App.  559;  Sheedy 
v.  Union  Press  Brick  Works,  25  Mo. 
App.  527:  Taylor  v.  Bradley.  39  N. 
V.  L29;  100  Am.  Dec.  415;  Gill  v.  X. 
Y.  Cab  Co.,  4s  IIuiuN.  Y.),  524;  1 
X.  Y.  Supp.  202;  Hudson  v.  Archer, 
9S.  D.  240;  68  X.  W.  541. 

59 


§  76  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   <>F    DAMAGES. 

produce  the  best  evidence  in  their  power  as  to  the  amount  of 
the  loss  sustained  by  them.18  Nor  does  the  above  criticism  apply 
to  the  general  rule  that  damages  must,  in  breaches  of  contract,  be 
capable  of  certain  ascertainment  as  distinguished  from  remote, 
speculative  or  contingent  damages.14  But  this  reasonable  cer- 
tainty above  stated  does  not  mean  a  mathematical  exactness  or 
accuracy,  for  this  distinction  is  clearly  made  in  numerous  deci- 
sions as  will  be  apparent  throughout  this  treatise,  especially  so  in 
those  cases  which  cover  personal  injuries  and  death  by  accident, 
neglect  or  default.  Thus  the  impossibility  of  definitely  measur- 
ing damages  for  personal  injuries  by  a  money  standard,  consti- 
tutes no  reason  for  denying  relief.1'  Another  point  of  value 
in  connection  with  this  element  of  certainty  is  illustrated  by  a 
comparatively  recent  decision  which  determines  that,  in  an  action 
for  breach  of  contract  to  sell  and  deliver  certain  timber  on  land, 
no  such  difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  damages  for  said  breach 
exists  as  to  preclude  maintenance  of  said  suit.1!i 

§  76.  Nominal  damages — Generally. — The  consideration  of 
the  general  principles  covering  this  subject  necessarily  involves 
others  heretofore  discussed  under  other  headings.17  Thus  it  is 
well  settled  that  whenever  a  legal  right  is  clearly  shown  to  have 
been  invaded,  nominal  damages  will  be  allowed,  and  the  failure 
to  perform  a  duty  or  contract  constitutes  a  legal  wrong  inde- 
pendent of  actual  damage  done  to  the  party  injured,  and  the  rule 
applies  even  though  no  actual  or  special  damages  be  proven.18 


u  Holmes  v.  Barclay,  4  La.  Ann.  64. 

14  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hall,  124 
U.  S.  444;  31  L.  Ed.  479. 

16 Mayor,  etc.,  of  Birmingham  v. 
Lewis.  92  Ala.  352,  357:  9  So.  243, 
and  see  the  chapters  herein  covering 
personal   injuries  and  death  by  acci- 


65  Ala.  586,  591,  per  Somerville,  J. 
Some  damages  are  always  presumed 
to  follow  from  the  violation  of  any 
right,  and  therefore  the  law  will,  in 
such  cases,  award  nominal  damages 
if  none  greater  be  proved.  Barlow 
v.   Lowder,    35    Ark.    492,    493,    per 


dent.  English,  C.  J.      Whenever  there  is  a 

16Dorris  v.  King  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.  !  clear  violation  of  a  right,  it  is  not 
1899),  54  S.  W.  683.  ;  necessary  to   show  actual   damages, 

17 See  sees.  62,  71-74,  herein.  and   if   none    other   be   proved,  the 

18  Every  wrong  imputes  a  damage,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  nominal  dam- 
and  when  none  other  is  proved  and  ages.  Bristol  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley, 
the  evidence  shows  a  clear  breach  of  28  Conn.  201,  211,  per  Ellsworth,  J., 
duty,  nominal  damages  are  always  j  quoting  Story,  J.,  in  Webb  v.  Port- 
recoverable.      Adams   v.    Robinson,    land  Mfg.  Co.,  3  Sumner  (IT.  S.),  196. 

60 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMA< 


So  the  fact  that  plaintiff  lias   been  benefited  does  not  of   itself 
preclude  nominal  damages,1'-*  and  if  the  evidence  shows  that  any 


When  a  right  is  invaded  or  a  wrong 
done  and  no  particular  damage  is 
proved,    the    law    implies   or    infers 


wrongdoer.  This  last  applies  more 
particularly  to  unlawful  entries  upon 
real  property  and  to  disturbances  of 


nominal  damage.      Foster  v.  Elliott,  ]  incorporeal  rights  when  the  unlaw- 
33  Iowa,  216, 223.     Whenever  a  right    l'ul  act  might   have  an  effect  upon 


is  invaded  the  law  presumes  dam- 
age, and  though  no  actual  injury  be 
sustained,  an   action    may  he    main- 


the  rightof  tin'  party  and  In-  evidence 
in  favor  of  the  wrongdoer  if  his 
right    ever    came    in   question.       In 


tained  for  the  wrongful  diversion  of  \  these  cases  an  action  may  be  sup- 
water  from  the  plaintiffs  mill,  and  ported  though  there  he  no  actual 
nominal  damages  may  he  recovered,  damage  done,  because  otherwise  the 
Munroe  v.  Stickney,  48  Me.  462.  party  might  lose  his  right.  So,  too, 
"It  is  a  principle  that  for  the  viola-  whenever  anyone  wantonly  invades 
tion  of  every  legal  right,  nominal  another's  rights  for  the  purpose  of 
damages  at  least  will  he  allowed,  and  injury,  an  action  will  lie  though  no 


the  failure  to  perform  a  duty  or  con- 
tract is  a  legal  wrong,  independent 
of  actual  damage  done  to  the  party 


actual  damage  be  done.  The  law  pre- 
sumes damage  on  account  of  the  un- 
lawful   intent.       But    it    is    believed 


for  whose  benefit  the  performance  of  that  no  case  can  be  found  where 
such  duty  or  contract  is  due."  Ful-  damages  have  been  given  for  a  tres- 
kerson  v.  Eads,  19  Mo.  A  pp.  620,  pass  to  personal  property,  when  no 
023,  per  Ellison,  J.,  citing  2  Suther-  unlawful  iuteut  or  disturbance  of  a 
laud  on  Dam.  11,  13.  Proof  of  in- .  right  or  possession  is  shown,  and 
vasion  of  rights  entitles  to  recover  !  when  not  only  all  probable  hut  all 
at  least  nominal  damages.  Ilooten  '  possible  damage  is  expressly  dis- 
v.  Barnard,  137  Mass.  36,  citing  proved.  Paul  v.  Slason,  22  Vt.  231, 
Lund  v.  New  Bedford,  121  Mass.  238;  54  Am.  Dec.  75,  per  Poland.  .1. 
286.  Where  a  wrongful  act  is  charged  "Actual  perceptible  damage  is  not 
and  confessed  in  the  pleadings,  com-  indispensable  as  the  foundation  of  an 
plainants  are  entitled  to  at  least  action.  The  law  tolerates  no  further 
nominal  damages.  Lonsdale  Co.  v.  inquiry  than  whether  there  has  been 
Moies,  2  Cliff.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  R.  1.)  the  violation  of  a  right.  If  so  the 
538;  Fed.  <'as.  No.  8,497,  per  Clif-  party  injured  is  entitled  to  maintain 
ford,  Cir.  J.  Whenever  an  invasion  his  action  for  nominal  damages  in 
of  a  legal  right  is  established  though  vindication  of  his  right  if  no  other 
no  actual  damage  be  shown,  the  law  damages  are  fit  and  proper  to  re- 
infers  a  damage  to  the  owner  of  numerate  him.  .  .  Lord  Holt  says: 
property  and  gives  nominal  damages.  '  It  is  impossible  to  imagine  any  such 
This  goes  upon  the  ground  either  thing  as  injuria  sine  damnn.  Every 
that  some  damage  is  the  probable  injury  imports  damage  in  the  nature 
result  of  the  defendant's  act  or  that  of  it.1  S.  P.  2  Ld.  Raym.  955,  and  he 
his  act  would  have  the  effect  to  in-  cites  many  cases  in  support  of  his 
jure  the  other's  right  and  would  be  position.  ...  In  the  same  case  of 
evidence  in  future    in    favor  of  the    Ashby  v.  White  (2  Ld.  Raym.  938;  6 


For  note  1!>  see  page  62. 


61 


§76 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF   DAMAGES. 


property  was  damaged  to  any  extent  while  in  defendant's 
possession,  it  should  not  be  dismissed  on  motion.20  So  where  in 
any  view  of  the  case  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  nominal 
damages,  it  is  error  to  limit,  by  instructions  to  the  jury,  the  right 
to  recover  at  all.-'1  And  contributory  negligence  does  not  of  ne- 
cessity limit  the  amount  of  recovery  to  a  nominal  sum.22  It  is 
also  decided  that  the  jury  are  not  limited  to  such  damages  of  ne- 
cessity, because  there  is  no  evidence  of  particular  damage.23  The 
same  rule  has  also  been  applied  to  an  action  for  not  entering 
satisfaction  of  a  judgment.24  But  damages  will  be  nominal  as 
to  a  passenger  on  a  train  stopped  by  quarantine  officers  before 
entering  a  city.25     So  the  taking  of  a  private  way  for  a  public 


Mod.  45;  Holt,  524),  as  reported  by 
Lord  Raymond,  2  Ld.  Raym.  953, 
Lord  Holt  said:  '  If  the  plaintiff  has 
a  right  he  must  of  necessity  have  a 
means  to  vindicate  and  maintain  it, 
and  a  remedy  if  he  is  injured  in  the 
exercise  or  enjoyment  of  it;  and  in- 
deed it  is  a  vain  thing  to  imagine  a 
right  without  a  remedy,  for  want  of 
right  and  want  of  remedy  are  recip- 
rocal.' S.  P.  6  Mod.  53.  *  The  princi- 
ples laid  down  by  Lord  Holt  .  .  . 
seem  absolutely  in  a  judicial  view  in- 
controvertible, and  they  have  been 
fully  recognized  in  many  other  cases 
...  I  am  aware  that  some  of  the  old 
cases  inculcate  a  different  doctrine 
and  perhaps  are  not  reconcilable 
with  that  of  Lord  Holt.  There  are 
also  some  modern  cases  which  at 
first  view  seem  to  the  contrary  .  .  . 
upon  the  whole  .  .  .  my  judgment 
is  that  wherever  there  is  a  clear  vio- 
lation of  a  right,  it  is  not  necessary 
in  an  action  of  this  sort  (diversion 
of  a  water  course)  to  show  actual 
damage;  that  every  violation  im- 
ports damage  and  if  no  claim  be 
proved,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a 
verdict  for  nominal  damages,  and  a 
fortiori  this  doctrine  applies  when- 
ever the  act  done  is  of  such  a  nature 
as  that,  by  its  repetition  or  continu- 

62 


ance,  it  may  become  the  foundation 
or  evidence  of  an  adverse  right.  See 
also  Mason  v.  Hill,  3  Barn.  &  Ad. 
304;  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  1."  Webb  v. 
Portland  Mfg.  Co.,  3  Sumn.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  D.  Me.)  189;  3  Law.  Rep.  374; 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,322,  per  Story,  Cir.  J. 
See  also  Whipple  v.  Cumberland  Mfg. 
Co.,  2  Story  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Me),  661; 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,516,  per  Story,  Cir.  J., 
citing  Butman  v.  Hussey,  3  Fairf. 
( 12  Me. )  407. 

19  Excelsior  Needle  Co.  v.  Smith. 
61  Conn.  56;  23  Atl.  693;  Mize  v. 
Glenn,  38  Mo.  App.  98;  Johnson  v. 
Conant,  64  N.  H.  109;  7  Atl.  716; 
Murphy  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  23  Wis.  365; 
99  Am.  Dec.  181.  See  also  Jewett  v. 
Whitney,  43  Me.  242;  Pond  v.  Merri- 
field,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  181. 

2°  Leber  v.  Stores,  64  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
464;  31  Misc.  Rep.  474,  affg  62  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  1124.  Examine  as  the 
motion,  First  Nat.  Bk.  v.  First  Nat. 
Bk.,  116  Ala.  520;  22  So.  976. 

21  O'Horo  v.  Kelsey,  60  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  604;  70  N.  Y.  Supp.  14. 

22  Felton  v.  Newport  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  Term. ),  44  C.  C.  A.  530;  105  Fed.  332. 

23  Burgett  v.  Lanata,  15  La.  Ann.  337. 

24  Allen  v.  Conrad,  51  Pa.  St.  (1  P. 
F.  Smith)  487. 

25  So  held  in  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


street  will,  where  such  way  has  the  characteristics  of  the  latter, 
only  justify  the  recovery  of  such  damages  by  the  landowner,* 
and  the  return  of  property  during  trial  of  a  Buit  for  conversion 
is  id  defense  to  the  whole  cause  of  action,  so  as  bo  preclude  re- 
covery of  a  nominal  sum,  even  though  no  Bpecial  damage  is 
proven.27  Again,  any  unauthorized  interference  with  an  ease- 
ment, so  as  to  diminish  the  full  enjoyment  of  it,  is  a  wrong 
which  may  be  redressed  by  action.  Thus  the  law  implies  dam- 
age from  flowing  water  back  upon  the  land  of  another,  not  only 
for  the  present  injury,  but  also  to  preserve  the  rights  of  prop- 
er tv.*  The  same  rule  applies  to  the  diversion  of  water  from  a 
mill,29  and  also  to  injuries  to  riparian  rights.  Nor  in  any  of 
these  cases  need  actual  damage  be  proved  in  order  to  recover 
nominal  damages."     Again,  a  violation  of  an  owner's  right  by  a 


R.  Co.  v.  Linam  (Ark.  1901),  60  S. 
W.  951.  But  examine  Wilson  v. 
Alabama,  G.  S.  H.  Co.,  77  Miss.  714; 
28  So.  5(>7;  52  L.  R.  A.  357,  citing, 
Hurst  v.  Warner.  L02  Mich.  238;  26 
L.  R.  A.  484;  Town  of  Kosciusko  v. 
Slomberg,  08  Miss.  469;  9  So.  -JOT; 
12  L.  R.  A.  528;  Matter  of  Smith,  146 
N.  Y.  68,  74;  40  N.  E.  497,  498;  28  L. 
R.  A.  820,  823;  State  v.  Burdge,  95 
Wis.  390;  70  X.  W.  347;  37  L.  R.  A. 
157.  162. 

26  In  re  Opening  of  North  Fifth  St., 
71  N.  Y.  Supp.  644. 

27  Cernalian  v.  Chrisler,  107  Wis. 
645;  83  N.  W.  778. 

28  Graver  v.  Sholl,  6  Wright  (Pa.), 
58,  67.  See  generally  as  to  the  rights 
of  riparian  owners  and  the  nature 
of  such  rights  aud  extent  thereof, 
Cave  v.  Tyler  (Cal.  1901),  65  Pa. 
1089;  Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Kin- 
gan  &  Co.,  155  Ind.  476;  58  N.  E. 
715;  Meek  v.  Carlettsburg  &  P.  P. 
Co.,  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1318;  CO  S.  W. 
484;  Sowers  v.  Shift,  15  La.  Ann.  30 ; 
Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Indian  Orchard 
Co.,  177  Mass.  CI;  58  N.  E.  181; 
Crawford  Co.  v.  Hathaway.  60  Neb. 
7".4;  84  X.  W.  271.  rehearing  de- 
nied, 85    N.  W.  303;  Spink   v.  Corn- 


ing, CI  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  84;  7u  N. 
Y.  Supp.  143;  (iallagher  v.  Kingston 
Water  Co.,  164  N.  Y.  602;  58  V  I 
1087,  aff'g  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  250;  25 
App.  Div.  82;  Pine  v.  New  York  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  N.  Y.),  103  Fed.  337;  <ieer  v. 
Durham  Water  Co.,  127  N.  C.  :'.!'.': 
37  S.  E.  474;  Mizell  v.  McGowau, 
120  X.  C.  134;  26  S.  E.  783;  Winons 
Point  S.  Club  v.  Bodi,  10  Ohio  C.  D. 
544;  20  Ohio  C.  Ct.  R.  637:  Beech  v. 
Kuder,  15  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  89;  Dyer  v. 
Cranston  Print  Works  Co.,  22  R.  I. 
506;  48  Atl.  791;  City  of  New  What- 
com v.  Fairhaven  Land  Co.  (Wash. 
1901),  64  Par   735. 

ostein  v.  Burden,  24  Ala.  130;  60 
Am.  Dec.  453. 

30  Eagle  ct  P.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gibson, 
62  Ala.  369;  Creighton  v.  Evans, 
53  Cal.  55;  Parker  v.  Griswold, 
17  Conn.  288;  42  \m.  Dec.  739; 
Plumleigh  v.  Dawson,  1  Gilm.  illl.) 
544;  41  Am.  Dec.  195;  Munroe  v. 
Stickney,  48  Me.  462;  Peck  v.  (lark, 
14l'  Mass.  436;  8  X.  E.  335;  Dorman 
v.  Ames,  Gil.  (12  .Minn.  |  451;  Jones  v. 

Hannovan,  55  Mo.  462,468;  Blodgett 
v.  Stone,  00  X.  II.  167;  Amoskeag 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Goodale.  46  X.  II.  53; 
New   York   Rubber  Co.    v.    Kothery, 

by 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


trespass  warrants  nominal  damages,  even  though  no  actual  or 
appreciable  damage  is  sustained,  since  the  presumption  attaches 
that  however  inconsiderable  the  injury,  some  damages  have  neces- 
sarily been  occasioned  thereby,  and  if  rights  of  property  are 
interfered  with,  the  owner  may  maintain  his  action  against  the 
trespasser  without  being  obligated  to  prove  actual  damage.31 
The  same  rule  applies  to  the  removal  of  a  wall  supporting  a  tene- 
ment,K  and  to  the  wrongful  detention  of  personal  property.33 

§77.  Nominal  damages  —  Breach  of  contract.  —  Nominal 
damages  can  be  recovered  where  a  breach  of  contract  is  proven, 
even  though  it  does  not  appear  that  actual  or  substantial  dam- 
ages have  been  sustained,  and  there  is  no  proof  thereof.34  And 
the  rule  applies  where  the  breach  is  well  alleged  and  is  admitted 
as  true,15  or  if  the  cause  of  action  is  admitted  by  default,  at  least 


132  N.  Y.  293;  4-1  X.  Y.  St.  R.  557; 
30  N.  E.  841;  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  575, 
iev'g32  X.  Y.  St.  R.  905:  Little  v. 
St au bach,  63  X.  C.  285;  Pastorius  v. 
Fisher,  1  Rawle  (Pa.),  27;  Chatfield 
v.  Wilson,  1  Will.  (Vt.)670. 

31  Champion  v.  Vincent,  20  Tex. 
811,  815;  Appletou  v.  Fullerton,  1 
Gray  (Mass.),  186,  194;  Dudley  v. 
Tilton.  14  La.  Ann.  283,  585.  See 
also  Attwood  v.  Fricot,  17  Cal.  38, 
44;  76  Am.  Dec.  567.  Merrill  v. 
Dibble,  12  Bradw.  (111.  A  pp.)  85; 
Johnson  v.  Stinger,  39  111.  App. 
180;  Hefley  v.  Baker,  19  Kan.  9; 
Brown  v.  Perkins,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 
89;  Keirn  v.  Warfield, 60  Miss.  799; 
Bruch  v.  Carter,  3  Vr.  (32  X.  J.  L.) 
554;  Pierce  v.  Hosmer,  66  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  345;  White  v.  Griffin,  4  Jones,  L. 
iX.  C.)  139;  Few  v.  Killer  (S.  C. 
1902),  41  S.  E.  85;  Caruth  v.  Allen, 
2  McCord  (S.  C),  226;  Norvell  v. 
Thompson,  2  Hill,  L.  (S.  C.)  470; 
Bradley  v.  Flewitt,6  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.) 
69. 

3-2McConnell  v.  Kibbe,  33  111.  174, 
179;  85  Am.  Dec.  265. 

33  Oden  v.  Stubblefield,  2  Ala.  684. 

31  Adams  v.  Robinson,  65  Ala.  586; 

64 


Browner  v.  Davis,  15  Cal.  9,  11;  Mc- 
Carty  v.  Beach,  10  Cal.  461;  Adding- 
ton  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.,  93  Ga. 
566;  20  S.  E.  71;  Stock  Quotation 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Trade,  44  111. 
App.  358;  Eosenbaum  v.  McThomas, 
34  Ind.  331;  Howard  v.  Wilmington 
&  S.  R.  Co.,  1  Gill  (Md.),  311;  Hagan 
v.  Riley,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  515;  Cow- 
ley v.  Davidson,  10  Minn.  302;  Du- 
laney  v.  St.  Louis  Sugar  Ref.  Co.,  42 
Mo.  App.  659;  Middleton  v.  Moore, 
36  Mo.  App.  627;  Uhlig  v.  Barnum. 
43  Xeb.  584;  61  X.  W.  749;  Jurnick 
v.  Manhattan  Optical  Co.  (X.  J. 
1901),  49  Atl.  681;  Devendorf  v. 
Wert.  42  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  227;  Clinton 
v.  Mercer,  3  Murph.  (X.  C.)  119; 
Bondv.  Hilton,  2  Jones,  L.  (N.  C.) 
149;  Hope  v.  Alley,  9  Tex.  394;  con- 
tra, see  Chambers  v.  Walker,  80  Ga. 
642:  6  S.  E.  165;  Mansur  &  Tebbetts 
Imp.  Co.  v.  Willett  (Okl.  1900),  61 
Pac.  1066. 

35  Cowley  v.  Davidson,  10  Minn. 
392.  See  Adams  v.  Robinson,  65  Ala. 
586,  590;  Code,  1876,  sec.  2978; 
O'Horo  v.  Kelsey,  60  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  604;  79  X.  Y.  St.  R.  14;  Oh 
Chow    v.   Hallett;   She   At  v.   Same 


i:i;ai.   PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMA( 


such  damages  are  recoverabh  .in.  the  rule  ap] 

technical  breach,'  or  such  damages  may  1*  given  mi 

u  though  performance  would  have  hem  a  positive 
injury  to  plaintiff,*  or  notwithstanding 

remote  or  speculative  to  be  considered,1  and  so  whether  or  not 
anv  actual  loss  was  Buffered.       And  this  las:   rule  has  been  ap- 
plied to  a  breach  of  contract  by  a  telegraph  company  in  m 
gentlv  failing  to  promptly  deliver  a  m< 
a  wndor  of  land  erroneously  supposed  he  could  gn 
the  purchaser  is  entitled  thereto  and  to  nominal  -        But 

the  agreement  may,  however,  be  so  uncertain  and   indetin. 
not  to  constitute  the  basis  of  admeasurement  of  damage.-  for 
the  breach  thereof. "     And  if  an  action  is  prematurely  bn 
before  any  actual  breach  of  a  contract  of  employment,  not  even 
nominal  damages  can  be  recovered.' 

§  78.  Nominal  damages  only,  unless  substantia]  damages 
proved.— It  is  a  general  rule  that  for  breach  of  a  con;: 
nominal  damages  can  be  recovered  unless  some  substantial  dam- 
ages be  shown  or  there  is  proof  of  actual  injury  or  loss,  for  sub- 
stantial damages  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  breach  alone/ 


(U.  S.  C.  C.  D.Or.),  12Sawy.  259;  5 
Chic.  L.  News,  109:  Fed.  Cas. 
N 

:iunell  v.  Bebb.  126  Mi. 
7  Det  L.  X.  742;  85  X.   W 

87  Seat  v.  Moreland,  7  Humph. 
(Tenn,)575;  contra,  Mansur  &  Teb- 
betts  Imp.  Co,  v.  Willett  (Okl.  1900), 
61  Pac.  1 

•  Mickey  v.  Baud,  9  Mich.  32. 
■  Ellsler  v.  Brooks,  22  Jon-  - 
X.  V      " 
•    Treadwell  v.  Tillis.  IOC  -    i 

886. 
«  Ib.pe  v.  Alley.  9  Tex. 
4-  Western  Un.  Tele<_-.  Co.  v.  Birch- 
field,  14  Tex.  Civ.  A:  -  S.  W. 
j   Am.   Xeg.   Rep.  468;  Kenmrn 
v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.  ( 

Am.  He*  See  Joyce 

on  Electric  Law  (ed.  1900),  see- 
943. 

6 


•    Irwin  v.  Askew.  74  Ga.  581. 
itz  v.  Wolf.  7:J  N.  Y    - 

S48;  16  Misc.  82 
«  Pellet    v.    Manufacturers   A    M. 
5.  C.  C.  A.  II 
.   104  Fed.  "    . 
-    irborough  v.  State,  24  Ark.  20; 
Belfour  v.  Baney,  Li  Eng.  (Ark 
Acheson  v.  "Western  Un.  1 
9'}  Cal.  641 :  Turpie  v.  Lowe.  114  Ind. 
37;  15  X.  E.  B34;  Rhine  v.  Moi 
Ind.  81:  Jones'  Exrs.  v.  Xoe.  71  Ind. 

■  .  9  Ind.  13;    M 
Valley  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kelfi 
4-1 :  Diers  v.  Edwards,  23  Ky.  I. 
000;  63  S.  W.  276;  Wilson  v.  b 
13  B.  Mon.  |  Ky,   330;  Merrill  v.  W<  Bt- 
ern  Un.  T.  '    -  Am. 

Elec.  Cas.  600;  Tufts  v.  Benne 
Mass.   398;  40  N.  B.  172:  Pollard  v. 
Porter.  3  Gray     "  .2;  Wilson 

v.    Wagar,    26  Mich.    452;   Breen   v. 


§78 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 


or  unless  negligence  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  damage  sus- 
tained,47 or  the  terms  of  the  contract  contemplate  only  actual 
damages,*  or  it  otherwise  furnishes  in  itself  the  guide  for  the  ad- 
measurement of  damages.49  So  if  the  parties  have  not  agreed 
upon  any  fixed  price  as  the  basis  of  the  contract,  but  have  only 
specified  a  maximum  sum,  and  there  is  a  breach,  the  liability  is 
only  that  of  nominal  damages.50  Again,  gratuitous  bailees  who 
have  assumed  a  contract  obligation  to  deliver  the  goods  in 
question,  and  who  have  failed  to  fulfill  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, are  liable  only  for  nominal  damages  for  the  destruction  of 
the  property  by  fire,  as  such  destruction  is  not  a  damage  such 
as  might  fairly  and  reasonably  be  considered  as  either  arising 
naturally,  according  to  the  usual  course  of  things  from  the  breach 
of  such  contract,  or  such  as  might  reasonably  have  been  sup- 
posed to  have  been  in  the  contemplation  of  both  parties  at  the 
time  the}r  made  the  contract  as  the  probable  result  of  the 
breach  of  it.51  Again,  in  case  of  an  actionable  wrong,  there  must 
be  some  evidence  as  to  the  amount  of  damages  to  recover  more 
than  a  nominal  sum,5~and  damages  must  be  proven  to  buildings 
to  recover  nominal  damages  as  to  land  where  the  allegation  is  of 
injury  to  the  buildings'.53  So  the  same  principles  necessitate  proof 
of  actual  damage  in  torts  generally  if  more  than  a  nominal  award 
is  sought,54  and  the  same  is  true  in  actions  for  the  taking  and 


Fairbank,  35  Mo.  App.  554;  Hays  v. 
Dalzell,21  Mo.  App.  679;  Richardson 
v.  Jones,  1  Nev.  405;  French  v.  Bent, 
43  N.  H.  448;  Frothingham  v.  Ever- 
ton,  12  N.  H.  239;  Gerli  v.  Poidebard 
Silk  Mfg.  Co.,  57  N.  J.  L.  (28  Vt. ) 
432;  31  Atl.  401;  30  L.  R.  A.  61; 
Conger  v.  Weaver,  20  N.  Y.  140;  Im- 
porters' &  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Christie,  5  Rob.  ( N,  Y. )  169 ;  First  Nat. 
Bk.  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  30  Ohio  St. 
555;  Cronin  v.  Sharp,  16  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  76;  Moore  v.  Anderson,  30  Tex. 
224;  Amer.  Bldg.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Hart, 
2  Wash.  594;  27  Pac.  468.  Hub- 
bard v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  33  Wis. 
558;  Rosenfield  v.  Express  Co.,  1 
Woods  (U.S.),  131;  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
12,060;  American  Surety  Co.  of  N.  Y. 
66 


v.  Woods  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  La.),  45  C. 
C.  A.  282;  106  Fed.  263;  105  Fed. 741. 

47  Bodkin  v.  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co., 
31  Fed.  134;  2  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  857. 

48  Green  v.  Weaver,  63  Ga.  302. 

49  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Egbert, 
12  Casey  (Pa.),  360;  78  Am.  Dec.  382; 
State  v.  Ward,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  100. 

50  United  Press  v.  New  York  Press 
Co.,  164  N.  Y.  406;  58  N.  E.  527, 
aff' g  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  807. 

51  Leggo  v.  Welland  Mfg.  Co.,  2 
Ont.  R.  45. 

52  Watts  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co., 
39  W.  Va.  196;  19  S.  E.  521;  23  L.  R. 
A.  674;  57  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  694. 

53  McDonnell  v.  Cambridge  R.  Co., 
151  Mass.  159;  23  N.  E.  84. 

54  Havens  v.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R. 


OENKKAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


rg 


detention  of  personal  property,  conversion,  etc.,  except  there  be 
proof  of  value."  So  in  ease  of  the  detention  of  a  vessel  through 
the  fault  of  the  consignee  an  unreasonable  length  of  time  at  the 
port  of  discharge,  not  only  the  detention  but  the  damages  and 
their  nature  must  he  proved,  where  there  is  no  express  contract 
to  refer  to  for  the  purpose  of  computing  the  amount  to  be  paid 
as  demurrage.  In  an  action  to  recover  damages  of  that  nature, 
proof  must  be  given  of  their  existence  and  amount.56  Again, 
only  nominal  damages  are  recoverable  in  an  action  for  personal 
injuries  where  there  is  no  allegation  or  proof  as  to  earning  ca- 
pacity.'' 

§  79.  Nominal  damages — New  trial  and  reversal. — Another 
proposition  of  importance  in  connection  with  this  right  to  nom- 
inal damages  is  that  the  failure  to  award  them  does  not  consti- 
tute a  ground  of  reversal,  provided  no  substantial  right  is  vio- 
lated thereby,58  or  a  judgment  for  costs  is  given  in  favor  of  the 
prevailing  party.7-'     Nor  will  there  be  a  reversal  or  new  trial 


Co.,  28  Conn.  69;  Webb  v.  Gross,  79 
Me.  224;  9  Atl.  612;  Hough  v.  Young, 
1  Ham.  (Ohio)  504;  Custard  v.  Bur- 
dett,  15  Tex.  456. 

55  Miller  v.  Jones,  26  Ala.  247; 
Rose  v.  Gallup,  33  Conn.  338; 
Brady  v.  Whitney,  24  Mich.  154. 
Phoenix  v.  Clark,  2  Mich.  328;  Win- 
mark  v.  Lorton,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  480; 
15  Daly  (X.  Y.),  548;  Lay  v.  Bayles, 
4  Cold.  (Tcnn.)246;  Rutland*  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  B'k  of  Middlebury,  32  Vt. 
639. 

86  Dayton  v.  Parke,  142  X.  Y.  391, 
399;  59  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  788;  37  N.  E. 
642. 

57  Pickett  v.  West  Monroe,  47  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  629;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  30. 
See  chapters  post,  herein,  as  to  per- 
sonal injuries  and  death  by  accident. 

68  Cahuzac  v.  Samini,  29  Ala.  288; 
Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  v.  McMillan,  29 
Ala.  147;  Ringlehaupt  v.  Young,  55 
Ark.  128;  17  S.  W.  710;  McGann  v. 
Hamilton,  58  Conn.  69;  19  Atl.  376; 
Eiswald  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  60  Ga. 


496;  Wadhams  v.  Swan,  109  III.  46; 
Thisler  v.  Hopkins,  85  111.  App.  207; 
Smith  v.  Parker,  148  Ind.  127;  45 
X.  E.  770;  Boardman  v.  Marshall- 
town  (t.  Co.,  105  Iowa,  445;  75  X.  \V. 
343;  Stewart  v.  Lapsley,  7  La.  Ann. 
456;  Boyden  v.  Moore,  5  Mass.  365; 
Stevens  v.  Yale,  113  Mich.  680;  Eng-. 
lish  v.  Caldwell,  30  Mich.  362;  State 
v.  Rayburn,  22  Mo.  App.  303;  Sloggy 
v.  Crescent  Creamery  Co.,  72  Minn. 
316;  75  \.  W.  225;  Sess  v.  Richey, 
58  N.  Y.  Supp.  1148;  27  Misc.  843; 
Rambant  v.  Irving  Nat.  Bk.,  42  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  14:!;  58  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1056;  Throckmorton  v.  Evening  Poal 
Pub.  Co..  35  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)396; 
5  1  \.  Y.  Supp.  887;  Chambers  v. 
Frazier,  29  Ohio  St.  362;  Bilgrien  v. 
Dowe,  91  Wis.  393;  64  X.  \V.  1025; 
Riess  v.  Delles,  45  Wis.  662;  Kelly 
v.  Fahrney  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.),  38  C.  C. 
A.  108;  97  Fed.  176;  Fisher  v.  Meyer, 
20  Blatchf.  i  P.  S.)  512;  12  Fed.  842. 
69  East  Moline  Co.  v.  Weir  Plow 
Co.  (  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  7th  C).  37  C.  C. 
67 


§80 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF   DAMAGES. 


granted  where  plaintiffs  could  have  recovered  no  more  than 
nominal  damages,60  although  a  verdict  for  such  damages  will  be 
set  aside  where  there  is  clear  evidence  of  actual  damage,  cap- 
able of  being  classified  and  determined  by  a  legal  measure.61 
Nor  can  a  verdict  for  nominal  damages  be  considered  as  a  find- 
ing for  defendant,  because  upon  the  case  as  tried  the  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  a  substantial  award.62  And  where  it  appears  that 
plaintiff  mistook  the  basis  on  which  damages  should  be  ascer- 
tained, and  such  as  have  been  suffered  are  substantial,  the  de- 
nial of  nominal  damages  is  a  ground  of  reversal,  since  the  plain- 
tiff would  have  been  entitled  thereto  in  any  event.63 

§  80.  General  damages. — Damages  necessarily  and  natu- 
rally resulting  from  breach  of  contract  may  be  recovered  under 
averments  setting  forth  the  contract  and  its  breach,64  and  where 
they  are  the  proximate  result  of  the  injury  and  reasonably  cer- 
tain to  ensue  therefrom,  they  may  be  recovered  under  a 
general  allegation  without  being  specially  pleaded.65  So  also, 
where  they  follow  as  a  necessary  result  of  the  unlawful  deten- 
tion of  property,  they  need  not  be  specially  averred,66  but  they 


A.  62;  95  Fed.  250,  citing  Mahoney 
v.  Robbins,  49  Ind.  146;  Palmer  v. 
Degan,  58  Minn.  505 ;  Heator  v.  Pearce, 
59  Neb.  583;  81  N.  W.  615;  Smitb  v. 
Weed  Sew.  Mach.  Co.,  26  Ohio  St. 
562;  Enos  v.  Cole,  53  Wis.  235;  10 
N.  W.  377;  Hibbard  v.  Western  Un. 
Tel.  Co.,  33  Wis.  558. 

60  Schwartz  v.  Davis  (Iowa),  57  N. 
W.  849;  Stuart  v.  Trotter  (Iowa),  39 
N.  W.  212. 

61  Paul  v.  Leydenberger,  17  Bradw. 
(111.  App. )  167;  and  see  Foreman's 
Ins.  Co.  v.  McMillan,  29  Ala.  147; 
Chapin  v.  Babcock,  67  Conn.  255 ;  34 
Atl.  1039,  and  citations  in  first  note 
to  this  section. 

62  Chouquette  v.  Southern  Elec.  K. 
Co.,  152  Mo.  257;  53  S.  W.  897,  citing 
several  cases. 

63  Thomson-Houston  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Durant  L.  Imp.  Co.,  144  N.  Y.34;  63 
N.  Y.  St.  Pv.  8. 

68 


64  Russell  v.  Corning  Mfg.  Co.,  63 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  640;  49  App.  Div.  610. 
See  also  Laraway  v.  Perkins,  10  N.  Y. 
37.  See  sec.  88,  herein.  As  to  distinc- 
tion between  general  and  special 
damage,  see  Roberts  v.  Graham,  6 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  578. 

65  Edgerton  v.  O'Neil,  4  Kan.  App. 
73;  46  Pac.  206.  See  sees.  83  et  seq., 
herein. 

66  Jackson  v.  Grace,  3  Okla.  143; 
41  Pac.  79,  and  damages  which  nat- 
urally and  necessarily  result  from  the 
injury  may  be  proven  under  a  general 
allegation  of  damages,  where  a  speci- 
fied amount  of  damages  is  averred. 
Louisville,  St.  L.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Nea- 
fus,  13  Ky.  L.  Rep.  951;  18  S.  W. 
1030,  see  also  Russell  v.  Corning  Mfg. 
Co.,  49  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  610;  63 
N.  Y.  Supp.  640.  See  also  as  to  dis- 
tinction between  the  necessary  and 
natural  result  of  an  injury,  Vander- 


GENERAL    PBtNCtPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


:    31 


must  be  such  as  necessarily  and  naturally  result  from  the  act 
complained  of  in  order  to  be  recovered  under  a  general  aver- 
ment.6' Again,  in  ex  delicto  actions  where  the  claim  is  for 
general  damages  only,  a  bill  of  particulars  is  held  unnecessary,^ 
and  an  averment  of  special  damages  is  unnecessary  to  recover 
the  loss  of  any  species  of  personal  property  in  detinue;'0  nor  is 
such  allegation  necessary  in  an  action  sounding  in  tort.''  So 
damages  for  personal  injury  may  be  general  and  not  special  so 
as  to  be  recovered  without  being  specially  pleaded.71  Again,  a 
declaration  alleging  damages  in  general  terms  warrants  a  re- 
covery for  the  real  injury,  even  though  there  is  a  claim  averring 
that  the  injury  is  to  the  plaintiff's  peace,  happiness  and  feel- 
ings.7' So  where  a  breach  is  alleged  and  damages  demanded,  it 
is  a  sufficient  averment  of  nonpayment,73  and  a  general  claim 
for  damages  by  a  landowner  on  appeal  from  proceedings  to  open 
a  street  maybe  sufficient,  notwithstanding  a  provision  that  the 
landowner  shall  state  specilically  the  grounds  of  his  objection 
in  the  court  below.74  So  it  is  only  requisite  to  aver  damages 
generally  in  a  specified  amount  in  an  action  for  negligent  in- 
jury.75 Again,  a  claim  is  for  general  and  not  special  damages 
when  the  averments  are  for  injuries  disabling  plaintiff  perma- 
nently.70 


§  81.  Special  damages.— The  partial  closing  of  a  street  while 


slice  v.  Newton,  4  N.  Y.  130;  Berge- 
mann  v.  Jones,  94  X.  Y.  51;  Bogart 
v.  Biukbalter,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  525; 
6  X.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  1G0;  Solins  v.  Lias, 
16  Abb.  (X.  Y.)  311.  See  also  sees.  88, 
89,  berein. 

«  Root  v.  Butte,  A.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
20  Mont.  3">4;  51  Pac.  153;  Atcbison, 
Topeka  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Willey,  57 
Kan.  764;  48  Pac.  25;  2  Am.  Xeg. 
Rep.  144. 

<*  Benzv.  South  Betblehem  (C.  P.), 
5  Northampton  Rep.  381. 

cu  Garden  v.  Neiley  (Can.),  31  N. 
S.  89. 

to  purcell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.,  108  X.  C.  421;  12  S.  E.  956. 

71  West     Chicago     St.     R.    Co.    v. 


Levy,  182  111.  525;  55  N.  E.  554,  atT'g 
82  111.  App.  202,  and  cases  cited.  See 
also  Ft.  Scott,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lightburn  (Kan.  App.  1899),  58  Pac. 
1033;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  K.  Co.  v. 
Weigers.  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  344 ;  54 
S.   W.  910. 

"'-  Cox  v.  Richmond  &  D.  K.  Co., 
87  <:a.  747;  13  S.  E.  827. 

73  Belt  v.  Washington  Water-Power 
Co.,  24  Wash.  387;  64  Pac.  525. 

71  Decatur  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I. 
R.  Co.,  146  End.  577;  45    X.    E.   793. 

1''  McFarland  v.  Roly,  4  Ohio  Dec. 
211 ;  1  Cleve.  L.  Rep.  118.  See  Foerst 
v.  Kelso,  131    Cal.  376;  63    Pac.  6S1. 

7"  Bibb  Co.  v.  Ham,  110  Ga.  340;  35 
S.  E.  656. 

69 


§81 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


it  is  being  graded  and  paved  does  not  constitute  such  special 
damage  to  a  street  car  company  as  to  enable  it  to  recover  there- 
for,77 although  if  special  injury  has  resulted  to  a  person  from 
closing  a  highway,  as  where  he  has  been  to  expense  in  removing 
obstructions  in  order  to  travel,  an  action  lies.78  But  the  fact 
that  an  unlawful  obstruction  of  a  street  cuts  off  the  only  prac- 
ticable route  by  which  an  individual  may  reach  his  land  is  not 
special  damage.79  Again,  if  special  damages  are  relied  on  because 
of  failure  to  stop  a  train  at  a  flag  station,  they  must  be  averred,* 
and  one  who  has  suffered  such  damage  from  a  nuisance  may 
maintain  an  action  against  an  individual  or  corporation,81  but 
the  special  damage  must  sufficiently  appear  from  the  allegations 
in  such  case.82  There  are  also  other  applications  of  the  doctrine 
which  come  within  the  general  principles  hereinafter  stated. 
Thus,  if  special  damages  are  claimed,  they  must  be  averred  to 
prevent  surprise,  and  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  them,53  and  such  damages  must  be  pleaded  in  replevin.84 
So,  in  an  action  of  trespass  in  case  of  a  wrongful  entry  and  re- 
moval of  a  fence  and  the  deprivation  of  the  use  of  pasture.85 
So,  unless  they  are  specifically  claimed,  they  cannot  be  allowed 
under  a  general  allegation  and  demand  therefor,  although  there 
are  specific  statements  in  the  same  pleading  of  the  precise 
amount  and  character  of  the  claimed  damage.85  And  the  mere 
conclusion  in  a  pleading  that  a  standpipe  or  water  tower  is  lia- 
ble to  burst,  is  not  a  sufficient  allegation  of  special  damages.87 
]f,  however,  special  items,  such  as  counsel  fees,  loss  of  time,  etc., 

general  public.    Advance  Elevator  & 
W.  Co.  v.  Eddy,  23  111.  App.  352. 

82  Clark  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 
(Wis.),  36  N.  W.  326. 

83  See  Fitch  v.  Fitch,  35  N.  Y.  Super. 
(3  J.  &  S.)  302.  303;  Alfaro  v.  David- 
son, 40  N.  Y.  Super.  (8  J.  &  S.)  87, 
89,    per  Freedman,  J. 

84Rosecrans  v.  Osay,  49  Neb.  512; 
68  N.  W.  627. 

85  May  v.  Carter,  67  Mo.  App.  323. 

86  Dennison  v.  Lewis  (D.  C.  App.), 
23  Wash.  L.  Rep.  138. 

87  Barrows  v.  Sycamore,  150  111. 
588;  49  111.  App.  590;  37  N.  E.  1096; 
25  L.  R.  A.  535. 


77  Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 181  Pa.  592;  37  Atl.  910; 
40  W.  N.  C.  453;  28  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
55. 

78  Lansing  v.  Wiswall,  5  Den.  (N. 
Y.)  213. 

79  Baier  v.  Schermerhorn,  96  Wis. 
372;  71  N.  W.  600. 

50  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Siddons,  58 
111.  App.  607. 

8'  Mehrof  Bros.  B.  M.  Co.  v.  Dela- 
ware, L.  &  W.  B.  Co.  (N.  J.),  16  Atl. 
12.  But  the  special  damages  which 
one  sustains  from  the  obstruction  of 
an  alley  must  be  only  such  as  are  dif- 
ferent from  those  sustained  by  the 

70 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


§81 


have  been  proven,  the  jury  should  not  be  instructed  that  "  No 
measure  of  damages  can  be  prescribed  except  the  enlightened 
conscience  of  impartial  jurors."88     Again,  if  such  damages  do 

not  necessarily  result  from  the  injury,  they  must  be  particularly 
averred  to  be  recovered,'1  although  it  is  decided  that  an  aver- 
ment thereof  is  only  necessary  where  the  righl  of  action  itself 
depends  upon  the  special  injury  received.1*1  In  case  of  contracts 
the  plaintiff  is  not  always  limited  to  the  recovery  of  general 
damages.  There  may  be  such  special  circumstances  as  will  en- 
able him  to  recover  special  damages,  BUch  as  are  the  natural  and 
proximate  cause  of  the  breach,  although  not  in  general,  follow- 
ing as  its  immediate  effects.  Hut  the  pleading  must  particu- 
larize or  set  out  the  special  damage  or  loss.'-'1  It  is  also  deter- 
mined that  in  an  ad  ion  to  recover  such  damages  for  breach  of 
contract,  the  party  in  fault  must  have  had  knowledge,  at  the 
time  of  entering  into  the  agreement,  of  the  fact,  making  prob- 
able the  special  damages/*  It  has,  however,  been  said  :  "The 
test  has  been  put  in  another  form,  namely,  that  they  must  be 
such  as  a  court  or  jury  may  reasonably  consider  to  be  those 
which  the  parties  would  reasonably  contemplate.  I  do  not 
believe  that  t6  be  the  true  test  for  those  who  make  con- 
tracts mean  to  fulfill  them."113  But  loss  of  profits  must  be  par- 
ticularly pleaded  in  an  action  for  the  price  of  goods  where  the 
defense  is  that  they  were  not  according  to  contract,91  although 
it  need  not  be  specifically  alleged  that  plaintiff  has  sustained 
special  damages  in  order  to  recover  them  in  an  action  by  an 
abutting  property  owner  for  injury  occasioned  in  the  grade  of 


88  Coleman  v.  Allen,  79  Ga.  637,  5 
S.  E.  204. 

89  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Willey,  57  Kan.  764;  48  Pac.  25;  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  344;  SolmB  v.  Lias,  16 
Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  311;  Squires  v. 
Gould,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y. )  159;  Casta- 
nos  v.  Ritter,  3  Duer  ( N.  Y.),  310; 
Baldwin  v.  N.  V.  &  II.  S.  N.  Co.,  4 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  314;  Williams  v.  Fra- 
zier,  41  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  428;  and 
see  last  preceding  section  herein,  and 
sees.  88,  89,  herein. 

00  McCarty  v.  Beach,  10  Cal.  462, 464. 


Qi  Lawrence  v.  Porter  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  6th  C. ),  93  Fed.  62,  64,  per  Lurton, 
Cir.  J.;  11  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  27;  22  U. 
S.  A.  483;  26  L.  R  A.  167. 

92  Ligon  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R  Co.,  3 
Willson,  Civ.  Cas.  Ct.  App.  sec.  2. 

9a  Prehn  v.  Royal  Ilk.  of  Liverpool 
L.  R.,  5  Exeh.  Cas.  92,  99,  per  Mar- 
bin,  B. ;  Bank  of  Commerce  ▼.  Goos, 
39  N>b.  437;  23  L.  R.  A.  190,  L93,  per 
Ryan,  C. 

«  Stevens  v.  Sonto,  18  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
929;  2N.  Y.  Supp.  484. 

71 


S  82 


fiEXERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


a  street.95  If,  however,  legal  damages  are  recoverable  under  a 
complaint  setting  forth  a  cause  of  action,  an  error  in  alleging 
special  damages  does  not  invalidate  the  complaint.96  So  an  alle- 
gation of  general  damages  does  not  preclude  an  averment  of 
special  damages.97 

§  82.  Direct  damages.— It  is  a  general  principle  that  there 
should,  in  cases  of  injury  from  a  tort,  be  an  indemnity  to  com- 
pensate the  party  injured  for  the  loss  which  is  the  immediate 
result  of  the  wrongful  act.18  So  one  who  does  a  malicious  or 
illegal  act,  calculated  to  prove  injurious  to  others,  is  responsi- 
ble for  the  direct  consequences  resulting-  therefrom,  even  though 
the  particular  damage  which  followed  was  not  intended  or 
anticipated, "  Or  was  not  known,  or  could  not  have  been  fore- 


95  Cook  v.  Ansonia,  66  Conu.  413; 
34  Atl.  183. 

96  Hoosier  Stone  Co.  v.  Louisville, 
N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (Ind.)31  N.  E. 
365. 

97  Hillv.  Anderson  (Ohio  Supr.  Ct. 
Cin.  1899),  9  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec. 
480. 

When  averment  of  special  dam- 
ages is  sufficient  as  to  loss  of  busi- 
ness, etc.,  of  wife  in  action  by  hus- 
band and  wife  for  injuries  to  her,  see 
Healey  v.  Ballantine  &  Sons  (N.  J. 
1901),  49  Atl.  511;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
155. 

See  further  tliat  special  damages 
must  be  averred,  Donnell  v.  Jones, 
17  Ala.  689;  Tucker  v.  Parks,  7  Colo. 
62;  Colorado  M.  K.  Co.  v.  Trevarthen, 
IColo.  App.  152;  27  Pac.  1012;  Bris- 
tol, etc.,  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201; 
Olmstead  v.  Burke,  25  111.  86;  Chi- 
cago, W.  D.  K.  Co.  v.  Klauber,  9  111. 
App.  613;  Reid  v.  Johnson,  132  Ind. 
416;  31  X.  E.  1107;  Rothschild  v. 
Williamson,  83  Ind.  387;  Teagarden 
v.  Hetfield,  11  Ind.  522;  Reeves  v. 
Andrews,  7  Ind.  207;  Hanna  v.  Pegg, 
1  Blatchf.  (Ind.)  181;  Wilson  v.  Dean, 
10  Iowa,  432;  Wilson  v.  Barnes,  13  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)330;  Hunter  v.  Stewart, 

72 


47  Me.  419;  Hemineway  v.  Woods, 
1  Pick.  (Mass.)  524;  Burnll  v.  New 
York,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  14  Mich.  34; 
Brown  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  80 
Mo.  457;  Burlington  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Emmert,  53  Neb.  237;  73  N.  W.  540; 
Burnside  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  47 
N.  H.  554;  Kraft  v.  Rice,  61  N.  Y. 
Supp.  368;  45  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  569; 
Hoffman  v.  Rudiman,  5  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
326 ;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  214;  Schmit  v.  Dry 
Dock  E.  B.  R.  Co.,  3  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 
257  ;  Uertz  v.  Singer  Mfg.  Co.,  35 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  116;  Hyatt  &  S.  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Gray,  111  N.  C.  92;  15  S.  E.  940; 
Hart  v.  Evans,  8  Pa.  St.  13;  Alstin  v. 
Huggins,  3  Brev.  (S.  C.)  185;  Oh 
Chow  v.  Hallett;  She  At  v.  Same  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  D.  Ore.),  12  Sawy.  (U.  S.) 
259  ;  5  Chic.  Leg.  News,  109;  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  10,469;  Boyden  v.  Burke,  14 
How.  (U.  S.)  575. 

98  Overpeek  v.  Rapid  City  (S.  D. 
1901),  85  N.  W.  990;  10  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  489,  492,  per  Corson,  J.;  Chi- 
cago &  I.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunter  (Ind.), 
27  X.  E.  477. 

99  Vanderburg  v.  Truax,  4  Den. 
(N.  Y.)  464.  "A  person  is  entitled 
to  recover  for  all  consequences  which 
are  the  natural  and  probable  result 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


seen;100  for,  as  it  has  been  declared,  "  the  direct  and  immediate 
consequences  of  the  injurious  act  are  to  be  regarded,"  and  they 
must  naturally  and  reasonably  result  from  defendant's  acta  or 
omission.'  They  also,  in  cases  of  personal  injuries,  include  all 
consequences  thereof,  future,  as  well  as  past,  even  though 
serious  results  have  ensued.3  Again,  in  cases  of  breach  of 
tract,  if  the  losses  resulting  therefrom  are  not  the  direct  and 
natural  consequences  thereof,  by  reason  of  special  circum- 
stances known  to  both  parties  when  the  contract  was  made, 
they  must,  in  order  to  justify  a  recovery,  be  such  as  could,  in 
view  of  the  circumstances,  have  been  foreseen  and  estimated 
with  reasonable  certainty;  '  and  if  the  damages  arise  from  cir- 
cumstances peculiar  to  the  particular  case,  and  are  not  the 
natural  result  thereof,  such  circumstances  must  be  known  to 
the  party  who  broke  the  contract.5  This  question,  however,  of 
direct  damages  and  of  natural  and  probable  consequences,  is  so 
closely  involved  with  that  of  proximate,  remote,  uncertain, 
speculative,  contingent  and  consequential  damages/'  that  the 
reader  is  referred  to  the  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter, 
wherein  these  questions  are  fully  considered. 


of  injuries  negligently  intlicted  upon 
him  by  another,  that  is,  for  those 
consequences  which  the  common  ex- 
perience of  men  justify  us  in  believ- 
ing will  result  from  an  injury." 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  K.  Co.  v. 
Willey,  57  Kan.  764  ;  48  Par.  25, 
per  Duster,  Ch.  .1.:  Watson  v.  Rhein- 
derknecht  (Minn.  L901),  84  N'.  W. 
798;  Me  Allen  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg. 
Co.,  79  Tex.  243;  7  S.  W.  715.  See 
sec.  89,  herein. 

i°°  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wood  i  End.),  I  I  X.  E,  572. 

i  Galveston,  li.  &  S.  A.  II.  Co.  v. 
Zantzinger  (Tex.  lS'JS),  4S  S.  W. 
503  ;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  177,  483,  per 
Gaines,  Ch.  J. 

-  Victorian  Ry.  Cornmrs,  v.  ( 'oultas, 
L.  R.  13  App.  Cas.  222  ;  The  Xotting 
Hill,  L.  R.  '•'  Prob.  Div.  105  (Eng. 
C.  A.);  .lex  v.  Strauss,  L22  X.  V.  293  ; 
33   N.  Y.  St.  R.  448  ;   29   X.    E.  478, 


aff'g  22  J.  &  S.  52.     See  sees.  88,  89, 
herein. 

Gainard  v.  Rochester,  C.  &  B.  R. 
Co.,  50  Hun  (N.  Y.),  22  ;  S.  C,  121 
N.  Y.  (5(30  ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  470  ;  18 
St.  R.  692. 

4  Kelley  v.  Fahrney  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  Ark.  1899),  97  Fed.  176. 

■■  Brauer  v.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav. 
Co.,  (it)  X.  Y.  St.  R.  465  ;  34  Misc. 
127,  mod'd  7::  X.  Y.  Supp.  291. 

G  See  generally  as  to  these  dam- 
ages, Central  of  Georgia  R.  Co.  v. 
Edwards,  111  Ga.  528;  36 S.  E.  810  j 
8  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  595,  599,  600  ;  Civ. 
Code,  Ga.  sees.  8912,  3913  ;  Kiernan 
v.  Chicago,  S.  F.  &  ('.  R.Co.,  123111. 
188;  14  N.  E.  18  ;  11  W.  632  ; 
Indiana,  1).  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  113 
I  ml.  308;  15  X.  E.  451  ;  12  W. 
910;  Carraher  v.  Allen  (Iowa.  1000), 
83  X  W.  902  ;  Corrister  v.  Kansas 
City,   St.  J.   A:    C.    B.    R.   Co.,  25   Mo. 

73 


§83 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


§  83.  Consequential  damages — The  question  as  to  the  re- 
coveiy  of  consequential  damages  is  controlled  not  only  by  the 
form  of  the  action  and  the  pleadings,  but  also  depends  upon 
whether  the  particular  damages  claimed  to  have  been  sustained 
can  be  said  to  be  a  proximate  and  natural  result  of  the  original 
wrongful  act.7  .  In  this  class  of  damages,  for  which  recovery  may 
be  had  in  some  cases,  are  included  those  for  mental  suffering, 


App.  619  ;  Brink  v.  Wabash  R.  Co., 
160  Mo.  87  ;  60  S.  W.  1058  ;  Brauer 
v.  Oceanic  S.  N.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  Supp. 
465  ;    35    Misc.     127,    mod'd    73    N. 
Y.    Supp.    291  ;    First    Nat.    Bk.    v. 
Burger,  9  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  824  ; 
Gaar  v.  Snook,    1   Ohio  C.   D.    142  ; 
Sullivan  Co.  v.  Ruth,   106  Teun.  85  ; 
59  S.   W.   138  ;    City  of   Antonio   v. 
Smith   (Tex.  1900),   59   S.   W.   1109  ; 
Fowler    v.    Shook    (Tex.   Civ.   App. 
1900),  59  S.  W.  282  ;  Smith  v.  City  of 
Antonio  (Tex.  1900),  57  S.  W.  881  ; 
Atlantic   &   D.   R.    Co.   v.   Delaware 
Const.  Co.,  98  Va.  503  ;  37  S.  E.  13  ; 
2  Ya.  Sup.  Co.  Rep.  430  ;  Smith  v. 
Bolles,  132  U.  S.  125  ;  10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
39  ;  33  L.  Ed.  279  ;  23  Ohio  L.  J.  57. 
7  "We  may  as  well  consider  here 
as  anywhere  what  we  are  to  under- 
stand    by    consequential     damages; 
when  are  they  so  related  to  the  cause 
to  which  they  are  ascribed  as  to  be  in 
legal  view  clearly  ascribable  to  it, 
flowing  from  it  and  proximate  to  it. 
Every  judge  will  agree  that  all  dam- 
ages must  be  the  result  of  the  injury 
complained  of,  whether  it  consist  in 
the  withholding   of  a  legal  right  or 
the  breach  of  a  duty  legally  owed  to 
the  plaintiff.     If  they  necessarily  re- 
sult, such  as  the  loss  of  the  value  of 
an  article  of  property  which   is  car- 
ried away  or  destroyed,  or  of  a  sum 
of  money  which  is  not  paid  to  the 
plaintiff  according  to  the  contract,  or 
the  loss  of  time  and  the  endurance  of 
pain  consequent  upon  having  one's 
limb  fractured,  they  are  called  gen- 

74 


eral  damages  and  may  be  shown  un- 
der the  ad  damnum,  or  general  alle- 
gation of  damages,  for  the  defendant 
does  not  need  notice  of  such  conse- 
quences for  his  defense;  he  knows 
that  they  must  exist  of  course  and 
that  they  are  proximate  and  will  be 
in  evidence  on  the  trial.  But  if  cer- 
tain injuries  and  losses  do  not  neces- 
sarily result  from  the  defendant's 
wrongful  act,  but  in  fact  follow  it  as 
a  natural  and  proximate  consequence, 
they  are  called  special  and  must  be 
specially  alleged  that  the  defendant 
may  have  notice  and  be  prepared  to 
go  into  the  inquiry.  ...  In  all  cases 
the  litigant  parties  must  be  confined 
to  the  principal  transaction  com- 
plained of  and  to  its  attendant  cir- 
cumstances and  natural  results. 
These  results  include  all  the  damages 
to  the  plaintiff  of  which  the  injurious 
act  of  the  defendant  was  the  efficient 
cause,  though  in  point  of  time  such 
damage  did  not  occur  until  sometime 
after  the  act  done.  Damages  are 
often  recovered  down  to  the  time  of 
trial  and  even  after,  if  the  jury  are 
satisfied  from  the  nature  of  the  wrong 
proved  upon  the  defendant  that  the 
consequences  are  likely  to  follow  in 
the  natural  course  of  things.  .  .  . 
Speculative  and  possible  losses,  such 
as  specific  profits  in  business,  do  not 
fall  within  the  rule,  for  they  are  too 
contingent  and  remote."  Bristol 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28  Conn.  201, 
211,  212,  per  Ellsworth,  J. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAl 


§84 


indignity,  insult  or  fright,"  loss  of  profits,9  expenses    and  future 

or  prospective  losses,"  all  of  which  are  more  fully  treated  in  this 
work  under  the  particular  actions  where  their  recovery  has  heen 
sought. 

§  84.  Proximate  cause. — If  the  loss  proceeds  inevitably  and 
of  absolute  necessity  from  a  speciiied  cause,  that  will  be  the 
proximate  cause;  and  where  a  certain  result  usually  and  natu- 
rally follows  from  a  certain  cause,  the  one  may  be  deemed  to 
sustain  an  immediate  relation  to  the  other,  but  neither  of  these 
propositions  constitutes  the  sole  test  whereby  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  loss  may  be  ascertained.  If  there  are  different 
agencies,  each  of  which  conduces  to  the  loss,  the  moving  effi- 


8  Kellyville  Coal  Co.  v.  Yehuka,  94 
111.  App.  74;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  K.  Co. 
v.  Christison,  39  111.  App.  495;  Eders 
v.  Skannal,  35  La.  Ann.  1000;  State 
v.  Weinel,  13  Mo.  App.  583;  Shay  v. 
Camden  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (X.  J.  1901),  49 
Atl.  547;  Williams  v.  Underbill,  63 
App.  Div.  (N.  V.  I  228;  71  X.  Y.  Supp. 
291;  O'Flaherty  v.  Xassau  Elec.  R. 
Co.,  105  N.  Y.  624;  59  X.  E.  1128;  Ft. 
Worth  &  X.  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  25  S.  W.  1032. 

9  Borden  City  lee  &  Coal  Co.  v. 
Adams,  69  Ark.  219;  62  S.  \V.  591; 
Nightingale  v.  Scannell,  18  Cal.  315; 
Gregory  v.  Brook,  35  Conn.  437;  95 
Am.  Dec.  278;  Blood  v.  Herring,  22 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1725;  01  S.  W.  273; 
Stewart  v.  Patton,  65  Mo.  App.  21;  2 
Mo.  App.  Rej).  1143;  Cranford  v. 
Parsons,  63  X.  H.  438;  Schile  v. 
Brokhahns,  80  N.  V.  614;  Kyle  v. 
Ohio  River  Co.  (  W.  Va.  1901 1,  38  S.  K. 
489.  The  extent  of  the  loss  must, 
however,  he  shown  with  reasonable 
certainty,  Stewart  v.  Patton,  65  Mo. 
App.  21;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  1143,  and 
must  be  the  natural  and  proximate 
result  of  the  act  complained  of.  Med- 
bury  v.  X.  V.  &  E.  K.  Co.,  26  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  564;  Walter  v.  Post,  6  Duer 
(X.  Y.),  315;  St.  John  v.  Xew  York, 


6  Duer  (X.  Y.),  315;  13  How.  Pr. 
527;  Bennett  v.  Drew,  3  Bos.  (X.  V.) 
355;  Albert  v.  Bleecker  St.  &  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Daly  (X.  Y. ).  389;  Tuttle  v. 
Hannegan,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  92. 

io  Brown  v.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  36  Ga. 
377;  McPheters  v.  Moose  River  L.  D. 
Co.,  78  Me.  329;  5  Atl.  270;  Benson 
v.  Maiden  &  M.  G.  Co.,  6  Allen 
(Mass),  149;  Ohiliger  v.  Toledo,  l'O 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  142;  10  O.  C.  I).  7<.2. 

11  Rockland  Water  Co.  v.  Tillson, 
69  Me.  255;  Still  v.  Jenkins.  15  X.  J. 
L.  302.  Damages  for  prospective  loss 
in  action  for  personal  injury  are  not 
recoverable  in  absence  of  evidence  as 
to  permanency  of  injury.  Noonan  v. 
Obermeyer  &  Liebman  Brew.  c>.,  50 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)377;  63  X.  Y.  Supp. 
10(16;  7  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  556.  When 
recoverable  for  breach  of  contract. 
Fall  v.  McRee,  36  Ala.  61;  Ennis  v. 
Buckeye  Pub.  Co.,  44  Minn.  105;  46 
N.  W.  314;  Pales  v.  Beraenway,  64 
Me.  373;  Tiffin  v.  War.].  5  Oreg,  450. 
When  not  recoverable,  see  Vance  v. 
Towne,  13  La.  225;  Hunt  v.  Tibbette, 
7d  Me.  221;  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  24 
Mich.  426;  Terry  v.  Beatrice  Starch 
Co.,  13  Neb.  866;  62  N.  W.  255; 
Skinner  v.  Tinker.  .'14  Bail),  i  V  Y.  | 
333;  Gordon  v.  Brewster,  7  Wis.  355. 

75 


§  84 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


cient  cause  nearest  iu  the  point  of  time  may  be  considered ;  but 
if  one  cause  be  merely  the  nearest  and  another  the  adequate 
efficient  cause,  the  efficient  cause  is  the  proximate  one,  for  close- 
ness in  the  order  of  time  in  which  certain  things  occur  is  not 
necessarily  the  test.  If  an  efficient  adequate  cause  be  found,  it 
is  to  be  considered,  unless  some  other  cause,  not  incidental  to  it, 
but  independent  of  it,  is  shown  to  have  intervened  between  it 
and  the  result.  The  act  may  be  the  primary  cause  operating 
through  an  unbroken  successive  chain  of  events,  which  form  a 
continuous  whole,  in  which  case  said  act  is  considered  the  proxi- 
mate cause,  but  if  the  loss  may  be  attributed  to  a  new  and  con- 
trolling influence,  an  independent  event  intervening,  whereby 
the  chain  of  successive  events  is  broken,  then  the  act  which  set 
in  motion  the  successive  causes  may  become  too  remote  to  be 
considered.12     So  the  question   whether  an  original  wrongful 


12  3  Joyce  on  Insurance,  sec.  2834. 
"  The  proximate  cause  is  the  efficient 
cause,  the  one  that  necessarily  sets 
the  other  causes  in  motion.  The 
causes  that  are  merely  incidental  or 
instruments  of  a  superior  or  con- 
trolling agency  are  not  the  proxi- 
mate causes  and  the  responsible  ones, 
though  they  may  be  nearer  in  time 
to  the  result.  It  is  only  when  the 
causes  are  independent  of  each  other 
that  the  nearest  is  of  course  to  be 
charged  with  the  disaster."  ^Etna 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Boon,  95  U.  S.  117,  130. 
See  also  the  G.  R.  Booth,  171  U.  S. 
455,  461 ;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  y.  Charles- 
ton Bridge  Co.,  65  Fed.  632;  Good- 
lander  Mill  Co.  v.  Standard  Oil  Co., 
63  Fed.  405;  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Mosely,  57  Fed.  925;  Union  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Callahan,  56  Fed.  992;  Scott 
v.  Shepherd,  2  W.  Bl.  892.  As  sus- 
taining the  general  principles  stated 
in  the  text,  see  the  following  cases: 
Jacobsen  v.  Dalles  P.  &  A.  Nav. 
Co.,  93  Fed.  975;  The  Joseph  B. 
Thomas,  86  Fed.  658;  56  U.  S.  App. 
619;  30  C.  C.  A.  333;  Hunter  v.  Kan- 
sas City  &   M.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  85  Fed. 

76 


379;  54  U.  S.  App.  653;  29  C.  C.  A. 
206;  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ballentine,  84  Fed.  935;  56  U.  S. 
App.  266;  28  C.  C.  A.  572;  Kowalski 
v.  Chic.  G.  W.  R.  Co.,  84  Fed.  586; 
Brisco  v.  Mimah  Consol.  Min.  Co., 
82  Fed.  952;  Ross  v.  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.,  81  Fed.  676;  30  Chic.  L. 
N.  29;  52  U.  S.  App.  290;  26  C.  C.  A. 
564;  Mayer  v.  Thompson-Hutchin- 
son  Bldg.  Co.,  116  Ala.  634;  22  So. 
859,  22  So.  593;  Farmers  H.  L. 
C.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Westlake,  23  Colo. 
26;  46  Pac.  134;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bedell,  11  Colo.  App.  139;  54 
Pac.  280;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
U.  S.  141;  District  of  Cal.  v.  Derap- 
sey,  13  App.  D.  C.  533;  27  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  87;  31  Chic.  L.  N.  217;  Central  of 
Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  106  Ga.  176;  43 
L.  R.  A.  402;  32  S.  E.  77;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  283;  McGregor 
v.  Reid,  M.  &  Co.,  178  111.  464;  53  N. 
E.  323;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  28,  rev'g 
76  111.  App.  610;  Louisville,  N.  A.  & 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Heck,  151  Ind.  292;  50 
N.  E.  988;  11  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  382;  Cox  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  102  Iowa,  711;   72  N.  W.  301  ; 


GENBEAL   PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


act  was  the  proximate  cause  of  an  accident  or  injury  where 
other  agencies  intervened,  depends  upon  whether  such  original 
act  was  the  antecedent,  efficient  and  dominant  cause  which  put 
the  other  causes  in  operation.13 

§85.  Proximate  cause  continued. — The  maxim,  .ansa 
proxima  non  remota  spectator,"  is  not  controlled  by  time  or 
distance,  nor  by  the  succession  of  events."     But  where  an  effi- 

9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  804;  I  AfL  121;  43  W.  N.  C.  389;  29  Pitts. 
Kansas  City  Car  &  F.  Co.  v.  Sechrist,   L.  J.  X.   S.  310;  Cochran  v.    Phila 


5!)  Kan.  778;  54  Pac.  G88;  Illinois 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wizell,  100  Ky.  235; 
38  S.  \V.  5;  6  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  337;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  738;  Stone 
v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  171  Mass. 
536;  41  L.  R.  A.  794;  51  N.  E.  1; 
4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  490;  Smeizel  v.  Oda- 
nah  Iron  Co.,  116  Mich.  149;  74  N. 
W.  488;  4  Det.  L.  N.  1111;  Lam- 
beck  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  I.  R.  Co., 
106  Mich.  512;  64  N.  W.  479;  2  Det. 
L.  N.  536;  Smithson  v.  Chic.  Gr.  W. 
R.  Co.,  71  Minn.  216;  73  N.  W.  853; 
11  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  726; 
Aldrich  v.  Concord  &  M.  R.  Co.,  67 
X.  H.  380;  36   Atl.  252;  McCann  v. 


&  R.  T.  R.  Co.,  184  Pa.  St.  565;  39 
Atl.  296;  Willis  v.  Prov.  Teleg.  Pub. 
Co.,  20  R.  1.  285;  38  Atl.  947;  State 
v.  Ruth,  9  S.  D.  84;  68  X.  W. 
189;  Anderson  v.  Miller,  96  Tenn. 
:;:,;  33  s.  W.  615;  31  L.  R.  A.  604; 
International  ct  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
Downing,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  643;  41 
8.  W.  190;  Thompson  v.  .Salt  Lake 
Rap.  Trans.  Co.,  16  Utah,  281;  40  L. 
R.  A.  172;  52  Pac.  92;  10  Am.  ifc  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  563;  Isham  v.  Dow's 
Estate,  70  Vt.  588;  45  L.  R.  A.  87. 
67  Am.  St.  Rep.  691;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep; 
106;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  13;  Fowlka 
v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  96  Va.  742;  32  S. 


Xewark  A-  S.  O.  R.  Co.,  58  X.  J.  L.  E.  464;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
642;  33  L.  R.  A.  127;  34  Atl.  1052;  4  250:  1  Va.  S.  C.  Rep.  146;  Crouse  v. 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  382;  Laid-  Chic.  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.,  102  Wis.  196: 
law  v.  Sage,  158  X.  Y.  73;  52  X.  E.  I  78  X.  W.  446;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
679;  44  L.   R.   A.  216,  rev'g  2   App.    X.  S.  780;  Eoley  v.  East  Flamborough 


Div.  374;  73  X.  Y.  St.  R.  469;  37  X.  V. 
Supp.  770;  Kennedy  v.  Mayor,  73 
X.  Y.  365;  29  Am.  Rep.  169;  Meyer  v. 
Haven,  37  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  194;  55 
X.  Y.  Supp.  864;  Lehman  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  305;  51  X. 
Y.  Supp.  524;  Storey  v.  Xew  York, 
29  App.  Div.  (3  X.  Y.)  316;  51  X.  Y. 
Supp.  580;  Laible  v.  Xew  York  C.  & 
II.  K.  R.  Co.,  13  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.) 
574;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  1003;  Crampton 
v.  Ivie,  124  X.  C.  591;  32  S.  E.  968; 
Berry  v.  Sugar  Notch,  191  Pa.  St. 
345;  43  Atl.  240;  Card  v.  Columbia, 
191  Pa.  St.  254;  43  Atl.  217:  Heister 
v.  Fawn   Twp.,  189  Pa.  St.  253;  42 


Twp.,  26  Ont.  App.  43. 

W  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans.  52 
Xeb.  50;  71  X.  W.  1062.  See  also 
Alabama,  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  so 
Ala.  600;  East  Tenn.  V.  *  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lockhart,  79  Ala.  315;  Rickei  v. 
Freeman,  50  X.  II.  420;  9  Am.  Rep, 
267;  Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn  City  A-  N. 
R.  Co.,  36  X.  Y.  39;  39  Am.  Dec.  490; 
Jordan  v.  Wyatt,  4  Crat.  |  Va.)  151; 
47  Am.  Dec.  720. 

14  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  62  Pa. 
St.  353;  4  Western  Jurist,  254;  Kel- 
logg v.  Chic.  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  26 
Wis.  223;  7  Am.  Rep.  69. 

77 


§§  86,  87  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 

cient  adequate  cause  has  been  discovered,  that  is  to  be  deemed 
the  true  cause,  unless  some  new  cause  not  incidental  to  but  in- 
dependent of  the  first  shall  be  found  to  intervene  between  it 
and  the  first.15  And  where  one  of  two  causes  combine  to  pro- 
duce an  injury,  both  of  which  are  in  their  nature  proximate, 
one  being  culpable  negligence  of  the  defendant  without  which 
the  accident  would  not  have  happened,  and  the  other  some  ac- 
cident for  which  neither  party  is  responsible,  the  defendant  is 
liable  in  damages.16 

§  86.  Proximate  cause  for  jury. — The  question  as  to  the 
proximate  cause  of  an  injury  is  ordinarily  one  of  fact  for  the 
jury,17  except  where  the  evidence  is  not  contradictory  and  the 
case  is  clear,  when  it  may  be  for  the  court.18  The  determination, 
however,  of  the  jury  upon  this  question  may  be  set  aside,  where 
it  is  clearly  against  the  weight  of  evidence.19 

§  87.  Natural  aud  proximate  result  of  act  complained  of. 

— The  object  of  an  action  for  damages  being  to  recover  compen- 
sation for  the  loss  or  damage  sustained,  it  is  a  general  rule  that 
in  the  absence  of  circumstances  which  would  justify  an  award 
of  punitive  damages,  only  such  damages  are  recoverable  as  are 
the  natural  and  proximate  result  of  the  act  complained  of,* 


15  Marble  v.  City  of  Worcester,  4 
Gray  (Mass.),  412,  per  Thomas,  J.; 
Kellogg  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  26 
Wis.  223;  7  Am.  Rep.  69. 

16  Leeds  v.  New  York  Teleph.  Co. 
(N.  Y.  1901),  64  App.  Div.  (1ST.  Y.) 
484;  10  Am.  Neg.  Cas.  435,  438,  per 
Sewell,  J.,  citing  Sawyer  v.  City  of 
Amsterdam,  20  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.) 
227;  Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn  City  &  N. 
R.  Co.,  36  X.  Y.  39;  9  Am.  Neg.  Cas. 
619;  King  v.  City  of  Cohoes,  77  N. 
Y.  83;  Cohen  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  N. 
Y.,  113  N.  Y.  532;  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
509;  21  N.  E.  700;  Phillips  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  127  N.Y.  657; 
3  Silv.  C.  A.  467;  38  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
675;  27  N.  E.  978. 

17  Postal  Teleg.  Cable  Co.  v.  Zopfi, 
43  U.  S.  App.   141;  19  C.   C.   A.  605; 

78 


73  Fed.  609;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Craig,  37  U.  S.  App.  654;  19  C.  C. 
A.  631;  73  Fed.  642;  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Needham,  32  U.  S.  App. 
635;  16  C.  C.  A.  457;  69  Fed.  823; 
Colorado  Mortg.  &  I.  Co.  (Colo.),  42 
Pac.  42;  Kitchen  v.  Carter,  47  Neb. 
776;  66  N.  W.  855;  Pickens  v.  South 
Carolina  &  G.  R.  Co.,  54  So.  C.  498; 
32  S.  E.  567;  Klatt  v.  Foster  Lumber 
Co.,  92  Wis.  622,  628;  66  N.  W.  791, 
793. 

18  Schwartz  v.  Shull,  45  W.  Va. 
405;  31  S.  E.  R.  914;  5  Am.  Neg.  R. 
496;  Klatt  v.  Foster  Lumber  Co.,  92 
Wis.  622,  628;  66  N.  W.  791,  793. 

19  Kitchen  v.  Carter,  47  Neb.  776; 
66  N.  W.  855. 

20  The  Normannia,  62  Fed.  469, 
481;  Brantley  v.  Gunn,  29  Ala.  387; 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    KAMA' 


§87 


and  this  is  true  whether  the  damages  arise  from  the  withhold- 
ing of  a  Legal  right  or  the  breach  of  a  Legal  duty,"  or  whether 
the  action  be  in  conl  ract  or  tort,28  or  whether  the  damages  claimed 
are  general  or  special.-3  Again,  if  the  damages  are  the  natural 
and  proximate  consequences  of  the  wrongful  act,  the  degree  of 
the  probability  of  their  occurrence  is  not  to  be  considered.31  The 
burden  of  proof,  however,  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  to 
show  that  the  injury  was  the  proximate  result  of  the  act  com- 
plained of,  rests  upon  the  plaintiff."      lint  those  damages  which 


Kelly  v.  Altemus,  34  Ark.  184;  36 
Am.  Rep.  36;  Anderson  v.  Taylor, 
66  Cal.  131;  38  Am.  Rep.  52;  Chides 
ter  v.  Consul.  Peoples  Ditch  I 
Cal.  56;  Streeter  v.  Marshall  Silver 
Min.  Co.,  4  Colo.  535;  Gregory  v. 
Brooks,  35  Conn.  437;  '•»:)  Am.  Dec. 
278;  Bristol  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Giidley,  28 
Conn.  201;  Johnson  v.  Drummond, 
16  111.  App.  641;  Bullman  v.  Ind.  C. 
&  L.  R.  Co.,  76  Ind.  166;  40  Am. 
Rep.  230;  Georgia  v.  Kepford,  45 
Iowa.  48;  Bosch  v.  Burlington  & 
Mo.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  402;  24  Am.  Rep. 
754;  City  of  Topeka  v.  Tattle,  5 
Kan.  311;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Shook,  3  Kan.  App.  710;  47  Pac.  685; 
Thorns  v.  Dingley,  70  Me.  100;  35 
Am.  Rep.  310;  Noxon  v.  Hill,  2 
Allen  (Mass.),  215;  Krueger  v.  Le 
Blanc,  62  Mich.  70;  28  X.  W.  757; 
Griggs  v.  Fleckenstein,  14  Minn.  81; 
100  Am.  Dec.  100;  Chamberlain  v. 
Porter,  0  Minn.  260;  Fitzgerald  v. 
Fitzgerald  &  M.  C.  Co.  (Neb.  1805), 
62  N.  W.  899;  Lamb  v.  Baker,  34 
Neb.  485;  52  N.  W.  285;  Warwick  v. 
Hutchinson,  45  X.  .1.  L.  61;  Kuhn  v. 
Neeb,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  647;  Ton  Eyck  v. 
Del.  &  R.  Canal  Co.,  18  X.  J.  L.  200; 
37  Am.  Dec.  233;  Cuff  v.  Newark  & 
N.  Y.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  X.  J.  L.  17;  10 
Am.  Rep.  205;  Ehrgotl  v.  Ww  York, 
96  N.  Y.  264,  rev'g  06  How.  Pr. 
161;  Baker  v.  Drake.  53  V  V.  211; 
13  Am.  Rep.  507;  Medbury  v.  X.  V. 
&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  X.  A'.  564;  Knight 


v.  Wilcox,  14  X.  Y.  413,  rev'g  18 
Barb.  212;  Walrath  v.  Redtield,  11 
X.  Y.  212;  Lawrence  v.  Wardwell,  6 
X.  Yr.  423;  Freeman  v.  Clute,  3  X.  Y. 
42  1;  Nil.-s  v.  X.  Y.  C.  &  B.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  58;  43 
N.  Y.  Supp.  751;  Foels  v.  Tona- 
wauda,  59  Hun  (X.  Y.),  ^>1;  38 
\.  V.  St.  R.  126;  14  X.  Y.  Supp.  46; 
Hallock  v.  Belcher,  42  Barb.  I  N.  Y.) 
199;  People  v.  Albany,  5  Lans. 
(N.  Y.)  524;  Butler  v.  Kent.  10 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  223;  Jackson  v.  Hall, 
84  N.  C.  489;  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Egbert,  36  Pa.  St.  360;  78  Am.  Dec. 
382;  Harrison  v.  Berkley,  1  Strob. 
(S.  C.)  525;  47  Am.  Dec.  578;  Collins 
v.  East  Penn.  Y.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  56 
Tenn.  841;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  16  Tex.  Civ.  A.  93;  40  S.  W. 
608;  Dem.  Pub.  Co.  v.  Jones,  83 
Tex.  302;  18  S.  W.  652;  Victorian 
Ry.  Commrs.  v.  Coultas,  57  L.  J.  P. 
C.  69;  13  App.  Cas.  22;  58  L.  T.  390; 
37  W.  R,  L29;  52  J.  P.  500;  Glover  v. 
I..  A  S.  W.  Ry.,  37  L.  J.  Q.  B.  57;  L. 
R.  3  Q.  B.  25;  17  L.  T.  139;  OByrne 
v.  Campbell,  15  Ont.  R.  339. 

-1  Warwick  v.  Hutchinson,  45 
N.  J.  L.  61. 

■-'-  Baker  v.  Drake,  5:*,  X.  Y.  211;  13 
Am.  Rep.  507. 

28  Chamberlain  v.  Porter,  9  Minn. 
260. 

-■»  Harrison  v.  Berkley,  1  Strob. 
(S.  C.)  52:.;    17  Am.  Dec.  578. 

26  McCarty  v.   Lockport,    13   App. 

79 


§§  88,  89  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 

are  the  natural  and  proximate  result  of  the  injury  need  not  be 
specially  pleaded  by  him.86 

§  88.  Proximate  consequences  illustrated. — The  pay- 
ment of  a  tax  charged  against  a  person  by  an  illegal  alteration 
of  an  assessment  list  is  a  consequential  injury  resulting  from  the 
alteration  and  for  which  recovery  may  be  had.27  And  there  may 
be  a  recovery  for  damages  caused  by  horses  running  away, 
in  consequence  of  stepping  into  a  hole  in  the  street.28  But 
damages  caused  by  the  ignition  of  oil  negligently  allowed  to 
escape  where  such  ignition  is  caused  by  the  act  of  a  third 
person  are  too  remote,  the  negligence  in  permitting  the  oil  to 
escape  not  being  the  proximate  cause  of  the  damage  sustained  r9 
nor  is  an  injury  to  a  crop  resulting  from  the  taking  of  an  animal 
needed  in  its  cultivation,  a  proximate  consequence  of  such  tak- 
ing ;  :5°  nor  is  deterioration  from  cultivation  of  the  soil,  where 
damages  are  claimed  for  clearing  land  of  timber; 31  nor  is  sick- 
ness of  an  opera  singer  and  loss  of  anticipated  receipts  in 
consequence  thereof,  where  the  action  is  for  negligence  in  fail- 
ing to  complete  an  opera  house  in  time.33 

§  89.  Natural  and  probable  consequences — Those  in  con- 
templation of  parties — Contracts. — In  the  application  of  the 
rule  that  the  damages  to  be  recovered  must  be  the  natural  and 
proximate  consequence  of  the  act  complained  of,  those  results 
which  the  wrongdoer  must  have  contemplated  as  the  probable 
consequence  of  his  fraud  or  breach  of  contract  will  be  consid- 
ered as  proximate.33  Damages  which  are  the  natural  and  prob- 
able consequences  of  the  breach  of  a  contract,  that  is,  such  as 
may  be  said  to  have  been  in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties 
at  the  time  of  entering  into  the  contract  as  a  natural  and  prob- 


Div.   (N.   Y.)  494;    43   N.   Y.   Supp. 
693. 

26  Croco  v.  Oregon  Short-Line  R. 
Co.,  18  Utah,  311;  44  L.  R.  A.  285; 
54  Pac.  985. 

27  Bristol  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gridley,  28 
Conn.  201. 

28  City  of  Topeka  v.  Tuttle,  5  Kan. 
311. 

80 


29  Neal  v.  Atlantic  Ref.  Co.,  16  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  R.  241;  4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  49. 

so  Jackson  v.  Hall,  84  N.  C.  489. 

3i  Brantley  v.  Gunn,  29  Ala.  387. 

32  New  York  Academy  of  Music  v. 
Hilton,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  217. 

83  Smith  v.  Bolles,  132  U.  S. 
125. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OP    DAMAGES. 


§90 


able  result  of  a  breach  thereof,  may  be  recovered.  '  But  it  lias 
been  held  that  an  instruction  is  erroneous  which  fixes  the  'lam- 
ages  as  such  as  both  parties  reasonably  contemplated  at  the 
time  of  making  the  contract,  since  the  facts  being  ascertained, 

the  law  and  not  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  fixes  the 
measure  of  damage 

§00.  Natural  and  probable  consequences — Torts. — In  ac- 
tions in  tort  there  may  be  a  recovery  of  damages  for  those  injuries 
which  may  be  said  to  be  the  natural  and  probable  consequences 
of  the  wrongful  act  complained  of  and  proximately  resulting 
therefrom.*      But  in   this  class   of  actions   the   rule   is   much 


a*  Smith  v.  Holies,  132  U.S.  125: 
Gunter  v.  Heard.  93  Ala.  227:  9  So. 
389;  Swift  v.  Eastern  Warehouse, 
86  Ala.  294;  5  So.  505;  Mitchell  v. 
Clarke,  71  Cal.  163;  60  Am.  Kep. 
529;  Brock  v.  Gale,  14  Fla.  523;  14 
Am.  Rep.  356;  Stewart  v.  Lainer,  75 
Ga.  582;  O'Connor  v.  Nolan,  64  111. 
App.  357;  Cincinnati  &  C.  Air  Line 
Co.  v.  Rogers.  24  Ind.  103;  Graves  v. 
Glass,  86  Iowa,  261;  53  X.  W. 
231;  Blood  v.  Herring,  22  Ky.  Law 
Kep.  1725;  til  S.  W.  273;  Dwyer  v. 
Tulane  Ed.  F.  Adm.,  47  La.  Ann. 
1232;  17  So.  796;  La.  Rev.  Civ. 
Code,  sec  1934;  Williams  v.  Barton, 
13  La.  404;  Furstenburg  v.  Fawsett, 
61  Md.  184;  Abbott  v.  Galch,  L3  Bid. 
314;  71  Am.  Dec.  635;  Wetmore  v. 
Pattison,  45  Mich.  439;  8  X.  W. 
67;  Hopkins  v.  Sanford,  38  Mich. 
611;  Hatchings  v.  Ladd,  10  Mich. 
493;  Pruitt  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R. 
Co.,  62  Mo.  527;  Hyatt  v.  Hannibal 
&  St.  J.  R.  Co..  19  Mo.  App.  287; 
Skirm  v.  Hilliker  i  N.  J.  Sup.  1901  |, 
4:,  Atl.  679;  Booth  v.  Spuyten  Duy- 
vil  R.  M.  Co.,  til)  N.  V.  1ST;  Hamil- 
ton v.  McPherson,  28  N.  Y.  72:  84 
Am.  Dec.  330;  Taylor  v.  Read,  I 
PaigefN.  Y".),561;  Billmeyer v. Wag- 
ner, 91  Pa.  St.  92;  Finch  v.  Heer- 
mans,   5   Luz.   Leg.    Reg.   (Pa.)    125; 


State  v.  Ward.  9  Heisk.  (Tenu.)  100; 
Fowler  v.  Shook  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1900),  59  s.  W.  282;  Galveston  H. 
&S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stovall,  3  Willson 
Civ.  ''as.  Ct.  App.  (Tex.)  sec.  252; 
Cockburn  v.  Ashland  Lumber  Co., 
54  Wis.  019;  12  N.  W.  49;  Hadley 
v.  Haxendale,  9  Kxeh.  341;  26  Eng. 
L.  &  Eq.  R.  398;  Joyce  on  Elec. 
Law,  sees.  823,  951,  '■>■>-. 

35  Collins  v.  Stephens.  58  Ala.  543. 

se McAfee  v.  Crawford,  13  How. 
(U.  S.)  447:  14  L.  Ed.  217;  Frink  v. 
Schroyer,  18  111.  416:  Rillinan  v.  ind. 
C.  &  L.  R.  Co..  76  Ind.  166;  40  Am. 
Rep.  230;  Binford  v.  Johnston,  82 
Ind.  426;  42  Am.  Rep.  508;  John- 
son  v.  Courts,  3  Har.  &  M.  i  Md.) 
570;  Derry  v.  Flitner,  118  Mass.  131; 
Watson  v.  Rheinderknecht  (Minn. 
1901),  84  X.  W.  798;  Hughes  v.  Mc- 
Donough,  43  X.  .1.  I>.  459;  39  Am. 
Rep.  60:',:  City  of  Allegheny  v.  Zim- 
merman, '.'.".  Pa.  St.  287.  "  ordi- 
narily in  actions  of  torts,  the  rule  of 
damages  is  compensation     in    money 

for  the  damage  sustained  by  reason 
of  the  natural  and  obvious  eon- 
Bequences  of  the  wrongful  art.  I 
believe  the  doctrine  of  remote  anil 
proximate  causes  has  finally  re- 
duced itself  to  this.  The  wrongful 
aet  is  the  proximate  cause  of  all  the 

-1 


§90 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 


broader  than  in  the  case  of  contracts.07  Thus  it  is  said  that  "  the 
universal  and  cardinal  principle  in  such  cases  is  that  the  person 
injured  shall  receive  compensation  commensurate  with  his  loss 
or  injury  and  no  more.  This  includes  damages  not  only  for 
such  injurious  consequences  as  proceed  immediately  from  the 
cause  which  is  the  basis  of  the  action,  but  consequential  damages 
as  well.  These  damages  are  not  limited  or  affected  so  far  as 
they  are  compensatory  by  what  was  in  fact  contemplated  by  the 
party  in  fault.  He  who  is  responsible  for  a  negligent  act  must 
answer  'for  all  the  injurious  results  which  flow  therefrom  by 
ordinary,  natural  consequences,  without  the  interposition  of  any 
other  negligent  act  or  overpowering  force.'  Whether  the  injuri- 
ous consequences  may  have  been  '  reasonably  expected  '  to  follow 
from  the  commission  of  the  act  is  not  at  all  determinative  of  the 
liability  of  the  person  who  committed  the  act  to  respond  to  the 
person  suffering  therefrom.  As  said  in  Stevens  v.  Dudley.;i7a 
'  It  is  the  unexpected  rather  than  the  expected  that  happens  in 
the  great  majority  of  cases  of  negligence.'  "^     Damages  are  re- 


damage,  which  ought  reasonably  and 
naturally  to  be  expected  from  it. 
Always,  however,  the  damage  must 
be  something  which  has  a  money 
value,  and  which  can  be  estimated 
in  money.  .  .  .  When,  however,  the 
element  of  malice  enters  into  the 
wrong,  the  rule  of  damages  is  differ- 
ent and  more  liberal.  I  think  it  is 
equally  well  settled  that  in  such 
cases  there  enters  into  the  question 
of  damages,  considerations  which 
cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  exact 
pecuniary  compensation  such  .  .  . 
as  mental  distress  and  vexation  .  .  . 
offenses  to  the  feelings,  insult,  deg- 
radation, offenses  against  honest 
pride,  and  all  matters  which  cannot 
arise  except  in  those  wrongs  which 
are  attended  with  malice."  Bixby  v. 
Dunlap,  56  N.  H.  456;  22  Am.  Rep. 
475;  480,  481,  per  Cushing,  C.  J. 

37Mentzer  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg. 
Co.,  93  Iowa,  572;  62  N.  W.  1;  5 
Am.  Elec.  Cas.  709.  So  it  has  been 
said   that    "  Liability  for  breach  of 

82 


covenant  is  less  extensive  than  that 
for  a  tort,  and  involves  only  such 
consequences  as  are  the  direct  and 
proximate  result  of  the  act  com- 
plained of.  There  are  certain  arbi- 
trary rules  in  regard  to  such 
breaches,  the  principal  one  of  which 
is  to  give  compensation  for  what  is 
actually  lost,  to  make  the  damages 
correspond  with  the  real  injury  sus- 
tained, but  not  to  permit  a  recovery 
where  the  loss  cannot  be  directly 
traced  to  the  act  done  or  omitted. 
It  will  be  sufficient  if  the  injury  is 
the  natural  or  necessary  conse- 
quence of  the  act,  but  remote  or 
merely  possible  consequences  are 
excluded  from  consideration." 
United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
46  N  Y.  St.  R.  238;  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
798,  per  McAdam,  J. 

37a  56  Vt.  158. 

38  Mentzer  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg. 
Co.,  93  Iowa,  752;  62  N".  W.  1;  5 
Am.  Elec.  Cas.  716,  per  Deemer,  J. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


§  M 


coverable  for  the  natural  and  proximate  results  of  an  injury, 
though  the  precise  form  in  which  they  resulted  could  nol  have 
been  foreseen,39  or  though  the  full  extent  of  the  injury  could 
not  have  been  in  the  contemplation  of,  or  anticipated  by,  the 
wrongdoer;10  So  where  a  wound  is  negligently  inflicted  upon 
a  person,  it  is  not  necessary  that  blood  poisoning  be  the  ordi- 
nary effect  of  such  a  wound  to  permit  a  recovery  therefor." 
And  this  rule  has  also  been  applied  in  the  case  of  the  sale  of 
liquor  to  a  person,1'  of  dangerous  explosives  to  a  child,"  and 
where  a  landlord  has  broken  into  his  tenant's  store  and  removed 
the  roof." 


§91.  Remote,  contingent  and  speculative  damages. — The 

rule  that  recovery  can  only  be  had  for  such  damages  as  arc  tin- 
natural  and  proximate  result  of  the  act  complained  of,  exeludes 
recovery  for  such  damages  as  are  too  remote  and  are  contingenl 
or  speculative  in  character.15     So  in  actions  for  breach  of  a  eon- 


39  Hill  v.  Winsor,  118  Mass.  251. 

40  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wood,  113  Ind.  544;  14  N.  E.  572; 
Bohrer  v.  Dienhart  Harness  Co.,  19 
Ind.  A  pp.  489;  49  \.  E.  296;  Sloan 
v.Edwards,  Gl  Md.  90;  McGanahan 
v.  New  York,  N.  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  171 
Mass.  211;  50  N.  E.  010;  Allison 
v.  Chandler,  11  Mich.  542;  Christian- 
son  v.  Chic.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  67 
Minn.  94;  69  N.  W.  640;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  86 ;  Hoepper  v.  Southern  Hotel 
Co.,  142  Mo.  378;  44  S.  W.  257; 
Graney  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co., 
140  Mo.  39;  41  S.  W.  246;  38  L.  R. 
A.  633;  8  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
187;  Harrison  v.  Berkley,  1  Strob.  (S. 
C.)  525;  47  Am.  Dec.  578.  But 
see  Coley  v.  Statesville,  121  X.  C. 
301;  28  S.  E.  482;  Miles  v.  Postal 
Teleg.  Cable  Co.,  55  S.  C.  403;  33  S. 
E.  493;  Wilber  v.  Follansbee,  97 
Wis.  577;  72  X.  W.  741;  The  Nor- 
mannia,  62  Fed.  409,  481. 

41  McGanahan  v.  New  York,  X.  II. 
&  H.  R.  Co.,  171  Mass.  211;  50  N.  E. 
610. 


42  Harrison  v.  Berkley,  1  Strob.  (S. 
C.)  525;  47  Am.  Dec.  578. 

«Binford  v.  Johnston,  82  Ind.  426; 
42  Am.  Rep.  508. 

44  Allison  v.  Chandler.  1 1  Mich.  542. 

45  N.  Y.  &  C.  Miu.  Sign  Co.  v. 
Fraser,  130  l\  s.  611;  32  L.  Ed.  1031; 
9  Sup.  Co.  665;  Colin  v.  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.,  40  Fed.  40;  Lehman  v.  Mc- 
Quown,  31  Fed.  138;  Macomber  v. 
Thompson,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  s.919;  1 
Sumn.  i  IT.  S.  I  384;  Evans  v.  Cincin- 
nati S.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  78  Ala.  341 :  Brig- 
ham  v.  Carlisle,  78  Ala.  24:',;  56  Am. 
Rep.  28;  Goodell  v.  Bluff  City  Lum- 
ber Co.,  57  Ark.  203;  21  S.  W.  104; 
Wallace  v.  Ali  Sam.  71  Cal.  197;  12 
Pac.  46;  60  Am.  Rep.  534;  Mysore  v. 
Quigley,  9  Houst.  (Del.  i  348;  32  Atl. 
960;  Washington  A-  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Amer.  Car  Co..  5  App.  D.  C.  524; 
Reed  v.  Augusta,  25  Ga.  3S6;  Con- 
sumers Pure  Ice  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  ">s 
111.  App.  51'.';  Chapman  v.  Kirby, 
49  111.  211:  Williamson  v.  Branden- 
burg, 133  hid.  594;  32  V  1  834; 
Montgomery  Co.   V.  A.   Soc.  n.  Har- 

a 


§91 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


tract,  remote  or  speculative  damages  should  not  be  considered.46 
And  in  actions  for  personal  injuries  consequences  which  are  con- 
tingent, speculative  or  merely  possible  are  not  proper  to  be  con- 
sidered in  estimating  the  damages.  It  is  not  enough  that  the 
injuries  received  may  develop  into  more  serious  conditions  than 
those  which  are  visible  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  nor  even  that 
they  are  likely  to  so  develop.  To  entitle  a  plaintiff  to  recover 
present  damages  for  apprehended  future  consequences,  there 
must  be  such  a  degree  of  probability  of  their  occurring,  as 


wood,  126  Ind.  440;  10  L.  R.  A.  532; 
26  N.  E.  182;  Winne  v.  Kelly,  34 
Iowa,  330;  Leffingwell  v.  Gilchrist, 
40  Iowa,  416;  Walrath  v.  Whittekind, 
26  Kan.  482;  Minneapolis  H.  W.  Co. 
v.  Cummings,  26  Kan.  367;  Bergen 
v.  New  Orleans,  35  La.  Ann.  523; 
Bohm  v.  Cleaver,  25  La.  Ann.  419; 
Bridges  v.  Stickney,  38  Me.  361; 
Lannahan  v.  Heaver,  79  Md.  413;  29 
Atl.  1036;  Allis  v.  McLean,  48  Mich. 
428;  12  N.  W.  640;  Mizner  v. 
Frazier,  40  Mich.  59#;  20  Am.  Rep. 
562;  Connoble  v.  Clark,  38  Mo.  App. 
476;  Callaway  Min.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Clark,  32  Mo.  305;  Loeb  v.  Kamak, 
1  Mont.  152;  Denver,  T.  &  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hutchins.  31  Neb.  572;  48  N.  W. 
398;  Watt  v.  Nevada  Cent.  R.  Co., 
23  Nev.  154;  44  Pac.  423;  Clark  v. 
Nev.  L.  &  M.  Co.,  6  Nev.  203;  Bern- 
stein v.  Meech.  130  N.  Y.  354;  29  N. 
E.  255,  affg  54  Hun  634;  8  N.  Y. 
Supp.  914;  Medbury  v.  N.  Y.  &  E. 
R.  R.  Co.,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  564;  N. 
Y.  Smelting  &  R.  Co.  v.  Lieb,  48 
N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  508;  Boyle  v.  Reeder, 
1  Ired.  (N.  C. )  607;  Rhodes  v.  Baird, 
16  Ohio  St.  573;  Gaar  Scott  &  Co.  v. 
Snook,  1  Ohio  Civ.  Ct.  R.  259;  In  re 
Yohe's  Estate,  6  Phila.  (Pa.)  293; 
Haak  v.  Wise,  33  Leg.  Int.  (Pa.)  322; 
Tappan  v.  Harwood,  2  Speer  (S.  C. ), 
536;  Post  v.  Orndoff,  7  Heisk.  ( Tenn. ) 
167;  San  Antonio  Gas  Co.  v.  Ilarber, 
1  White  &  W.  Cir.  Cas.  Ct.  App. 
(Tex.)  sec.  1125;  Connelly  v.  Western 

84 


Un.  Teleg.  Co.  (Va.  1902),  7  Va.  Law 
Reg.  704;  Burton  v.  Pinkerton,  36 
L.  J.  Ex.  137;  L.  R.  2  Ex.  340;  17  L 
T.  15;  15  W.  1139;  Woodger  &  G 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  36  L.  J.  C.  P.  177;  L.  R 
2  C.  P.  318;  15  L.  T.  795;  Scholes  v 
North  London  Ry.,  21  L.  T.  835 
Hobbs  v.  L.  &  S.  Ry.,  44  L.  J.  Q.  B 
49;  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  Ill;  32  L.  T.  352 
23  W.  520;  Cobb  v.  G.  W.  Ry 
Co.,  62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  335;  1  Q.  B.  459;  4 
R.  283;  68  L.  T.  483;  41  W.  275 
57  J.  P.  437;  C.  A;  Lynch  v.  Knight 
9  II.  L.  Cas.  577;  8  Jur.  (N.  S. )  724 
5  L.  T.  291;  Sharp  v.  Powell,  41  L.  J 
C.  P.  95 ;  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  253 ;  26  L.  T.  436 
20  W.  584;  Nicosia  v.  Vallone,  37  L 
L.  T.  106;  P.  C;  Priestly  v.  Maclean 
2  F.  &  F.  288;  Hoey  v.  Felton,  11  C 
B.  (U.  S.)  142;  31  L.  J.  C.  P.  105;  I 
Jur.  (U.  S.)  764;  5  L.  T.  354;  10  W 
78;  The  Notting  Hill,  L.  R.  9  Pi  oh 
Div.  105  (Eng.  C.  A.);  Dallea  v.  Tay- 
lor, 35  Q.  B.  (Ont.)  395. 

4«  Gunter  v.  Beard,  93  Ala.  227;  9 
So.  389;  Reed  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lewis, 
94  Ala.  626;  10  So.  333;  Fonge  v. 
Pac.  Mail  Co.,  1  Cal.  353;  Davis  v. 
Fish,  9  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  406:  48 
Am.  Dec.  387;  Harris  v.  Moss,  112 
Ga.  95;  37  S.  E.  123;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Thurman,  69  Iowa,  693;  25 
N.  W.  909;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ft.  Scott,  15  Kan.  435;  Read- 
ing v.  Donovan,  6  La.  Ann.  491; 
Code,  art.  1928;  Bullock  v.  Bergman, 
46  Ind.  270;  Vicksburg  &  M.  R,  R. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMA 


§  92 


amounts  to  a  reasonable  certainty  that  they  will  result  from  the 
original  injury.17  But  it  is  declared  thai  the  mere  fact  that 
speculation  or  conjecture  is  resorted  to  will  not  prevent  a  re- 
covery of  damages  unless  it  is  necessary  to  resort  thereto." 
Nor  are  damages  necessarily  remote  and  speculative  because  to 
some  extent  uncertain  and  difficult  of  exact  measurement.41 
Again,  where  the  damages  alleged  in  a  complaint  are  too  remote, 
it  is  held  that  the  remedy  is  by  motion  to  strike  out  instead  of 
by  demurrer.10 


§  92.  Application  of  rule  as  to  remote  or  speculative  dam- 
ages,— Damages  arising  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case,  and  not  naturally  resulting  from  a  breach  of 
contract,  are  not  recoverable  unless  known  to  the  person  break- 
ing the  contract.51  And  likewise  there  can  be  no  recovery  for 
the  increased  price  of  having  logs  sawed  elsewhere,  this  being 
rendered  necessary,  owing  to  the  defective  construction  of  a 
sawmill,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  this  could  have  entered 
into  the  contemplation  of  the  parties,'-  or  for  a  loss  resulting 
from  a  sale  of  logs  without  being  cut  into  lumber."  So  dam- 
ages for  loss  of  profits  on  a  shipment  of  goods,  which  a  rail  mud 
company  was  obliged  to  decline,  because  of  noncompletion  of 
work  which  contractors  had  agreed  to  have  done  by  a  certain 
time,  are  too  remote  and  speculative  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of 
the  contract.54     And  prospective  profits  which  might  have  been 


Co.  v.  Ragsdale,  46  Miss.  458;  Booth 
v.  Spuyten  Duyvil  It.  M.  Co.,  60  N. 
Y.  487;  Grubb  v.  Burford,  98  Va.  55:5; 
37  S.  E.  4;  2  Va.  Sup.  Co.  Rep. 
467. 

47  Streng  v.  Frank  Ihert  Brew.  Co. 
(App.  Div.  N.  Y.  1900),  64  N.  Y. 
Supp.  34;  7  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  650,  per 
Woodward,  J.  See  also  Cicero  &  P. 
St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown,  89  111.  App. 
318;  Bailey  v.  Westcott.  16  N.  Y.  St 
R.  671;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  67;  14  Daly, 
506;  Stroll  m  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  805,  rev'g  32 
Hun,  20;  Murtaugh  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Hun  (N.  Y.),  456; 
23  N.  Y.  St.   R.  636;  3  N.  V.  Supp. 


483;  Cook  v.  New  York  Cent  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  N.  Y.  St.  R.  853. 

«  Jacksonville  v.  Doau.  4S  111.  App. 
247. 

49  Chew  v.  Lucas,  15  I  ml.  App. 
595;  43  N.  E.  235. 

50  Norton  v.  Kumpe,  121  Ala.  446; 
25  So.  841. 

51  Brauer  v.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav. 
Co.,  34  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  127;  69  V 
Y.  Supp.  465,  order  modified,  ','■>  N. 
Y.  Supp.  291.  See  also  Cockburn  v. 
Ashland  Lumber  Co.,  54  Wis.  619; 
12  N.  W.  49. 

w  Bruhni  v.  Ford,  38  U.S.  328. 
&)  Biuhm  v.  Ford,  33  V.  S.  323. 
54  Atlantic   A-    I).   Ry.   Co.   v.  Del. 
85 


§ 93 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


made  by  the  lessees  of  property,  but  for  the  failure  of  the  lessor 
to  rebuild  as  it  was  his  duty  to  do  are  too  remote  and  specula- 
tive ; B  as  are  also  profits  not  the  immediate  consequence  of  de- 
fendant's wrongful  act.™  Again,  where  owing  to  the  negligent 
alteration  of  a  message  in  the  course  of  transmission,  a  merchant 
is  unable  to  fulfill  a  contract  obligation,  and  as  a  result  of  such 
inability  loss  of  business  and  customers  ensued,  damages  for  the 
latter  result  are  too  remote  and  speculative  to  be  recovered.57 
So  also,  where,  owing  to  the  negligent  delay  of  a  telephone 
company  in  delivering  a  message  to  a  witness  to  be  present  at 
a  trial  and  testify,  he  failed  to  appear,  and  as  a  result  of  such 
failure  it  was  claimed  that  the  suit  was  lost,  damages  therefor 
were  held  to  be  too  remote."''  And  again,  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  unlawfully  preventing  a  person  from  procuring 
lumber  from  accustomed  sources,  the  expenses  of  travel  to 
another  place,  in  order  to  purchase  lumber  are  not  recoverable.59 
Nor  is  a  wrongdoer,  who  has  broken  into  a  person's  house  and 
murdered  a  servant  of  the  owner,  liable  for  damages,  because 
the  owner's  family  has  abandoned  such  house  as  a  result  of  the 
crime,  and  that  in  consequence  it  has  become  worthless.60  And 
where  as  a  result  of  the  negligent  operation  of  a  street  roller  a 
horse  becomes  frightened  and  a  blood  vessel  in  the  heart  is 
ruptured,  which  results  in  death,  the  city  is  not  liable  therefor."1 

§  93.  Same  subject  continued. — Evidence  is  inadmissible 
in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  as  to  loss  of  capacity  for  the 
enjoyment  of  the  pleasures  of  life,  as  it  is  too  vague  to  furnish 
any  basis  for  damages.'-  So  also  in  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  breaking  of  a  leg,  evidence  of  a  hypothetical  sec- 
ond fracture  is  inadmissible.'"     And  where  damages  are  claimed 


Const.     Co.,    98    Ya.    503;  37  S.  E. 
13;  2  Va.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  230. 

55  Lightfoot  v.  West,  98  Ga.  546;  25 
S.  E.  587. 

56  Morey  v.  Met.  Gas  L.  Co.,  6  J. 
&  S.  (N.  Y.)  185. 

57  Fererro  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg. 
Co.,  9  App.  (D.  C.)  455;  24  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  790;  35  L.  R.  A.  548. 

58  Martin  v.  Sunset  Teleph.  & 
Teleg.  Co.,  18  Wash.  260;  ,51  Pac.  376. 

86 


59  Jackson  v.  Stanfield,  137  Ind. 
592;  23  L.  R.  A.  588;  36  N.  E.  345. 

e°  Clark  v.  Gay,  112  Ga.  777;  38  S. 
E.  81. 

61  Lee  v.  City  of  Burlington,  113 
Iowa,  356;  85  N.  W.  618. 

62  Locke  v.  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60  S. 
W.  314. 

63  Lincoln  v.  Saratoga  &  S.  R.  Co., 
23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  425. 


GENERAL    PKINTIPLES    OF    DAMAl 


§  94 


for  building  a  railroad  nearer  to  a  certain  point  than  specified, 

the  jury  cannot  consider  such  elements  as  danger  from  lire  or 
the  frightening  of  horses/'1  And  again,  the  fact  that  because 
of  excavations  in  a  street,  the  owner  of  property  on  such  street 
has  been  unable  to  find  a  purchaser  therefor,  is  too  remote  and 
speculative,65  as  are  also  injuries  consequentially  resulting  to 
third  persons  who  stand  in  no  natural  or  Legal  relation  to  the 
person  injured.™  So  also  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  as  a 
result  of  a  collision  of  boats,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  in- 
jury to  the  health  of  a  boatman  due  to  exposure  in  voluntarily 
remaining  aboard  after  the  collision.*17  And  mental  suffering 
because  of  inability  to  pay  rent  due  is  too  remote  in  an  action 
for  personal  injuries.69  Again,  it  has  been  held  that  there  can 
be  no  recovery  of  damages  on  account  of  the  freezing  of  goods 
owing  to  the  inability  of  the  owner  of  land  to  construct  a  cel- 
lar for  the  purpose  of  holding  such  goods  because  of  the  pen- 
dency of  a  false  claim  to  such  land.69  So  also  damages  for  the 
sinking  of  a  vessel  eight  months  after  a  collision  are  too  remote 
to  be  chargeable  to  the  collision.70 

§  94.  Actual,  compensatory  and  substantial  damages. — 

There  is  said  to  be  no  distinction  between  actual  and  compensatory 
damages,71  and  as  we  have  stated  elsewhere,  actual,  perceptible 
damage  is  not  indispensable  as  the  foundation  of  an  action.rJ 
But  the  measure  of  compensation,  as  based  upon  the  testimony, 
limits  the  amount  of  recovery,713  subject,  however,  to  such  right 
as  the  court  may  have  in  the  premises  and  in  the  exercise  of  its 
discretion  under  the  law  to  increase  the  amount  of  the  verdict.74 


64 Hutchinson  v.  Chic.  &  \.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  41  Wis.  541. 

65  City  of  San  Antonio  v.  Mullally, 
11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  596;  3:5  S.  \\\  256. 

66  Gregory  v.  Brooks,  35  Conn.  4:17; 
.95  Am.  Dec.  278. 

«  The  Brinton,  50  Fed.  581. 

68  Planters'     Oil    Co.    v.     Mansell 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  43  S.  W.  913. 

69  Cormier   v.    Bouroue,    32    N.   B. 
283. 

70Grubbs  v.   The  John  C.  Fisher 
(Pa.),  22  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  122. 


7'  Mogle  v.  Blatch.  5  Ohio  C.  C. 
51. 

■-  Webb  v.  Portland  Mfg.  Co.,  3 
Story  (U.S.),  189,  per  Story,  J.,  quot- 
ed in  Blanchard  v.  Burbank,  16 
Bradw.  (111.  App.  i  375,  383,  per 
Bailey,  J. 

73 Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore*  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  66  Midi.  261;  33  N.  W.  806;  10 
W.  184. 

74  Sullivan  v.  Vicksburg,  S.  A  P.  R. 
Co.,  39  La.  Ann.  800;  2  So.  586. 

87 


§94 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


Again,  it  is  decided  that  a  recovery  of  nominal  damages  is  no 
bar  to  a  suit  for  actual  damages,  where  they  did  not  take  place 
before  the  commencement  of  the  former  suit.  Successive  suits 
for  actual  damages  may  be  brought  from  time  to  time  as  they 
are  sustained,  and  in  each  suit  the  party  may  recover  such  dam- 
ages as  he  has  sustained  prior  to  its  commencement,  not  barred 
by  a  previous  recovery.7"'  liut  a  judgment  for  actual  damages  can- 
not, it  is  held,  be  rendered  in  an  action  for  exemplary  damages  '° 
Again,  the  simple  and  direct  mode  of  ascertaining  the  actual 
loss  should  be  chosen  where  there  are  different  modes  of  estima- 
tion or  determination  of  the  damages,  in  preference  to  a  method 
which  is  complicated  by  many  uncertain  and  hypothetical  ele- 
ments.77 Another  general  rule  has  been  stated,  viz  ;  that  where 
damages  have  been  sustained  for  a  breach  of  contract,  the  plain- 
tiff is  not  entitled  to  recover  all  he  could  have  made  had  the  con- 
tract been  fulfilled. ;s  And  for  a  breach  of  contract  of  sale  the  law 
imposes  no  damages  by  way  of  punishment.  The  innocent  party 
is  only  entitled  to  recover  his  real  loss.  If  the  market  value  is 
less  than  the  contract  price,  the  buyer  has  sustained  no  loss.79  So 
in  an  action  for  breach  of  a  contract  which  contains  no  qualifica- 
tion or  limitation*  to  the  contraiy,  the  right  to  damages  is  unre- 
stricted and  extends  to  the  inclusion  of  all  injuries,  whether  fore- 


-•■>  McConnell  v.  Kibbe,  33  111.  175, 
179;  85  Am.  Dec.  265. 

w  Cobb  v.  Columbia  &  G.  N.  R.  Co., 
37  S.  C.  194;  15  S.  E.  878;  12  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.  J.  251.  If  only  actual  dam- 
ages are  asked  on  the  trial  in  a  suit 
for  both  actual  and  exemplary  dam- 
ages, a  charge  that  the  jury  shall 
"only  consider  the  question  of  ac- 
tual damages  "  will  be  presumed  to 
have  been  understood.  East  Line  & 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee   (Tex.),  9  S.  W.  604. 

"The  Rossend  Castle  (U.  S.  D.  C. 
D.  N.  Y.),  30  Fed.  462. 

78  Bacon's  Abr.  (Bouv.  1854) 
"Damages"  D.  I.  p.  64,  citing  Gil- 
pin v.  Consequa,  Pet.  (U.  S.  C.  C. ) 
85;  Shepherd  v.  Hampton,  3  Wheat, 
(U.  S.)  200;  Douglass  v.  M'Callister, 
3  Cranch  (U.  S.),  298;  Willing  v.  Con- 


sequa, Pet.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  172;  Yonqua 
v.  Nixou,  Pet.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  221; 
Hopkins  v.  Lee,  6  Wheat.  (U.S.)  109; 
Hell  v.  Cunningham,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
69;  Watt  v.  Potter,  2  Mason  (U.  S.), 
77;  Pope  v.  Barrett,  1  Mason  (U.S.), 
177;  Blanchard  v.  Ely,  ,21  Wend. 
(N.  Y. )  342;  Boyd  v.  Brown,  17  Pick. 
(Mass.)  453.  But  see  Bucknam  v. 
Nash,  3  Fairf.  (Me.)  474;  Board  v. 
Head,  3  Dana  (Ky. ),  491 ;  Nourse  v. 
Snow,  6  Greenl.  (Me.)  208.  See  also 
Short  v.  Skipworth,  1  Brock.  (U.  S.) 
103,  114,  per  Chief  Justice  Marshall. 
Examine,  however,  chapters  post, 
herein,  on  contracts. 

79  Lawrence  v.  Porter  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
6th  C),  93  Fed.  62,  65,  66,  per  Lur- 
ton,  Cir.  J.;  11  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  27; 
22  U.  S.  A.  483;  26  L.  R.  A.  167. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OP    DAMAi 


§   '■'» 


seen  or  otherwise/1  So  full  compensatory  damages  may  be  given 
for  breach  of  a  covenant  to  perform  certain  ads,  whereby  a  loss 
results  to  the  plaintiff."1  A  special  mode  of  compensation  may, 
however,  be  fixed  and  so  operate  as  to  limit  or  qualify  the  recov- 
ery,® and  compensation  for  the  actual  Loss  governs  in  contracts 
of  indemnity.88  If  the  injury  sustained  is  not  the  result  of  wilful 
or  wanton  wrong,  compensatory  damages  only  will  be  allowed. 
But  a  recovery  lies  to  the  full  extent  of  an  injury  sustained 
by  a  passenger  through  a  carrier's  negligence/'  So  in  tort  gen- 
erally the  damages  should  be  a  full  indemnity  commensurate 
with  the  injury  or  loss  suffered,*  although  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages awarded  for  an  injury  or  wrong  should  not  as  a  rule  ex- 
ceed a  fair  or  actual  compensation,81  unless  there  is  malice, 
etc.83  Again,  if  a  jury  determines  the  doubtful  facts  in  the 
plaintiff's  favor,  and  they  should  have  allowed  actual  damages, 
a  failure  so  to  do  will  constitute  a  ground  for  reversal.®  Sub- 
stantial damages  may  be  awarded  in  an  action  for  personal  in- 
juries, even  though  no  direct  evidence  of  the  amount  of  the 
pecuniary  loss  be  given.90  So  in  actions  for  such  injuries  it  has 
been  declared  that  the  granting  of  compensation  by  an  award 
of  substantial  damages  should  be  encouraged  to  compel  higher 
vigilance,91  and  such  damages  may  be  recovered  for  a  continu- 
ous tort,  even  though  nominal  damages  have  been  awarded  in 
a  prior  suit  therefor/-     But  they  should  be  shown  in  trespass  to 


80  Allen  v.  Steers,  39  La.  Ann.  586; 
2  So.  199.  But  see  Short  v.  Skip- 
worth,  1  Brock.  (U.  S. )    111. 

bl  Trenwith  v.  Gilvery,  50  X.  J.  L. 
18;  11  Atl.  325;   10  Cent.  182. 

82  Brown  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R. 
Co., 36  Minn.  236;  31  X.  V) 

83  Wilson    v.    McEvory, 
169. 

M  Green  v.  Penn.    R.  Co.  (U.  S 
C.  E.  I).  Pa.),  36    Fed.  GG 
Maher  v.  Louisville,  N.    <>.  & 
Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  64;  3  So.  462 


941. 

25     Cal. 

C. 
See  also 
T.  K. 
Phil- 
adelphia, W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Quigley, 
21  How.  (U.  S.)  213;  Day  v.  Wood 
worth,  13  How.  (U.  S.)  371.  See 
sec.  89,  herein. 
»6Purcell  v.  St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.,  48 


Minn.  134;  50  X.  W.  1034;  11  Ry.  & 
Cup.  L.  .!.  111. 

M  I'.ussy  v.  Donaldson,  4  Dall.  (U. 
S. )  20G. 

^T  Milwaukee,  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Anns, 
91  U.  S.  489;  Stuyvesant  v.  Wilcox 
(Mich.),  52  X.  W.  465. 

88  Barry  v.  Edmunds,  116  V.  S.  550. 

89Aiello  v.  Aaron,  68  X.  Y.  Supp. 
186;  33  Misc.  G80. 

90  Clare  v.  Sacramento  Elec.  P.  & 
L.  Co.,  122  Cal.  504;  55  Pac.  326;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Bop.   115. 

91  Scott  v.  l'enn.  R.  Co.,  30  V  V. 
St.  R.  843;  9  X.  V.  Supp.  189;  ease 
was  rev'd;  41  X.  V.  St.  K.  712. 

wStafford  v.  Maddox,  87  Ga.  537; 
13  S.  E.  559. 

89 


8  95 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


land,  and  they  must  be  proven,  unless  only  a  nominal  sum  is 
sought.'"  So  they  cannot  recover  against  a  vessel  in  an  action 
by  one  injured  by  a  fall  where  the  evidence  shows  that  no  sub- 
stantial injuries  were  received,95  and  if  the  record  shows  an  en- 
tire failure  to  prove  in  what  sum,  if  any,  the  plaintiffs  were 
damaged,  there  can  be  no  recovery.96  Again,  if  nominal  dam- 
ages only  are  allowed,  yet,  if  the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  if  at  all, 
to  a  substantial  sum,  the  verdict  will  be  reversed  and  a  new 
trial  granted.97 


§  95.  Double,  triple  or  treble,  or  other  increased  damages. 

— The  legislature  of  a  state  has  power  to  fix  the  amount  of 
damages  beyond  compensation  by  way  of  punishment  for  negli- 
gence in  performing  duties  necessary  for  the  protection  of  per- 
sons or  property,  and  the  mode  in  which  fines  and  penalties  shall 
be  enforced,  whether  at  the  instance  of  private  parties  or  at  the 
suit  of  the  public,  and  what  disposition  shall  be  made  of  the 
amounts  collected  are  matters  of  legislative  discretion.  Nor  is 
it  a  valid  objection  that  the  sufferer  from  the  negligence,  in- 
stead of  the  state,  receives  such  additional  damages.  Again, 
the  exercise  of  swch  power  is  not  a  taking  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  nor  does  it  den}'-  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  within  the  fourteenth  article  of  the  amendment  of 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States.98     Some  of  the  cases  in 


93  Ross  v.  New  Home  Sew.  Mach. 
Co.,  24  Mo.  App.  353;  Rich  v.  Rich, 
16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  6G3;  Benson  v. 
Village  of  Waukesha,  74  Wis.  31 ;  41 
N.  W.  1017. 

94  See  sees.  76  and  77,  herein. 

95  The  Ed.  Roberts  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
3d  C),  34  C.  C.  A.  6S5;  93   Fed.  988. 

96  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Waxel- 
baum  (Ga.  1901),  39  S.  E.  443;  10 
Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  254. 

9?  Gartner  v.  Saxon,  19  R.  I.  461; 
Conrad  v.  Dobmeier  (Minn.),  58  N. 
W.  870.     Examine  sec.  78,  herein. 

98  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Humes, 
115  U.  S.  512,  a  case  of  fencing  rail- 
roads; Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Beckwith,  129  U.  S.  26.  Under 
90 


Code,  Iowa,  sec.  1289,  allowing  double 
the  value  of  stock  killed  or  damages 
caused  thereto,  and  by  failure  of  rail- 
road to  fence,  etc.,  see  for  the  under- 
lying principles  stated  in  the  text, 
the  citations  to  the  above  cases  noted 
in  Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus 
Digest,  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. ;  and  that 
"  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature 
to  provide  for  doubling  damages." 
See  also  Fye  v.  Chapin  (Mich.),  80 
N.  W.  797;  7  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  67,  cit- 
ing Trompen  v.  Verhage,  54  Mich. 
304;  20  N.  W.  53;  Cummings  v.  Riley, 
52  N.  H.  368;  Chickering  v.  Lord 
(N.  H.),  32  Alt.  773;  Fitzgerald  v. 
Dobson,  78  Me.  359 ;  7  Alt.  704 ;  Barrett 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  101. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


which  double  damages  are  given  are  for  injuries  from  d<  . 
injuries  to  stock  ;  '"  embezzling  money  or  chattels  before  admin- 
istration ; '  unlawful  distress  ;  trespass  ;  trespass  or  trover  in 
cutting  timber  and  carrying  it  away ;  *  malicious  prosecution  to 
an  employer  by  reason  of  a  laborer  or  renter  having  being  enticed 
away;6  for  unlawful  detainer  of  Leased  land,  but  the  statute  is 
directory  merely;1  for  forcible  entry  and  detainer,"  and  for 
converting  logs  lying  in  a  river,  or  on  or  near  the  bank  there- 
of." The  following  are  also  instances  of  the  allowance  of 
treble  or  triple  damages.  Thus  they  may  be  given  for  in- 
juries to  bridges;"'  failure  to  observe  the  law  of  the  road;11 
forcible  entry  and  detainer;1"  forcible  exclusion  from  real  prop- 


s' Riley  v.  Harris  (Mass.  1900),  58 
N.  E.  584;  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  47;  Pub. 
Suit.  Mass.  Oh.  102,  sec.  93;  Swift  v. 
Applebone,  23  Mich.  252;  Comp. 
Laws,  645.  See  as  to  constitution- 
ality of  statute,  Cliapin  v.  Fye, 
(U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  1900),  21  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  71;  note,  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  48; 
80  N.  W.  797;  Fye  v.  Chapin  (Mich. 
1899),  7  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  67;  Act 
No.  161  of  1850,  sec.  5593;  Comp. 
Laws,  1897. 

wo  Stovall  v.  Smith,  4  IJ.  Mon.  ( Ky. ) 
378,  Act  1798;  Wood  v.  St.  Louis, 
K.  C.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  109;  Wag. 
St.  p.  310,  sec.  43;  llollyman  v. 
Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo. 
480. 

CSpauhling  v.  Cook,  48  Vt.  1(5; 
(Jen.  Stat.  ell.  51,  sec.  10. 

* Hugill  v.  Reed,  49  N.  J.  L.  (20 
Vr.)  300;  8  Atl.  287. 

3  Newcomb  v.  Hutterfiekl,  8  Johns. 
(N.Y.J342;  Act,  April 9, 1805, sec. 28, 
ch.  94. 

4  Welsh  v.  Anthony,  4  Harris  (Pa. ), 
254. 

B  Campbell  v.  Finney,  3  Watts  (Pa.), 
84;  Acts,  1705. 

GChrestman  v.  Russell,  73  Miss. 
452;  18  So.  656;  Miss.  Code,  1892, 
sec.  1068. 

7  Hall    &  P.  Furniture  Co.  v.  Wil- 


bur, 4  Wash.  644;  30  Pac.  665;  Wash. 
Act,  March  27,  1890. 

-  Michau  v. Walsh, 6  Mo.  346:  Acts, 
1837,  p.  63;  Feedler  v.  Schroeder,  59 
Mo.  364;  Wag.  St.  pp.  645, 646,  sec.  22; 
Finley  v.  Magill,  57  Mo.  A  pp.  481; 
Rev.  Stat.  sec.  5108. 

9Parklmist  v.  Staples,  91  Wis. 
196;  64  N.  W.  882. 

10Shepard  v.  Gates,  50  Mich.  495; 
15  N.  W.  878;  Comp.  Laws,  1320. 

11  Stevens  v.  Kelley,  66  Conn.  570; 
34  Atl.  502;  Conn.  Gen.  Stat  sees. 
2689-2691;  Broschait  v.  Tuttle,  59 
Conn.  1;  21  Atl.  925;  11  L.  R.  A.  33. 

'-Rimmer  v.  Blasingame,  94  Cal. 
139;  39  Pac.  857;  Iburg  v.  Fitch,  .7 
Cal.  189;  Cal.  Code,  Civ.  Pioc. 
sec.  1774;  Wier  v.  Bradford,  1  Colo. 
1  1;  Lane  v.  Ruhl,  103  Mich.  38;  61 
N.  W.  347;  Newkirk  v.  Traccy,  61 
Mich.   171;   27  N.  W.  884;  How.  Ann. 

Stat.  sec.  8306;  Bowser  v.  Melcher, 
40 Mich.  185 ;  Comp.  Laws.  sec.  6717; 
Shaw  v.  Hoffman,  25  Mich.  162; 
Missoula  Elec.  L.  Co.  v.  Morgan  13 
Mont.  394;  34  Pac.  188;  Stover's  V 
V.  Annot.  Code,  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  1669; 
Labro  v.  Campbell,  56  N.  V.  Super. 
70;  Kirchnei  \.  New  Borne  S.  M.  Co., 
L6  N.  V.  Supp.  761;  12  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
907;  O'Donnell  \.  Mclntyre,  2  NT.  Y. 
St.  R.  689;  Pilaris  v.  (iere,  31  Hun 
91 


§95 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   <>F    DAMAGES. 


erty  ;  1:!  holding  over  lands  or  tenements;11  failure  of  tenant  to 
quit  after  giving  notice  ;  B  negligent  setting  out  of  fires  ;16  vio- 
lation of  a  patent  right; 17  seizure  by  an  officer  of  property  ex- 
empt from  process  ; 1H  vexatiously  or  maliciously  suing  or  causing 
any  action  or  special  proceeding  to  be  instituted  in  another's 
name,  without  the  latter's  consent ; w  for  certain  trespasses  *  if 
wilful  or  malicious  ; 21  trespass  or  trover  in  cutting  timber  and 
carrying  it  away,"  unless  there  was  an  honest  belief  by  the  tres- 
passer that  the  timber  was  his  ;  ^  cutting  down,  girdling  or  in- 
juring trees,  timber  or  underwood;21  waste  by  tenants  in  com- 
mon ;  a  or  by  tenant  or  guardian  ; x  permissive  waste  by  a  tenant 


(N.  Y.),  443;  Compton  v.  The  Chel- 
sea, 139  N.  Y.  538;  54  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
538;  34  N.  E.  1090,  rev'g  70  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  361;  54  N.  Y.  St.  R.  112. 

13  2  Grantham's  Annot.  Stats.  S. 
D.  (1901)  sec.  5813;  Rev.  Codes, 
N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  5007. 

14  Cal.  Civ.  Code  (1899),  sec.  3345; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  4351;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  5006;  2 
Grantham's  Annt>t.  Stats.  S.  D. 
(1901)  sec.  5812. 

15  Cal.  Civ.  Code  (1899),  sec.  3344; 
1  Mont.  Codes  (1895),  sec.  4350;  Rev. 
Codes,  N.  D.  (1899)  sec.  5005;  1 
Grantham's  Annot.  Codes,  S.  D. 
(1901)  sec.  5811. 

i«  Calvin  v.  Gualala  Mill  Co.  (Cal. 
1893),  33  Pac.  94;  Cal.  Pol.  Code,  sec. 
3344. 

i"  Gray  v.  James,  Pet.  (U.  S.  C.  C.) 
394;  Cross  v.  United  States,  1  Gall. 
(U.S.)  26;  Stimpson  v.  Railroad,  1 
Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)  164;  Welling  v. 
La  Bau,  35  Fed.  302;  Lyon  v.  Donald- 
son, 34  Fed.  789. 

18  Wymond  v.  Amsbury,  2  Colo. 
213;  Rev.  Stat.  p.  308,  sec.  35. 

19  2  Stover's  N.Y.  Annot.  Code,  Civ. 
Proc.  sec.  1900. 

20  Snelling  v.  Garfield,  114  Mass. 
443;  Genl.  Stat.  Mass.  ch.  38,  sec.  10; 
Brewster  v.  Link,  28  Mo.  147;  King 
v.  Havens,  25  Wend.  (N.  ,Y.J  4^>- 

92 


21  Barnes  v.  Jones,  51  Cal.  303; 
Michigan,  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Deer  Lake 
Co.,  60  Mich.  143. 

22  weish  v.  Anthony,  4  Harris  (Pa. ), 
254;  Stover's  N.  Y.  Annot.  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  sec.  1668. 

23  Alt  v.  Grosclose,  61  Mo.  App. 
409;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  645.  See  also 
Glenn  v.  Adams  (Ala.  1901),  29  So. 
836. 

24  Cal.  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3346;  Annot. 
Code,  Iowa (1897), sec.  4306;  1  Mont. 
Codes  (1895),  sec.  4352;  Stover's  N. 
Y.  Annot.  Code,  Civ.  Proc.  sees.  1667, 
1668;  Rev.  Codes,  N.  D.  (1899) 
sec.  5008;  2  Grantham's  Annot.  Stats. 
S.  D.  (1901)  sec.  5814;  McCruden 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  5  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  59;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  114,  aff'd 
77  Hun(N.  Y.),  609;  59  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
892;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1135,  aff'd  151 
N.  Y.  623;  45  N.  E.  1133;  Humes  v. 
Proctor,  73  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  265;  26  N.  Y. 
Supp.  315;  57  N.  Y.  St.  R.  284,  aff'd 
151  N.  Y.  520;  45  N.  E.  948;  Lewis 
v.  Thompson,  3  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  329; 
73  N.  Y.  St.  R.  776. 

25  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  3  Shep. 
(Me.)  198;  Stat.  1821,  ch.  35. 

26  Annot.  Code,  Iowa  (1897), 
sec.  4303;  Danziger  v.  Silberthan,  21 
Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  283  ;  18  N.  Y. 
Supp.  350. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OP    DAMAGES.  >6,  97 

in  dower,  although  the  allowance  of  such  damages  is  discretion' 
ary;87  using  unsealed  weights  and  measures,9  and  treble  the 
value  of  moneys  or  valuable  thing  lost  by  gaming  "  at  any  nine 
or  sitting."  a 

§  96.  Same  subject — How  fixed. — In  New  York,  it  double, 
treble  or  other  increased  damages  are  given  by  statute,  the  de- 
cision of  the  court  or  report  of  the  referee  must  specify  the  sum 
awarded  as  single  damages  and  direct  judgment  for  the  increased 
damages.*  So  in  Connecticut  the  court  increases  the  amount 
found  by  the  jury  to  conform  to  the  statutory  allowance.31  And 
in  a  comparatively  recent  Michigan  case  it  was  declared  that 
"  the  presumption  is  that  those  damages  are  to  be  ascertained 
as  in  ordinary  cases — if  the  trial  be  before  a  jury,  by  the  jury  ; 
and  by  the  court  when  the  jury  is  dispensed  with."  In  this  case 
the  provision  of  the  statute  was  that  "  upon  the  trial  of  any 
cause  mentioned  in  this  section,  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  may 
be  examined  under  oath  touching  the  matter  at  issue,  and  evi- 
dence may  be  given  as  in  other  cases  ;  and  if  it  shall  appear  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  court,  by  the  evidence,  that  the  defendant 
is  justly  liable  for  the  damages  complained  of,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act,  the  court  shall  render  judgment  against  such 
defendant  for  double  the  amount  of  damages  proved  and  for 
costs  of  suit."  ffi  Upon  a  contention  as  to  the  constitutionality 
of  this  statute  it  was  held  operative  in  that  the  word  "  court  " 
would  be  construed  to  mean  •'  the  court  acting  through  all  its 
instrumentalities  which  includes  the  jury."33 

§97.  Liquidated  damages — Penalty. — Where  the  Code 
so  provides,  a  contract  liquidating  damages  is  void,  except  where 


»  Sherill  v.  Connor,  107  N.  C.  543; 
12  S.  E.  588. 

28  Shannon's  Annot.  Code,  Tenn. 
(is; »ti)  sec.  3480. 

29  Johnson  v.  McGregor,  157  111. 
350;  41  X.  E.  558;  111.  dim.  Code, 
sec.  132. 

80  Stover's  N.  Y.  Annot.  Code,  Civ. 
Proc.  sec.  1020. 

:!1  Broschart  v.  Tuttle.  59  Conn.  1; 
21  Atl.  925;  11  L.  R.  A.  S3.  See 
Quimly  v.   Carter,  20  Me.  218;  Lob- 


dell  v.  New  Bedford,  1  Mass.  153; 
Burnham  v.  Strother,  60  Midi.  619; 
33  \.  W.  410;  Warren  v.  Doolittle, 
5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  678;  Brewster  v.  Link, 
28  Mo.  147. 

:!-  Mich.  Corap.  L.  1887,  sec.  5593; 
Act  Xo.  161,  of  1850,  as  to  injuries  by 
dogs. 

:«  Fye  v.  Chapin  (Mich.),  80  X  W. 
707;  7  Am.  Neg.  Hep.  C>7,  per  Mont- 
gomery, J. 

93 


§  97  GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 

it  is  impossible  or  extremely  difficult  to  fix  the  actual  damages, 
and  this  applies  to  an  agreement  for  a  certain  sum  per  month 
on  account  of  deprivation  of  possession  of  certain  premises,31 
although  it  is  decided  that  parties  may  in  case  of  breach  of 
covenant  liquidate  the  damages  recoverable,35  and  also  that  if 
the  damages  are  uncertain  in  their  nature  in  respect  to  the  per- 
formance or  omission  of  a  particular  act,  the  parties  may,  by 
agreement,  settle  the  amount  of  damages  at  any  sum.36  So  a 
contract  for  purchase  of  personal  property  may  validly  provide 
for  liquidated  damages.3'  But  it  is  decided  that  a  stipulation 
of  this  character,  to  be  enforceable  as  such,  must  be  uncertain 
and  not  ascertainable  by  any  satisfactory  or  certain  rule  of  law.* 
In  a  recent  case  in  New  York,  it  was  provided  in  a  contract 
between  an  electric  light  company  and  the  owner  of  a  build- 
ing that  a  certain  amount  should  become  due  and  payable  to 
the  company  as  damages,  if  the  company  discontinued  its  cur- 
rent, either  because  the  consumer  was  in  arrears  or  failed  to 
comply  with  the  rules  and  regulations,  or  was,  through  the 
"  fault  "  of  the  consumer,  prevented  from  supplying  a  current 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  contract.  Under  this  contract 
it  was  held  that* the  company  could  not  discontinue  its  current, 
and  recover  the  liquidated  damages  merely  because  of  a  failure 
to  use  the  electric  lamps  and  motor  while  waiting  for  a  tenant.  •' 
Again,  if  it  is  clearly  ascertainable  from  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract that  damages  were  to  be  paid  in  a  sum  agreed  upon  in 
case  of  its  breach,  it  is  a  valid,  enforceable  agreement.4"  But  it 
must  clearly  appear  from  the  contract,  in  order  to  have  the  pay- 
ment of  a  liquidated  sum  operate  as  a  discharge,  that  such 
amount  was  absolutely  to  be  paid  and  received  in  lieu  of  per- 
formance,11 and  if  the  contract  expressly  and  unambiguously 

34  Eva  v.  McMahon,  77  Cal.  467; 
19Pac.  872;  Cal.  Civ.  Code,  sees.  1670, 
1671.  See  Patent  Brick  Co.  v.  Moore, 
75  Cal.  205;  16  Pac.  890. 

35Taul  v.  Everet,  4  J.  J.  Marsh. 
(Ky. )  10. 

36Mott  v.  Mott,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
127;  Lampman  v.  Lochran,  19  Barb. 
I  X.  V. )  338. 

i7Halff  v.  O'Connor,  14  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  191;  37  S.  \V.  238.     ' 

94 


38Krutz  v.  Robbins,  12  Wash.  7; 
40  Pac.  415;  28  L.  R.  A.  676. 

39  United  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Brenneman  (Sup.  Ct.  App.  Term), 
21  Misc.  (XT.  Y.)  41;  46  N.  Y.  Supp. 
916;  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  947. 

40Eakin  v.  Scott,  70  Tex.  442;  7 
S.  W.  777. 

41  Gray  v.  Crosby,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
219. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


§98 


provides  for  the  payment  of  such  damages,  evidence  of  a  con- 
trary intention  is  inadmissible.*  So  a  valid  stipulation  for  a 
liquidated  sum  limits  the  liability  for  a  breach  of  the  contra 
but  there  cannot  be  a  recover}'  of  the  amount  agreed  upon  and 
the  actual  damages  as  well,41  nor  can  it  be  shown  that  the  actual 
damages  were  less,1,  nor  will  the  covenant  !»•  extended  by  im- 
plication, hut  will  he  enforced  as  far  as  applicable.48  But  if  the 
damages  are  not  agreed  upon  as  liquidated  and  a  penalty  is 
fixed,  the  latter  does  not  limit  the  amount  of  the  recovery. '* 
The  most  important  question,  however,  in  this  connection,  is 
whether  damages  are  liquidated  or  a  penalty,  and  as  this  d. 
sion  belongs  to  another  part  of  this  work,  it  will  be  treated  in  its 
proper  place. 

§  98.  Unliquidated  damages. — As  to  unliquidated  damages 
it  is  said."  The  rule  upon  the  subject  of  liquidated  and  unliqui- 
dated damages  we  take  to  be,  that  where  a  precise  sum  for  dam- 
ages is  not  agreed  upon  and  is  not  of  the  essence  of  the  contract 
between  the  parties,  the  quantum  of  damages  is  unliquidated 
and  it  is  for  the  jury  to  assess  them  ;  but  where  the  precise  sum 
has  been  fixed  and  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  that  sum  is  the 
ascertained  and  liquidated  damages,  and  the  jury  must  assess 
that  amount,  no  more,  no  less.  ...  In  the  case  before  us  there 
were  no  damages  agreed  upon  between  the  parties,  there  was 
not  even  a  penalty  named,  and  the  only  penalty  for  breach  of 
the  contract,  or  for  negligence  in  the  performance,  was  what  the 
law  would  raise  and  the  jury  assess  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  .  .  .  damages  which  may  he  gotten  rid  <>f 
altogether  or  mitigated  by  proof  of  circumstances  cannot  be 
liquidated,"  and  the  court  held  that  a  suit  against  a  telegraph 
company  for  damages  sustained  by  the  failure  of  the  company 
to  transmit  a  despatch,  ordering  a  sale  of  gold,  was  a  claim  for 


Shook,    21    J.   &  S. 
v.    Fisher,    2     Hilt. 


42  Perzi'll    v. 
(X.  V.)  501. 

43  Townsend 
(N.  Y.)47. 

44  Harrow  v.  Cornell,  12  App.  Div. 
i\.  V.i  mi  l;  42  N.  V.  Supp.  1081. 

4i  McLean  v.  McLean,  15  Wkly. 
Dig.  (N.  V.i  1S1,  rev'd  on  other 
grounds,  '.it;  N.  Y.  652. 


46  Leggett  v.  Mutual  L.  Ins.  Co., 
53  X.  Y.  394,  rev'g  64  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
23 

47  So  held  in  Noyea  v.  Phillips,  60 
N.  Y.  408.  Hut  see  Beers  v.  Shan- 
non, 7.5  X.  Y.  292,  rev'g  12  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  101. 


95 


s  no 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF   DAMAGES. 


unliquidated  damages*  Claims  for  unliquidated  damages  may 
be  settled  by  the  court  of  claims  in  a  case  transmitted  thereto 
by  a  department,  and  which  involves  certain  controverted  ques- 
tions of  law  and  fact  under  a  claim  on  contract.49  Such  dam- 
ages should  not,  however,  be  increased  beyond  the  amount 
claimed  in  the  ad  damnum  clause  after  verdict  except  upon  new 
trial,  where  such  clause  contains  the  only  indication  of  the  de- 
mand,30 and  averaging  estimates  by  the  jury  in  an  action  for  un- 
liquidated damages  is  not  a  ground  for  reversal,  where  they  did 
not  agree  to  be  bound  by  the  result,  and  the  sum  awarded  is 
slightly  in  excess  of  such  verdict.51  Again,  it  has  been  decided 
that  in  an  action  for  such  damages  where  the  defendant  does 
not  admit  the  same  in  his  answer,  the  plaintiff  must  establish 
the  amount  of  his  claim,  since  the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon 
him.5'  In  England  the  debtor's  act,52a  making  invalid  certain 
transfers  with  intent  to  defraud  creditors,  does  not  include  as  a 
creditor  until  after  judgment  is  recovered,  the  plaintiff  in  an 
action  for  unliquidated  damages.53 

§  99.  Continuing  damage  and  damages— Entirety  of  dam- 
ages.— Formerly  where  a  trespass  was  of  a  permanent  nature 
and  the  injury  was  continually  renewed,  the  allegation  was  of 
a  continuing  injury  from  one  day  to  another,  and  this  was  called 
laying  the  action  with  a  continuando,  the  plaintiff  not  being 
obligated  to  bring  a  suit  for  every  separate  day's  offense  ;  but 
if  each  one  of  several  acts  was  complete  in  itself,  it  could  not  be 
laid  with  a  continuando,  yet  if  there  were  repeated  acts  of  tres- 
pass, as  by  cutting  down  trees,  they  might  be  laid  to  be  done 
not  continually,  but  at  different  days  and  times  within  a  given 
period.54  So  damages  for  trespass  by  cattle  may  be  laid  with  a 
continuando   as  at  common  law,  and  any  number  of  trespasses 


*8  Smithson  v.  United  States  Teleg. 
Co.,  29  Md.  162;  Allen's  Teleg.  Cas. 
885,  387-389,  per  Nelson,  J. 

49  Myerle  v.  United  States,  33  Ct. 
CI.  1. 

50  Sweet  v.  Excelsior  Elec.  Co. 
J.),  31Atl.  721. 

51  McDonnell  v.  Pescadero  &  S 
S.  Co.,  120  Cal.  476;  5'J  Pac.  725. 

96 


\. 


.M. 


sa  Smock  v.  Carter,  6  Okla.  300;  50 
Pac.  262. 

52  a  Act,  1869,  sec.  13,  sub.  2. 

53  So  held  in  Reg.  v.  Hopkin's  C.  C. 
R.  (1896),  1  Q.  B.  652;  65  L.  J.  M.  C. 
N.  S.  125. 

54  8  Blackstone's  Comm.  (4th  ed.) 
Cooley,  *212,  citing  upon  the  last 
point     Chicago    &    E.   I.  R.  Co.  v. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


proved  within  the  time  specified."  But  if  the  injury  directly 
results  from  a  single  act,  all  the  damages  must  be  recovered  in 
one  action,  for  successive  actions  cannot  be  brought."  Again,  in 
case  of  a  nuisance,  every  continuance  thereof  constitutes  a  new 
ground  of  action  with  resulting  damages, ';  and  where  persons 
are  sued  for  a  nuisance,  it  is  a  repetition  thereof  to  permit  it  to 
exist,  and  an  action  lies  therefor."  So  successive  suits  may  be 
brought  for  a  continuing  trespass  as  long  as  it  continues."  But 
if  the  damages  are  entire  and  susceptible  of  immediate  recovery, 
the  claim  cannot  be  divided  and  successive  actions  be  main- 
tained, for  where  it  is  of  a  permanent  character,  as  in  case  of  a 
continuing  nuisance  if  the  damage  is  original  and  may  he  at 
once  estimated,  one  action  lies  for  the  entire  loss.1*  Again,  in 
trespass  quare  clausum  fregit  and  for  cutting  down  and  carry- 
ing away  trees,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  amount  of  in- 
jury which  the  plaintiff  suffered  from  the  whole  trespass  taken 
as  a  continuous  act.'11  So  continuing  damages  flowing  from 
trespass  before  and  after  suit  brought  must,  it  is  decided,  be  re- 
covered in  one  suit.1"  And  a  vendee  in  possession  of  real  prop- 
erty under  executory  contract  of  sale  may  recover  the  whole 
damage  to  the  land  by  a  trespass.'"  So  a  mortgagor  may  recover 
compensation  for  the  entire  damage  caused  by  a  trespasser  in 
an  action  against  him  before  suit  by  the  mortgagor.''1      But  in 


Loeb,  118  111.  203.  See  also  notes,  53 
Am.  Rep.  123-139;  59  Am.  Rep. 
351-369. 

65  Richardson  v.  Northrop,  66 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  85. 

*  Porter  v.  Cobb,  22  Hun  (X.  Y.  I, 
278.  See  La  Rue  v.  Smith,  15:5  X.  V. 
428,  affg63  X.  Y.  St.    R.  592. 

57  Sloggy  v,  Dilworth,  38  .Minn. 
179;  36  N.  W.  451;  8  Am.  Si.  Rep. 
856;  Heckwith  v.  Griswold,  29  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  291.  See  also  Wager  v.  Troy 
Un.  R.  Co.,  25  X.  Y.  526;  Phillips 
v.  Terry,  3  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y. )  607; 
(5  Abb.  U.  S.  327);  3  Keyes  (X.  V. ), 
313;  Mahon  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 
24  N.  Y.  658.  See  also  City  of  Mans- 
field v.  Hunt,  19  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R. 
488;  10    O.    C.     D.    567;    Quinu    v. 

7 


Lowell  Elec.  L.  Co.,  144  Mass.  176; 
11  N.  E.  732;  4  X.   Eng.  349. 

58  Hockstrasser  v.  Martin,  62  Hun 
(N.  Y.K  165;  41  N.  Y.  St.  R.  761. 

"■"  Savannah,  F.  &  \V.  R.  <"■>.  v. 
Davis.  -'.")  Fla.  917;  7  So.  •_".»:  43  Am. 
&   Eng.  R.  Cas.  542. 

60  So  held  in  Stodghill  v.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.,  53  Iowa.  341 :  Chicago 
A-  E.  I.  R.  (o.  v.  Loeb,  118  111.  203. 

6i  Foote  v.  Merrill,  54  X.  EL  490; 
20  Am.    Rej>.  151. 

62  Cook  v.  Redman,  45  Mo.  App. 
397. 

68  Hueston  v.  Mississippi  &  li.  R. 
Boom  Co..  76  Minn.  251;  79  X.  W. 
92. 

m  Delaware  &  A.  Teleg.  &  Teleph. 
Co.  v.  Elvins  (X.  J.),  43  Atl.  90:!. 

9T 


§100 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 


case  of  a  nuisance,  a  judgment  for  defendant  in  trespass  for 
damages  to  real  property  does  not  bar  a  like  action  for  dam- 
ages subsequently  accruing  after  commencement  of  the  first 
suit,  the  premises  having  been  repaired  and  there  being  new  in- 
juries and  also  aggravation  of  old  ones.65  If,  however,  succes- 
sive actions  may  be  maintained  for  a  continuing  trespass,  the 
recovery  is  limited  so  as  not  to  include  damages  under  prior  re- 
coveries.66 Again,,  a  court  of  equity  may  interfere  if  the  trespass 
is  a  continuing  one,67  but  if  the  continuance  is  prospective 
merely  in  case  of  a  nuisance,  damages  cannot  be  recovered 
therefor.68  Other  matters  relevant  to  this  question  of  continu- 
ing damage  and  damages  are  presented  in  the  case  of  physical 
injuries  and  future  damage's,  as  well  as  in  entirety  of  damages 
under  contracts,  which  are  considered  elsewhere  herein  under 
their  proper  headings. 

§  100.  Excessive  or  unreasonable  damages. ^-It  is  well  set- 
tied  that  a  verdict  will  be  set  aside  or  reversed  where  it  is  so 
much  in  excess  of  what  the  facts  in  the  case  and  the  law  justi- 
fies that  it  is  manifestly  the  result  of  passion,  prejudice,  partial- 
ity, sympathy,  ignorance,  corruption  or  misconception  on  the 
part  of  the  jury,  or  where  the  damages  are  so  large  or  unreason- 
able, or  outrageous  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
and  the  law,  as  to  shock  the  conscience  or  moral  sense,  and  thus 
clearly  evidence  that  the  verdict  proceeded  from  some  of  the 
above-mentioned  causes ;  but  the  rule  is  otherwise  if  the  above 
principles  do  not  apply.69     But  a  new  trial  need  not  be  granted 


66  Amrhein  v.  Quaker  City  Dye 
Works,  192  Pa.  253:  43  Atl.  1008. 

66  Cumberland  &  O.  C.  Co.  v.  Hutch- 
ings,  65  Me.  140. 

76  Wheelock  v.  Noonan,  108  N.  Y. 
179;  13  N.  Y.  St.  R.  110;  15  N.  E. 
67. 

68  Whitmore  v.  Bischoff,  5  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  176. 

69  Harris  v.  Zanone,  93  Cal.  59 ;  28 
Pac.  845,  applied  to  punitive  dam- 
ages in  tbis  case;  Atlanta  v.  Marti u 
(Ga.),  13  S.  E.  805;  Pearson  v.  Zebr, 
138  111.  48;  29  N.  E.  854;  Chicago 
City  R.  Co.  v.  Andersbn,  93  111.  App. 

98 


419,  afTd  61  N.  E.  999;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Greso,  79  111.  App.  127;  Chi- 
cago City  R.  Co.  v.  Fennimore,  78 
111.  App.  478;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
520;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bink- 
opski,  72  111.  App.  22;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  433;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kemper,  153  Ind.  618;  53  N.  E.  931; 
1  Repr.  1100;  Courtuey  v.  Clinton, 
18  Ind.  App.  620;  48  X.  E.  799;  Elk- 
hart &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldorf,  17  Ind. 
App.  29;  46  N.  E.  88;  Bell  v.  Morse 
(Kan.),  29  Pac.  1086;  Ft.  Scott,  W.  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kinney,  7  Kan.  App. 
650,  53  Pac.  880;  City  of  Ludlow  v. 


GENERAL    PRINCI  I'LKs    (>!•     DAMAGES. 


6  100 


merely  because  the  amount  seems  to  the  court  to  be  excessive, 
nor  because  the  court  is  dissatisfied  with  the  award  i7"  but  they 
must  also  appear  to  have  been  given  under  the  influence  of  pas- 
sion, prejudice,  etc.,71  and  the  court  must  be  satisfied  that  such 
is  the  fact.7-  Again,  "  in  no  case  will  the  court  ask  itself  whether 
if  it  had  been  substituted  instead  of  the  jury,  it  would  have  given 
precisely  the  same  damages,  but  the  court  will  simply  consider 
whether  the  verdict  is  fair  and  reasonable,  and  in  the  exercise 
of  sound  discretion,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ; 
and  it  will  be  deemed  so  unless  the  verdict  is  so  excessive  or 
outrageous  with  reference  to  those  circumstances,  as  to  demon- 
strate that  the  jury  have  acted  against  the  rules  of  law.  or  have 
suffered  their  passions,  their  prejudices,  or  their  perverse  disre- 
gard of  justice  to  mislead  them."73  So,  "in  all  actions  which 
sound  in  damages,  the  jury  seem  to  have  the  discretionary 
power  of  giving  what  damages  they  think  proper ;  for  though 


Mackintosh  (Ky.  1899),  53  S.  W.  524; 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Dixon,  20 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  792  (1883);  50  S.  \Y.  252; 
47  S.  W.  615;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  827;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Donaldson,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1384;  43 
S.  W.  439;  Peterson  v.  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.,  65  Minn.  18;  67  X.  \Y. 
646;  33  L.  R.  A.  302;  1  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  375;  Chitty  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  Co.,  148  Mo.  64;  49  S.  W. 
868;  Wainwright  v.  Satterheld,  52 
Neb.  403;  72  N.  W.  359;  Neb.  Code, 
Civ.  Proc.  sec.  314;  Consolidated 
Tract.  Co.  v.  Graham,  62  N.  J.  L.  90; 
40  Atl.  773;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  600;  17 
Nat.  Corp.  Rep.  213;  58  Alb.  L.  J. 
93;  31  Chic.  L.  N.  35;  Robinson  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  63  N.  V. 
Supp.  969;  31  Misc.  171,  affVl  65  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1144;  Rowq  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  153; 
63  N.  Y.  St,  R.  753;  Gale  v.  N.  Y. 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  13  Hun  (N.  Y.),  1;  53 
How.  Pr.  385;  Kellow  v.  Long  Isl.  R. 
Co.,  42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  813:  If,  V  Y. 
Supp.  676 ;  Rlackwell  v.  O'Gnrman  Co. 
( R.I.  1901 ),  49  Atl.  28,  and  cases  cited ; 


Vogel  v.  McAuliffe  (R.  I.),  31  Atl.  1; 
St.  Louis  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Germany 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  56  S.  YV.  :>st;: 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall 
(Tex.  Civ.  A]. p.),  21  S.  \Y.  1024; 
Thirkfield  v.  Mountain  View  Ceme- 
tery Assu..  12  Utah,  76;  41  Par.  564; 
Harrison  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  W.  I;. 
Co.  (Utah),  27  Pac.  728;  Norfolk  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Shote,  92  Ya.  34;  22 
s.  E.  811;  Renne  v.  United  States 
Leather  Co.,  107  Wis.  305;  83  N.  W. 
IT:'.:  York  v.  Canada  Atlantic  S.  S. 
Co.,  22  S.  C.  167. 

70  Smith  v.  Pittsburg  &  W.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  Ohio),  90  Fed.  783; 
41  Ohio  L.  J.  113:  13  Am.  &  Kng.  R. 
('as.  N.  S.  716.  See  also  Rompillon 
v.  Abbott,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  662;  Chatts- 
worth    v.    Howe,    60    111.    App.    55. 

71  Mceks  v.  St.  Paul,  tit  Minn.  220: 
66  V  W.  966. 

'-  Russell  v.  Bradley  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D. 
N.  Y.),  50  Fed.  5 15. 

:;  Whipple  v.  Cumberland  Mfg. 
Co.,  2  Story  (U.  s.  C.  C.  I>.  Me.),  661; 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,516. 

99 


§101 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


in  contracts  the  very  sum  specified  and  agreed  on  is  usually 
given,  yet  if  there  are  any  circumstances  of  hardship,  fraud  or 
deceit,  though  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  the  contract,  the  jury 
may  consider  them,  and  proportion  and  mitigate  the  damages 
accordingly."  7l 

§  101.  Same  subject  continued — -If  the  verdict  is  clearly 
excessive  in  view  of  an  agreed  measure  of  damages,  a  reversal 
will  be  granted/'  and  so  where  it  is  in  disregard  of  the  charge 
to  the  jury  as  to  the  measure  of  damages;76  so,  where  it  is  not 
sustained  by  the  evidence  and  is  excessive,77  and  the  excess  is 
not  due  to  inadvertence,  misapprehension  of  facts,  error  of  law 
or  error  in  computation  by  the  jury.78  But  if  tin  allowance  in 
excess  of  the  amount  admitted  is  based  on  conjecture,  the  ver- 
dict will  be  reversed,79  although  there  will  be  no  reversal  where 
effectual  or  substantial  justice  is  obtained  by  the  verdict,80  and 
a  verdict  for  damages  for  personal  injuries  will  not  be  disturbed 
as  excessive,  there  being  no  legal  measure  of  damages,81  nor 
will  it  be  reversed  as  excessive  on  a  writ  of  error  where  the  trial 
court  did  not  disturb  it.83  But  where  the  amount  awarded 
is  in  excess  of  that  recoverable  on  the  good  cause  of  action,  one 
of  the  causes  averred  being  bad,  the  verdict  will  be  reversed.85 
Ao-ain,  where  the  actual  damages  awarded  are  within  the  rule 
on  which  verdicts  for  excessive  damages  will  be  set  aside,  it 
will  be  presumed  that  the  entire  verdict,  including  exemplary 
damages,  is  influenced  by  the  same  motives,  and  even  though 
the  exemplary  damages  are  remitted,  there  will  be  a  reversal.84 
The  fact,  however,  that  a  person  who  has  received  a  personal 


74  3  Bacon's  Abr.  "  Damages " 
(D),  1. 

75  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
ley Co.  Ct,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1307;  49 
S.  W.  332. 

76Tietz  v.  Philadelphia  Tract. 
Co.,   169  Pa.  516;  36  W.  N.  C.    469. 

"Green  v.  Barney  (Cal.),  36  Pac. 
1026;  Ft.  Scott,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kinney,  7  Kan.  App.  650;  53  Pac.  880. 

78  Ft.  Scott,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kin- 
ney, 7  Kan.  App.  650;  53  Pac.  880. 

n  Van    Auken    v.    Clute,   13   App. 

100 


Div.    (N.    Y.)   622;  43    N.  Y.    Supp. 
1166. 

80  City  Bk.  v.  Mershon,  33  Fed.  240. 

81  Newport  News  &  O.  P.  R.  & 
Elec.  Co.  v.  Bradford  (Va.  1902),  40 
S.  E.  900. 

8-'  Pierce  v.  Van  Dusen  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  6th  C),  47  U.  S.  A.  339;  78  Fed. 
G93. 

83  Fish  Keck  Co.  v.  Redlon,  7  Kan. 
App.  93;  53  Pac.  72. 

84  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Gordon 
(Tex.),  7S.  W.  695. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


6  102 


injury,  and  has  from  mere  ignorance,  and  not  in  bad  faith,  re- 
turned to  work,  and  thus  aggravated  such  injury,  will  not  cause 
damages  which  have  been  rendered  therefor  to  be  reduced,  al- 
though compensation  for  the  injury  is  impossible  of  separation 
from  the  aggravation.85  Another  important  factor  is  that  the 
point  must  be  properly  brought  up  and  presented  on  appeal  or 
error  or  no  relief  is  available.""' 


§  102.  Voluntarily  remitting  excess  —  Remittitur  by 
court. — The  prevailing  party  may  remit  the  excess  where  it  is 
small  and  is  due  to  miscalculation,*7  or  is  nntsogreat  as  to  indicate 
any  improper  motive,*  or  where  there  is  an  inadvertence  of  the 
trial  court  in  directing  a  verdict  for  a  few  dollars  more,  the  error 
is  not  available  when  first  raised  on  appeal  and  the  excess  is  vol- 
untarily remitted,811  nor  will  there  be  a  reversal  where  the  only 
ground  urged  for  a  new  trial  is  an  excess  which  is  remitted.90 
Again,  the  parties  are  not  deprived  of  their  constitutional  right 


85  Toledo  Elec.  St.  II.  Co.  v.  Tucker, 
13  Ohio  C  C.  411;  7  Ohio  Dec.  167. 
See  14  L.  R.  A.  677,  as  to  excessive 
verdicts  for  personal  injuries,  and  see 
extended  note  at  end  of  chapter,  post, 
herein,  on  personal  injuries. 

86  Curran  v.  Folley,  67  111.  App. 
54;'> :  Stewart  v.  Butts,  61  111.  App. 
483;  Crooks  v.  Hibbard,  58  111.  App. 
568;  New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hamlet  Hay  Co.,  149  Ind.  344;  47  X.  E. 
1060;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
291,  rehearing  denied,  49  N.  E.  269; 
J.  V.  Farwell  &  Co.  v.  Zeuon,  100 
Iowa,  640;  65  N.  W.  317,  aff'd  69  N. 
W.  1030;  Briscoe  v.  Little,  19  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  5;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  908;  aff'g 
41  N.  Y.  Supp.  1107;  Q.  W.  Loverin- 
Browne  Co.  v.  Bk.  of  Buffalo,  7  X. 
D.  569;  75  X.  W.  92:);  Gulf  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Gaedecke  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  39  S.  \V.  312;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
707;  Chosnutt  v.  Chism,  20  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  23;  48  S.  \V.  549;  Third  Nat. 
Bk.  v.  National  Bk.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
5th  C),  30  C.  C.  A.  436;  58  U.  S. 
App.  148;  86  Fed.  852. 


87  McCormick  II.  M.  Co.  v.  Wesson 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  41  S.  W.  725:  42 
S.  W.  328.     See  sec.  108,  hereiu. 

98  Chicago  &  K.  I.  K.  Co.  v.  Clem- 
inger,  77  111.  App.  186,  affd  178  111. 
536;  53  N.  E.  320,  citing  Holmes  v. 
Jones,  121  N.  Y.  461;  Hennessy  v. 
District  of  Columbia,  8  Mackey,  220; 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dwyer,  36  Kan. 
58;  Peyton  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  41 
ha.  Ann.  861;  Howard  v.  Grover,  28 
Me.  97;  48  Am.  Dec.  478;  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Duelin,  86  Tex. 
450;  Lombard  v.  Chicago,  R.  I  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  47  Iowa,  494;  Phelps  v.  Cogs- 
well. 70  Cal.  201;  Cogswell  v.  West 
Street  &  N.  E.  Electric  R.  Co.,  ". 
Wash.  46;  Brown  v.  Southern  1". 
Co.,  7  Utah,  288;  Sioux  City  &  1'.  K. 
Co.  v.  Finlayson.  \u  Neb.  57s ;  4(.i 
Am.  Rep.  724;  Kennon  v.  Gilmer,  9 
Mont.  108;  Ilutchins  v.  St.  Paul.  M. 
&  M.  R.  Co.,  44  Minn.  6. 

89  Q.  W.  Loverin-Browne  Co.  v. 
Bank  of  Buffalo.  7  N.  I).  569;  75  N. 
W.  923. 

*>  Wall  v.  Posey,  105  Ga.  484;  30 
1U1 


8  102 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


of  trial  by  jury  by  the  affirmance  of  a  judgment  upon  the  re- 
mittitur of  a  suggested  sum,91  and  the  appellate  court  may  af- 
firm a  judgment  on  condition  that  a  certain  sum  or  certain  items 
be  remitted,92  where  the  amount  can  be' ascertained  by  compu- 
tation,93 or  where  the  measure  of  recovery  is  not  fixed  by  law.91 
But  the  verdict  must  be  such  as  to  come  within  the  rule  of  in- 
fluence, passion  or  prejudice  in  order  to  be  cured  by  a  remit- 
titur.95 Again,  it  is  decided  that  the  common-law  rule  that  an 
excessive  verdict  may  be  cured  by  a  remittitur  has  not  been 
changed  except  in  so  far  as  the  verdict  is  entirely  vitiated  by 
the  Code  provision  allowing  it  to  be  set  aside  when  given  under 
the  influence  of  passion  or  prejudice,96  and  in  case  of  such  sug- 
gestion or  condition  as  to  remitting  a  part  of  the  award  and  a 
refusal  so  to  do  by  the  party,  a  new  trial  may  be  granted.97 
But  it  is  also  decided  that  if  the  verdict  is  the  result  of  passion 
or  prejudice,  a  new  trial  should  be  granted  instead  of  a  remit- 
titur beino- required.93  "  And  where  the  record  as  brought  to  this 
court  shows  that  in  the  judgment  of  the  court  below  the  sum 
awarded  by  the  jury  was  in  substantial  excess  of  a  just  allow- 
ance and  awarded  without  due  and  careful  consideration,  a  re- 
trial of  the  case  will  be  ordered,  notwithstanding  the  remission 
of  the  sum  deemed  to  be  unjust." yy 


S.  E.  729;  Augusta  R.  Co.  v.  Glover 
(Ga.),  18  S.  E.  406;  58  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  269. 

»i  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Syfan, 
91  Tex.  562;  44  S.  W.  1064,  aff'g  43 
S.  W.  551. 

92  Rand  v.  Binder  (Iowa),  75  N.  W. 
505. 

93  Brown  v.  Doyle,  69  Minn.  543; 
72  N.  W.  814;  Chouteau  v.  Suydam, 
21  N.  Y.  179. 

9*  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hynes,  21  Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.  34;  50  S. 
W.  624;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  208. 

95  Wainwright  v.  Satterfleld,  52 
Neb.  403;  72  N.  W.  359;  North  Chi- 
cago St.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  70  111. 
App.  336. 

*  Wainwright    v.   Satterfleld,    52 

102 


Neb.  403;  72  N.  W.    359;  Neb.  Code, 
Civ.  Proc.  sec.  314. 

97  Musser  v.  Lancaster  City  St.  R. 
Co.,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  430;  12  Lane.  L. 
Rev.  12. 

98  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Penni- 
more,  78  111.  App.  478;  3  Chic.  L.  .1. 
Wkly.  520. 

"Atchison,  Topeka  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Richards,  58  Kan.  344;  49  Pac.  436; 
3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  25,  per  Doster,  Ch.  J. 
See  sec.  108,  herein.  See  further 
as  to  remitting  excess  and  remittitur 
generally.  Kerry  v.  Pacific  M.  &  S. 
Co.,  121  Cal.  564;  54  Pac.  262,  modi- 
fying 54  Pac.  89;  McFadden  v.  Dietz, 
115  Cal.  697;  47  Pac.  777;  Scholfield 
G.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Scholfield,  71  Conn. 
1;  40  Atl.  1046;  Ross  v.  Fickling,  11 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OK    DAMAGES. 


§103 


§  103.  Where  excess  is  small. — Where  the  excess  is  so  small 
as  to  come  within  the  maxim  de  minimis,  there  will  be  no  re- 
versal ;  1"  nor  where  the  excess  is  a  few  dollars  more  in  a  verdict 
of  guilty  in  a  prosecution  for  obtaining  money  under  false  pre- 
tenses.1    But  if  the  damages  are  substantially  in  excess  of  the 


App.  I).  C.  442;  25  Wash.  L.  Rep. 
80(5;  Dowdie  v.  State  (Ga.),  29  S.  E. 
595;  King  v.  Black  Diamond  C.  Co., 
99  Ga.  103 ;  24  S.  E.  970;  Spring  Valley 
v.  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.,  173  111. 
497;  50  N.  E.  10(5!):  10  Nat.  Corp. 
Rep.  887,  rev'g  72  111.  App.  629;  30 
Chic.  Leg.  N.  164;  Stone  v.  Billings, 
167  111.  179;  47  N.  E.  372,  aff'g  63 
111.  App.  371;  Kansas  &  T.  Coal  Co. 
v.  Reid  (Ind.  Ty.  App.),  40  N.  W. 
898;  Newbury  v.  Gretchell  &  M.  L. 
Mfg.  Co.,  100  Iowa,  441;  69  N.  W. 
743;  Leavenworth,  N.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Meyer,  58  Kan.  305;  49  Pac.  89; 
Bealle  v.  School,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  475;  Postal  Teleg.  Cable  Co. 
v.  Louisiana  W.  R.  Co.,  49  La.  Ann. 
1270;  22  So.  219;  Sloman  v.  Mercan- 
tile C.  G.  Co.,  112  Mich.  258-264;  4 
Det.  Leg.  N.  28;  70  N.  W.  886;  26 
Ins.  L.  J.  665;  Chitty  v.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &.  8.  R.  Co.,  148  Mo.  64;  49  S.  W. 
868;  Warder  v.  Henry,  117  Mo.  530; 
23  S.  W.  776;  Lenzen  v.  Miller,  53 
Neb.  137;  73  N.  W.  460,  modifying 
51  Neb.  855;  71  N.  W.  715;  Lawrence 
v.  Church.  129  N.  V.  635;  29  N.  E. 
106;  41  N.  Y.  St.  R.  513;  Carter  v. 
Beckwith,  128  N.  Y.  312;  40  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  343;  28  N.  E.  582;  Everett  v. 
Akins,  8  Okla.  184;  56  Pac.  1062; 
Bricker  v.  Elliott,  58  Ohio  St.  726; 
51  N.  E.  1096;  Cochran  v.  Baker,  34 
Oreg.  555;  52  Pac  520;  Lantz  v.  Frey, 
19  Pa.  St.  366;  Kidder  v.  Aaron,  10 
S.  D.  256;  72  \.  W.  893;  Crabb  v. 
Nashville  Bk.,  6  Yerg.  (Tenn.  |  333; 
Fidelity  &  C.  Co.  v.  Allibone,  90  Tex. 
660;  40  S.  W.  399;  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  90  Tex.  566;  40  S. 


\V.  6,  aff'g  39  S.  W.  652;  Texas 
Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  86  Tex. 
421;  25  S.  W.  417,  aff'g  25  S.  W.  740; 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Measles, 
81  Tex.  474;  17  S.  W.  124;  Tenant  v. 
Cray,  5  Munf.  (Va. )  494;  Kohler  v. 
Fairhaven  &  N.  W.  II.  Co.,  8  Wash. 
455;  36  Pac.  681;  denying  rehearing 
8  Wash.  452;  36  Fac.  253;  Roberts  v. 
Bettman,  45  W.  Va.  143;  30  S.  E.  95; 
Reed  v.  Keith,  99  Wis.  672;  75  N.  W. 
392;  Second  Ward  Saw  Bk.  v. 
Schranck,  97  Wis.  250;  73  N.  W.  31; 
39  L.  R.  A.  569;  Evaus  v.  Foster,  80 
Wis.  509;  50  N.  W.  410;  14  L.  R.  A. 
117;  Koenigsberger  v.  Richmond  S. 
M.  Co.,  158  U.  S.  41;  39  L.  Ed.  889; 
15  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  751;  Lewis  v.  Wilson, 
151  U.  S.  551;  38  L.  Ed.  267;  14  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  419;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Horn,  151  U.  S.  110;  38  L.  Ed.  91; 
14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  259;  North  Ameri- 
can L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Colonial  &  U.  S. 
M.  Co.,  28  C.  C.  A.  88;  55  U.  S.  App. 
157;  83  Fed.  796;  Hazard  Powder 
Co.  v.  Volger,  7  C.  C.  A.  130-136;  58 
Fed.  152-158. 

lwTonstall  v.  Robinson  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  Ark.),  229.  Excess  of  29  cents  no 
ground  for  reversal.  Matthews  v. 
First  Nat.  Bk.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  36  N. 
S.  W.  331.  Nor  an  excess  of  50  cents 
but  the  excess  will  be  directed  to  be 
written  off.  Dannenberg  v.  Guernsey 
(Ga.),  7  S.  E.  105.  But  an  excess 
of  $3  is  not  within  the  maxim. 
Cameron  Sun  v.  McAnaw,  72  Mo. 
App.  196.  See  further,  Cullanan  v. 
Shaw,  24  Iowa.  441 ;  Moffett  v.  Ayres, 
3  N.  .1.  L.  (2  Pen.)  65.'.. 

1  Wax  v.  State  (Neb. ),  61  N.  W.  117. 
103 


§  104 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 


amount  that  ought  to  be  recovered,  a  new  trial  will  be  granted ; 
the  word  ''.substantially"*  being  used  as  opposed  to  the  maxim, 
"De  minimis  non  curat  lex."  And  this  rule  obtains  even 
though  the  setting  aside  of  the  verdict  was  not  requested  on 
that  ground.' 

§  104.  Evidence  as  a  factor. — Evidence  on  appeal  will  sus- 
tain a  verdict  even  though  there  are  excessive  damages  where 
the  prevailing  party  is  entitled  to  anything,  and  the  question 
of  relief  is  not  before  the  court.3  Nor  will  there  be  a  reversal 
where  the  judgment  is  for  the  right  party,  and  is  sustained  by 
the  evidence ; i  nor  where  there  is  any  legitimate  proof  in  the 
record  to  sustain  the  evidence  ; 5  nor  where  the  amount  awarded 
is  authorized  by  the  evidence  and  the  court  has  charged  the 
jury  correctly  as  to  the  measure  of  damages ; 6  nor  where  the  is- 
sues were  fairly  submitted  to  the  jury,  although  the  verdict  is 
for  as  large  an  amount  as  the  evidence  will  sustain  ; '  nor  where 
the  instructions  were  that  the  jury  were  not  bound  to  accept 
all  plaintiff's  testimony  as  true  as  to  the  extent  of  his  injury, 
but  should,  upon  all  the  evidence,  award  only  such  damages 
as  they  believed  plaintiff  fairly  and  justly  entitled  to  receive 
and  the  plaintiff  to  pay ; s  nor  where  the  plaintiff  fails  to 
insert  a  statement  that  the  case  contains  all  the  evidence;9 
nor  where  all  the  evidence  is  not  returned  on  the  question  of 


2  Rowland  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ross 
(Va.  1902),  40  S.  E.  922. 

3  Globe  Accdt.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Helwig, 
13  Ind.  App.  530;  41  N.  E.  976. 

4  Evans  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  73 
Mo.  App.  76;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  19. 
See  also  Messinger  v.  Dunbam,  62 
Ark.  326;  35  S.  W.  435;  Grant  v. 
Dreyfus  (Cal.),  52  Pac.  1074;  Kel- 
logg Newspaper  Co.  v.  Paterson,  59 
111.  App.  89;  Cone  v.  Smyth,  3  Kan. 
App.  607;  45  Pac.  247;  Wilson  v. 
Smith,  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  927;  38  S.  W. 
870;  Jobnson  v.  Parker,  58  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  332;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  146;  7  Misc. 
685;  Caldwell  v.  Parker  (Tex.),  17 
S.  W.  87;  Montreal  Gas  Co.  v.  St. 
Laurent,   26    Can.   S.    C.    176;    The 

104 


Robert  Graham  Dun  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
1st,  C),  17  C.  C.  A.  90;  33  U.  S. 
App.  297;  70  Fed.  270;  Muller  v. 
Ryan,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  736. 

5  Murray  v.  Salt  Lake  City  R.  Co., 
16  Utah,  456;  52  Pac.  596. 

6  Berkson  v.  Kansas  City  Cable 
Co.,  144  Mo.  211;  45  S.  W.  1119. 

7  Murphy  v.  Rementer  (Pa.),  7 
Del.  Co.  Rep.  203:  15  Lane.  L.  Rev. 
270. 

8  Christian  v.  Erwin  (111.),  17  N.  E. 
707. 

9  Hunt  v.  Webber,  22  App.  Div.  N. 
Y.  631  ;  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  24.  See 
Reuhl  v.  Sperry  (C.  C),  Ohio  C.  D. 
688. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


§104 


damage,10  for  the  objection  of  excessive  damages  will  not  be 
considered  on  appeal  in  the  absence  of  evidence ; :1  nor  will 
there  be  a  reversal  where  evidence  is  wanting  that  the  jury 
acted  corruptly  or  perversely,  or  that  the  damages  are  grossly 
excessive  ; ''  nor  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
the  damages  were  in  the  amount  of  the  verdict;"  nor  where, 
although  the  verdict  seems  too  large,  it  is,  nevertheless,  within 
the  estimates  of  competent  witnesses  ;M  nor  where,  by  the  testi- 
mony of  several  witnesses,  the  damages  aggregate  the  amount 
of  the  verdict;15  nor  where,  in  an  action  of  trespass  and  injury 
to  real  property,  the  actual  damages  proven  are  less  than  one 
half  the  verdict,  which  is  for  a  small  amount,  as  an  abstract 
sum;16  nor  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  and  the  amount 
is  fixed  by  the  jury  below  the  highest  and  above  the  lowest 
estimate  of  the  witnesses;17  nor  where  some  of  the  witnesses 
have  fixed  the  damages  at  a  larger  sum  than  that  given;18 
nor  where,  notwithstanding  such  conflicting  evidence,  there  is 
sufficient  testimony  to  sustain  the  verdict  ;u  nor  where  in  such 
case  the  amount  after  remittitur  was  approved  by  the  trial  court 
and  justified  by  the  evidence,20  for  "whether  the  verdict  is  ex- 
cessive is  to  be  determined  solely  from  a  consideration  of  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  and  whether  it  will  fairly  sustain  the  con- 
clusion of  the  jury,"'-1  although  it  is  said  that  the  appellate  court 
will  not  weigh  the  evidence.-  But  a  verdict  will  not  stand  on 
appeal  which  is  for  the  largest  amount  justified  by  the  evidence, 


10  Davis  v.  Tribune  Job  Print.  Co., 
70  Minn.  95  ;  72  N.  W.  SOS. 

11  Casey  v.  Oakes,  17  Wash.  409  ; 
50  Pac.  53,  Rev'g  15  Wash.  450  ;  48 
Pac.  53. 

12  Doyle  v.  Maine  S.  L.  R.  Co.  (Me.), 
13  Atl.  275. 

18  Asher  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lunsford, 
17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  559  ;  32  S.  W.  166. 

14  Home  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kulihuan. 
58  Neb.  488  ;  78  N.  W.  936. 

16  Texas  A  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner 
(Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.),  37  S.  W.  643. 

16  Zimmerman  v.  Bonzar  (Pa.),  10 
Atl.  71. 

17  Calumet  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore 
(111.),  15  N.  E.  764. 


18  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Bourne 
(Colo.),  16 Pac.  839;  Same  v.  Scbmidt 
(Colo.),  n;  Pac.  842.  See  Board  of 
Street  Opening,  In  re,  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 
145;  Clark  v.  Pope  I  Fla. ),  10  So. 
586. 

19  Lindeman  v.  Fry.  77  111.  App.  89, 
aff'd  178  111.  174;  52  N.  F.  851. 

-'  Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crowell,  77  III. 

App.  5  1  !. 

•-''  Harrison  v.  Sutter  St.  II.  ('.>..  11''. 
Cal.  156;  47  Pac.  1019;  1  Am.  Xeg. 
Rep.  403. 

--  Thomas  v.  Snyder,  20  111.  App. 
140;  50  N.  E.  398. 


105 


§8  105,106     GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF   DAMAGES. 

unless  there  is  a  remittitur  for  the  excess;23  and  it  will  be  re- 
versed where  it  is  not  warranted  in  any  view  of  the  evidence, 
and  there  were  errors  on  the  trial,24  although  if  exemplary  dam- 
ages might  have  been  allowed,  the  verdict  will  stand  as  to  any 
excess  of  actual  damages.25  Again,  even  though  there  is  no 
proof  of  special  damages,  the  verdict  in  an  action  of  slander  will 
not  be  reversed  where  the  excess  is  not  such  upon  the  facts  as 
to  show  prejudice  * 

§  105.  Two  or  more  excessive  verdicts.— A  verdict  does  not 
cease  to  be  excessive  because  of  repeated  adjudications,  for  a 
wrong  does  not  ripen  into  a  right,  and  the  last  verdict  will  be 
set  aside  if  grossly  excessive  in  itself,27  although  it  will  not  be 
disturbed  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  any  verdict  was  ex- 
cessive,28 nor  unless  it  appears  that  the  last  award  was  excessive 
or  unreasonable.29  Again  it  is  declared  in  a  Wisconsin  case  that 
a  decision  as  to  the  amount  of  damages  recoverable  on  a  given 
state  of  facts  in  a  particular  case  when  once  rendered  in  this 
court  is  res  adjudicata  and  absolutely  controlling  in  such  case,  the 
same  as  a  decision  upon  any  other  question.  And  a  verdict  for 
more  than  the  amount  once  held  erroneous,  because  excessive, 
cannot  thereafter  be  held  good  upon  the  same  or  substantially 
the  same  evidence  because  sanctioned  by  a  second  or  any  number 
of  juries.30 

§  106.  In  excess  of  amount  claimed  or  of  ad  damnum 
clause. — The  verdict  and  judgment  should  not  be  for  a  greater 
amount  than  the  complaint,  declaration  or  petition  claims,  or  it 


23  Carter  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  295. 

24  Bates  v.  British  Amer.  Assur. 
Co.,  100  Ga.  249;  28  S.  E.  155. 

25  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
rison A.  &  A.  Co.,  1G0  111.  288;  43 
N.  E.  393. 

26  Unterberger  v.  Scharf ,  51  Mo. 
App.  102. 

27  Consolidated  Tract.  Co.  v.  Gra- 
ham, 62  N.  J.  L.   90;  40  Atl.  773;  58 

106 


Alb.  L.  J.  93;  17  Natl.  Corp.  Rep. 
213;  31  Chic.  L.  News,  35;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  660;  44  Atl.  964. 

28  Covington  S.  R.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Piel 
(Ky.),  8  S.  W.  449. 

29  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson, 
82  111.  App.  605. 

3«  Collins  v.  Janesville  (Wis.  1901), 
87  N.  W.  241 ;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  520, 
529,  per  Marshall,  J. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


§    10- 


will  be  reversed,31  although  the  excess  may  be  remitted,*-'  or  if 
the  court  correct  it  during  the  same  term  it  is  not  error,33  but 
the  object  ii in  cannot  be  first  raised  on  appeal ; 3I  nor  is  it  ground 
for  reversal  where  the  excess  is  merely  for  accrued  interest 
pending  suit;35  nor  will  the  verdict  be  disturbed  where  the 
amount  thereof  corresponds  with  the  sum  fixed  by  agreement 
during  trial*  Hut  a  new  trial  should  be  granted  where  there 
is  no  amendment  during  trial  and  the  excess  is  not  required  to 
be  written  off,  and  so  even  though  such  excess  is  merely  of 
interest  on  the  damages  claimed,87  although  it  is  held  that  the 
general  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  judgment  does  not  ex- 
ceed the  ad  damnum.33 


§  107.  Inadequate  damages. — If  the  damages  are  so  grossly 
less  or  disproportionate  as  to  come  within  the  rule  as  to  passion 
or  prejudice  of  the  jury  stated  in  regard  to  excessive  damages,51 
the  court  will  reverse  the  same.  So  it  has  been  decided  that  if 
the  admitted  facts  are  ignored  as  to  the  damages  sustained  and 
the  charge  of  the  court  has  been  plainly  disregarded  and  the 
award  as  found  is  insufficient,  less  than  that  claimed,  is  contrary 
to  law  and  not  supported  by  the  evidence,  the  court  will  on  ap- 


81  See  Flourney  v.  Childress  Minor 
(Ala.),  9:5;  Dinsmore  v.  Anstil  Minor 
(Ala.),  89;  Derrick  v.  Jones,  1  Stew. 
(Ala.)  18;  Hogan v.  Taylor,  Hempst. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  Ark.)  20;  Hudspeth  v. 
Gray,  5  Ark.  175;  Gage  v.  Rogers,  20 
Cal.  91;  Palmer  v.  Reynolds,  3  Cal. 
396;  Smith  v.  Allen,  5  Day  (Conn.), 
357;  Brown  v.  Smith,  24  111.  190; 
Gower  v.  Carter,  3  Iowa,  244;  Rowan 
v.  Lee,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  97;  Gros- 
venor  v.  Danforth,  1(5  Mass.  74;  I'ot- 
ter  v.  Prescott,  2  Hun  (Mass.),  686: 
Pope  v.  Salsmon,  35  Mo.  3i>2:  Beck- 
with  v.  Boyce,  12  Mo.  440;  Excelsior 
Elec.  Co.  v.  Sweet,  59  X.  J.  L.  441; 
Lake  v.  Merrill,  10  X.  J.  L.  288; 
Weed  v.  Lee,  50  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  354; 
Crabb  v.  Nashville  Bk.,  (i  Terg. 
(Term.)  333;  Tenant  v.  Gray,  5  Muni. 
(Va.)  494. 

82  Kerry  v.   Pacific  M.  S.  Co.,  121 


Cal.  564;  54  Pac.  262;  mod'g  54 
Pac.  89;  Excelsior  Elec.  Co.  v.  Sweet, 
59  X.  J.  L.  44. 

33  Holeman  v.  Coleman,  1  A.  K. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  296. 

M  Fidelity  &  C.  Co.  v.  Weise,  80 
111.  App.  499;  Grand  Lodge  A.  O.  & 
U.  W.  Co.  v.  Bagley,  60  111.  App.  589; 
Hunt  v.  O'Brien,  59  111.  App.  321; 
Cunningham  v.  Alexander,  58  III. 
App.  296. 

86  Metropolitan  Accdt.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Froiland,  101  111.  30;  43  X.  E.  766; 
25  Ins.  L.  J.  595,  aff'g  59  111.  App. 
522.  See  also  Lauter  v.  Simpson,  2 
End.  App.  293;  28  N.  E.  324. 

30  Wilson  v.  Panne,  1  Kan.  App. 
721 ;  41  Pac.  984. 

37  Georgia  R.  &  Bkg.  <"o.  v.  Craw- 
ley, 87  Ga.  191;  13  S.  E.  508. 

88  Plato  v.  Turrill,  18  111.  273. 

89  Sec.  99,  herein. 

107 


§107 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


peal  reverse  the  same  ;  *  and  where  the  damages  can  be  definitely 
ascertained  and  the  award  is  unreasonably  small,  the  verdict  will 
be  reversed."  So  where  the  evidence  of  plaintiff,  if  believed, 
would  necessitate  a  larger  judgment  or  the  evidence  of  defend- 
ant if  believed  would  require  a  judgment  for  him.42  Again,  a 
new  trial  is  proper  where  the  instructions  to  the  jury  would  au- 
thorize  them  to  find  a  larger  amount,43  or  where  the  verdict 
should  necessarily  have  been  for  a  larger  sum  than  was  rendered 
upon  the  issues  and  evidence,  **  or  where  the  plaintiff,  if  entitled 
to  recover  at  all,  is  clearly  entitled  to  a  larger  sum  than  that 
awarded,45  or  where  the  actual  damages  are  proven  with  such 
certainty  as  to  a  reasonably  definite  measure  of  damages  that  the 
verdict  is  manifestly  inadequate,46  or  where  in  general  they  evi- 
dence the  result  of  passion,  prejudice,  etc.47  But  the  appeal 
court  must  be  convinced  that  the  jury  was  influenced  by  partiality, 
passion  or  prejudice,  or  by  some  misconception  of  the  evidence 
or  the  law.48  And  courts  of  appeal  are  not  inclined  to  increase 
the  damages  unless  they  are  manifestly  insufficient  ;4!l  nor  will 
the  judgment  be  reversed  where  there  is  evidence  to  warrant 
the  finding  of  the  jury  ;m  nor  where  the  evidence  somewhat  con- 
flicts even  though  the  courts1  views  do  not  coincide  with  the 
finding ; 51  nor  merely  because  the  verdict  was  based  upon  the 
lowest  instead  of  the  highest  estimate;52  nor  where  some  of  the 


40  Koebig  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  108 
Cal.  235;  41  Pac.  469. 

"Wilson  v.  Morgan,  58  N.  J.  L. 
(29  Vr.)  426. 

42  Kina  v.  C.  C.  Bendall  Commis- 
sion, 7  Colo.  App.  507;  44  Pac.  377. 

«  Distad  v.  Shanklin,  11  S.  D.  1;  75 
N.  W.  205. 

44  Yager  v.  Exchange  Nat.  Bk.,  57 
Neb.  310;  77  N.  W.  768. 

45  Hexter  v.  Cory  ( Tex.  ),18  S.  W.  574. 
4«  Hackett   v.   Pratt,   52   111.   App. 

346. 

47  Dowd  v.  Westinghouse  Air  Brake 
Co.,  132  Mo.  579;  34  S.  W.  493.  See 
also  Townsend  v.  Briggs,  88  Cal.  230; 
Hanson  v.  Urbana  &  C.  Elec.  St.  R. 
Co.,  75  111.  App.  474;  Galloway  v. 
Weber,  55  111.  App.  366;  Hackett  v. 
108 


Pratt,  52  111.  App.  346;  Conrad  v. 
Dobmeier,  57  Minn.  147;  Warne  v. 
Stanton,  12  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  623; 
43  N.  Y.  Supp.  1167;  Bradwell  v. 
Pittsburg  &  W.  End  Co.,  139  Pa.  404. 
Coffin  v.  Varilla,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
417;  Allison  v.  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W.  425. 

48  Palmer  v.  Leader  Pub.  Co.,  7  Pa. 
Sup.  Ct.  594;  42  W.  N.  C.  556;  29 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  101. 

49  Holmes  v.  Tennessee  Coal  I.  & 
R.  Co.,  49  La.  Ann.  1465;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  174. 

50  Hercules  Iron  Works  v.  Elgin 
J.  &  E.  R.  Co.  (111.),  30  N.  E.  1050. 

51  Brooks  v.  Ludin,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  338. 

52  Clarke  v.  Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R. 
Co.  (Neb.),  37  N.  W.  484. 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


§  108 


evidence  would  justify  a  smaller  verdict  ;a  nor  where  a  nonsuit 
should  have  been  granted  upon  the  evidence  ;  w  nor  where  the 
testimony  fails  to  show  that  greater  damages  wen-  sustained  or 
unless  some  rule  of  law  has  been  violated;  "  or  where  tin-  sum 
awarded  is  all  that  the  only  evidence  legally  admitted  reason- 
ably warranted,  even  though  the  court  may  have  been  incorrect 
in  his  theory  as  to  the  measure  of  compensation:"*  nor  can  a 
party  complain  as  to  the  insufficiency  of  a  master's  allowance  in 
his  report  where  it  was  confirmed  by  the  chancellor  without  ex- 
ception taken.57 

§  108.  Excessive  and  inadequate  damages— Power  of 
court. — It  is  decided  that  excessive  damages  as  a  ground  lor  a 
new   trial  applies  only  to  actions  ex   delicto.*     In    Illinois  the 


6:1  Beavers  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  47 
Neb.  761;  66  N.  W.  821. 

54  Cominskey  v.  Connellsville  X. 
H.  &  L.  St.  R.  Co.,  4  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  431. 

56  MeBean  v.  McCullum,  89  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  95;  34  X.  Y.  Supp.  1003;  68 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  838. 

■'"'■  Warrior  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Mabel 
M.  Co.,  112  Ala.  624;  20  So.  918. 

«  Reedy  v.  Weakley  (Tenn.  Cli. 
App.),  89  S.  W.  739.  See  further  as 
to  noureversal  for  inadequacy  of 
verdict,  Broom  v.  Jennings,  Kirby 
( Conn. ),  392 ;  Farley  v.  Gate  City  Gas- 
light Co.,  105  G:i.  323;  31  S.  E.  L93; 
Roberts  v.  Rigdon  (Ga.),  7  S.  E.  742; 
Engel  v.  Fischer.  44  111.  App.  362; 
Central  Un.  Telepli.  Co.  v.  Fehring, 
146  Ind.  189;  45  X.  E.  64;  I 'ax  ton  v. 
Vincennes  Mfg.  Co.,  20  lnd.  App. 
253;  50  X.  E.  583;  Schwartz  v.  Davis. 
90  Iowa.  324;  Baldwin  v.  Dewitt,  19 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1248;  43  S.  W.  246;  Linss 
v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  D.  Ky.),  91  Fed.  964;  Benedict  v. 
Michigan  B.  &  P.  Co.,  115  Mich.  527; 
73  X.  Vv*.  802;  4  Del.  L.  V  967;  Nel- 
son v.  West  Duluth  (  Minn.  i.  57  \.  \V. 
149;  Murphy  v.  Rementer  (  Pa.  C.  P. ), 
7  Del.  Co.  Rep.  203;  15  Lane.  L.  Rev. 


270;  The  George  W.  Clyde  ( U.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  2d  C),  58  U.  S.  App.  10;  30 
C.  C.  A.  292;  86  Fed.  665.  See  also 
note,  47  L.  R.  A.  33,  under  the  fol- 
lowing headings  :  Inadequacy  of 
damages  as  a  ground  for  setting  aside 
a  verdict:  (I.)  Power  and  duty  of 
the  court  as  to;  (II.)  rule  in  con- 
tract actions:  (III.)  rule  in  actions 
with  relation  to  property  and  prop- 
erty rights;  (IV.)  rule  in  actions  for 
personal  injuries:  (a)  generally;  (b) 
actions  for  libel  and  slander;  (c)  ac- 
tions for  malicious  prosecution  and 
false  imprisonment;  (d)  actions  for 
assault  and  battery  and  other  torts; 
(e)  actions  for  personal  injuries 
caused  by  negligence:  (1)  general 
rules  as  to;  (2)  what  sufficient  to 
show  bias  or  omission  of  duty — in- 
stances; (/)  statutory  provisions  as 
tosmallness  of  damages  for  personal 
injury;  (V.)  effect  of  uncertainty  as 
to  cause  of  injury;  i  VI. )  who  entitled 
to  relief;  (VII.)  matters  of  proced- 
ure; (VIII.)  increase  of  verdict  by 
court. 

58  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  v  Gray 
(Ind.).  16  X.  E.  7S7  ;  Thomas  v. 
Merry  (Ind.),  15  \.  E.  244. 

109 


§108 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    DAMAGES. 


supreme  court  will  not  review  the  question  of  excessive  dam- 
ages,59 but  it  is  determined  in  Louisiana  that  the  supreme  court 
may  diminish  or  increase  damages  according  to  its  judgment  and 
reasonable  discretion,  based  upon  the  facts  in  the  particular 
case.60  In  Michigan  the  court  may  act  upon  its  own  motion 
where  the  award  is  insufficient  and  order  a  new  trial.61  In 
Missouri  no  power  exists  in  the  supreme  court  to  set  aside 
a  judgment  where  the  only  reason  is  that  the  verdict  appears 
larger  than  the  evidence  seems  to  justify.62  Nor  will  the  New 
York  court  of  appeals  whose  jurisdiction  is  limited  to  the  re- 
view of  questions  of  law,63  interfere  with  the  insufficiency  of  an 
award  unless,  upon  the  uncontradicted  evidence  affected  by  no 
question  of  credibility,  the  award  is  inadequate,  or  a  wrong 
principle  has  been  adopted  in  admeasuring  the  damages  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  prevailing  party.64  And  so  where  the  damages 
are  excessive  the  remedy  being  in  the  lower  court.56  So  in  New 
Mexico  the  supreme  court  does  not  sit  to  pass  upon  the 
amount  of  the  award  of  a  jury,  but  only  to  correct  errors  on  the 
trial;*  nor  will  the  supreme  court  of  South  Carolina  review 
the  refusal  by  a  circuit  judge  of  a  new  trial  for  excessive  dam- 
ages ; 6T  and  so  as  to  the  Texas  court  of  civil  appeals,  unless  a 
manifest  wrong  has  been  done.68  Again,  in  the  United  States 
circuit  court  of  appeals  the  power  is  limited  to  the  inquiry 
whether  the  instruction  to  the  jury  properly  directed  the 
mode  of  assessing  damages.69 


59  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gaei- 
nowski,  155  111.  189;  40  N.  E.  601, 
aff'g  54  111.  App.  276;  Goldie  v. 
Werner,  151  111.  551;  38  N.  E.  95. 

60  Rice  v.  Crescent  City,  51  La. 
Ann.  108;  24  So.  791. 

61  Ft.  Wayne  &  B.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Donovan,  110  Mich.  173;  68  N.  W. 
115;  3  Det.  L.  N.  369. 

62  Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  144  Mo. 
519;  44  S.  W.  1053;  10  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  729. 

63  Const.  N.  Y.  (1900),  art.  VI,  sec. 
9;  N.  Y.  Laws,  1887,  ch.  507. 

64  Slavin  v.  State,  152  N.  Y.  45;  46 
N.  E.  321. 

"^Starbird  v.    Barrows,  62   N.  Y. 

110 


615.  See  as  to  appellate  term  of  New 
York  supreme  court,  Tyler  v.  Third 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  165;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  523.  See  as  to  general 
term  of  New  York  supreme  court, 
McHugh  v.  New  York  El.  R.  Co.,  47 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  73;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  744. 

66  Schofield  v.  Territory,  Amer. 
Valley  Co.,  9  N.  M.  526;  56  Pac.  306. 

67Gillman  v.  Florida  C.  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  53  S.  C.  210;  31  S.  E.  224;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  125;  Dob- 
son  v.  Cothran,  34  S.  C.  518;  13  S.  E. 
679. 

68  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gibson  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ),  38  S.  W.  480. 

69  Homestake  Min.  Co.  v.  Fullerton 


GENERAL   PEINCIPLBS    OF    DAMAGES.      §§  109,  110 

§  109.  Excessive  and  inadequate  damages — Trial  court.— 
"  It  lias  been  repeatedly  held  by  this  court  that  if  a  verdict  for 
damages  is,  in  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court,  excessive  and 
the  result  of  inconsiderate  judgment  or  unfairness  of  action, 
it  is  its  duty  to  set  it  aside  and  award  a  new  trial,  instead  <>f 
ordering  a  remittitur  of  the  amount  deemed  to  be  excessive.""1' 
But  the  trial  court  may  in  California  direct  a  new  trial  unless 
the  prevailing  party  remit  the  excess  where,  in  the  said  court's 
opinion,  the  award  is  not  sustained,  by  the  evidence.71  So  in 
Georgia  the  appellate  court  will  not  interfere  with  the  granting 
of  a  new  trial  by  the  trial  court  subject  to  the  remitting  of  a 
part,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  the  verdict  was  required 
under  the  law  and  the  facts,  and  a  new  trial  had  not  previously 
been  granted.'-  Again,  it  is  decided  in  Illinois  that  it  is  the 
trial  court's  duty  to  grant  a  new  trial,  in  case  of  an  exces- 
sive verdict,  or  to  insist  upon  the  excess  being  remitted,7^ 
Again,  a  referee's  report  is  conclusive  like  the  verdict  of  a 
jury  upon  exceptions  raised  presenting  questions  of  fact  for  the 
trial  term.71  And  the  appellate  division  of  the  New  York  su- 
preme court  will  not  further  reduce  a  verdict  where,  upon  the 
trial  justice's  opinion,  there  should  be  no  further  modification. 7:' 
So  in  Pennsylvania  it  is  decided  that  the  trial  court  and  the  ap- 
pellate court  should  determine  as  to  a  verdict  being  excessive 
or  not  upon  the  evidence.7* 


§110.  Jury  and  instructions  generally.— These  questions 
are  considered  in  this  treatise  in  connection  with  the  various  sub- 
jects in  which  the  points  have  arisen  and  will,  therefore,  be  only 
generally  noticed  here.     Thus  a  jury  may  award  damages  for 


(TJ.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C),  16  C.  C.  A. 
545;  36  U.S.  App.  32;  09  Fed.  923; 
2  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  596. 
See  further  note,  47  L.  R.  A.  33. 

70  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Richards,  58  Kan.  344;  49  Pac.  4:56; 
Drumm  v.  Cessnura,  58  Kan.  331; 
49  Pac.  78. 

"Etchas  v.  Orena,  121  Cal.  270;  53 
Pac.  798. 

72  Harris  v.  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co., 
103  Ga.  495;  30  S.  E.  425. 


73  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeler, 
73  111.  App.  368;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
125. 

74  Drown  v.  Hamilton  (X.  H.),  44 
Atl.  79. 

75  Stemmerman  v.  Nassau  Eleo.  R. 
Co.,  36  AppDiv.  (N.  Y.)  218;  5G  N.  Y. 
Supp.  730. 

70  Powers  v.  Rich,  184  Pa.  325  ;  39 
Atl.  62  ;  41  W.  X.  C.  407. 


Ill 


§110 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF    DAMAGES. 


personal  injuries  even  though  no  opinion  has  been  given  as  to 
the  amount."  And  they  may  be  charged  that  the  only  question 
is  as  to  the  measure  of  damages  where  there  is  such  conclusive 
proof  of  defendant's  liability  as  to  preclude  a  verdict  for  him.7s 
And  they  may  be  instructed  to  award  damages  to  the  plaintiff 
if  they  believe  ■  his  testimony,  there  being  none  other.79  But 
the  jury  must  determine  the  measure  of  damages  as  a  fact  in 
accordance  with  the  law.80  If  the  instruction  applies  only  to 
the  amount  of  damages  and  there  in  no  contention  that  the 
judgment  is  excessive,  the  charge  is  not  open  to  objection.81 
And  portions  as  to  which  there  is  no  evidence  as  to  damages 
may  be  eliminated  and  a  requested  instruction  so  modified.82 
So  if  the  true  general  rule  of  damages  is  stated  correctly  and 
specific  application  thereof  is  made  by  other  instructions,  the 
charge  is  not  erroneous  even  though  turgid  and  redundant,83 
and  where  the  verdict  is  for  defendant  no  prejudicial  error  arises 
because  correct  instructions  as  to  the  measure  of  damages  are 
refused.84  But  the  party  should  request  a  proper  charge  upon 
the  measure  of  damages,  and  if  he  omits  so  to  do  he  cannot 
complain  on  appeal  of  the  court's  omission  to  so  instruct.85 
Proper  instructions,  however,  as  to  the  compensation,  do  not 
cure  errors  in  admission  of  evidence.86  And  a  charge  is  erro- 
neous which  permits  the  jury  in  estimating  damages  to  con- 
sider offensive  questions  by  counsel  on  cross-examination  after 
warning.87  So  an  instruction  which  requires  too  high  a  degree 
of  care  in  preventing  injury  to  property  is  erroneous.88 


«  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lewis,  48  111.  App.  274. 

78  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald, 
152  U.  S.  262;  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  019; 
38  Fed.  434. 

79  White  v.  Blanchard,  164  Pa.  345; 
30  Atl.  204;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
103. 

80  Parke  v.  Frank,  75  Cal.  364. 

gi  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Slanker,  77  111.  App.  567,  aff'd  180 
111.  357;  54  N.  E.  309. 

82  Boggess  v.  Metropolitan  St.   R. 

112 


Co.,  118  Mo.  328;  23  S.  W.  159;  24  S. 
W:  210. 

83  Nye  &  S.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  56  Neb. 
754;  77  N.  W.  118. 

84 Montgomery  v.  AVillis  (Neb.),  63 
N.  W.  494. 

»  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cody  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  5th  C),  67  Fed.  71. 

86  Kohue  v.  White  (Wash. ),  40  Pac. 
794. 

87  Driscoll  v.  Collins,  31  N.  B.  604. 

88  King  v.  Miles  City  Irrig.  D.  Co., 
16  Mont.  463;  41  Pac.  431. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§    HI 


CHAPTER  V. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§  111.   Exemplary    damages     gener- 
ally. 

112.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment. 

113.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment, 

continued. 

1 14.  Where  act  punishable  or  pun- 

ished criminally. 

115.  Not    as    punishment   but    as 

compensation. 
11G.   Doctrine   of  exemplary  dam- 
ages denied. 

117.  Same  subject  continued. 

118.  Plaintiff    not   entitled    to   as 

matter  of  right. 

119.  Elements  necessary  to  justify. 

120.  Wanton  or  malicious  act. 

121.  Malice  sufficient  to  justify. 

122.  Gross  negligence. 

123.  Actual     damage     should     be 

shown. 

124.  Actions  allowed  in. 

125.  Instances  when  allowed. 

126.  Interference  with   exercise  of 

personal  rights. 

127.  Instances  when  not  allowed. 

128.  In  action  on  bond. 

129.  State  may  fix  amount. 

130.  Where    two   or  more   defend- 

ants. 


131.  Against   persons   under  legal 

disability. 

132.  Effect  of  death  of  wrongdoer. 

133.  Mitigation  of  damages. 

134.  Act  done  in  exercise  of  a  sup- 

posed right. 

135.  Against      corporations  —  Ac- 

cepted rule. 

136.  Decisions  holding  ratification 

or.  authorization  of  act  nec- 
essary. 

137.  Same  subject — Particular  de- 

cisions. 

138.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

139.  Decisions  holding  ratification 

or  authorization  of  act  un- 
necessary. 

140.  Same  subject — Particular  de- 

cisions. 

141.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

142.  Against    municipal    corpora- 

tions. 

143.  Evidence  as  to  motives. 

144.  Evidence  as  to  financial  con- 

dition of  defendant. 

145.  Amount,  matter  of  discretion 

with  jury. 

146.  Instructions  as  to  exemplary 

damages. 


§  111.  Exemplary  damages  generally. — Exemplary,  puni- 
tive or  vindictive  damages,  which  are  practically  synonymous,1 

though  said  to  be  wrong  in  theory,2  are,  nevertheless,  allowable 


lHurfurthy.  Corp.  of  Washington,    v.  Drake,  _>   Mete.  (Ky.)  140;  74  Am. 
6  D.  C.  288;  Roth  v.  Eppy,  80  111.  263;  j  Dec.  406. 
Lowry  v.  Coster,  91  111.  182;   Chiles  I     2 Dougherty  v. Shown,  48  Tenn.  302. 

8  11;; 


S  HI  EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

in  certain  cases  of  tort.3     Of  this  rule,  allowing  such  damages,  it 
has  been  said  that  tk  although  it  has  been  occasionally  resisted 


3  Scott  v.  Donald,  165  U.  S.  58;  41 
L.  Ed.  632;  17  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  265, 
aff'g  74  Fed.  859;  13  Nat  Corp.  Rep. 
6;  Bary  v.  Edmunds,  116  U.  S.  550; 
29  L.  Ed.  729;  Conard  v.  Pac.  Ins. 
Co.,  6  Pet.  (U.  S.)  262;  Boston  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Fiske,  2  Mason  (U.  S.),  120; 
Cowen  v.  Winters,  96  Fed.  935; 
Morning  Journal  Assn.  v.  Ruther- 
ford, 51  Fed.  513;  New  York,  L.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  50  Fed.  496; 
United  States  v.  Taylor,  35  Fed.  484; 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Cunning- 
ham, 99  Ala.  314;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  658; 
Floyd  v.  Hamilton,  33  Ala.  235 ;  Me- 
Cullough    v.    Walton,    11    Ala.    492; 

Kirkser  v.  Jones,  7  Ala.  622;  Clark 
v.  Bales,  15  Ark.  452;  Bundy  v. 
Maginness,  76  Cal.  532;  18  Pac.  668; 
Cal.  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3294;  Ores  v. 
McGlasher,  74  Cal.  148;  15  Pac  452; 

Waters  v.  Dumas,  75  Cal.  564;  17  Pac. 

685;  Nightingale  v.  Scannell,  18  Cal. 

315;  Wynne  v.  Parsons,  57  Conn.  73; 

17    Atl.    362;    Mason   v.    Hawes,    52 

Conn.  12;  52  Am.  Rep.   552;  Dalton 

v.  Beers,  38  Conn.  529;  Robinson  v. 

Burton,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  335;  Jacobus 

v.  Congregation  of  C.  of  I.,  107  Ga. 

518;    6    Am.    Neg.     Rep.    434  ;    49 

Cent.      L.     J.     307;  ~4    Chic.    L.   J. 

Wkly.  408;   33  S.  E.   853;    Barber  v. 

Lainier,    82    Ga.    216;    8  S.     E.    57; 

Coleman  v.   Ryan,  58  Ga.   1321;  Ga. 

Civ.    Code,   sec.    3906;    Harrison     v. 

Ely,  120  111.  83;  11  N.  E.  334;  Roth 

v.   Eppy,    80   111.    283;    Donnelly    v. 

Harris,     41     111.     126;    Sherman    v. 

Dutch,    16    111.    283;    McNamara  v. 

King,  7  111.  432;  Binford  v.  Young, 
115  Ind.  179;  16  N.  E.  192;  Moore  v. 
Crose,  43  Ind.  34;  Mullison  v.  Hoch, 
17  Ind.  227;  Taber  v.  Hutson,  5  Ind. 
322;  Anthony  v.  Gilbert,  4  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  348;  Thill  v.  Pohlmann,  76 
Iowa,  638;  41  N.  W.  385.     See  Iowa 

114 


Code,  sec.  1557;  Redfieldv.  Redfield, 
75  Iowa,  435;  39  N.   W.  688;  Fox  v. 
Wunderlich,  64  Iowa,   187;    Cochran 
v.  Miller,  13  Iowa,  128;  Annot.  Code, 
Iowa   (1897),    sec.    4200;    Hefley   v. 
Baker,    19   Kan.   9;  Malone   v.   Mur- 
phy,   2  Kan.    250;    Tyson   v.  Ewing, 
3   J.    J.    Marsh.     (Ky.)     185;    Bron- 
son     v.      Green,      2      Duv.       (Ky.) 
234;  Chiles  v.   Drake,  2  Mete.  (Ky.) 
146;  Webb  v.  Gilman,  80  Me.  177;  13 
Atl.  688;  Wilkinson  v.  Drew,  75  Me. 
260;    Pike    v.    Dilling,    48    Me.   539; 
Blumhardt  v.  Rohr,  70  Md.  328;  17 
Atl.    266;    Elbin    v.     Dean,   33    Md. 
135;   Baltimore,    etc.,  R.    R.    Co.  v. 
Breinig,    25    Md.    378;    Newman   v. 
Stein,  75  Mich.  402;  Ross  v.  Leggett, 
61    Mich.    445;    Beck    v.     Small,    35 
Minn.  465;  29  N.   W.  69;  Seeman  v. 
Feeney,  19  Minn.  79;  Fox  v.  Stevens, 
13   Minn.    272;    Lynd    v.    Picket,    7 
Minn.   184;  Higgins  v.  Louisville.  N. 
O.  &  Tex.  R.  R.   Co.,  64  Miss.  80;  8 
So.  176;  Vicksburg&  Meridian  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Scanlon,  63  Miss.  413;  Bell  v. 
Morrison,  27  Miss.  68;  Green  v.  Craig, 
47  Mo.  90;  Callahan  v.   Cararoto,   39 
Mo.    156;  Stoneseifer   v.    Sheble,   31 
Mo.  243 ;  Taylor  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 
Co.,  48  N.  H.  304;  2  Am.   Rep.  229; 
Magee  v.  Holland,  27  N.  J.  L.  86;  72 
Am.  Dec.  341 ;  Winter   v.    Peterson, 
24  N.   J.   L.   524;    Warner  v.    Press 
Pub.  Co.,   132  N.   Y.    181;  43  N.   Y. 
St.   R.   633;  30  N.  E.  393;  Brook  v. 
Harrison,  91  N.  Y.   83;  Hamilton  v. 
Eno,  81  N.   Y.    116;  Voltz   v.   Black- 
mar,  64  N.   Y.  440;  Wort  v.  Jenkins, 
14  Johns.    (N.    Y.)   351;    Walker    v. 
Wilson,     8     Bosw.      (N.     Y.)     586; 
Bowden      v.      Bailes,     101      N.      C. 
612;  S.  E.  342;  Louder  v.   Hinson,  4 
Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  369;  Peckham  Iron 
Co.    v.     Harper,    41    Ohio     St.    100; 
Hayner  v.  Cowden,  27  Ohio  St.  292; 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§112 


by  text  writers  and  courts,  it  has  become  by  a  great  array  of 
decisions  so  firmly  rooted  in  the  common  law  that  it  cannot  be 
overturned  except  by  an  act  of  the  legislature.'*  ' 


^  112.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment. — The  question  whether 
exemplary  damages  are  to  be  considered  as  a  compensatioo  or 
are  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment  has  been  much  discussed. 


22  Am.  Rep.  303;  Smith  v.  Ft.  W.  & 
C.  R.  R.  Co..  23  Ohio  St.  10;  Atlantic 
it  Great  \Y.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Dunn.  190hio 
St.  162;  2  Am.  Rep.  382;  Heneky  v. 
Smith,  10  Oreg.  349;  45  Am.  Rep. 
143;  Reynolds  v.  Braithwaite,  LSI 
Pa.  St.  416;  18  Atl.  1110;  25  W.  N. 
C.  269;  47  Phila.  Leg.  Int.  426;  20 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  361:  Baiuett  v. 
Reed,  51  Pa.  St.  190;  McKnight  v. 
Ratcliffe,  44  Pa.  St.  168;  Xagle  v.  Mul- 
lison.  34  Pa.  St.  48;  Hodgson  v. 
Millward,  3  Grant  ( Pa. ),  406;  Hazard 
v.  Israel,  1  Binn.  (Pa.)  228;  2  Am. 
Dec  438;  Kenyon  v.  Cameron.  17  R. 
I.  122:  20  Atl.  233;  Wade  v.  Elec.  L. 
&  1'.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  296;  64  Am.  St. 
Rep.  676;  29  S.  E.  233;  Quinn  v.  So. 
Car.  Ry.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  381;  1  L.  R.  A. 
682;  7S.  E.  614;  Jefcoat  v.  Knotts,  1 
Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  649;  Genay  v.  Mor- 
ris, 1  Bay.  (S.  C. )  6;  Dougherty  v. 
Shown,  48  Tenn.  302;  Goodall  v. 
Thurman,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  209; 
Shannon's  Annot.  Code,  Tenn.  (1896) 
5291;  Biering  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  69 
Tex.  599;  7  S.  W.  90;  Shaw  v.  Brown, 
41  Tex.  446;  Stell  v.  Paschall.  40 
Tex.  640;  Camp  v.  Camp,  59  Vt. 
667;  10  Atl.  748;  Rea  v.  Harrington. 
58  Vt.  181;  56  Am.  Rep.  561;  2  Atl. 
475;  Ellsworth  v.  Potter,  41  Vt.  685; 
Nye  v.  Merriam,  35  Vt.  538;  Spear  v. 
Hiles,  67  Wis.  350;  30  N.  W.  506; 
Pickett  v.  Crook,  20  Wis.  35S:  Mc- 
Williams  v.  Bragg,  3  Wis.  424;  Union 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hause,  1  Wyo.  27; 
Mayer  v.  Frohe,  40  W.  Va.  246,  249; 
22  S.  E.  58;  Bell  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  j 


10  C.  B.  N.  S.  306;  Huckle  v.  Money. 
2  Wils.  205;  Beardmore  v.  Carring- 
ton,  2  Wils.  244;  Sears  v.  Lyons,  2 
Stark.   X.  P.    317;   Merest  v.  Harvey. 

5  Taunt.  442;  Thomas  v.  Harris.  3 
H.  &  N.  961;  Emblem  v.  Myers.  <»  H. 

6  N.  54:  Skull  v.  Gleinster,  33  L.  J. 
C.  P.  185;  Pearson  v.  Lemaitre,  5 
M.  &  G.  700;  Forde  v.  Skinner.  4  C. 
&  P.  239;  Doe  v.  Filliter,  13  M.  &  \V. 
47;  Brewer  v.  Dew,  11  M.  &  W.  625; 
I.eith  v.  Pope,  2  Wm.  Bl.  1327:  Caddy 
v.  Barlow,  1  Man.  £  Ryl.  275;  Stein 
v.  Belanger,  Rap.  .hid.  Queh.  9  C.  S. 
535.  But  see  contra,  Greeley  s.  I,. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Yeager.  11  Colo.  345; 
is  Pac.  211:  Murphy  v.  Hohbs.  7 
Colo.  541;  49  Am.  Rep.  366;  5  Pac. 
119;  llawes  v.  Knowles,  114  Mass 
518;  Smith  v.  Holcomb,  99  Mass.  552; 
Stowe  v.  Heywood,  7  Allen  (Mass.), 
119;  Barnard  v.  Poor,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  378;  Spear  v.  Hubhard.  4 
Pick.  (Mass.)  143;  Wilson  v.  Bowen, 
64  Mich.  133;  Detroit  Daily  Tost  v. 
McArthur,  16  Mich.  447:  Bank  of 
Commerce  v.  Goos,  39  Xat.  437;  2:1 
L.  R.  A.  190;  58  N.  W.  84;  Boldt  v. 
Budwig,  19  Xat.  739;  Riewe  v.  Me- 
Cormick,  11  Xeb.  263;  Roose  v.  Per- 
kins, 9  Neb.  315;  Boyerv.  Barr,8Neb. 
70;  Bixby  v.  Dunlap,  56  X.  11.456; 
Fay  v.  Parker.  53  X.  H.  342;  Spokane 
Truck  &  Dray  Co.  v.  Hoefer.  2  Wash. 
St.  45;  25  Pac.  1072;  11  L.  R.  A.  689; 
26  Am.  St.  Rep.  842;  2  Greenleaf  on 
Ev.  (16th  ed.)  sec.  253n. 

♦McCarthy   v.    Miskern.   22    Minn. 
90,  per  Cilfillan,  C.  J., 

115 


U12 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


The  general  rule,  however,  as  sustained  by  the  great  weight  of 
authority,  is  that  such  damages  are  allowed  as  a  punishment  and 
for  the  purpose  of  restraining  others  from  following  a  similar 
line  of  conduct.5  In  those  cases  where  the  injury  complained 
of  is  due  to  fraud,  malice,  gross  negligence  or  oppression,  the  law 
blends  the  interests  of  society  and  of  the  aggrieved  individual 
and  awards  such  damages  as  an  example  to  the  wrongdoer  or 
others  and  for  the  purpose  of  deterring  them  from  similar  trans- 


5  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ky.  Co.  v. 
Prentice,  147  U.  S.  107;  37  L.  Ed. 
101;  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Arms,  19  U.  S.  489;  23  L.  Ed.  374; 
Day  v.  Woodwartli,  13  How.  (U.  S. ) 
371;  14  L.  Ed.  185;  Stimpson  v. 
Railroads,  1  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S. )  104, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  13,450;  Press  Pub.  Co. 
v.  Monroe,  73  Fed.  201;  51  L.  A. 
353;  Tibler  v.  Alford,  12  Fed.  R.  202; 
Alabama,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sellers,  93  Ala. 
9;  9  So.  375;  Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Steen,  42  Ark.  321;  Cal.  Civ.  Code, 
sec.  3294;  Dibble  v.  Morris,  20  Conn. 
420;  Beecber  v.  Derby  Bridge  & 
Ferry  Co.,  24  Conn.  491:  Huntley 
v.  Bacon,  15  Conn.  207:  Linsley 
v.  Bushnell,  15  Conn.  230;  Merrills 
v.  Tariff  Mfg.  Co.,  10  Conn.  384;  27 
Am.  Dec.  082;  Peoria  Bridge  Assoc, 
v.  Loomis,  20  111.  235;  Lake  Erie  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Cbristison,  39  111.  App. 
495;  Root  v.  Sturdivant,  70  Iowa,  55; 
29  N.  W.  802;  Parkbnrst  v.  Mas- 
teller,  57  Iowa,  474;  10  N.  W.  S04; 
Ward  v.  Ward,  41  Iowa,  080;  William- 
son v.  Stage  Co.,  24  Iowa,  171;  Hen- 
drickson  v.  Kingsbury,  21  Iowa,  379; 
Titus  v.  Corkins,  21  Kan.  722;  Ken- 
tucky Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dills,  4 
Bush  (Ky.),  311;  Phila.  Wilm.  & 
Bait.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Larkin,  47  Md.  155; 
28  Am.  Rep.  442;  Bannon  v.  Rail- 
road, 24  Md.  108:  New  Orleans  & 
C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stathan,  42  Miss.  007; 
Buckley  v.  Knapp.  48  Mo.  102:  Ken- 
nedy v.  Nortb  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo. 
351;  Fobrmann  v.  Consol.   Tract.  Co. 

116 


(N.  J.  ),  43  Atl.  892;  0  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
001;  Voltz  v.  Blackmar,  04  N.  Y. 
444;  Millard  v.  Brown.  35  N.  Y.  297; 
Etcliberry  v.  Levielle,  2  Hilt.  (  N.  Y.) 
40;  Tifft  v.  Culver,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
180;  Wallace  v.  Mayor,  2  Hilt. 
(N.  Y. )  440;  9  Abb.  Pr.  40;  Sullivan 
v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  12  Oreg. 
392;  7  Pac.  508;  53  Am.  Rep.  304; 
Johnson  v.  Allen,  100  N.  C.  131; 
Reeves  v.  Winn,  97  N.  C.  246; 
Gillreath  v.  Allen,  10  lied.  (N.  C.) 
07;  Pitts.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Lyon,  123  Pa.  St.  140;  10  Atl.  007; 
2  L.  R.  A.  489;  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  517; 
Hodgson  v.  Mill  ward,  3  Grant  (Pa.), 
400;  Hagan  v.  Prov.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  3 
R.  I.  88,  91;  Samuels  v.  Richmond  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  35  S.  C.  493;  14  S.  E. 
943;  Louisville,  N.  &  Gt.  So.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Guinan,  11  Lea  (Tenn. ),  98; 
47  Am.  Rep.  279;  Dougherty  v. 
Sbown,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  302;  Cox  v. 
Crumley,  5  Lea  (Tenn.),  529;  Polk 
v.  Fancber,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  336; 
Rogers  v.  Ferguson,  36  Tex.  544; 
Claiborne  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co., 
40  W.  Va.  303;  33  S.  E.  202;  14  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  217;  Mayer  v. 
Frobe,  40  W.  Va.  246;  22  S.  E.  58 
(in  West  Virginia  tbese  two  cases 
overrule  the  former  decisions  of 
Pegram  v.  Stortz,  31  W.  Va.  220;  6 
S.  E.  485;  Beck  v.  Thompson.  31  W. 
Va.  459:  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  870;  7  S.  E. 
447);  Mc Williams  v.  Bragg,  3  Wis. 
424;  Clissold  v.  Machell,  26  Up.  Can. 
q.  427. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES.  §  113 

actions/'  In  several  states,  however,  the  rule  has  been  affirmed 
that  though  punitory  damages  are  those  allowed  beyond  a  com- 
pensation, they  are  not  in  the  nature  of  a  public  punishment  but 
are  based  upon  the  act  as  a  tort.1  And  it  has  been  held  improper 
to  charge  the  jury  that  "you  may  give  what  is  called  vindict- 
ive damages,  that  is,  such  damages  as  will  satisfy  the  highly 
excited  feelings  of  the  party  injured."8 

§  113.  Are  in  nature  of  punishment,  continued.— The  doc- 
trine that  such  damages  are  allowed  as  an  example  or  by  way 
of  punishment  has  been  repeatedly  affirmed  in  the  federal 
courts.9  So  in  the  United  States  supreme  court  it  has  been  de- 
clared that,  "in  actions  of  trespass  and  all  actions  on  the  case 
for  torts,  a  jury  may  inflict  what  are  called  exemplary,  punitive 
or  vindictive  damages  upon  a  defendant,  having  in  view  the 
enormity  of  the  offense  rather  than  the  measure  of  compensa- 
tion to  the  plaintiff.  We  are  aware  that  the  propriety  of  this 
doctrine  has  been  questioned  by  some  writers,  but  if  repeated 
judicial  decisions  for  more  than  a  century  are  to  be  received  as 
the  best  exposition  of  what  the  law  is,  the  question  will  not 
admit  of  argument.  ...  In  actions  of  trespass  where  the  in- 
jury has  been  wanton  and  malicious,  or  gross  and  outrageous, 
courts  permit  juries  to  give  in  addition  to  the  measured  com- 
pensation of  the  plaintiff,  which  he  would  have  been  entitled 
to  recover  had  the  injury  been  inflicted  without  design  or  in- 
tention, something  further  by  way  of  punishment  or  example 
which  has  sometimes  been  called  smart  money.  This  has  al- 
ways been  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  jury  as  the  degree  of 
the  punishment  to  be  thus  inflicted  must  depend  on  the  pecu- 
liar circumstances  of  each  case."10  And  again  in  another  deci- 
sion in  this  court  it  was  said  that  ''jurists  have  chosen  to  place 
this  doctrine  on  the  ground,  not  that  the  sufferer  is  to  berecom- 

«  Louisville,  X.  &  Ot.  So.  R.  R.  Co.    v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282;  28    Am. 


v.  Guinan,    11   Lea    (Tenn.),    08;  47 
Am.  Rep.  270. 

7  Humphries  v.  Johnson,  'JO  Ind. 
190;  Ilendricksou  v.  Kingsbury,  _'l 
[owa,  870;  Chiles  v.  Drake,  no  Ky. 
146;  74  Am.  Dec.  400;  City  of  Lowell 
V.  Short,  4Cush.  (Mass.)  27.">;  Brown 


Rep.  582, 

s . I. »nes  v.  Turpin,  ii  Eeisk.  |  Tenn.  i 
181. 

9 See  cases  cited  in  preceding  uote. 

10  Day  v.  Woodworth,  13  Bow. 
(U.  S.)  371;  14  L.  Ed.  185,  per  Mr. 
Justice  Grier. 

117 


$113  EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

pensed,  but  that  the  offender  is  to  be  punished,  and  although 
the  soundness  of  it  has  been  questioned,  it  must  be  accepted  as 
the  general  rule  in  England  and  in  most  of  the  states  of  this 
country."  "  The  words  of  the  court  in  a  New  York  decision  are 
also  pertinent  in  this  connection^  it  being  declared  that  "in 
vindictive  actions,  as  they  are  sometimes  termed,  such  as  libel, 
assault  and  battery,  and  false  imprisonment,  the  conduct  and 
motive  of  the  defendant  is  open  to  inquiry  with  a  view  to  the 
assessment  of  damages  ;  and  if  the  defendant  in  committing 
the  wrong  complained  of,  acted  recklessly  or  wilfully  and  ma- 
liciously with  a  design  to  oppress  and  injure  the  plaintiff,  the 
jury  in  fixing  the  damages  may  disregard  the  rule  of  compen- 
sation, and  beyond  that  may,  as  a  punishment  to  the  defendant 
and  as  a  protection  to  society  against  a  violation  of  personal 
rights  and  social  order,  award  such  additional  damages  as  in 
their  discretion  they  may  deem  proper.  The  same  rule  has 
been  held  to  apply  in  the  case  of  wilful  injury  to  property, 
and  in  actions  of  tort  founded  upon  negligence  amounting  to 
misconduct  and  recklessness."12  And  in  an  early  decision  in 
North  Carolina  words  of  similar  import  are  also  used.  In  this 
case  it  was  said  that,  "  in  actions  of  tort  where  there  are  cir- 
cumstances of  aggravation,  juries  are  not  restricted  in  the 
measure  of  damages  to  the  mere  compensation  for  the  injury 
sustained,  but  may,  in  their  discretion,  increase  the  amount 
according  to  the  degree  of  malice  by  which  the  evidence  shows 
the  defendant  was  actuated,  the  extent  of  the  injury  intended, 
and  not  that  which  was  really  inflicted.  Accordingly,  juries 
are  told  in  many  cases  they  may  give  exemplary  damages,  that 
is,  such  as  will  make  an  example  of  the  defendant,  or  vindict- 
ive damages  or  smart  money,  terms  which  explain  themselves. 
.  .  .  Injuries  sustained  by  a  personal  insult  or  attempt  to  de- 
stroy character,  are  matters  which  cannot  be  regulated  by  dol- 
lars and  cents.  It  is  fortunate  that  while  juries  endeavor  to 
give  ample  compensation  for  the  injury  actually  sustained,  they 


11  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Arms,  91  U.  S.  489;  23  L.  Ed.  374,  per 
Mr.  Justice  Davis. 

i'2  Voltz  v.  Blackmar,  64  N.  Y.  444, 


Bennett,  19  N.  Y.  174;  Taylor  v. 
Church,  8  N.  Y.  460;  Burr  v.  Burr,  7 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  207;  Cook  v.  Ellis,  6 
Hill    (N.  Y.),  466;    Tifft    v.   Culver, 


per   Andrews,  J.     See   also    Millard   3  Hill   (N.    Y.),    180;  King  v.    Root, 
v.    Brown,  35   N.    Y.    297;    Hunt  v.  I  4  Wend.  (N.  T.)  113. 

118 


KXKMI'LAUY    DAMAGES. 


§114 


are  allowed  such  full  discretion  as  to  make  verdicts  to  deter 
others  from  flagrant  violations  of  social  duty,  otherwise  there 
would  be  many  injuries  without  adequate  remedy."13  So,  also, 
this  doctrine  has  been  affirmed  in  the  Connecticut  cases  by  the 
statement  that  "there  is  no  principle  better  established,  and 
no  practice  more  universal,  than  that  vindictive  damages  or 
smart  money  may  be,  and  is,  awarded  by  the  verdicts  <>i  juries 
in  cases  of  wanton  or  malicious  injuries,  and  whether  the  form 
of  the  action  be  trespass  or  case."14  And  it  has  been  said  in  a 
Missouri  decision  that  "  this  is  now  the  general  and  almost 
universal  doctrine  and  is  thoroughly  imbedded  in  the  jurispru- 
dence of  this  state."  v' 


§  114.  Where  act  punishable,  or  punished  criminally.— 

The  objection  has  been  raised  in  some  jurisdictions,  that  if  the 
act  of  the  defendant  may  also  be  punished,  or  has  been  punished 
criminally,  exemplary  damages  should  not  be  given,  since  this 
would  be  an  infliction  upon  him  of  two  punishments  for  the 
same  offense,  in  violation  of  his  legal  rights.  Though  much 
has  been  said  in  favor  of  such  a  rule,  yet  the  courts  have  generally 
adhered  to  the  doctrine  that  the  fact  that  the  defendant  is  pun- 
ishable, or  has  been  punished  criminally,  for  the  act  causing  the 
loss  or  injury,  should  not  defeat  an  allowance  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages. The  latter  though  being  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment  are, 
nevertheless,  incidentally  compensatory  for  the  wrongful  act  of 
the  defendant,  and  such  damages,  though  being  also  penal,  yet 
are  for  the  wrongful  injury  to  the  individual,  while  the  punish- 
ment inflicted  criminally  is  for  the  injury  caused  to  society  at 


"Gilreath  v.  Allen,  10  Ired.  (N.  C.) 
67,  per  Pearson,  J.  See  also  Johnson 
v.  Allen,  100  N.  C.  131;  5  S.  E.  666; 
Reeves  v.  Winn,  97  X.  C.  246;  Smith- 
wick  v.  Ward,  7  Jones  (N.  C),  64; 
McAnlay  v.  Birkhead,  13  lred.  L.  (N. 
C.)  28;  Howell  v.  Howell,  10 Ired.  L. 
(N.  C.)  84. 

i*  Lindsley  v.  Bushnell,  15  Conn. 
23t>;  38  Am.  Dee.  79,  per  Church,  J. 
See  also  Denison  v.  Hyde,  6  Conn. 
578;  Edwards  v.  Beach,  3  Day  (Conn.), 
447. 


is  Buckley  v.  Kuapp,  48  Mo.  162, 
per  Wagner,  J.  See  also  Franz  v. 
Hilterbraiul,  4:>  Mo.  121;  Callaghan 
v.  Cafferata,  39  Mo.  137;  Kennedy  v. 
North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co..  36  Mo.  351; 
Freidenheit  v.  Edmundson,  36  Bfo. 
■jl'7  ;  88  Am.  Dec.  141;  Walker  v. 
Borland,  21  Mo.  --'89;  Corwin  v.  Wal- 
ter, 18  Mo.  7:1;  Millmni  v.  Beach,  14 
Mo.  104;  Von  Fragstein  v.  Windier, 
•l  Mo.  A.pp.  588;  but  see  opinion  ex- 
pressed in  BfcEeOD  v.  Citizens  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  42  Mo.  79. 

119 


§114 


EXEMPLAR?    DAMAGES. 


large  for  the  same  wrongful  act."'  In  an  early  case  in  New  York 
it  is  said  in  this  connection  that,  "in  vindictive  actions  jurors 
are  always  authorized  to  give  exemplary  damages  where  the 
injury  is  attended  with  circumstances  of  aggravation;  and  the 
rule  is  laid  down  without  the  qualification  that  we  are  to  regard 
either  the  possible  or  actual  punishment  of  the  defendant  by 
indictment  and  conviction  at  the  suit  of  the  people.  That  the 
criminal  suit  is  not  a  bar  to  the  civil,  and  that  no  court  will 
drive  the  prosecutor  to  elect  between  them  if  the  former  be  by 
indictment,  is  entirely  settled.  .  .  .  He  may  proceed  by  both  at 
the  same  time ;  nor  will  the  court  even  stay  proceedings  in  the 
civil  prosecution  to  govern  themselves,  by  the  event  of  a  pend- 
ing criminal  prosecution.  .  .  .  We  concede  that  smart  money 
allowed  by  a  jury  and  a  fine  imposed  at  the  suit  of  the  people, 
depend  on  the  same  principle.     Both  are  penal  and  intended  to 


is  Brown  v.  Evans,  17  Fed.  912; 
Wilson  v.  Middleton,  2  Cal.  54; 
Howlett  v.  Tuttle,  15  Colo.  454;  24 
Pac.  921;  Smith  v.  Bagwell,  19  Fla. 
117;  45  Am.  Rep.  12;  Jefferson  v. 
Adams,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  321;  Brannon 
v.  Silvernail,  81  111.  434;  Ward  v. 
Ward,  41  Iowa,  686;  Garland  v. 
Wholeham,  26  Iowa,  185;  Hendrick- 
sou  v.  Kingsbury,  21  Iowa,  379; 
Jockers  v.  Borgmaun,  29  Kan.  109; 
44  Am.  Rep.  625;  Chiles  v.  Drake,  2 
Mete.  (Ky.)  146;  74  Am.  Dec.  406; 
Johnson  v.  Smith,  64  Me.  553;  Boetch- 
er  v.  Staples,  27  Minn.  306;  38  Am. 
Rep.  295;  7  N.  W.  263;  Wheatley  v. 
Thorn,  23  Miss.  62;  Baldwin  v.  Fries, 
46. Mo.  App.  288;  Corwin  v.  Walton, 
18  Mo.  71;  59  Am.  Dec.  285;  New  v. 
McKechnie,  95  X.  Y..632;  Cook  v. 
Ellis,  6  Hill  (X.  Y.),  466;  Fry  v. 
Bennett,  4  Dner  (X.  Y),  247;  Sowers 
v.  Sowers,  87  N.  C.  303;  Hayner  v. 
Cowden,  27  Ohio  St.  292;  22  Am.  Rep. 
303;  Atlantic  &  Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Dunn,  19  Ohio  St.  162;  2  Am. 
Rep.  382;  Roberts  v.  Mason,  10  Ohio 
St.  278;  Barr  v.  Moore,  87  Pa.  St. 
385;    30   Am.    Rep.    367;    Porter   v. 

120 


Seiler,  23  Pa.  St.  424;  62  Am.  Dec. 
341 ;  Wolf  v.  Cohen.  8  Rich.  L.  ( S.  C. ) 
144;  Cole  v.  Tucker,  6  Tex.  266; 
Hoadley  v.  Watson,  45  Vt.  289;  12 
Am.  Rep.  197;  Borland  v.  Barrett,  76 
Va.  128;  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44 
Wis.  282;  Jones  v.  Clay,  1  Bos.  & 
Pull.  191;  Jacks  v.  Bell,  3  Carr.  &  1'. 
316;  but  see  contra  Huber  v.  Teuber, 
3  McArthur  (D.  C. ),  484;  Cherry  v. 
McCall,  23  Ga.  193;  Albrecht  v. 
Walker,  73  111.  69;  Wabash  Pr.  & 
Pub.  Co.  v.  Crumrine,  123  Ind.  89, 
93;  21  N.  E.  904;  Farmau  v.  Lauman, 
73  Ind.  568;  Stewart  v.  Madox,  63 
Ind.  51;  Koerner  v.  Oberly,  56  Ind. 
284;  26  Am.  Rep.  34;  Meyer  v. 
Bohlfing,  44  Ind.  238;  Humphries  v. 
Johnson,  20  Ind.  190;  Nossaman  v. 
Rickert,  18  Ind.  350;  Butler  v. 
Mercer,  14  Ind.  479;  Struble  v.  Nod- 
wift,  11  Ind.  64;  Johnson  v.  Vuthrick, 
7  Ind.  137;  Taber  v.  Hutson,  5  Ind. 
322;  61  Am.  Dec.  96;  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.  v.  Bierhaus,  8  Ind.  App. 
563;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  723;  Ormsby 
v.  Johnson,  1  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  80; 
Austin  v.  Wilson,  58  Mass.  (4  Cush.) 
273 ;  50  Am.  Dec.  766. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§115 


deter  others  from  the  commission  of  the  like  crime.  The  former, 
however,  becomes  incidentally  compensatory  for  damages,  and 
at  the  same  time  answers  the  purposes  of  punishment."" 

§  115.  Not  as  punishment  but  as  compensation.— In  X.  w 
Hampshire  the  doctrine  of  damages  being  awarded  as  a  punish- 
ment or  example  is  distinctly  denied.  The  courts  in  this  state 
though  speaking  of  such  damages  as  exemplary,  endeavor  to 
reconcile  them  with  the  idea  of  compensation,  it  being  declared 
that  they  are  allowed  by  way  of  remuneration  for  the  wrong 
done,  considering  the  aggravating  circumstances  and  the  wilful 
or  reckless  character  of  the  act.  The  rule  that  exemplary  dam- 
ages may  be  given  as  a  punishment  in  cases  of  express  fraud, 
malice,  indignity,  wantonness,  oppression,  insult  and  cruelty,  is 
supported  by  the  early  decisions  in  New  Hampshire.18  But  in 
the  case  of  Fay  v.  Parker,19  which  contains  an  elaborate  and 
lengthy  review  of  the  decisions  and  authorities  as  to  such  dam- 
ages, it  is  declared  that  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  of  tort  is  en- 
titled to  a  full  compensation  for  the  injury  sustained  by  him, 
but  that  this  cannot  be  increased  by  the  addition  of  a  line  for 
the  punishment  of  the  defendant.20     And  in  a  later  case  in  this 


i- Cook  v.  Ellis,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  466; 
41  Am.  Dec.  757,  per  curiam. 

18  Woodman  v.  Nottingham,  49  N. 
H.  387;  Belknap  v.  Boston  &  Me.  K. 
K.,  49  X.  II.  358;  Ilolyoke  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.,  48  N.  II.  541;  Taylor  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  48  X.  H.  303; 
Cram    v.    Hadley,    48    X.    H.    191; 

Towle  v.  Blake,  48  X.  II.  92;  M »• 

v.  Bowman,  47  X.  II.  494;  Perkins  v. 
Towle,  43  X.  H.  220;  Knight  v.  Fos- 
ter, 39  N.  II.  576;  Eopkinsv.  Rail- 
road, 36  X.  II.  9;  Symonds  v.  Car- 
ter, 32  X.  11.458;  Davidson  v.  Good- 
all,  18  X.  H.  42:'.;  Whipple  v.  Wal- 
pole,  ID  X.  II.  130. 

i953  X.  II.  342;  16  Am.  Rep.  270. 

20  The  court  in  conclusion  said  in 
this  case:  "The  true  rule,  simple 
and  just,  is  to  keep  the  civil  and  the 
criminal  process  and  practice  dis- 
tinct and  separate.     Let  the  criminal 


law  deal  with  the  criminal  and  ad- 
minister punishment  for  the  legiti- 
mate purpose  and  end  of  punish- 
ment— namely  the  reformation  of  the 
offender  and  the  safety  of  the  peo- 
ple. Let  the  individual  whose  rights 
are  infringed  and  who  has  suffered  in- 
jury go  t<>  the  civil  courts  and  there 
obtain  full  and  ample  reparation 
and  compensation  ;  but  let  him  not 
thus  obtain  the  'fruits'  to  which  he 
is  not  entitled  and  which  belong  to 
others.  Why  longer  tolerate  a  false 
doctrine  which  in  its  practical  exem- 
plification deprives  a  defendant  of 
his  constitutional  righl  of  indictment 
or  complaint  on  oath  before  being 
called  into  court  ?  Deprives  him  of 
the  right  of  meeting  the  witnesses 
against  him  face  to  face  ?  Deprives 
him  of  the  right  of  not  being  com- 
pelled  to    testify   against    himself? 

121 


S  115 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


state  it  is  said  that  damages  sometimes  termed  exemplary,  vin- 
dictive or  punitive  are  awarded,  but  these  terms  do  not  imply 
that  they  are  awarded  as  a  punishment  for  violation  of  the 
criminal  law.  They  are  not  open  to  the  objection  of  exposing 
the  defendant  to  a  double  punishment,  but  are  rather  to  be 
considered  as  a.  compensation  for  the  wrong,  considering 
the  existence  of  malice  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.21  It  was 
declared  by  the  court  in  this  case  that :  "  It  is  incorrect  to  sepa- 
rate what  is  called  actual  damages  from  what  is  called  exem- 
plary damage.  The  rule  is  not,  as  I  understand  it,  to  instruct 
the  jury  in  the  first  place  to  determine  the  actual  money  dam- 
age which  the  plaintiff  has  sustained,  and  then  further  instruct 
the  jury  that  if  they  find  the  defendant  has  been  malicious, 
they  may  give  another  separate  sum  in  damages  by  way  of  ex- 
ample or  for  the  sake  of  punishment.  The  true  rule,  as  I 
understand  it,  is  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if  they  find  the  de- 
fendant has  been  malicious,  the  rule  of  damages  will  be  more 
liberal ;  that  instead  of  awarding  damages  only  for  those  mat- 
ters which  are  capable  of  exact  pecuniary  valuation,  they  may 
take  into  consideration  all  the  circumstances  of  aggravation — 
the  insults,  offended  feelings,  degradation,  and  so  on— and  en- 
deavor, according  to  their  best  judgment,  to  award  such  dam- 
ages by  way  of  compensation  or  indemnity  as  the  plaintiff  on 
the  whole  ought  to  receive  and  the  defendant  ought  to  pay."  a 
And  in  an  early  case  in  Kentucky  the  view  that  such  damages 
may  be  allowed  but  that  they  are  to  be  considered  as  a  remu- 


Deprives  him  of  the  right  of  being 
acquitted  unless  the  proof  of  his 
offense  is  established  beyond  all 
reasonable  doubt?  Deprives  him  of 
the  right  of  not  being  punished  twice 
for  the  same  offense  ?  Punitive 
damages  destroy  every  constitutional 
safeguard  within  their  reach.  And 
what  is  to  be  gained  by  this  annihi- 
lation and  obliteration  of  the  funda- 
mental law  ?  The  sole  object  in  its 
practical  results  seems  to  be  to  give 
a  plaintiff  something  which  he  does 
not  claim  in  his  declaration.  If 
justice  to  the   plaintiff  require  the 

122 


destruction  of  the  constitution,  there 
would  be  some  pretext  for  wishing 
the  constitution  were  destroyed. 
But  why  demolish  the  plainest 
guarantees  of  that  instrument  and 
explode  the  very  foundation  upon 
which  constitutional  guarantees  are 
based,  for  no  other  purpose  than  to 
perpetuate  false  theories  and  de- 
velop unwholesome  fruit?"  Per 
Foster,  J. 

21  Bixby  v.  Dunlap,  56  N.   H.  456; 
22  Am.  Rep.  475n. 

22  Per  Cushing,  C.  J. 


I.XKM  I'l.AKV    DAMAGES. 


§  116 


ueration  for  circumstances  of  aggravation  was  also  affirmed  by 

the  court.21 

§  116.  Doctrine  of  exemplary  damages  denied.— In  one  of 

the  later  cases  in  Michigan  it  is  declared  that  the  purpose  of  an 
action  of  tort  is  to  recover  such  damages  as  have  been  sustained 
as  a  result  of  an  injury  at  the  hands  of  the  defendant,  the  ob- 
ject of  such  action  being  compensation  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that 
when  that  is  accorded,  anything  beyond,  by  whatever  name 
called,  is  unauthorized.23*  And  it  is  also  declared  in  this  same 
case  that  "it  is  not  the  province  of  the  jury,  after  full  damages 
have  been  found  for  the  plaintiff  so  that  he  is  fully  compensated 
for  the  wrong  committed  by  the  defendant,  to  mulct  the  defend- 


23  "  The  right,  however,  of  the 
plaintiff  to  recover  vindictive  dam- 
ages for  personal  injuries  where  the 
commission  of  the  act  complained 
of  is  accompanied  with  circum- 
stances of  aggravation  has  been  re- 
peatedly recognized  by  this  court  as 
proper,  and  this  must  now  be  re- 
garded as  a  settled  rule  of  law  in 
this  state.  This  rule,  when  properly 
understood,  is  in  our  opinion  sup- 
ported by  principle  and  analogy  and 
has  a  decided  preponderance  of  au- 
thority in  its  favor.  The  arguments 
used  in  opposition  to  the  rule  pro- 
ceed on  the  erroneous  assumption 
that  vindictive  damages  are  inflicted 
by  way  of  criminal  or  penal  punish- 
ment, and  are  not  given  by  way  of 
compensation  for  the  injury  nun- 
plained  of.  Such  damages  may  oper- 
ate by  way  of  punishment,  but  they 
are  allowed  by  way  of  remuneration 
for  the  wrong  suffered.  They  are 
proportioned  to  the  aggravating  cir- 
cumstances and  wilful  and  reckless 
character  of  the  act  which  occasioned 
the  injury  to  the  plaintiff.  They  are 
discretionary  with  the  jury  as  the 
damages  for  personal  injuries  always 
are.  The  actual  damages  which  are 
sustained  in   such    cases   cannot   be 


measured  or  determined  by  any  de- 
finite criterion,  but  have  to  be  fixed 
by  the  jury  on  a  proper  consideration 
of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Where  the  element  of  wilful  negli- 
gence, malice  or  oppression  inter- 
venes, the  law  permits  the  jury  to 
give  what  is  termed  punitory,  vin- 
dictive or  exemplary  damages  and 
such  damages  although  given  to  rec- 
ompense the  sufferer,  do  inflict  a 
punishment  upon  the  offender.  But 
such  is  the  effect  of  every  judgment 
for  damages  which  is  rendered  in  an 
action  for  an  injury  to  the  person; 
and  there  would  he  as  much  pro- 
priety in  the  argument  that  as  dam- 
ages in  such  cases  always  operate  as 
a  punishment,  the  offender,  if  the  act 
In-  one  for  which  he  is  liable  to  be 
indicted,  will  be  thereby  twice  pun- 
ished for  the  same  offense,  as  there 
is  that  such  an  effect  is  produced 
when  the  damages  are  increased  and 
made  exemplary  on  account  of  the 
reckless  conduct  of  the  offending 
party."  Chiles  v.  Drake,  2  Mete. 
(Ky.l  14(i:  74  Am.  Dec.  406,  per 
Simpson.  < '.  .1. 

^a  Wilson  v.   How-en.  »'>4  Mich.  141; 
SI  N.  W.  81,  per  Champlin,  .J. 

123 


§  117 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


ant  in  an  additional  sum  to  be  handed  over  to  the  plaintiff  as  a 
punishment  for  the  wrong  he  has  done  to  the  plaintiff."  a  In  an 
earlier  case  in  this  state,  however,  it  is  declared  that  the  jury, 
while  they  should  confine  themselves  to  awarding  a  compensa- 
tion and  should  under  no  circumstances  in  addition  to  com- 
pensating the  plaintiff,  proceed  to  punish  the  defendant,  yet  they 
should  fairly  compensate  the  plaintiff  for  the  injury  he  has  sus- 
tained, and  in  so  doing  may  consider  such  aggravating  circum- 
stances, as  accompanied  the  defendant's  act  in  estimating  the 
damages,25  and  a  similar  doctrine  seems  to  be  followed  in  the 
Massachusetts  decisions.-*1 


§  117.  Same  subject  continued. — The  doctrine  of  exem- 
plary or  punitive  damages  is  also  denied  in  the  earlier  Colorado 
decisions.     As  to  the  award  of  such  damages  being  a  violation 


24  Wilson   v.    Bowen,  64  Mich.  141; 
31  N.  W.  81,  per  Champlin,  J. 

25  In  this  case  it  is  said  that  "  the 
purpose  of  an  action  for  tort  is  to 
recover  the  damages  which  the  plain- 
tiff has  sustained  from  an  injury 
done  him  by  the  defendant.  In  some 
cases  the  damages  are  incapable  of 
pecuniary  estimation,  and  the  court 
performs  its  duty  by  submitting  all 
the  facts  to  the  jury  and  leaving 
them  to  estimate  the  plaintiff's  dam- 
ages as  best  they  may  under  all  the 
circumstances.  In  other  cases  there 
may  be  a  partial  estimate  of  damages 
by  a  money  standard,  but  the  inva- 
sion of  the  plaintiff's  lights  has  been 
accompanied  by  circumstances  of 
peculiar  aggravation  which  are  cal- 
culated to  vex  and  annoy  the  plain- 
tiff and  cause  him  to  suffer  much 
beyond  what  he  would  suffer  from 
the  pecuniary  loss.  Here  it  is  mani- 
festly proper  that  the  jury  should 
estimate  the  damages  with  the  ag- 
gravating circumstances  in  mind  and 
that  they  should  endeavor  fairly  to 
compensate  the  plaintiff  for  the 
wrong  he  has  suffered.     But  in  all 

124 


cases  it  is  to  be  distinctly  borne  in 
mind  that  compensation  to  the  plain- 
tiff is  the  purpose  in  view  and  any 
instruction  which  is  calculated  to 
lead  them  to  suppose  that  besides 
compensating  the  plaintiff  they  may 
punish  the  defendant  is  erroneous." 
Stilson  v.  Gibbs,  53  Mich.  280;  18 
N.  W.  815,  per  Cooley,  C.  J.  See 
also  in  this  connection,  McPherson 
v.  Ryan,  59  Mich.  33;  26  N.  W.  321; 
Ross  v.  Leggett,  61  Mich.  445;  1  Am. 
St.  Rep.  609;  28  N.  W.  695;  Johnston 
v.  Disbrow,  47  Mich.  59;  10  X.  W. 
79;  Fay  v.  Swan,  44  Mich.  544;  7  N. 
W.  215;  Scripps  v.  Reilly,  38  Mich. 
23.  But  see  Ganssly  v.  Perkins,  30 
Mich.  492;  Elliott  v.  Herz,  29  Mich. 
202;  Detroit  Daily  Post  v.  Mc Arthur, 
16  Mich.  447,  in  which  cases  the 
court  did  not  seem  to  draw  such  a 
fine  distinction  as  in  the  later  cases. 
26Hawes  v.  Knowles,  114  Mass. 
518;  19  Am.  Rep.  383.  See  also 
Smith  v.  Holcomb,  99  Mass.  552; 
Stone  v.  Heywood,  7  Allen  (Mass), 
119;  Barnard  v.  Poor,  21  Pick.  ( Mass. ) 
378 ;  Spear  v.  Hubbard,  4  Pick.  ( Mass. ) 
143. 


EXEMPLABY    DAMAGES.  §   117 

of  the  constitutional  provision  as  to  two  punishments,  it  is  said 
in  the  case  of  Murphy  v.  Mobbs  :  *  "  Courts  attempt  to  explain 
away  the  apparent  conflict  with  the  constitutional  inhibition 
above  mentioned ;  they  say  that  the  language  there  refers 
exclusively  to  criminal  procedure,  and  cannot  include  civil 
actions.  But  this  position  amounts  to  a  complete  surrender  of 
the  evident  spirit  and  intent  of  that  instrument.  When  the  con- 
vention framed  and  when  the  people  adopted  the  constitu- 
tion both  understood  the  purpose  of  this  clause  to  be  the 
prevention  of  double  prosecutions  for  the  same  offense.  Yet 
under  the  rule  allowing  exemplary  damages,  not  only  may  two 
prosecutions  but  also  two  convictions  and  punishments  be  had. 
What  difference  does  it  make  to  the  accused  so  far  as  this  ques- 
tion is  concerned,  that  one  prosecution  takes  the  form  of  a 
civil  action  in  which  he  is  called  defendant?  He  is  practically 
harassed  with  two  prosecutions,  and  subjected  to  two  convic- 
tions, while  no  hyhothesis,  however  ingenious,  can  cloud  in 
his  mind,  the  palpable  fact  that  for  the  same  tort  he  suffers  two 
punishments.  An  effort  has  been  made  to  mitigate  the  un- 
deniable hardship  and  injustice  by  declaring  that  juries  in  the 
second  prosecution,  whether  it  be  civil  or  criminal  in  form,  may 
consider  the  punishment  already  inflicted.  But  both  reason 
and  authority  conclusively  show  that  this  proposition  is  illusory  ; 
that  the  application  of  such  a  rule  is  impracticable,  and  that  the 
attempt  to  apply  it,  while  producing  confusion,  would  not 
effectively  accomplish  the  purpose  intended."  *  In  this  case  of 
Murphy  v.  llobbs,-"'  other  objections  to  the  allowance  of  such 
damages  were  also  raised,  it  being  declared  that  the  rule  allow- 
ing them  was  an  exception  to  procedure  in  all  other  cases,  a 
trial  and  conviction  being  had,  and  punishment  by  line  inflicted 
without  indictment  or  sworn  information,  and  also  that  it  re- 
jected the  rules  of  evidence  applicable  in  all  criminal  cases,  the 
doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  being  replaced  by  the  rule  eon- 
trolling  in  civil  actions,  allowing  a  conviction  on  mere  prepon- 
derance of  evidence  and  defendant  being  compelled  to  testify 


"7  Colo.  541;  49  Am.  Hep.  3G6; 
5  Pac.  119,  per  Helm,  .1.  This  case 
contains  an  exhaustive  discussion  of 
the  suhject. 


-'-  s,.e  also  Greeley,  S.  L.  A-  1'.  Co. 
v.  Feager,  11  Colo.  345;  is  Pac.  211 

•-'7  Colo.  r,41;  4!»    Am.  Hep.  3 
Pac.  119. 

L25 


§  118  EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

against  himself.  Exemplary  damages  were,  however,  allowed 
in  Colorado  by  a  subsequent  act  of  the  legislature,™  and  under 
this  act  the  general  rule  prevails  that  it  must  appear  that  there 
was  malice  or  wantonness  in  the  act  complained  of,  or  that  it 
was  done  under  such  circumstances  as  show  a  reckless  disregard 
of  the  injured  person's  rights  in  order  to  justify  an  allowance 
thereof.31  Again,  in  Nebraska,  the  decisions  are  uniformly  op- 
posed to  the  allowance  of  any  damages  in  excess  of  those  which 
operate  as  a  compensation  for  the  actual  loss  or  injury  sus- 
tained.^ So  in  this  connection  it  is  said  in  an  early  case  in 
this  state  that  "  damages  should  be  equal  to  the  amount  of 
the  injury  sustained  ;  but  upon  what  principle  should  they  be 
given  in  excess  of  that  amount?  In  law  the  injured  party  upon 
being  paid  the  damages  sustained  by  the  injury  has  received 
full  compensation  therefor.  Why  then  should  the  property  of 
the  party  causing  the  injury  be  taken  from  him  and  given  to 
another  without  compensation  ?  Constitutional  guarantees  of 
the  rights  of  private  property  amount  to  but  little,  if  courts 
sanction  its  practical  confiscation,  under  the  name  of  exemplary 
or  punitive  damages.  And  the  effect  of  permitting  the  jury  to 
give  exemplary  damages  is  to  allow  them  to  return  a  verdict 
for  such  sum  as  their  prejudice  or  caprice  may  prompt  them  to 
do  without  regard  to  the  amount  of  the  injury.  If  it  is  said 
that  these  damages  are  imposed  as  a  punishment,  it  is  a  full  and 
sufficient  answer  to  say  that  the  state  inflicts  punishment  and 
not  individuals."  ,33  A  similar  doctrine  also  has  been  affirmed 
in  Washington.34 

§  118.  Plaintiff  not  entitled  to  as  matter  of  right.— Ex- 
emplary damages  are  given  as  a  punishment  upon  the  defendant 
for  his  wrongful  conduct  towards  the  plaintiff,  and  not  upon 
any  theory  that  the  latter  is  entitled  to  such  damages  as  a  mat- 
ter of  right.35 


30  See  Colo.  Acts,  1889,  p.  64. 

31  Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Cloud 
(Colo.  App.  1895),  40  Pac.  779. 

32  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Goos,  39 
Neb.  437;  23  L.  R.  A.  190;  58  N.  W. 
84;  Boldt  v.  Budwig,  19  Neb.  739: 
Roose  v.  Perkins,  9  Neb.  315;  Boyer 
v.  Barr,  8  Neb.  70. 

126 


33  Riewe  v.  McCormick,  11  Neb. 
264,265;  9  N.  W.  88,  per  Maxwell, 
C.  J. 

34  Spokane  Truck  &  Dray  Co.  v. 
Hoefer,  2  Wash.  St.  45;  25  Pac.  1072; 
11  L.  K.  A.  689;  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  842. 

35  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Rector,  104  111.  296;  Hawks  v.  Ridg- 


EXEMPLAR?    1>A  MAGES. 


§119 


§  119.  Elements  necessary  to  justify. — The  primary  pur- 
pose of  an  action  for  damages  is  to  recover  compensation  for 
the  actual  loss  or  injury  sustained.*  The  liability  for  punitive 
or  exemplary  damages,  however,  being  for  the  purpose  of  pun- 
ishment or  as  an  example,  rests  primarily  upon  the  question  of 
motive."  And  the  jury  are  not  at  liberty  to  go  beyond  the  al- 
lowance of  a  compensation  unless  it  be  shown  that  the  act  was 
done  wilfully,  maliciously  or  wantonly,  or  was  the  result  of  that 
reckless  indifference  to  the  rights  of  others  which  is  equivalent 
to  an  intentional  violation  of  them,  and  where  there  is  no  proof 
that  the  injury  was  so  inflicted,  exemplary  damages  should  not 
be  allowed. B     So  it  is  declared  in  a  recent  decision  that   "ex- 


way,  33  111.  473;  Schippel  v.  Norton, 
38  Kan.  567;  16  Pac.  804;  Webb 
v.  Gilman,  80  Me.  177;  13  Atl. 
688;  New  Orleans,  etc.,  K.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burke,  53  Miss.  200;  Kenyon  v.  Came- 
ron, 17  R.  I.  122;  20  Atl.  233; 
Wade  v.  Columbia  El.  St.  R.  L.  & 
P.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  296;  29  S.  E.  233; 
(i4  Am.  St.  Rep.  676;  Snow  v.  Carpen- 
ter, 49  Vt.  426;  Boardman  v.  Gold- 
smith, 48  Vt.  403. 

86  See   chapter  on  damages  gener- 
ally, herein. 

:!T  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Arms,  91  U.  S.  493;  23  L.  Ed.  374; 
Wentworth  v.  Blackman,  71  Iowa, 
255;  32  N.  W.  311;  Fleet  v.  Ilollen 
kemp,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  219;  56  Am 
Dec.  563;  Webb  v.  Gilman,  80  Me 
177;  13  Atl.  688;  6  N.  Eng.  166 
Haines  v.  Schultz,  50  X.  J.  L.  481 
14  Atl.  1488. 

as  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v 
Arms,  91  U.  S.  489;  23  L.  Ed.  374 
The  Scotland,  42  Fed.  925;  Miller  v 
.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9,560 
Wiggin  v.  Coffin,  3  Story  (U.  S.),  1; 
Garrett  v.  Sewell,  108  Ala.  521;  18 
So.  7:'<7;  Brewer  v.  Watson,  65  Ala. 
88;  Snow  v.  Grace,  2."  Ark.  570;  Ye- 
rian  v.  I.inkletter,  80  Cal.  135;  Sei- 
dell v.  Cushman,  20  Cal.  56;  81  Am. 
Dec.  93;  Spencer  v.  Murphy,  6  Colo. 


App.  453;  41  Pac.  841;  Florida  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ilerst,  30  Fla.  1;  16  L.  R.  A. 
631;  52  Am.  &  Eug.  R.  Cas.  400;  11 
So.  500:  12  Ry.  A  Corp.  L.  .!.  218; 
Kolb  v.  O'Brien,  86  111.  211;  Becker 
v.  Dupree,  75  111.  167;  Scotr  v.  Bry- 
son,  74  111.  420;  Miller  v.  Kirby,  71 
111.  242:  Tripp  v.  Grouuer,  00  111. 
470;  Stilwell  v.  Barnett,  60  111.  219; 
Pierce  v.  Millar.  44  111.  189;  Hawk  v. 
Ridgway,  33  111.  475;  Williams  v. 
Reil,  20  111.  147:  Mansur-Tebbetts  I. 
Co.  v.  Smith,  65  111.  App.  319;  White 
v.  Xaerop,  57  111.  App.  114;  Van- 
gundy  v.  Berkenmoyer,  19  111.  App. 
229;  Louisville,  X.  A.  A-  Chic.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Shanks.  94  Ind.  598;  Moore  v. 
('rose,  43  Ind.  30;  Linton  Coal  &  M. 
Co.  v.  Persons,  15  Ind.  App.  09;  43 
X.  E.  651;  Waller  Bros.  v.  Waller, 
76  Iowa,  513;  41  X.  W.  307;  Inman 
v.  Ball,  65  Iowa.  543;  22  N.  W.  666; 
Curl  v.  Chic.  R.  I.  A  V.  Ry.  Co.,  63 
Iowa.  117:  19  X  W.  308;  Williamson 
v.  Western  Stage  Co.,  21  Iowa,  171; 
Winstead  v.  Hulme,  32  Kan.  568; 
4  Pac  994;  Cripton  v.  Thompson, 
32  Kan.  367;  4  Pac.  69S;  Bell  v. 
Campbell,  17  Kan.  212;  Potter  v. 
Stamfli,  2  Kan.  App.  788;  44  Pac. 
4t',;  Jacobs  v.  Louisville  A-  \".  R.  R. 
Co.,  10  Bush  (Ky.),  263;  Louisville 
&  Portland  Canal  Co.  v.  Mnrphy,  9 
1-27 


§  119 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


emplary  damages  are  allowable  only  where  there  is  misconduct 
or  malice,  or  such  recklessness  or  negligence  as  evinces  a  con- 
scious disregard  of  the  risrhts  of  others.  But  where  the  act  or 
omission  complained  of  is  free  from  fraud,  malice,  oppression  or 
other  special  motives  of  aggravation,  damages  by  way  of  punish- 
ment cannot  be-  awarded,  and  compensator}'  damages  onlv  are 
permissible."39     And  an  instruction  that'1  if  there  was  some 


Bush  (Ky. ),  522;  Louisville,  Lex.  & 
Cin.  R.  R.  Co.  v  Case,  9  Bush  (Ky. ), 
728;  Kentucky  &  Port.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  556;  Fush  v. 
Egan,  48  La.  Anu.  60;  19  So.  108; 
Hamilton  v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  & 
S.  S.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  824;  8  So.  586; 
Townseud  v.  Fontenot,  42  La.  Ann. 
890;  8  So.  616;  Leen  v.  Smith,  35  La. 
Ann.  518;  Massie  v.  Bailey,  33  La. 
Ann.  485;  Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14 
La.  Ann.  806;  Sapp  v.  Northern  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.,  51  Ind.  115;  Wanamaker  v. 
Bowers,  36  Md.  42;  Moore  v.  Schultz, 
31  Md.  423;  Schindel  v.  Schindel,  12 
Md.  208;  Elliott  v.  Herz,  29  Mich. 
202;  Hyatt  v.  Adams,  16  Mich.  180; 
Hoffman  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  45 
Minn.  53;  47  N.  W.  312;  Vicksburg 
&  Meridian  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlon,  63 
Miss.  413;  Chic.  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Scurr,  59  Miss.  456;  42  Am,  I 
Rep.  373  (In  this  decision  the  case 
of  Memphis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Green,  52  I 
Miss.  783,  which  held  that  punitive 
damages  might  be  awarded  against 
a  carrier  for  a  mere  omission  of  duty 
"  by  way  of  punishment  for  the  neg- 
lect of  travelers,"  citing  2  Kedfield 
on  Rys.  sec.  182,  is  criticised  as  an 
entire  misconception  of  Judge  Red- 
field's  text.);  New  Orleans  J.  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Statham,  42  Miss.  007; 
97  Am.  Dec.  478;  Brown  v.  Cape 
Girardeau  Mac.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  89  Mo. 
152;  1  S.  W.  129;  Engle  v.  Jones,  HI  Mo. 
316;  Laird  v.  Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  78  Mo. 
App.  273;  2  Mo.  A.  Rep.  263;  Lewis  v. 
Jannoupoulo,  70Mo.  App.  325;  Clark 
128 


v.  Fairley,  30  Mo.  App.  335;  Bohm 
v.  Dumphy,  1  Mont,  333;  Waters  v. 
Stevenson,  13  Nev.  157;  29  Am.  Rep. 
293;  Belknap  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co., 
49  N.  H.  358;  Cram  v.  Hadley,  48  N. 
H.  191;  Powers  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 
Co.,  120  N.  Y.  178;  24  N.  E.  95; 
Hamilton  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
53  N.  Y.  25,  rev'g  3  J.  &  S.  118; 
Wallace  v.  Williams,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
628;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  180;  Rawlins  v. 
Vidvard,  34  Hun  (N.Y.),  205;  Parker 
v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  319;  Wallace  v.  City  of  New 
York,  18  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  169; 
Auchmuty  v.  Ham,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
495;  Walker  v.  Wilson,  8  Bosw.  (N. 
Y. )  586;  Waters  v.  Greenleaf,  John- 
son L.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  648;  20  S.  E. 
718;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chamberlain,  4  Okla.  542;  46  Pac. 
499;  Burk  v.  Serrill,  80  Pa.  St.  413; 
Seeley  v.  Aldeu,  61  Pa.  St.  302;  100 
Am.  Dec.  642;  Heil  v.  Glanding,  42 
Pa.  St.  493;  Herreshoff  v.  Tripp,  15 
R.  I.  92;  23  Atl.  104;  Neel  v.  Deans, 
1  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  310;  Springer 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Smith,  16  Lea  (Tenn.), 
498;  1  S.  W.  280;  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Greenwood,  2  Tex.  C.  A. 
76;  21  S.  W.  559;  Neill  v.  Newton, 
24  Tex.  202;  Wood  v.  Amer.  Nat. 
Bank  (Va.  1902),  40  S.  E.  931;  Burns 
v.  Hi  nes,  94  Va.  413;  26  S.  E.  875; 
Peshine  v.  Shepperson,  17  Gratt. 
(Va.)  485;  94  Am.  Dec.  468;  Talhott 
v.  West  Va.  (.'.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  42  W.Va. 
560  26  S.  E.  311. 
39  Wood  v.  Araer.  Nat.  Bank    ( Va. 


EX  EM  P  L  A  R 1    U  A  M  A  GES. 


§  120 


element  of  fraud,  malice,  reckless  negligence  or  oppression,  in- 
sult, rudeness,  or  wilful  wrong,  or  other  cause  of  aggravation 
in  the  running  of  defendant's  train  by  Lawrence  station  without 
stopping,"  the  jury  might  allow  exemplary  damages,  is  held  in- 
correct, as  allowing  such  damages,  if  there  was  some  element, 
however  inlinitesimally  small  of  any  of  the  above  things  in  the 
act  of   the  company. "' 

§  120.   Wanton  or  malicious  act. — The  rule  as  supported 

by  authority  is  that  in  case  of  wilful,  oppressive,  wanton  or 
malicious  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  defeudent  in  inflicting  the 
injury  complained  of,  the  jury  will  not  be  limited  to  an  award 
of  damages  which  are  merely  compensatory  for  such  injury,  but 
may  allow  exemplary  or  punitive  damages  against  the  wrong- 
doer.41    So  it  is  declared  in  a  case  in  the  United  States  supreme 


1902),    40     S.     E.     931,     per    Whit- 
tle, J. 

40  Vicksburg  &  Meridian  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Scanlan,  63  Miss.  413,  was  objected 
to  by  defendant.  Similar  instruc- 
tion was  given  in  Chic.  St.  L.  &  N. 
O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scurr,  59  Miss.  45(5; 
42  Am.  Rep.  373,  as  however  an- 
nouncing the  rule  that  there 
should  be  none  but  actual  dam- 
ages if  there  were  no  wilful  wrong. 

41  Phila.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Quigley. 
21  How.  (U.  S.)  213;  Press  Pub.  Co. 
v.  Monroe,  73  Fed.  193;  38  U.  S.  App. 
410;  28  Chic.  Leg.  News,  248;  Fother- 
inghain  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  30  Fed. 
252;  1  L.  R.  A.  474;  Lieukauf  v. 
Morris,  66  Ala.  406;  Barlow  v. 
Lowder,  35  Ark.  492;  Dorsey  v.  Man- 
love,  14  Cal.  553;  Dalton  v.  Beers,  38 
Conn.  529;  Welch  v.  Durand,  36 
Conn.  182;  4  Am.  Rep.  55;  Dibble  v. 
Morris,  26  Conn.  416;  Coleman  v. 
Ryan,  58  Ga.  132;  Illinois  &  St.  L. 
R.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cobb,  68  111.5.1; 
Wanzer  v.  Bright,  52  111.  35;  Reeder 
v.  Purdy,  48  111.  261;  Peoria  Bridge 
Assoc,  v.  Loomis,  20  111.  235;  Mc- 
Avoy  v.  Wright,  25  Ind.  22;  Millison 

9 


v.  Hock,  17  Ind.  227;  Nordhaus  v. 
Peterson,  54  Iowa,  68;  6  N.  W.  77; 
Cady  v.  Case,  45  Kan.  733;  26  Pac. 
448;  Jockers  v.  Borginan,  29  Kan. 
121:  Tucker  v.  Green,  27  Kan.  357; 
Hefley  v.  Baker,  19  Kan.  9;  Sawyer 
v.  Saner,  10  Kan.  460 :  Malone  v. 
Murphy,  2  Kan.  250;  Louisville  <fr 
X.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballard,  83  Ky.  307; 
Slater  v.  Sherman,  5  Bush  (Ky.), 
206;  Chiles  v.  Drake,  2   Mete,    i  Ky. ) 

1146;    Graham     v.     St.    Charles     St. 

;  R.    Co.,    47    La.    Ann.    1656;    18   So. 

j707;  Wilkinson  v.  Drew,  75  Me. 
360;  Pike  v.  Dilling,  48  Me.  539;  At- 
lantic &  G.  C.  Consol.  Coal  Co.  v. 
Maryland  Coal  Co.,  62  M<1.  135;  Sloan 
v.  Edwards,  61  Md.  89;  Zimmerman 

]  v.  Helser,  32  Md.  274;  Bait.  &  <  >.  R. 
Co.  v.  Blocker,  27  Md.  277:  Lynd  v. 
Picket,  7  Minn.  184;  82  Am.  Dec  7'.': 
Storm  v.  Green,  51  Miss.  103;  Heirn 
v.  McCaughan,  :*.2  Miss.  17:  (id  Am. 
Dec.  58S;  Vicksburg  &  .1.  R.  Co.  v. 
Patton,  31  Miss.  156;  66  Am.  Dec 
553;  Green  v.  Craig,  46  Mo.  90;   Bald- 

I  win  v.  Fries,  46  Mo.  App.  288;  Bohm 
v.  Dunphy,  1  Mont.  :::;:!;  Towle  v. 
Blake,  4s   N.    H.   92;  Hopkins  v.  Atr 

129 


§  120  EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

court  that,  "  whenever  the  injury  complained  of  has  been  in- 
flicted maliciously  or  wantonly,  and  with  circumstances  of  con- 
tumely or  indignity,  the  jury  are  not  limited  to  ascertainment 
of  a  simple  compensation  for  the  wrong  committed  against  the 
aggrieved  person."42  And  again. it  has  been  said  that  "when 
there  is  an  element  either  of  fraud,  malice,  such  a  degree  of  neg- 
ligence as  indicates  a  reckless  indifference  to  consequences, 
oppression,  insult,  rudeness,  caprice,  wilfulness  or  other  cause 
of  aggravation  in  the  act  or  omission  causing  the  injury,  punitive 
damages  may  be  awarded."  *»  So  also  in  a  case  in  Alabama,  the 
court  says  :  "  We  deduce  from  the  authorities  the  doctrine  to  be 
that  exemplary  damages  are  allowable  not  only  for  acts  mali- 
ciously perpetrated,  but  also  in  cases  where  one  knowingly,  wan- 
tonly and  recklessly  does  an  act,  fraught  with  probable  injury 
to  person  or  property  and  ultimately  producing  such  injury  or 
damages."  u  And  in  a  Texas  decision  it  is  declared  that  it  is 
"  too  well  settled  by  the  decision  of  this  court  in  accordance  we 
think  with  the  well  established  rule  of  the  common  law  to  be 
now  questioned,  that  where  the  injury  complained  of  is  tainted 
with  fraud,  malice  or  wilful  wrong,  exemplary  damages  may  be 
recovered."  fi 


lantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  H.  9; 
Trainer  v.  Wolff,  58  N.  J.  L.  381;  33 
Atl.  1051;  Cable  v.  Dakin,  20  Wend. 
(N.  Y. )  172;  Wallace  v.  Mayor,  2 
Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  440;  9  Abb.  Pr.  40;  18 
How.  Pr.  169;  Reeves  v.  Winn,  97 
N.  C.  246;  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  287;  1  S.  E. 
448;  Holmes  v.  Railway  Co.,  94N.  C. 
318;  Duncan  v.  Stalcup,  18  N.  C.440; 
Peckham  Iron  Co.  v.  Harper,  41  Ohio 
St.  100;  Day  v.  Holland,  15  Oreg. 
464;  15  Pac.  855;  Barnett  v.  Reed,  51 
Pa.  St.  190;  88  Am.  Dec.  574;  Seely 
v.  Alden,  61  Pa.  St.  302;  100  Am. 
Dec.  642;  Nagle  v.  Mullison,  34  Pa. 
St.  48;  Windham  v.  Rhame,  11  Rich. 
L.  (S.  C.)  283;  73  Am.  Dec.  116;  Wil- 
kins  v.  Gilmore,  21  Tenn.  140;  Bryan 
v.  McGuire,  3  Head  (Tenn.),  530: 
Crawford  v.  Doggett,  82  Tex.  139;  17 
S.  W.  929;  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  859;  Shaw 
v.  Brown,  41  Tex.  449;  Neil  v.  New- 
130 


ton,  24  Tex.  202;  Reed  v.  Samuels. 
22  Tex.  114;  Cole  v.  Tucker,  6  Tex. 
266;  Edwards  v.  Leavitt,  43  Vt.  126; 
Nye  v.  Merriam,  35  Vt.  438;  Borland 
v.  Barrett,  76  Va.  128;  Birchard  v. 
Booth,  4  Wis.  67. 

«  Phila.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Quig- 
ley,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  213,  214,  per 
Campbell,  J. 

43  Holmes  v.  Railway  Co.,  94  N.  C. 
318,  per  Ashe,  J.,  cited  with  approval 
in  Knowles  v.  Norfolk  So.  R.  R.  Co., 
102  N.  C.  86;  9  S.  E.  7. 

44  Lienkauf  v.  Morris,  66  Ala.  406, 
per  Somerville,  J. 

45  Shaw  v.  Brown,  41  Tex.  449; 
per  Moore,  J.  See  also  Hedgepeth  v. 
Robertson,  18  Tex.  858;  Kolb  v. 
Bankhead,  18  Tex.  228;  Oliver  v. 
Chapman,  15  Tex.  400;  Graham 
v.  Roder,  5  Tex.  141 ;  Smith  v.  Sher- 
wood, 2  Tex.  460. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§§121.122 


§  121.  Malice  sufficient  to  justify.  The  mere  doing  of  an 
unlawful  or  injurious  act  does  not  constitute  malice  as  used  in 
the  rule  allowing  exemplary  damages,  but  it  implies  that  the  act 
was  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  mischief  <>r  of  criminal  indifference 
to  civil  obligations.48  So  where  the  condemnation  proceedings 
under  which  a  railroad  company  took  possession  of  land  and 
proceeded  to  construct  its  trucks  and  use  the  same  were  sub- 
sequently found  to  be  defective,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff 
was  not  entitled  to  recover  exemplary  damages  on  such  grounds, 
as  the  entry  was  without  fraud,  malice  or  evil  intent.1'  But 
where  after  one  verdict  and  judgment  against  defendant  he  con- 
tinued to  discharge  sewage  upon  land  of  the  plaintiff,  such  con- 
tinuance was  held  to  show  such  malice  and  wilfulness  as  would 
justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damages.43  And  where  a  wrong- 
ful seizure  of  property  is  committed  in  a  rude,  aggravating  or 
insulting  manner,  malice  may  be  inferred  therefrom  and  ex- 
emplary damages  may  be  awarded,49  as  express  malice  need  not 
be  proved  in  all  cases  to  justify  such  damages.50  Again  exem- 
plary damages  may  be  recovered  for  an  illegal  levy  on  property, 
where  the  officer  at  the  time  had  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  such 
levy  was  illegal."'1 

§  122.  Gross  negligence It  is  a  general  rule  that  exem- 
plary damages  may  be  allowed  where  the  injury  or  loss  appears 
to  have  been  the  result  of  gross  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant."'2     The  term  "'gross  negligence"  as  used  in  this  con- 


46  Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Quigley, 
21  How.  (U.  S.)  202;  16  L.  Ed.  73; 
Willis  v.  Miller,  29  Fed.  238;  Strickler 
v.  Yager,  29  Fed.  244;  Brown  v. 
Allen,  35  Iowa,  306.  See  Read  v. 
Case,  4  Conn.  166;  10  Am.  Dec.  110. 

47  Bait.  &  ().  R.  Co.  v.  Boyd,  67 
Ind.  32;  10  Atl.  315;  1  Am.  St.  Rep. 
362. 

48  Paddock  v.  Somes,  51  Mo.  App. 
320.  See  Long  v.  Trexler  (Pa.),  8 
Atl.  620. 

49  Roberts  v.  Heim,  27  Ala.  678. 

50  Farwell  v.  Warren,  51  111.  467; 
Borland  in  Barrett,  76  Va.  128;  44 
Am.  Rep.  152. 


01  Willis  v.  Miller,  29  Fed.  238; 
Strickler  v.  Yager,  29  Fed.  244; 
Lynd  v.  Pickett,  7  Minn.  184;  82  Am. 
Dec.  79. 

■"'-'  Richmond,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Vance, 
93  Ala.  144;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arnold.  SO  Ala.  60;  2  So.  :;.-,7 :  Soutb 
t<-  N.  A.  K.  Co.  v.  McLudon,  •;:'■  Ala. 
266;  Kan.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller,  2 
Colo.  442;  Gibney  v.  Lewis,  t'.s  Conn. 

392;  36  Atl.  799;  Chattanooga  R.  A 
R.  Co.  v.  Liddell,85  Ga.  482;  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  169;  11  S.   E.  853;  Cochran 

v.  Miller,  13   Iowa.  128;   Kansas  Pac. 
Ry.    Co.    v.    Kessler,    18    Kan. 
Leavenwortb  L.  A  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice, 
131 


§  122  EXEMPLARY   DAMAGES. 

nection  is  to  be  construed  as  meaning  a  negligence  so  gross 
as  to  show  an  entire  want  of  care,  and  sufficient  to  authorize 
the  inference  or  presumption  that  the  person  guilty  of  such 
negligence  was  conscious  of  the  probable  consequences  of  his 
act  and  was  indifferent  thereto.153  And  such  damages  should 
not  be  awarded  in  mere  cases  of  negligence  or  carelessness, 
where  no  element  of  wilfulness  or  wantonness  appears.51 


10  Kan.  426;  Kountz  v.  Brown,  16 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  577;  Central  Pass.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Chattersou  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  18; 
Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14  La.  Ann.  818; 
Eliason  v.  Grove,  85  Md.  215;  36  Atl. 
844;  Stoher  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  91  Mo.  509;  4  S.  W.  389;  Goetz 
v.  Ambs,  27  Mo.  28;  Taylor  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  304;  2  Am. 
Rep.  229;  Whipple  v.  Walpole,  10  N. 
H.  130;  Brasington  v.  South  Bound 
K.  Co.  (S.  C.)f  40  S.  E.  665;  East 
Tennessee,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  90 
Tenn.  570;  18  S.  W.  268;  Mo.  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  72  Tex.  95;  10  S. 
W.  325;  Talbot  v.  West  Va.  R.  Co., 
42  W.  Va.  560;  26  S.  E.  311. 

53  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ky.  Co.  v. 
Arms,  91  U.  S.  489;  23  L.  Ed.  374; 
Alabama,  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sellers,  93 
Ala.  9;  Patterson  v.  South  &  N.  A. 
R.  Co.,  89  Ala.  318;  7  So.  437;  Ala- 
bama G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  80  Ala. 
600;  2  So.  337;  Lienkauf  v.  Morris, 
66  Ala.  406;  Yeriau  v.  Linkletter,  80 
Cal.  135;  Wall  v.  Cameron,  6  Colo. 
275;  Gibney  v.  Lewis,  68  Conn.  392; 
36  Atl.  799;  Ford  v.  Charles  Warner 
Co.,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  88;  37  Atl.  39; 
Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Mooney, 
40  Fla.  17;  24  So.  148;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  721;  Florida  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hirst,  30  Fla.  1 ;  16  L.  R.  A.  631 ; 
52  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  409;  11  So. 
506;  12  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  218;  Chat- 
tanooga, R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Liddell, 
85  Ga.  482;  11  S.  E.  853;  21  Am.  St. 
Rep.  169;  Clevenger  v.  Dunaway,  84 
111.  367;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &C.  R.  Co. 

132 


v.  Wurl,  62  111.  App.  381;  Pierce  v. 
Millay,  44  111.  189;  Chic.  K.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Connell,  46  Kan.  581;  26 
Pac.  947;  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  G. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kier,  41  Kan.  671;  21  Pac. 
770;  Hefley  v.  Baker,  19  Kan.  19; 
Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kessler,  18 
Kan.  523;  Leavenworth  L.  &  G.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rice,  10  Kan.  426;  McHenry 
Coal  Co.  v.  Sneddon,  98  Ky.  684;  34 
S.  W.  228;  Claxton  v.  Lexington  &  B. 
S.  R.  Co.,  13  Bush  (Ky.),  636;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Coustantine,  14 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  432;  Baltimore,  etc., 
Trans.  Co.  v.  Boone,  45  Md.  344;  Pat- 
terson v.  Chic.  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  49 
Mich.  184;  13  N.  W.  508;  Peterson  v. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.,  72  Minn.  41; 
74  N.  W.  1022;  40  L.  R.  A.  661;  8  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  517;  Hoff- 
man v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn. 
53;  Trauermann  v.  Lippincott,  39 
Mo.  App.  478;  Edelmann  v.  St.  Louis 
Transf.  Co.,  3  Mo.  App.  503;  Powers 
v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  178; 
Caldwell  v.  New  Jersey  S.  B.  Co., 
47  N.  Y.  282;  Kuchenmeister  v. 
O'Connor  (Ohio),  8  Wkly.  L.  Bull. 
257;  11  Wkly.  L.  Bull.  170;  Day  v. 
Holland,  15  Oreg.  464;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rosenzweig,  113 
Pa.  St.  519;  Brooks  v.  Clark,  57  Tex. 
105;  Hoadley  v.  Watson,  45  Vt.  289; 
Meibus  v.  Dodge,  38  Wis.  300;  20 
Am.  Rep.  6;  Pickert  v.  Crook,  20 
Wis.  358;  2  Shearman  &  Redf.  on 
Neg.  (5th  ed.)  sec.  748. 

54  Floyd  v.   Hamilton,  33  Ala.  235; 
Moody    v.     McDonald,    4    Cal.    297; 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§  L23 


§  123.  Actual  damage  should  bo  shown. — A  right  of  action 
cannot  be  maintained  simply  for  the  purpose  of  inflicting  pun- 
ishment upon  some  supposed  wrongdoer,  and  therefore  exem- 
plary damages  are  not  recoverable  unless  there  has  been  some 
real  or  actual  damage  sustained.  Exemplary  damages  are 
merely  incidents  of  a  cause  of  action  to  recover  damages  for 
some  real  or  substantial  loss,  and  can  never  constitute  the 
basis  of  a  cause  of  action  independent  of  such  elements, 
though  the  act  of  the  defendant  may  have  been  wanton  or 
malicious.  It  therefore  follows  that  if  no  actual  damage  has 
been  suffered,  or  if  the  damage  has  been  merely  nominal,  the 
injury  being  purely  technical,  exemplary  damages  should  not 
be  allowed/"     And  where  the  actual  damages  awarded  by  a  ver- 


Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller,  2 
Colo.  442;  St.  Peter's  Church  v. 
Beach,  26  Conn.  355;  McCoy  v.  Phila. 
W.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  5  Houst.  (Del.)  599; 
Toledo,  P.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 
74  111.  83;  City  of  Jacksonville  v. 
Lambert,  62  111.  519;  Toledo,  P.  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  43  III.  418; 
Williams  v.  Real,  20  111.  147;  Louis- 
ville, N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shanks, 
94  Ind.  598;  City  of  Parsons  v.  Lind- 
say, 26  Kan.  426;  Kentucky  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dills,  4  Bush  (Ky.),  593; 
Louisville  &  Portland  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  2  Duv.  (  Ky. )  556;  Mud  River 
Coal  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Williams,  15  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  847;  Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14 
La.  Ann.  806;  Cursler  v.  Bait.  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  60  Md.  358;  Bait  &  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  Breinig,  25  Md.  378;  90  Am. 
Dec.  49;  Allison  v.  Chandler,  11 
Mich.  542;  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Stratham,  42  Miss.  607:  97 
Am.  Dec  478;  Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
Kendrick,  40  Miss.  374;  90 Am.  Dec. 
332;  Leahy  v.  Davis,  121  Mo.  227; 
25  S.  W.  941;  Goetz  v.  Ambs,  27  Mo. 
28. 

^Paterson  v.  Dakin  (  D.  C.  S.  D. 
Ala.),  31  Fed.  682;  Lamb  v.  lfar- 
baugh,  105  Cal.  680;  39  Pac.  56; 
Kelly  v.  Valentine,    17   HI.  App.  87; 


Roth  v.  Eppey,  80  111.  283:  Hackett 
v.  Smelsley,  77  111.  109;  Brautigain 
v.  White,  73  111.  561;  Fentz  v.  Mead- 
ows, 72  111.  540;  Keedy  v.  Howe, 
72  111.  133;  Meidel  v.  Anthis,  71  111. 
241:  Freese  v.  Tripp,  70  111.  496; 
Boardman  v.  Marshalltown,  105  Iowa, 
445:  75  N.  W.  343;  Kuhn  v.  Chic, 
M.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Iowa,  137:  37 
N.  W.  116;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kan- 
sas (irain  Co.,  60  Kan.  30;  55  Pac. 
277;  Adams  v.  Salina,  58  Kan.  246; 
48  Pac.  918;  Schippell  v.  Norton, 
38  Kan.  567;  16  Pac.  804;  Stacy  v. 
Portland  Pub.  Co.,  68  Me.  279; 
Mattice  v.  Brinkman,  74  Mich.  705; 
42  N.  W.  172;  Carson  v.  Texas  In- 
stallment Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34 
S.  W.  762  ;  Jones  v.  Matthews 
75  Tex.  1  ;  12  S.  W.  823  ;  Ni.kic 
v.  McGehee,  27  Tex.  134;  Bar- 
ber v.  Kilbourn,  16  Wis.  485.  But 
see  Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  Monroe.  7:1 
Fed.  196;  19  C.  C.  A.  429:  38  U.  S. 
App.  410;  Wilson  v.  Vaughn,  23  Fed. 
229;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sellers, 
93Ala.9;9So.375;89Am.St.  Hep.  17; 
Blanchard  v.  Burbank,  16  111.  App. 
375.  In  a  case  in  Maine  the  court 
says:  "It  is  said  in  vindication  of 
the  theory  of  punitive  damages  that 
the    interests   of   the    individual    in- 

133 


§124 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


diet  are  remitted  before  judgment,  the  court  is  deprived  of  the 
power  to  render  judgment  for  the  exemplary  damages  awarded 
by  such  verdict ;  x  but  where  the  failure  to  recover  compensatory 
damages  is  owing  to  defects  in  the  pleadings  and  not  to  the  ab- 
sence of  substantial  damages,  the  right  to  recover  exemplary 
damages  will  not  be  affected.57  And  if  the  actual  recoverable 
damage  sustained  has  been  settled  for  under  a  compromise  agree- 
ment, no  claim  for  vindictive  damages  being  included  in  such 
settlement,  it  is  held  that  a  recovery  of  actual  damages  is  not  a 
prerequisite  to  a  recovery  of  vindictive  damages.58 


§  124.  Actions  allowed  in.39 — It  may  be  stated  generally  that 
the  allowance  of  punitive  damages  is  confined  to  actions  of  tort,,iU 
and  that  they  are  not  allowable  in  actions  for  breach  of  con- 
tract.61 But  to  justify  an  award  of  punitive  damages,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  injury  be  attended  by  force.  In  this  connec- 
tion it  has  been  said  :  "  There  is  a  class  of  personal  injuries  such 
as  slander,  libel,  malicious  prosecution  and  including  injuries  to 
a  person's  health,  business  and  property  caused  by  indirect  means 
unattended  with  force  and  for  redress  of  which  the  remedy  is  by 
an  action  upon  the  case  and  not  by  an  action  of  trespass,  for 


jured  and  of  society  are  blended. 
Such  damages  are  to  be  awarded 
against  a  defendant  for  punishment. 
But  if  all  the  individual  injury  is 
merely  technical  and  theoretical, 
which  is  the  punishment  to  be  in- 
flicted for?  If  a  plaintiff  upon  all 
such  elementsof  injury  as  were  open 
to  him  is  entitled  to  recover  but 
nominal  damages  shall  he  be  the  reci- 
pient of  penalties  awarded  on  account 
of  an  injury  or  supposed  injury  to 
others  beside  himself?  .  .  .  Puni- 
tive damages  are  the  last  to  be  as- 
sessed in  the  elements  of  injury  to  be 
considered  by  a  jury  and  should  be 
first  to  be  rejected  by  facts  in  miti- 
gation." Stacy  v.  Portland  Pub.  Co., 
68  Me.  288,  per  Peters,  J. 

56  Smith  v.  Dye,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
662;  51  S.  W.  858,  rev'g  denied  in  52 
S.  W.  981. 

134 


57  Favorite  v.  Cottrill,  62  Mo.  App. 
119. 

58  Gregory  v.  Coleman  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  22  S.  W.  181. 

59  Under  the  heading  of  the  partic- 
ular injuries  for  which  damages  may 
be  recovered,  the  question  as  to  the 
allowance  of  exemplary  damages  is 
therein  considered  where  such  ques- 
tion has  arisen. 

60  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wysor, 
82  Va.  250. 

61  Chase  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co., 
44  Fed.  554;  3  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  817; 
Ga.  Code,  sec.  2943;  Duche  v.  Wilson, 
37  Hun  (X.  Y.),  519;  Houston,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Shirley,  54  Tex.  125; 
Guildford  v.  Anglo-French  S.  S.  Co., 
9  Can.  303.  An  exception  to  this 
general  rule  may  be  found  in  chapter 
on  actions  for  breach  of  promise  of 
marriage,  herein. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§124 


which  a  jury  may  give  exemplary  damages  as  well  where  the 
action  is  in  case  as  when  it  is  in  trespass.®  Such  damages  may 
be  allowed  under  a  proper  state  of  facts  in  actions  for  assault  and 
battery  ;,:!  maiming  and  disfiguring  plaintiff  ;'•'  seduction;®  libel 
and  slander ; a  fraud  ;b'  malicious  abuse  of  process  ; ,s  wrongfully 
suing  out  a  writ  of  replevin ;®  illegal  and  wrongful  seizure  of  prop- 
erty ;'u  attachment  sued  out  wrongfully  ; T1  in  actions  against  sher- 
iff  for  misconduct  of  deputy ; 7i  against  officer  who  has  over- 
stepped his  powers;18  for  trespass  to  real  property  ; Tl  and  in 
actions  to  recover  damages  under  the  liquor  act.73      And  under 


w  Kl.Tt  v.  Hollenkenip,  13  B.  Mon. 

(Ky.)  219  ;  50  Am.  Dec.  563,  per 
Hise,  J. 

63  Brundy  v.  Maginness,  7*5  Cal. 
582;  18  Pac.  668:  Dalton  v.  Beers, 
38  Conn.  529;  Harrison  v.  Ely.  120 
111.  83;  11  N".  E.  334;  Reeder  v.  Prudy, 
48  111.  261;  Foote  v.  Nichols,  28  111. 
486;  Boot  v.  Sturdivant,  70  Iowa,  55; 

29  N.  W.  802 :  Webb  v.  Oilman,  80  Me. 
177;  13  Atl.  658;  Green  v.  Craig,  47 
Mo.  90;  Ileneky  v.  Smith,  10  Dreg. 
349;  45  Am.  Rep.  143;  Edwards  v. 
Leavitt,  43  Vt.  126;  Bircliard  v. 
Booth,  4  Wis.  67. 

<*  Pike  v.  Dilling,  48  Me.  539. 

65  Robinson  v.  Burton,  5  llarr. 
(Del.)  335;  Ball  v.  Bruce,  21  111.  161: 
Stevenson  v.  Belknap,  6  Iowa,  97; 
Life  v.  Eisenleid,  32  N.  V.  220. 

60  Morning  Journal  Assn.  v.  Ruth- 
erford, 51  Fed.  513  ;  Binfonl  v. 
Young,  115  Ind.  179;  16  V  E.  142: 
Blumhardt  v.  Rohr,  70  Md.  328;  17 
Atl.  266;  Warner  v.  Press  Pub.  Co., 
132  N.  Y.  181;  43   X.  Y.  St.   R.  633; 

30  N.  E.  393;  Holmes  v.  Jones,  121 
X.  Y.  461;  Bergmann  v.  Jones,  94 
X.  Y.  51;  Samuels  v.  Evening  Mail, 
75  X.  Y.  604,  rev'g9  Hun,  288;  Til- 
lotson  v.  Cheetham,  3  Johns.  (  X.  V. ) 
56:  Kendall  v.  -Stone,  2  Sandf.  (  X.  Y. ) 
269  ;  Bowden  v.  Bailes,  101  X.  C. 
612;  8  S.  E.  342;  Sowers  v.  Sowers, 
87  N.  C.  303. 

67  Piatt   v.    Brown,  30  Conn.   336; 


!  Oliver  v.  Chapman,  15  Tex.  400.  But 
Bee  singleton  v.  Kennedy,  9  B.  Mom. 
(Ky.)222. 

68  Barnett  v.  Reed,  51  Pa.  St.  190. 
See  also  Louder  v.  Hinson,  4  Jones, 
L.  (X.  C.j  190. 

69  Brizsee  v.  Torrence,  21  Wend. 
( X.  Y. )  144. 

70  Lynd  v.  Picket,  7  Minn.  184; 
Robinson  v.  Goings,  63  Miss.  500. 

71  Floyd  v.  Hamilton,  33  Ala.  235; 
McCulloughv.  Walton,  11  Ala.  492; 
Kirksey  v.  Jones,  7  Ala.  622;  Shan- 
non's Annot.  Code  (Tenn.  1896), 
5291:  Biering  v.  First  Nat.    Bank,  69 

I  Tex.  599;  7S.  W.  90. 

7- Hazard  v.  Israel,  1  Binn.  (Pa.) 
228;  2  Am.  Dec.  438. 

73  Shaw  v.  Brown,  41  Tex.  446; 
Rodgers  v.  Ferguson,  36  Tex.  544. 
See  also  Nightingale  v.  Scannell,  18 
Cal.  315;  Phelps  v.  Owens,  11  Cal. 
22;  Dorsey  v.  Manlove,  14  Cal.  553. 

7*  Waters  v.  Dumas,  75  Cal.  564: 
17  Pac.  685  ;  Hefley  v.  Baker,  19 
Kan.  9;  Union  Bank  v.  Rideau  Lum- 
ber Co.,  3  Ont.  L.  Rep.  269. 

76  Roth  v.  Eppy,  80  111.  283:  Back- 
I  ett  v.  Smelsley,  77  111.  109;  Thill  v. 
Pohlmaun,  76  Iowa, 638;  41  X.  v, 
Fox  v.  Wunderlich,  64  Iowa.  1<7; 
Goodenough  v.  McGrew,  4  1  Iowa, 
670;  Richmond  v.  Schickler,  57  Iowa, 
486;  10  X'.  W.  882.  See  Iowa  Code, 
s.o.  1557.  But  see  Freese  v.  Tripp, 
70  111.  496. 

135 


§§  125,  126  EXEMPLARY   DAMAGES. 

the  Iowa  Code,7'"'  it  is  provided  that  in  actions  to  recover  real  prop-* 
erty  in  case  of  wanton  aggression,  the  jury  may  award  exemplary 
damages. 

§  125.  Instances  when  allowed, — Punitive  damages  have 
been  allowed  where,  without  any  reasonable  cause,  the  defend- 
ant ejected  the  plaintiff  from  a  house  in  inclement  weather,  at 
night  and  while  she  was  in  a  delicate  state  of  health,  she  being 
also  assaulted  and  beaten.77  So,  also,  they  have  been  allowed 
for  great  and  wanton  cruelty  in  beating  plaintiff's  horse  to 
death.78  And  where  a  dead  body  was  disintered  in  a  wanton  and 
malicious  manner,  or  as  the  result  of  gross  negligence,  or  the 
reckless  disregard  of  the  rights  of  others,  equivalent  to  an  in- 
tentional violation  thereof,  such  damages  might,  it  was  declared, 
be  awarded.79  Again,  the  recovery  of  such  damages  was  per- 
mitted where  judges  of  an  election  wilfully,  corruptly  and  fraud- 
ulently refused  to  receive  the  vote  of  a  registered  voter.80  So, 
also,  where  a  person  without  authority  maliciously  cut  down  a 
tree  on  the  highway,  exemplary  damages  were  allowed ; 81  and 
they  were  also  held  allowable  in  behalf  of  the  government  against 
one  who  went  upon  government  land  and  cut  trees  thereon, 
when  done  wilfully  or  with  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
the  government.82 

§  126.  Interference  with  exercise  of  personal  rights. — 

Certain  personal  rights  and  privileges  are  secured  by  the  con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  to  the  individual  citizen,  and  in 
case  of  an  intentional,  malicious  and  repeated  interference  with 
the  exercise  of  such  rights,  exemplary  damages  may  be  awarded.83 


76  Annot.  Code,  Iowa  (1897).  sec. 
4200. 

77  Redfield  v.  Redfield,  75  Iowa, 
435;  39  N.  W.  688. 

78  Wort  v.  Jenkins,  14  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  351. 

79  Jacobus  v.  Congregation  of  C.  of 
I.,  107  Ga.  518;  33  S.  E.  853;  6  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  437;  49  Cent.  307;  4 
Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  408.  See  Meagher 
v.  Driscoll,  99  Mass.  281;  Thirkfield 

136 


v.  Association,  12  Utah,  76;  41  Pac. 
574. 

80  Elbin  v.  Dean,  33  Md.  135. 

8*  Winter  v.  Peterson,  24  N.  J.  L. 
524. 

82  United  States  v.  Taylor,  35  Fed. 
484. 

83  Scott  v.  Donald,  165  U.  S.  58;  41 
L.  Ed.  632;  17  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  265, 
aff  g  74  Fed.  859;  13  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
6. 


i:\KMPLAUV    DAMAGES.  §§127-130 

§  127.  Instances  when  not  allowed. -Though  a  seizure  of 
goods  may  be  illegal,  yet  this  will  not  be  sufficient  to  justify  ail 
award  of  punitive  damages  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  show- 
ing fraud,  malice,  gross  negligence  or  oppression  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant,*1  and  such  damages  were  held  not  recoverable 
against  the  owner  of  a  house  which  was  being  removed,  where, 
through  an  error  of  judgment,  he  failed  to  give  sufficient  notice 
of  danger.'*  And  where  the  defendant  had  placed  the  plaint  iff. 
a  little  girl,  in  a  buggy,  in  an  action  for  injuries  caused  by  the 
horse  running  away,  it  was  held  that  exemplary  damages  should 
not  be  allowed,  there  being  no  evidence  of  malice.86  So,  also, 
for  the  sale  of  property  under  a  judgment,  subsequently  reversed 
on  appeal,  it  was  held  that  such  damages  should  not  he  allowed. 
where  malice  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  was  negatived  by  the 
fact  that  he  acted  under  legal  advice,  and  also  by  the  other  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case.87 

§  128.  In  action  on  bond.  -Exemplary  damages  are  not  re- 
coverable in  an  action  on  an  attachment  bond  since  such  action 
is  regarded  as  one  ex  contractu,83  and  a  similar  rule  prevails  in 
an  action  on  a  bond  executed  under  the  dram  shop  act  in  Illi- 
nois.89 

§  129.  State  may  fix  amount. — The  amount  of  damages 
which  may  be  given  as  a  punishment  beyond  compensation  may, 
in  some  cases,  be  fixed  by  the  legislature  of  a  state.  Thus  it  has 
been  so  held  in  the  case  of  a  railroad  company  where  such  dam- 
ages were  imposed  by  statute  for  gross  negligence  in  failing  to 
provide  and  maintain  cattle  guards.  And  that  such  damages  go 
to  the  sufferer  instead  of  the  state,  is  no  objection.9' 

§  130.  Where  two  or  more  defendants. — In  case  an  action 
is  brought  against  two  or  more  defendants  to  recover  damages 


"  Snow  v.  Grace,  25  Ark.  570:  Win 
stead  v.  Hulme,  32  Kan.  568;  4  I'ac 
994;  Bell  v.  Campbell,  17  Kan.  212; 
Wanamaker  v.  Bowers,  36  M<1.  42; 
Moore  v.  Schultz,  :',1  Md.  423;  Engle 
v.  Jones,  51  Mo.  316. 

86  Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14  La.  Ann. 
806. 

»  Pierce  v.  Millay,  44  111.  189. 


87  Fush  v.  Egan.  48  La.  Aim.  80; 
19  So.  108. 

m  Wood  v.  Barker,  37  Ala.  80;  sin>\\ 
v.  Grace.  25  Ark.  670;  McClendoo  v. 
Wells.  20  S.  C.  514. 

«»  Cobb  v.  People.  84  III.  611. 

'"  Missouri  Pac.  By.  Co.  r.  Humes, 
115  U.  S.  512;  29  L.  Ed.  403.  (See 
Mo.  Laws,  1875,  p.  131.) 

137 


§§  131,  132 


EX  KM  PLARY    DAMAGES. 


for  an  injury  jointly  inflicted  by  them,  and  it  appears  that  only 
one  is  chargeable  with  malice,  or  such  other  conduct  as  would 
authorize  an  allowance  of  punitive  damages,  such  damages  can- 
not be  recovered  against  both  or  all  the  defendants.91  But  in 
such  a  case  exemplary  damages  may  be  recovered  from  the  one 
chargeable  with  such  conduct,  and  only  compensatory  damages 
from  the  other  or  others.92 

§  131.  Against  persons  under  legal  disability — The  dam- 
ages recoverable  against  persons  laboring  under  a  legal  disabil- 
ity should  be  limited  to  those  which  are  compensatory  and  ex- 
emplary damages  should  not  be  awarded.93  Thus  it  has  been 
so  held  in  actions  to  recover  damages  for  a  tort  committed  by  a 
lunatic.94  And  such  damages  were  held  not  recoverable  against 
a  child  ten  years  of  age  for  an  injury  inflicted  by  him  through 
recklessness  or  childish  indiscretion.95 


§  132.  Effect  of  death  of  wrongdoer. — Exemplary  damages 
being  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment  inflicted  upon  a  wrong- 
doer for  his  wanton,  malicious  or  grossly  negligent  act  in  caus- 
ing the  injury  complained  of,  it  follows  that  though  after  the 
death  of  the  wrongdoer  the  right  of  action  to  recover  damages 
for  the  tort  may  survive  against  his  estate,  yet  the  right  to  re- 
cover exemplary  damages  does  not  survive.06  If,  however,  the 
death  of  the  wrongdoer  does  not  occur  until  after  verdict  against 
him,  it  will  not  affect  the  recovery  of  exemplary  damages  al- 
lowed in  such  verdict.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  where  a 
statute  provides  that  where  an  action  is  commenced  against  the 
executor  or  administrator  of  one  originally  liable  for  a  tort,  ex- 


91  Becker  v.  Dapree,  75  111.  167. 

92  Clark  v.  Xewsam,  1  Exch.  131 ; 
Clissold  v.  Machell,  26  Up.  Can.  Q. 
B.  422.  But  see  contra,  McCarthy 
v.  De  Armit,  99  Pa.  St.  63,  wherein 
the  recovery  is  limited  in  such  a  case 
to  compensatory  damages. 

93 O'Brien  v.  Loomis,  43  Mo.  App. 
29;  Krora  v.  Schoonmaker,  3  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  647. 

94MeIntyre  v.  Sholty,  121  111.  660; 
2  Am.  St.  Rep.  140;  13  N.  E.  239; 
138 


Jewell   v.    Colby   (N.    H.),   24    Atl. 
202. 

95  O'Brien  v.  Loomis,  43  Mo.  App.  29. 

96  Sheik  v.  Hobson,  64  Iowa,  146; 
Edwards  v.  Ricks,  30  La.  Ann.  926; 
Wilkins  v.  Wainwright,  173  Mass. 
212;  53  N.  E.  397;  Mass.  Pub.  Stat. 
ch.  166,  sec.  2;  Hewlett  v.  George, 
68  Miss.  703;  9  So.  885;  13  L.  R.  A. 
682;  Rippey  v.  Miller,  11  Ired.  L.  (N. 
C.)247;  Wright  v.  Donnell,  34  Tex. 
291. 


EXEMPLARY    I  >  AM  AGES. 


§§  133,  134 


emplary  damages  shall  not  be  allowed,  such  statute  does  not 
apply  to  a  case  where  the  defendant  after  a  verdict  againsl  him 
has  been  rendered  and  nothing  remains  to  be  done  except  to  dis- 
pose of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  and  enter  up  judgment.91 

§  133.  Mitigation  of  damages. — The  manner  or  motive  of 
the  act  causing  the  injury,  that  is,  whether  it  is  done  in  a  wanton 
or  malicious  spirit  or  in  such  a  manner  as  evinces  a  reckless 
disregard  of  the  consequences,  being  the  ground  on  which  the 
allowance  of  exemplary  damages  is  based,  it  necessarily  follows 
that  facts  showing  the  absence  of  a  wrongful,  malicious  or  wanton 
motive  may  be  introduced  in  evidence  in  mitigation  of  such 
damages.  That  the  act  was  done  in  good  faith,  in  a  mutual 
mistake  as  to  the  rights  of  the  parties,  or  that  the  defendant 
acted  under  the  advice  of  counsel,  or  that  his  conduct  was  due 
to  provocation  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  are  facts  which  may 
always  be  shown  in  mitigation  of  or  to  prevent  the  allowance  of 
such  damages.93  And  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff 
may  be  shown  in  an  action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries,  as 
a  defense  to  an  allowance  of  punitive  damages.99 

§  134.  Act  done  in  exercise  of  a  supposed  right. — Although 
it  may  be  stated  as  a  general  rule  that  exemplary  damages  may 
be  awarded  to  a  plaintiff  who  has  sustained  loss  or  injury  owing 
to  the  wilful  act  of  the  defendant,  yet  this  may  be  qualified  to 
the  extent  that  in  actions  of  trespass,  involving  injury  to  per- 
sonal property,  the   defendant's   act  may  have   been  wilful,  yet 


97  Wilkins  v.  Wain wright,  17:*.  Mass. 
212:  53  N.  E.  397.  See  Mass.  Pub. 
Stat.  ch.  1GG,  sec.  2. 

98  City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jeffries,  73 
Ala.  183;  Ward  v.  Blackwood,  41 
Ark.  295;  48  Am.  Rep.  41;  Walker  v. 
Fuller,  29  Ark.  448;  Dalton  v.  Beers, 
38  Conn.  529;  Shores  v.  Brooks,  81 
Ga.  408;  Cockrane  v.  Tuttle,  75  111. 
361;  Jasper  v.  Purnell,  07  111.  358; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Chic.  Rock  Island  &  V. 
Ry.  Co.,  50  Iowa,  79;  Brown  v.  Allen, 
35  Iowa,  300;  Plummer  v.  llarbut, 
5  Iowa,  308;  Fnsh  v.  Egan,  48  La. 
Ann.  00;  19  So.  108;  Currier  v.  Swan, 


63  Me.  324;  Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Eoeflich,  62  Md.  300:  Bradner  v. 
Faulkner,  93  V  Y.  515;  Kill  v. 
Youruans,  80  N.  Y.  324;  Yates  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  B.  Co..  67  NT.  Y. 
100;  Millard  v.  Brown,  35  N.  Y.  297; 
Uptonv.  Upton,  51  Hun  (N.  Y.  i,  L84; 
21  N".  Y.  St.  Rep.  559;  4  X.  Y.  Supp. 
936;  Bennett  v.  Smith.  23  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  50;  Carpenter  v.  Barber,  44  Vt. 
442;  shay  v.  Thompson,  59  Wis.  540. 

••southern  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  - 
292;  52    V.  S.  App.    70S;  40  L.  R.  A. 
746;  30  0.  C.  A.  58;  Chic,  eto.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  McKeau,  40  111.  218. 

139 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


have  been  done  in  good  faith  with  honest  intentions  and  proper 
prudence  and  caution  in  the  exercise  of  a  supposed  right,  in 
which  case  the  rule  has  been  generally  affirmed  that  exemplary 
damages  are  not  recoverable.110  So  an  officer,  who  by  mistake, 
seizes  property  not  embraced  in  a  chattel  mortgage  under  which 
foreclosure  proceedings  have  been  instituted,  is  not  liable  for  ex- 
emplary damages  where,  upon  being  informed  of  the  mistake,  he 
offers  to  return  the  property  if  the  owner  will  identify  it.1  Nor 
will  a  landlord  be  liable  for  such  damages  for  levying  on  prop- 
erty which  is  in  the  possession  of  the  lessee  but  belongs  to  a 
stranger,  unless  he  had  knowledge  as  to  the  ownership  of  such 
property. -  Nor  again,  should  they  be  awarded  against  one  who 
goes  upon  vacant  land  and  cuts  timber  therefrom,  where  he  acted 
in  good  faith,  believing  it  to  be  his  own  land.3 

§  135.  Against  corporations — Accepted  rule. — The  question 
as  to  the  allowance  of  exemplary  or  punitive  damages  in  actions 
against  corporations  has  been  presented  in  various  phases  and 
has  also  been  productive  of  much  discussion  in  the  various 
courts  in  which  it  has  arisen.  It  may  be  stated  generally  that 
private  corporations  may,  in  a  proper  case,  be  subject  to  an  al- 
lowance of  exemplary  damages  in  actions  against  them.4     A  cor- 


100  Kelly  v.  MacDonald,  39  Ark.  387 ; 
Walker  v.  Fuller,  29  Ark.  448;  Selden 
v.  Cushman,  20  Cal.  56;  Yahoola  R.  & 
C.  C.  Hydraulic  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Irby,  40 
Ga.  479;  White  v.  Naerob,  57  111. 
App.  114;  Mackin  v.  Blythe,  35  111. 
App.  216;  Gravett  v.  Mugge,  89  111. 
218;  Waldron  v.  Marcier,  82  111.  550; 
Scott  v.  Byson,  74  111.  420;  Dobbins 
v.  Duquid,  65  111.  464;  Hawk  v.  Ridg- 
way,  33  111.  473;  Waller  v.  Waller, 
76  Iowa,  513;  41  N.  W.  307;  Went- 
worth  v.  Blackman,  71  Iowa,  255;  32 
X.  W.  311;  Inman  v.  Ball,  65  Iowa, 
543;  22  N.  W.  666;  Wormald  v.  Hill, 
4  Ky.  Law  Rep.  723;  Perrine  v. 
Blancbard,  15  La.  Ann.  133;  Sapp  v. 
Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  51  Md.  115; 
Jones  v.  Rahilly,  16  Minn.  320; 
Rayor  v.  Mims,  37  Mich.  34;  26 
Am.  Rep.  493;  Allison  v.   Chandler, 

140 


11  Mich.  542;  Bruce  v.  Ulery,  79  Mo. 
322;  Hull  v.  Sumner,  12  Mo.  App. 
583;  Kiff  v.  Youmans,  86  N.  Y.  324; 
Price  v.  Murray,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y. 
Super.)  243;  Blewett  v.  Coleman,  1 
Pears.  (Pa.)  516;  Louisville,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Guinan,  11  Lea  (Penn.), 
98;  Hillman  v.  Baumbach,  21  Tex. 
203;  Neese  v.  Radford,  83  Tex.  585; 
19  S.  W.  141. 

1  Inman  v.  Ball,  65  Iowa  543;  22 
N.  W.  666.  See  Hull  v.  Sumner,  12 
Mo.  App.  583. 

2  Mackin  v.  Blythe,  35  111.  App. 
216. 

3  Walker  v.  Fuller,  29  Ark.  448. 

*  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93 
Ala.  54;  47  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  500; 
9  So.  722;  Columbus  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridges,  86  Ala.  448;  5  So.  864;  Jef- 
ferson County  Sav.  Bank  v.  Eborn, 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§135 


poration,  however,  can  only  act  though  its  servants  or  agents  for 
whose  conduct  it  is,  as  a  general  rule,  responsible  in  case  of  in- 
jury to  third  persons,  though  the  act  be  wanton  or  wilful  where 
it  is  done  by  such  servant  or  agent  within  the  scope  of  his  em- 
ployment. The  question,  however,  upon  which  the  courts  have 
disagreed  has  been  whether  exemplary  damages  should  be  al- 
lowed, where  the  act  of  the  servant  or  agent  was  wilful,  wanton 
or  with  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  injured  person. 
In  such  cases,  however,  the  rule  has  been  recognized,  except  in 
those  jurisdictions  where  exemplary  damages  are  not  allowed, 
that  they  may  be  awarded  against  the  corporation  where  they 
would  be  allowed  against  an  individual  in  like  circumstances, 
that  is,  when  the  act  may  be  said  to  be  the  corporation's  own  act, 
as  in  case  it  was  negligent  in  hiring  the  servant,  or  when  there 
is  an  authorization  or  ratification  of  an  act  done  by  a  servant  or 
agent  within  the  scope  of  his  employment  and  such  act  would 
justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damages  if  the  action  were  against 
the  latter.5 


84  Ala.  529;  4  So.  380;  Central  of 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown  (Ga.  1901),  10 
Am.  Neg.  Rep. 30;  Chattanooga,  R.  t& 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Liddell,  85  Ga.  482;  11 
S.  E.  853;  8  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  296; 
Frink  v.  Coe,  4  Greene  (Iowa),  555; 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart, 
55  Kan.  667;  41  Pac.  961;  Goddard 
v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  57  Me.  202; 
2  Am.  Rep.  39;  Railroad  v.  Blocker, 
27  Md.  277;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brookhaveu  Mack.  Co.,  71  Miss.  663; 
16  So.  252;  Higgins  v.  Louisville,  N. 
O.  &  Tex.  R.  R.  Co.,  04  Miss.  80;  8 
So.  170;  Vicksburg  &  Meridian  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Scanlon,  63  Miss.  413;  Stone- 
seifer  v.  Sheble,  31  Mo.  243;  Cald- 
well v.  Now  Jersey  S.  B.  Co.,  47 
N.  Y.  282;  The  Oriental  v.  Barclay, 
16Tex.  Civ.  App.  103;  41  S.  W.  117; 
Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Slusser, 
10  Ohio  St.  157;  Palmer  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  3  S.  C.  580;  16   Am.  Rep.  750. 

6  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Prentice,  147  U.  S.  Ill;  37  L.  Ed.  97; 
13   Sup.   Ct.   Rep.  261;  7    Am.  R.  & 


Corp.  Rep.  400;  47  Alb.  L.  J.  186; 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  122 
U.  S.  008;  30  L.  Ed.  1148;  Milwau- 
kee &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Anns.  91  U.S. 
489;  23  L.  Ed.  374;  Phila.  W.  &  B.  R. 
Co.  v.  Quigley,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  210; 
16  L.  Ed.  75;  Reale  v.  Ry.  Co.,  1  Dill. 
(U.  S.)  569;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,159;  Al- 
abama G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93  Ala. 
54;  '  iiy  Nat.  Hank  v.  Jeffries,  73 
Ala.  183;  Gasway  v.  Atlantic  &  W. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Ga.  216;  Singer  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Holdfodt.  86  111.  455;  l".»  Am. 
Rep.  43;  Wheeler  &  Wilson  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Boyce,  36  Kan.  350;  13  Pac. 
609;  59  Am.  Rep.  571;  Bowler  v. 
Lane,  3  Mete.  (Ky.  )311;  Hill  v.  New 
Orleans,  O.  &  G.  W.  R.  Co.,  11  La. 
Ann.  292;  Varillat  v.  New  Orleans 
&  Carrollton  R.  R.  Co.,  10  La.  Ann. 
88;  Phila.  W.  &.  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lar- 
kin,  47  Bid.  155;  28  Am.  Rep.  442; 
New  Orleans,  etc.,  R.  R. « !o.  v.  Bailey, 
40  Miss.  395;  Gillette  v.  Mo.  Valley 
R.  R.  Co..  55  Mo.  315;  17  Am.  Rep. 
653;  Rouse  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  41 
141 


§  186  KXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

§  136.  Decisions  holding  authorization  or  ratification  of 

act  necessary. — Whether  a  corporation  should  be  subject  to 
exemplary  damages  for  the  act  of  a  servant  or  agent  within  the 
scope  of  his  employment,  where  such  act  is  Wilful,  wanton,  ma- 
licious, or  done  with  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  rights  of  others, 
if  it  has  not  been  previously  authorized  or  subsequently  ratified 
by  the  corporation,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion. 
That  in  such  a  case  exemplary  or  punitive  damages  should  not 
be  allowed  is  a  rule  asserted  in  many  jurisdictions.  The  prin- 
ciples upon  which  this  rule  is  based  by  the  various  decisions  is 
that  exemplary  damages  are  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment  and 
should  not  be  visited  upon  one  who  has  not  participated  in  the 
offense,  it  not  being  the  purpose  of  the  law  to  punish  a  person 
for  an  offense  of  which  he  is  not  guilty,  and  that  he  is  not  guilty 
in  the  absence  of  proof  making  him  particeps  criminis  of  the  ser- 
vant's act.fi 


Mo.  App.  298;  Belknap  v.  Boston  & 
M.  I!.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  H.  358;  Ackerson 
v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  By.  Co.,  32  N.  J. 
L.  254;  Cleghorn  v.  New  York  Cent. 
&  H.  B.  B.  B.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  44;  15  Am. 
Rep.  375;  Townsend  v.  New  York 
Cent.  &  H.  B.  B.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  295; 
Hamilton  v.  Third  Ave.  B.  B.  Co., 
53  N.  Y'.  25;  Caldwell  v.  New  Jersey 
S.  B.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  282;  Atlantic  & 
G.  W.  By.  Co.  v.  Dunn,  19  Ohio  St., 
162;  2  Am.  Bep.  382;  Hogan  v.  Prov. 
&  W.  B.  E.  Co.,  3  B.  I.  88;  Quinn  v. 
So.  Car.  By.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  381; 
Haley  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  B.  B.  Co.,  7 
Baxt.  (Perm. )  240;  Craker  v.  Chic. 
&  N.  W.  By.  Co.,  30  Wis.  057;  Bell  v. 
Midland  B.  Co.,  10  C.  B.  N.  S.  287; 
4  L.  T.  N.  S.  293. 

«Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  B.  Co.  v. 
Prentice.  147  U.  S.  101 ;  37  L.  Ed. 
97;  13  Sup.  Ct.  Bep.  261;  7  Am.  B. 
&  Corp.  Bep.  406;  47  Alb.  L.  J.  186; 
Denver,  B.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  122 
U.S.  608;  30  L.  Ed.  1148;  Milwaukee 
&  St.  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arms,  91  U.S. 
489;  23  L.  Ed.  374;  Phila.  W.  &  B. 
R.  Co.  v.  Quigley,  21  How.  ( U.  S.)  210; 
142 


The  Amiable  Nancy,  3  Wheat.  (U.  S. ) 
546;  16  L.  Ed.  75;  Press  Pub.  Co.  v. 
Monroe,  73  Fed.  202;  51  L.  R.  A.  353; 
Henniug  v.  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.. 
41  Fed.  864;  Potts  v.  Chic.  City  Ry. 
Co.,  33  Fed.  810;  McGuire  v.  Golden 
Gate,  McAllister  (U.  S.),  104;  Tra- 
birjg  v.  California  Nav.  &  I.  Co.,  121 
Cal.  137;  53  Pac.  744;  8  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  695 ;  Warner  v.  So. 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  113  Cal.  105;  45  Pac. 
187;  Wardrobe  v.  Cal.  Stage  Co.,  7 
Cal.  118;  Colvin  v.  Peck,  62  Conn. 
155;  25  Atl.  355;  McCoy  v.  Phila., 
etc.,  R.  B.  Co.,  5  Houst.  (Del.)  599; 
Bedwood  v.  Met.  B.  Co.,  6  D.  C. 
302;  Augusta  Factory  v.  Barnes,  72 
Ga.  217;  53  Am.  Bep.  838;  Detroit 
Daily  Post  v.  Mc Arthur,  16  Mich. 
447;  Haver  v.  Cent.  B.  B.  Co.  (N.  J. 
1900),  45  Atl.  593;  7  Am.  Neg.  Bep. 
296;  Forhman  v.  Consol.  Tract.  Co. 
(N.  J.  1899),  43  Atl.  892;  6  Am.  Neg. 
Bep.  601 ;  Haines  v.  Schultz,  50  N.  J. 
L.  481;  14  Atl.  488;  Cleghorn  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  Y. 
44;  15  Am.  Rep.  375;  Townsend  v. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§  137 


§  137.  Same  subject — Particular  decisions. — In  this  con- 
nection it  has  been  said  by  the  United  States  supreme  court 
that  "exemplary  or  punitive  damages  being  awarded  not  by 
way  of  compensation  to  the  sufferer,  but  by  way  of  punish- 
ment of  the  offender  and  as  a  warning  to  others  can  only  1>p 
awarded  against  one  who  has  participated  in  the  offense.  A 
principal  therefore,  though  of  course  liable  to  make  compensa- 
tion for  injuries  done  by  his  agent  within  the  scope  of  his  em- 
ployment, cannot  beheld  liable  for  exemplary  or  punitive  dam- 
ages, merely  by  reason  of  wanton,  oppressive  or  malicious  intent 
on  the  part  of  the  agent.*''7  And  in  this  same  decision  it  was 
declared  that  the  law  upon  the  question  is  nowhere  better 
stated  than  in  the  following :  "  In  cases  where  punitive  or 
exemplary  damages  have  been  assessed,  it  has  been  done  upon 
evidence  of  such  wilfulness  or  recklessness  or  wickedness  on 


N.  V.  295;  15  Am.  Rep.  419;  George 
v.  Cypress  Hills  Cemetery,  32  App. 
Div.  281;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  1097; 
Muckle  v.  Rochester  Iiy.  Co.,  79 
Bun  (N.  Y.),  32;  Fisher  v.  Met.  E. 
R.  Co.,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.),433;  Murphy 
v.  Cent.  Park.  N.  &  E.  R.  II.  R.  Co., 
16  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  96;  Donovan  v. 
Man.  Ry.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  St.  R.  722; 
Baldwin  v.  New  York  &  Harlem 
Nav.  Co.,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  314;  Sul- 
livan v.  Oreg.  Ry.  &  Xav.  Co.,  12 
Oreg.  392;  7  Pac.  508;  53  Am.  Rep. 
364;  Staples  v.  Schmid,  is  R.  I.  224; 
19  L.  R.  A.  824;  26  Atl.  196;  Hagan 
v.  Prov.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  R.  I.  88; 
Nashville  &  Chattanooga  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Staines,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  52;  2  1 
Am.  Rep.  296;  International  &  G.  X. 
R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  75  Tex.  41:  12 
S.  W.  860;  42  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  (as. 
211;  International  &  G.  V  R.  Co.  v. 
Garcia,  70  Tex.  207:  7  S.  W.  802; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
58  Tex.  170;  44  Am.  Rep.  610:  Willis 
v.  McNeill,  57  Tex.  465;  Ricketta  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co..  33  W.  Va. 
433;  10  S.  E.  801;  7  L.  R.  A.  354:  41 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  42;  25   Am.    St. 


Rep.  901;  Rohinsonv.  Superior  Rapid 
Trans.  R.  Co.,  94  Wis.  345:  34  L. 
R.  A.  205;  68  N.  W.  961:  Mace  v. 
Reed,  89  Wis.  440;  62  N.  \V.  186; 
Bass  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co..  42 
Wis.  654:  24  Am.  Rep.  437:  Craker 
v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Wis. 
657:  17  Am.  Rep.  504;  Milwaukee 
&  .Miss.  K.  K.  Co.  v.  Finney,  10  Wis. 
388;  Clark  v.  Mewsam,  1  Exch.  131, 
140;  Clissoldv.  Machell,  26  Up.  Can. 
Q.  li.  422;  Bacon's Abr.  (Bouv.  1854) 
"Damages"  (D.)  1,  p.  65.  The  re- 
tention of  a  servant  after  knowledge 
of  his  act  has  been  held  to  be  such  a 
ratification  as  will  render  a  corpora- 
tion liable  to  exemplary  damages 
(Bass  v.  Chic.  &  S.  \Y  Ry.  Co.,  42 
Wis.  654;  24  Am.  Rep.  437):  though 
in  Texas  it  has  been  held  that  it 
does  not  amount  to  a  ratification  as  a 
matter  of  law.  Dillingham  v.  An- 
thony, 73  Tex.  47;  3  L.  R.  A.  634; 
11  S.  W.  139.  See  also  Texas  &  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Jones  (Tex  Civ.  App. ),  29 
S.  W.  491 1. 

■  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Prentice,  147  U.  S.  107;  37  L.  Ed. 
101,  per  Mr.  Justice  Gray. 

143 


8  137 


EX  KMl'LARY    DAMAGES. 


8 

the  part  of  the  party  at  fault  as  amounted  to  criminality  which, 
for  the  good  of  society  and  warning  to  the  individual,  ought  to 
be  punished.  If  in  such  cases  or  in  any  case  of  a  civil  nature 
it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  visit  upon  the  offender  such  ex- 
emplary damages  us  will  operate  as  punishment  and  teach  the 
lesson  of  caution  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  criminality,  yet 
we  do  not  see  how  such  damages  can  be  allowed  where  the 
principal  is  prosecuted  for  the  tortious  act  of  his  servant 
unless  there  is  proof  in  the  cause  to  implicate  the  principal  and 
make  him  particeps  criminis  of  his  agent's  act.  No  man  should 
be  punished  for  that  of  which  he  is  not  guilty.  .  .  .  Where  the 
proof  does  not  implicate  the  principal,  and  however  wicked  the 
servant  may  have  been,  the  principal  neither  expressly  nor  im- 
pliedly authorizes  or  ratifies  the  act  and  the  criminality  of  it  is 
as  much  against  him  as. against  any  other  member  of  society,  we 
think  it  is  quite  enough  that  he  shall  be  liable  in  compensatory 
damages  for  the  injury  sustained  in  consequence  of  the  wrong- 
ful act  of  a  person  acting  as  his  servant." 8 


«  Hogan  v.  Prov.  &  \V.  K.  Co.,  3 
K.  I.  88,  91,  per  Mr.  Justice  Brayton. 
And  in  a  New  York  decision  it  is 
likewise  declared  that  "for  inju- 
ries by  the  negligence  of  a  servant, 
while  engaged  in  the  business  of  the 
master,  within  the  scope  of  his  em- 
ployment, the  latter  is  liable  for  com- 
pensatory damages.  But  for  such 
negligence,  however  gross  or  cul- 
pable, he  is  not  liable  in  punitive 
damages,  unless  he  is  also  charge- 
ahle  with  gross  misconduct.  Such 
misconduct  may  be  established  by 
showing  that  the  act  of  the  servant 
was  authorized  or  ratified  or  that  the 
master  employed  or  retained  the 
servant  knowing  that  he  was  incom- 
petent, or  from  bad  habits  unfit  for 
the  position  he  occupied.  Some- 
thins:  more  than  ordinary  negligence 
is  requisite.  It  must  be  reckless 
and  of  a  criminal  nature  and  clearly 
established  corporations  incur  this 
liability  as  well  as  private  persons." 
Cleghorn  v.    N.  Y.   Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

144 


Co.,  56  N.Y.  44;  15  Am.  Rep.  375, 
per  Church,  C.  J.  So  again  in  a 
case  in  Louisiana,  it  is  said  that 
"  it  is  true  juries  sometimes  very 
properly  give  what  is  called  smart 
money.  They  are  often  warranted 
in  giving  vindictive  damages  as  a 
punishment  inflicted  for  outrageous 
conduct.  But  this  is  only  justifiable 
in  an  action  against  the  wrongdoer, 
and  not  against  persons  who  on  ac- 
count of  their  relations  to  the  of- 
fender are  only  consequentially  lia- 
ble for  his  acts  as  the  principal  is  res- 
ponsible for  the  acts  of  his  factor  or 
agent."  Knee  v.  Lizardi,  8  La.  26, 
33,  per  Martin,  J.  And  in  a  case  in 
Oregon,  the  court  after  stating  that 
such  damages  may  be  justified 
against  a  wrongdoer,  says:  "To  at- 
tempt to  extend  the  doctrine  so  as 
to  visit  the  punishment  upon  inno- 
cent parties  is  to  my  mind  unreason- 
able and  unjust.  I  cannot  see  any 
principle  upon  which  an  employer, 
whether  a  natural  or  artificial  per- 


EXEMPLARY    I>  IMAGES. 


§138 


§  138.  Same  subject — Illustrations. — The  rule  stated  in 
the  preceding  section  has  been  applied  where  the  malicious  act 
of  the  conductor  in  ejecting  a  passenger  from  a  train  was  neither 
authorized  nor  ratified  by  the  carrier.9  And  for  the  mistreat- 
ment of  a  passenger  on  a  boat  by  the  captain,  it  was  held  that 
punitive  damages  should  not  be  awarded  against  the  owner 
where  the  act  was  not  ratified  by  the  latter.1"  Again,  where  the 
servant  of  a  railroad  company  who  was  in  charge  of  an  engine, 
blew  the  whistle  and  made  a  great  noise  which  frightened 
plaintiffs  horse  and  caused  injury  to  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held 
that  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  the  defendant  knew  of  the 
reckless  character  of  the  servant  and  witli  such  knowledge  still 
retained  him  in  its  service,  only  compensatory  damages  were 
recoverable."  And  a  similar  rule  was  applied  where  a  person 
was  injured  by  contact  with  a  telegraph  wire  which,  owing  to 
the  negligence  of  employees,  was  negligently  allowed  to  touch 
electric  light  wires.1-  And  likewise  where  poison  ivy  was  al- 
lowed, by  employees  of  a  corporation  maintaining  a  cemetery, 
to  grow  upon  a  grave,  causing  injuries  to  the  owner  of  a  burial 


son  can  be  made  liable  for  the  acts 
of  his  or  its  servant  beyond  compen- 
satory damages,  unless  the  employer 
directed  the  doing  of  the  act  or  rati- 
fied it  after  it  was  done.  .  .  .  The 
•acts  of  the  conductor  in  the  present 
case  may  have  been  so  malicious  and 
reckless  as  to  indicate  a  depraved 
mind,  and  if  such  were  the  fact  he 
ought  to  be  punished  for  his  wick- 
edness, but  by  what  rule  of  consist- 
ency can  that  punishment  be  inflicted 
upon  the  company.  ...  It  is 
claimed,  however,  in  the  decision  of 
the  courts  which  hold  that  a  railroad 
company  is  liable  to  exemplary  or 
punitive  damages,  that  the  conductor 
of  a  train  of  cars  is  pro  hac  vice  to 
be  regarded  as  the  company  itself; 
but  this  certainly  is  only  a  fiction  of 
law.  The  fact  that  the  company 
acts  through  agents  in  the  transaction 
of  its  business  is  no  more  peculiar 
than  where  a  natural   person   trans- 

10 


acts  his  business  through  agents. 
The  conductor  ...  is  not  punished 
by  the  judgment  against  the  com- 
pany. ...  It  js  the  stockholders 
.  .  .  who  are  punished  when  exem- 
plary damages  are  awarded  in  the 
action  and  if  there  is  any  justice  in  a 
rule  which  allows  it  in  such  a  case,  I 
am  apprehensive  I  shall  never  be 
able  to  discover  it."  Sullivan  v. 
Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  12  Oreg. 
392;  7Pac.  508;  53  Am.  Rep.  304. 

9  Robinson  v.  Superior  Rapid 
Trans.  R.  Co.,  94  Wis.  345;  68  N".  W. 
0G1 ;  34  L.  R.  A.  205.  See  also  Town- 
send  v.  X.  Y.  Cent.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.. 
56  X.  V.  295;  15  Am.  Rep.  419. 

I  Mace  v.  Reed,  89  Wis.  440;  62 
X.  \V.  186. 

II  Nashville  v.  <  hattanooga  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Staines.  9  Ileisk.  (Tenn.)  52; 
24  Am.  Rep.  296. 

'-  Eenning  v.  Western  Dn.  Teleg. 
Co..  41  Fed.  864. 

14.'» 


§139 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


lot,  it  was  held  that  exemplary  damages  were  not  recoverable 
against  the   corporation  in  the  absence  of  notice  to  it  of  the 
condition  complained  of,  or  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  learn 
of  and   obviate  such  condition.13      So,  also,   where  the  act  of 
the  servant  or  agent  was  unauthorized,  as  where  an  agent,  by 
fraudulent  misrepresentations,  induced  a  person  to  take  pas- 
sage on  a  cholera  infected  steamship,  exemplary  damages  should 
not  be  given.14     And  where  a  salesman  who  was  in  charge  of  a 
store  being  suspicious  that  plaintiff  had  stolen  certain  goods 
therefrom,  detained  her  and  caused  her  to  be  sent  to  the  police 
station,  it  was  held   that  exemplary  damages  should  not  be 
awarded  against  the  master,  it  not  appearing  that  he  had  par- 
ticipated in  or  approved  of  such  act.15     And  a  similar  rule  has 
been  affirmed  in  the  case  of  a  wrongful  attachment  by  an  agent 
or  attorney.10     But  if  the  servant  be  acting  in  the  execution  of 
an  unlawful  purpose,  of  which  the  master  approves,  such  dam- 
ages may  be  allowed.17     And  in  case  of  gross  negligence  or  mis- 
conduct of  the  servant,  if  the  master  was  aware  of  such  miscon- 
duct or  had  means  of  knowing  that  the  servant  was  not  prudent 
or   careful,  or   if  proper  care  was  not  exercised  in  his   selec- 
tion, the  jury  may  award  exemplary  damages.18     And  punitive 
damages  may  be  recovered  against  a  newspaper  proprietor  for 
libelous  language  inserted  in  the  paper  by  a  reporter  upon  proof 
of  the  approval  by  the  former  of  the  latter's  conduct.19 

§  139.  Decisions  holding  ratification  or  authorization  of 
act  unnecessary.  Though  the  rule  has  been  asserted  in  many 
jurisdictions  that  to  hold  a  corporation  responsible  in  exem- 
plary damages  for  the  act  of  a  servant,  it  must  appear  that  the 
corporation  was  either  negligent  in  the  employment  of  such 
servant  or  authorized  or  ratified  his  act,  yet  in  a  greater  number 
of  jurisdictions  the  contrary  doctrine  which  has  been  more  gen- 


13  George  v.  Cypress  Hills  Ceme- 
tery, 32  App.  Div.  281;  52  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1097. 

I*  The  Normannia,  62  Fed.  469. 
See  also  Colvin  v.  Peck,  62  Conn. 
155;  25  Atl.  355,  as  to  unauthorized 
act  of  agent. 

is  Staples  v.  Schmid,  18  R.  I.  224; 
19  L.  R.  A.  824;  26  Atl.  193. 
146 


K  Willis  v.  McNeill,  57  Tex.  465. 

17  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris, 122  U.  S.  597;  7  Sup.  Ct.  1286; 
30  L.  Ed.  1146. 

ig  Henning  v.  Western  Un.  Tel. 
Co.,  41  Fed.  864. 

si  Haines  v.  Schultz,  50  N.  J.  L. 
481 ;  14  Atl.  488. 


EXEMPLAR V    DAMAGES. 


§  139 


erally  followed  prevails.  The  rule  as  established  by  this  class  of 
cases  is  that  if  the  servant  or  agent  was  engaged  in  furthei 
ing  the  master's  business  and  was  acting  in  the  scope  of  his 
employment,  exemplary  damages  are  allowable  against  the  mas- 
ter for  an  injury  due  to  the  wilful,  wanton  or  malicious  act  or 
gross  negligence  of  the  servant  or  agent.  The  principle  under- 
lying these  decisions,  which  may  be  said  to  be  especially  appli- 
cable as  between  carrier  and  passenger,  is  that  the  corporation 
can  only  act  through  natural  persons,  to  whom  the  care,  manage- 
ment and  transaction  of  its  business  is  entrusted,  and  whether 
such  persons  occupy  the  position  of  officers,  agents  or  servants, 
they  represent  the  corporation  in  the  particular  employment  in 
which  engaged,  the  entire  power  of  the  corporation  pro  hac  vice 
being  vested  in  such  persons.  Again  the  doctrine  of  respondeat 
superior,  which  makes  a  corporation  liable  in  compensatory  dam- 
ages for  the  malicious  torts  of  its  servants,  should  apply  equally 
to  exemplary  as  well  as  to  compensator}'  damages.  The  cor- 
poration, if  we  view  the  servant  or  agent  as  distinct  from  the 
corporation  and  assume  the  relation  to  be  as  in  the  case  of 
natural  persons,  master  or  principal,  and  servant  or  agent,  may 
be  equally  innocent  of  wrong  so  far  as  the  injury  is  concerned 
and  yet  liable  for  compensatory  damages  for  the  wilful  or  wan- 
ton act  of  an  agent.  The  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  is 
founded  on  public  policy  and  equally  so  is  the  doctrine  of  ex- 
emplary damages,  and  both  are  equally  applicable  to  corpora- 
tions irrespective  of  any  authorization  or  ratification  on  the  part 
of  the  corporation,  of  the  servant  or  agent's  act.41 


20  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Seed, 
115  Ala.  670;  22  S.  W.  474;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  1;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Prazier,  93  Ala.  45;  9  So.  30:5;  Citi- 
zens Ry.  Co.  v.  Steen,  42  Ark.  321; 
Flanuery  v.  Rait.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 
Mackey  (D.  C),  111;  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Dougherty,  86  <Ja.  744;  12  S.  E.  7  17. 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Horner,  73  Ga.  251; 
Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes,  96 
111.  162;  Chic,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Bryan, 
90  111.  120;  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hold- 
fodt,  86  111.  455;  29  Am.  Rep.  43; 
Toledo,   Wabash  &  W.  R.    H.   Co.    v. 


Harmon,  75  111.  2!)8;  Pullman  Pal. 
Car  Co.  v.  Reed,  75  111.  167;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammer,  72  111.  353; 
Rockford.  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wells,  66  111.  321;  Chic.  R.  I.  A-  1'. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Herring.  57  111.  59;  St. 
Louis.  Alton  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dall.y. 
19  111.  353;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ross,  31  111.  A.pp.  170;  Citizens  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Willoel.y.  134  Ind.  563;  33 
N.  E.  027;  Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co  < 
Rogers,  38  Ind.  110;  Jeffersonville 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers.  28  Ind.  1;  West- 
ern Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Bierhaus,  8 
147 


5  140 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§  140.  Same  subject— Particular  decisions.— In  this  con- 
nection it  is  said  in  a  recent  case  in  Kentucky  that  "a  corpora- 
tion can  act  only  through  natural  persons.  It  of  necessity  com- 
mits its  business  absolutely  to  their  charge.  They  are,  however, 
selected  by  it.  In  the  case  of  a  railroad  the  safety  and  comfort 
of  passengers  is  necessarily  committed  to  them.     They  act  for 


Ind.  App.  563;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  723; 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry, 
55  Kan.  715;  41  Pac.  952;   Lexington 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Coziue   (Ky.   1901),  64  S. 
\V.  848;  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  595;  Mem- 
phis &  C.  Packet   Co.  v.    Nagel,  97 
Ky.  9;  29  S.  W.  743;  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  94   Ky.  410;  22  S. 
\Y.  7-17;  11  Am.  Neg.  Cas.  579;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.    R.   Co.  v.    Ballard,   85 
Ky.  307;  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  600;  3  S.  W. 
530;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Coy, 81   Ky.  303;  Hawkins   v.   Riley, 
17  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  101;  City  Transfer 
Co.  v.  Robinson,  12  Ky.  L.  Rep.  555; 
Louisville  &    N.  R.  Co.  v.   Kingman, 
1-    Ky.    L.    Rep.  82;  35  S.  VV.    264;  5 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  401;  Daw- 
son   v.  Louisville   &  N.  R.  R.   Co..  6 
Kv.  L.  Rep.  668:  McFeev.  Vicksburg, 
etc.,  H.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  791;  7  So. 
720;    Rutherford  v.  Shreveport  &  H. 
R.  Co..  41   La.   Aun.   793;  6  So.  644; 
41  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.   129;  Hanson 
v.    Ry.  C...  62   Me.  84;  Phila.  Wilm. 
&  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Larkin,  47  Md.155; 
28  Am.  Rep.  442;  Bait.   &   R.  R.'  Co. 
v.   Blocker,    27    Mil.    277:  Hawes   v. 
Knowles,  114  Mass.  518:  19  Am.  Rep. 
383;  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.   v.   Law- 
rence.   74   Miss.    782;    22   So.   53;    15 
Nat.    Corp.    R.     124:    1     Miss.    Dec. 
I  No.  5)  4;  8  Am.  &    Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
s.  59;  Southern   Exp.  Co.  v.   Brown, 
67   Miss.  200;  7  So.  318;  19  Am.  St. 
Rep.  306;    Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    v. 
Crudup,  63  Miss.  291;  New  Orleans, 
J.   &   G.    N.    R.   Co.  v.  Allbritton,  38 
Miss.  242:    75   Am.    Dec.   98;    Vicks- 
burg &    J.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Tat  ton,  31 

148 


Miss.    198;  Canfield  v.  Chic.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Mo.  App.  354;  Kellett 
v.  R.    R.    Co.,  22  Mo.  App.  356;  Tra- 
vels  v.    Kan.  Pac.   Ry.  Co.,   63   Mo. 
421;  Doss  v.  Mo.,  etc.,  R.   R.  Co.,  59 
Mo.    27;  21    Am.    Rep.    37;    Perkins 
v.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  201;  Quigley 
v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Nev.  350; 
21   Am.   Rep.   757;    Purcell  v.   Rich- 
mond, etc.,  R.  Co.,  108  N.  C.  404:  12 
S.  E.  954;  12  L.  R.  A.  113;  10  Ry.  & 
Corp.    L.  J.  35;  Rose   v.    R.   R.   Co., 
106  N.  C.  168;  Knowles   v.    Norfolk 
So.  R.   Co.,  102  N.  C.  59;  9  S.  E.  7: 
Atlantic  &  Great  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunn. 
19    Ohio  St.    162;  2   Am.    Rep.   382; 
Sullivan  v.  Oregon   R.  Co.,  12  Oreg. 
392;  7  Pac.  508;  Phila.  Tract.  Co.  v. 
Orbann,  119  Pa.  St.  37;  12  Atl.  816; 
11  Cent.  628;  21  W.  N.  C.  76;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Rosenzweig, 
113  Pa.  St.  519;  6  Atl.  545;  Mack  v. 
South  Bound  R.  Co.,  52  S.  C.  323:  29 
S.   E.  905;  40  L.   R.  A.   679;  3  Chic. 
L.  J.  Wkly.  272;    Rucker  v.  Smoke, 
37  s.  C.  377;  16  S.  E.  40;  34  Am.  St. 
Rep.  758;  Hart  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A. 
R.  Co.,  33  S.  C.  427:  12  S.  E.  9;  10 L. 
R.  A.  794:  Quinn  v.  So.  Car.  Ry.  Co., 
29  S.  C.  381;  7  S.  E.  614;  1  L.  R.  A. 
682;  Palmer  v.  Railroad,  3  S.  C.  580; 
16  Am.  Rep.  750;  San  Antonio  &  A. 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Grier,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
138;  49  S.   W.   148;    The  Oriental  v. 
Barclay,   16   Tex.   Civ.   App.  193;  41 
S.  W.  117;  Fell  v.  Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.,    44    Fed.    248:     Hutchinson   on 
Carriers,  sec.  815a  ,•  5  Thompson  on 
Corp.  sees.  6384,  6385,  6388. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES.  §  140 

it.  Its  entire  power  pro  hac  vice  is  vested  in  them,  and  as  to 
passengers  in  transitu,  they  should  be  considered  as  the  corpora- 
tion itself.  It  is,  therefore,  as  responsible  for  their  acts  in  the 
conduct  of  the  train  and  the  treatment  of  the  passengers  as  the 
officers  of  the  train  would  be  for  themselves  if  they  were  the 
owners  of  it.  Public  interests  require  this  rule,"-'1  And  in  an- 
other decision  in  Mississippi  the  court  says  :  "  It  is  argued  that 
vindictive  damages  are  in  their  nature  penal  and  that  no  one 
should  be  liable  to  punishment  unless  the  act  complained  of  is 
his  own  act  made  so  by  his  authorization  or  ratification  of  it 
when  committed  by  the  servant,  and  that  it  is  illogical  for  the 
courts  to  do  anything  punitive  in  character  unless  the  master  is 
directly  and  personally  responsible  for  the  very  act  complained 
of.  The  sufficient  answer  to  this  contention  is  that  the  judge- 
made  law  of  punitive  damages  is  not  the  result  of  logic  but  of  pub- 
lic  necessity  as  text-writers  and  courts  have  repeatedly  shown. 
-^If  corporations-  artificial  beings  who  can  act  only  through  agents 
and  servants  in  their  varied  and  multitudinous  and  constantly 
recurring  business  dealings  with  the  public— can  never  be  held 
liable  in  punitive  damages  for  the  acts  of  their  servants  unless 
expressly  ratified  by  them,  no  matter  how  gross  and  outrageous 
the  wrongful  act  of  the  servant,  we  feel  perfectly  safe  in  declar- 
ing that  no  recovery  for  more  than  mere  compensatory  damages 
will  ever  again  be  awarded  against  corporations.  Corporations 
never  expressly  authorize  their  servants  to  beat  or  insult  or 
outrasre  those  having  business  relations  with  them,  and  they 
rarely  ratify  such  conduct.  Having  by  the  constitution  of  their 
being  to  act  solely  by  agents  or  servants,  they  must  as  matter 
of  sound  public  policy  be  held  liable  for  all  the  acts  of  their 
agents  and  servants  who  commit  wrongs  while  performing  the 
master's  business  and  in  the  scope  of  their  employment,  and  this 
to  the  extent  of  liability  for  punitive  damages  in  proper  eases."  a 

21  Louisville  &  N.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Bal-  ,  no  mind  but  tlie  mind  of  it>  servants; 
lard,  85  Ky.  311;  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  600;  it  has  no  voice  but  the  voice  of  its 
3  S.  W.  530,  per  Holt,  J.  ',  servants;  and   it  has  no  hands  with 

82  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Law-  which  to  act  but  the  hands  of  its  ae* 
rence,  74  Miss.  803;  22  So.  53,  per ,  vants.  All  its  schemes  of  mischief 
Woods,  C.  J.  Again  in  case  in  as  well  ;is  its  schemes  of  public  en- 
Maine  it  is  declared  that  "  a  ecu  po-  terprise  are  conceived  by  human 
ration  is  an  imaginary  being.     It  has    minds  and  executed  by  human  hands; 

149 


£141  EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 

£141.  Same  subject  -Illustrations.— Such  damages  may  be 
recovered  for  a  violation  of  duty  by  an  employee  in  the  conduct 


and  these  minds  and  liands  are  its 
servants'  minds  and  hands.  All  at- 
tempts, therefore,  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  guilt  of  the  servant  and 
the  guilt  of  the  corporation;  or  the 
malice  of  the  servant  and  the  malice 
of  the  corporation;  or  the  punish- 
ment of  the  servant  and'the  punish- 
ment of  the  corporation  is  sheer  non- 
sense, and  only  tends  to  confuse  the 
mind  and  confouud  the  judgment. 
Neither  guilt,  malice  nor  suffering  is 
predicable  of  this  ideal  existence 
called  a  corporation.  .  .  .  And  since 
these  ideal  existences  can  neither  be 
hung,  imprisoned,  whipped  or  put  in 
the  stocks,  since  in  fact  no  corrective 
influence  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
them  except  that  of  pecuniary  loss, 
it  does  seem  to  us  that  the  doctrine 
of  exemplary  damages  is  more  bene- 
ficial to  them  than  in  its  application 
to  natural  persons.  If  those  who  are 
in  the  habit  of  thinking  that  it  is  a 
terrible  hardship  to  punish  an  inno- 
cent corporation  for  the  wicked- 
ness of  its  agents  and  servants,  for  a 
moment  reflect  upon  the  absurdity 
of  their  own  thoughts,  their  anxiety 
will  be  cured.  .  .  .  There  is  but  one 
vulnerable  point  about  these  ideal 
existences  called  corporations,  and 
that  is  the  pocket  of  the  monied 
power  that  is  concealed  behind  them. 
and  if  that  is  reached  they  will 
wince."  Goddard  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  57  Me.  202;  2  Am.  Rep.  39, 
per  Walton,  J.  A  corporation  may 
be  subjected  to  exemplary  or  puni- 
tive damages  for  tortious  acts  of  its 
agents  or  servants  done  within  the 
scope  of  their  employment  in  all 
cases  where  natural  persons  acting 
for  themselves  if  guilty  of  like  tor- 
tious acts  would  be  liable  to  such 
damages.     Atlantic  &  Great  W.  Ry. 

150 


Co.  v.  Dunn,  19  Ohio  St.  162;  2  Am. 
Rep.  382.  In  this  case  the  court, 
after  asserting  the  doctrine  of  iden- 
tity of  principal  and  agent  and  de- 
claring that  it  rests  on  sound  princi- 
ples of  public  policy  and  applies  with 
peculiar  propriety  to  corporations 
"which  are  capable  of  actions  only 
through  the  medium  of  agents  and 
which  touch,  infringe  upon  and  come 
in  contact  with  individuals,  persons 
and  the  public  only  by  means  of  their 
agents  and  servants,"  puts  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  damages  to  the 
extent  of  exemplary  or  punitive 
damages  can  be  given  as  in  cases  of 
natural  persons  and  says  "  In  answer 
to  this  query,  it  is  proper  to  inquire 
what  is  the  ground  of  reason  and 
principle  on  which  exemplary  dam- 
ages are  allowable  in  any  case  ?  The 
answer  is  ready  and  clear.  Nobody 
will  dispute  it.  It  rests  not  on  the 
ground  of  abstract  or  theoretical  jus- 
tice but  on  the  ground  of  public  pol- 
icy— a  policy  which  seeks  to  pro- 
mote the  public  safety;  to  punish 
through  the  medium  of  a  civil  pro- 
ceeding a  fraudulent,  malicious,  in- 
sulting or  wilful  wrongdoer,  and  to 
hold  him  up  as  a  warning  example 
to  others  to  deter  them  from  offend- 
ing in  like  manner.  Now  why  do 
not,  the  same  considerations  of  pub- 
lic policy  apply  as  well  to  corpora- 
tions as  to  natural  pei.su us?  I  am 
unable  to  see  why  they  do  not.  Cor- 
porations, embodying  as  they  often 
do  the  concentrated  wealth  and  in- 
fluence of  many  individuals,  cer- 
tainly have  the  power  to  do  injury, 
at  least  equal  to  that  of  natural  per- 
sons; and  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
history  of  corporations  affords  no 
satisfactory  guaranty  that  they  may 
not   use    that    power    for   purposes 


KXKMl'LABY    DAMAGES. 


§  141 


of  the  train  causing  injury  to  a  passenger  when  accompanied 
by  oppression,  fraud,  malice,  insult  or  other  wilful  misconduct, 
evincing  a  reckless  disregard  of  consequences.'-0  So  they  may 
be  allowed  for  the  ejection  of  a  passenger  where  the  act  is  un- 
provoked, wilful  and  malicious  and  performed  in  a  rude  and 
aggravating  manner  with  the  intention  of  wounding  the  feel- 
ings of  the  passenger  and  of  bringing  him  into  contempt  and 
disgrace.21  And  where  a  train  is  wilfully  run  past  a  station, 
those  in  charge  refusing  to  stop  to  let  off  or  take  on  a  passenger, 
such  damages  may  be  allowed,25  and  similarly  in  case  of  such 
conduct  towards  a  passenger  on  a  boat.26     Again,  they  have  been 


inimical  to  individual  and  public  in- 
terest unless  restrained  by  conscious- 
ness of  amenability  to  effective  legal 
penalties,  .  .  .  unless  the  public, 
through  the  medium  of  our  laws, 
retain  the  means  to  exercise  an  ef- 
fective restraint  upon  any  tendency 
to  wrongdoing  to  which  they  may  be 
subject,  and  especially  in  respect  to 
the  care  or  the  want  of  it  with  which 
their  servants  may  be  selected.  It 
seems  to  me  there  is  so  much  danger 
of  the  abuse  of  power  in  this  direc- 
tion as  to  forbid  the  recognition  of 
a  distinction  between  them,  acting 
through  agents  and  individuals,  act- 
ing in  their  own  proper  persons  in 
respect  to  the  liabilities  consequent 
upon  tortious  action.  The  actual 
management  of  such  corporations  is 
apt  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  either  a 
single  individual  or  of  a  small  and 
closely  associated  number  of  indi- 
viduals; and  the  danger  is  that  such 
persons  will  be  led  by  a  spirit  of 
nepotism  or  personal  favoritism  or 
by  false  notions  of  economy  leading 
them  to  lix  the  compensation  for  the 
services  of  their  servants  at  a  rate 
inadequate  to  secure  the  services  of 
competent  and  trustworthy  men, 
to  forget  the  higher  and  paramount 
duty  due  to  the  public  in  this  par- 
ticular, unless  the  stern  but  just  and 


discriminating  hand  of  the  law  is 
kept  constantly  visible  before  them." 
Per  Brinkerhoff,  C.  J.  In  Pennsyl- 
vania it  is  said  that  "  it  seems  to 
be  settled  by  the  preponderance  of 
authority  in  this  country  that  in  ac- 
tions against  corporations  for  in- 
juries received  through  the  negli- 
gence of  their  servants,  exemplary 
damages  may  be  recovered  when  the 
injuries  are  wanton  and  malicious, 
are  indicted  in  a  gross  or  outrageous 
manner,  whether  the  act  was  per- 
viously  authorized  or  subsequently 
ratified  by  the  corporation  or  not." 
Phila.  Tract.  Co.  v.  Orbann,  119  Pa. 
St.  42.  12  Atl.  816,  per  Mr.  Justice 
Clark. 

23  Louisville  &  X.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bal- 
lard, 85  Ky.  307;  3  S.  \V.  530:  7  Am. 
St.  Hep.  GOO. 

a*  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Byan, 
90  111.  126;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.Wil- 
loeby,  134  Ind.  563;  3:1  N.  E.  627: 
Rose  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
106  X.  C.  168;  11  S.  E.  526;  Palmer 
v.  Railroad,  3S.  C  581:  16  Am.  Rep. 
750. 

25  Purcell  v.  Richmond  &  Danv.  R. 
R.  Co..  108  N.  C.  414;  12  S.  E.  '.'54; 
12  L.  R.  A.  113;  New  Orleans  J.  & 
Gt.  X.  B.  Co.  v.  Hurst.  36  Miss.  660. 

-6Heirn  v.  MeCaughan.  32  Miss.  1. 

151 


SS    142,   143  EXEMPLARS    DAMAGES. 

allowed  in  the  ease  of  gross  negligence  of  the  servants  of  a 
telegraph  company  as  to  the  delivery  of  a  telegram.*  So,  also, 
where  a  sewing-machine  was  sold,  to  be  paid  for  in  monthly  in- 
stallments, and  a  lease  was  delivered  and  accepted,  which  au- 
thorized the  seller  upon  nonpayment  of  any  installment  to  enter 
the  premises  of  the  purchaser  without  process  and  remove  the 
machine,  and  payments  were  made  to  a  certain  agent  regularly, 
and  other  agents  of  the  seller  entered  the  premises  of  the  pur- 
chaser forcibly  and  violently  in  his  absence  and  removed  the 
machine  against  the  remonstrances  of  his  wife  claiming  that  an 
installment  was  unpaid,  which  was  not  the  fact,  it  was  held 
that  though  the  machine  was  returned  the  next  day,  exemplary 
damages  might  be  allowed.28 

§  142.  Against  municipal  corporations. — While  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  be  liable  for  compensatory  damages,  yet 
it  is  a  general  rule  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  of  exemplary 
damages  against  such  a  corporation  s  in  the  absence  of  express 
statutory  authority.30  So  the  treble  damages  allowed  by  stat- 
ute in  certain  cases  are  not  recoverable  against  a  municipal 
corporation  unless  the  statute  so  provides.31 


§  143.  Evidence  as  to  motives. — Such  evidence  should  be 
submitted  to  the  jury  as  may  enable  them  to  act  intelligently 
and  justly  in  determining  the  amount  of  exemplary  damages 


27  Western  Uu.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Seed, 
115  Ala.  670;  22  S.  W.  474;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  1.  As  to  general  liability 
of  telegraph  companies  for  delay, 
error  or  negligence  in  the  transmis- 
sion and  delivery  of  telegrams,  see 
Joyce  on  Electric  Law,  sees.  800- 
A35. 

«  Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Holdfodt,  86 
111.  455;  29  Am.  Rep.  43. 

»  Mayor  v.  Lewis,  92  Ala.  352;  9 
So.  243;  Barbour  County  v.  Horn, 
48  Ala.  567;  Chicago  v.  Kelly,  69 
111.  475;  Chicago  v.  Jones,  66  111. 
349;  Ottawa  v.  Sweely,  65  111.  434; 
Chicago  v.  Langlass,  52  111.  256;  4 
Am.  Rep.  603;  Chicago  v.  Martin,  49 

152 


111.  241;  95  Am.  Dec.  590;  Toledo, 
Peoria  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  43 
111.  419;  Bennett  v.  City  of  Marion, 
102  Iowa,  425;  71  N.  W.  360;  63  Am. 
St.  Rep.  454;  Wilson  v.  Wheeling,  19 
W.  Va.  350;  42  Am.  Rep.  780.  In 
Myers  v.  San  Francisco,  42  Cal.  215, 
exemplary  damages  were  allowed  in 
such  a  case,  but  the  decision  was 
based  on  a  statutory  provision  au- 
thorizing the  allowance  of  such  dam- 
ages. 

30  Bennett  v.  City  of  Marion,  102 
Iowa,  425;  71  N.  W.  360;  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  454. 

31  Hunt  v.  Booneville,  65  Mo.  620; 
27  Am.  Rep.  299. 


EXEMPLAR  V    DAMAGES. 


§  144 


to  be  allowed.  Such  damages  rest  primarily  upon  the  motive  of 
the  defendant, K  and,  therefore,  every  fact  and  circumstance 
bearing  upon  his  motive  or  affecting  his  conduct  at  the  time  of 
the  injury,  and  all  the  circumstances  under  which  he  acted, 
should  be  laid  before  them,  and  likewise  evidence  is  admissible 
to  explain  his  motives  and  conduct.33 

§  144.  Evidence  as  to  financial  condition  of  defendant.— 

In  those  cases  where  exemplary  damages  may  be  recovered,  it  is 
proper  to  receive  evidence  as  to  the  financial  condition  of  the 
defendant.  The  plaintiff  may  introduce  evidence  showing  the 
wealth  of  the  defendant,  so  as  to  enable  the  jury  to  determine 
what  damages  shall  be  assessed  against  him  as  a  punishment,  for 
what  might  be  a  severe  and  excessive  punishment  to  a  person 
of  little  or  no  wealth,  might,  on  the  other  hand,  be  very  inade- 
quate when  awarded  against  one  whose  financial  standing  was 
high.  As  such  evidence  is  admissible  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff, 
so  likewise  the  defendant  may  show  that  he  is  poor  or  a  man 
of  little  wealth,  so  that  an  excessive  amount  may  not  be 
awarded.  **  So  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  same 
amount  of  merely  penal  damages  should  not  be  allowed  against 
a  man  who  is  poor  though  he  may  be  found  guilty,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  man  who  is  well  off.35  The  rule  that  evidence  of  the 
wealth  of  the  defendant  is  admissible,  has  been  held  applicable 
where  the  action  is  against  a  corporation,  and  in  such  a  case  it 
was  held  proper  to  inquire  :  1.  What  the  entire  paid  up  capital 
stock  of  the  company  was7  2.  What  its  liabilities  were? 
3.  What  were  its  assets  ?  4.  What  was  its  surplus  over  and 
above  liabilities  ?     5.   What  dividends  had  been  paid  to  stock- 


82  See  sees.  118-120,  herein. 

83  Day  v.  Holland,  15  Oreg.  464;  15 
Pac.  855. 

MMullin  v.  Spangenbenr,  112  111. 
140;  Farm  an  v.  Lauman,  7:>  [nd.  568; 
Sloan  v.  Edwards,  61  Md.  89;  Beck 
v.  Small,  35  Minn.  465;  29  N.  W.  69; 
McCarthy  v.  Niskern,  22  Minn.  90; 
Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Lawrence, 
74  Miss.  782;  22  So.  53;  Buckley  v. 
Knapp,  48  Mo.   152;  Johnson  v.  Al- 


len, 100  N.  C.  132;  Heneky  v.  Smith, 
10  Oreg.  349;  45  Am.  Rep.  14:}:  Mi- 
theis  v.  Mazet,  104  Pa.  St.  580;  30 
Atl.  4:54;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  109; 
Kea  v.  Harrington,  58  Vt.  181;  2 
Atl.  475;  •"«'>  Am.  Rep.  561;  Earl  v. 
Tupper,  45  Vr.  275;  Barman  v.  Cun- 
diff,  82  Va.  239;  Hare  v.  M;irsh,  61 
Wis.  435. 

«b  M  itheia  v.  tfazet,  104  Pa.  St.  580; 
30  Atl.  434;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  169. 
153 


8  14i 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


holders  for  five  years  past  and  how  they  were  paid?36  And  the 
right  of  the  defendant  to  introduce  evidence  of  his  own  poverty 
has  been  held  to  exist,  though  no  evidence  as  to  his  wealth  has 
been  introduced  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff.37 

§  145.  Amount,  matter  of  discretion  with  jury.— While  it 

may  be  stated  generally  that  exemplary  damages  should  be 
commensurate  to  the  nature  of  the  offense,  having  due  regard 
to  the  standing  of  the  parties,38  yet  it  is  a  general  rule  that  the 
amount  of  such  damages  is  a  matter  which  rests  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  jury,39  and  to  award  exemplary  damages  the  jury 
need  not  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  injury 
complained  of  was  maliciously  committed.4"  So,  also,  where 
exemplary  or  punitive  damages  are  clearly  warranted  by  the 
evidence,  it  has  been  held  that  where  the  court  cannot,  as  a 
general  rule,  say  that  the  jury  has  awarded  a  larger  sum  than 
is  reasonable,  proper  and  necessary  to  have  that  statutory  ef- 
fect intended  by  the  law  in  such  cases,41  unless  such  sum  ap- 
pear to  be  grossly  excessive,  when,  as  in  other  cases,  the  court 
may  set  aside  the  verdict.1^  While  the  question  as  to  the 
amount  of  such  damages  is  a  matter  for  the  discretion  of  the 
jury,  "yet  a  court  is  not  bound  to  turn  the  matter  over  to  them 
arbitrarily  and  without  any  suggestions  as  to  matters  which 
they  ought  to  consider  in  their  assessment  of  such  damages. 
It  may  and  indeed  ought  to  call  their  attention  to  any  matters 


86  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Law- 
rence, 74  Miss.  782;  22  So.  53. 

37  Johnson  v.  Smith,  64  Me.  553. 

38  Burke  tt  v.  Lanata,  15  La.  Ann. 
337;  Hooker  v.  Newton,  24  Wis.  292. 

3y  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Seed, 
115  Ala.  670;  22  So.  474;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  1;  Doremus  v.  Hennessy,  62  111. 
Api>.  391;  Frankforter  v.  Bryan,  12 
111.  549;  Colburu  v.  State,  47  Ind. 
310;  Root  v.  Sturdivant,  70  Iowa, 
55;  29  N.  W.  802;  Titus  v.  Corkins, 
21  Kan.  722;  Webb  v.  Gilman,  80 
Me.  177:  13  Atl.  688;  Goddard  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  57  Me.  202; 
Raynor  v.  Nims,  3  Mich.  34;  26  Am. 
Rep.  493;  Southern   R.   Co.   v.   Ken- 

154 


drick,  40  Miss.  374;  Canfield  v.  Chic. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Mo.  App. 
354;  Day  v.  Holland,  15  Oreg.  464; 
15  Pac.  855;  Kenyon  v.  Cameron,  17 
R.  I.  122;  20  Atl.  233;  Borland  v. 
Barrett,  76  Va.  128;  Habeiman  v. 
Gasser  (Wis.),  80  N.  W.  105. 

40  St.  Ores  v.  McGlashen,  74  Cal. 
148;  15  Pac.  452. 

41  Webb  v.  Gilman,  80  Me.  177; 
13  Atl.  688;  Goddard  v.  Grand  Trunk 
Ry.  Co.,  57  Me.  202. 

«  Cutler  v.  Smith,  57  111.  252;  Col- 
lins v.  Council  Bluffs,  35  Iowa,  432; 
Burkett  v.  Lanata,  15  La.  Ann.  337; 
McCarthy  v.  Niskern,  22  Minn.  90; 
Rogers  v.  Henry,  32  Wis.  328. 


EXEMPLARY    DAMAGES. 


§140 


which  will  tend  to  prevent  any  mere  arbitrary  and  thoughtless 
award,  and  to  make  the  assessmenl  fair  and  reasonable  consid- 
ering all  the  circumstances  of  the  case."  1!  And,  generally,  the 
court  should  in  those  cases,  where  the  question  of  exemplary 
damages  is  involved,  state  the  rule  in  reference  thereto  to  the 
jury,  together  with  such  restrictions  and  limitations  as  arc  ap- 
plicable.44 And  where,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  no  evi- 
dence to  justify  the  assessment  of  exemplary  damages,  the  trial 
court  may  so  instruct  the  jury.43  Again,  while  the  amount  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  jury  in  its  discretion,  it  is,  however,  sub- 
ject to  this  restriction,  that  its  verdict  should  not  exceed  the 
sum  claimed  as  damages  by  the  plaintiff.46 


§  146.  Instructions  as  to  exemplary  damages. — An  erro- 
neous instruction  as  to  exemplary  damages  will  not  be  a  ground 
for  disturbing  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  where  it  clearly  ap- 
pears that  only  compensatory  damages  were  awarded,47  nor  can 
the  refusal  of  an  instruction  as  to  such  damages  be  complained 
of  where  the  jury  find  that  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover  at 
all,  and  there  is  consequently  no  ground  for  an  award  of  exem- 
plary damages.48  And  where  no  claim  is  made  for  punitive 
damages,  an  instruction  is  harmless  to  defendant  which  merely 
limits  the  recovery  to  compensatory  damages,  though  it  omits 
to  expressly  state  that  the  jury  are  not  to  give  anything  by  way 
of  vindictive  damages.49  But  where  a  charge  improperly  per- 
mits the  recovery  of  such  damages,  and  it  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  jury  allowed  such  damages  in  its  verdict  or 
not,  a  judgment  for  plaintiff  may  be  reversed.'^ 


"Titus  v.  Corkins,  21  Kan.  722, 
per  Brewer,  J. 

«  Kutner  v.  Fargo,  '20  Misc.  |  N.  Y. ) 
207;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  To;}.  See  also 
llaberinan  v.  Gasser  (Wis.),  80  N. 
W.  10.-). 

*&  Bullock  v.  Del.  L.  &  \V.  R.  Co., 
f.l  N.  J.  L.  550;  40  Atl.  050;  11  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  837;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  419. 

46  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier, 
93  Ala.  45;  9  So.  303;  30  Am.  St. 
Rep.  28. 


«  Siegle  v.  Rush.  173  111.  559;  50 
N.  E.  1008.  aff'g  72  111.  A  pp.  485; 
Wright  v.  Donnell,  34  Tex.  291; 
Fitzpatrick  v.   Blocker,  23  Tex.  552. 

48  Jones  v.  cooper,  97  Iowa.  735; 
«5  N.  W.  1000;  EricksoD  v.  Pome- 
rank,  66  Minn.  376;  69  N.  W.  39. 

■"  Norton  v.  Third  Ave.  I:  Co.,  26 
App.  Div.  (X.  V.)  r,<i;  49  V  V.  Supp. 
898. 

60  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Wind- 
ham, 120  Ala.  231;  24  So.  843. 

155 


§  147      NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 

152. 
153. 

154. 

155. 

156. 
157. 

158. 


159. 
160. 

161. 

162. 


163. 


164. 


Generally. 

Negligence  defined. 

Ordinary  care. 

Presumption  of  negligence. 

Burden  of  proof  —  Negli- 
gence. 

Negligence — For  jury. 

"  Inevitable  accident " — "  Act 
of  God." 

"  Inevitable  accident" — "  Un- 
avoidable accident." 

Inevitable  or  unavoidable  ac- 
cident— Illustrations. 

Avoidable  accident. 

Avoidable  accident — Illustra- 
tions. 

Duty  to  use  ordinary  care  to 
avoid  consequences  of  an- 
other's negligence. 

Gross  negligence. 

Wilful  injury — Wanton  negli- 
gence. 

Contributory  negligence — De- 
fense to  action. 

Contributory  negligence  as 
defense  not  affected  by  sta- 
tute, giving  right  of  action 
for  death. 

Negligence — Open  and  visible 
defects — Contributory  neg- 
ligence. 

Wilful  injury — Contributory 
negligence  no  defense. 


165.  Contributory      negligence  — 

Burden  of  proof. 

166.  Contributory      negligence  — 

Burden  of  proof  —  Con- 
tinued. 

167.  Contributory      negligence  — 

Burden  of  proof — Conclu- 
sion. 

168.  Doctrine  of  comparative  negli- 

gence. 

169.  Error   of    judgment — Sudden 

emergency  —  Contributory 
negligence. 

170.  Error   of   judgment — Sudden 

emergency — Negligence. 

171.  Contributory      negligence  — 

Stop,  look  and  listen. 

172.  Imputed  negligence. 

173.  Imputed      negligence — Cases 

generally. 

174.  Imputed     negligence  —  Hus- 

band and  wife. 

175.  Contributory    negligence     of 

parent  as  affecting  recovery 
for  injury  to  child — Recov- 
ery by  parent. 

176.  Contributory    negligence     of 

parent  as  affecting  recovery 
for  injury  to  child — Recov- 
ery by  child. 

177.  Contributory      negligence  — 

Degree  of  care  required  of 
children. 


§  147.  Generally. — It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  authors  in 

this  work  to  enter  into  a  detailed  discussion  or  consideration  of 

the  principles  of  law  governing  in  all  cases  of  negligence  and 

of  contributory  negligence.     Damages  and  the  measure  of  dam- 

156 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE,     g    1  18 

ages,  however,  are  in  such  a  vast  number  of  cases  so  closely 
allied  to  or  dependent  upon  the  questions  of  negligence  or  of 
contributory  negligence,  that  a  presentation  of  the  general  rules 
of  law  in  such  cases  is  here  given,  together  with  a  brief  discus- 
sion of  the  general  duties  imposed  in  certain  relations  and  of 
the  degree  of  care  required  of  persons  under  certain  conditions. 

§  148.  Negligence  defined. — The  word  "negligence"  has  been 
declared  to  be  "a  word  of  very  undefined  signification."'  In 
the  many  cases  which  have  arisen  numerous  definitions  of  it 
have  been  given  by  the  courts.'  Thus  it  has  been  declared  to 
be  the  omission  to  do  something  which  a  reasonable  man,  guided 
by  those  considerations  which  ordinarily  regulate  the  conduct 
of  human  affairs,  would  do,  or  doing  something  which  a  reason- 
able and  prudent  man  would  not  do.:!  And  again,  it  is  de- 
clared to  be  the  omission  to  do  something  that  a  reasonable  man 
would  do,  or  the  doing  something  that  a  reasonable  man  would 
not  do — not  intentionally ; 4  the  absence  of  due  care  under  the 
circumstances  ; 5  a  want  of  that  degree  of  care  which  an  ordi- 
narily prudent  man  would  have  exercised  under  the  circum- 
stances ;6  the  want  of  care  and  diligence:7  the  want  of  ordinary 
care  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty  ; s  a  failure  to  exercise  that  de- 
gree of  care  which  ordinarily  prudent  persons  would  exercise 
under  the  same  circumstances ; 9  the  doing  of  an  act,  or  the 
omission  to  act,  which  results  in  damage;1"  the  failure  to  do 
what  a  reasonable  and  prudent  person  would  ordinarily  have 
done  under  the  circumstances  of  the  situation,  or  doing  what 
such  a  person  under  the  existing  circumstances  would  not  have 


iSubmariue  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Dickson, 
15  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  759:  10  Jur.  X.  S. 
211;  Allen's  Teleg.  ('as.  229,  247. 

2 See  cases  cited  in  Joyce  on  Elec- 
tric Law,  sec.  734. 

BMcGraw  v.  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  (Neb.  1809),  81  N.  W.  306. 

4  Blyth  v.  Birmingham  Water  Co., 
11  Exch.  781,  per  Alderson,  B. 

5Patton  v.  Southern  K.  Co.  (U.  S. 
('.  C.  App.  4th  C.  ),  42  V.  S.  App. 
5(57:  27  C.   C.  App.  287:  82   Fed.  979. 


,J  Galveston.  II.  &  S.  A.  K.  Co.  v. 
Simon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W. 
309. 

7  Hodgson  v.  Dexter,  1  (  ranch 
(U.  S.  C  C),  111. 

b  Murphy  v.  City  of  Dayton,  8 Ohio 
S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  354. 

9Greef  v.  Brown,  7  Kan.  a.pp.  394; 
51  Pac.  926. 

10  Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers,  110  Ala. 
331;  20  So.  346. 

157 


S   149     NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

done  ;  u  the  doing  of  some  act  which  a  cautious  and  prudent 
man  would  not  do,  or  the  neglecting  to  do  some  act  which  a  cau- 
tious and  prudent  man  would  not  neglect,  assuming  that  he 
was  acting  in  his  own  interest  or  affairs ; 12  a  failure  to  exercise 
such  care  as  an  ordinary  prudent  man  would  exercise  under 
similar  circumstances;13  and  such  an  omission  by  a  responsible 
person,  to  use  that  degree  of  care,  diligence  and  skill  which  it 
was  his  legal  duty  to  use  for  the  protection  of  another  person 
from  injury  as  in  a  natural  and  continuous  sequence  causes  un- 
intended damage  to  the  latter.14  It  will  be  observed  that  in  many 
of  these  definitions  the  terms  "  ordinary  care  "  and  "  ordinary 
prudent  man"  are  used.  No  inflexible  rule  as  to  the  exact  de- 
gree of  care  to  be  used  can  be  framed  so  as  to  apply  in  all  cases 
in  the  determination  of  whether  negligence  exists  or  not.  The 
degree  of  care  which  a  person  should  exercise  will  vary  accord- 
ing to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case.1"'  So  negli- 
gence may  only  be  denned  as  the  omission  to  do  an  act  which 
an  ordinary  prudent  man  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  would 
do,  or  the  doing  of  an  act  which  an  ordinary  prudent  man  in  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care  would  not  do.16 

§  149.  Ordinary  care.— The  term  "ordinary  care"  is  a  rela- 
tive one,  depending  upon  the  circumstances  of  time,  place  and 
person.     The  terms  "  ordinary  care,"  "  reasonable  prudence,"  and 


"  Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones,  95  U.  S. 
442. 

12Ahern  v.  Oregon  Telepli.  Co.,  24 
Oreg.  276;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  361. 

13  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cody 
(U.  S.  S.  C.  1897),  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
763. 

14  Shearman  &  Redfield  on  Neg. 
(5th  ed.)  sec.  3. 

is  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cody 
(U.  S.  S.  C.  1897),  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
763;  Richardson  v.   Kier,  34  Cal.  63. 

>«  See  Hunter  v.  Kansas  City  &  M. 
R.  &  Bridge  Co.  (C.  C.  App.  6th  C), 
54  U.  S.  App.  653;  29  C.  C.  A.  206; 
85  Fed.  379;  Rosen  v.  Chicago  G.  W. 
R.  Co.  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  49  IT.  S. 
App.  647;  83  Fed.  300;  27,  C.  C.  A. 
158 


534;  Grant  v.  Mosely,  29  Ala.  302; 
Bizzell  v.  Booker,  16  Ark.  308;  Rich- 
ardson v.  Kier,  34  Cal.  63;  Wabash 
R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  18  Ind.  App.  549; 
48  N.  E.  663:  Webster  v.  Symes,  109 
Mich.  1;  66  N.  W.  580;  2  Oet.  L.  N. 
982;  Geist  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
(Neb.  1901),  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  414, 
424,  and  cases  cited;  Mowrey  v.  Cen- 
tral City  Ry.  Co.,  66  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
43;  S.  C,  51  N.  Y.  666;  Pakalinsky  v. 
New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  424;  Woolley  v.  Grand  Street 
&  Newton  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Barb.  (N.  Y. ) 
121.  See  also  Milligan  v.  Tex.  &  N. 
O.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1902),  66 
S.  W.  896. 


NEGLIGENCE   AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.      5    L50 

similar  terms  have  a  relative  signficance  and  are  dependent  upon 
the  special  circumstances  and  surroundings  of  the  particular 
case.17  It  may  be  defined  generally  as  such  care  as  ordinarily 
prudent  men,  under  similar  circumstances,  would  exercise. 1S 
And  where  such  car.-  has  been  exercised,  though  an  injury  may 
result  to  another,  negligence  cannot  be  said  to  exist.  So  where 
a  person  performs  a  lawful  act  in  a  lawful  manner  and  without 
any  carelessness  on  his  part,  he  is  not  responsible  to  another  for 
an  injury  resulting  therefrom/'  since  no  man  is  an  insurer 
that  acts  which  are  lawful  and  done  by  him  with  care,  shall  not 
injuriously  affect  others.90  But  acts  which  are  lawful  in  them- 
selves may  be  done  in  such  a  careless  or  negligent  manner  as  to 
render  the  doer  of  such  acts  liable  to  a  third  person  in  damages 
for  an  injury  caused  thereby.'1  And  where  absence  of  ordinary 
care  has  been  shown,  evidence  that  the  person  was  a  careful, 
prudent  and  cautious  man  is  not  admissible  to  negative  his  want 
of  such  care." 


§  150.  Presumption    of    negligence.— As  a    general    rule 
negligence  will  not  be  presumed  from  the  mere  happening  of 


17  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144 
U.  S.  108;  1  Russell  &  Winslow's  Syl- 
labus Digest,  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
1587,  and  cases  there  cited. 

18  Asbury  v.  Charlotte  Electric  Ry. 
L.  &  P.  Co.  (X.  C.  1809),  34  S.  E. 
654;  Houston  &  T.  C.  It.  Co.  v.  Sgal- 
inski.  10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  107:  46 
S.  W.  113;  Olwell  v.  Milwaukee 
Street  R.  Co.,  92  Wis.  330;  GO  N.  W. 
362;  .luyce  on  Electric  Law,  sec.  571. 
"  Ordiuary  care  is  the  care  ordinarily 
exercised  by  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind or  its  type  the  ordinarily  pru- 
dent person  under  the  same  or 
similar  circumstances."  Yerkes  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Wis.  1001).  88 
X.  W.  33,  36,  per  Dodge,  J. :  Tully  v. 
Phila.  W.  ct  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Del.  1901), 
50  Atl.  95,  96.  "  The  expressions, 
•great  care,1  'due  and  reasonable 
care,'  '  ordinary  care  and  vigilance.' 
•  reasonable  and  proper  care,' '  reason- 


able degree  of  care  and  diligence,' 
'care  and  diligence  adequate  to  the 
business  which  they  undertake.' 
■  with  skill,  care  and  with  attention," 
'a  high  degree  of  responsibility,1 
said  to  be  various  forms  of  express- 
ing what  is  known  as  ordinary  care." 
Joyce  on  Electric  Law,  sec.  17n,  cit- 
ing Fowler  v.  Western  I'nion  Teleg. 
Co..  so  Me.  381  :  -2  Am.  Elec.  Cas. 
012:  Birney  v.  Wash.  Print.  Teleg. 
t'n.,  is  m,1.  341;  si  Am.  Dee.  607; 
Allen's  Teleg.  Cas.  195,  212. 

«>  Llshowski  v.  Hill,  01  N.  J.  L. 
375;  39  Atl.  904:  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
318. 

-'  Marshall  v.  Well  wood,  38  N.  .1. 
1..  339,  343,  per  Beasley,  C.  J. 

21  Seabrook  v.  Dicker.  4  bob.  (N. 
Y.    344. 

--  Tenney  v.  Tuttle,  1  Allen    M 
185. 

159 


8    150     NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

an  accident,  but  there  are  some  cases  where  an  accident  occurs 
which,  in  ordinary  course  of  things  does  not  happen  if  proper 
care  is  exercised,  and  in  such  cases  the  presumption  of  negli- 
gence arises,  the  doctrine  res  ipsa  loquitur  being  applied.23 
Thus  in  an  early  case  in  New  York,21  it  was  said  as  to  carriers  of 
passengers  that  where  it  was  shown  that  an  accident  had  occurred 
"through  some  defect  in  the  vehicle  or  other  apparatus  used  by 
the  carrier,  a  strong  presumption  of  negligence  arises,  founded 
upon  the  improbability  of  the  existence  of  any  defect  which 
extreme  vigilance,  aided  by  science  and  skill,  could  not  have  de- 
tected.'' And  where  a  seaman  who  was  employed  on  a  vessel 
from  which  ore  was  being  unloaded  by  means  of  a  crane  was 
injured  by  ore  falling  on  him  caused  by  the  breaking  or  slip- 
ping of  a  bolt  which  held  the  bucket,  it  was  said  by  the  court 
that  the  accident  "  was  of  such  a  character  as  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption of  negligence,  either  in  the  character  of  the  machinery 
used,  or  in  the  care  with  which  it  was  handled."5  So  the  pre- 
sumption of  negligence  has  been  held  to  arise  where  a  person 
walking  along  the  street  was  struck  by  a  chisel  falling  from  a 
building,  upon  which  work  was  being  done ;  *  where  under 
similar  conditions  a  person  was  struck  by  a  piece  of  wood  fall- 
ing ; r'  and  where  a  person  was  injured  by  ice  and  snow  falling 
from  a  roof.28     So,  also,  such  presumption  has  been  held  to  arise 


23  Dixon  v.  Pluns,  98  Cal.  384; 
Gannon  v.  Wilson,  69  Cal.  541:  Fair- 
banks Canning  Co.  v.  Innes,  24  111. 
App.  83,  affVl  125  111.  410;  Brent- 
ner  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  It.  Co.,  08  Iowa, 
530:  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  State, 
82  Md.  293;  Manning  v.  West  End 
Ry.  Co.,  1GG  Mass.  230:  Barnowski 
v.  Helson,  89  Midi.  52:  Wiser  v. 
Chesley,  53  Mo.  547;  Graves  v.  Tich- 
nor,  6  N.  11.587:  Suburban  Elec.  Co. 
v.  Nugent,  58  N.  J.  L.  658;  Seybold 
v.  New  York,  Lake  Erie,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
05  N.  Y.  562;  Volkmar  v.  Manhattan 
Ry.  Co..  184  X.  Y.  418:  Dunn  v.  Bal- 
lantyne,  5  App.  Div.  483:  Butler  v. 
Cusbing,  46  Hun  (X.  Y.),  521;  Earl 
v.  Cmucb,  131  X.  Y.  013:  Fields  v. 
New  York  Central  R.  Co.,  32  N.  Y. 
160 


346;  Pixley  v.  Clark,  35  N.  Y.  520: 
Mullen  v.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567; 
Haynes  v.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  114  N.  C. 
203:  Graham  v.  Davis,  4  Ohio  St.  363; 
Shafer  v.  Lacock,  168  Pa.  497;  Snyder 
v.  Wheeling  Electrical  Co.,  43  W. 
Va.  661:  28  S.  E.  733;  39  L.  R. 
A.  499:  Scott  v.  London  Dry  Docks 
Co.,  3  Hurlst.  &  C.  596;  Briggs  v. 
Oliver,  4  Hurlst.  &  C.  403. 

24  Curtis  v.  Rochester,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
18  N.  Y^.  534. 

25  Cummings  v.  National  Furnace 
Co.,  60  Wis.  601. 

J,;  Cahalin  v.  Cochran,  1  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  583:  Dixon  v.  Pluns,  98  Cal.  384. 

27  Clare  v.  National   City  Bank,    1 
Sw.  (N.  Y. )  539. 

28  Shepard  v.  Creamer,  160  Mass.  496. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTEIBUTOBY    NEGLIGENCE.      §    L51 


in  the  case  of  a  building  falling;"  of  walls  falling;"  where 
switch  tracks  were  in  disrepair  as  a  result  of  which  an  employee 
was  injured  ;:!1  where  goods  were  broken  while  in  the  possession 
of  a  carrier  ; :si  where  a  bolt  from  an  elevated  railway  fell  into 
the  street  j33  where  dangerous  structures  are  erected  in  the 
streets  or  in  public  places,  as  a  result  of  which  injury  ensues  ;  ;| 
where  a  person  is  injured  by  the  fall  of  an  elevator; :r'  or  of  a 
scaffold  ;*  by  the  upsetting  of  a  stage  coach,'7  and  when-  injury 
is  caused  by  rocks  falling  upon  adjoining  land  as  a  result  of 
blasting.'' 

§  151.  Burden  of  proof— Negligence.— We  have  stated  in 
the  preceding  section  that  under  certain  conditions  negligence 
will  be  presumed.  This,  however,  is  an  exception  to  the  gen- 
eral rule,  which  is  that  where  a  person  has  received  some  injury 
which  he  claims  is  the  result  of  negligence  upon  the  part  of 
another,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him  to  establish  such  negli- 
gence.*    So  where  it  was  claimed  that  death  was  due  to  the  in- 


*  Giles  v.  Diamond,  etc.,  Co. 
I  Del.),  0  Cent.  684. 

*>  Mulleu  v.  St.  John,  57  N".  Y. 
567  :  Vincent  v.  Cook,  4  Hun  ( N.  Y. ), 
S18. 

a  Ind.  B.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonehart 
(Ind.),  13  West.  425. 

32  Ketchum  v.  Merchants  Union 
Transf.  Co.,  52  Mo.  390. 

:«  Volkmar  v.  Manhattan  H.  Co., 
134  X.  V.  41S.  Sec  also  Brooks  v. 
Kings  Co.  El.  R.  Co.,  4  Misc.  288, 
aff'd  144  N.  Y.  647. 

34  Dunn  v.  Ballantyne,  5  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  483;  Earl  v.  Crouch,  131 
N.  Y.  613. 

88  Fairbanks  Canning  Co.  v.  Innes. 
24  III.  App.  33,  aff'd  125  111.  410; 
Moran  v.  Racine  Wagon  Co.,  74  linn 
(N.  Y.  ),  454:  26  N.  Y.  Super.  852. 

36  Flynn  v.  Gallagher,  52  N.  Y. 
Super.  524. 

37  Stokes  v.  Salstontall,  13  Peters 
(U.  S.),  181;  7  Am.  Neg.  Cas.  297. 

33  Hay  v.  The  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 
159. 

11 


39  Dolby  v.  Hearn,  1  Mai  v.  (Del.) 
153;  37  Atl.  45;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R. 
Co.  v.  Chancellor,  165  HI.  43S:  40 
N.  E.  269,  rev'g  60  111.  App.  525:  Illi- 
nois, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  111. 
177:  Ziech  v.  Hebard.  67  111.  App. 
97;  State,  Brady  v.  Consolidated  Gas 
Co.,  85  Md.  637:  Brown  v.  Congress 
St.  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  153:  Deserant  v. 
Cerillos  Coal  R.  R.  Co.  i  New  Mexico, 
1898),  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  2U6:  Mc- 
Mahon  v.  New  York  Elev.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  J.  &  S.  (N.  V.  )  507;  Deyo  v.  New 
York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  34  V.  V.  9; 
Lamb  v.  Camden  A-  A.mboy  R.  K.  Co., 
16  X.  V.  271:  Painton  v.  New  York 
Central  Ry.  Co.,  83  X.  Y.  7:  Allen  v. 
State  Steamship  Co.,  132  X.  Y.  91; 
3,0  X.  E.  482;  Caldwell  v.  New  Jersey 
Steamboat  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  282,  aff'g56 
Barb.  425;  Coley  v.  Statesville,  1 J 1 
N.  C.  30;  28  S.  E.  182;  <  'arson  v. 
Bromley,  184  Pa.  549;  39  Atl.  1115: 
Jenkins  v.  McCarthy,  45  S.  C,  278:  22 
S.  E.883;  Montreal  Rolling  Mills  Co. 
v.  Corcoran,  26  <  an.  S.  C.  595;  Bi  idges 

161 


§  152  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

haling  of  gas  which  the  gas  company  negligently  allowed  to 
escape  from  its  pipes,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  must  estab- 
lish negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant.'"  And  where  a 
widow  was  suing  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  it  was  held  that 
tlir  burden  of  proof  was  upon  her  to  establish  negligence  either 
by  direct  evidence  or  by  weight}-,  consistent  and  precise  pre- 
sumptions arising  from  the  facts  proved.41  And  again,  where  a 
person  died  while  in  prison  and  it  was  alleged  that  his  death 
\\as  due  to  the  improper  condition  of  the  prison,  it  was  held  in 
an  action  against  the  town  to  recover  damages,  that  the  burden 
of  proof  was  on  the  testatrix  to  show  that  the  defendant  had 
neglected  its  duty  as  to  such  prison.42  So,  also,  in  an  action  to 
recover  damages  for  injuries  to  a  cellar  due  to  alleged  percola- 
tion from  defendant's  stable,  it  was  held  that  the  burden  of 
proof  was  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  negligence.13  And  in  another  case  where  a  person 
had  met  his  death  by  falling  over  the  railing  of  a  stairway  of 
an  elevated  railway  station,  it  was  held  that  the  complaint  had 
been  properly  dismissed,  there  being  no  evidence  showing  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  defendant.44  Circumstantial  evidence 
may  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  negligence  on 
the  part  of  a  defendant,  but  it  must  be  such  evidence  as  will 
lead  directly  to  the  conclusion  that  the  negligence  complained 
of  was  attributable  to  some  act  of  commission  or  omission  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant.45 

§  152.  Negligence— For  jury — Where  from  the  facts  in  a 
case  all  reasonable  men  must  necessarily  draw  the  same  con- 
clusion, the  question  of  negligence  may  then  be  said  to  be  one 
of  law  for  the  court,  but  where  the  facts  are  such  that  reason- 
able men  may  fairly  differ  upon  the  question  whether  there  has 
been  negligence  or  not,  the  determination  of  such  question  is  for 


v.  North  London  R.  Co.,  L.   R.  6  Q. 
B.  377;  7  H.  L.  232. 

40  State-Brady  v.  Consolidated  Gas 
Co.,  85  Md.  637;  37  Atl.  263. 

41  Montreal    Rolling   Mills   Co.    v. 
Corcoran,  26  S.  C.  595. 

42  Coley  v.  Statesville,  121  N.  C.  301 ; 
28  S.  E.  482. 

162 


43  Carson  v.  Bromley,  184  Pa.  549; 
39  Atl.  1115. 

44  McMahon  v.  New  York  Elev.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  507. 

45  Robbins  v.  Mount,  4  Rob.  (N.  Y. ) 
553;  S.  C,  33  How.  Pr.  24;  Fagan  v. 
Thomas,  6  J.  &  S.  133. 


NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  £  152 

the  jury."''  In  order,  however,  to  authorize  the  court  to  with- 
draw from  the  jury  the  decision  of  the  question  of  negligence, 
it  is  said  that  the  facts  must  not  only  be  undisputed,  but  there 
must  also  be  only  one  set  of  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  the 
facts,  and  that  such  inferences  must  lead  to  only  one  conclu- 
sion.17 Where  negligence  is  alleged,  a  mere  scintilla  of  evi- 
dence in  support  of  the  allegation  is  not  sufficient  for  the  sub- 
mission of  such  question  to  the  jury.*  If,  however,  there  is 
some  evidence,  though  slight  and  such  as  may  cause  reasonable 
men  to  differ  as  to  the  question  of  negligence,  then  it  is  for  the 
jury  to  determine  whether  there  was  negligence  or  not.49  So 
where  from  the  evidence  an  inference  might  be  drawn  either 


4«  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives, 
144  U.  S.  408;  1  Russell  &  Wins- 
low's  Syllabus  Digest  ;  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  1581) ;  Mynning  v.  Detroit,  etc., 
R.  Co..  59  Mich.  257  :  26  X.  W. 
514  ;  Newark,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Block, 
55  N.  J.  605  ;  27  Atl.  1067  ;  Ilowett 
v.  I'enn.,  etc.,  It.  Co.,  166  Pa.  St.  607  ; 
SI  Atl.  306.  See  the  following'  cases 
where  question  of  negligence  was  left 
to  the  jury:  Louisville,  etc.,  It.  Co. 
v.  Woods,  105  Ala.  561  ;  17  So.  41  ; 
Hayes  v.  Williams,  17  Colo.  465  ;  :',(> 
Pac.  352  ;  Fiske  v.  Forsythe,  etc., 
Bleaching  Co.,  57  Conn.  118  ;  17  Atl. 
356  ;  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  Iud.  228  ; 
Wise  v.  Covington,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  91 
Ky.  537  :  16  S.  W.  351  ;  Balhoff  v. 
Michigan  C.  R.  Co.,  106  Mich.  606  ; 
65  N.  W.  592  :  2  Det.  L.  N.  723  : 
28  Chic.  L.  N.  166  :  Callahan  v. 
Warne,  40  Mo.  131  ;  Chicago  B.,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Oleson,  40  Neb.  889  :  59  V 
W.  354;  Coinben  v.  Belleville  Stone 
Co.,  59  N.  J.  L.  (30  Vroom)  226  :  36 
Atl.  473  :  O'Harrav.  New  York  Cen. 
&  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.),  56, 
aff'd  153  N.  Y.  690;  McGovern 
v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  11  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  588  ;  S.  C,  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 
595  ;  Dwyer  v.  Buffalo  General  Elec. 
Co.,  20  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  124  ;  46  N. 
Y.  Supp.  874  ;  Wallace  v.  Third  Ave. 


R.  R.  Co.  (S.  C.  X.  V  App.  Div. 
1899),  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  215  ;  Hurley 
v.  New  York  &  B.  Brew.  Co..  13 
App.  Div.  i  X.  V.i  167  ;  43  X.  V. 
Supp.  259  ;  Smith  v.  Metropolitan 
Street  R.  Co.,  7  App.  Div.  (X.  V.  | 
253  ;  74  X.  Y.  St.  R.  706;  40  X. 
Y.  Supp.  14S  :  Ellerbee  v.  Carolina 
C.  R.  Co.,  lis  X.  C.  1024  :  24  S.  E. 
808  ;  Call  v.  Eastou  Transit  Co.,  180 
Pa.  618;  37  Atl.  89  ;  Washington  v. 
Missouri,  K.&T.  R.  Co.,  90  Tex.  314  ; 
38  S.  W.  764,  rev'g  36  S.  W.  778. 

47  Eastwood  v.  Retsoff  Mining  Co., 
86  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  91,  aff'd  152  X.  Y. 
651. 

48  Powers  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Hun  (N.  Y.),  1'.'  :  38 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  558  :  11  X.  Y.  Supp.  408  : 
128  X.  Y.  659.  See  also  Dwight  v. 
(iermania  Life  Ins.  Co.,  103  X.  Y. 311: 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Hoist,  110  Pa. 
St.  226:  1  Atl.  217:  Casey  v.  New 
York  Central  R.  R.  Co..  25  Wkly. 
Dig.  56S  :  Murray  v.  Forty-Second 
Street  M.  &  St.  X.  R.  Co.,  9  App. 
Div.  i  X.  Y.  i  610  :  41  X.  Y.  Supp.  G20. 

*9  Cumberland,  etc.,  Iron  Co.  v. 
Scally,  27  Md.  589  :  Erickson  v. 
Twenty-Third  St.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun 
iN.  Y.),  108  :  24  \.  Y.  Supp.  003  : 
Painton  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co., 
83  N.  Y.  7. 

163 


§  153     NEGLIGENCE   AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

that  the  muster  did  not  exercise  the  proper  degree  of  care  as  to 
machinery,  appliances,  and  place  to  work  in  for  his  servant,  or 
that  the  servant's  death  was  due  to  a  failure  on  his  part  to  ex- 
ercise ordinary  care,  or  that  it  was  the  result  of  obvious  danger 
or  risk,  it  was  held  that  the  question  was  one  for  the  jury.50 
And  again,  where  from  the  facts  of  the  case  it  was  doubtful 
whether  the  death  of  a  driver  was  due  to  contributory  negli- 
gence on  his  part,  or  to  negligence  of  the  gripman,  the  question 
was  held  to  be  one  for  the  jury.51  But  where  in  answer  to  the 
defense  of  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  plaintiff's  in- 
testate, it  was  claimed  that  the  defendant  could  have  avoided 
the  injury  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  it 
was  held  that  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  injury  could 
have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  after  such 
contributory  negligence  had  intervened,  such  issue  should  not 
be  submitted  to  the  jury.52 

§  153.  "  Inevitable  accident  "— "  Act  of  God."  —Accidents 
are  generally  classified  as  (1)  those  which  are  the  "act  of  God," 
(  2  >  as  "  inevitable,"  and  (3)  as  "  avoidable."  The  terms  "  act 
of  God"  and  "inevitable  accident"  are  frequently  used  as 
equivalent  expressions.  There  is,  however,  in  the  majority  of 
the  cases,  a  distinction  made,  the  term  "  inevitable  accident  " 
being  considered  as  of  a  broader  meaning  than  the  term  the 
"  act  of  God."  So  it  has  been  said  that  "  every  '  act  of 
God  '  is  an  '  inevitable  accident '  because  no  human  agency  can 
resist  it ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  every  inevitable  accident 
is  an  act  of  God.  Damage  done  by  lightning  is  an  inevitable 
accident  and  also  an  act  of  God,  but  the  collision  of  two  vessels 
in  the  dark  is  an  inevitable  accident  and  not  an  act  of  God."  ■ 
"  Act  of  God  "  may  be  said  as  a  general  rule  to  denote  such  acci- 
dents as  arise  from  natural  causes  and  are  not  due  to  and  cannot 
be  avoided  by  human  agency.  In  those  cases  where  loss  or 
injury  is  due  to  the  act  of  God,  damages  therefor  cannot  be 


50  Comben  v.  Belleville  Stone  Co., 
59  N.  J.  L.  (30  Vroom)  226;  36  Atl. 
473. 

51  Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.,  7  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  253  :  74  N. 
Y.  St.  K.  706  :  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  148. 

164 


52  Ellerbee  v.  Carolina  C.  R.  Co., 
118  N.  C.  1024  ;  24  S.  E.  808. 

53  Anderson's  Diet,  of  L.,  citing  Fer- 
guson v.  Brent,  12  Md.  33,  La  Grand, 
C.  J.  See  also  The  Charlotte,  9  Ben. 
6-16;  cases,  10  id.  310,  312,  320. 


NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  §  1">:>. 

recovered.  In  such  cases  the  act  of  God  must  be  the  sole 
and  immediate  cause  of  the  injury.  If,  however,  there  be  any 
human  intervention  which  operates  to  produce  the  injury,  then 
it  cannot  be  said,  in  a  legal  sense,  to  be  an  act  of  God.™  So 
where  a  vessel  was  sunk  by  running  upon  the  mast  of  a  sloop 
which  had  been  sunk  by  a  squall  but  was  visible,  it  was  held 
not  to  be  a  loss  occasioned  by  the  act  of  God.35  Hut  damages 
due  to  storms  of  unusual  violence  ;  M  to  extraordinary  Hoods  ;  " 
or  snowstorms  ;*  or  to  sudden  freezing  VJ  are  within  the  clause. 
"act  of  God."'50  That  a  loss  or  damage  is  due  to  the  act  of 
God  is  frequently  set  up  by  carriers  in  defense  to  an  action 
against  them  for  damages  where  goods  entrusted  to  them  for 
transportation  have  been  lost  or  injured.  It  is  not  sufficient, 
however,  as  a  defense  in  such  cases  unless  it  appear  that  the 
goods  were  not  by  any  act  of  commission  or  omission  negligently 
exposed  by  the  carrier  to  the  danger  of  loss  by  such  act  of  God," 
for  if  it  appear  that  the  carrier's  negligence  contributed  to  the 
loss,  he  may  then  be  liable  for  the  damages  to  the  goods  though 


54  Michaels  v.  New  York  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  0(54:  Merritt  v. 
Earle,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  38,  aff'd  29 
X.  Y.  117;  Mc Arthur  v.  Sears,  '21 
Wend.  (X.  Y.)  190;  King  v.  Shep- 
herd, 3  Story,  349. 

65  Merritt  v.  Earle,  29  N.  Y.  117. 

MNichols  v.  Marslaud,  L.  R.  10 
Ex.  255;  Compton  v.  Long  Island  R. 
R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  St.  R.  554. 

i:  Morris  v.  Savannah,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
23  Fla.  182:  Withers  v.  North  Kent. 
R.  Co.,  3  Hurlst.  &  X.  969;  Morrison 
v.  Davis,  20  Pa.  St.  171. 

is  Pruitt  v.  Hannibal,  etc..  R.  <'o.. 
62  Mo.  527. 

«»Lowe  v.  Moss,  12  111.  477:  West 
v.  Steamboat  Berlin,  3  Iown,  532; 
Worth  v.  Edmonds,  52  Barb,  i  N.  Y.) 
40;  Missouri  Pac.  By.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 72  Tex.  it.');  10  S.  W.  325. 

60  See  also  the  following  eases  for 
construction  of  the  phrase,  "  Act  of 
God:"  Smith  v.  Western  R.  Co.  of 
Ala.,  91  Ala.  455;  Williams  v.  Grant, 


1  Conn.  487:  Central  B.,  etc..  Co.  v. 
Cent,  87  Ga.  402;  13  S.  E.  502;  Lowe 
v.  Moss,  12  111.  477;  Plaisted  v.  B.  & 
K.  Steam  Xav.  Co.,  27  Me.  132;  Pied- 
mont, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  McKcn/.ie,  *  75 
Md.  458:  24  Atl.  157:  Wendell  v. 
Pratt,  12  Allen  (Mass.),  464:  Harris 
v.  Rand,  4  N".  H.  259:  Morris  Canal 
Co.  v.  Byerson,  27  N.  J.  L.  457:  Read 
v.  Spaulding,  5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  395, 
aff'd  30  N.  Y.  (530:  Parsons  v.  Hardy, 
14  Wend.  (N.  Y. )  215;  Price  v.  Harts- 
horn, 44  Barb.  (X.  Y. )  055,  aff'd  44  X. 
Y.  94;  4  Am.  Rep.  645:  Slater  v. 
South  Carolina  B.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  96; 
McCall  v.  Brock,  5  Strobh.  (S.  C.) 
119;  Friend  v.  Woods,  6  Gratt.  i  Ya.  i 
189. 

61  Crosby  v.  Fitch,  12  Conn.  410: 
Bead  v.  Spaulding,  5  Bosw.  I  N.  V.  i 
395,  aff'd  30  X.  Y.  630;  Bostwick  v. 
Bait.  &  Ohio  B.  B.  Co.,  45  X.  Y.  712. 
rev'g  55  Barb.  137:  Klauber  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  21  Wis  21. 

165 


S§  154,  155    NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTOR*   N  KGLIGENCE. 

the  act  of  God  was  the  immediate  cause  thereof/'-  The  burden 
of  proof  is,  however,  upon  a  carrier,  claiming  that  goods  in  his 
care  have  been  injured  by  such  accident,  to  show  that  no  act  or 
neglect  of  his  contributed  to  the  injury.63 

§  154.  "Inevitable  accident  "— "  Unavoidable  accident." 

The  terms  "inevitable  accident"  and  "unavoidable  acci- 
dent "  appear  to  be  used  by  the  courts  generally  as  equivalent 
expressions,'51  and  may  be  defined  as  such  accidents  as  arise  un- 
expectedly from  some  unknown  source,  or  from  some  known 
source,  and  which  cannot  be  avoided  by  a  person  exercising  the 
requisite  degree  of  care  and  skill  in  the  premises,  and  in  such 
cases,  as  a  general  rule,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  any  injury 
sustained.05 

§  155.  Inevitable  or  unavoidable  accident— Illustrations. 

Where  a  horse  becomes  unmanageable  without  any  fault  on 

the  part  of  the  driver,  and  as  a  result  thereof  a  child  is  run 
over  and  injured,  the  driver  is  not  liable  therefor.66     Nor  is  a  street 


02Heylv.  Inman  Steamship  Co.,  14 
Hun  (N.  Y. ),  564.  See  also  cases  cited 
in  preceding  note  and  throughout 
this  section. 

63 Michaels  v.  New  York  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  564;  Read  v. 
Spaulding,  30  N.  Y.  630;  Wing  v. 
New  York  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Hilt. 
(N.  Y.)  235. 

1)4  Mr.  Anderson,  however,  in  his 
Dictionary  of  Law  distinguishes  be- 
tween "inevitable  accident"  and 
"  unavoidable  accident.''  He  speaks 
of  inevitable  accidents  as  those  which 
are  absolutely  unavoidable  because 
effected  or  influenced  by  the  uncon- 
trollable operations  of  nat  ure,  and  un- 
avoidable accidents  as  such  as  result 
from  human  agency  alone,  but  are 
unavoidable  under  the  circumstances. 
The  words  "inevitable"  and  "un- 
avoidable" are  similarly  defined  and 
given  as  synonyms  in  Webster's  Dic- 
tionary.    Inevitable  is  denned  "not 

166 


evitable,  incapable  of  being  avoided; 
admitting  of  no  escape  or  evasion; 
unavoidable;"  and  unavoidable  is 
defined  as  "  not  avoidable;  nottobe 
shunned;  necessary;  inevitable;  as 
unavoidable  evils." 

65  Ryan  v.  Armour,  166  111.  568;  47 
N.  E.  60,  aff'g  67  111.  App.  102; 
Nave  v.  Flack,  90  Ind.  205;  Brown  v. 
Kendall,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  292;  Reiss 
v.  N.  Y.  Steam  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  103; 
38  N.  Y.  St.  R.  842;  28  N.  E.  24; 
Cosulich  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  122  N. 
Y.  118;  33  N.  Y.  St.  R.  287;  25  N.  E. 
259;  Conger  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
R.  Co.,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  375;  Crutch- 
field  v.  Richmond,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  76 
N.  C.  320;  Wakeman  v.  Robinson, 
8  Moore,  63;  1  Bing.  213;  Blythe  v. 
Birmingham  Water  Co.,  11  Exch. 
781. 

w  Trow  v.  Thomas,  70  Vt.  580;  41 
Atl.  652. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTOR?    NEGLIGENCE.     §156 

railway  company  liable  for  the  death  of  a  child  caused  by  his 
unexpectedly  and  suddenly  appearing  on  the  track  bo  closely  in 
front  of  an  approaching  car,  that  it  was  impossible  to  stop  it  in 
time  to  avoid  the  accident.67  So  an  electric  lighl  company  is  not 
liable  for  the  death  of  a  person  caused  by  the  breaking  of  a  live 
electric  light  wire,  where  the  breaking  was  due  to  an  accident 
which  no  reasonable  human  care  could  prevent.6*  And  a  carrier 
having  no  knowledge  that  a  package  which  it  receives  contains 
nitroglycerine  is  not  liable  for  damages  caused  by  an  explosion 
thereof.'2'  Nor  is  an  owner  of  real  property,  who  is  making  ex- 
cavations upon  his  land,  liable  for  injuries  to  adjoining  buildings 
caused  by  such  excavations,  where  he  has  been  guilty  of  no  neg- 
ligence.'0 Nor  is  a  person  who  is  lawfully  operating  a  steam 
boiler  upon  his  own  premises  with  all  reasonable  care  liable  to 
an  adjoining  owner  for  an  injury  sustained  by  him  as  a  result  of 
the  boiler  exploding.71  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  person  law- 
fully using  fire  on  his  own  premises  is  not  liable  for  an  injury 
to  adjoining  premises  caused  by  the  fire  communicating  thereto, 
where  there  has  been  no  negligence  or  fault  on  his  part.74 

$  156.  Avoidable  accident. —An  avoidable  accident  is  one 
which  might  have  been  averted  by  the  exercise  on  the  part  of  a 
person  performing  an  act,  of  such  care  as  under  the  circum- 
stances of  the  occasion  would  have  been  required.  So  though 
a  person  may  be  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in  being  up- 
on the  tracks  of  a  railroad  company,  yet  if  the  employees  of  the 
company  in  charge  of  the  engine  knew  of  his  danger  in  time  to 
have  avoided  the  injury  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  and 
negligently  failed  to  use  the  means  at  their  command  to  prevent 
it,  the  company  will  be  liable  in  damages,  for  the  injury  so  sus- 


67  Callary  v.  Easton  Transit  Co., 
185  Pa.  lTti;  30  Atl.  813;  Kierzen- 
kowski  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Co., 
184  Pa.  459;  :$'.»  Atl.  220;  9  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  533. 

68  Snyder  v.  Wheeling  Electrical 
Co.,  43  W.  Va.  GG1;  39  L.  R.  A.  499; 
28  S.  E.  733.  See  Joyce  on  Elec- 
tric Law,  sees.  450-454,  GOO,  607,  612. 

69  Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524. 


70  Bailey  v.  Gray,  53  S.  C.  503;  31 
S.  E.  354. 

71  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51  N.  Y.  47G; 
10  Am.  Rep.  47G. 

-Bizzell  v.  Booker,  16  Ark.  308; 
Clark  v.  Foot.  8  Johns.  (N.  V.)  422; 
Lansing  v.  Stone.  :)7  Barb.  (N.  Y. ) 
15;  Simons  v.  Monier.  29  Barh.  (N. 
Y.)  419;  Hinds  v.  Barton,  25  N.  Y. 
544. 

167 


§  157  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

tained.73  And  it  is  not  essential  that  the  employees  should  ac- 
tually know  of  the  danger  to  which  a  person  is  exposed  upon 
the  track  in  order  to  render  the  company  liable,  but  it  is  suf- 
ficient if  they  have  such  notice  or  belief  as  will  put  a  prudent 
man  on  the  alert,74  and  the  fact  that  a  person  is  a  trespasser 
does  not  change  the  rule ; ~r'  and  an  instruction  as  to  the  effect 
of  contributory  negligence  was  held  to  be  properly  refused 
where  it  failed  to  state  the  phase  of  the  case  tending  to  show 
that  the  defendant  could  have  prevented  the  accident  by  the 
exercise  of  reasonable  care  after  having  discovered  the  plain- 
tiff's danger.76  Contributory  negligence  to  defeat  recovery  in 
such  cases  must,  it  is  held,  intervene  between  the  failure  of  the 
defendant  to  exercise  the  necessary  care  to  avoid  the  injury  and 
the  accident.77  In  the  application  of  the  rule  that  though  a 
person  may  have  contributed  to  an  injury  yet  if  the  person  in- 
flicting it  could,  after  discovering  the  other's  danger,  have 
avoided  it,  recovery  may  be  had,  it  is  held  that  prior  negligence 
of  the  defendant  cannot  be  invoked  or  considered.78 


§  157.  Avoidable  accident — Illustrations. — Where  a  tres- 
passer on  a  railroad  track,  while  attempting  to  rescue  a  child, 
was  struck  by  the  train,  it  was  held  that  the  company  was  lia- 
ble where  the  engineer  saw  his  danger  but  failed  to  exercise 
reasonable  care  to  prevent  the  injury.79     And  a  street  railway 


73  Kansas  &  A.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Fitz- 
hugh,  61  Ark.  341:  33  S.  W.  960; 
Pierce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  560;  45  N. 
E.  1068,  affg  63  111.  App.  562;  Neet 
v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  100 
Iowa,  248;  76  N.  W.  677;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  26:  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mulligan,  45  Md.  486:  Mathews  v. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  63  Mo. 
App.  569;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  866:  Lloyd 
v.  Albermarle  &  R.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  C. 
1010;  24  S.  E.  805;  Blankenship  v. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  15  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  82;  38  S.  W.  216.  See  also 
McCreery  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  (W. 
Va.  1901),  10  Am.  Xeg.  Kep.  500,  506. 

74  Tucker  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co., 
92  Va.  549;  24   S.  E.  229.     But  see 

168 


Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Vittitoe, 
19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  612;  41  S.  W.  269. 

75Peirce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  560;  45 
N.  E.  1068,  affg  63  111.  App.  562; 
Mathews  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  63  Mo.  App.  569;  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  866;  Tucker  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  92  Va.  549:  24  S.  E.  229. 

7,;Sheehan  v.  Citizens  R.  Co.,  72 
Mo.  App.  524. 

77  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sain,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  386;  33  S.  W. 
558. 

78  Dull  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Co.,  21  Ind.  App.  571;  52  N.  E.  1013; 
1  Repr.  676. 

79 Pierce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  560;  45 
N.  E.  1068,  aff'g63  111.  App.  562. 


Negligence  and  contributory  negligence.  §  i"-s 

company  is  liable  for  the  death  of  a  person  killed  on  its  track 
where  the  accident  is  due  to  the  failure  of  the  motorman  to 
keep  watch  over  the  track,  or  to  his  neglect  to  use  the  proper 
means  for  stopping  the  car  after  he  lias  discovered  the  presence 
of  such  person  upon  the  track.90  So,  also,  where  an  engineer  of 
a  train  saw  a  man  upon  the  track  approaching  a  trestle  about 
three  quarters  of  a  mile  away,  and  made  no  attempt  to  check 
the  speed  of  the  train  or  to  give  any  warning  of  its  approach 
until  about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  trestle,  it  was  held  that, 
notwithstanding  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  person  in  go- 
ing upon  the  trestle,  the  negligence  of  the  engineer  in  making 
no  effort  to  avoid  the  accident  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the 
death  for  which  the  company  was  liable.81  And  where  a  person 
lying  at  the  side  of  a  track  was  struck  and  killed  by  a  train,  it 
was  held  that  the  company  was  liable  if  the  engineer,  by  the 
exercise  of  a  reasonable  and  proper  lookout,  could  have  discov- 
ered him  in  time  to  have  avoided  the  accident.88  But  the  fact 
that  the  employees  in  charge  of  a  train  see  an  object  upon  the 
track  at  a  point  where  they  have  no  reason  to  suspect  the  pres- 
ence of  children,  and  which  appears  to  be  no  living  object,  or 
anything  of  substantial  value  to  be  injured  or  to  cause  injury 
to  the  train  or  passengers,  does  not  put  them  under  any  obliga- 
tion or  duty  to  stop  until  its  nature  can  be  ascertained  ;  and 
where  a  train  did  not  stop  under  such  circumstances,  but  when 
it  was  too  late  the  object  was  discovered  to  be  a  child,  and  with 
the  aid  of  every  appliance  and  the  exercise  of  the  greatest  effort 
and  skill  on  their  part  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  injury,  the  com- 
pany was  not  liable.83 

§  158.  Duty  to  use  ordinary  care  to  avoid  consequences  of 
another's  negligence. — The  following  discussion  from  a  recent 
ease  ^  ably  considers  the  point  indicated  by  the  head  line.    The 


80 San  Antonio  Street  R.  Co.  v. 
Renken,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  229;  38 
S.  W.  829. 

BlMcLamb  v.  Wilmington  &  \V.  R. 
Co.,  li-'U  X.  C.  862;  29  S.  E.  894. 

82Pliarrv.  Southern  R.  Co.,  1  IK  \. 
C.  751;  26  S.  E.  149.     See  Sullivan  v. 


St.   Louis  S.    W.    R.    Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  36  S.  W.  1020. 

s:1  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Prewitt 
(S.  C.  Kan.  189S),  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  '29. 

-'  Western   a-    Atlantic    R.   ('••.    v. 
Ferguson  (Ga.  |,  39  S.  E.  306;  10  Am. 
Neg.  Kep.  228  et  seq.,  per  Cobb,  J. 
169 


8    L58      NEGLIGENCE    ANI>   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

court  says :  "  In  the  case  of  Railroad  Co.  v.  Luckie,*3  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Lumpkin  uses  the  following  language  :  '  It  seems  to  be  the 
clear  meaning  of  our  law  that  the  plaintiff  can  never  recover  in 
an  action  for  personal  injuries,  no  matter  what  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant  may  be,  short  of  actual  wantonness,  when  the 
proof  shows  he  could,  by  ordinary  care,  after  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant  began  or  was  existing,  have  avoided  the  conse- 
quences to  himself  of  that  negligence.'  This  language  can 
convey  no  other  impression  than  that,  in  cases  of  the  charac- 
ter referred  to,  the  duty  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  use 
ordinary  care  for  his  protection  against  the  consequences  of 
the  defendant's  negligence  does  not  arise .'  until  after  the  negli- 
gence began  or  was  existing.'  The  ruling  in  the  Luckie  case  * 
was  approved  in  terms  in  the  case  of  Brunswick  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gibson,87  where  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Simmons  used  the  expression 
above  referred  to,  saying  that  '  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  against 
a  railroad  company  for  personal  injuries  cannot  recover  even 
though  the  company  may  have  been  negligent,  if  after  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  defendant  began  or  was  existing,  the  person  in- 
jured could  by  ordinary  care  have  avoided  the  consequences  to 
himself  of  that  negligence.'  In  the  case  of  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Attaway,88  the  present  chief  justice  used  the  following  language  : 
'The  rule  which  requires  one  to  avoid  the  consequences  of 
another's  negligence  does  not  apply  until  he  sees  the  danger  or 
has  reason  to  apprehend  it.'  In  the  case  of  Coiner  v.  Barfield,89 
Mr.  Justice  Fish  says  in  substance  that  if  one  who  was  injured 
by  the  negligence  of  another  used  proper  diligence  as  soon  as 
his  peril  was  apparent  to  avert  the  catastrophe,  it  could  not  be 
said  that  by  ordinary  care  he  might  have  avoided  the  con- 
sequences of  the  other's  negligence.  In  Macon  &  I.  S.  Elec.  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Holmes,9"  Mr.  Justice  Lewis  says :  "  A  party  cannot 
be  charged  with  the  duty  of  using  any  degree  of  care  or  diligence 
to  avoid  the  negligence  of  a  wrongdoer  until  he  has  reason  to 
apprehend  the  existence  of  such  negligence.  No  one  can  be 
expected  to  guard  against  what  he  does  not  see,  and  cannot  fore- 


8587Ga.  7;  13  S.  E.  105. 

86  Railroad  Co.  v.  Luckie,  87  Ga.  7; 
13  S.  E.  105. 

87  97  Ga.  497;  25  S.  E.  484;  11  Am. 
Neg.  Cas.  351n. 

170 


8890Ga.  661;  16  S.  E.  958. 
8n02Ga.  489;  31  S.  E.  90. 
90  103  Ga.  658;  30  S.  E.  565;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  251. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTOB?    NEGLIGENCE.     §   158 

tell.  The  rule,  therefore,  which  requires  one  to  exercise  ordinary 
care  and  diligence  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  another's  neg- 
ligence, necessarily  applies  to  a  case  where  there  is  opportunity 
of  exercising  this  diligence  after  the  negligence  has  begun  and 
has  become  apparent.'  From  the  expressions  used  and  the  rul- 
ings made  in  the  Cases  cited,  and  there  are  many  others  where 
similar  expressions  are  used  and  similar  rulings  made,  the  rule 
of  force  with  reference  to  the  subject  under  investigation  seems 
to  be  well  settled,  and  may  be  thus  stated  :  The  duty  Imposed  by 
law  upon  all  persons  to  exercise  ordinary  care  to  avoid  the  con- 
sequences of  another's  negligence  does  not  arise  until  the  neg- 
ligence of  such  other  is  existing,  and  is  either  apparent,  or  the 
circumstances  are  such  that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would 
have  reason  to  apprehend  its  existence.  In  such  eases,  and  in 
such  cases  only,  does  the  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care  to 
escape  the  consequences  of  negligence  entirely  defeat  a  recov- 
ery, in  other  cases  (that  is,  where  the  person  injured  by  the 
negligence  of  another  is  at  fault  himself,  in  that  he  did  not, 
before  the  negligence  of  the  other  became  apparent,  or  be- 
fore the  time  arrived  when,  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  it 
should  have  appeared  to  him  that  there  was  reason  to  apprehend 
its  existence,  observe  that  amount  of  care  and  diligence  which 
would  be  exercised  under  like  circumstances  by  an  ordinarily 
prudent  person)  such  fault  or  failure  to  exercise  due  care  and 
diligence  at  such  a  time  would  not  entirely  preclude  a  recovery, 
but  would  authorize  the  jury  to  diminish  the  damages  in  propor- 
tion to  the  amount  of  default  attributable  to'  the  person  in- 
jured/" ...  At  common  law  if  the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff 
contributed  to  the  injury,  he  could  not  recover.  This  doctrine, 
referred  to  usually  as  that  of  'contributory  negligence,'  is  not 
the  law  of  this  state;  but  the  doctrine  referred  to  often  as  that 
of  'comparative  negligence,' is  the  rule  of  force  here.*2  This 
rule  authorizes  a  recovery  by  the  plaintiff,  although  he  was  at 
fault,   provided  he  was  injured  under  circumstances  where.  l>\ 


91  Comer  v.    Barfield,  102  Ga.  489;  I  Co.  v.   Johnson,  38   Ga.  409;  11    Am. 
31  S.  E.  90:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Holmes,    Neg.  Cas.  292. 

103  Ga.   60S;  4  Am.   Neg.    Hep.  251;       9-  See  note  on    Comparative  N'eg- 
30  S.  E.  565;  Macon  &  Western  R.  R.  |ligence,  9  Am.    Neg.    Rep.    248  262 

See  also  sec.  16S,  herein. 

171 


§   158     NBGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  on  his  part,  he  could  not  have 
avoided  the  consequences  of  the  defendant's  negligence.93  If 
the  plaintiff  knows  of  the  defendant's  negligence,  and  fails  to 
exercise  that  degree  of  care  and  caution  which  an  ordinarily 
prudent  man  would  exercise  under  similar  circumstances  to 
prevent  an  injury  which  will  result  from  such  negligence,  it 
is  well  settled  that  he  cannot  recover.91  If  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant  was  existing  at  the  time  that  plaintiff  was  hurt, 
and  he,  in  the  exercise  of  that  degree  of  care  and  caution 
which  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  exercise  under  simi- 
lar circumstances,  could  have  discovered  the  defendant's  neg- 
ligence, and  when  discovered  could,  by  the  exercise  of  a  like 
degree  of  care,  have  avoided  the  same,  then  he  cannot  recover.95 
If  at  the  time  of  the  injury  an  ordinarily  prudent  person,  in 
the  exercise  of  that  degree  of  care  and  caution  which  such 
a  person  generally  uses,  would  have  reasonably  apprehended 
that  the  defendant  might  be  negligent  at  the  time  when  and 
place  where  the  injury  occurred  and  so  apprehending  the  proba- 
bility of  the  existence  of  such  negligence,  could  have  taken 
steps  to  have  prevented  the  injury,  then  the  person  injured 
cannot  recover,  if  he  failed  to  exercise  that  degree  of  care  and 
caution  usually  exercised  by  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  to 
ascertain  whether  the  negligence  which  might  have  been  rea- 
sonably apprehended  really  existed.96  If  there  is  anything  pres- 
ent at  the  time  and  place  of  the  injury  which  would  cause  an 
ordinarily  prudent  person  to  reasonably  apprehend  the  proba- 


93  See  Civ.  Code,  sees.  2322,  3830. 

94  See  Railroad  Co.  v.  Neily,  56  Ga. 
544;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Harris,  76  Ga. 
508;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Luckie,  87  Ga. 
6;  13  S.  E.  105;  Briscoe  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co..  103  Ga.  224.  227:  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  360;  28  S.  E.  638;  Railroad  Co. 
v.  Dorsey,  106  Ga.  826,  828;  32  S.  E. 
873:  Hopkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110 
Ga.  85,  88;  35  S.  E.  307. 

95  See  Atl.  &  W.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Loftin,  86  Ga.  43.  45;  12  S.  E.  186; 
11  Am.  Neg.  Cas.  350n  ;  Railroad  v. 
Luckie,  87  Ga.  6:  13  S.  E.  105;  Bruns- 
wick &  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibson, 

172 


97  Ga.  489;  25  S.  E.  485;  11  Am.  Neg. 
Cas.  351n  ;  Cain  v.  Railway  Co.,  97 
Ga.  298;  22  S.  E.  918;  Railroad  Co. 
v.  Bradford  (Ga. ),  38  S.  E.  823. 

96  See  Railroad  Co.  v.  Blooming- 
dale,  74  Ga.  604,  611:  Smith  v.  Rail- 
road Co..  82  Ga.  801;  10  S.  E.  Ill; 
Jenkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89  Ga.  756: 
15  S.  E.  655;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Attaway, 
90  Ga.  657,  661;  16  S.  E.  956;  Macon 
&  Indian  Springs  Electric  St.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Holmes,  103  Ga.  655;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  251 ;  30  S.  E.  563;  Lloyd  v.  City 
&  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  110  Ga.  167;  7 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  591;  35  S.  E.  170. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.     §    lo8 

bility,  even  if  not  the  possibility  of  danger  to  him  in  doing  an 
act  which  he  is  about  to  perforin,  then  he  must  take  such  steps 
as  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  take  to  ascertain  whether 
such  danger  exists,  as  well  as  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  tin- 
same  after  its  existence  is  ascertained,  and  if  he  fails  to  *  1  * >  this 
and  is  injured,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  recover,  if  by  taking 
proper  precautions  he  could  have  avoided  the  consequences  of 
the  negligence  of  the  person  inflicting  the  injury.  A  railroad 
track  is  a  place  of  danger,  and  one  who  goes  thereon  is  bound 
to  know  that  he  is  going  into  a  place  where  he  is  subject  to  the 
dangers  incident  to  the  operation  of  trains  upon  that  track.93 
This  is  true  without  regard  to  the  place  where  the  track  is, — 
whether  in  the  country,  where  pedestrians  are  not  expected  to 
be,  or  at  a  public  road  crossing,  or  at  a  street  crossing,  or  at  the 
stations  and  depots  of  railroad  companies,  where  persons  are 
expected  and  invited  to  be  present.  No  matter  where  the  track 
is  located,  any  person  who  goes  upon  the  same  is  bound  to  know 
that  he  is  going  upon  a  place  where  his  presence  would  be  at- 
tended with  more  or  less  danger.  What  would  or  would  not 
amount  to  negligence  in  the  manner  in  which  a  person  entered 
upon  a  railroad  track  would  depend  to  a  large  extent  upon  the 
peculiar  location  of  the  place  at  which  he  went  upon  the  track. 
An  ordinarily  prudent  person  in  the  possession  of  all  his  facul- 
ties would  not  attempt  to  cross  a  railroad  track  at  any  place 
without  using  at  least  his  sense  of  sight,  if  not  that  of  hearing, 
to  determine  whether  at  the  time  and  place  he  was  about  to 
cross  the  same,  there  were  present  any  of  those  dangers  which 
a  person  of  ordinary  intelligence  would  reasonably  apprehend. 
In  Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith,"  it  was  in  effect  held  that  one  is  not 
bound  to  anticipate  negligence  when  the  law  commands  dili- 
gence for  his  protection  at  the  hands  of  another;  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Bleckley  in  the  opinion  of  that  case  saying :  'If  (the 
plaintiff)  had  been  on  the  crossing,  or  at  any  place  he  was  by 
right  entitled  to  be,  he  would  have  been  warranted  in  assuming 
that  the  whole  world  would  be  diligent  in  respect  to  him  and  his 
safety.'     We  do  not  understand  this  rule  to  mean  that  it  is  an 

97  See  Comer  v.  Shaw,  98  Ga.  545;    110  Ga.  167;  1   km.   Neg.   Rep.  601; 

„     .       ..      .  ...     -vt__     n....     on.   .     ok   C     T?    17fl 


35  S.  E.  170. 


25  S.  E.  7:5:i:  1 1  Am.  !Jeg.  Cas.  851n  ;    . 

Lloyd  v.  City  &  Surburban  Ry.  Co.,       98  78  Ga,  700;  3  S.  E.  899. 


IT:'. 


§  159  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

act  of  ordinary  prudence  for  a  person  to  go  blindly  into  a  place 
which  may  or  may  not  be  dangerous,  simply  because  the  law 
has  commanded  those  in  charge  of  such  place  to  do  certain 
things,  which,  if  faithfully  performed,  would  render  improbable, 
if  not  impossible,  injury  to  any  one  at  that  place.  Ordinary 
care  would  itself  require  the  use  of  the  senses  to  ascertain 
whether  there  was  at  the  particular  time  any  danger  in  going 
into  the  place.  An  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  necessarily 
apprehend  the  possibility  of  danger,  and  would  always  act  on 
such  apprehension,  and  use  his  senses  to  determine  whether  or 
not  it  was  safe  to  go  into  the  place  at  the  time  that  he  was 
seeking  to  enter  the  same." 

§  159.  Gross  negligence. — The  distinction  generally  made 
as  to  the  different  degrees  of  negligence  has  not  in  all  cases  re- 
ceived favorable  consideration  from  the  court.  So  it  was  said  in 
an  English  case  that  no  matter  by  what  epithet  we  may 
call  negligence,  whether  we  term  it  plain  negligence  or  gross 
negligence,  it  is  really  only  the  "failure  to  bestow  the  care  and 
skill  which  the  situation  demands."99  And  in  a  case  in  the 
United  States  supreme  court  it  was  declared  that  the  term  "  gross 
neolio-ence  "  was  a  relative  term  "  doubtless  to  be  understood  as 
meaning  a  greater  want  of  care  than  is  implied  by  the  term  '  or- 
dinary negligence,'  but  after  all  it  means  the  absence  of  the  care 
that  was  requisite  under  the  circumstances."  It  was  also  said 
in  this  case  that  "  the  law  furnishes  no  definitions  which  can  be 
applied  in  practice,  but  leaves  it  to  the  jury  to  determine  in  each 
case  what  the  duty  was  and  what  omissions  amounted  to  a 
breach  of  it.*' 1C0  So  in  a  case  in  New  York  it  is  said  that  the 
distinction  as  to  the  different  degrees  of  negligence  is  neither 
founded  upon  any  principle,  nor  is  it  capable  of  any  certain  and 
satisfactory  application  to  individual  cases  as  they  arise.  The 
court  further  says  :  "  Attempts  have  been  made  to  fix  a  liability 

99  Wilson  v.  Brett,  11  M.  &  W.  113,  State  v.  Manchester,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  52 

per  Rolfe.  B.  N.  H.  557;  Wells  v.  New  York  Cen- 

ioo  Milwaukee,     etc.,     R.     Co.     v.  tral  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.   181;  Briggs 

Arms,    91  U.    S.  494,    per   Davis,  J.  v.    Taylor,    28   Vt.    180;    Hinton   v. 

See  also   Steamboat  New  World  v.  Dibbin,  2  Q.  B.  646;  Beal  v.  South 

King,  16  How.  474;  Denver  Consol.  Devon  Ry.  Co.,  3  H.  &  C.  337. 
Elec.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  21  Colo.  371; 
174 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTOR*    NEGLIGENCE.     §    L59 

upon  the  distinction  between  gross  negligence  and  negligence 
merely,  but  courts  have  been  compelled  to  abandon  the  attempt, 
and  to  say  that  negligence  does  not  change  its  character  and  be- 
come anything  but  negligence  by  the  application  of  any  epithet 
to  it."1  Though  the  utility  in  practice  of  any  classification  or 
definition  of  different  degrees  of  negligence  may  be  doubtful, 
yet  the  fact  remains  that  there  are  different  degrees  of  negli- 
gence. Under  the  same  state  of  facts  in  two  cases,  we  might 
in  one  have  a  person  guilty  of  negligence  in  only  a  slight  degree, 
while  there  might  be  on  the  part  of  the  person  in  the  other  case, 
negligence  of  a  much  greater  degree.  So,  again,  a  given  course 
of  conduct  in  one  case  might  be  no  negligence  at  all,  or  possibly 
only  slight  negligence,  while  in  an  another  case  under  different 
conditions  the  same  course  of  conduct  would  be  an  aggravated 
degree  of  negligence.  Thus  it  was  that  negligence  was  origi- 
nally divided  into  three  classes,  known  as  slight,  ordinary  and 
gross,  corresponding  to  the  different  degrees  of  care  known  as 
slight,  ordinary  and  great.  In  this  connection  it  has  been  said 
that,  "  strictly  speaking,  it  is  not  correct  to  divide  negligence 
into  degrees  at  all,  because  there  can  -be  no  negligence,  within 
the  legal  meaning  of  the  term,  except  where  the  degree  of  care 
required  by  law  in  the  particular  case  has  not  been  given. 
.  .  .  But  .  .  .  these  terms  are  in  familiar  use  and  are  per- 
fectly well  understood,  and  any  attempt  to  dispense  with  them 
will  cause  far  more  confusion  than  it  clears  away.  We  adhere, 
therefore,  to  a  classification  of  negligence,  corresponding  with 
the  classification  of  care."2  Gross  negligence  has  been  defined 
as  the  "  omission  of  that  care  which  even  inattentive  and  thought- 
less men  never  fail  to  take  of  their  own  property  or  interests."3 
And  again  we  have  it  defined  as  a  "  great  and  aggravated  degree 
of  negligence  as  distinguished  from  negligence  of  a  lower  de- 


•  Smith  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 
Co.,  24  N.  Y.  2l'2. 

2  Shearman  &  Rerlfield  on  Negli- 
gence (5th  ert. ),  sec.  48.  See  also 
Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pointer,  14 
Kan.  50;  Burlington,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Wendt,  12  Neb.  76;  Dudley  v. 
Camden,    etc.,    Ferry    Co.,    13    Vr. 


(N.  J.)  25:  Dallas  City  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beeman,  74  Tex.  291:  Cremer  v. 
Town  of  Portland,  36  Wis.  100; 
Const.  Texas.  1876,  art.  16.  sec  26, 
and  cases  cited  in  last  note  of  this 
section. 

:i  Anderson's    Dictionary    of    Law 
(1893). 

175 


§   100     NEGLIGENCE   AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

gree," '  as  "  that  entire  want  of  care  which  would  raise  a  pre- 
sumption of  a  conscious  indifference  to  consequences,''5  as  "the 
want  of  slight  care,"6  and  as  negligence  "amounting  to  wilful 
injuiy. " 7  The  element  of  wilfulness  does  hot,  however,  in  our 
mind,  enter  into  the  determination. of  the  question  to  this  extent. 
Gross  negligence  being,  as  we  view  it,  the  absence  of  a  slight 
degree  of  care  or  diligence  not  amounting  to  wilful  injury.8 

§  160.  Wilful  injury— Wanton  negligence. — The  terms 
"  wilful  injury  "  and  "  wanton  negligence  "  are  used  in  some  cases 
as  equivalent  or  synonymous  terms.9  Thus  it  is  said  in  one  case  : 
"  Then  there  is  that  reckless  indifference  or  disregard  of  the 
natural  or  probable  consequence  of  doing  an  act,  designated 
whether  accurately  or  not  in  our  decisions  as  '  wanton  negli- 
gence '  to  which  is  imputed  the  same  degree  of  culpability  and 
held  to  be  equivalent  to  wilful  injury."  10  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  a  wilful  act  can  also  be  classed  as  a  negligent  act, 
since  it  is  claimed  that  in  negligence  there  is  no  intent  to  do 
wrong  which  will  injure  another,  the  injury  being  due  in  case 
of  negligence  to  a  mere  absence  of  care.  The  terms,  however, 
"wilful  neglect,"  "wilful  negligence,"  and  "wanton  negli- 
gence," are  used  in  many  of  the  cases  so  that  though  such  a 
phrase  may  appear  incorrect,  yet  the  courts  have  recognized  such 
terms  by  using  them  and  their  use  by  the  courts  has  been  in  an 
equivalent  sense.  In  the  sense  in  which  any  one  of  them  is 
used,  they  being  considered  synonymous,  it  may  be  defined  as 


4  Doorman  v.  Jenkins,  2  Ad.  &  El. 
261. 

5  Southern  Cotton  Press,  etc.,  Co. 
v.  Bradley,  52  Tex.  587. 

6  Shearman  &  Redfield  on  Negli- 
gence (5th  ed. ),  sec.  49. 

7  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd, 
36  111.  409. 

8  See  Richmond,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Farmer,  97  Ala.  141;  12  So.  86; 
Jacksonville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  South- 
wortli,  32  111.  App.  307,  afTd  135 
111.  250;  25  N.  E.  1093;  Lake  Shore, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Bodemer,  139  111.  596; 
20  N.  E.  692;  Galbraith  v.  West  End 
R.  Co.,  165  Mass.  572;  43, N.  E.  501; 

176 


Smith  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co., 
24  N.  Y.  222;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Coon,  111  Pa.  St.  430;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Graham,  85  Pa.  St.  91; 
Austin,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  73 
Tex.  592;  115  S.  W.  858;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Shuford,  72  Tex.  165; 
Wright  v.  Clark,  50  Vt.  130.  See 
also  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dodge  (Ky.  1902),  66  S.  W.  606. 

9  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb, 
97  Ala.  308;  12  So.  374  and  other 
cases  in  this  state  cited  in  this  sec- 
tion. 

10  Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers,  110  Ala. 
331;  20  So.  346. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.     §  161 


the  intentional  act  or  failure  to  act  of  a  person  who  is  conscious 
of  his  own  conduct  and  who,  from  his  knowledge  of  existing 
circumstances  and  conditions,  is  also  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
such  conduct  will  naturally  or  probably  result  in  injury.11  Thus 
it  is  said  :  "A  mere  error  of  judgment,  as  the  result  of  doing 
an  act,  or  the  omission  of  an  act  having  no  evil  purpose  or 
intent,  a  consciousness  of  probable  injury,  may  constitute  simple 
negligence,  but  cannot  rise  to  the  degree  of  wanton  negligence 
or  wilful  wrong.1-  And  again:  "To  constitute  wilful  injury 
there  must  be  design,  purpose,  intent  to  do  wrong  and  inflict  the 
injury."  w  The  words  "  wanton  "  and  "  wilful  "  are  of  very  sim- 
ilar meaning.  Wanton  means  unrestrained,  reckless,  regardless 
of  consequences,  and  in  some  cases  a  wanton  act  may  be  a  wil- 
ful one  or  committed  with  evil  intent.  Wilful  means  inten- 
tional as  distinguished  from  accidental,  with  a  bad  purpose,  or 
with  evil  intent.11  So  it  will  be  seen  that  if  the  terms  "  w;mton 
negligence,"  "  wilful  negligence,"  and  "  wilful  injury  "  are  to  be 
used  as  equivalent  in  meaning,  there  must  be  in  each  the  intent 
to  act  or  omit  to  act  with  a  consciousness  that  such  conduct  will 
result  in  probable  injury.15 

§  161.  Contributory  negligence— Defense    to    action — It 

may  be  stated  as  a  general  rule  that  in  actions  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  injury,  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff 
is  a  defense  thereto  provided,  however,  that  such  negligence  con- 


11  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin, 
117  Ala.  307;  23  So.  231;  Louis- 
ville &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb, 
97  Ala.  308;  12  So.  374;  Electric  Co. 
v.  Bowers,  110  Ala.  328;  20  So.  345; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Markee,  103  Ala. 
160;  15  So.  511;  Peoria  Bridge  Co. 
v.  Loomis,  20  111.  235;  Kentucky 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gastineau,  83 
Ky.  119.  The  term  "wilful  neglecl  " 
is  used  in  the  Kentucky  statutes. 
See  Kentucky  Gen.  Slats,  ch.  57, 
sec.  3. 

w  Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers.  110  Ala. 
331:  20  So.  346;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Lee.    92    Ala.    272;    9   So.    230:    Al- 

12 


ahama  Great  Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
Moorer,  116  Ala.  642;  22  So.  900;  9 
Am.  &  Eug.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  742;  3  Am. 
Nee.  Rep.  320;  Peoria  Bridge  Assn. 
v.  Loomis,  20  111.  235.  But  see  Kan- 
sas City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell, 
6  Kan.  App.  417. 

w  Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers.  llU.Vla. 
328;  20  So.  345. 

14  Anderson's  Dictionary  of  Law, 
L099,  1114. 

'■  Electric  Co.  v.  Bowers.  110  Ala. 
331 :  20  So.  346,  and  other  cases 
in  Alabama  cited  in  this  note;  Peoria 
Bridge  Assn.  v.  Loomis,  20  111.  235. 
But  see  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Campbell,  6  Kan.  App.  417. 

177 


§  161     NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

tributed  directly  to  and  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.16 
So  it  is  declared  by  the  United  States  supreme  court  that  if  the 
proximate  and  immediate  cause  of  the  injury  can  be  traced  to 
the  want  of  ordinary  care  and  caution  in  the  person  injured,  an 
action  for  the  injury  cannot  be  maintained  unless  it  further 
appear  that  the  defendant  might,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care  and  prudence  have  avoided  the  consequences  of  the  injured 
party's  negligence.17     So  it  has  been  held  that  contributory  neg- 


16  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144 
U.  S.  40S;  Little  v.  Hackett,  116  TJ. 
S.  371;  Sheffer  v.   Railroad   Co.,  105 
U.  S.  249;  St.   Louis  &  S.   F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Whittle,  20  C.  C.  A.  196;  40  U.  S. 
App.    23;     74     Fed.      296;     Fernan- 
dez v.   Sacramento,   etc.,   R.  Co.,  52 
Cal.  45;  Flynn  v.  San  Francisco,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  40  Cal.  14;  6  Am.    Rep.  595; 
Isbell  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  R.  Co., 
27   Conn.  393;  Maxwell  v.  Wilming- 
ton City  Ry.  Co.,  1  Marv.  (Del.)   199; 
40  Atl.  945:  Lyman  v.  Philadelphia, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Houst.  (Del.)  583; 
Indianapolis  v.  Caldwell,  9  Ind.  297; 
Atvvood  v.  Bangor,  O.  &  O.  T.  R.  Co., 
91   Me.  399;  40  Atl.  67;  Bigelow  v. 
Reed,  51  Me.  325;  Kennedy  v.  Cecil 
Co.,   69   Md.  65;  14  Atl.    524;  Mur- 
phy v.  Deane,    101   Mass.  455;  Wil- 
liams v.  Edmonds,  75  Mich.  92;  42  N. 
W.   534;    Barbee  v.  Reese,  60  Miss. 
906;    Schaabs   v.  Woodburn   Sarven 
Wheel  Co.,  56  Mo.  173;  Dickson  v. 
Omaha,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  124  Mo.  140;  27 
S.  W.  476;    Guthrie  v.   Mo.  Pac.   R. 
Co.,   51    Neb.   746;    71   N.    W.   722; 
O'Connor  v.  North  Truckee  Co.,  17 
Nev.  245;  30  Pac.  882;    Winship  v. 
Enfield,    42   N.    H.    197;     Delaware, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Toffey,  38  N.  J.  L. 
525;  Dudley  v.  Camden,  etc.,  Ferry 
Co.,  45  N.  J.  L.  368;  Griff  en  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  34;  Mun- 
ger  v.  Tonawanda  R.  R.  Co.,  4  N.  Y. 
349:  5  Den.    255;    Cunan  v.   Warren 
Chemical  &  Mfg.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  153; 
Gray  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  J. 
'  178 


&   S.  519,  affd  65  N.  Y.  561:  Suy- 

dam  v.  Grand  St.  &   Newton  R.  R. 

Co.,  41  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  375;  17  Abb. 

Pr.  304;  Terry  v.  New  York  Central 

R.    R.    Co.,    22    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    574; 

Pickett  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co., 

117  N.  C.  616;  30  L.  R.  A.  257;  23  S. 

E.  264;  Gunter  v.  Wicker,  85  N.  C. 

310;  Schweinf tilth   v.   Cleveland,   C. 

C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  60  Ohio  St.  215; 

54  N.  E.  89;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 

N.  S.  73;  42   Ohio   L.   J.  2;  Wolf  v. 

Lake  Erie  &   W.  R.  Co.,  55  Ohio  St. 

517 :  45  N.  E.  708;  36  L.  R.  A.  812;  37 
Ohio  L.  J.  23;  Ford  v.  Umatilla  Co., 
15  Oreg.  313;  Drake  v.  Philadelphia, 

etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Pa.  St.  240;  Thir- 
teenth St.  R.  Co.  v.  Boudron,  92  Pa. 
St.  475;  Martin  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
51  S.  C.  150;  28  S.  E.  303;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Culpepper, 
19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46  S.  W.  922; 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Brewer,  23 
Wash.  L.  Rep.  724;  7  App.  D.  C.  113; 
Towler  v.  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  18 
W.  Va.  579. 

17  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144 
U.  S.  408.  See  also  McPeck  v.  Central 
Vt.  R.  Co.,  79  Fed.  596;  Boston  & 
M.  R.  Co.  v.  McDuffey,  79  Fed.  942 ; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hellentlial, 
88  Fed.  120;  Gilbert  v.  Erie  R.  Co., 
97  Fed.  751,  cited  in  Russell  &  Wins- 
lows'  Syllabus  Digest,  U.  S.  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  (ed.  1900),  in  support  of 
above  proposition;  Culbertson  v. 
Halliday,  50  Neb.  229;  69  N.  W.  853; 

j  Thompson  v.  Salt  Lake  Rap.  Trans. 


NEGLICKNOE    AND    CON'II:  1IU'T<  >RY 


L61 


ligence  in  any  degree  which  immediately  conduces  to  the  injury 
is  a  defense.18  but  that  it  must  refer  to  the  direct  occasion  of  the 
injury  and  not  to  a  remote  cause  of  it ; 1!1  and  that  though  the 
plaintiff  may  be  guilty  of  negligence,  yet  if  such  negligence  in 
no  way  contributed  to  the  injury,  it  is  no  defense  to  an  action 
to  recover  damages  therefor.'-1"  In  determining  the  question  of 
contributory  negligence,  it  is  held  that  the  standard,  by  which 
the  conduct  of  the  person  sought  to  be  charged  therewith,  is  to 
be  judged,  is  that  of  an  ordinarily  careful  prudent  man.-1  And 
that  when  a  person  is  approaching  or  is  in  a  dangerous  place,  he 
should  use  his  faculties  to  avoid  injury,  but  that  he  is  not  re- 
quired under  this  rule  to  exercise  the  best  judgment  or  to  make 
use  of  the  most  available  means  for  his  safety."  And  the  mere 
fact  that  a  person  is  at  a  point  or  place  of  danger  is  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  charge  him  with  contributory  negligence  in  ease  of 
injury  to  him  since  he  has  the  right  to  assume  that  any  other 
person  who  may  also  be,  or  have  the  right  to  be,  at  such  point 
will  conduct  himself  in  accordance  with  the  rights  of  both.-' 
Where  contributory  negligence  is  set  up  as  a  defense  to  an  action 
for  an   injury  received  in  another  state,  the  effect  to  be  given 


Co.,  16  Utah,  281;  52  Pac.  92;  40  L. 
I!    A.  172. 

»  Bunn  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 
H.  Co.,  6  Hun  (N.  Y.),  303;  Gray  v. 
Second  Ave.  K.  K.  Co.,  65  X.  Y.  561  : 
2  .J.  &  S.  519. 

19  Lannen  v.  Albany (ias  Light  Co., 
44  N.  Y.  459;  46  Barb.  264. 

J  Ford  v.  Charles  Warner  Co.,  1 
Mai  v.  (Del.)  88;  37  Atl.  39;  Hawks 
v.  Winans,  10  J.  &  S.  451;  74  N.  Y. 
609;  Travis  v.  Carolton,  26  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  821 ;  7  X.  Y.  Supp.  231:  Haley  v. 
Earle.  30  N.  Y\  208;  Martin  v.  South- 
ern K.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  150;  28  S.  E.  303; 
McCreery  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  (W. 
Va.  1901),  10  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  500,  506. 

21  Salter  v.  Utica  &  Black  River  R. 
R.  Co.,  88  X.  Y.  42. 

•■«  Wright  v.  Boiler,  20  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
874;  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  742,  aff'd  123 
N.    Y.   630:    33  N.   Y.  St.    R.    1028; 


25    X.    E.    052.     See    .sees.    158,    168, 
herein. 

28  Newson  v.  Xew  York  Central  R 
R.  Co.,  29  X.  Y.  383.  See  also  Gon- 
zales v.  New  York  tfe  Harlem  R.  R. 
Co.,  39  How.  Pr.  407.  rev'g  1  Sw. 
506;  Spooner  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R. 
Co.,  54  N.  Y.  230.  rev'g31  Barb.  419; 
36  Barb.  217:  (irippen  v.  Xew  York 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  34;  New 
York.  Lake  Erie.  etc..  R.  <  o.  v.  Atlan- 
tic Refg.  Co..  L29  X.  V.  597;  42  V  V 
St.  R.  346;  29  N.  K.  829;  Boyce  v. 
Manhattan  R.  Co..  118  X.  Y.  314:  23 
N\  Y.  St.  R.  692:  23  X.  E.  304: 
Murphy  v.  Xew  York  Central,  etc., 
R.  Co..  118  X.  Y.  527;  23  V  E.  812; 
Bullock  v.  Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
105  X.  C  180:  10  S.  E.  988:  Reeves 
v.  Delaware,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  30  Pa,  St 
454. 

179 


§§  162,  163    NEGLIGENCE   AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

thereto  is  to  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  place  and  not  by 
the  law  of  the  forum.31 

§  162.  Contributory  negligence  as  defense  not  affected 
by  statute  giving  right  of  action  for  death — Under  the  Ohio 
statute  ■  providing  that  when  death  is  caused  by  such  wrongful 
act,  neglect  or  default  as  would  if  death  had  not  ensued,  entitle 
the  party  injured  to  maintain  an  action  for  damages,  the  one  caus- 
ing the  injury  shall  be  liable  to  the  personal  representatives  in  be- 
half of  specified  persons,  it  has  been  decided  that  in  an  action  for 
damages  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  person  killed 
by  such  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  is  a  defense  to  an  action 
to  recover  for  such  death.26  And  under  the  same  statute  it  is 
held  that  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  beneficiaries,  but  not 
of  the  administrator,  constitutes  a  defense  to  such  an  action  in 
behalf  of  themselves,  but  not  as  to  beneficiaries  free  from  neg- 
ligence.27 So,  also,  under  a  similar  provision  in  the  Kentucky 
constitution*  it  was  held  that  the  right  which  previously  existed 
to  rely  upon  contributory  negligence  as  a  defense  to  an  action 
to  recover  for  death  resulting  from  an  injury  due  to  the  wrong- 
ful or  negligent  act  of  another  was  not  taken  away."' 

§  163.  Negligence— Open  and  visible  defects— Contributory 
negligence. — In  a  late  decision  of  the  supreme  court,  appellate 
division,  of  New  York,*  the  action  was  brought  for  death  oc- 
casioned by  a  claimed    defective  platform  of  a  toboggan  slide 


24  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
low, 43  S.  W.  711;  41  L.  R.  A.  614;  19 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1931. 

25  Ohio  Rev.  Stat.  sees.  6134.  6135. 
26Wolf  v.  Lake   Erie  Ar    W.    K.  Co., 

55  Ohio  St.  517;  36  L.  R.  A.  812;  45 
N.  E.  708;  37  Ohio  L.  J.  23.  See 
also  Cameron  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.  (N.  D.),  80  N.  W.  885. 

27  Wolf  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co., 
55  Ohio  St.  517;  36  L.  R.  A.  812;  45 
N.  E.  708;  37  Ohio  L.  J.  23.  See 
also  in  this  connection.  Toledo,  W. 
&  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Grable.  88  111.  441; 
Wymoie   v.    Mahaska  Co.,,  78   Iowa, 

180 


396;  6  L.  R.  A.  545:  Donahoe  v. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R,  Co.,  83  Mo. 
543:  Westerberg  v.  Kinzua  Creek  & 
K.  R.  Co.,  142  Pa.  471:  Bamberger 
v.  Citizens  St.  R.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  18: 
23  L.  R.  A.  486;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Groseclose,  88  Va.   267. 

28  Ky.  Const,  sec.  241. 

29  Passamaneck  v.  Louisville  R.  Co., 
98  Ky.  195:  32  S.  W.  620;  17  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  763. 

30  Barrett  v.  Lake  Ontario  Imp. 
Co.,  68App.  Div.  601;  74  N.  Y.  Supp. 
301. 


NEGLIGENCE    AM)   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.     §   163 

from  which  the  deceased  fell ;  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  was  set 
aside.31  The  court  said:  ''It  may  be  admitted  that  the  ques- 
tion whether  there  was  evidence  to  sustain  the  jury's  ver- 
dict of  negligence  in  the  construction  of  the  platform  and  the 
railing  thereon  is  not  entirely  free  from  doubt.  It,  of  course, 
would  have  been  a  simple  and  inexpensive  matter  to  have  put 
one  or  even  more  additional  railings  around  the  platform,  and 
to  thus  have  made  impossible  arr>  accident  such  as  happened. 
It  also  would  be  very  easy  to  say,  in  the  light  of  the  unfortu- 
nate occurrence  which  did  happen,  that  it  would  have  been  well 
to  have  done  this.  This,  however,  is  not  the  method  by  which 
we  are  to  determine  this  question.  We  are  rather  to  say 
whether  before  this  accident  happened  there  was  anything 
which  should  have  led  the  person  responsible  for  the  structure, 
in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  caution  and  thoughtfulin>s, 
to  apprehend  that  there  was  a  probability  of  its  happening.  As 
was  said  in  Crafter  v.  Railway  Co.,a  and  quoted  with  approval 
in  Larkin  v.  O'Neill,33  'a  line  must  be  drawn  in  these  cases 
between  suggestions  and  possible  precautions,  and  evidence  of 
actual  negligence  such  as  ought  reasonably  and  properly  to  be 
left  to  a  jury.  It  is  difficult  in  some  cases  to  determine  where 
the  line  is  to  be  drawn.'  ...  In  Larkin  v.  O'Neill,0'  plaintiff 
fell  upon  the  stairway  in  defendant's  store.  The  steps  were  used 
by  a  great  number  of  people  and  it  was  claimed  that  they  were 
negligently  constructed,  in  that  there  were  no  footholds,  brass 
plates  or  rubber  pads  thereon  to  keep  one  from  slipping.  The 
court,  referring  to  the  fact  that  these  steps  had  been  used  daily 
in  safety  by  a  great  number  of  people  who  passed  up  and  down. 
say,  with  reference  to  plaintiff's  accident:  *  There  is  nothing  in 
the  manner  in  which  the  stairs  were  constructed,  used,  or  kept 
from  which  such  a  result  could  reasonably  be  anticipated.  It 
is  quite  probable  that  the  accident  occurred  from  slipping  or 
from  a  misstep  by  the  plaintiff.'  In  Hart  v.  Grennell,"'  where  it 
was  held  that  defendant  was  not  liable  because  plaintiff  had 
tripped  and  fallen  over  a  truck  handle  in  the  hitter's  store,  it 
was  said  that  the  rule  of  liability  in  such  a  case  'has  reference 


81  Williams.  J.,   dissented. 

82  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  300. 

*»  119  N.  Y.  221-225 ;  23  N.  E.  563.  564. 


"119  X.  V.  221:   2:',  N.  E.  568 
85  122  N.  Y.  371:    25  X.  E.  354. 

181 


$    L63     NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

to  such  dangers  as  might  reasonably  be  anticipated  by  a  pru- 
dent  and  careful  man  .  .  .  the  question  is,  could  the  mischief 
have  been  reasonably  foreseen?'  In  Burke  v.  Wetherbee,36 
an  accident  was  caused  by  the  slipping  of  a  hook  from  the  bail 
of  a  car  which  was  used  in  defendant's  mine.  The  plaintiff 
claimed  that  there  should  have  been  a  bolt  through  the  hook, 
and  there  was  no  question  that  such  an  appliance  could  have 
been  easily  used  and  would  have  prevented  the  accident.  The 
car  had  been  used,  however,  for  a  long  time  safely,  and  without 
any  such  accident.  In  speaking  of  this  test  by  actual  expe- 
rience, the  court  say :  '  What  more  could  any  reasonable  or 
prudent  man  have  to  justify  him  in  believing  that  this  con- 
venient appliance  was  also  a  safe  and  proper  one?  What 
greater  or  different  tests  could  it  have  been  subjected  to  be- 
fore a  mine  owner  could  use  it  without  the  imputation  of  negli- 
gence?' In  Dougan  v.  Transportation  Co.,37  the  deceased 
was  attempting  to  secure  his  hat,  which  had  blown  off,  and  in  so 
doing  he  slipped  and  went  through  one  of  the  openings  in  the 
rail  of  defendant's  boat  and  was  drowned.  There  was  proof  that 
the  boat  had  run  in  the  same  condition  for  a  long  time,  and  that 
the  same  situation  existed  upon  other  boats,  and  that  no  acci- 
dent had  occurred  before.  The  court  said :  '  Had  there  been 
proof  tending  to  show  that  any  such  danger  would  be  appre- 
hended by  a  reasonably  prudent  person,  the  evidence  should 
have  been  submitted  to  the  jury.'  But  it  held  that,  in  the  light 
of  the  experiences  had  with  the  boat,  there  was  no  such  evi- 
dence. In  Loftus  v.  Ferry  Co.,*  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  a 
child  six  years  old,  while  passing  from  the  ferryboat  to  the 
dock,  fell  through  an  opening,  22  inches  high,  between  the  bot- 
tom and  second  rail  of  the  float  or  bridge  over  which  passengers 
passed  in  going  upon  or  leaving  the  boat.  The  proof  was  that 
this  bridge  had  been  in  service  five  or  six  years,  was  similar  to 
bridges  of  other  ferries,  and  that  no  similar  accident  had  pre- 
viously happened.  In  holding  that  there  was  no  proof  of 
negligence  upon  the  part  of  defendant,  the  court  say :  *  The 
rule  does  not  impose  upon  the  defendant  the  duty  of  so  pro- 
viding for  the  safety  of  passengers  that  they  shall  encounter 

36  98  N  Y.  562.  «  84  N.  Y.  455;  38  Am.  Rep.  533. 

v  56  N.  Y.  1. 
182 


NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  §  103 

no  possible  danger,  and  meet  with  no  casualty  in  the  use  of 
the  appliances  provided  by  it.  It  was  possible  for  the  defend- 
ant so  to  have  constructed  the  guard  that  such  an  accident 
as  this  would  not  have  happened,  and  this,  so  far  as  appears, 
could  have  been  done  without  unreasonable  expense  or  trouble. 
If  the  defendant  ought  to  have  foreseen  that  such  an  acci- 
dent might  happen,  or  if  such  an  accident  could  reasonably 
have  been  anticipated,  the  omission  to  provide  against  it  would 
be  actionable  negligence.  But  the  facts  rebut  any  inference 
of  negligence  on  this  ground.  The  company  had  the  expe- 
rience of  years,  certifying  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  guard. 
That  it  was  possible  for  a  child,  or  even  a  man  to  get  through 
the  opening  was  apparent  enough.  But  that  this  was  likely 
to  occur  was  negatived  by  the  fact  that  multitudes  of  persons 
had  passed  over  the  bridge  without  the  occurrence  of  such  a 
casualty.' **  Within  the  rules  laid  down  by  and  the  reasoning 
of  these  and  other  cases,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  had 
safely  and  securely  served  all  of  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 
designed  for  years,  we  think  it  was  improper  to  permit  a  jury 
to  say  that  this  platform  and  railing  was  not  constructed  with 
reasonable  care  and  that  it  was  not  sufficient  to  guard  against 
any  contingencies  which  could  be  reasonably  apprehended.  We 
think  this  case  can  clearly  be  distinguished  from  that  of  Don- 
nelly v.  City  of  Rochester,40  especially  relied  upon  by  plain- 
tiff. .  .  .  Some  of  the  cases  to  which  we  have  already  referred, 
like  that  of  Larkin  v.  O'Neill  and  Hart  v.  Grinnell,  in  holding 
the  defendant  not  liable,  especially  refer  to  the  fact  that  the  per- 
son injured  was  not  exposed  to  any  unreasonable  or  concealed 
danger  ;  that  the  conditions  complained  of  were  obvious  to  every 
one  as  to  risks,  and  were  well  known  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that 
the  defendant  did  not  expose  anyone  'to  hidden  or  unforeseen 
danger.'  We  think  also  that,  within  the  rule  laid  down  in 
Koehler  v.  Manufacturing  Co.,41  Hickey  v.  Taaffe,4'  and  Buck- 
ley v.  Manufacturing  Co.,43  it  is  proper  to  hold  that  the  in- 
testate, although  an  infant,  was  to  be  charged  with  knowledge 


3J  See  also  Lafflin  v.  Railroad  Co., 
106  N.  Y.  136;  12  X.  E.  599;  60  Am. 
Rep.  433;  Craighead  v.  Railroad  Co., 
123  N.  Y.  391;  25  N.  E.  387. 

40  166  N.  Y.  315;  59  N.  E.  989. 


«  12  App.  Div.  50;  42  X.  Y.  Supp. 
182,  1105. 
«  105  N.  Y.  26;  12  N.  E.  280. 
«  113  N.  Y.  540;  21  N.  E.  717. 

183 


§§  I  t"»l.  It'..")  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

of  the  construction  which  was  open  to  his  view,  and  of  the 
risks  which  were  incident  thereto,  and  to  the  use  of  the  plat- 
form. As  stated  before,  the  conclusion  reached  upon  these 
questions  lead  us  to  the  belief  that  the  order  appealed  from 
should  be  reversed  without  considering  the  question  of  defend- 
ant's liability  as  a  lessor." 

§  164.  Wilful  injury— Contributory  negligence  no  defense. 

— As  a  general  proposition  it  may  be  stated  that  though  a  per- 
son may  himself  have  been  guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
yet  this  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for  damages  for  wilful  in- 
jury.41 And  it  is  declared  that  no  matter  how  gross  the  con- 
tributory negligence  may  be,  it  does  not  exempt  one  from  lia- 
bility for  an  injury  wilfully  and  intentionally  inflicted  after 
knowledge  of  the  peril  to  which  one  has  exposed  himself  by 
such  negligence.45  But  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  death  of 
a  person  under  a  recent  Kentucky  statute,  which  provided  for 
recovery,  where  the  death  resulted  from  "  negligence  or  wrong- 
ful act,"  and  which  provided  for  punitive  damages  if  the  "act 
is  wilful  or  the  negligence  gross,"  but  which  did  not  provide  as 
prior  statutes  did  for  recovery  in  case  of  "  wilful  neglect,"  con- 
tributory negligence  was  held  to  be  a  defense  thereto.46 

§165.    Contributory  negligence  — Burden   of  proof. — In 

several  of  the  states  the  rule  prevails  that,  in  an  action  to  re- 
cover damages  for  an  injury  due  to  the  negligence  of  another, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  an  absence  of 


**  Sclmmaker  v.  Mather,  38  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  542;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  411,  aff'd 
133  N.  Y.  590:  44  N.  Y.  St.  R.  754; 
30  X.  E.  755;  Martin  v.  Wood,  23  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  457;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  274: 
1  Silv.  S.  C.  212,  aff'g  18  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
274;  4  X.  Y.  Supp.  208;  Sanford  v. 
Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  343. 
See  also  Tanner  v.  Louisville,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  60  Ala.  621;  Denver  &  R  G. 
Co.  v.  Spencer,  25  Colo.  9;  10  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  (as.  X.  S.  536;  52  Pac. 
211;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Newman,  94 
Ga.  560;  21  S.  E.  219;  Wabash  R. 
184 


Co.  v.  Zerwick,  74  111.  App.  670; 
Palmer  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
112  Ind.  250;  Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Smith,  26  Ohio  St.  124;  Hol- 
stine  v.  Oregon,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  8  Oregon, 
163;  Bane  v.  Reading  R.  Co.,  155 
Pa.  St.  170;  26  Atl.  99. 

45  Denver  &  R.  G.  Co.  v.  Spencer, 
25  Colo.  9;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  536;  52  Pac.  211. 

46  Clark  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
101  Ky.  34;  39  S.  W.  840;  36  L.  R. 
A.  123;  8  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
355;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1082. 


NEGLIGENCE   AND    C0NTRIB1  T"k\     NEGLIGENCE.     §    L65 

contributory  negligence.17  In  New  York,  where  the  rule  is  fol- 
lowed, it  is  declared  that  no  presumption  arises  one  way  or  the 
other  as  to  the  absence  of  contributory  negligence,  but  that  the 
burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  establish  such  absence,  or  he  fails 
in  his  case.ls  So  where  there  was  sufficient  evidence  on  the 
question  of  negligence  of  the  defendant  to  have  justified  the 
submission  of  such  question  to  the  jury,  it  was  held  that  the 
case  was  not  entitled  to  go  to  the  jury,  there  being  no  evidence 
upon  the  question  of  decedent's  freedom  from  contributory  neg- 


«Park  v.  O'Brien,  23  Conn.  339;  i 
Ryan  v.  Bristol,  63  Conn.  2G;  27  Atl. 
309;  AugustaS.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade, 
105  Ga.  134;  31  S.  E.  420;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  548;  Chicago  & 
E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Chancellor,  105  111.  438; 
40  N.  E.  269,  rev'g  60  111.  App.  525; 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Levy,  160  111. 
385;  43  X.  E.357;  Dyer  v.  Talcott,  16 
111.  300;  West  Chicago  St.  K.  ('<>.  v. 
Boeker,  70  111.  App.  67;  Young  v. 
Citizens  St.  K.  Co.,  148  Ind.  54:  4  4 
X.  E.  927.  reh'g  denied  in  47  N.  E. 
142;  Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Baker, 
146  Ind.  600;  39  N.  E.  552;  Evansville 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Gentry,  147  Ind.  408; 
44  N.  E.  311;  37  L.  R.  A.  378;  5  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  500;  Penn.  Co. 
v.  Finney,  145  Ind.  551;  42  X.  E.  816; 
Kauffman  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  I.. 
R.  Co.,  144  Ind.  456;  43  X.  E.  446; 
Lamport  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
C»>.,  142  Ind.  269;  41  N.  E.  586; 
Whitesell  v.  Hill,  66  X.  W.  894,  aff'd 
on  reh'g  in  101  Iowa,  629;  70  X.  W. 
750;  37  L.  R.  A.  830;  Benton  v.  Cen- 
tral City  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa,  192; 
Ryan  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  44 
La.  Ann.  806;  Perkins  v.  Eastern, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  29  Me.  307;  Allyn  v. 
Boston,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Mass.  77. 
(See,  however,  Walsh  v.  Boston  A-  M. 
R.  Co.,  171  Mass.  52;  50  X.  E.  453); 
Mitchell  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
51  Mich.  236;  Mich.  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Coleman,  28  Mich.  440;  Cen- 


tral, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Mason,  51  Miss. 
234;  Jencksv.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co., 
33  App.  Div.  635;  53  X.  Y.  Supp. 
625;  Schafer  v.  New  York,  12  App. 
Div.  384;  42  X.  Y.  Supp.  744; 
Fejdouski  v.  Delaware  it  II.  Canal 
Co.,  12  App.  Div.  589;  43  X.  V. 
Supp.  84;  Dorr  v.  McCullough;  B 
App.  Div.  327;  40  X.  Y.  Supp.  806; 
Durkee  v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  88 
Hun,  471;  69  N.  Y.  St.  R.  39;  East- 
wood v.  RetzofC  Min.  Co.,  86  Bun 
(X.  Y.),  91:  68  X.  Y.  St.  R.  38;  34 
X.  Y.  Supp.  196,  aff'd  152  X.  Y.  651;  47 
X.  E.  1106;  Newdoll  v.  Young,  80 
Hun  (X.  Y.i,  364;  61  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
824;  Sutherland  v.  Troy  &  Boston 
R.  R.  Co.,  74  Hun  (X.  Y. ).  162;  56 
X.  Y.  St.  R.397:  Pearslee  v.  Chatham. 
69  Hun  i.N.  V.).  389;  52  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
695;  Wlialen  v.  Citizens  Gas  Light 
Co.,  151  X.  Y.  70:  45  X.  K.  363,  rev'g 
10  Misc.  281;  »;:;  \.  v.  st.  K.  :!17: 
30  X.  Y.  Supp.  1077:  <;eo<_die<jan  v. 
Atlas  Steamship  Co..  [46  X.  Y.  369; 
;  40  X.  E.  507.  afFg  3  Misc.  221:  51 
j  X.  Y.  St.  R.  868;  22  X.  V.  Supp. 
749;  Wiwirouski  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
Mich.  South  Rv.  Co.,  124  X.  Y.  420; 
36  X.  Y.  St.  R.  405;  26  X.  E.  L028; 
Walker  v.  Hereon,  22  Tex.  55. 

48  Eastwood  v.  Uetzoff  Min.  Co., 
86  Hun  i  X.  Y.i.  91;  'is  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
38:  34  X.  Y.  Supp.  196,  aff'd  152  X. 
Y.  651;  47  X.  E.  1106. 

is:> 


§    L65     NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

ligence  which  would  have  authorized  a  finding  on  such  issue  in 
favor  of  the  decedent,  and  accordingly  a  nonsuit  was  ordered.49 
As  to  the  character  of  evidence  necessary  to  authorize  the  sub- 
mission of  such  question  to  the  jury,  it  is  declared  by  the  court 
in  one  of  the  New  Vork  cases  that  "  the  true  rule  in  my  opin- 
ion is  this  :  The  jury  must  eventually  be  satisfied  that  the  plain- 
tiff did  not,  by  any  negligence  of  his  own,  contribute  to  the  in- 
jury. The  evidence  to  establish  this  may  consist  in  that  offered 
to  show  the  nature  or  cause  of  the  accident,  or  in  any  other 
competent  proof.  To  carry  a  case  to  the  jury,  the  evidence  on 
the  part  of  the  plaintiff  must  be  such,  as  if  believed,  would  au- 
thorize them  to  find  that  the  injury  was  occasioned  solely  by 
the  negligence  of  the  defendant.  It  is  not  absolutely  essential 
that  the  plaintiff  should  give  any  affirmative  proof,  touching 
his  own  conduct  on  the  occasion  of  the  accident.  The  character 
of  the  defendant's  delinquency  may  be  such  as  to  prove  prima 
facie  the  whole  issue  ;  or  the  case  may  be  such  as  to  make  it 
necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  show,  by  independent  evidence,  that 
he  did  not  bring  the  misfortune  upon  himself.  No  more  certain 
rule  can  be  laid  down."  M  And  it  may  be  said  to  be  the  rule  in 
most  of  the  other  states  which  hold  that  the  burden  of  proof  as 
to  contributory  negligence  is  on  the  plaintiff  that  affirmative 
proof  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  absence  of  contributory  negligence 
is  not  necessary  or  essential  in  all  cases,  since  in  many  cases  the 
facts  and  circumstances  may  be  such  that  its  absence  may  be 
inferred.51  In  a  case  in  Maine  it  is  declared  that  if  it  is  sought 
to  establish  the  absence  of  contributory  negligence  by  inference, 
"it  must  be  by  inference  from  the  facts  in  the  case.  It  cannot 
be  inferred  from  general  conduct,  nor  from  the  habits  or  in- 
stincts of  mankind,  nor  from  the  argument  that  men  are  likely 


4J  Peaslee  v.  Chatham,  69  Hun 
(N.  Y. ),  389;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  695.  See 
also  Chicago  &  E.  I.  K.  Co.  v.  Chancel- 
lor. 165  111.  4:!8:  40  X.  E.  269,  rev'g60 
111.  App.  525;  Kauffnian  v.  Cleveland, 
C.  C-  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  144  Ind.  456;  43 
N.  E.  446. 

50  Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 

20   X.  Y.  65,  aff'g   6   Duer,  633,  per 

Denio,  J.     See  also  Boyle  v.  Degnon- 

McLean  Const,  Co.,  61   X.   Y.  St.  R. 

186 


1043,  and  other  Xew  York  cases  cited 
in  this  section. 

51  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin, 
71  111.  177;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cozby, 
69  111.  App.  266;  Nelson  v.  C.  R.  I. 
Co.,  38  Iowa,  564;  Mayo  v.  Boston, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mass.  137; 
Mynning  v.  Detroit,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
64  Mich.  93,  and  cases  cited  in  first 
note  in  this  section. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    C0NTRIB1    lol:Y    NEGLIGENCE. 


166 


to  he  careful  in  danger."8  While  it  is  held  that  do  presump- 
tion arises  one  way  or  the  other  as  to  the  absence  of  contribu- 
tory negligence,  yet  it  is  also  held  in  New  York  that  the  law 
will  always  presume  that  every  man  is  desirous  of  preserving 
his  life  and  keeping  his  body  from  harm."'' 

§   166.  Contributory  negligence— Burden  of  proof —Con- 
tinued.—While,  as  we  have  stated  in  the  preceding  section,  in 

several  states,  the  rule  is  that  the  burden  of  the  proof  is  upon 
the  plaintiff  to  show  the  absence  of  contributory  negligence,  yet 
this  is  not  the  rule  which  prevails  in  the  majority  of  the 
states  and  in  the  federal  eourts,  where  it  is  held  that  the  ques- 
tion of  contributory  negligence  is  a  matter  of  defense,  the  bur- 
den of  supporting  which  is  upon   the   defendant.'1     So   in  an 


5-  McLane  v.  Perkins  (Maine,  1898), 
4l'   At!.  :.'.M;. 

■•■■  Eastwood  v.  Retzoff  Min.  Co..  86 
Hun  (X.  V.i,  91;  68  X.  V.  St.  R.  38; 
34  X.  Y.  Supp.  mti,  aff'd  152  X.  V. 
651;  47  X.  E.  1106. 

64  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Steele 
(C.  C.  App.  6th  C),  84  Fed.  93;  54 
U.  S.  App.  550;  29  C.  C.  A.  81 ;  Fitch- 
hurg  R.  Co.  v.  Nichols  (C.  C.  App. 
1st  C),  50  U.  S.  App.  297;  29  C.  C.  A. 
500;  8.-)  Fed.  945;.  Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ohisholm  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C), 
4!t  l'.  S.  App.  700:  21  C.  C.  A.  663; 
83  Fed.  652;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  161  U.  S.  451;  m  I..  Ed.  760; 
10  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  tilS:  Washington, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon,  147  U.  S.  571; 
(.3  sup.  i  t.  R.  .V>7;  Indianapolis,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Ho  I'M.  93  IT.  s.  291;  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Gladman,  15  Wall.  (U.  S. ) 
401:  Western  Ry.  of  Alabama  v. 
Williamson,  114  Ala.  LSI;  '21  So.  827; 
McDonald  v.  Montgomery  St.  R.  Co., 
110  Ala.  101;  20  So.  317:  Lopez  v. 
Central  Arizona  Min.  Co.,  1  Ariz. 
404;  Little  Rock,  etc,  R.  Co.  v.  Eu- 
banks,  48  Ark.  460;  3  S.  W.  808; 
Texas,  etc,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Orr,  46  Ark. 
182;  Robinson  v.  Western  Pac.  R.  R. 
Co.,  48  Cal.  409;  Denver,  etc.,  R.  Co. 


v.  Ryan,  17  Colo.  98;  28  Pac.  79;  Jef- 
ferson v.  Brady,  4  Honst.  (Del.)  626; 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Yniestra, 
21  Fla.  700:  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Weaver,  :',:>  Kan.  112;  11  Pac.  408: 
Paducah,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoehl,  12 
Bush  iKy. ),  41:  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
McCally,  41  Kan.  639;  Lexington, 
etc.,  County  Min.  Co.  v.  Stephens,  20 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  696;  47  S.  W.  321;  Balti- 
more, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State.  00  Md. 
449:  Freeh  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  39  Md.  .V74:  Michigan  v.  De- 
troit Cent.  Mills  Co.,  31  Mich.  274; 
Hocum  v.  Weitherich,  22  Minn.  152; 
Lane  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  132  Mo. 
4;  33  S.  W.  645;  Thompson  v.  North 
Mo.  R.  R.  Co..  ol  Mo.  190;  11  Am. 
Rep.  443;  Stevens  v.  Missouri  P.  R. 
Co.,  07  Mo.  App.  356;  Prosser  v. 
Montana  Cent.  R.  Co..  17  Mom.  372: 
43  Pac.  81;  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin, 48  Neh.  0.".:  00  N.  \V.  1007;  1  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  1 :  New  .Jersey 
Ex.  Co.  v.  Nichols,  3-.'  X.  .1.  L.  166; 
Moore  v.  Central  R.  Co..  24  X.  J.  L. 
268;  Cameron  v.  Great  Northern  R. 
Co.,  8  X.  I).  124;  77  X.  W.  1010;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  520;  5  Am. 
Xeg.  Rep.  4.")4;  Wood  v.  Barthola- 
mew,  122  X.  C.  177;  29  S.  E.  959; 
1ST 


S  L66  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


action  to  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  a  person  upon  a 
railroad  track  at  a  point  where  he  had  a  right  to  go  upon  the 
track,  it  was  held  that  after  having  given  proof  of  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  railroad  company  sufficient  to  account 
for  the  accident  without  any  fault  on  the  part  of  the  deceased, 
the  plaintiff  was  not  under  the  burden  of  showing  lack  of  con- 
tributory negligence."  But  if  in  such  an  action  contributory 
negligence  is  disclosed  by  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff,  or  may 
be  fairly  inferred  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  then  the 
burden  may  be  shifted  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  the  lack  of 
such  negligence/*  If,  however,  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to 
show  contributory  negligence,  it  is  held  that  the  presumption  is 
that  due  care  was  exercised.57  Thus  it  was  so  held  where  there 
was  no  evidence  of  how  an  accident  occurred.58  And  where  there 
was  no  eyewitness  to  a  railroad  accident  by  which  a  person 
met  his  death,  it  was  held  that  it  would  be  presumed  that  due 
care  was  exercised  by  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  the  accident 
until  the  contrary  was  made  to  appear  by  the  evidence.39     The 


Norton  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co., 
122  N.  C.  910;  29  S.  E.  886;  White 
v.  Suffolk  &  Carolina  R.  R.  Co. 
(N.  C.  1897),  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  457; 
Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Whitacre, 
35  Ohio  St.  627;  Robinson  v.  Gary, 
28  Ohio,  241;  Ford  v.  Umatilla  Co., 
15  Oreg.  313;  Hays  v.  Gallagher,  72 
Pa.  St.  136;  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Weber, 
76  Pa.  St.  157;  Cassidy  v.  Angell,  12 
R.  I.  447;  Carter  v.  Columbia,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  19  S.  C.  22;  Danner  v.  South 
Carolina  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.) 
329;  Texas,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphy, 
46  Tex.  356;  Walker  v.  Westfielrl,  39 
Vt.  246;  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Bryant, 
95  Va.  212;  28  S.  E.  183;  Kimball  v. 
Friend,  95  Va.  125;  27  S.  E.  901;  8 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  451 ;  3  Va. 
Law  Reg.  650;  Northern  Pac.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Brien,  1  Wash.  599;  21  Pac. 
32;  Johnson  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  73;  14  S.  E.  432; 
Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  41  Wis.  105;  22  Am. 
Rep.   714. 

66  Toledo  P.  &  W.   R.  Co.   v.  Chis- 
188 


holm(C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  49  U.S. 
App.  700;  83  Fed.  652;  27  C.  C.  A. 
663. 

66  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Bryant,  95 
Va.  212;  28  S.  E.  183;  Kimball  v. 
Friend,  95  Va.  125;  27  S.  E.  901;  8 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  451;  3  Va. 
Law  Reg.  650;  Durrell  v.  Johnson, 
31  Neb.  796;  48  N.  W.  890. 

67  Norton  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co., 
122  N.  C.  910;  29  S.  E.  886.  See  also 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanderson, 
174  111.  495;  Salyers  v.  Monroe,  104 
Iowa,  74;  Northern  Cen.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  29  Md.  420:  Mynning  v.  De- 
troit, etc.,  R.  It.  Co.,  64  Mich.  95; 
Flynn  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
78  Mo.  195;  Cameron  v.  Great  North- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  8  N.  D.  124;  77  N.  W. 
1016;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  454;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  520;  Schum  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.Co.,  107  Pa.  St.  8;  Cassidy 
v.  Angell,  12  R.  I.  447. 

58 Schum   v.   Penn.  R.   R.  Co.,   107 
Pa.  St.  8. 
59  Cameron  v.  Great  Northern  R. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORS    NEGLIGENCE.     §    167 

rule  that  the  question  of  contributory  negligence  is  a  matter  of 
defense,  the  burden  of  supporting  which  rests  upon  the  de- 
fendant is  not  varied,  it  is  declared,  by  the  fact  that  plaintiff 
alleges  that  he  was  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  or  by  any  other 
state  of  the  pleadings.**  Although  the  rule  adopted  and  fol- 
lowed by  the  Massachusetts  courts  is  that  followed  by  the  mi- 
nority of  the  states,"1  yet  in  that  state  it  is  held  in  a  late  case 
that,  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  death  caused  by  neg- 
ligence under  a  Massachusetts  statute,62  the  burden  is  upon  a 
defendant  railroad  company  to  show  that  the  deceased  was 
guilty  of  gross  or  wilful  negligence,  and  that  such  negligence 
contributed  to  the  injury,  and  that  plaintiff  need  not  negative 
such  negligence.*" 

§  167.  Contributory  negligence— Burden  of  proof— Con- 
clusion.— In  the  preceding  sections  we  have  stated  the  two 
different  rules  which  prevail  as  to  the  burden  of  proof  in  con- 
nection with  the  question  of  contributory  negligence.  It  will 
be  noticed  that  in  several  of  those  states  which  hold  that  the 
burden  to  establish  its  absence  is  on  the  plaintiff,  it  is  also  de- 
clared that  the  law  will  always  presume  that  every  man  is 
desirous  of  preserving  his  life  or  his  body  from  injury  until  the 
contrary  is  proved,  and  that  the  absence  of  contributory  negli- 
gence may  in  many  instances  be  inferred  from  the  facts  and 
circumstances  in  each  case,  and  that  where  it  may  be  inferred, 
affirmative  proof  of  its  absence  is  not  necessary.  In  those  states 
where  the  opposite  rule  prevails,  it  is  generally  held  that  due 
care  will  always  be  presumed  until  the  contrary  is  proved,  but 
that  contributory  negligence  may  be  inferred  from  the  fads  in 
a  case,  without  direct  proof  thereof,  thus  casting  the  burden  on 
the  plaintiff  to  show  its  absence.  The  prevailing  rule  to-day  as 
clearly  supported  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  is  that  the 
question  of  contributory  negligence  is  a  matter  of  defense,  and 
that  in  the  absence  of  facts  and  circumstances  from  which  its 


R.  Co.,  8  N.  D.  124;  77  N.  W.  1016; 
5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  454;  12  Am.  &  EDg. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  520. 

60Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Nichols  |C. 
('.  App.  1st  C),  50  U.  S.  App.  --".17: 
85  Fed.  945:  29  C.  C.  A.  500. 


1,1  See  preceding  section. 
«'-'  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  §  213. 
«» Walsh   v.    Boston  it    M.    R.   Co., 
171  Mass.  52;  50  N.  E.  4:.:?. 


189 


§  168    np:gligence  and  contributory  negligence. 

existence  may  be  inferred,  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant  to 
show  its  existence  by  affirmative  proof. 

§  168.  Doctrine  of  comparative  negligence.— In  a  recent 
Wisconsin  case,64  the  court65 says  that  the  doctrine  of  comparative 
neo-lio-ence  does  not  prevail  in  that  state  and  adds:  "The  doc- 
trine  of  this  court  like  that  of  all  courts  that  entirely  discoun- 
tenance comparative  negligence,  is  that  contributory  negligence 
of  the  plaintiff,  however  slight,  precludes  his  recovering  in  an 
action  grounded  on  the  defendant's  negligence,  however  great 
such  negligence  may  have  been.  In  this  we  do  not  refer  to 
wilful  misconduct  of  a  wrongdoer,  which  has  come  to  be  spoken 
of  as  gross  negligence,  meaning  however  intent,  actual  or  con- 
structive, to  do  the  injury,  and  not  negligence  at  all,  strictly 
so-called.  The  doctrine  of  contributory  negligence  applied  here 
has  the  sanction  of  the  common  law  from  time  immemorial,  the 
support  of  most  of  the  courts  and  standard  text-writers,  and 
half  a  century  of  the  adjudications  of  this  court.  To  change  it 
otherwise  than  by  legislative  enactment  would  be  judicial  usur- 
pation. Therefore,  it  is  idle  to  urge  upon  our  attention  author- 
ities that  cannot  be  applied  except  by  such  transgression. 
Cases  supporting  each  of  the  lines  of  comparative  negligence 
and  the  other  rules  to  which  we  have  referred,  are  presented 
here  as  bearing  on  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover,  and  many 
more  might  be  found,  especially  in  the  inferior  appellate  courts 
of  some  of  the  states.  Upon  the  faith  of  such  authorities  it  is 
believed  much  money  has  been  uselessly  expended  and  false, 
unattainable  hopes  built  up.  Other  courts  have  found  it  neces- 
sary, by  vigorous  language,  to  stay  the  tendency  of  such  mis- 
chief. In  a  very  recent  case  in  Missouri  the  court  used  these 
emphatic  words :  '  There  is  no  comparative  negligence  in  this 
state.  The  rule  that  the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff  (want  of 
ordinary  care  was  undoubtedly  meant)  which  contributed  di- 
rectly to  the  cause  of  the  injury  will  prevent  a  recovery,  is 
without  exception  or  qualification.'  The  court  was  speaking 
of  where  recovery  is  sought  on  the  ground  of  defendant's  want 
of  ordinary  care."  * 

64  Tesch  v.  Milwaukee  Elec.  R.  &  I      65  Per  Marshall,  J. 
L.  Co.,  108  Wis.  593  ;  84  N.  W.  823.    |      <*  Hogan  v.  Citizens  Railway  Co., 
190 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRIBUTORS     NEGLIGENCE,     §    L69 


§169.  Error  of  judgment— Sudden  emergency  -Contribn- 
tory  negligence. — If  a  person  owing  to  the  negligence  of  an- 
other is  placed  in  a  position  of  peril  where  he  is  obliged  instantly 
to  choose  a  line  of  conduct  in  the  hope  of  escaping  the  impend- 
ing danger,  and  he  makes  such  a  choice  as  a  man  of  ordinary 
prudence  would  make  under  similar  circumstances,  and  is  in- 
jured thereby,  the  fact  that  if  he  had  chosen  another  line  of  ac- 
tion the  injury  might  have  heen  avoided  will  not  render  him 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence.'17     Thus  it  was  so  held  where  a 


150  Mo.  M,  51  S.  \V.  473.  Doctrine 
of  comparative  negligence  does  not 
exist  in  Kentucky.  Sandy  River 
C.  C.  Co.  v.  Candill  (Ky.  App.  1901), 
60  S.  W.  180.  Not  error  to  charge 
"If  the  defendant  was  less  negligent 
than  thr  plaintiff,  plaintiff  could  not 
recover."  Willingham  v.  Macon  & 
B.  R.  Co.  (113  Ga.  374),  38  S.  E.  843, 
approved  in  Brunswick  &  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Wiggins  (Ga.  1901).  39  S.  E.  551. 
where  the  court  per  Little,  J.,  says 
"as  a  matter  of  law,  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover  for  injuries  indicted 
by  the  negligence  of  an  agent  of  a 
railroad  company  in  the  operation 
of  its  trains,  if  both  the  agent  and 
the  person  injured  are  equally  negli- 
gent at  the  time  the  injury  was  sus- 
tained. Section  2322  of  the  Civil  Code 
declares  that  no  person  shall  recover 
damages  from  a  railroad  company 
for  injuries  to  himself  where  the 
same  is  caused  by  his  own  negli- 
gence, but  if  the  complainant  and 
the  agents  of  the  company  arc  both 
at  fault,  the  former  may  recover,  but 
the  damages  may  be  diminished  by 
the  jury  in  proportion  to  the  amount 
of  default  attributable  to  him."  See 
also  opinion  in  sec.  158,  herein,  and 
note  22,  thereto.  If  injury  is  in- 
dicted wilfully,  contributory  negli- 
gence does  not  preclude  recovery. 
Bolin  v.  Chicago,  St.  F.  M.  &  O.  K. 
Co.,  108  Wis.  333;  84  N.  W.  446. 
67  Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Paulk,  24 


Ga.  350;  Smith  v.  Wiightaville,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  83  Ga.  G71;  10  S.  E.  361; 
Peoria,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  144  111. 
227;  33  N.  E.  931;  Muldowney  v.  Il- 
linois, etc.,  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  462; 
Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  R.  Co..  65 
Iowa,  91;  21  N.  W.  198;  Barton  v. 
Springfield,  110  Mass.  131;  Richfield 
v.  Mich.  C.  R.  Co.,  110  Mich.  406:  OS 
X.  W.  218;  3  Det.  L.  N.  425;  Chi- 
cago, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  4ti  Mich. 
532;  9  N.  W.  841;  Benoit  v.  Troy  & 
Lansingbnrgh  R.  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y. 
223;  48  N\  E.  524,  rev'g  9  App.  Uiv. 
622;  40  X.  Y.  St.  R.  1140;  Wynn  v. 
Central  Park.  North  &  East  River  R. 
R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  :.75:  44  \.  Y.  St.  K 
673;  30  N.  E.  721:  Twomley  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  69  N.  Y.  158:  Dyer  v.  Erie 
R.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  228;  Read  v. 
Brooklyn  II.  R.  Co.,  32  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  503:  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  209; 
Floettel  v.  Johnson  Engineering  Co.. 
19  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  136;  45  N.  Y. 
Supp.  980;  Heath  v.  (ileus  Falls, 
Sandy  Hill  &  Fort  Edward  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  90  Hun  (\.  Y.),  560;  71  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  29:  Cowen  v.  Knickerbocker 
Ice  Co.,  6  X.  Y.  St.  R.  612,  aff'd  112 
N.  Y.  664;  20  N.  Y.  St.  R.  978;  20  N. 
E.  413:  Quill  v.  New  York  Cent.  R. 
R.  Co.,  10  Daly  (N.  Y. ),  313;  11  N. 
Y'.  Supp.  80:  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  612; 
Blackwell  v.  Lynchburg,  etc..  K.  •  ',,.. 
Ill  X.  C.  151:  If,  S  E.  1i':  Vallo  v. 
United  States  Exp.  Co..  147  Pa.  St. 
404:  23  Atl.  594;  Gibbons  v.  Wilkes- 
191 


§  170     NEGLIGENCE   AND   CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 

woman,  who  was  a  passenger  in  a  car,  upon  seeing  the  danger  of 
an  impending  collision,  arose  from  her  seat  with  the  intention  of 
escaping  from  the  car,  and  was  thrown  out  and  injured.68  And 
again,  where  a  person  was,  by  the  negligence  of  those  in  charge 
of  a  locomotive  placed  in  a  position  of  danger,  and  in  rising 
from  the  seat  of  his  wagon  was  struck  by  the  engine  and  killed, 
while  if  he  had  remained  seated  he  would  have  escaped  unin- 
jured.09  So,  also,  where  horses  commenced  to  run  away  and  the 
driver  in  attempting'  to  direct  their  course,  though  exercising 
his  best  judgment,  erred,  it  was  held  to  be  an  error  of  judgment, 
and  that  there  was  no  ground  for  the  imputation  of  negligence.'u 
The  rule  above  stated,  however,  is  held  not  to  apply  to  a  per- 
son who,  by  his  own  negligence,  has  placed  himself  in  a  position 
of  peril.71 

§  170.  Error  of  judgment— Sudden  emergency— Negli- 
gence.—In  many  cases  also  where  it  is  sought  to  charge  a  per- 
son with  negligence,  the  fact  that  the  person  sought  to  be 
charged  therewith  was  confronted  with  imminent  peril  and 
made  a  mistake  of  judgment  will  relieve  him  of  such  charge. 
This  may  frequently  happen  in  the  case  of  those  in  charge  of 
cars  and  other  public  and  private  conveyances.  Thus  in  the 
case  of  motormen  in  charge  of  electric  cars,  the  rule  is  that 
where  a  motorman  in  the  presence  of  imminent  danger  has  two 
or  more  lines  of  action  open  to  him,  and  he  chooses  one  of  them 
in  good  faith,  the  fact  that  it  may  subsequently  appear  that  by 
the  adoption  of  another  line  of  action  the  danger  might  have 
been  better  avoided  will  not  of  itself  constitute  negligence  on 


Bane,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  155  Pa. St. 279; 
26  Atl.  417;  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sein,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
386;  33  S.  W.  558. 

68  Heath  v.  Glens  Falls,  Sandy  Hill 
&  Fort  Edward  St.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  560;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  29. 

«9  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sein,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  386;  33  S. 
W.  558.  See  also  Smith  v.  New 
York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  App. 
Div.  (Y.  Y.)  493;  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
666;  Wiley  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
192 


76  Hun  (N.  Y.),  29,  aff'd  144  N.  Y. 
717,  cases  of  attempting  to  cross 
railroad  tracks  to  escape  threatened 
peril. 

70  Benoit  v.  Troy  &  Lansingburgh 
R.  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  223,  rev'g  9  App. 
Div.  622;  40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  1140. 

71  Richfield  v.  Michigan  C.  R.  Co., 
110  Mich.  406;  68  N.  W.  218;  3  Det. 
L.  N.  425;  Austin,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Beatty,  73  Tex.  592;  11  S.  W.  858; 
Baltzer  v.  Chicago  &  R.  Co.,  83  Wis. 
459;  53  N.  W.  885. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.      § 


171 


his  part,  or  render  the  company  liable.'2  So  in  a  case  in  New 
York  it  was  declared  that  where  an  employee  of  a  railroad  is 
confronted  with  a  sadden  emergency,  the  failure  on  bia  part  to 
exercise  the  best  judgment  possible  does  no!  establish  lack  of 
care  and  skill.73  So  where  a  motorman,  after  having  started  his 
car  across  a  street,  saw  a  runaway  horse  coming  towards  the 
track,  and  he  had  hut  a  brief  instant  to  decide  on  what  course 
to  pursue,  it  was  held  that  though  he  may  have  erred  in  judg- 
ment in  continuing  to  cross  the  street,  yet  this  of  itself  did  not 
constitute  negligence  rendering  the  company  liable.71 

$  171.  Contributory  negligence— Stop,  look  and  listen. 

"  In  some  jurisdictions  the  mere  failure  to  stop,  look  and  listen 
by  one  who  is  about  to  cross  a  railroad  track  is  negligence  per 
se,  and  this  is  true  notwithstanding  that  at  the  place  where  the 
person  was  about  to  cross,  there  is  imposed  upon  the  railroad 
company,  by  statute  or  otherwise,  the  duty  of  giving  signals  as 
to  the  approach  of  trains  to  such  places.  In  other  jurisdictions 
it  is  held  that  the  mere  failure  to  stop,  look  and  listen  will  not 
amount  to  negligence  per  se,  but  the  question  whether  it  is  such 
negligence  as  will  defeat  a  recovery  is  one  of  fact,  to  be  deter- 
mined by  a  jury  after  taking  into  consideration  all  of  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,"  and  the  court  adds  that  even  in  certain 
jurisdictions  referred  to  in  the  opinion,  ''the  rule  is  settled  that 


72  Joyce  on  Electric  Law  (ed.  1!)00), 
sec.  574,  citing  Stabenau  v.  Atlan- 
tic Ave.  R.  Co.,  15.j  N.  V.  511;  50  N. 
E.  277,  rev'g  89  Hun,  009:  Bittner  v. 
Cross  town  .St.  Ry.  Co.,  153  X.  JT.76; 
46  \.  E.  104;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  642, 
rev'g  12  Misc.  (  X.  Y. )  514;  67  \.  Y. 
St.  R.  367;  S3  X.  Y.  Sup  p.  672; 
Phillips  v.  Peoples'  Pass.  R.  Co.,  190 
Pa.  St.  222;  42  Atl.  686;  43  Wkly. 
N.  of  ('as.  Ml;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  719; 
Lock  wood  v.  Belle  City  R.  Co.,  92 
Wis.  97;  65  N.  W.  866;  Bisliof  v. 
Belle  City  R.  Co.,  92  Wis.  139;  65  X. 
W.  733. 

78  Wynn  v.  Central  Park,  North  & 
East  River  R.  R.  Co.,  133  X.  Y.  575; 
44  N.  Y.  St.  R.  673;  30  X.  E.  721. 
In  this  case  it  appeared  that  while 

13 


descending  a  down  grade  the  brake 
chain  on  a  car  broke  causing  the  car 
to  descend  of  its  own  weight  and  to 
collide  with  another  car,  and  that 
the  driver  remained  on  his  car  until 
it  was  within  four  feet  of  the  other, 
when  he  jumped.  The  court  held 
that  it  appearing  that  the  driver  hav- 
ing used  his  best  judgment  and  hav- 
ing done  all  that  could  have  been 
done,  it  was  error  to  leave  the  ques- 
tion to  the  jury  to  determine  whether 
the  car  bad  been  managed  with 
the  care  and  skill  required  by  law. 

"*  Phillips  v.  Peoples"  Pass.  II.  Co., 
190  Pa.  St.  222;  42  Ail.  686;  4:1 
Wkly.  X.  of  Cas.  531 ;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep. 
719. 

193 


§  171  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

one  about  to  cross  a  railroad  track  must  use  his  senses  in  a  way 
that  an  ordinarily  prudent  person  would  under  similar  circum- 
stances use  them,  in  order  to  determine  whether  it  would  be  safe 
to  cross  at  that  time  and  place ;  and  this  is  true  notwithstand- 
ing the  company  may  be  by  law  required  to  give  signals,  slacken 
speed,  or  do  such  other  acts  as  would,  if  faithfully  performed, 
render  improbable,  if  not  impossible,  injury  to  any  one  crossing 
the  track."  75  "  There  has  been  an  endeavor  in  a  large  number 
of  cases,  in  behalf  of  electric  street  railway  companies,  to  obtain 
an  enforcement  with  the  same  degree  of  strictness  of  the  rule 
which  requires  persons  about  to  cross  the  tracks  of  a  steam  rail- 
road to  '  stop,  look  and  listen,'  and  making  failure  to  do  so  neg- 
ligence per  se.  The  courts,  however,  have  not  inclined  to  a 
strict  application  of  this  rule  in  the  case  of  electric  railway  tracks, 
owing  to  the  difference  in  the  character  of  the  roads,  their  rights 
in  reference  to  their  tracks,  and  the  general  conditions  affecting 
and  surrounding  their  operation.  An  electric  street  railway  is 
within  the  purposes  for  which  a  street  is  dedicated  or  taken, 
while  a  steam  railroad  is  not.  The  right  of  the  company  in  the 
street  is  merely  a  right  in  common  with  that  of  the  public.  It 
possesses  no  proprietary  interest  in  or  to  the  right  of  way,  and 
the  cars  are  not  run  at  such  a  high  rate  of  speed  and  are  more 
easily  and  quickly  stopped.  On  account  of  these  distinctions 
and  differences  in  the  character  and  operation  of  the  roads,  the 
rule  that  persons  must  '  stop,  look  and  listen '  before  crossing 
the  tracks  of  a  steam  railroad  does  not  apply  as  strictly  in  the 
case  of  crossing  the  tracks  of  an  electric  street  railway."76 


76  Western  &  Atlantic  R.  Co.  v. 
Ferguson  (Ga. ),  39  S.  E.  306;  10  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  230,  per  Cobb,  J.  See 
note  as  to  "  stop,  look,  and  listen," 
9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  408-416.  See  also 
notes,  11  L.  R.  A.  385;  9  L.  R.  A. 
157;  7  L.  R.  A.  316;  notes,  90  Am. 
Dec.  780-787. 

76  Clark  v.  Bennett,  123  Cal.  275; 
55  Pac.  908;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
299;  Davidson  v.  Denver  Tramway 
Co.,  4  Col.  App.  283;  4  Am.  Elec. 
Cas.  534;  Capital  Traction  Co.  v. 
Lusby,  26  Wash.  L.  Rep.  163;  12 
194 


App.  D.  C.  295;  Evansville  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Gentry,  147  Iud.  408;  44  N.  E. 
311,  37  L.  R.  A.  378;  5  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  500;  Orr  v.  Cedar 
Rapids  &  M.  C.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa, 
1895),  5  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  445;  Rob- 
bins  v.  Springfield  St.  Ry.  Co., 
165  Mass.  30;  6  Am.  Elec  Cas.  495; 
Holmgren  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co. 
(Minn.  1895),  5  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  499; 
Shea  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  50 
Minn.  395;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  481; 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Scott, 
58  N.  J.  L.  682;  6  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  616; 


NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTOR?  NEGLIGENCE.   §  1 7 "J 

§  172.  Imputed  negligence.— Id  many  cases,  although  an 

injured  party  may  be  guilty  of  no  direct  act  of  negligence  on 
his  part  contributing  to  the  injury,  yet  by  reason  of  some  rela- 
tion existing  between  such  injured  party  and  a  third  person,  an 
act  of  such  third  person  contributing  to  the  injury  may  be  im- 
puted to  the  person  injured  so  as  to  prevent  the  recovery  of 
damages.  This  question  of  imputable  negligence  frequently 
arises  where  a  person  riding  in  a  vehicle  or  conveyance  driven 
bv  another  is  injured  owing  to  some  negligence  or  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  the  person  driving.  In  these  cases,  in  order  to 
impute  the  negligence  of  the  driver  to  the  person  injured,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  latter  must  have  taken  some  part  in  the  con- 
trol or  management  of  the  vehicle,  such  as  directing  the  manage- 
ment of  the   horse  or  instructing  the  driver  in  this  particular. 


Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Behr, 
59  N.  J.  L.  477;  37  Atl.  142;  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  189;  Consolidated 
Traction  Co.  v.  Haight,  59  N.  J.  L. 
577;  37  Atl.  135;  2  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  192;  Brozek  v.  Steinway  Ry. 
Co.,  10  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  360;  6  Am. 
Elec.  Cas.  542;  Ehrismau  v.  East 
Ilarrisburg  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  150 
Penn.  St.  180;  4  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  486; 
Citizens'  Rapid  Trans.  Co.  v.  Sei- 
prist,  96  Tenn.  119;  6  Am.  Elec.  Cas. 
583;  Hall  v.  Ogden  City  St.  Ry.  Co., 
13  Utah,  243;  44  Par.  1046;  »'. 
Am.  Elec.  Cas.  598;  4  Am.  &  Eng. 
K.  Cas.  N.  S.  77.  See  Joyce  on  Elec. 
Law  (ed.  1900),  sees.  625-050  where 
this  subject  is  exhaustively  discussed 
in  connection  with  electric  railroads 
and  where  the  conclusion  is  as  fol- 
lows: "We  think  we  are  justified  in 
stating  the  rule  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
a  person  about  to  cross  the  tracks  of 
an  electric  street  railway  to  look  and 
listen  for  approaching  cars,  and 
that  failure  to  do  so  is  prima  facie 
contributory  negligence,  not  nec- 
essarily precluding  recovery,  but  de- 
pendent as  to  its  effect  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  particular  case. 


Those  operating  electric  railways 
are  held  to  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  to  prevent  injury  to  persons 
crossing  their  tracks,  that  is.  a  de- 
gree of  care  such  as  an  ordinarily  [un- 
dent man  would  exercise,  under  the 
same  circumstances,  commensurate 
with  the  necessities  arising  from  the 
use  of  the  instrument  operated,  the 
possibility  of  danger,  and  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case.  They 
have  no  right  to  recklessly  rundown 
pedestrians,  or  persons  in  vehicles, 
who  may  be  crossing  their  tracks. 
The  latter  have  an  equal  righl  with 
the  company  to  the  use  of  the  portion 
of  the  street  occupied  by  the  tracks, 
subject  only  to  the  limitation  that 
they  must  not  necessarily  obstruct 
the  passage  of  the  cars.  Though  a 
person  may  by  his  own  negligence, 
be  in  a  position  of  danger  nn  the 
tracks  of  an  electric  street  railway, 
yet  his  act  will  not  preclude  recovery, 
if  those  in  charge  of  the  car,  after 
having  become  aware  of  his  danger, 
could,  by  proper  care  and  diligence, 
have  avoided  the  injury."  See  Rus- 
sell v.  Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.  (Minn. 
1901),  SO  N.  W.  346. 

195 


§  17-2  NEGLIGENCE  AND  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

If  lie  has  not  so  done,  then  whether  he  be  in  a  public  vehicle  as 
a  passenger  or  in  a  private  vehicle  riding  upon  the  invitation  of 
another,  the  rule,  as  clearly  supported  by  the  authorities,  is  that 
no  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  driver  will  be  imputed  to  him.17 
He  must  also  exercise  due  care  himself  to  avoid  injury  and  is 
not  relieved  from  the  consequences  of  his  failure  to  do  so,78  and 
if  he  participates  in  the  negligence  of  the  driver  he  will  be 
chargeable  with  such  negligence  so  as  to  prevent  recovery  of 
damages  for  any  injury  sustained.79  So,  also,  will  the  negligence 
of  the  driver  be  imputed  to  him  if,  with  a  knowledge  of  the 


"Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lapsley  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  C.)i  51  Fed-  174;  4  U.  S. 
App.  542;  2  C.  C.  A.  149;  16  L.  R.  A. 
800;  32  Am.  L.  Reg.  373;  Georgia  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  87  Ala.  610;  6  So. 
413;  Tompkins  v.  Clay  St.  R.  Co., 
66  Cal.  163;  4  Pa.  1165;  Roach  v. 
Western  &  A.  R.  Co.,  93  Ga.  785;  21 
S.  E.  67;  Carnis  v.  Erwin,  59  111. 
App.  555;  Branuan  v.  Kokomo,  etc., 
R.  Co..  115  lud.  115;  17  N.  E.  202: 
Larkin  v.  Burlington,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
85  Iowa,  492;  52  N.  W.  480;  Cahill  v. 
Cincinnati,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  92  Ky.  345; 
Randolph  v.  O'Riordan,  155  Mass. 
331;  29  N.  E.  583;  Alabama  &  V.  R. 
Co.  v.  Davis,  69  Miss.  444;  13  So.  693; 
Dickson  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  104 
Mo.  491;  16  S.  W.  381;  Noyes  v. 
Boscawen,  64  N.  H.  361;  10  Atl.  690; 
Consol.  Tract.  Co.  v.  Behr,  59  N.  J. 
L.  477;  37  Atl.  142:  Consol.  Tract. 
Co.  v.  Hoimark,  60  N.  J.  L.  456;  38 
Atl.  684;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
370,  afTg59  N.  J.  L.  297;  36  Atl.  100; 
Kleiner  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  36  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  191;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  394; 
De  Loge  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.),  149;  71 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  720;  McCallum  v.  Long 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  96; 
103  N.  Y.  686;  Masterson  v.  New 
York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  247; 
Pettingill  v.  Town  of  Olean,  48  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  96 :  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  367,  aff'd 
141  N.  Y.  573;  McCormack  v. 
196 


Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co.,  18  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  33;  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  230, 
denying  reh'g  16  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
24;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  684;  Robinson  v. 
New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N. 
Y.  11 ;  65  Barb.  146:  Kessler  v.  Brook- 
lyn Heights  R.  R.  Co.,  3  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  426;  74  N.  Y.  St.  R.  140;  38 
N.  Y.  Supp.  799;  Strauss  v.  New- 
burgh  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  264;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  998;  Gaylor 
v.  Syracuse,  B.  &  N.  Y.  R.  R.  Co.,  105 
N.  Y.  647;  23  Wkly.  Dig.  396;  Dyer 
v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  228;  St. 
Clair  St.  R.  Co. ;  Covington  Transfer 
Co.  v.  Kelly,  36  Ohio  St.  86;  Carr  v. 
Easton  City,  142  Pa.  St.  139;  21  Atl. 
822 ;  Borough  of  Carlisle  v.  Brisbane, 
113  Pa.  St.  554;  6  Atl.  372;  Markham 
v.  Houston,  etc.,  Nav.  Co.,  73  Tex. 
247;  11  S.  W.  131;  New  York,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  85  Va.  939.  See 
also  Joyce  on  Electric  Law  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  596.  But  see  Omaha,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  v.  Talbot,  48  Neb.  627;  67  N.  W. 
569;  Ritger  v.  Milwaukee,  99  Wis. 
190;  74  N.  W.  15. 

78  Bergold  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co., 
30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)438;  52  N.  Y. 
Supp.  11;  Johnson  v.  Superior  Rapid 
Trans.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis.  233;  64  N.  W. 
753. 

79  De  Loge  v.  Hudson  &  New  York 
Central  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  149;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  720. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND   CONTRlBUTOBY    NEGLIGENCE.     §    173 


danger  about  to  be  incurred,  he  neither  objects  nor  makes  any 
effort  to  avoid  it.80  Thus  it  was  so  held  where  a  person  was 
riding  in  another's  conveyance  at  the  iatter's  request  and  the 
owner  drove  so  recklessly  that  the  other  should  have  perceived 
his  carelessness  but  failed  to  do  so  or  to  make  any  remonstrance. 
Under  the  conditions  in  this  ease  it  was  held  that  there  could 
be  no  recovery  of  damages  for  an  injury  sustained  by  reason  of 
collision  with  a  railroad  train.81  And  it  is  held  that  a  passenger 
in  a  public  conveyance  may  be  chargeable  with  the  negligence  of 
the  driver,  where  he  has  exercised  control  over  such  driver  be- 
yond the  mere  giving  of  directions  as  to  his  place  of  destination 
if,  as  a  result  of  such  control,  the  injury  results  therefrom  either 
in  whole  or  in  part.82  But  the  negligence  of  the  driver  will  not 
be  imputed  to  him  merely  because  of  suggestions  as  to  the  line 
of  route  to  be  taken,83  or  of  a  caution  to  "ride  slow"  in  ap- 
proaching a  crossing.1*1 

§  173.  Imputed    negligence— Cases    generally.— Where  a 

person  in  an  unconscious  condition  without  any  fault  of  his 
own  was  placed  in  a  wagon,  the  negligence  of  the  driver 
was  held  not  imputable  to  him  so  as  to  prevent  recovery  for 
injuries  caused  both  by  the  negligence  of  the  driver  and  the 
condition  of  the  highway.83  So  negligence  of  a  gripman  on  a 
cable  car  in  crossing  the  tracks  of  another  road  at  excessive 
speed  is  not  imputable  to  the  conductor  so  as  to  prevent  re- 
covery by  him  for  injuries  sustained;1*  nor  is  the  negligence 
of  the  driver  of  a  hose  cart  imputable  to  a  fireman  riding  on 
the  cart : sr  nor  of  one  policeman,  detailed  to  drive  an  ambu- 


8u  Miller  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  128  Iud.  97;  27  N.  E.  339;  Don- 
nelly v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.,  109  X. 
Y.  16:  14  N.  Y.  St,  R.  29;  15  N.  E. 
733;  28  W.  D.  250;  Brickell  v.  New- 
York  Central  A  II.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 
N.  Y.  290,  aff'g  12  \.  Y.  St.  R.  450. 

"Smith  v.  New  York  Central,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  38  II mi  (  N.  Y.),  33. 

82  Haiti  more  and  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Adams,  U.  C.  App.  25  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  167;  1  App.  D.  C.  '.'7. 

88  Zimmerman  v.    Union    Ry.    Co. 


(App.  Div.  X.  Y.  1898).  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  665. 

**  Bergold  v.  Xassau  Elec.  R.  Co., 
30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  438;  52  X.  Y. 
Supp.  11. 

85  Foley  v.  East  Flaniborough  Twp.. 
26  Ont.  App.  43. 

80  Minster  v.  Citizens  Ry.  Co..  53 
Mo.  App.  276. 

*"  Houston  City  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rich- 
art,  87  Tex.  539;  29  S.  W.  1040, 
rev'g  27  S.  W.    918. 

197 


§174     NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

lance,  to  another  riding  on  the  inside  of  same;1"  nor  can  the 
negligence  of  a  tugboat,  acting  as  an  independent  contractor 
in  the  towing  of  a  vessel,  and  having  entire  control  of  her 
movements,  be  charged  to  the  vessel.89  So,  also,  where  a  person 
was  with  others  in  a  rowboat  which  was  run  down  by  a  schooner, 
it  was  held  that  the  negligence  of  the  others  could  not  be  im- 
puted to  deceased,  where  it  did  not  appear  that  he  was  in  any 
way  responsible  for  their  conduct.90 

§  174.  Imputed  negligence— Husband  and  wife. — In  the 

case  of  a  woman  riding  with  her  husband,  it  has  been  held  that 
she  is  not  chargeable  with  his  negligence  where  they  are  not  en- 
gaged in  a  joint  enter])  rise  and  he  is  not  her  servant  or  agent,91 
unless  she  does  some  act  to  encourage  his  carelessness.92  She  is 
not,  however,  excused  from  using  reasonable  care  herself.  So 
in  crossing  railroad  tracks  she  should  use  reasonable  and  pru- 
dent effort  herself  to  see  that  the  crossing  is  safe,  and  if  she 
observes  that  her  husband  is  about  to  commit  a  negligent  act 
in  driving  across  such  tracks,  her  silence  may  not,  as  a  matter  of 
law,  constitute  negligence,  but  the  inferences  arising  from  such 
facts  will  present  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine.93  And 
this  may  be  said  to  be  the  general  rule  as  to  the  right  of  a  wife 
to  recover  for  injuries  sustained  under  such  circumstances,  ex- 
cept in  those  states  where  enabling  statutes  have  not  materially 
changed  the  status  of  the  wife  from  her  position  under  the  com- 
mon law,  or  where  the  common-law  form  of  action  is  still  main- 
tained.94    In  an  action  by  the  husband  and  wife,  however,  it  is 


88  Bailey  v.  Jourdan,  18  A  pp.  Div. 
IN.  Y.)387;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  399. 

89  Vessel  Owners  Towing  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  11  C.  C.  A..  3iiG:  63  Fed. 
626. 

90  Reich  v.  Peck,  83  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
214;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  806;  31  N.  Y. 
Sup]..  391,  aff'd  152  N.  Y.  640;  N.  E. 
1151. 

91  Finley  v.  Chicago.  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co..  71  Minn.  471:  74  N.  W.  174. 

92  Platz  v.  Cohoes,  24  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
101. 

93  Hoag  v.  New  York    Central   R. 

198 


R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  Y.  199;  19  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
80;  18  N.  E.  648,  rev'g  21  Wkly. 
Dig.  506. 

94  So  this  rule  prevails  in  the  fol- 
lowing states:  Louisville,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  v.  Creek,  130  Ind.  139;  29  N.  E. 
481;  Reading  v.  Telfer,  57  Kan.  798; 
Finley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.  71  Minn.  471;  N.  W.  474;  Hoag  v. 
New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N. 
Y.  199;  19  N.  Y.  St.  R.  80;  18  N. 
E.  648,  rev'g  21  Wkly.  Dig.  506; 
Hedges  v.  Kansas  City,  18  Mo.  A  pp. 
26.     But  see  following  states  where 


NEGLIGENCE   AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.     5  175 


held  that  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  husband  will  be  a 
defense  to  the  action.95  In  a  case  in  the  federal  courts  it  lias 
been  declared  that  although  the  statutes  may  have  emancipated 
a  woman  from  many  common-law  disabilities  and  relieved  the 
husband  from  responsibility  for  civil  injuries  committed  By  her, 
yet  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  wife  may  consti- 
tute a  defense  to  an  action  by  the  husband  for  the  loss  of  her 
society  and  the  expense  of  her  cure.96 

§  175.  Contributory    negligence    of  parent    as   affecting 
recovery  for  injury  to  child— Recovery  by  parent.— In  an 

action  by  a  parent,  to  recover  damages  for  his  own  use  and  bene- 
fit, where  his  child  has  been  injured,  the  contributory  negligence 
of  the  parent  or  of  an  agent  entrusted  by  him  with  the  custody 
of  such  child,  will  be  a  defense  to  the  action97  as  will  also  the 


the  wife  may  not  recover:  Peck  v. 
New  York,  X.  II.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 
Conn.  379;  Yahn  v.  Ottumwa,  60 
Iowa.  429;  Davis  v.  Guarnieri,  45 
Ohio  St.  470;  Nanticoke  v.  Warne, 
10(5  Pa.  St.  373;  Carlisle  v.  Sheldon, 
38  Vt.  440. 

93  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Goodenough,  55 
N.  J.  L.  (26  Vroom)  577;  28  Atl. 
3;  22  L.  R.  A.  460. 

M  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Honey  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  12  C.  C. 
A.  190;  63  Fed.  39;  26  L.  R.  A.  42. 
See,  however,  Honey  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  423. 

97  Alabama,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
gess, 116  Ala.  509;  22  So.  913; 
Daley  v.  Norwich,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  26 
Conn.  591;  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Wilcox,  138  111.  370;  Chicago  v. 
Hesing,  8:)  111.  204;  Westbrook  v. 
Mobile,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  500; 
Hogan  v.  Citizens  R.  Co.,  150  Mo.  36; 
51  S.  W.  47:'.;  Wi.-se  v.  Remme,  140 
Mo.  289;  41  S.  W.  797:  Juskowitz 
v.  Dry  Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  53  N. 
Y.  Supp.  992;  2.".  Misc.  04;  Bellefon- 
taine,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  18  Ohio 
St.  399;  Cincinnati  v.  Gregory,  3  <  >hio 
N.  P.  142;  1  Ohio  L.  D.  223;  Johnson 


v.  Reading  City  Pass.  R.  Co.,  160  Pa. 
St.  647;  28  Atl.  1001;  34  W.  X.  C. 
203;  Smith  v.  Hestonville,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  92  Pa.  St.  450;  Bamberger  v.  Citi- 
zens St.  R.  Co.,  95  Tenu.  18;  Ploof  v. 
Burlington  Traction  Co.,  70  Vt.  509. 
In  Missouri  it  has  been  held  that  if 
the  parents  of  a  child  are  guilty  of 
negligence  in  permitting  it  to  go  up- 
on the  streets  unattended,  they  can- 
not recover  for  an  injury  caused  by 
a  street  car,  even  though  the  driver 
might  have  prevented  the  injury  by 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  since 
in  the  case  of  two  directly  negligent 
acts  the  court  will  not  endeavor  to 
sever,  apportion  and  discriminate 
between  them  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
termining which  act  caused  the  in- 
jury. Hogan  v.  Citizens  R.  Co..  150 
Mo.  36;  51  S.  W.  47:'..  Neither 
the  contributory  negligence  of  the 
parent  nor  of  the  infant  is  available 
as  a  defense  to  an  action  brought 
against  a  railroad  company  under 
Ala.  Code,  sec.  2589,  for  negligent 
homicide  of  the  child.  Alabama  G. 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Burgess,  116  Ala.  509;  22 
So.  913.  Iu  New  Jersey  it  has 
been    held   that    the    fact  that   the 

199 


S  L76    ne(ii,k;kn('k  ani>  contributors  negligence. 

negligence  of  the  child  where  there  is  no  presumption  of  inca- 
pacity.88 But  it  is  held  that  the  contributory  negligence  of  a 
parent  is  no  defense  to  an  action  by  him  if  the  child  exercised 
that  degree  of  care  which  an  adult  of  reasonable  prudence 
would  have  exercised."  * 


$  176.  Contributory  negligence  of  parent  as  affecting  re- 
covery for  injury  to  child — Recovery  by  child.— Upon  the 

question  whether  in  case  of  an  injury  to  a  child  the  negligence 
of  the  parent  of  such  child  contributing  to  the  injury  majy  be 
imputed  to  the  latter,  so  as  to  prevent  recovery  by  him  of  dam- 
ages, the  decisions  are  not  in  harmony.  The  prevailing  rule, 
however,  as  sustained  by  the  courts  of  the  majority  of  the 
states,  is  that  where  a  child  has  been  injured,  the  contributory 
negligence  of  the  parent  will  not  be  imputed  to  the  child,  so 
as  to  prevent  the  latter  from  recovering  for    such    injury.100 


death  of  a  minor  son  was  partly  due 
to  the  contributory  negligence  of  the 
father,  yet  this  would  be  no  defense 
to  an  action  by  the  father  suing  as 
administrator  and  sole  next  of  kin. 
Consol.  Traction  Co.  v.  Howe.  30  Vr. 
(N.  J.  L.J275. 

98  Pratt  Coal,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Brawley, 
116  Ala.  509;  22  So.  913. 

99  Wiswell  v.  Doyle,  1H0  Mass.  42; 
35  X.  E.  107.  See  McGarry  v.  Loomis, 
63  N.  Y.  104. 

ioo  Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kow- 
alski  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C.  |,  34  C.  C.  A. 
1:  92  Fed.  310.  aff'g  84  Fed. 
586:  Berry  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co. 
(C.  C.  D.  Ind.),  70  Fed.  679;  Pratt 
Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley,  83  Ala.  371;  3 
So.  555;  Daley  v.  Norwich,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  591;  Atlanta,  etc., 
Airline  Co.  v.  Gravitt,  93  Ga.  369;  20 
S.  E.  550;  26  L.  R.  A.  553;  44  Am. 
St.  Rep.  145;  Evansville  v.  Senhenn, 
151  Ind.  42:  47  N.  E.  634;  41  L.  R.  A. 
728;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  568,  reh'g 
denied  in  151  Ind.  61;  52  X.  E.  88;  41 
L.  R.  A.  734;  Wymore  v.  Mahasko 
Co.,  78  Iowa,  396;  6  L.  R.  A.  545, 
200 


South  Covington  &  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Herrklotz,  47  S.  W.  265;  20  Ky.  L. 
R.  750;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  153; 
Barnes  v.  Shreveport  City  Ry.  Co., 
47  La.  Ann.  1218:  5  Am.  Elec.  Cas. 
452;  Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc., 
It.  Co.,  87  Mich.  400;  49  N.  W.  670: 
Westbrook  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.,  66 
Miss.  560;  Winters  v.  Kansas  City 
Cable  R.  Co.,  99  Mo.  509;  6  L.  R.  A. 
536;  Bisaillon  v.  Blood,  64  N.  H.  565; 
15  Atl.  147;  Newman  v.  Phillipsburg 
Horse  Car  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  L.  446: 
19  Atl.  1102;  8  L.  R.  A.  842;  Bottoms 
v.  Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.C. 
699;  19  S.  E.  730;  25  L.  R.  A.  784; 
St.  Clair  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  43 
Ohio  St.  91;  Erie  City  Pass.  R.  Co. 
v.  Schuster,  113  Pa.  St.  412;  57  Am. 
Rep.  471 ;  Western  Un.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Hoffman,  80  Tex.  424;  15  S.  W.  1048; 
Allen  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  943:  Robinson 
v.  Cone,  22  Yt.  224;  54  Am.  Dec.  67; 
Ploof  v.  Burlington  Traction  Co.,  70 
Vt.  509;  43  L.  R.  A.  108;  41  Atl. 
1017;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
702;  Norfolk  &  W.   R.   Co.  v.  Grose- 


NEGLIGENCE   AND   CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENT  B.     B    176 


While  tlie  weight  of  authority  supports  this  rule  and  it  is  more 
clearly  in  consonance  with  the  principles  of  law  and  just  ice.  yet 
there  are  several  states  in  which  it  is  dissented  from,  the  ride  in 
the  dissenting  and  minority  courts  being-  based  cither  on  the 
ground  of  the  identification  of  the  infant  with  the  parent  or  of 
the  agency  of  the  parent.  In  these  states  it  is  declared  that 
where  a  child  is  non  sui  juris  though  it  may  be  incapable  by  its 
own  negligence  of  forfeiting  its  legal  rights,  yet  the  carelessness 
of  its  parents  may  be  imputed  to  it  so  as  to  prevent  a  recovery 
of  damages  by  or  in  behalf  of  the  child  for  such  injury.1  Where 
this  rule  prevails,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  negligence 
of  the  parent  must  concur  with  the  negligence  of  the  child  in 
order  to  constitute  contributory  negligence.-  So,  also,  it  has 
been  declared  that  the  negligence  of  the  parents  is  no  defense 


clore,  88  Va.  267;  13  S.  E.  254;  Roth 
v.  Union  Depot  Co.,  13  Wash.  525; 
31  L.  K.  A.  855;  43  Pac.  641;  44  Pur. 
253.  In  a  New  Jersey  case  it  was 
said:  "An  infant  of  tender  years 
cannot  be  charged  with  negligence, 
nor  can  he  he  so  charged  with  the 
commission  of  such  fault  by  substit  u- 
tion,  for  he  is  incapable  of  appointing 
an  agent,  the  consequence  being  that 
he  can  in  no  case  be  considered  to 
be  the  blamable  cause,  either  in 
whole  or  in  part  of  his  own  injury. 
There  is  no  injustice,  nor  hardship  in 
requiring  all  wrongdoers  to  be  an- 
swerable to  a  person  who  is  incapa- 
ble either  of  self-protection  or  of 
being  a  participator  in  their  mis- 
feasance." Xewman  v.  Phillipsburg 
Horse  Car  R.  Co..  52  N.  J.  L.  446;  10 
Atl.  1102;  8  L.  K.  A.  842,  per 
Beasley,  C.  J. 

1  Meeks  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  52  Cal. 
602;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Logue, 
158  111.  621;  42  \.  E.  53,  affg  58 
111.  App.  142;  Baltimore  &  <  >.  S.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Pletz,  f,i  111.  App.  mi ; 
Brown  v.  European  &  W.  A.  R.  Co., 
58  Me.  384;  Gibbons  v.  Williams, 
135  Mass.  333;  Fitzgerald  v.  St.  Paul 
M.   &  M.    R.   Co.,   29  Minn.   336:  43 


Am.  Rep.  212;  Dudley  v.  Westcott, 
44  N.  Y.  St.  R.  882;  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
130,  rev'g  40  X.  Y.  St.  R.  506;  Foley 
v.  New  York  Central  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
78  Hun  (N.  Y.),  248;  60  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
6;  Canavan  v.  Stuyvesaut.  12  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)74;  66  X.  Y.  St.  R.  iiS7:  33 
X.  Y.  Supp.  53,  mod'd  154  X.  Y. 
84;  47  X.  E.  967;  Mangani  v. 
Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  239;  38  X.  Y.  455;  Burke  v. 
Broadway  &  Seventh  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
40  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  529:  34  How.  Pr. 
239:  McLain  v.  Van  Zandt,  48  How. 
Pr.  (X.  Y.)  80;  Callahan  v.  Sharp, 
27  Ilun  |\.  Y.i.  85;  85  X.  Y.  672; 
Schindler  v.  X.  Y.  L.  E.  K.  K.  Co.,  1 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  289;  Doran  v.  Troy.  22 
Wkly.  Dig.  230;  104  X.  Y.  684;  Hart- 
field  v.  Roper,  21  Wend.  (X.  Y. )  615 
(This  last  case  in  Xew  York  may  be 
said  to  be  the  leading  case  in  that 
state,  at  least,  if  not  the  leading  case 
in  support  of  the  dissenting  doctrine 
in  all  the  states,  ami  is  cited  in  the 
majority  of  the  opinions. ) :  Parish  v. 
Eden,  62  Wis.  272. 

-  Foley  v.  N'.w  York  Central  &  H. 
H.  R.  i;.c<».,  75  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  455:  57 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  67'.'. 

201 


§    177     NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 

to  an  action  in  behalf  of  the  child  to  recover  damages  for  an  in- 
jury to  him  where  he  has  neither  committed  or  omitted  any  act 
which  would  constitute  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  person  sui 
juris,  and  that  where  he  has  exercised  the  care  required  of  a 
person  sui  juris,  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  parents  is 
immaterial.3  And,  again,  that  where  the  person  causing  the 
injury  is  guilty  of  gross  negligence,  the  negligence  of  the  par- 
ents is  no  defense.4  And  that  where  the  child  is  in  the  im- 
mediate custody  of  one  of  its  parents,  the  negligence  of  the 
other  will  not  be  imputed  to  it.5 

§  177.  Contributory  negligence — Degree  of  care  required 

of  children. — Although  the  doctrine  of  contributory  negligence 
is  applicable  to  children  as  well  as  to  adults, 6  yet  the  former 
are  not  held  to  the  exercise  of  the  same  degree  of  prudence  and 
caution  as  would  be  expected  and  required  of  the  latter.  The 
degree  of  care  and  caution  required  of  children  must  be  gradu- 
ated according  to  the  age,  experience  and  knowledge  of  the 
child  in  each  particular  case,  and  the  question  whether  a  child 
has  been  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in  a  particular  in- 
stance can  only  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  circumstan- 
ces of  that  case  in  connection  with  the  above  rule.7     Under  this 


3  McGarry  v.  Loomis.  63  X.  Y.  104; 
dimming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
104  N.  Y.  669;  21  Abb.  N.  C.  1 ;  5  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  737:  10  X.  E.  855;  25 
Wkly.  Dig.  506,  affg  38  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
362.  See  also  Lyncb  v.  Smith,  104 
Mass.  52. 

4  Connery  v.  Slavin,  23  Wkly.  Dig. 
(N.  Y.)545. 

5  Hennessy  v.  Brooklyn  City  R. 
Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  206;  39  N. 
V.  St.  R.  805. 

6  Honegsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
R.  Co..  1  Keyes  (X.  Y.),  570;  2  Abb. 
Dec.  378,  rev'g  1  Daly,  89;  Morrison 
v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  302;  Burke 
v.  Broadway  &  Seventh  Ave.  R.  R. 
Co.,  49  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  529;  34  How. 
Pr.  239. 

7  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gladman,  15  Wall. 
(U.    S.)  401;   Mobile,  etc.,  R.  Co.   v. 

202 


Crenshaw,  65  Ala.  566;  Pueblo  Elec. 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherman,  25  Colo.  114; 
53  Pac.  322;  Birge  v.  Gardiner,  19 
Conn.  509;  Western,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  81  Ga,  397;  7  S.  E.  912: 
Xorton  v.  Volzke,  158  111.  402;  41  N. 
E.  1085;  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  167;  Atlas 
Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  100  Ind. 
293;  Consol.  City  &  Chelsea  Park 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Carlson,  58  Kan.  62;  48 
Pac.  635;  2  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  536;  7 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  274;  Kan- 
sas Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Whipple,  39  Kan. 
531;  18  Pac.  730;  Paducah  v. 
Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  12  Bush  (Ky. ), 
41;  McLaughlin  v.  Xew  Orleans,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  23;  18  So.  703; 
Baltimore  City  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooney, 
87  Md.  261;  39  Atl.  859;  11  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  759;  Collins  v. 
South  Boston,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  142  Mass. 


NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTBIBUTOR?    NEGLIGENCE.     §171 


rule,  age  alone  is  not  the  determining  factor,  but  experience, 
knowledge  and  ability  to  discern  danger  are  also  elements  to  be 
considered.  So  it  follows  that  while  in  one  case  a  child  of  eleven 
or  twelve  might  be  held  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
yet  in  another  case,  under  similar  facts  and  surroundings  and 
pursuing  a  similar  line  of  conduct,  a  child  of  eight  or  nine,  pos- 
sessing a  higher  degree  of  experience,  knowledge  and  ability  to 
discern  danger,  might  he  chargeable  with  negligence  contribut- 
ing to  the  injury.  After  the  question  of  contributory  negligence 
on  the  part  of  a  child  has  been  determined,  the  same  general 
rules  as  to  its  being  a  defense  control  as  in  the  case  of  adults, 
and  if  it  appear,  though  a  child  has  been  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence,  that  the  accident  could  have  been  avoided  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care  on  the  part  of  the  person  causing  the 
injury,  it  is  no  defense  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  therefore 
As  a  general  rule  the  question  whether  a  child  is  guilty  of  con- 
tributory negligence  is  for  the  jury,9  although  in  some  cases  very 


301;  Wright  v.Detroit,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  77 

Mich.    123;  43  X.    E.    765:  Ecliff    v. 

Wabash  R.  Co.,  04  Mich.  196;  Lynch 

v.  Metropolitan,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  112  Mo. 

420;    20  S.  W.     642;    Duffy  v.    -Mo. 

R.    Co.,    19   Mo.    App.   3s0:  Consol. 

Tract.  Co.  v.  Scott,  58  N.  J.  L.  682; 

34  Atl.  1094;  Penny  v.  Rochester 
K.  Co.,  7  App.  Div.  (X.  V.i  595;  40 
\.  V.  Supp.  172:  71  X.  V.  St.  R.  732, 

all'd  154  X.  Y.  770;  Muller  v.  Brook- 
lyn H.  R.  Co.,  IS  App.  Div.  (X.  V.) 
177:  45  X.  Y.  Supp.  954:  Keller  v. 
Haaker,  2  App.  Div.  (X.  S\)245;  73 
N.  V.  St.  R.  374:  37  X.  5T.Supp.792; 
Haycroft  v.  Lake  Shore  A-  Mich.  S. 
R.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Bun  (X.  V.),  489: 
Thurber  v.  Railroad  Co..  60  X.  V. 
326;  Kunz  v.  Troy.  104  X.  V.  344. 
rev'g  36  Hun,  615;  Mallard  v.  Ninth 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Daly  i  X.  V.),  376: 
27  X.  Y.  St.  R.  S01 :  7  X.  Y.  Supp. 
666;  Brown  v.  Syracuse.  77  Hun  (X. 
V.),  411:  60N.T.  St.  It.  16;  Guichard 
v.  New,  84  IIun(X.  ST.),  54;  65  X.  V. 
St.  R.  20:  Goff  v.  Akers.  49  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  615,  aff'd  139  X.  Y.  653;  Manly  v. 


Wilmington,  etc.,  R.  Co..  7  1  X.  I 
655;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mac- 
key,  53  Ohio  St.  370:  29  L.  R.  A.  757; 
41  N.  E.  980;  34  Ohio  L.  J.  259; 
Penn.,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kelley.  31  Pa.  St. 
372:  Kauch  v.  Lloyd,  31  Pa.  St.  358; 
Bridges  v.  Asheville,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  27 
S.  C.  456;  3  S.  E.  860;  Queen 
v.  Dayton  Coal  &  I.  Co..  95  Tenn. 
458;  30  L.  R.  A.  82;  32  s.  W.  160; 
49  Am.  St.  Rep.  9:)."):  San  Antonio 
Waterworks  Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  44  S.  W.  181:  Reed  v.  Mad- 
ison, 83  Wis.  171:  Merritt  v.  Ilepen- 
stal,  2:»  Can.  S.  C.  150. 

a  Mallard  v.  Ninth  Ave.  B.  R.  Co.. 
1.-,  Daly,  376;  27  X.  Y.  St.  R.  801;  7 
X.  Y.  Supp.  666. 

a  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox, 
138  Ml.  370;  Kane  v.  West  End  St.  R. 
Co.,  169  Mass.  64:  47  X.  E.  -"."1: 
Consol.  City  A-  Chelsea  Park  By.  I  o. 
v.  Carlson.  58  Kan.  62;  48  Pac. 
635;  2  Am.  N"eg.  Rep.  636;  7  Am.  A 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  274;  Connolly  v. 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co..  114  X.  Y 
104;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  675;  Stone  v. 
203 


8   177     NEGLIGENCE    AND    CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


young  children  have  been  declared  to  be,  as  a  matter  of  law,  in- 
capable of  contributory  negligence.10 


Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  K.  R.  Co.,  115 
N.  V.  104,  rev'g  40  Hun,  184;  tia- 
roni  v.  Compagnie  Nationale  de 
Navigation,  39  N.  Y.  St.  R.  63;  14  N. 
Y.  Supp.  797;  Jones  v.  Utica  &  Black 
River  R.R.  Co.,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.),  115; 
Ilyland  v.  Burns,  10  N.  Y.Supp.  386; 
41  X.  Y.  Supp.  873. 

10  So  held  in  case  of  child  four  and 
one    half     years    old,   Crawford    v. 

204 


Southern  R.  Co.,  106  Ga.  870;  33  S. 
E.  826;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  459;  4 
Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  436;  and  in  case 
of  one  a  little  less  than  four  years  of 
age,  Covington,  etc.,  Street  R.  Co. v. 
Herrklotz,  47  S.  W.  265;  20  Ky. 
L.  R.  75;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  153. 
See  in  this  connection  Joyce  on  Elec- 
tric Law  (ed.  1900),  sec.  585. 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


TITLE  III. 

WRONGS  AFFECTING  RIGHTS  OF  PERSONS. 
CHAPTER  VII. 

PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§  178.  Physical  injuries  —  Substan- 
tial and  nominal  damages — 
Generally. 

179.  Damages  flowing  from  negli- 

gent act  though  not  con- 
templated. 

180.  Disfigurement  of  person. 

181.  Inconvenience. 

182.  Prospects    of     marriage    im- 

paired. 

183.  Miscarriage  —  Loss     of     pro- 

spective offspring — Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for. 

184.  Miscarriage— Loss      of      pro- 

spective offspring  — Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for 
— Continued. 

185.  Miscarriage— Loss      of      pro- 

spective offspring — Wheth- 
er damages  recoverable  for 
— Conclusion. 
18t>.   Exemplary  damages. 

187.  Exemplary    damages   contin- 

ued. 

188.  Exemplary    damages— Physi- 

cal injuries  occasioned  by 
animals. 

189.  Exemplary      damages  —  Mal- 

practice. 

190.  Exemplary  damages— Placing 

cantharides  in  wine. 

191.  Direct  results  of   injury— De- 

fect in  highway— Statute, 
— What  included  — Massa- 
chusetts. 


192.  Interest  not  recoverable. 

193.  Mitigation  of  damages. 

194.  Duty    of    injured    person    to 

minimize    damages — Medi- 
cal assistance. 

195.  Same  subject  continued. 

196.  Duty    of    injured    person    to 

submit   to   surgical   opera- 
tion. 

197.  Effect  of  plaintiff's  death. 

198.  Release  of  claims  for  personal 

injuries — Generally. 

199.  Release     when      induced     by 

fraud  no  bar. 
20U.  Same  subject  continued. 

201.  Setting  aside  of    release — Re- 

turn of  consideration  not 
necessary. 

202.  Release     limited    to    injuries 

specifically  mentioned. 

203.  Release  by  railroad  employee 

Acceptance  of  benefits  of 
relief  association. 

204.  Recovery  of  special    damages 

-Pleadings. 

205.  Amendment    of    complaint — 

Increased  damages. 

206.  Inst  ructions— Generally. 

207.  Amount  of  recovery— Instruc- 

tions as  to. 

208.  "Such  sum  as  will  compen- 

sate"- "  Fail  and  just  com- 
pensation "  •'  Fair  and 
reasonable  compensation  " 
— Instructions. 

206 


213.  Excessive    damages  —  Remit- 

titur of  part  of  judgment. 

214.  Excessive   damages  — Review 

of  question  as  to  amount. 


^  178  PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 

§  209.  Instructions  -  Measure       of       212.  Excessive  damages 
damages — Miscellaneous. 

210.  New  trial  based  on  change  of 

experts'  opinions. 

211.  Inadequate  damages— Gener- 

ally. 

§  178.  Physical  injuries— Substantial  and  nominal  dam- 
ages—Generally.— As  a  general  rule  every  injury  to  a  person 
imports  a  damage  sustained   by  him,  and  the  fact  of  an  injury 
having  been  inflicted   entitles   the   person   injured  to  at  least 
nominal  damages.     If,  however,  the  injury  is  a  substantial  one. 
more  than  nominal  damages  should  be  awarded.1    So  where  owing 
to  the  negligence  of  another  a  person  was  injured  so  as  to  ren- 
der him  unconscious,  confine  him  in  a  hospital  for  several  weeks, 
and  his  neck  was  injured  so  as  to  cause  his  head  to  turn  to  one 
side,  and  at  the  time  of  the  trial  he  walked  similar  to  a  paralytic, 
it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  substantial  and  not  merely 
nominal  damages.-     And  in   this  case   the    plaintiff's  injuries 
being  such  as  to  entitle  him  to  substantial  damages,  it  was  held 
that  a  new  trial  would  be  granted  where  only  nominal  damages 
were  awarded.      But  in  the  absence  of  evidence  upon  which 
substantial  damages  may  be  based  only  nominal  damages  should 
be  allowed.      So  where  there  was  no  evidence  as  to  the  amount 
of  plaintiff's  salary  as  a  music  teacher,  it  was  held  that  only 
nominal   damages   should   be    awarded    for  such  item.3     And 
where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  as  to  the  injuries  sustained  by 
a'  person,  that  of  the  plaintiff  tending  to  show  them  to  have 
been  serious,  while  that  of  the  defendant  shows  them  to  have 
been  slight,  it  has  been  held  that  a  verdict  for  nominal  damages 
will  not  be  disturbed,  since  in  such  case  the  credibility  of  the 
witnesses  is  a  matter  for  the  jury  to  determine.4     And  a  ver- 
dict for  nominal  damages  only  is  held  not  to  be  a  ground  for  a 
new   trial   where  it  is  apparent  that  the  jury  meant  to  find 
against  his  right  to  recover.5     And  a  charge  which  stated  that 


1  Smith  v.  Ingersoll-Sergeant 
Rock  Drill  Co.,  12  Misc.  (N.  Y.)5; 
66  N.  Y.  St.  R.  727;  33  N.  Y.  Supp. 
70. 

2  Carter  v.  Wells  Fargo  Co.  (C. 
C.  S.  D.  Cal.),  64  Fed.  1005. 

206 


3  Baker  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co., 
118  N.  Y.  533,  aff'g  22  J.  &  S.  394. 

4  Weinberg  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
139  Mo.  286;  40  S.  W.  882;  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  397. 

5  Reeve   v.   Wilkesbarre   &  W.  V. 


PHYSICAL     in.ii  i:ies.  §§  179,  180 

the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  nominal  damages  at  any  rate  was 
held  not  to  be  ground  fur  reversal  where  actual  damages  were 
found  by  the  jury  and  the  cause  of  action  was  dependent  on 
the  fact  of  the  injury .''' 

§  170.  Damages  flowing  from  negligent  act   though  not 

contemplated.— It  is  not  necessary  that  every  result  of  a  per- 
son's negligent  act  which  causes  an  injury  to  another  could 
have  been  foreseen  or  contemplated  by  such  person  in  order 
that  a  recovery  therefor  may  be  had.  If  the  damages  claimed 
flowed  directly  and  legitimately  from  such  negligent  act,  there 
may  be  a  recovery  of  the  same.7  So  where,  owing  to  the  negli- 
gence of  a  carrier,  a  passenger  sustained  personal  injuries  whicli 
resulted  in  a  cancer,  it  was  held  that  damages  might  be  recovered 
for  such  result.8  And  in  another  case  where,  owing  to  a  defect 
in  a  highway,  the  axle  of  plaintiff's  wagon  was  broken  and  he  was 
dragged  over  the  dashboard,  and  he  procured  another  carriage 
and  drove  to  his  home  several  miles  distant  in  a  cold  rain,  and 
he  claimed  that  he  subsequently  suffered  injury  from  the  strain 
and  shock,  while  defendant  claimed  that  such  injuries  were  due 
to  the  subsequent  exposure  to  the  rain  and  cold,  it  was  held  that 
the  direct  result  of  the  accident  was  the  exposure,  and  whether 
the  subsequent  injuries  were  due  to  this  or  to  the  strain  and  shock, 
or  to  both,  recovery  of  damages  therefor  might  be  had.11 

§  180.  Disfigurement  of  person. — Disfigurement  is  an  ele- 
ment in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  which  the  jury  may  con- 
sider in  estimating  the  amount  of  damages.1"  And  where  a  per- 
son has  been  permanently  disfigured  or  deformed  as  a  result  of 
personal  injuries,  damages  for  mental  suffering  arising  from  such 
disfigurement  or  deformity  may,  it  is  generally  decided,  be  re- 


Traction  Co.  (C.  P.),  9  Kulp  (Pa.), 
182. 
6  Howe  v.  Cochran,   47  Minn.  403; 


10  Smith  v.  Pittshurg  &  W.  R.  Co 
(C.  C.  X.  D.  Ohio),  90  Fed.  7-:'.: 
13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  716;    11 


50  N.  W.  368.  Ohio  L.  J.  113;  Alabama G.  S.  R.  Co. 

TCrouse  v.  Chicago  A-   \".    \V.    Ry.    v.    Hill,  93    Ala,    511;  9  So.    7^-':  47 


Co.,  104  Wis.  473.  80  N.  W.  752. 

8  Baltimore   City  Pass.    Ry.    Co.   v. 
Kemp,  01  Md.  619;  48  Am.  Rep.  134. 


Am.  &  Eng.  R.  <as.  500;  Birmingham 

v.  Lewis.  92  Ala.  352;  St.    Louis  S. 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dobbins,  60  Ark.  481  :  :'•" 


'■'  Ehrgott  v.  Mayor.  90    X.    V.   204;    S.  W.  SS7.   roh'g  denied  60  Ark.  486; 
48   Vm    Rep  622.  .       I  31  S.  W.  147;  Southern   Bell  Teleph. 

207 


S§  is 1-1 83 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


covered.11  And  in  addition  thereto,  where  the  disfigurement  is 
connected  with  an  injury  which  will  impair  the  injured  person's 
future  ability  to  labor,  damages  are  also  to  be  awarded  as  in  other 
cases  of  permanent  injury,  that  is,  on  the  basis  of  the  loss  due 
to  the  person's  impaired  ability  to  labor  and  earn  money.12  Again 
m  an  action  for  wantonly  maiming  or  disfiguring  a  person,  the 
injured  person  may  recover  exemplary  damages.18 

§  181.  "Inconvenience." — In  an  action  to  recover  for  per- 
sonal injuries,  compensatory  damages  cannot,  it  is  held,  include 
an  allowance  for  "  inconvenience  "  as  well  as  for  the  injuries.11 
In  a  case  in  Pennsylvania,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
damages  in  such  an  action  consist,  among  other  items,  of  the 
inconvenience  and  suffering  naturally  resulting  from  the  in- 
juries.15 And  again,  in  another  case  in  the  same  state,  it  is  de- 
cided that  there  may  be  a  recovery  for  the  privation  and  incon- 
venience to  which  a  person  is  subjected  as  a  result  of  an  injury.1*5 

§  182.  Prospects  of  marriage  impaired. — If  as  a  result  of 
an  injury  to  an  unmarried  woman  her  prospects  of  marriage  are 
impaired,  such  resulting  injury  is  an  element  of  damage  for 
which  recovery  may  be  had.17  But  in  order  to  authorize  a 
recovery  therefor  such  special  damage  must,  it  is  held,  be  alleged 
and  proved.18 

§  183.  Miscarriage  —  Loss  of  prospective  offspring— 
Whether  damages  recoverable  for. — As  will  appear  herein- 
after, the  weight  of  authority  supports  the  rule  that  there 
can  be  no  recovery  for  injuries  resulting  from  fright,  though 


Co.  v.  Jordan,  87  Ga.  69;  Western  & 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  81  Ga.  397;  7  S.  E. 
912;  Stewart  v.  Maddox,  63  Ind.  51; 
Newbury  v.  Getchel  &  M.  Lumber  & 
Mfg.  Co.,  100  Iowa,  441;  69  N.  W.  743; 
Nichols  v.  Brabazon,  94  Wis.  549. 

11  See  chap.  VIII,  herein. 

12  See  chap.  IX,  herein. 

is  Pike  v.  Billing,  48  Me.  539. 

14  Root  v.  Des  Moines  City  Ry.  Co. 
(Iowa,  1900),  83  N.  W.  904;  Jenson  v. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  86 
Wis.    589;  57  N.    W.    359;  22  L.    R. 

208 


A.  680.  But  see  Railroad  Co.  v.  Carr, 
71  Ind.  135;  17  Ala.  1052;  Miller  v. 
Steamship  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  St.  R.  664. 

is  Goodhart  v.  Penna.  R.  R.  Co.,  177 
Pa.  St.  1;  35  Atl.  191;  5  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  364;  38  W.  N.  C. 
545. 

i6  Smith  v.  East  Mauch  Chunk,  3 
Super.  Ct.  (Pa.)  495. 

i"  Smith  v.  Pittsburg,  etc.,  Ry.  Co., 
90  Fed.  783. 

i8  Hunter  v.  Stewart,  47  Me.  419. 


PHYSICAL      [NJUBIE8.  §   183 

the  fright  may  be  caused  by  the  negligent  act  of  another, 
where  there  is  no  immediate,  personal  injury."  So  where  there 
was  no  physical  injury  sustained  by  a  woman  as  a  result  of  the 
negligent  act  of  another  but  fright  alone  ensued  which  resulted 
in  a  subsequent  miscarriage,  it  was  held  that  such  miscarriage 
could  not  be  considered  as  the  proximate  result  of  defendant's 
negligence,  and  there  could  be  no  recovery  therefor.*  And 
where  as  a  result  of  a  personal  injury  inflicted  upon  a  woman, 
a  miscarriage  ensues  which  results  in  the  loss  of  prospective 
offspring,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  such  loss  by  the  hus- 
band.21 In  this  ease  it  was  said  by  the  court  that  the  jury 
were  "allowed  to  estimate  the  pecuniary  interest  which  a 
husband  had  in  the  chance  that  an  embryo,  not  yet  quickened 
into  life,  would  become  a  living  child.  The  sex  could  not  be 
known  and  if  born  alive  the  infant  might  have  been  destitute  of 
some  faculty,  or  so  physically  infirm  as  to  have  made  it  a  help- 
less charge.  There  are  no  elements  whatever  upon  which  a  jury 
could  base  any  conclusion  that  a  pecuniary  injury  had  been  suf- 
fered by  the  plaintiff  from  the  loss  of  the  unborn  child,  and  this 
injury  should  have  been  excluded  from  the  consideration  of  the 
jury  as  too  remote  and  speculative  to  form  an  element  in  the 
recovery."22  And  in  an  action  by  a  woman,  it  was  held  that  the 
mere  loss  of  prospective  offspring  by  miscarriage,  there  being  no 
proof  that  her  health  had  thereby  been  impaired  or  that  she  had 
suffered  to  a  greater  extent  than  she  would  have  done  if  the  child 
had  been  born  at  the  proper  time  did  not  entitle  her  to  substantial 
damages.23  In  another  case  where  a  telegraph  company  failed 
to  deliver  a  message  summoning  a  doctor  to  attend  a  woman 


19  See  sees.  219-222,  herein. 

20  Mitehell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  151 
X.  Y.  107;  4.")  N.  E.  354;  34  L.  K. 
A.  781.  See  also  Phillips  v.  Dick- 
erson,  85  III.  1 1 :  -~  Am.  Rep.  607; 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Greal  Western  R.  K. 
Co.,  12  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  04i3;  Victorian 
Ky.  Commissioners  v.  Conltas,  13 
App.  Cas.  222.  But  see  Purcell  v. 
St.  Paul  Citv  Kv.  Co.,  48    Minn.  134; 


N.  Y.  417;  26  L.  K.  A.  4G;  62  X.  Y. 
St.  U.  432;  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  738;  38  N. 
E.  454,  rev'g  53  X.  Y.  St.  R.  664; 
24  X.  V.  Supp.  142.  where  the  court 
had  permitted  the  jury  to  consider 
••  any  damages  arising  from  the  in- 
jury and  resulting  in  depriving  the 
plaintiff  of  prospective  offspring." 

-'-'  Per  Andrews,  Ch.  J. 

-;  Hawkins   v.   Fronl   St.  ('able  R. 


Oliver  v.  Town  of   LaValle,  36  Wis.    Co.,    3   Wash.   592;    28     Pac.     1021. 
592.  |  See  Bovee  v.  Danville  53  Vt.  190. 

»  Butler  v.  Manhattan    R.  Co.,  143  j 

U  209 


§  184  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

about  to  give  birth  to  a  child  and  no  doctor  was  present  and  the 
child  died  before  birth,  it  was  held  that  there  could  be  no  recov- 
ery for  the  loss  of  the  child."4  In  this  case  the  court  said  :  *'  We 
do  not  think  the  death  of  the  child  before  birth,  and  the  grief 
or  sorrow  occasioned  thereby,  can  be  an  element  of  damages  in 
this  character  of  suit.  If  it  be  made  to  appear  from  the  testimony 
that  Mrs.  Cooper  suffered  more  physical  pain,  mental  anxiety 
and  alarm,  on  account  of  her  own  condition  than  she  would  have 
done  if  Dr.  Keating  had  been  in  attendance  upon  her,  and  the 
failure  to  secure  his  services  is  shown  to  be  due  to  the  want  of 
proper  care  on  the  part  of  defendant's  servants,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  deliver  the  message,  a  fair  and  reasonable  compensation 
should  be  allowed  for  such  increased  pain  and  mental  suffering  ; 
but  the  death  of  the  child,  the  bereavement  of  the  parents  and 
their  grief  for  its  loss  cannot  be  considered  as  an  element  of 
damages.  Such  damages  are  too  remote.  They  are  the  result 
of  a  secondary  cause  and  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  enter  into 
the  verdict.  ...  It  would  be  correct  to  allow  proof  that  the 
child  was  stillborn  if  such  fact  tended  to  show  that  the  labor 
was  thereby  prolonged  and  her  suffering  so  increased."35 

§  184.  Miscarriage — Loss  of  prospective  offspring — 
Whether  damages  recoverable  for — Continued.— In  other 
cases,  however,  it  has  been  decided  that  where  a  woman  suffers  a 
personal  injury  which  produces  a  miscarriage,  this  latter  result 
may  be  considered  in  estimating  the  damages  recoverable.* 
Thus  it  was  so  held  where  the  misconduct  of  a  servant  of  the 
carrier  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  miscarriage,  though  the 
woman's  condition  was  unknown  to  the  carrier  or  its  em- 
ployees.'^ And  where  a  glass  globe  was  negligently  permitted 
to  fall  and  it  struck  a  woman  upon  the  temple,  and  as  a  result  of 
the  shock  caused  by  the  blow  a  miscarriage  resulted,  it  was  held 

24  Western    Union    Teleg.    Co.    v.    65  N.  W.  226:  2  Det.  L.  N.  711;  Jones 


Cooper,  71  Tex.  507;  2  Am.  Elec. 
Cas.  795. 

20  Per  Collard,  J. 

26  Mann  Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.  Dupre 

(C.  C.  App.  5th  C),  54  Fed.  646;  47 

Alb.  L.    J.    446;  Tunnicliffe   v.    Bay 

Cities  Consol.  R.  Co.,  107  Mich.  261; 

210 


v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.,  23  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  141;  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  914; 
Brown  v.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  54  Wis.  342;  41  Am.  Rep.  41. 

27  Mann  Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.  Dupre 
(C.  C.  App.  5th  C),  54  Fed.  646;  47 
Alb.  L.  J.  446. 


PHYSICAL      I  N.I  IK!  I 

that  damages  might  be  recovered  therefor.  And  in  another 
case  where  a  pregnant  woman  was  let  off  a  train  at  a  place  three 
miles  from  her  destination,  on  a  cloudy  night,  and  she  walked 
to  her  destination  and  as  a  result  of  the  walk  and  exposure  a 
miscarriage  resulted,  it  was  held  that  such  miscarriage  was  the 
direct  result  of  the  defendant's  negligence,  and  that  such  neg- 
ligence was  the  proximate  and  not  the  remote  cause  of  the 
injury,  and  that  the  defendants  were  liable  therefor.'*  In  this 
case  it  was  said  by  the  court:  M  All  the  acts  done  by  the  plain- 
tiffs and  from  which  the  injury  flowed  were  rightful  on  their  part 
and  compelled  by  the  act  of  the  defendant.  .  .  .  We  can  see  no 
reason  why  the  defendant  is  not  equally  liable  for  an  injury 
sustained  by  a  person  who  is  placed  in  a  dangerous  position, 
whether  the  injury  is  the  immediate  result  of  a  wrongful  act  or 
results  from  the  act  of  the  party  in  endeavoring  to  escape  from 
the  immediate  danger.  ...  If  defendant,  by  its  negligence, 
placed  the  plaintiffs  in  a  position  where  it  was  necessary  for 
them  to  act  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  wrongful  act  of 
the  defendant,  and  acting  with  ordinary  prudence  and  care  to 
get  themselves  out  of  the  difficulty  in  which  they  had  been 
placed,  they  sustained  injury,  such  injury  can  be  and  is  traced 
directly  to  the  defendant's  negligence  as  its  cause;  and  it  is  its 
proximate  cause,  within  the  rules  of  the  law  upon  that  sub- 
ject." ■ 

§  1N5.  Miscarriage— Loss  of  prospective  offspring — 
Whether  damages  recoverable  for — Conclusion. — From  a 
consideration  of  the  cases  noted  in  the  preceding  section  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  courts  are  not  in  harmony  as  to  the  recovery 
of  damages  in  cases  of  miscarriage.  Where  the  miscarriage  re- 
sults in  loss  of  prospective  offspring,  it  would  seem  that  the 
better  reasoning  would  support  the  conclusion  that  there  can  be 
no  recovery  for  such  loss.  In  many  cases  the  sex  of  the  unborn 
child  cannot  be  determined,  or  whether  it  will  be  free  of  de- 
formity, and  even  where  it  may  be  possible  to  determine  these 


*8  Jones  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co..  23 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.  H41:  48  N.  Y.  Supp. 
914. 

»  Brown  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  S.  D.  P. 


Ry.   Co.,  54  Wis.  842;  41  Am.   Rep. 
41. 

»  Per  Taylor,  J. 

211 


§   186  PHYSICAL      INI  TRIES. 

facts,  it  may  still  be  an  uncertain  question  as  to   whether  the 
embryo  would  have  developed  into  a  child  of  good  health  and 
sound  mental  faculties.      The  basis   of  recovery  for  a  child's 
death  by  a  negligent  act  is  the   value  of  services  to  the  parent 
during   minority,81  but  if  the  child's  mental  faculties  are  im- 
paired or  he  is  a  sickly  child,  he  may  not  only  be  unable  to  ren- 
der any  services,,  but   may,  on    the  other  hand,  be  a  source  of 
expense  and  cause  of  sorrow  and  worry  to  the  parents,  not  only 
during  minority  but  during  the  whole  of  his  or  his  parent's  life. 
To  permit,  therefore,  a  recovery  for  loss  of  prospective  offspring 
would  be  an  extension  of  the  field  of  damages,  too  much  into  the 
realms  of  possibility.     In  those  cases  where  a  negligent  act  re- 
sults in  a  miscarriage,  the  general  rule  seems  to  be  that  damages 
therefor  are  recoverable.     But  in  such  cases  it  would  seem  that 
though  damages  may  be  recovered  for  a  physical  injury  or  neg- 
ligent act  independent  of  any  miscarriage,  yet  if  miscarriage 
results  from  such  act  or  injury  in  order  to  authorize  a  recovery 
for  the  latter,  it  should  appear  that  there  was  an   increased  or 
aggregated  mental  or  physical  pain  or  distress  in  connection 
with  such  miscarriage,  in  addition  to  what  the  mother  would 
have  suffered  if  the  child  had  been  born  at  the  proper  time  or 
that  her  health  had  been  impaired  thereby.     In  the  absence  of 
anv  such  evidence  there  would  seem  to  be  but  little  basis  for 
the  awarding  of  damages  for  a  miscarriage. 

§  186.  Exemplary  damages.— In  actions  for  physical  inju- 
ries the  plaintiff  is  not  in  all  cases  limited  in  his  recovery  to 
compensatory  damages.  The  injury  may  not  be  due  alone  to 
mere  negligence,  but  there  may  be  wilfulness,  wantonness  or 
malice  in  the  infliction  thereof,  or  there  may  be  such  gross 
negligence  in  the  commission  of  the  act  causing  the  injury  or 
omission  to  avert  the  injury,  as  amounts  to  a  criminal  indiffer- 
ence to  the  consequences.  It  is  in  such  cases  as  these  that  the 
law  permits  a  recovery,  not  merely  of  damages  which  are  com- 
pensatory, but  also  authorizes  the  jury  to  assess  a  sum  in  ad- 
dition thereto,  not  on  the  basis  of  a  compensation,  but  rather  as 
an  example  which  may  deter  others  from  the  commission  of 
similar  acts.     So  it  may  be  stated  as  a  recognized  rule  of  the 

51  See  chaps,  on  death  by  wrongful,  etc.,  act,  herein, 

212 


PHYSICAL      IN. (TRIES. 


§  1«7 


common  law  and  as  a  rale  generally  followed  to-day,  that  wh.-re- 
evcr  ;i  physical  injury  has  been  inflicted  maliciously  or  wantonly. 
the  jury  may  give,  in  addition  to  ;i  mere  compensation  tor  the 
injury  suffered,  punitive  or  exemplary  damages,  such  damages 
are,  however,  only  to  be  awarded  where  there  has  been  a  mali- 
ciousness or  wantonness  in  the  inlliction  of  the  injury.*  But 
malice,  as  used  in  this  connection,  does  not  mean  merely  the 
doing  of  an  unlawful  or  injurious  act,  but  rather  implies  that 
the  act  complained  of  was  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  mischief  or 
of  criminal  indifference  to  civil  obligations." 


3  187.  Exemplary  damages  continued. 


-While  it  has  some- 
times been  declared  that  exemplary  damages  may  be  given  in 


92  Lake  Shore  &  Mich.  Southern 
K.  Co.  v.  Prentice,  147  U.  S.  101  ; 
Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Quig- 
ley,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  202:  Floyd  v. 
Hamilton,  :«  Ala.  235  ;  Alabama  G. 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93  Ala.  514  :  9  So. 
722  ;  47  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  500  ; 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  53 
Ark.  7  ;  Moody  v.  McDonald,  4  Cal. 
297  ;  Gibney  v.  Lewis,  68  Conn.  392  ; 
St.  Peters  Church  v.  Beach,  26  Conn. 
355  ;  Ford  v.  Charles  Warner  Co.,  1 
Mary.  (Del.)  88  :  Florida  C.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mooney,  40  Fla.  17  ;  24  So. 
148  ;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  721;  Florida  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hirst, 
30  Fla.  1  ;  16  L.  R.  A.  (131  ;  11  So. 
50<>  ;  52  Am.  &  Fug.  R.  Cas.  40'.t  :  12 
Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  218  ;  Chattanooga 
R.  A-  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Liddell.  85  Ga. 
482;  11  S.  E.  853;  S  Ry.  &  Corp. 
L.  J.  296  ;  Pierce  v.  Millay,  44  111. 
189  ;  Peoria  Bridge  Assoc,  v.  Loomis, 
20  111.  2:;:.  :  Williams  v.  Real,  20  111. 
147  ;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  (  hris- 
tison,  39  111.  App.  495  ;  Linton  Coal 
&  M.  Co.  v.  Persons,  15  Ind.  App. 
09  ;  43  N.  E.  (551  ;  Fleet  v.  Hollen- 
kemp,  13  B.  Mom  (Ky.)  219;  Ken- 
tucky, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dills,  1 
Bush  (Ky. ),  593  ;  Chile6  v.  Drake,  2 


Mete.  (Ky. )  146  ;  Pike  v.  Dilling,  48 
Me.  539  ;  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Blocker,  27  Md.  277  :  Baltimore, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Breinig,  25  Md. 
378;  Hyatt  v.  Adams,  16  Mich.  L80 ; 
Allison  v.  Chandler,  11  Mich.  542; 
Doss  v.  Missouri,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  59 
Mo.  27  ;  Lewis  v.  Jauuoupoulo,  70 
Mo.  App.  325  ;  Clark  v.  Fairley,  80 
Mo.  App.  335  ;  Walker  v.  Wilson,  8 
Bosw.  I  N.  V. )  586  ;  Wallace  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  N.  Y.,  2  Hilt.  (  X.  Y.  I  440  ;  9  Abb. 
Pr.  40  ;  18  How.  Pr.  109  ;  Caldwell 
v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  47 
N.  Y.  282  ;  Louder  v.  Hinson,  4 
Jones  (N.  C),  L.  369  :  Heil  v.  (lan- 
ding, 42  Pa.  St.  49:]  ;  Bennett  v. 
Reed,  51  Pa.  St.  190;  Mack  v.  South 
Bound  R.  Co.,  52  S.  C.  323  :  29  S.  E. 
905  ;  40  L.  R.  A.  679  ;  :i  Chic.  L. 
.1.  Wkly.  27_'.  See  chaps,  on  Negli- 
gence, herein. 

3»  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Quigley,  21  How.  I  U.  S.  )  202  ;  Peoria 
Bridge  Assoc,  v.  Loomis,  20  111.  285  : 
Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blocker. 
27  Md.  277:  Hopkins  v.  Atlantic 
Ave.,  etc.,  I!.  R.  Co.,  :'•<■'  V  H.  9  ; 
Wallace  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  N.  V.,  •_'  Hilt. 
(  N.  V.  i  440  ;  9  Abb.  Pr.  40  ;  IS  How. 
Pr.  169. 

213 


§  188  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

cases  of  gross  negligence,*4  yet  this  we  think  is  to  be  construed 
as  being  in  line  with  the  above  rule,  and  that  the  gross  negli- 
gence must  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  authorize  the  inference 
or  presumption  that  the  person  guilty  of  such  negligence  was 
conscious  of  the  probable  consequences  of  his  act  and  indiffer- 
ent thereto.35  In  an  action,  however,  for  injuries  due  to  negli- 
gence where  it  is  sought  to  recover  punitive  damages,  the 
failure  of  the  court  to  submit  the  question  of  the  wilfulness  of 
the  defendant  to  the  jury  is  held  to  be  harmless,  where  the 
jury  found  the  defendant  free  from  negligence  and,  therefore, 
not  entitled  to  damages.36  But  where  the  jury  are  charged 
that  if  they  find  gross  negligence  they  may  allow  punitive 
damages,  not  merely  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  damages 
but  only  as  a  punishment,  and  that  such  damages  should  not  be 
allowed  even  for  that  purpose  except  the  negligence  be  gross, 
it  is  held  that  such  a  charge  is  erroneous  in  not  explaining  to 
the  jury  under  what  circumstances  such  damages  may  be  al- 
lowed.37 

§  188.  Exemplary  damages— Physical  injuries  occasioned 

by  animals. — The  rules  as  to  the  allowance  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages in  other  actions  control  also  in  the  case  of  actions  to  re- 
cover for  physical  injuries  occasioned  by  animals.  So  where  a 
person  possessing  a  dog  which  he  knew  was  ferocious  and  ac- 
customed to  bite  people,  left  him  unsecured  in  his  sleigh  in  a 
village  street  and  the  dog  threw  down  and  bit  a  child  seven 
years  of  age,  who  came  up  to  the  sleigh  and  commenced  hand- 
ling the  whip,  it  was  held  that  the  jury  might  award  vindictive 
damages  if  they  found  that  the  owner  of  the  dog  was  guilty  of 
gross  and  criminal  negligence.38     And  where  a  person  owning  a 

34  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93    98  Ky.  684  ;    34  S.  W.   228  ;    17  Ky. 


Ala.  514  ;  9  So.  722  ;  47  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  500  ;  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  87  Ky.  327;  8  S. 
W.  706  ;  Kountz  v.  Brown.  16  B. 
Mon.  (Ky. )  577;  Taylor  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  304.  See 
also  chaps,  on  Negligence,  herein; 
contra  Ycriam  v.  Linkletter,  80  Cal. 


L.  Rep.  1261.      See  chaps,  on  Negli- 
gence, herein. 

36  Moore  v.   Drayton,  40  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  933  ;  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  723. 

37  East  Tenn.    V.   &   G.   R.  Co.   v. 
Lee,  90  Tenn.  570  ;  18  S.  W.  268. 

38  Meibus  v.   Dodge,  38  Wis.   300; 
20  Am.   Rep.  6.     See  also   Cameron 


L35  :  22  Pac.  70.  v.    Bryan,   89  Iowa,  214;    56    N.    W. 

35  Mc Henry  Coal  Co.  ,v.   Sneddon,  '  434. 

214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES.  §§  189-191 

ram  permitted  it  to  run  at  large  and  it  was  alleged  that  the  owner 
knew  that  the  ram  was  inclined  to  be  vicious  and  to  injure  man- 
kind, it  was  held  that  there  could  he  no  recovery  of  exemplary 
damages  except  upon  proof  of  gross  and  criminal  negligence 
amounting  to  a  wanton  disregard  of  the  safety  of  Others  and  iii 
law  equivalent  to  malice.39  But  where  a  dog  belonging  to  a  pas- 
senger was  tied  by  a  porter  so  that  it  could  reach  other  passen- 
gers, it  was  held  that  the  company  was  not  liable  for  punitive 
damages  for  injuries  caused  by  a  bite  from  such  dog.40 

§  189.  Exemplary  damages  Malpractice.  — It  would  seem 
that  the  same  rules  as  apply  to  the  allowance  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages in  other  cases  would  also  apply  in  actions  to  recover  for  an 
injury  which  is  the  result  of  malpractice.  If  the  malpractice  is 
wilful,  wanton  or  malicious,  or  consists  of  such  gross  negligence 
as  raises  the  presumption  of  a  probable  knowledge  of  the  conse- 
quences and  an  entire  disregard  thereof,  then  such  damages 
would  appear  to  be  properly  allowable.  So  it  has  been  held  that 
if  a  patient  proves  gross  negligence  in  the  treatment  of  his  dis- 
eases, he  may  recover  exemplary  damages.41  In  another  case, 
however,  it  has  been  held  that  the  damages  which  a  patient  or 
her  representative  (not  her  husband)  may  recover  in  an  action 
for  malpractice  are  to  be  measured  by  the  common-law  rule  and 
that  vindictive  damages  cannot  be  recovered.4- 

§  190.  Exemplary  damages— Placing  cantharides  in  wine. 

— The  giving  to  a  person  of  any  substance  which  will  probably 
have  an  injurious  effect  and  of  which  effect  the  giver  is  aware, 
though  done  in  a  spirit  of  mischief,  should  render  such  person 
liable  to  exemplary  damages  where  injury  results  therefrom. 
Thus  it  was  so  held  where  a  physician  put  a  portion  of  canthar- 
ides into  the  plaintiffs  glass  of  wine,  from  the  effects  of  which 
the  plaintiff  did  not  recover  for  several  months.43 

§  191.  Direct  results  of  injury — Defect  in  highway- 
Statute— -"What  included — Massachusetts. — ruder  the  Massa- 


39  Pickett  v.  Crook,  20  Wis.  358. 

40  Trinity  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
18  Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.  090;  46  S.  W. 
389. 


«  Cochran  v.  Miller,  13    Iowa.  128. 
4-  Long  v.  Morrison,  14  End.  595. 
"Genay  v.  Norm,  l    Kay.  (S.  C.) 
6. 

215 


§§  192,  193  PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 

chusetts  statute  41  providing  that  where  a  person  is  injured  by  any 
defect  negligently  allowed  to  exist  in  the  highway,  the  city 
which  is  responsible  for  such  defect  shall  be  liable  for  the  direct 
and  immediate  results  of  the  injury,  if  an  injury  is  caused  by 
such  a  defect,  damages  will  be  limited  to  the  direct  and  imme- 
diate results  thereof  and  will  not  include  a  subsequent  in- 
jury due  to  a  weakness  resulting  from  the  original  injury.  So 
where  a  person's  ankle  was  injured  by  such  a  cause,  and  owing 
to  a  weakness  of  the  ankle  resulting  therefrom,  the  person  sus- 
tained a  subsequent  fracture  of  the  leg,  it  was  held  there  could 
be  no  recovery  of  damages  for  the  latter  injury.45 

§  192.  Interest  not  recoverable. — The  general  rule  in  an 
action  for  personal  injuries  is  that  the  damages  therefor  should 
not  include  an  allowance  for  interest,40  though  it  has  been  said 
that  in  estimating  the  damages  the  jury  may  consider  the  length 
of  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  injury.47  But  it  is  held  in 
one  case  that  interest  may  be  allowed,  in  the  discretion  of  the 
jury,  upon  such  money  as  has  been  actually  expended  by  the 
plaintiff  as  a  result  of  the  injury  and  in  connection  therewith.48 

§  193.  Mitigation  of  damages. — Contributory  negligence 
may  in  some  cases  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages  in 
actions  for  personal  injuries.49     And  a  person's  condition  caused 


44  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  chap.  52,  sec.  18. 

45  Raymond  v.  Haverhill,  168  Mass. 
382;  47  X.  E.  101. 

46  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Young, 
81  Ga.  397;  Ratteree  v.  Chapman,  79 
Ga.  574;  Sargent  v.  Hampden,  38 
Me.  581;  Zipperlein  v.  Pittsburg,  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  8  Ohio  S.  &  C. 
P.  Dec.  587:  Pittsburg  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  104  Pa.  St.  306;  Louisville 
&  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace  (Tenn.),  14 
L.  R.  A.  548;  49  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
490;  17  S.  W.  882;  Texas  &  X.  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  Carr,  91  Tex.  332;  43  S.  W. 
18,  rev'g  42  S.  W.  126.  But  see 
Chic.  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 
2  Ind.  App.  213;  28  X.  E.  328. 

«  Zipperlein  v.  Pittsburg  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  8  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  587. 
216 


48  Washington,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hickey,  12  App.  (D.  C.)  269. 

49  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  How- 
ard, 90  Tenn.  144;  19  S.  W.  116. 
See  chaps,  herein  on  effect  of  con- 
tributory negligence.  But  in  a  case 
in  Georgia,  it  was  held  that  an  un- 
qualified instruction  that  if  plain- 
tiff's negligence  contributed  to  the 
damages,  the  jury  might  reduce 
the  amount  according  to  the  extent 
of  the  contribution,  was  erroneous 
though  the  jury  were  also  instructed 
by  the  court  that  want  of  ordinary 
care  on  the  plaintiff's  part  would 
defeat  recovery.  Miller  v.  Smythe, 
95  Ga.  288;  22  S.  E.  532. 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§    1^ 


by  injuries  sustained  prior  to  those  for  which  he  seeks  to  recover 
may  be  considered  by  the  jury.™  And  where  a  boy  misrepre- 
sented his  age  at  the  time  of  obtaining  employment  in  a  factory, 
it  was  held  that  such  fact  might  be  considered  in  mitigation  of 
damages  for  injuries  sustained  while  working  at  a  dangerous 
machine."'1  lint  the  jury  in  making  up  their  verdict  are  not  to 
consider  sick  benefits  received  from  any  source  other  than  the 
defendant/'-  And  gratuitous  nursing,  or  aid,  or  help  from 
friends  are  not  to  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages." 
Nor  is  the  defendant  entitled  to  have  the  proceeds  of  an  accident 
insurance  policy  deducted  from  the  amount  of  damages.54  And 
the  fact  that  the  results  of  an  injury  to  a  married  woman  may 
have  been  prolonged  or  her  recovery  delayed  by  her  becoming 
pregnant  after  receiving  the  injury  is  held  not  necessarily  and 
as  a  matter  of  law  sufficient  ground  to  justify  a  reduction  of 
damages,  where  she  had  not  been  cautioned  in  respect  thereto 
by  her  medical  adviser."1"' 


§  194.  Duty  of  injured  person  to  minimize  the  damages — 
Medical  assistance — Where  a  person  has  been  injured  by  the 
negligence  of  another,  it  is  his  duty  to  exercise  reasonable  care 
to  prevent  any  aggravation  of  the  injury  and  consequent  increase 
of  damages.  In  these  cases  it  is  his  duty  to  employ  such  medi- 
cal assistance  as  ordinary  prudence  in  his  situation  requires, 
and  to  use  ordinary  care  and  judgment  in   so  doing.56     And 


61  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kins- 
man, IS  Ky.  L.  Rep.  82;  35  S.  YV. 
264;  :>  Am.  &  Eug.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  401. 
See  sec.  210,  herein  as  to  effect  of 
prior  injury  or  disease. 

61  Legate  v.  Esplin,  Rap.  Jud.  Que- 
bec, 12  C.  S.  113. 

02  Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Baer,  90  Md.  97;  44  Atl.  992. 

53 Ohio,  etc.,  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickersou, 
59  Ind.  317;  Indianapolis  v.  Gaston, 
58  Ind.  224. 

64  Harding  v.  Town  of  Townshend, 
43  Vt.  530;  5  Am.  Rep.  304,  where  a 
person  was  injured  owing  to  a  defect 
in  the  highway.  See  also  Pittsburg, 
etc.,   R.  R.   Co.  v.   Thomson,  56  111. 


138;  Clark  v.  Wilson,  103  Mass.  219; 
4  Am.  Rep.  532;  Althorf  v.  Wolf.  22 
X.  Y.  355;   Coulter  v.  Pine  Township, 

164  Pa.  St.  543;  Bradburn  v.  Great 
Western  R.  R.  Co.,  I..  R.  Exch.  1. 

55Salladay  v.  Dodgeville,  85  Wis. 
318;  20   I..    K.    A.  541;  55  N.  w 

56  Osborne  v.  Detroit,  32  Fed. 
36;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Meech, 
163  111.  :;o:,:  45  X.  E.  290:  Pull- 
man Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Bluhm,  109  111. 
20;  Toledo  A-  W.  \V.  K.  Co.  v.  Eddy. 
72  111.  188;  Elgin  v.  Riordan,  21  111. 
App.  000;  Louisville.  X".  A.  A  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  409;  Colum- 
bia City  v.  Langohr,  20  Ind.  App. 
395:  50  N.  E.  831:  Citizens  R.  R.  Co. 
217 


£194  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

where  any  of  the  consequences  which  a  plaintiff  has  suffered 
could  have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  the  required  care  and 
prudence,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  such  results,"7  although  it 
has  been  declared  that  in  case  of  a  wilful  injury,  the  mere  fail- 
ure of  the  injured  person  to  use  reasonable  care  to  avoid  the 
consequences  of  the  injury  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  by  him 
for  so  much  of  the  damage  as  results  from  that  failure.58  In 
this  case  it  was  said  :  "Where  in  cases  of  an  intentional  tort, 
the  plaintiff  has  purposely  omitted  to  take  reasonable  steps  to 
prevent  an  aggravation  of  his  damages,  or  has  been  so  grossly 
negligent  in  that  regard  as  to  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  wilful  omis- 
sion on  his  part,  he  ought  not  to  recover  for  the  damages  which 
might  have  been  prevented  by  proper  care ;  but  on  the  other 
hand  we  think  that  he  should  recover  his  full  damages  where 
he  has  been  guilty  of  ordinary  negligence  only."  »  And  in  cases 
of  injury  by  the  negligence  of  another,  the  failure  to  procure 
medical  assistance  at  once  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  where 
the  person  injured  considered  the  injury  at  first  but  a  slight 
one,60  since  a  person  in  such  case  is  only  obliged  to  act  in  the 
treatment  of  an  injury  in  the  manner  which  common  prudence 
would  dictate  under  like  circumstances.01  And  where  one  who 
had  been  injured  imprudently  used  intoxicating  liquors  as 
a  result  of  which  his  trouble  was  aggravated,  and  the  diffi- 


v.  Hobbs,  15  Ind.  App.  610:  Allender 
v.  Chic.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  37 
Iowa.  264;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Boston  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  84  Me.  33;  24  Atl.  432; 
Strudgeon  v.  Sand  Beach,  107  Mich. 
496;  65  N.  W.  616;  2  Det.  L.  N.  749; 
Chandler  v.  Allison,  10  Mich.  460; 
Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  144  Mo.  519; 
10  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  729;  44 
S.  W.  1053;  Miles  v.  Chic.  R.  I.  & 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  App.  484;  1  Mo. 
App.  Rep.  534;  Hogle  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
303;  Howson  v.  Mestayer,  3  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  571;  Radman  v.  Haberstro,  1 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  561;  Toledo  Elec.  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Tucker,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  411;  7 
Ohio  Dec.  169;  Vallo  v.  United  States 
Exp.  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  404;  14  L.  R.  A. 
218 


743;  Bradford  v.  Downs,  126  Pa.  St. 
622;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Man- 
nerwitz,  70  Tex.  73. 

57  Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  144  Mo. 
519;  44  S.  W.  1053;  10  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  729;  Throckmorton  v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  14  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  222;  39  S.  W.  174. 

ss  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zantzinger,  92  Tex.  365;  44  L.  R.  A. 
553;  48  S.  W.  563;  71  Am.  St.  Rep. 
859;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
840:  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  477. 

59 Per  Gaines,  Ch.  J. 

60  Kennedy  v.  Busse,  60  111.  App. 
440;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Neal  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  693. 

61  Mt.  Sterling  v.  Crummy,  73  111. 
App.  572. 


PHYSICAL      [NJUEEES. 


6  IK 


culty  of  being  cured  increased,  it  was  held  that  evidence  of  this 
fact  was  admissible.82  But  the  fact  that  the  injur}'  has  been 
aggravated  by  plaintiff's  negligence  will  not  prevent  the  ad- 
mission of  evidence  as  to  the  nature,  extent  and  duration  of  the 
injuries.*3  Again,  in  case  of  an  injury  to  a  minor  child  of  tender 
years,  it  has  been  held  that  the  negligence  of  the  parent  in  pro- 
curing medical  assistance  and  treatment  after  the  injury  cannot 
be  imputed  to  the  child  so  as  to  affect  the  amount  of  recovery 
by  the  latter  for  such  injury."1 

§  195.  Same  subject  continued. — As  we  have  stated  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,  it  is  the  duty  of  a  person  injured  by  the  negli- 
gence of  another  to  employ  such  medical  assistance  as  ordinary 
prudence  in  his  situation  requires.  This  does  not,  however, 
mean  that  he  must  employ  the  most  skillful  practitioner  obtain- 
able, but  only  that  he  shall  exercise  reasonable  care  in  the  se- 
lection of  the  physician  or  surgeon,  and  where  such  care  has 
been  exercised,  the  fact  that  more  skillful  medical  assistance 
might  have  been  obtained  will  not  be  considered  in  mitigation 
of  the  damages.66  So  if  an  injured  person  has  exercised  ordinary 
care  in  the  selection  of  a  physician  or  surgeon,  the  fact  that  the 
latter  makes  any  errors  or  mistakes  in  the  treatment  of  the  in- 
juries will  not  prevent  a  recovery  of  all  the  damages  sustained."' 


89  Boggess  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co..  118  Mo.  328;  23  S.  \V.  159;  24  S. 
W.  210. 

68  Plummer  v.  Milan.  T'.»  Mo.  App. 
439:   1  Mo.  A.pp.  Rep.  000. 

64  Texas  A  I\  R.  Co.  v.  Beckworth 
(  Tex.  Civ.  App.  I.  32  S.  W.  809. 

,i5  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v. 
Bluhm,  109  111.  20;  Columbia  City  v. 
Lansohr.  20  [nd.  App.  :'.'.»:.;  50  N.  E. 
831;  Rice  v.  Des  Moines.  40  Iowa. 
638  ;  Collins  v.  Council  Bluffs,  32 
Iowa,  324;  7  Am.  Rep.  200;  Stover  v. 
Inhabitants  of  Blueliill.  51  Me.  439; 
McGanahan  v.  New  Fork,  N.  II.  &  II 
R.  Co.,  171  Mass.  211:  50  X.  E.  010;  4 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  284;  Moore  v.  Kala- 
mazoo, 100  Mich.  170;  Reed  v.  De- 
troit, 108  Mich.  224;  02  X.  W. 
967;  2  Det.  L.  N.  822;  New  York  & 


X.  J.  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Bennett.  62  X. 
J.  L.  742:  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  657;  42 
All.  7.")!':  Tuttle  v.  Farmington,  58 
N.  H.  13:  Sullivan  v.  Tioga  R.  R. 
Co.,  112  X.  V.  043:  Loeser  v. 
Humphrey,  41  Ohio  St.  378;  Heintz 
v.  Caldwell.  10  Ohio  ( '.  C.  630;  Sel- 
lcck  v.  Janesville.  100  Wis.  157;  75 
X.  W.  075:  II  L.  R.  A.  563;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  352. 

66  Columbia  City  v.  Langohr,  20 
[nd.  App.  395;  50  X.  E.  831;  Mc- 
Ganahan v.  X.  Y.  X.  II.  &  II.  R.  R. 
Co.,  171  Mass.  211:  50  X.  E.  610; 
Reed  v  Detroit,  108  Mich.  224:  65 
X.  \\".  967;  2  Det.  I..  X.  822;  New 
Fork  A-  X.  .1.  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Bennett, 
62  X.  J.  L.  742:  42  Atl.  7-V.>;  •"- 
Am.  X'eg.  Rep.  657;  Ileintz  v.  Cald- 
well. 10  Ohio  C.  C.  App.  630. 

219 


§    L96  PHYSICAL      tNJURIES. 

So  the  following  charge  to  the  jury  was  declared  to  be  certainly 
supported  by  authority  as  well  as  reason:  "  The  plaintiff  is  not 
held  responsible  tor  the  errors  or  mistakes  of  a  physician  or 
surgeon  in  treating  an  injury  received  by  a  defect  in  the  street 
or  sidewalk,  providing  she  exercises  ordinary  care  in  procuring 
the  services  of  such  physician.  Again,  where  one  is  injured  by 
the  negligence  of  another,  or  by  the  negligence  of  a  town  or  city, 
if  her  damages  have  not  been  increased  by  her  own  subsequent 
want  of  ordinary  care,  she  will  be  entitled  to  recover  in  conse- 
quence of  the  wrong  done,  and  the  full  extent  of  damage,  al- 
though the  physician  that  she  employed  omitted  to  employ  the 
remedies  most  approved  in  similar  cases,  and  by  reason  thereof 
the  damage  to  the  injured  party  was  not  diminished  as  much  as 
it  otherwise  should  have  been."  m  So  in  another  case  it  was  held 
that  where  a  reputable  and  reasonably  competent  physician  was 
employed  by  an  injured  person,  the  amount  of  damages  recover- 
able by  such  person  should  not  be  lessened  because  the  injury 
was  aggravated  by  the  use  of  the  injured  arm  and  shoulder,  where 
used  in  accordance  with  the  directions  of  the  physician.68  In 
those  cases  where  an  injured  person  has  consulted  a  physician, 
but  negligently  fails  to  comply  with  his  directions,  he  is  not 
necessarily  precluded  from  recovering  damages  accruing  subse- 
quent to  such  failure,  but  only  those  damages  which  accrue  as  a 
result  of  such  failure  are  not  recoverable.69 

§  196.  Duty  of  injured  person  to  submit  to  surgical  op- 
eration.— It  may  in  some  cases  of  injury  be  necessary  to  per- 
form a  surgical  operation  in  order  to  effect  a  cure.  Where 
such  an  operation  is  required  in  order  to  give  relief  or  to  bring 
about  a  cure  and  it  is  attended  with  slight  inconvenience  and 
no  danger,  it  is  held  that  if  a  person  under  such  circumstances 
refuses  to  submit  to  an  operation,  there  can  be  no  recovery  of 
damages  attributable  to  such  failure.70     So  in  a  late  case  in  New 


«  Selleck  v.  Janesville,  100  Wis. 
157;  75  N.  W.  975;  41  L.  K.  A.  563; 
4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  352. 

68  Columbia  City  v.  Langohr,  20 
Ind.  App.  395;  50  N.  E.  831. 

09  Keyes  v.  Cedar  Falls.  107  Iowa, 
509:  78  N.  W.  227. 
220 


70  Bailey  v.  Centerville,  108  Iowa, 
20;  78  N.  W.  831.  See  Mattis  v. 
Philadelphia  Traction  Co.,  6  Pa. 
Dist.  R.  94;  18  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  106,  where 
it  was  held  that  where  a  surgical 
operation  was  comparatively  new 
and   the  profession  were  not  abso- 


PHYSICAL      I  N.I  TRIES. 


|§  19T,  L98 


York,71  where  this  question  arose,  it  was  held  proper  to  charge 
the  jury  that  where  a  person  was  injured  by  the  negligence  of 
another,  lie  was  bound  to  use  the  usual  and  reasonable  remedies 
appropriate  to  effect  a  cure  ;  that  he  could  not  increase  the  dam- 
ages by  negligently  allowing  his  condition  to  become  worse  than 
it  would  if  properly  treated  ;  that  if  an  operation  was  attended 
with  danger  in  the  remotest  degree,  he  was  not  obliged  to  sub- 
mit thereto  ;  that  he  must  determine  this  matter  for  himself, 
and  if  he  decided  not  to  submit  to  an  operation,  either  by  reason 
of  apprehension  or  other  cause,  the  person  responsible  for  the  in- 
jury could  not  complain  thereof ;  but  that  the  evidence  of  the  ex- 
perts as  to  the  possibility  of  curing  such  an  injury  by  operation 
and  the  slight  incovenience  said  to  result  from  such  operation 
in  most  cases  was  to  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  determining 
the  amount  and  permanency  of  the  injury.  So  where  a  per- 
son who  had  been  injured  by  a  fall  upon  a  defective  sidewalk 
refused  to  submit  to  a  surgical  operation  for  hernia  and  his  con- 
duct was  that  of  a  reasonably  prudent  man  in  the  exercise 
of  reasonable  judgment,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  charge- 
able with  such  negligence  as  would  affect  his  recovery.7- 

§  197.  Effect  of  plaintiff's  death.— The  plaintiffs  death 
during  the  pendency  of  an  action  to  recover  for  injuries  sus- 
tained by  him  and  the  substitution  of  his  personal  representa- 
tive in  his  stead  does  not  affect  the  right  to  recover  damages 
but  only  limits  the  recovery  to  such  damages  as  are  shown  to 
have   been  sustained  by  the  plaintiff  prior  to  his  death.73 


§  19N.  Release  of  claims  for  personal  injuries — Generally. 

— If  a  person  who  has  received  a  personal  injury  executes  a  re- 
lease to  the  person  liable  therefor,  for  a  specified  consideration, 
the  release   being  given  understanding!}-  with  full   knowledge 


lutely  at  rest  as  to  the  best  method 
of  performing  it  though  it  was  gen- 
erally considered  as  accompanied  by 
Blight  risk  of  death,  an  injured  per- 
son was  not  obliged  to  submit  to  the 
same,  though  it  might  have  occa- 
sioned substantial  relief  and  approxi- 
mate cure. 


71  Blate  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  60 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  732. 

T-  Williams  v.  Brooklyn,  33  A.pp. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  539:  r.3  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1007. 

"Illinois  Steel  Co.  \.  Ostrowski. 
93  111.  App.  57. 

221 


§  198  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

of  its  force  and  meaning,  and  there  are  no  fraudulent  or  deceit- 
ful representations,  which  materially  induce  the  person  injured 
to  execute  the  same,  such  release  will  be  a  bar  to  a  subsequent 
action  for  the  injuries.74  And  it  has  been  held  that  an  em- 
ployee may,  by  contract,  assume  all  liability  for  injuries  received 
owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  employer,  and  that  such  con- 
tract is  not  against  public  policy.'5  So  where  an  employee  has 
been  injured  while  in  the  company's  employ,  and  as  a  part  com- 
pensation for  such  injury  the  company  agrees  to  employ  him  at 
certain  specified  wages  during  his  life  or  ability  and  disposition 
to  work,  he  may  in  an  action  for  the  breach  of  such  contract  re- 
cover prospective  damages  therefor.76  The  measure  of  damages 
in  such  an  action  is  the  amount  of  wages  due  at  the  time  of  the 
trial,  together  with  compensation  for  such  future  benefit  as  he 
would  probably  have  received  under  the  contract,  less  the 
amount  which  he  earned,  or  with  reasonable  diligence  might 
have  earned  elsewhere,  allowance  being  made  to  him  for  the 
expenses  of  obtaining  such  employment.77  A  release  executed 
by  an  employee  who  has  been  injured  is,  it  is  held,  admissible  in 
an  action  in  trespass  on  the  case  against  his  employee.78  But 
where  a  person  who  was  injured  by  being  thrown  from  a  street 
car  executed  a  release  or  receipt  in  full  for  all  damages  received 
from  the  fall,  such  receipt  being  in  the  name  of  a  certain  street 
car  company,  and  given  to  the  manager  of  such  company,  who 
was  also  the  manager  of  another  street  car  company  operated  in 
connection  with  such  company,  it  was  held  that  the  receipt  was 
not  sufficient  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  fall  was  from  the  car 
of  the  former  company,  where  the  manager  testified  that  it  was 
from  the  car  of  the  latter  company.71' 


™  Lumley  v.  Wabash  K.  Co.  (C.  C. 
E.  D.  Mich.),  71  Fed.  21;  McFar- 
land  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  125  Mo. 
253;  28  S.  W.  590;  Seeley  v.  Citi- 
zens Tract.  Co.,  179  Pa.  St.  334;  36 
Atl.  229. 

75  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mahoney,  148  Ind.  196;  40  L.  R.  A. 
101;  46  N.  E.  917;  8  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  441.  See  Brasell  v.  La 
Campagnie  du  Grand  Tronc,  Rap. 
Jud.  Quebec,  11  C.  S.  150. 

222 


76  Brighton  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S  R.  Co.  (Mich.  1895),  61  N.  W. 
550. 

77  Perm.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dolan,  6  Ind. 
App.  109;  32  N.  E.    802. 

78  Johnson  v.  Phila.  &  R.  R.  Co., 
163  Pa,  St.  127;  29  Atl.  854;  35  W. 
N.  C.  355. 

79  Anderson  v.  Des  Moines  St.  R. 
Co.,  97  Iowa,  739;  66  N.  W.  64. 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES.  §§    L99,   200 

§  199.  Release  when  induced  by  fraud  no  bar.— If  a  per- 
son who  hats  been  injured  by  the  negligent  acl  of  another  is 
fraudulently  induced  to  sign  a  release  for  the  damages  sus- 
tained, such  release  will  not  operate  as  a  bar  to  a  subsequent 
action  to  recover  for  such  injuries.  So  where  a  written  release 
was  executed  by  one  who  was  not  in  a  condition  to  understand 
what  he  was  doing,  it  was  held  that  it  was  no  liar  to  an  action 
by  the  injured  person  to  recover  damages  when  attacked  for 
fraud.80  And  where  an  illiterate  employee  gave  a  receipt  for 
wages  on  which  was  written  the  words,  "in  full  for  services 
and  damages,"  it  was  held  that  the  employer  was  not  thereby 
released  from  damages,  where  it  appeared  that  the  employee  did 
not  understand  that  such  receipt  was  to  be  a  release  of  dam- 
ages.81 So,  also,  where  money  was  received  by  a  person  under 
the  impression  that  it  was  a  gratuity,  it  was  held  that  an  instru- 
ment which  referred  to  such  money  as  a  "donation"  to  be  in 
"  full  payment  of  all  the  matters "  which  the  maker  thereof 
might  have  against  a  certain  street  car  company  in  consequence 
of  an  accident  which  was  declared  in  the  instrument  to  be  due 
to  such  person's  own  carelessness,  was  not  a  bar  to  an  action  to 
recover  for  the  injuries  resulting  from  such  accident.^  And 
again,  where,  four  days  after  an  accident  while  the  injured  per- 
son was  utterly  helpless  and  was  mainly  concerned  with  his 
immediate  needs,  a  release  was  executed  by  him  for  a  very  small 
consideration,  and  at  the  instigation  of  the  claim  agent  of  the 
railroad  company,  it  was  held  that  under  such  circumstances 
the  release  would  be  set  aside  as  a  fraud  and  an  imposition. s: 

§  200.  Same  subject  continued.— A  settlement  of  a  pending 
suit  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  will  not  be  set  aside  merely 
because  the  plaintiff  had  not  fully  recovered,  could  not  read  or 


*"  Malmstrom  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co., 
20  Wash.  195;  55  Pac.  38;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  K.  Cas.  X.  S.  329. 

M  Whitney  &  S.  Co.  v.  O'Rourke, 
172  111.  177;  50  N.  E.  242.  aff'g  68  111. 
A  pp.  487. 

82  Boikens  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R. 
Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  831;  l9So.   737. 

88  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  V.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cunningham,  59    Kan.  722;  54    Pac. 


1055;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
132.  In  this  case  it  appeared  thai 
the  person,  while  a  passenger,  had 
been  injured  in  a  collision,  and  that, 
among  other  severe  injuries,  his 
skull  had  been  fractured  and  his  leg 
broken.  The  consideration  for  the 
release  was  s75  and  care  t<>  be  given 
him  at  the  hospital  to  which  be  was 
taken  after  the  accident. 

9.9.2 


£   201  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

write,  and  his  attorneys  were  not  present  at  the  time  he  made 
such  settlement  and  had  no  knowledge  of  the  same.84  And  a 
release  to  a  railroad  company  by  an  employee  for  injuries  re- 
ceived while  on  one  of  such  company's  trains,  due  to  a  defect  in 
the  track  of  another  company  over  which  such  train  was  passing, 
will  not,  in  the  absence  of  undue  influence,  be  set  aside  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  because  the  company  to  which  he  gave  such  re- 
lease represented  that  the  company  owning  the  track  was  alone 
responsible  where,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  both  companies  were  re- 
sponsible and  the  effect  of  the  release  was  to  discharge  both 
companies.85  Again,  though  the  want  of  sufficient  mental  capac- 
ity may  be  a  good  ground  for  setting  aside  a  release,  yet  there 
must  be  some  evidence  tending  to  show  the  want  of  such  capac- 
ity in  order  to  authorize  the  consideration  of  such  question  by 
the  jury.*  And  where  a  person  who  has  executed  a  release  of 
damages  for  personal  injuries  claims  that  he  had  no  knowledge 
of  the  contents  of  such  release  and  was  induced  to  sign  the 
same  by  misrepresentations,  though  it  is  held  that  he  cannot 
state  his  understanding  as  to  the  purport  or  purpose  of  the 
paper,  yet  he  may  be  asked  whether  he  knew  at  the  time  he 
signed  the  same  that  he  was  settling  with  the  company  for 
damages  due  to  the  injury.87  And  where  a  release  is  pleaded 
by  the  defendant  in  an  action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries, 
the  admissibility  of  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that 
the  release  was  obtained  by  fraud  cannot  be  questioned  for  the 
first  time  on  appeal.^ 

§201.  Settine:  aside  of  release  Keturn  of  consideration 
not  necessary. — The  general  rule  that  one  who  seeks  to  rescind 
a  contract  must  restore  the  other  party  thereto  to  the  position 
which  he  was  in  at  the  time  he  entered  into  the  contract  does 
not  apply  where  one  seeks  to  set  aside  a  release  which  has  been 
procured  by  fraud.     In  such  cases  a  return  of  the  money  or 


84  Mosby  v.  Cleveland  Street  R.  Co., 
15  Ohio  C.  C.  501. 

85  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Sulli- 
van, 21  Colo.  ;i02 ;  41  Pac.  501. 

;«()eh  v.  Missouri.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co., 
130  Mo.  27;  :'.9  L.  K.  A.  442;  31  S.  W. 
'.102:  2  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  343. 

■2-24 


87  National  Syrup  Co.  v.  Carlson, 
155  111.  210;  40  N.  E.  492. 

88  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  How- 
ard. 27  Wash.  L.  Rep.  146;  14  App. 
D.  C.  262. 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§20- 


consideration  received  at  the   time  of  and  for  the  execution  of 

the  release  need  not  be  made."''  So  where  one  who  had  been 
injured,  owing  to  the  negligence  of  another,  signed  a  paper  re- 
leasing such  person  of  all  claims  For  damages,  and  he  was  in- 
duced to  make  such  release  by  fraud  and  false  representations 
that  the  money  was  a  gift  from  the  wife  of  the  defendant  who 
had  on  previous  occasions  made  gills  to  her,  it  was  held  that 
liefore  commencing  an  action  for  such  injuries  the  plaintiff  was 
not  bound  to  restore  the  money  received."  And  where  a  pas- 
senger who  had  been  injured  was  fraudulently  induced  to  sign  a 
release  to  the  company  of  all  claims  for  damages  for  personal 
injuries  under  the  belief  that  he  was  merely  signing  a  release 
of  any  claim  for  damages  to  his  clothing,  it  was  held  that  it  was 
not  necessary  for  him  to  return  the  money  received  under  such 
release  before  bringing  an  action  for  the  physical  injuries  sus- 
tained by  him.91 


§  202.  Release  limited  to  injuries  specifically  mentioned. 

— Where  a  release  specifically  enumerates  the  injuries  which  are 
known  and  considered  as  the  basis  of  the  settlement  and  other 
injuries  subsequently  develop,  the  existence  of  which  were  un- 
known to  the  parties  at  the  time,  but  which  are  of  such  a  char- 
acter and  nature  as  to  clearly  indicate  that  if  they  had  been 
known  the  release  would  not  have  been  executed  on  such  a 
basis,  such  release  will  be  no  bar  to  an  action  for  such  subse- 
quently developed  injuries. r;     And  where  a  release  was  executed 


89  O'Brien  v.  Chic.  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co..  89  Iowa,  044;  57  X.  W.  425,  where 
it  was  declared  that  the  release  was 
a  mere  receipt  for  a  gratuity  which 
the  plaintiff  might  retain  though 
defeated  in  the  action.  Bliss  v.  N. 
V.  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  100  Mass.  447; 
30  \.  E.  65;  Dwyer  v.  Wabash  R. 
Co.,  titi  Mo.  App.  335;  Shaw  v.  Web- 
ber, 70  Him  (X.  Y),  307:  C>1  X.  V.  St. 
R.  430;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  437;  The 
Oriental  v.  Barclay,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
193;  41  S.  W.  117.  Rut  see  Lyons  v. 
Allen,  11  App.  D.  C.  543;  26  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  50;  Louisville  A  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
McElroy,  100  Ky.  153;  IS  Ry.  L.  Rep. 
15 


730;  37  S.  W.  844:  Och  v.  Missouri, 
K.  A-  T.  R.  Co.,  130  Mo.  27:  36  L.  R. 
A.  442:  31  S.  W.  962:  2  Am.  A-  Eng. 
R.  (as.  X.  S.  343. 

90 Shaw  v.  Webber,  79  Bun  (N.  Y.). 
307;  HI  X.  Y.  St.  R.  430;  29  N.  V. 
Supp.  437.  aff'd  151  X.  V.  i;:,;,.  no 
opinion. 

W  Bliss  v.  X.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R,  K.  Co., 
160  Mass.    117:  36  X.  E.  05. 

92Lumley  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  (C. 
C.  App.  6th  ('.  I.  76  Fed.  66;  13  I'. 
S.  App.  470;  Union  I'.  R.  Co.  v. 
Artist,  19  U.  S.  App.  012:  23  1..  R,  A. 
581;  Xelson  v.  Minneapolis  St.  R. 
Co.,  01  Minn.  107:  Och  \.  Missouri, 

225 


§  203 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


under  such  circumstances,  which  was  broad  enough  in  its  terms 
but  the  unsuspected  injury  which  developed  appeared  to  have 
been  the  principal  injury  and  to  have  resulted  in  serious  and  per- 
manent disability,  it  was  held  that  the  release  would  not  be  con- 
strued as  including  such  injury.93  In  this  class  of  cases  also  a 
tender  back  of  the  money  received  in  connection  with  such 
release  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  enable  the  party  injured  to 
recover  for  the  injury  subsequently  developed.94 

§  203.  Release  by  railroad  employee — Acceptance  of 
benefits  of  relief  association.  —Relief  associations  have  been 
formed  in  many  instances  for  the  benefit  of  the  employees  of  a 
railroad  who  have  been  injured  or  disabled.  Of  these  associa- 
tions the  railroad  company  in  many  cases  contribute  to  a  certain 
extent  to  the  running  expenses  and  maintenance  and  often  also 
to  the  general  relief  fund.  Where  associations  of  this  kind  are 
in  existence  and  an  employee  joining  the  same  stipulates  or  con- 
tracts with  the  railroad  company  which  employs  him,  that  if 
he  is  injured  and  accepts  mone}'  from  the  relief  fund  on  ac- 
count of  such  injury,  the  acceptance  by  him  of  such  money  shall 
operate  as  a  relinquishment  or  release  of  any  right  to  damages 
against  the  company,  such  stipulation  is  a  valid  contract  or 
stipulation  being  supported  by  a  sufficient  consideration  and  not 
contrary  to  public  policy.'6     Such  a  contract  is  not  an  agreement 


K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  130  Mo.  27;  36  L.  R. 
A.  442;  31  S.  W.  962:  2  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  343. 

^Lumley  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  (C. 
C.  App.  6th  C),  76  Fed.  66;  43  U. 
S.  App.  476.  In  this  case  the  surT 
geon  of  the  company  had  told  the 
injured  person  that  the  pain  com- 
plained of  was  sympathetic  and  due 
to  another  cause,  but  it  was  held  that 
whether  the  opinion  was  honestly  or 
dishonestly  given  it  was  immaterial 
as  affecting  the  question  whether 
the  release  included  such  injury. 

94  Lumley  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  ( C.  C. 
App.  6th  0.),  76  Fed.  66;  43  U.  S. 
App.  476. 

95  Chic.  B.  &  Q.   R.  Co.  v.  Miller 

226 


(C.  C.  App.  8th  C.)i  76  Fed.  439; 
22  C.  C.  A.  264;  40  U.  S.  App.  448; 
Owens  v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  35  Fed. 
715;  Eckman  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.,  169  111.  312;  38  L.  R.  A.  750; 
48  N.  E.  496;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  308,  aff'g  64  111.  App.  444; 
Lease  v.  Penn.Co.,  10  Ind.  App.  47; 
37  N.  E.  423;  Maine  v.  Chic.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  70  N.  W.  630;  9 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  299;  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  15;  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.  v.  Curtis,  51  Neb.  442;  71  N.  W. 
42;  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co., 
55  Ohio  St.  497;  35  L.  R.  A.  507;  45 
N.  E.  641;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  152;  37  Ohio  L.  J.  30;  Johnson  v. 
Philadelphia  &   R.   R.  Co.,   163  Pa. 


PHYSICAL    INMIKIES. 


not  to  sue  the  emploj-er  for  injuries  due  to  the  latter's  negligence, 
but  merely  gives  to  the  employee  an  election  either  to  incept 
the  benefits,  in  which  case  he  is  precluded  by  the  agreement 
from  suing  the  company,  or  to  sue  the  company,  in  which  event 
he  cannot  accept  the  benefits  of  the  associal  ion.  The  acceptance 
of  the  benefits  operates  as  a  release  of  all  claim  to  damages  against 
the  railroad  company.98  Again,  where  an  employee  releases  the 
company  from  liability  by  accepting  the  hem  tits  of  a  relief  fund, 
such  release  is  not  in  violation  of  a  constitutional  provision  giv- 
ing to  employees  the  same  rights  and  remedies  allowed  to  per- 
sons who  are  not  employees  in  certain  cases  and  providing  that 
a  waiver  of  the  benefit  of  such  provision  shall  be  null  and  void.9' 
So,  also,  under  a  statute  of  Ohio,"'  prohibiting  any  contract  by 
which  the  right  to  damages  against  a  railroad  in  case  of  per- 
sonal injury  or  death  should  be  surrendered  or  waived,  or  in 
case  that  right  is  asserted,  the  surrender,  or  waiver  of  any  other 
right,  it  was  held  that  a  contract  by  an  employee  that  the  accept- 
ance of  any  benefits  from  the  relief  fund  should  release  the  em- 
ployer from  liability  for  damages  was  not  within  such  prohibi- 
tion.'* And  where  a  release  of  the  railroad  company  has  been 
made  by  the  acceptance  of  benefits,  such  release  cannot  be 
avoided  merely  on  the  ground  that  the  employee  did  not  know 
that  he  could  prove  certain  facts,  or  by  what  witnesses  he  could 
prove  them.10" 


127;  29  Atl.  854:  Johnson  v.  Charles- 
ton &  S.  R.  Co.,  55  S.  C.  152:  44 
L.  R.  A.  645;  32  S.  E.  2;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  K.  Cas.  N.  S.  761:  4  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  81. 

96  Eckman  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
160  111.  312;  88 L.  R.  A.  750:  48  X.  E. 
496;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  S. 
308,  aff'g  64  111.  App.  444;  Lease  v. 
Penn.  Co.,  10  Ind.  App.  47:  37  N.  E. 
423:  Spitze  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
75  Bid.  102:  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  55  Ohio  St.  497:  35 
L.  R.  A.  50*7;  45  N.  E.  641 :  7  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  152;  37  Ohio  L.  J. 
30;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bryant,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  332;  Ringle  v. 


Penu.  R.  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  529:  30 
Atl.  492:  Brown  v.  Bait.  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  23  Wash.  L.  Rep.  337.  See 
Elliott  on  R.  R.,  sec.  1384. 

"7  Johnson  v.  Charleston  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  55  S.  C.  152:  44  L.  R.  A.  645; 
32  S.  E.  2:  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  761;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  81,  con- 
struing such  a  release  in  connection 
with  S.  C.  Const.  1895.  art.  9,  sec.  15. 

98  Ohio  Act.  April  2,  1890. 

90  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cox,  55  Ohio  St.  597;  35  L.  R  A. 
507:  45  N.  E.  641;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  s.  152;  37  Ohio  L.  J.  30. 

wo  Vickers  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 
(C.  C.  N.  D.  111.),  71  Fed.  139. 
227 


§§  204,  205  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

§  204.    Recovery   of   special   damages— Pleadings.  —  The 

damages  which  are  recoverable  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries 
are  such  as  necessarily  result  from  the  act  complained  of  in  the 
absence  of  allegation  and  proof  of  special  damages.  If  a  plain- 
tiff in  such  an  action  seeks  to  recover  special  damages,  he  should 
allege  them  in  his  complaint  and  give  proof  thereof.1  So  where 
plaintiff  claims' particular  damages  by  reason  of  loss  of  any  spe- 
cial contract  or  engagement  as  a  result  of  personal  injuries,  the 
grounds  for  same  .should  be  stated  in  the  declaration .*  And 
where  the  only  allegation  as  to  special  damage  was  that  the 
plaintiff  had  been  hindered  in  her  business  and  incurred  expenses 
in  beine  cured,  it  was  held  that  evidence  was  not  admissible  of 
any  special  business  engagement  into  which  she  had  entered, 
and  that  she  could  not  express  her  opinion  of  what  she  could 
or  would  have  earned  thereunder.3  And  in  an  action  to  recover 
for  injuries  received  while  in  defendant's  car,  it  was  held  that 
the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  damages  for  the  cutting  of  his 
clothing,  since  they  were  special  and  should  be  alleged  in  the 
complaint.4  So  again,  under  an  allegation  of  a  physical  injury 
resulting  in  soreness  and  lameness,  it  was  held  that  there  could 
be  no  recovery  for  rheumatism  augmented  by  such  injury.5 
But  the  recovery  of  special  damages  from  an  injury  to  plaintiff's 
business  may  be  had  under  an  allegation  that  the  plaintiff  has 
become  so  disabled  as  to  interfere  seriously  with  his  business  in 
the  absence  of  a  motion  to  make  the  allegation  more  definite 
and  certain.6 

§  205.  Amendment  of  complaint— Increased  damages 

The  general  rule  seems  to  be  that  a  complaint  may,  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court,  be  amended  so  as  to  increase  the  amount 
of  damages  claimed.     Thus  it  is  so  held  in   Massachusetts.' 


1  Hunter  v.  Stewart,  47  Me.  419. 

2  North  Chic.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber, 
77  111.  App.  257;  Citizens  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burke,  98  Tenn.  650;  40  S.  W.  1085. 

3  Beardstown  v.  Smith,  150  111.  169; 
37  N.  E.  211,  aff'g  52  111.  App.  46. 

4  Schmitt  v.  Dry  Dock  R.  R.  Co., 
3  N.  Y.  St.  R.  257;  2  City  Ct.  359. 
In  this  case  it  was  held  that  damages 
for  loss  by  such   cutting  were  not    Co.,  160  Mass.  402;  35  N.  E.  851 

228  *  ■         . 


recoverable  under  an  allegation  that 
the  clothing  of  the  plaintiff  was  sat- 
urated with  blood. 

5  Hall  v.  Cadillac,  114  Mich.  99;  72 
N.  W.  33;  4Det.  L.  N.  499. 

6  Frobisher  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Transp. 
Co.,  81  Hun  (N.  Y.),  544;  63  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  287;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1099. 

7  Graves  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  P. 


PHYSICAL     lN.irinr.s.  \  206 

And  in  the  United  States  courts  it  is  held  that  the  trial  judge 
may,  in  his  discretion,  permit  a  complaint  to  he  amended  so  as 
to  introduce  an  additional  element  of  damages  for  money  ex- 
pended where  BUCh  element  is  foreshadowed  in  the  bill  of  par- 
ticulars." So  in  Georgia  it  is  held  that  the  plaintiff  is,  after  the 
commencement  of  the  trial,  entitled  as  a  matter  of  right  to  amend 
his  complaint  for  the  purpose  of  showing  an  additional  injury, 
and  that  the  defendant,  if  surprised  thereby,  may  have  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  case  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  such  amend- 
ment upon  making  a  proper  showing.''  And  in  a  case  in  New 
York  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  which  occurred  prior  to 
the  removal  of  the  statutory  limitation  of  the  amount  recovera- 
ble in  such  actions,  it  was  held  that  where  a  complaint,  declar- 
ing upon  such  action,  was  amended  to  increase  the  demand  in 
excess  of  the  statutory  limit,  it  was  not  prejudicial  where  the  ver- 
dict was  not  in  excess  of  such  limit,1"  In  New  Hampshire  also 
it  is  held  that  the  statement  filed  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
of  that  state  "  within  ten  days  of  the  date  of  the  injury  may  be 
amended  to  cover  damages  which  appear  subsequent  to  the  date 
of  filing.12 

§  206.  Instructions— Generally.— Where  the  law  provides 
a  definite  measure  of  damages  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries, 
the  statement  in  an  instruction  of  a  general  principle  as  to  the 
measure  of  damages  which  is  broader  than  is  applicable  to  the 
particular  case  and  which  is  not  qualified  by  other  instructions 
is  erroneous. ,:!  Although  it  has  been  held  that  though  an  in- 
struction does  not  limit  the  jury  to  any  particular  elements  of 
damages,  it  is  not  prejudicially  erroneous  if  the  verdict  is  clearly 
not  excessive."  Where  the  plaintiff's  recovery  was  limited  by 
the  instruction  to  the  issue  "  if  the  jury  shall  find  the  plaintiff 
has  been  injured  as  charged  in  the  declaration,"  such   instrue- 


8  Forty-Second  St.  M.  &  St.  N.  K. 
Co.  v.  Haunou  (C.  C.  App.  2d  C. ),  57 
U.  S.  App.  255;  85  Fed.  852;  20  ('.  <\ 
A.  1157. 

»  Atlanta  Consul.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bag- 
well, 107  Ga.  157;  33  S.  E.  191. 

10  Burns  v.  Houston  W.  S.  &  P.  F. 
R.  Co..  15  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  19;  36  X.  Y. 
Supp.  774;  71  X.  V.  St.  R.  804. 


11  X.  II.  (ren.  Laws,  chap.  75.  sec.  7. 

■■-  Noble  V.  Portsmouth  (X.  II.),  30 
Atl.  419. 

1:!  Omaha  Coal  C.  A-  L.  Co.  v.  Fay, 
:sc  Neb.  — ;  55  X.  W.  211. 

14  Sherwood  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co., 
132  Mo.  339;  33  S.  W.  774. 


229 


§  206  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

tion  was  held  to  limit  the  recovery  by  the  plaintiff  not  only  to 
the  described  injuries  but  to  their  causation  as  described  in  the 
declaration.13  While  an  instruction  should  be  clear  as  to  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  in  each  particular  case,  it  need  not  state  all  the 
elements  of  recovery."'  And  if  an  instruction  attempts  to  state 
the  causes,  other  than  those  for  which  defendant  is  responsible, 
which  may  have  produced  the  injury,  but  omits  those  which  the 
evidence  tends  to  establish  as  producing  causes,  such  omission 
does  not  constitute  error.17  Again,  an  instruction  should  not  as- 
sume the  existence  of  elements  which  should  be  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence and  are  not.  So  where  a  person  fell  into  an  excavation 
it  was  held  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  injury  caused  thereby 
that  an  instruction  which  assumed  that  the  plaintiff  sustained 
physical  injuries  causing  bodily  pain  and  mental  suffering,  was 
erroneous.18  But  an  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  may  recover 
as  a  result  of  "  said  injury  "  for  any  pain  and  anguish  which  he 
has  suffered  or  will  suffer  in  consequence  thereof,  all  damages 
to  his  person,  permanent  or  otherwise,  occasioned  thereby,  and 
generally  all  damages  alleged  in  the  declaration  which  they  may 
believe  from  the  evidence  he  has  sustained  by  reason  thereof, 
was  held  not  erroneous  as  assuming  that  the  hernia  which  it 
had  been  shown  that  the  plaintiff  was  suffering  from  was  a 
result  of  the  injuries  in  question.19  And  it  was  held  not 
erroneous  as  assuming  that  damages  were  sustained  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  in  assessing  damages  they  should  take  into  consid- 
eration all  the  facts  and  circumstances  before  them,  where  a 
technical  liability  was  admitted  by  the  defendant  upon  the 
trial.20  But  in  another  case  it  was  held  to  be  error  to  permit  the 
jury  to  consider  the  dislocation  of  a  shoulder  as  an  element  of 
damages  where  there  was  no  evidence  showing  a  dislocation,  the 
only  evidence  bearing  thereon  being  the  testimony  of  the  plain- 


15  American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Risley,  77 
111.  App.  476,  aff'd  in  179  111.  295;  53 
X.  E.  558;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  40. 

10  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Sullivan,  14:3  111.  48;  32  N.  E. 
398. 

17  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Sim- 
mons, 12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  501;  33  S. 
W.  1090. 

230 


18  Evans  v.  Joplin,  76  Mo.  App.  20; 
1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  485. 

19  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 
169  111.  287;  48  N.  E.  414,  affg  68 
111.  App.  472. 

20  North  Chic.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Hous- 
inger,  175  111.  318;  51  N.  E.  613,  aff'g 
70  111.  App.  101. 


PHYSICAL     [NJURIES. 


8  207 


tiff  that  he  could  not  use  his  arm,  and  that  of  his  physician  that 
he  was  unable  to  tell  whether  there  was  a  dislocation.  Again, 
if  the  evidence  as  to  the  cause  of  an  injury  consists  of  mere  spec- 
ulations, it  is  held  that  a  verdict  should  be  directed  for  the  de- 
fendant.22  But  if  the  evidence  with  all  its  inferences  fairly 
tends  to  sustain  a  verdict  for  plaintiff,  it  is  declared  that  it  is 
proper  to  refuse  a  peremptory  instruction  for  the  defendant.- 

§  207.  Amount  of  recovery— Instructions  as  to — While  the 

amount  named  in  the  complaint  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries 
may  be  said  to  be  the  amount  in  excess  of  which  damages  should 
not  be  awarded,  or  in  other  words  a  limitation  as  to  the  damages 
which  the  jury  may  assess,  yet  the  amount  claimed  may  be  so 
largely  in  excess  of  what  the  facts  of  the  case  would  justify  or 
warrant,  that  it  would  be  improper  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
they  may  award  plaintiff  fair,  reasonable  and  just  compensation 
to  any  amount  not  exceeding  the  amount  demanded,  since  such 
instruction  would  tend  to  impress  the  jury  that  a  verdict  of 
such  amount  would  be  justified.-'  But  though  such  an  in- 
struction, may  be  erroneous,  yet  a  judgment  will  not  be  reversed 
on  that  account  alone,  if  it  appear  from  the  amount  of  the 
verdict  and  the  evidence  that  the  error  was  harmless.-"'  But 
where  in  an  action  for  injuries  caused  by  a  defective  bridge, 
the  plaintiff  had  offered  to  accept  a  certain  amount  in  his  claim 
filed  with  the  supervisors,  it  was  held  not  prejudicial  to  defend- 
ant to  instruct  the  jury  that  he  could  not  recover  in  excess  of 
that  amount.-1"  Where  the  jury  is  instructed  as  to  the  amount 
recoverable  in  such  actions,  it  is  a  better  practice  to  instruct 
them  that  they  should  not  find  for  any  item  an  amount  in  excess 


21  Haszlachern  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co., 
60  N.  Y.  Supp.  1001. 

22  Gerue  v.  Consol.  Fireworks  Co., 
12  Ohio  C.  C.  420;  1  Ohio  C.  S.  616. 

-:!  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lyons,  157  111.  593;  42  N.  E.  55. 

24  Gilbertson  v.  Forty-Second  St. 
M.  St.  N.  Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. ) 
204;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  782;  Rost  v. 
Brooklyn  II.  II.  Co.,  10  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  477;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  1069, 
See  also  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Louders. 


178  111.  585,  rev'g  70  111.  App.  41; 
De  La  Vergne  Refrigerating  Bfach. 
Co.  v.  McLeroth,  60  111.  App.  529; 
Benson  v.  Chicago  A-  X.  W.  R.  Co., 
41  111.  App.  227;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Minor  (Miss.),  11  So.  101;  16  L. 
R.  A.  627. 

25  Texas  A-    P.   R.   R.  Co.  v.  Hoff- 
man, 83  Tex.  286;  18  S.  W.  711. 

26  Horaan  v.   Franklin  County,   98 
Iowa,  692;  68  N.  W.  559. 

231 


*  -JOS  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

of  what  the  petition  or  complaint  claims,  instead  of  merely 
limiting  the  aggregate  amount,  and  instructing  them  that  in 
assessing  the  damages  they  are  to  consider  the  various  items 
claimed  in  the  complaint,  but  imposing  no  limitation  as  to  the 
amount  they  may  assess  for  each  item.27  Again,  where  the 
court  was  charging  the  jury  as  to  the  amount  recoverable  for 
expenses  in  connection  with  plaintiff's  business,  it  was  held 
error  to  instruct  them  that  they  were  not  bound  to  restrict  the 
amount  awarded  to  what  was  actually  proven  in  dollars  and 
cents,  and  that  the  plaintiff's  efforts  in  going  to  business,  contrary 
to  the  advice  of  his  doctor,  probably  saved  the  defendants  a 
considerable  amount  of  expense  for  other  superintendence  for 
which  they  would  have  been  liable."28  If,  however,  in  a  certain 
case  of  injuries  the  amount  of  recovery  is  fixed  by  statute,  an  in- 
struction limiting  plaintiff's  recovery  to  actual  damages,  not 
exceeding  such  amount,  cannot  be  complained  of  by  defendant.-'9 
And  it  is  proper  to  charge  the  jury  that  in  assessing  the 
damages  in  the  particular  case  before  them,  they  are  not  to  con- 
sider decisious  of  the  supreme  court  upon  the  point  whether 
verdicts  awarded  by  juries  in  other  cases  were  or  were  not  ex- 
cessive.* But  in  instructing  the  jury  as  to  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages which  they  may  award  to  the  plaintiff,  it  is  not  proper  to 
draw  their  attention  to  the  price  for  which  they  would  be  will- 
ing to  suffer  the  same  injury.31 

§  208.  "Such  sum  as  will  compensate"—"  Fair  and  just 
compensation"—"  Fair  and  reasonable  compensation"— In- 
structions.—In  an  action  for  personal  injuries  the  jury  is  fre- 
quently charged  that  they  may  assess  damages  at  such  sum  as 
will  compensate  the  plaintiff,  and  the  use  of  such  term  has  been 
held  proper.  So  it  is  proper  to  charge  the  jury  that  they  may 
"  assess  the  damages  in  such  sum  as  in  your  judgment  will  com- 
pensate the  plaintiff  for  such  injury  and  pain  and  suffering."  " 
And,  again,  the  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  re- 


27  Blackwell  v.  Kansas  City,  76  Mo. 
App.  46;  1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  486. 

28  Smith  v.    Nova   Scotia   Teleph. 
Co.,  26  N.  S.  275. 

29  Schlerth  v.    Missouri,   P.   R.   R. 
Co.  (Mo.),  19  S.  W.  1134.  , 

232 


30  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  King  (Ga.),  14  S.  E.  708. 

si  Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  144  Pa.  St. 
348;  13  L.  R.  A.  374;  22  Atl.  910; 
48  Phila.  Leg.  Intel.  910. 

32  Springfield    Consol.    R.    Co.    v. 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§  208 


cover  such  sum  as  will  compensate  him  for  the  injuries,  "and 
put  him  in  such  a  position  as  he  would  have  been  in  if  he  had 
not  heen  injured,"  is  proper.  So,  also,  where  the  jury  was  in- 
structed to  find  compensatory  damages,  " considering  all  the 
facts  and  circumstances  of  the  ease,"  it  was  held  that  such  in- 
struction was  not  objectionable  as  failing  to  confine  the  juij  to 
what  they  believed  the  evidence  showed.84  And  an  instruction 
to  the  jury  that  they  might  assess  damages  in  BUCh  an  amount 
as  would  "  fully  compensate"  for  the  injury  proved  is  proper,  the 
word  "  fully  "  not  being  construed  as  extending  the  measure  of 
damages  beyond  the  amount  proved.35  So  an  instruction  to  the 
jury  that  they  might  assess  the  damages  at  such  sum  as  would 
reasonably  compensate  the  plaintiff  for  her  injuries,  but  which 
failed  to  state  the  elements  of  damages  which  the  jury  should 
consider,  was  held  not  objectionable  by  reason  of  such  omission, 
it  being  declared  that  if  the  defendant  desired  a  specification  in 
that  respect,  he  should  have  made  a  request  therefor.''  But 
where  plaintiff  admitted  that  she  had  been  recompensed  up  to  a 
certain  date  for  all  damages  resulting  from  an  injur}',  it  was  held 
error  to  charge  the  jury  that  if  she  recovered  she  was  entitled  to 
such  an  amount  as  would  compensate  her  for  all  pain  and  suffer- 
ing which  she  had  sustained  as  a  result  of  the  injury.37  In  other 
cases  it  has  been  held  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they  may 
award  reasonable  and  fair  compensation,*  or  fair  and  just  com- 
pensation.3' And  where  such  words  were  used,  the  use  of  the 
additional  words,    as  in  the  sound  judgment  of  the  jury,  is  a 


Hoeffner,  175  111.  634;  51  N.  E.  884, 
aff'g  71  111.  App.  162.  See  Jacquin 
v.  (irand  Ave.  Cable  Co.,  57  Mo. 
App.  320. 

83  Lee  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  21 
.).  &  S.  (N.  V.  i  260. 

-4  Missouri.  K.  A  T.  R.  Co.  v.  M<5- 
Elree,  1G  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  41  S. 
W.  84:!. 

36  Harrington  v.  Eureka  Hill  Min. 
Co.,  17  Utah,  300;  63  Pac.  7:17. 

36  Rose  v.  McCook,  70  Mo.  App. 
183. 

37  Och  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  1!.  K. 
Co.,  130  Mo.  27;  21   S.  W.  962;  36  L. 


R.  A.  442;  2  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  343. 

3*  Seward  v.  Wilmington.  _  Marv. 
(Del.)  180;  42  All.  451;  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Warren  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),39  S.  W.  652;  -2  Am  Neg.  Rep. 
246,  aif.l  90  Tex.  566;  40  S.  W  6. 
But  see  Texas  Brew.  Co.  v.  Dickey, 
20  Tex.  Civ.  A.pp.  606;  49   S.  V\ .  935. 

»9  Griffin  Wheel  Co.  v.  Markus,  79 
111.  App.  82;  :;  Chic.  L.  .1.  Wkiy.  540, 
aliYi  IsO  111.  391;  5)  V  E.  206.  See 
Thomas  v.  Gates  (CaL  1899),  58  Pac. 
315. 

233 


§  209  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

proper  and  adequate  compensation  to  the  injured  party,10  or  in 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  jury"  have  been  held  no  error. 
Again,  where  the  jury  were  instructed  that  they  might  award 
such  reasonable  sum  as  they  thought  would  be  a  proper  recom- 
pense for  pain  and  suffering,  not  a  compensation,  since  such 
injury  could  not  be  compensated,  it  was  declared  that  though 
this  statement  rendered  the  instruction  subject  to  criticism,  yet 
there  was  not  sufficient  cause  for  reversal  where  immediately 
following  such  statement  the  court  charged  that  it  was  for  the 

jury  to  fix  some  value  for  pain  and  suffering.42 
> 

§  209.  Instructions —Measure  of  damages — Miscellaneous. 

— An  instruction  to  the  jury  to  allow  "such sum  as  you  believe 
from  the  evidence  he  is  justly  entitled  to"  is  sufficient  in  the 
absence  of  a  request  for  more  definite  instructions.43  So,  again, 
where  the  jury  were  instructed  that  if  they  found  for  the  plaintiff 
they  should  award  her  such  damages,  not  in  excess  of  a  certain 
specified  amount,  as  from  the  testimony  in  the  case  they  might 
think  she  was  entitled  to,  such  instruction  was  declared  not  to 
be  erroneous  as  indicating  to  the  jury  that  they  might  allow  the 
plaintiff  a  sum  in  excess  of  the  compensatory  damages  to  which 
she  might  be  entitled  under  the  evidence.41  And  in  an  action 
for  wilful  or  wanton  injury  where  the  damages  may  be  punitive 
in  addition  to  compensatory,  it  is  proper  to  charge  the  jury  that 
they  may  award  such  damages  as  they  see  proper,  not  exceeding 
the  amount  claimed  in  the  complaint.45  But  where  an  instruc- 
tion was  given  to  the  jury  that  if  they  found  for  the  plaintiff  the 
verdict  should  be,  "  We,  the  jury,  find  the  defendant  guilty  and 
assess  the  damages  at" — whatever  you  think  proper  not  in  excess 
of  the  amount  claimed  in  the  declaration,  it  was  held  that  such 
instruction  was  erroneous  since  it  gave  the  jury  uncontrolled 
discretion,  where  the  basis  for  the  assessment  of  damages  was 


40  Seward  v.  Wilmington,  2  Marv. 
(Del.)  189;  42  Atl.  451. 

41  Griffin  Wheel  Co.  v.  Markus,  79 
111.  App.  82;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  456, 
aff'd  180  111.  391;  54  N.  E.  206. 

42  Willis  v.  Second  Ave.  Traction 
Co.,  189  Pa.  St.  430;  42  Atl.  1;  5  Am. 
Neg.  Kep.  245. 

234 


43  Lamb  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  108  Iowa, 
629;  79  N.  W.  366.  See  St.  A.  & 
T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Oden,  52  111.  App.  519. 

44  Wade  v.  Columbia  Elec.  St.  R. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  296;  29  S. 
E.  233;  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  676. 

45  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Burgess, 
119  Ala.  555;  25  So.  251. 


PHYSICAL      IN.H'RIES. 


5  210 


not  explained."1  And  an  instruction  lias  been  held  erroneous 
which  directed  the  jury  that  if  they  found  for  plaintiff  they 
might  bring'  in  such  damages  as  would  make  him  ,4  whole  in  dol- 
lars as  far  as  possible."17  Again,  where  the  jury  were  charged 
that  injuries  could  not  be  fully  compensated  by  money,  and  in 
connection  with  such  statement  it  was  also  declared  that  this  did 
not  allow  the  jury  to  give  whatever  was  claimed  by  the  plaintiff, 
but  that  the  question  must  be  considered  by  them  fairly  and 
reasonably  and  that  they  must  decide  under  all  the  circumstan- 
ces what  in  good  conscience,  justice  and  right  ought  to  be  given, 
the  instruction  was  held  not  erroneous.4"  And  in  another  ease 
where  the  court  stated  to  the  jury  that  "  money  is  an  inadequate 
recompense  for  pain/' it  was  held  that  this  was  not  a  reversible 
error  where  the  jury  was  expressly  instructed  that  the  plaintiffs 
measure  of  recovery  was  "compensatory  damages-  that  is  such 
sum  as  will  compensate  the  plaintiff  for  the  injury  she  has  sus- 
tained," and  the  whole  charge  was  based  on  the  theory  that  ex- 
emplary damages  could  not  be  given.49  And  where  an  instruc- 
tion permitted  the  jury  to  determine  the  extent  of  a  pecuniary 
loss  resulting  from  total  permanent  disability,  merely  from  evi- 
dence that  the  plaintiff  was  sixteen  years  of  age.  it  was  held  that 
such  instruction  was  not,  by  reason  of  its  inadequacy,  prejudi- 
cially erroneous,  especially  if  the  verdict  was  not  excessive.* 

§  210.  New  trial  based  on  change  of  experts'  opinions.— 

The  fact  that  expert  witnesses  have  changed  their  minds  since 
the  trial  of  a  case  as  to  the  extent  of  the  injury,  is  not  sufficient 
ground  for  the  setting  aside  of  a  verdict  on  appeal  and  the 
granting  of  a  new  trial  where  the  affidavits  of  such  witnesses 
are  met  by  counter  affidavits  of  other  experts  of  great  expe- 
rience.'1 


40  Quincy  II<>rse  R-,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
Sch.ike(C.  C.  App.  7th  C),  71  Fed. 
487;  18  C.  C.  A.  221;  34  U.  S.  App. 
444.    See  Wilson  v.  Granby,  47  Conn. 

47;  Hawes  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  103  Mo.  10;  Houston  K.  &  W.  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Richards,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
203;  49  S.  \V.  087. 

47  Guinard  v.  Knapp  S.  &  Co.,  95 
Wis.  482;  70  N.  W.  071. 


48  Toledo  v.  Clopeck,  9  Ohio  C.  D. 
432;  17  Ohio  C.  C.  585,  afTd  in  52 
Ohio  St.  042. 

•»'••  Morgan  v.  Southern  P.  Co..  95 
Cal.  501;  30  Pac.  001. 

M  Baker  v.  Irish,  172  Pa.  St.  528; 
33  Atl.  558;  37  W.  \.  C.  480;  26 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 

61  Munday  v.  Landry,  51  La.  Ann. 
303;  25  So.  00. 

1^5 


§  211  PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

§  211.  Inadequate  damages— Generally.— In  actions  to  re- 
cover for  personal  injuries,  the  damages  which  may  be  awarded 
therefor  cannot  be  graduated  with  certainty,  but  must  be  left 
to  the  sound  discretion  of  the  jury  to  be  determined  by  them  in 
the  exercise  of  their  intelligence  and  sense  of  justice  after  a 
consideration  of .  the  facts  of  each  case.  The  rule  as  to  the 
granting  of  a  new  trial  in  case  the  damages  awarded  are  inad- 
equate is  similar  to  that  which  controls  in  the  case  of  excessive 
damages.  The  fact  that  another  jury  might  have  awarded  a 
larger  verdict  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  authorize  the  granting 
of  a  new  trial  unless  it  also  clearly  appear  that  they  must  have 
been  influenced  by  passion,  prejudice,  partiality,  corruption  or 
ignorance  or  mistake  as  to  law  or  facts.  Where  any  of  these 
elements  appear  and  the  verdict  is  such  as  to  shock  the  con- 
science, a  new  trial  may  be  properly  granted.®  In  this  connec- 
tion it  is  said  in  a  late  case  :  "  Where  substantial  damages  are 
awarded  in  an  action  of  this  sort,  courts  are  very  reluctant  to 
grant  a  new  trial  on  account  of  the  inadequacy  thereof.53  .  .  . 
The  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  injuries  and  the  money  damages 
which  would  adequately  compensate  her  therefor,  were  ques- 
tions upon  which  different  minds  might  very  naturally  and  very 
honestly  arrive  at  different  conclusions.  The  jury  were  in  the 
best  possible  position  to  judge  intelligently  and  fairly  in  rela- 
tion thereto ;  and  while  the  amount  awarded  may  not  be  so 
large  as  another  jury  or  even  the  court  perhaps  might  award, 
yet  there  being  nothing  to  show  that  it  does  not  represent  the 
honest  judgment  of  competent  and  fair-minded  men,  we  have  no 
right  to  disturb  it."  M     But  where  the  jury  rendered  a  verdict 


52  Morris  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
144  Mo.  500;  Weinberg  v.  Metropol- 
itan St.  R.  Co.,  139  Mo.  280;  40  S. 
W.  882;  Spirk  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.,  57  Neb.  5G5:  78  N.  W.  272;  Ells- 
worth v.  Fairbury,  41  Neb.  881;  60 
X.  W.  336;  Holyoke  v.  Railway  Co., 
48  N.  H.  541;  Miller  v.  Del.,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  29  Vr.  (N.  J.)  428;  33  Atl. 
950;  Morrissey  v.  Westchester  Elec. 
Ry.  Co.,  30  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  424; 
51  N.  Y.  Supp.  945;  Saferstone 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  25  App.  Div. 
236 


(N.  Y.)  285;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  486;  27 
Civ.  Proc.  133;  Evans  v.  Del.  &  H. 
Canal  Co.  (Pa.  C.  P.),  6  Kulp,  465; 
McNeil  v.  Lyons,  20  R.  I.  672;  40 
Atl.  831;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  728; 
McDermott  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 
(Wis.),  55  N.  W.  179;  Phillips  v. 
Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  4  Q.  B.  D.  406. 

53  Citing  Manufacturing  Co.  v. 
Smith,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  12. 

64  McGowan  v.  Interstate  Consol. 
St.  R.  Co.,  20  R.  I.  264;  38  Atl. 
497 ;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  737,  per  Tilling- 


PHYSICAL      INJCRIES. 


for  $55  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  and  the  evidence 
clearly  established  the  fact  that  the  value  of  the  physician's  ser- 
vices was  888,  it  was  held  that  though  there  was  no  evidence 
as  to  the  value  of  time  lost  by  the  plaintiff,  a  new  trial  should 
be  granted.''  And  in  another  case  where  it  appeared  that  the 
plaintiff  had  expended  6485  for  medical  services;  that  the 
value  of  her  lost  time  was  over  $400 ;  that  her  sufferings 
had  been  protracted  and  severe,  and  that  her  injuries  wen 
rious  and  perhaps  permanent,  it  was  held  that  a  verdict  for 
$1,000  was  inadequate/*  And  again  in  another  ease  it  was 
held  that  a  verdict  for  nominal  damages  should  be  setasideand 
a  new  trial  granted  where  it  appeared  that  plaintiff's  injuries 
were  severe  and  that  she  had  suffered  much  therefrom."  Hut 
it  is  held  that  though  a  verdict  may  Ik-  less  than  the  physician's 
bill,  yet  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  such  bill  is 
reasonable  or  has  been  paid,  it  will  not  be  set  aside  as  inade- 
quate in  the  absence  of  other  grounds.58 

§  212.  Excessive  damages. — As  we  have  elsewhere  stated 
excessive  damages  are  those  which  are  so  largely  in  excess  of 
what  the  facts  of  the  case  and  the  law  justify  as  to  appear  to 
have  been  the  result  of  passion,  prejudice,  partiality,  ignorance 

or  corruption,  and  as  a  general  rule  unless  it  is  apparent  that 
some  of  the  above  elements  have  influenced  the  jury  in  their  ver- 
dict, it  will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  on  the  ground  of  being 
excessive.59     And  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  verdict  is  grossly 


hast,  J.  In  this  case  the  injury  was 
a  severe  and  permanent  one  and  the 
jury  awarded  •$.">, 000.  See  Evans  v. 
Delaware  &  II.  Canal  Co.  (Pa.  C.  P.). 
ti  Kulp,  465;  Allison  v.  Gulf  <'.  &  s. 
F.  K.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  A.pp.),  '^  S.  W. 
42.->. 

56  Saferstone  v.  Rochester  R.  Co., 
25  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  285;  49  X.  Y. 
Supp.  4SG;  27  Civ.  Proc.  133. 

M  McNeil  v.  Lyons,  20  R.  I.  672; 
40  Atl.    831;  4    Am.    Neg.    Rep.  728. 

57  Chouquette  v.  Southern  Elec.  R. 
Co.,  152  Mo.  257 1  53  S.  W.  897. 

58  Brook  v.  Luden,  G  X.  Y.  Supp. 
510.  afTg  1  X.  Y.  Supp.  338. 


59  Howland  v.  Oakland  Consul.  St. 
R.  (  o.,  110  Cal.  513;  42  Pac.  9S3; 
Denver  v.  Stein,  25  Colo.  12.") ;  .'.:'.  Par. 
283;  4  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  125;  Central 
R.  A-  Bkg.  Co.  v.  Strickland,  f»0  Ga. 
562;  52  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  216;  16 S. 
E.  352;  Xorth  Chicago  Si.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zeiger,  78  111.  App.  463;  Cleveland, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Balbert,  7.". 
111.  App.  592;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cheek,  152  1ml.  663;  53  X.  E.  641;  1 
Rep.  975;  Decatur  v.  Stoops.  21  Ind. 
App.  397;  52  X.  E.  iVS.\:  1  Rep.  516; 
Lauter  v.  Duckworth.  19  Ind.  App. 
535;  Fulmore  v.  St.  Paul  City  l:.  Co., 
72  Minn.  448;  75  N.  W.  589;  11 
0Q7 


§  213  PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 

excessive  and  due  to  any  of  the  above  causes,  it  will  be  set  aside 
without  regard  to  the  number  of  times  the  case  has  been  tried 
and  similar  verdicts  rendered.60  So,  also,- where  the  verdict  is 
manifestly  the  result  of  any  of  the  above  causes  or  where  the  evi- 
dence  is  conflicting,  an  order  granting  a  new  trial  on  the  ground 
that  the  damages  are  excessive  will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal.61 
But  where  the  testimony,  as  to  plaintiff's  physical  condition  being 
a  result  of  the  injury  or  of  other  causes,  is  conflicting,  a  verdict 
of  damages  will  not  be  set  aside  as  excessive  on  the  ground 
that  such  condition  was  caused  otherwise  than  by  the  injury.6' 
And  again  where,  although  there  was  some  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff's  condition  was  due  partially  to  alcoholism,  it  was  held 
that  a  verdict  which  was  not  excessive  if  his  condition  resulted 
solely  from  the  injury  would  not  be  deemed  excessive  on  appeal 
where  the  trial  court  had  in  its  charge  entirely  limited  the  re- 
covery of  the  plaintiff  to  damages  for  illness  or  incapacity  as  a 
result  of  the  injury.63 

§  213.  Excessive    damages— Remittitur  of  part  of  judg- 
ment.— If  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  has  been 


Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  63('>;  Ken- 
uerly  v.  Somerville,  68  Mo.  App.  222; 
Egan  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co., 
12  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  556;  42  N.  Y. 
Supp.  188;  Swan  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,  86  Hun  (N.  Y.),  265;  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  190;  66  N.  Y.  St.  R.  864;  Hem- 
penstall  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
82  Hun  (N.  Y.),  285;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
76;  Rowe  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
82  Hun  (X.  Y.),  153;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
753;    Uertz   v.   Singer  Mfg.    Co.,  35 

Hun  (X.  Y.),  116;  Butezv.  Fonda  J. 
&  <i.  B.  Co.,  45  X.  Y.  Supp.  808;  20 

Misc.   12;J ;  Nolan  v.   X.  Y.  C.  &  H. 

B.  B.  R.  Co.,    40  X.  Y.  St.  R.  848;  16 

X.  Y.    Supp.   826;  Polak  v.  Met.  St. 

R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  Supp.  1133;  28  Misc. 

791;  Tisdale  v.  D.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  4 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  812;  Buffalo  L.    Oil  Co. 

v.    Everest,    3    How.    (X.    S.)    179; 

Southern   R.    Co.    v.   Smith,  95    Va. 

187;  28  S.  E.  173  ;  Joyce  on  Electric 

Law,  sec.  949.  As  to  excessive  ver- 
238 


diets  in  particular  cases,  see  note  at 
end  of  this  chapter. 

60  Consol.  Traction  Co.  v.  Graham, 
62  X.  J.  L.  90;  40  Atl.  773;  4  Am. 
Xeg.  Rep.  660;  17  Nat.  Corp.  R.  616; 
58  Alb.  L.  J.  93;  31  Chic.  L.  News, 
35. 

61  Minick  v.  Troy,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
253,  aff'd  83  N.  Y.  514;  Peck  v.  N. 
Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Hun  (N. 
Y. ),  236:  Herbst  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co., 
40  X.  Y.  St.  R.  558;  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
938;  Hickinbotton  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  St.  R.  11;  McDonald 
v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  St. 
691,  aft'd  116  N.  Y.  546;  27  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  481;  22  N.  E.  1168. 

62  Haviland  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co., 
40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  773;  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
898. 

63  Wilhelm  v.  Brooklyn  Q.  C.  &  S. 
R.  Co.,  32  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  637;  52 
X.  Y.  Supp.  1090. 


PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


§214 


awarded  a  larger  verdict  than  the  court  considers  is  properly 
allowable  under  and  justified  by  the  evidence,  the  court  may, 
under  such  circumstances,  require  the  plaintiff  to  elect  to  take 
judgment  for  a  less  sum  or  accept  a  new  trial,  and  sik.1i  action 
is  not  prejudicial  to  the  defendant.'1  And  in  Illinois  it  is  held 
that  an  order  of  the  appellate  court  requiring  a  remittitur  of 
a  pari  of  the  judgment  in  such  an  action  and  taxing  the  costs 
in  that  court  to  the  plaintiff,  removes  all  just  ground  of  com- 
plaint in  the  supreme  court  as  to  the  misconduct  of  the  counsel 
for  plaintiff,  which  is  alleged  to  have  increased  the  verdict.'" 
In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  the  supreme  court  has  no  power  to 
require  a  remittitur  of  a  part  of  the  amount  awarded  in  an  action 
to  recover  for  personal  injuries  as  a  condition  of  the  affirmance 
of  the  judgment."' 


§  214.  Excessive  damages — Review  of  question  as  to 
amount. — Whether  the  verdict  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries 
is  excessive  will  not  he  determined  in  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  on  a  writ  of  error.'77  And  in  Wisconsin  the  ques- 
tion will  not  he  considered  on  appeal,  where  there  has  been  no 
motion  for  a  new  trial  on  such  ground,  and  where  there  is  no 
certificate  that  the  bill  of  exceptions  contains  all  the  evidence.** 
And  in  Illinois  it  has  been  decided  that  on  appeal  from  the  ap- 
pellate court  to  the  supreme  court  of  that  state,  the  latter  court 


64  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  58 
111.  App.  181;  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.  v.  Beckett  (Ind.  App.),  39 
N.  E.  421);  Newberry  v.  Getcbell  & 
M.  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.,  100  Iowa, 
441:  69  N.  W.  743;  Rea-Patterson 
Mill  Co.  v.  Myrick(Kan.  App.  1001), 
63  Pac.  462;  Union  P.  Hy.  Co.  v.  Mit- 
cbell,  56  Kan.  M2 1 ;  Floumoy  v. 
Shrevport  BeltRy.  Co.,  50  La.  Ann. 
491;  23  So.  465;  Friend  v.  Ingersoll 
(Neb.),  58  N.  W.  281;  Kalfnr  v. 
Broadway  Ferry  &  M.  A.  R.  Co.,  ltil 
N.  Y.  660;  57  N.  E.  1113,  aff'g  34 
App.  Div.  267;  54  N.  V.  Snpp.  50:}; 
McGowan  v.  Giveen  Mfg.  Co.,  54 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  233;  06  N.  Y.  Supp. 
708:  Silberstein  v.  H.  W.  S.,  etc.,  R. 


Co.,  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  452;  4  N.  Y. 
Supp.  843;  Clapp  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  461; 
Geisberg  v.  Mut.  Bldg.  &  L.  Assn. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  60  S.  W.  478. 

66  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Musa.  180  111.  130:  54  N.  E.  168, 
aff'g  80  111.  App.  223;  4  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  74. 

06  Rodney  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co. 
(Mo.),  30  S.  W.  150. 

«  New  York,  L. ■  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winter,  14.;  1".  S.  50;  36  L.  Ed.  71; 
11  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  146;  12  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  356. 

«s  Collins  v.  Janesville,  99  Wis. 
464 ;  75  N.  W.  88. 

239 


§  214  PHYSICAL   INJURIES. 

will  not  review  the  amount  of  damages  awarded  in  an  action  for 
personal  injuries  though  the  appellate  court  may  have  expressed 
in  its  opinion  wrong  views  as  to  the  basis  of  damages.09  And 
again,  in  North  Carolina  it  is  held  that  where  the  trial  court  re- 
fuses to  set  aside  a  verdict  on  the  ground  that  the  damages  are 
excessive,  such  refusal  cannot  be  reviewed  by  the  supreme  court 
of  that  state.70  .  So,  also,  it  is  held  in  New  York  that  a  judgment 
in  an  action  for  negligence  cannot  be  reversed  by  the  court  of 
appeals  of  that  state  on  the  ground  of  excessive  damages.11 
And  in  Utah,  under  the  statute  of  that  state,  where  there  is  any 
evidence  to  support  a  verdict  in  an  action  to  recover  damages 
for  injuries  due  to  negligence,  the  supreme  court  has  no  power 
to  say  that  such  verdict  is  excessive.72 


69  Illinois  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Harris,  162 
111.  200;  44  N.  £.  498.  See  also 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Connor, 
119  111.  586. 

70  Norton  v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co., 
122  N.  C.  910;  29  S.  E.  886. 

7i  (Tale  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R., 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  594,  aff'g 
13  Hun,  1. 

72  Harrington  v.  Eureka  Hill  Min. 
Co.,  17  Utah,  300:  53  Pac.  737.  It 
has  heen  declared  that  in  deter- 
mining whether  damages  are  exces- 
sive or  not,  the  best  criterion  is  the 
average  amount  awarded  for  injuries 
of  a  like  nature.  Lockwood  v. 
Twenty-Third  St.  R.  R.  Co,  23  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  16;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  663;  15  Daly, 
374. 

In  the  following  note  we  give  a 
list  of  cases  classified  as  nearly  as 
it  is  possible  so  to  do,  in  which  the 
question  of  whether  the  damages 
were  excessive  or  not  has  been  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  the  vari- 
ous injuries  and  elements  for  which 
awarded.  The  injuries  and  elements 
so  far  as  they  appear  in  each  case, 
are  stated  as  briefly  and  concisely  as 
it  is  possible  so  to  do,  for  it  is  of 
little  value  to  know  whether  a  ver- 
dict has  been  held  excessive  or  not 

240 


as  given  for  some  general  injury, 
without  knowing  the  various  ele- 
ments considered. 

Ankle — injury  to.  Verdicts  held 
not  excessive.  Compound,  com- 
minuted fracture — bones  protruded 
through  flesh  and  shoe — over  one 
hundred  pieces  removed — twenty 
months'  suffering — ankle  perma- 
nently stiff — also  foot  slightly  de- 
formed—$15,000.  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.  v.  Engler(C.  C.  App.  9th 
C),  21  C.  C.  A.  246;  44  U.  S.  App. 
517;  75  Fed.  102.  Dislocated  and 
bone  fractured — disabled  from  work 
for  nearly  a  year — in  opinion  of 
physicians  is  permanently  disabled 
— age  47 — earning  $50  a  month 
—$5,000.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co. 
v.  Farmer,  97  Ala.  141;  12  So.  86. 
Sprained — never  as  strong  as  be- 
fore— future  working  capacity  seri- 
ously affected — confined  to  house 
some  weeks — used  crutches  2  or 
3  months — using  cane  a  year  later — 
$1,650.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Friel,  39  S.  W.  704;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
152.  Wreni'hed — laborer— unable  to 
work  for  four  months — obliged  to 
use  crutches  2  or  3  weeks — consider- 
able    pain— $1,500.        McCovey     v. 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


§   21  1 


Forty-Second  St.  &  G.  S.  R.  Co.,  79 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  255;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  34; 
29  N.  Y.  Supp.  368. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Not  per- 
manent, only  less  free  in  its  move- 
ments—confined in  house  but  few 
weeks—; $10,000.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mattingly,  38  S.  W.  086;  18 
Ky.  L.  K.  823.  Ordinary  sprain- 
not  permanent— $2,000— reduced  to 
11,250.  Bennett  v.  Backus  Lumber 
Co.,  69  Minn.  530;  79  N.  W.  682. 
Fracture  of  «>ue  of  bones  in — tear- 
ing of  ligaments — injury  to  joint 
— great  pain— bed  3  months— age 
75_$4,000.  Johnson  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry.  Co.,  67  Minn.  260;  36  L.  R. 
A.  586;  69  V  W.  900;  1  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  93.  Injury  to  ankle  confining 
to  house  3  or  4  weeks — loss  of  7 
or  8  months'  time — at  time  of  trial 
able  to  earn  as  much  as  before  the 
accident — .$8,660.  Nichols  v.  Crystal 
Plate  Glass  Co.  ( Mo.  1895),  28  S.  W. 
991.  Ankle  and  heel  lacerated  and 
bruised— in  bed  11  weeks — loses  a 
year's  time — ankle  probably  more 
or  less  weak  always — in  time  may  be 
used  without  pain  and  only  stiff- 
ness— farmer — SO, 300.  Fremont  E. 
&  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  French,  48  Neb. 
638;  67  N.  W.  472;  4  Am.  &  Eirg.  R 
Cas.  N.  S.  365.  Sprained  and 
bruised — shoulder  dislocated — no 
considerable  time  lost — no  severe 
suffering — earning  capacity  not  ma- 
terially diminished— $2,650,  re- 
duced to  |1,200.  Fremont  E.  &  M 
V.  R.  Co.  v.  Leslie  (Neb.),  59  X.  W. 
559.  Sprained— prevented  from  oc- 
cupation as  dressmaker — nervous 
from— in  bed  5  or  6  weeks — paid 
between  $5  and  $10  for  medical  serv- 
ices— $1,000,  should  lie  reduced  to 
$500.  Corcorain  v.  Ulster  &  I).  R. 
Co.,  40  N.  V.  Supp.  1117;  9  App.  Div. 
i  \.  V.  i  621.  Injury  to  ankle— fibula 
broken  above  it — in   house  2  months 

16 


and  then  went  about  on  crutches — 
earning  capacity  not  affected,  but 
ankle  will  be  weak  for  a  lon<,r  time — 
$11,006 — excessive  and  should  be  re- 
duced  to  $5,000.  Bronsou  v.  Forty- 
Second  St.  M.  &  St.  X.  A.  K.  R.  I  ... 
67  Hun  (N.  Y.),  647;  50  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  740. 

Arm — loss  of.  Verdicts  held  not 
excessive.  One  arm — common  la- 
borer— $10,000.  Chicago  Anderson 
Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Kembarz,  51  111. 
App.  543,  atrd  Barnes  v.  Rembarz, 
150  111.  192;  37  N.  E.  239.  injured 
so  as  to  require  amputation — labor- 
ing man — age  46  or  47 — receiving 
from  $1.25  to  $1.50  per  day— 
$7,500.  Gibson  Co.  v.  (ilizoziuski, 
76  111.  App.  400.  Light  arm— leg 
more  or  less  bruised — evidence  from 
which  injury  might  have  been 
found  to  be  permanent — $8,537. 
Barrett  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co..  HI  N.  Y.  St.  R.  9.  Right  arm- 
other  serious  and  permanent  injuries 
— brakeman  —  $1 0,000.  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Slinkard,  17  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  585 j  M  S.  W.  35.  Fore- 
arm— brakeman — age  35 — receiving 
$55  per  month— great  physical  pain 
and  mental  anguish — $9,119.  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirkland,  11 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  528;  32  S.  W.  588. 
One  arm — suffering— young,  iudustri 
ous  and  able-bodied  man — wholly  de- 
pendent on  manual  labor  for  living — 
$3,500.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ampcy.  93  Pa.  L08;  25  S.  E.  226;  2 
Va.  L.  Keg.  284.  Injury  necessitat- 
ing amputation — left  arm — age  19 — 
healthy,  strong  and  capable  of  labor 

$10,000.  Baltzer  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
N.  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  257;  00  X.  \V.  716. 
Following  verdicts  held  excessive  : 
right  arm— great  pain — age  20 — 
earning  $1  per  day — idle  for  2^  years 
— then  receives  employment  at  $35 
per  month— $20,000  grossly  exces- 
•J41 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


sive.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kane,  70  111.  App.  676;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  489.  Right  arm— age  19— earn- 
ing $18  per  week,  5  months,  in  year — 
also  earns  additional  money — $18,000. 
Musser  v.  Lancaster  City  St.  R.  Co., 
15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  430;  12  Lane.  L.  Rev. 
12. 

Arm — Fractures  of.  Passenger  on 
street  car — arm  broken— contact 
with  iron  post  near  track — $2,000. 
New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Schnei- 
der (C.  C.  App.  5th  C),  60  Fed. 
210;  8  C.  C.  A.  571.  Woman— age  63— 
compound  fracture  of  lower  part  of 
left  arm — dislocation  left  wrist — 
great  pain— unable  to  shut  left  hand 
or  use  arm — expenses  for  surgical 
treatment  $35 — $950.  Kennedy  v. 
Whittaker,  81  111.  App.  605.  Married 
woman — double  fracture  of  arm — 
fracture  two  ribs  resulting  in  trau- 
matic pleurisy — contusion  of  knee 
resulting  in  synovitis — about  thirty 
abrasions  on  body — in  bed  2  months 
— home  4  months — much  pain — 
$2,500.  Terhune  v.  Koellisch  (N. 
J.  ),  43  Atl.  655.  Right  arm  broken 
— also  five  ribs — injured  in  back — 
muscles  torn  from  attachments  to 
spine — in  bed  3  months — year  before 
he  could  use  arm — ultimate  recovery 
placed  at  from  2  to  5  years — $25,000. 
Dieff  enbach  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  5  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)91;  74  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  80.  Arm  fractured — bruised 
hip — $1,750.  Murphy  v.  Weidman 
Cooperage  Co.,  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
283;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  486.  One  arm 
broken — permanently  weakened  for 
labor  and  also  rendered  smaller — 
severe  suffering  caused  by  sloughing 
of  pus  and  taking  out  of  the  affected 
bone — $1,200.  Toledo  v.  Higgins, 
12  Ohio  C.  C.  646;  3  Ohio   Dec.   532. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.     Left  arm 
fractured — permanently    impaired — 
242 


joint  became  stiffened  requiring  ad- 
hesions to  be  broken  when  plaster 
cast  was  removed  at  end  of  six 
weeks — necessary  to  break  adhe- 
sions— disabled  several  weeks  longer 
as  result  thereof — unable  for  some 
time  to  attend  to  business  as  a 
member  of  a  firm  of  custom  house 
brokers — expended  for  physicians 
about  $250— $3,000  held  excessive 
by  $500.  Thomas  v.  Consolidated 
Traction  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  36;  42  Atl. 
1061 ;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  122.  Arm 
fractured  and  disfigured — $6,600,  re- 
duced to  $3,000.  Ryder  v.  Mayor,  50 
N.  Y.  Supr.  220. 

Back,  see  Spine  and  Back. 

Bite  of  dog.  Following  verdicts 
held  not  excessive.  Bite  penetrating 
to  bone  of  wrist — also  on  side  |  inch 
deep  and  J  long — great  fright  and 
terror — nervous  prostration — woman 
—$800.  Robinson  v.  Marino,  3  Wash. 
434;  28  Pac.  752.  Girl— age  9— bite 
of  dog  on  hip — one  half  inch  deep 
and  two  inches  long — in  bed  several 
weeks — still  lame  at  time  of  trial— 
$1,450.  Fitzgerald  V.  Dolson,  78  Me. 
659.  (In  accordance  with  the  stat- 
ute the  amount  in  this  last  case  was 
to  be  doubled.)  Bite  of  vicious 
dog — $150.  Sylvester  v.  Maag,  155 
Pa.  St.  225;  26  Atl.  392.  In  follow- 
ing cases  verdicts  held  excessive. 
Child — resulting  epilepsy  claimed 
but  evidence  not  clear  as  to — doubts 
resolved  by  jury  in  favor  of  plain- 
tiff— not  clear  but  that  an  award  by 
way  of  punishment  was  included  in 
verdict— $20,000.  Judgment  not  al- 
lowed to  stand  unless  $10,000  was  re- 
mitted. Fye  v.  Chapin  (Mich.  1899), 
80  N.  W.  797.  Bright,  active  and 
well  woman — rendered  delicate  and 
nervous — frequent  fainting  spells 
and  becomes  partially  unconscious — 
injury   permanent — mind    impaired 


PHYSICAL      [NJURIES. 


6   21  I 


and  nearly  gone — $7,500,  reduced  to 
$5,000.     Hayes  v.  Smith,  15    Ohio  C. 

C.  300;  8  Ohio  C.   D.  92. 

Crippled    by      injury.     Following 

verdicts  held  not  excessive:  Wound 
5  to  7  inches  long  on  thigh — neces- 
sary to  graft  skin — permanently 
crippled— $7,500.  Lowry  v.  Bit. 
Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  P.  K.  Co.  (C.  C.  S. 

D.  ohioi.  88  Fed.  827;  3-1  Ohio  L. 
J.  147.  Man — age  36 — formerly  good 
health  and  active — in  business — in 
bed  nearly  a  year— unable  to  walk 
for  nearly  3  years — joint  of  one  foot 
destroyed  and  control  of  foot  lost — 
after  ten  years  one  leg  atrophied — 
other  leg  only  one  fourth  of  original 
vigor — other  severe  injuries — use  of 
legs  would  never  be  recovered — 
930,000.  Smith  v.  Whit  tier  (Cal.), 
30  Pac.  529.  Young  man— strong — 
earning  $45  per  month — $800  for 
medical  treatment  and  no  relief — 
Si,, not).  Lanark  v.  Dougherty,  4.")  111. 
A  pp.  206.  Woman— earning  $6  or  $7 
per  week  washing — also  $2  per  day 
on  knitting  machine— kept  boarders 
— hip  rendered  useless — cannot  walk 
with  crutches — or  stand  without 
something  to  lean  upon — perman- 
ent— also  both  arms  were  broken — 
$6,565.  Miller  v.  Boone  County 
(Iowa),  63  N.  W.  352.  Permanently 
lame  aud  partially  disabled — broken 
leg — in  bed  two  months — man  67 — 
$2,000.  Topeka  v.  Bradshaw,  5 
Kan.  App.  879;  48  Pac.  751.  Crip- 
ple for  lite — employee  in  paper 
mill — thrown  into  hot  pulp  and  acid. 
$2,037.50.  Fickett  v.  Lisbon  Falls 
Fibre  Co.,  91  Me.  268;  39  Atl.  996. 
Injury  to  girl — intense  pain— run- 
ning sore— cripple  for  life — $4,000. 
Coins  v.  Moberly  (Mo.),  29  S.  W. 
985.  Face  crushed — lower  part  im- 
movable— cripple  for  life — $8,000. 
Oties  v.  Cowles  E.  S.  &  A.  Co.,  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  251;  2fi    N.    Y.  St.    R.  869, 


aff'.l  130  N.    Y.  889;  40   N.  Y.  St.  R. 
983;  29  N.  K.  151.     Woman— ag< 
apparently    healthy — able    to    earn 

wages — use  of  Knees  Lost — employ- 
ment lost — repeatedly  blistered  and 
cauterized  bul  unable  to  regain  use 
of  limbs — obliged  to  use  crutches — 
$2,500.  Cross  v.  Elmira,  86  Hun  |  \. 
Y.i,  467;  33  N.  V.  Supp.  947;  87  V 
Y.  St.  R.  617.  Injuries  to  railroad 
switchman — permanently  lamed  and 
crippled— $7,000.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Winslow,  10  Ohio  I  I 
193;  1  Ohio  Dec.  147.  Injuries  to 
woman — much  pain  and  suffering 
cripple  for  life— $10,000.  Skottowe 
v.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  R.  Co.  (Ore- 
gon), 30  Pac.  222;  12  Ry.  &  Corp.  L. 
J.  112.  In  favor  of  parent  for  in- 
juries to  child— age  7— foot  injured— 
$200  for  medical  treatment — to  some 
extent  a  cri  ppl e  for  1  if  e— $500.  Dub- 
lin Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Jarrard  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W.  531,  affd  42 
S.  W.  959;  91  Tex.  289.  Injury  to 
girl — age  7 — foot  injured — to  some 
extent  a  cripple  for  life — $2,500. 
Dublin  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Jarrard 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  I,  40  S.  W.  531,  affd 
42  S.  W.  959;  91  Tex.  289.  Able- 
bodied  man — age  29 — earning  $2.10 
per  day — crippled  for  life — $4,000. 
St.  Lotus  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wool  urn 
(Tex.),  19  S.  W.  7S2.  Woman- 
age  24 — period  of  15  months  from 
date  of  injury  to  time  of  trial — help- 
less invalid  and  cripple  during  that 
time — suffered  continual  pain  dur- 
ing such  time  ami  at  times  excruciat- 
ing agony — neuritis  or  periostitis  as 
result  of  injury — take  possibly  18 
mouths  or  more  to  restore  to  health — 
unable  to  assist  in  household  mat- 
ters— nervous  system  and  general 
health  affected — unable  to  move 
around  without  aid  could  not  par- 
ticipate in  social  enjoyment — $5,000. 
Norfolk  v.  Jonakin.  94  Ya.  285;  26 
S.  E.    830.      Laborer-  age    over    35 

243 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


full  health  and  vigor  at  time  of  in- 
jury—severe pain  and  suffering- 
earning  capacity — decreased — per- 
manently crippled— $6,500.  Ogle  v. 
Jones,  16  Wash.  319;  47  Pac.  747. 
In  following  case  verdicts  held  ex- 
cessive: Injury  to  ankle— previ- 
ously feeble— woman — age  75 — in 
bed  3  mouths— still  suffering  pain  at 
time  of  trial— can  never  walk  with- 
out crutch— $4,000.  Johnson  v.  St. 
Paul  City  R.  Co.,  67  Minn.  260;  69 
N.  W.  900;  36  L.  R.  586. 

Earning  capacity.     Impairment  of 
—cases  generally.     Following  cases, 
verdicts   not    excessive:  Shipwright 
—earning    about    $96    per    month- 
age  48— only    able  to    work    lightly 
for  few  hours — muscular  sense   im- 
paired—unable to  do  work  requiring 
dexterity    and    fine    manipulation- 
loss  of  hearing  in  one  ear — $5,000. 
The  Pioneer  ( D.  C.   N.   D.    Cal.),  78 
Fed.    600.      Longshoreman— age   42 
— wholly     disabled       from      severe 
work    because    injuries    aggravated 
previous    disease    of  heart — $2,000. 
The  Persian  Monarch  (D.  C.  E.    D. 
N.  Y. ),    49  Fed.  669.     Cigar  packer 
—business    necessitated    his    stand- 
ing   up— earning    $20    per     week- 
could  not  stand  up  at  time  of  trial 
2  years    after    injury — earnings    re- 
duced to  $6  per  week— suffering  from 
hernia  at  time  of  trial— $4,200.     Den- 
ver v.  Steia  (Colo.  S.  C.  1898),  4  Am. 
Xeg.  Rep.  125.  Permanently  disabled 
and     incapacitated     from     securing 
permanent        employment — $1,0000. 
Brush  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Simonsohn, 
107  Ga.   70;  32  S.   E.  902.     Boarding 
house  keeper — age    42 — painful    in- 
juries— in  bed   2  months— incapable 
of  doing  housework  previously  done 
by  her — constantly  growing  worse — 
$800.     Lockport  v.   Richards,  81  111. 
App.  533.     Conductor  of  street  ear — 
earning  from  $80  to  $90  per  month— 
244 


age    45 — prospects  of  future  career 
good — impairment  of    capacity    for 
every  kind  of  employment — $16,500. 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Leach,  80  111. 
App.  354..  Widow— age  41— support- 
ing herself  and  children  by  washing 
and  scrubbing— unable    to  continue 
scrubbing — unable  to  stand  for  only  a 
short   time    without    much    pain— 
$1,500.   Joliet  v.  Johnson,  71  111.  App. 
423.  Man— earning  average  of  $90  pei 
month — age  32 — incapacitated  from 
work  and  any  manual  labor — $6,000. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  70 
111.  App.  45.     Tailor — loss  of  use  of 
thumb — prevented  from  earning  full 
wages  at  trade — also  other  injuries — 
in  house  4  months — subsequent  suf- 
fering  and  failure   to    sleep   well — 
$3,500.     North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Broms,  62  111.  App.  127.     Laborer- 
earning  $1.50  per  day — age  51— much 
past   and  future  suffering — laboring 
ability  diminished  one  half — $3,500. 
Frazer  v.  Schroeder,  60  111.  App.  519. 
Boy — age  16 — physical  strength  and 
activity    permanently    diminished — 
$1,500.     Homan   v.   Fleming,  51   111. 
App.  572.     Man— earning  $15  or  $16 
per  week  at  time  of  injury— age  over 
60 — rendered  an  invalid — unable  to 
perform  manual  or  mental    labor — 
$12,500.     West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bode.    51    111.    App.    440,  aff'd     150 
111.  396;  37  N.  E.  879.     Stenographer 
— earning  $75    to  $80  per    month — 
permanent  internal  injuries — pain — 
external  bruises — unable  to  work  at 
her      occupation— §10,000.         North 
Chicago  St.   R.   Co.  v.   Eldridge,  51 
111.     App.      430.     Farmer — incapaci- 
tated from   work  at — also  unable  to 
work  at  any  business  requiring  phy- 
sical   exertion— $3,500.     La  Salle  v. 
Porterfield,  38  111.  App.  553.    Woman 
— formerly  in  good  health — suffered 
pain    continually — injury     probably 
incurable — unable  to  do  her  house- 
work—$1,000.     Frankfort     v.    Cole- 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


§  214 


man,  19  Ind.  A.pp.  368;  49  \.  E.  -174. 
Stenographer — receiving  salary  of 
(50  per  month  and  earning  from  $un 
to  $25  ]>er  month  in  addition  thereto 
at  time  of  injury — injury  prob- 
ably permanent —  lameness — con- 
stant pain — incapacitated  from  reg- 
ular work-  $4,000.  Bryant  v.  Omaha 
&  C.  B.  K.  &  B.  Co.,  98  Iowa,  183; 
67  X.  W.  392.  Woman  — severe 
fall — passing  of  blood — sinking 
spells  causing  pain — unable  to  ob- 
tain rest  and  sleep — unable  to  per- 
form labor— $2,000.  Atcbison,  T.  & 
S.  F.  It.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  55  Kan.  007; 
41  Pac.  961.  Engineer — at  time 
of  injury  earning  $103.54  per  mouth 
— age  31 — unable  to  continue  in  such 
occupation  at  time  of  trial — hardly 
able  to  perform  any  work — disabil- 
ity probably  permanent  —  $0,500. 
Woods  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Co., 
108  Mich.  396;  00  N.  W.  328;  2 
Det.  L.  N.  888.  Man— earning  $70 
per  mouth — age  58 — great  pain — 
under  continual  medical  treatment 
— as  result  of  injury  progressive  and 
incurable  disease  which  will  ulti- 
mately end  in  death — prevented 
from  further  work— $8,800.  Cooper 
v.  St.  Paul  City  K.  Co.,  54  Minn.  379; 
56  N.  W.  42.  Man — earning  from 
$1,200  to  $1,500  per  year— age  56— 
great  pain — injuries  permanent — 
practically  deprived  of  power  to 
earn  a  living — $9,000.  Furman  v. 
Brooklyn  II.  R.  Co.,  25  A  pp.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  133;  lit  \.  Y.  Supp.  194. 
Man —earning  $18  per  week— strong 
and  healthy — age  38 — suffers  con- 
tinual pain — seriously  disabled — 
tremor  and  dizziness— unable  to 
perform  ordinary  work —$5,000. 
Mayer  v.  Liebmann,  16  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  54:  41  X.  V.  Supp.  1067;  2 
Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  700.  Man — earning 
$3,000  per  year  and  expense— age  28 
— strong  and  healthy  prior  t<>  injury 
— great  suffering — loss  from  inability 


to  wmk  and  medical  expenses  at  time 
of  trial  $9,100  may  never  again  be 
able  to  engage  in  bis  former  occupa- 
tion—$25,000.  Dieffenbach  v.  N.  v. 
L.  K.&  W.  R.  Co..  5  App.  Div.  i\.  Y.i 
91;  38  X.  Y.  Supp.  788.  Man— in 
bed  10  days — prevented  from  work 
for  live  weeks — earning  power  re- 
duced from  $25  per  week  i"  $8  pei 
week— $2,232.60.  Miller  v.  Manhat- 
tan R.  Co.,  7:;  Hun  iX.  V.i.  512;  56 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  189;  26  X.  Y.  Supp.  162. 
Laborer — earning  $2  per  day — age  50 
— permanently  disabled — $1,000. 

Soderman  v.  Troy  Steel  &  I.  L'<>.,  70 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  449;  53  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
678;  24  X.  Y.  Supp.  401.  Injuries 
likely  to  be  permanent — age  :;.". 
disabled  from  all  labor— $15,000. 
Solar/,  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  »  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  050:  11  Misc.  715,  aff'd  155 
N.  Y.  645.  Woman — husband  a  crip- 
ple— incapacitated  from  work  by  her 
injury — $1,000.  Fitzsimons        v. 

Rome,  21  W.  D.  (N.  Y.)  343.  Man- 
earning  $1.50  per  day— healthy, 
strong,  sober  and  industrious — age 
46 — leg  crushed  and  broken — 31- 
years  after  injury  dead  bone  still 
working  from  wound — leg  devoid  of 
strength,  shortened  and  partially 
stiffened — earning  capacity  practi- 
cally destroyed— $11,000.  Texas  & 
X.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Echols.  17  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  077;  41  S.  W.  488.  Man— earn- 
ing from  $00  to  $125  per  month — 
age  42  —  permanent  injuries — totally 
unable  to  pursue  his  trade— $9,000. 
Houston  City  Si.  R.  Co.  v.  Mcdlenka, 
17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  621;  43  S.  W.  1028. 
Brakcman — earning  from  $60  I  i  |7B 
per  month — age  27 — great  physical 
and  mental  pain — permanent  impair- 
ment of  health — ability  to  earn  a 
living  for  the  remainder  of  his  life 
probably  permanently  destroyed — 
$1,500.  Missouri.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chambers,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  487; 
43  S.  W.    1090;  3   Chic.    L.  J.  Wklv. 

245 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


99.  Man — earning  about  $75  per 
month — age  30 — confined  to  house 
about  4  months — paid  about  $300  to 
physicians— obliged  to  use  crutches 
—earns  but  little— §10,000.  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook,  12  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  203;  33  S.  W.  669,  reh'g 
denied  in  34  S.  W.  178.  Traveling 
salesman— salary  $190  per  month 
above  expenses — age  43 — wounds  in 
stomach  and  body— eyesight  gradu- 
ally failing — prevented  from  attend- 
ing to  business — $5,000.  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Huff  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  32  S.  W.  551.  Man— healthy 
and  robust — age  32 — constant  pain — 
mind  impaired  and  wrecked  body — 
deprived  of  ability  to  support  him- 
self and  family— $6,500.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Click  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  32  S.  W.  226.  Man— in 
vigorous  health — age  30 — earning 
capacity  reduced  from  $60  to  $25 
per  month — $4,750.  Mexican  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lauricella  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  301.  Conductor  on  rail- 
road— age  36 — several  hundred  dol- 
lars expended  for  treatment — still 
suffering — earning  capacity  dimin- 
ished two  thirds— $11,200.  Mexican 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Musette  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1894),  24  S.  W.  520,  aff'd  86  Tex.  708; 
24  L.  R.  A.  642;  26  S.  W.  1075.  Ser- 
vant— skull  broken — necessary  to  re- 
move part  leaving  brain  unprotected 
— capacity  to  labor  materially  im- 
paired—$2,500.  Richlands  Iron  Co. 
v.  Elius  (Va.  1894),  17  S.  E.  890;  17 
Va.  L.  J.  431.  Entirely  deprived  of 
health  and  ability  to  labor  for  life — 
$10,000.  Columbia  &  P.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hawthorn  (Wash.  T.),  19  Pac.  25. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Woman — 
about  half  of  time  worked  as  nurse  at 
from  $12  to  $15  per  week — remai  nder 
of  time  took  care  of  her  home — age 
59 — only  partially  incapacitated  — 
$7,000  is  excessive,  should  be  reduced 

246 


to  $3,500.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  80  111.  App.  71,  afTd  182 
111.  298;  55  N.  E.  366.  Man— pre- 
viously healthy  and  able  to  perform 
any  kind  of  work — age  30 — woubl 
continue  to  be  subject  to  annoyance 
from  pain  unless  he  submitted  to  an 
operation  to  which  some  risk  is  at- 
tached— obliged  to  work  for  less 
wages— $8,000  excessive  and  new 
trial  unless  plaintiff  stipulate  to  re- 
duce to  $5,000.  Bosworth  v.  Stand- 
ard Oil  Co.,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.),  485;  72 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  195.  Man — leg  shortened 
— still  suffering  pain — ability  to 
work  impaired — $7,500  reduced  to 
$3,500.  Geiler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co., 
11  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  413;  65  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  437.  Man — earning  $12  per  week 
— in  hospital  for  a  year — use  of  leg 
impaired  by  varicose  veins — unable 
to  do  hard  or  heavy  work — $15,000 
excessive,  should  be  reduced  to 
$8,000.  Chapman  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  384;  36  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1045.  Man — age  74 — much 
pain — health  and  working  capacity 
seriously  impaired — not  wholly  dis- 
abled—$7,800.  Campbell  v.  Cor- 
nelius (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1894),  23  S. 
W.  117. 

Eye — loss  of  and  injury  to.  Ver- 
dicts not  excessive.  Locomotive  en- 
gineer—  unable  to  work  for  eight 
months — considerable  expense — lost 
sight  of  one  eye — disqualified  from 
his  occupation  —  $3,000.  East  St. 
Louis  v.  Doughtery,  74  111.  App. 
490.  To  father  of  boy  aged  6— sight 
of  one  eye  lost  entirely  and  of  other 
partially  if  not  entirely — $2,900. 
Seltzer  v.  Saxton,  71  111.  App.  229. 
Man — age  22 — loss  of  sight  of  one 
eye — $2,000.  Lemser  v.  St.  Joseph 
Furniture  Co.,  70  Mo.  App.  209. 
Man — age  35 — sight  of  one  eye  de- 
stroyed and  of  other  affected — only 
able  to  do  one  half  the  work  since 


PHYSICAL,     INJURIES. 


§214 


the  accident  that  he  could  before — 
$5,000.  Johnston  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  (Mo.),  9  S.  W.  790.  Loss  of 
eyesight — in  bed  about  six  weeks — 
in  opinion  of  physician  would  never 
recover— $3,000.  New  Jersey  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  West,  8  N.  J.  L.  91.  Loss  of 
an  eye— $5,000.  Texas  &  P.  K.  Co. 
v.  Bowlin  (Tex.  Civ.  A.pp.),  32  S.  W. 
918.  Verdicts  held  excessive.  Loss 
of  eyesight— $37,500.  Deep  Min.  & 
I).  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  21  Colo.  53:1; 
43  Pac.  210.  Loss  of  an  eye— $0,000. 
Excessive  remittitur  of  $2,000.  Ben- 
agam  v.   Plassan,    15    La.   Ann.  703. 

Fingers— loss  of.  Verdicts  not  ex- 
cessive. Brakeman — one  finger  lost 
— another  broken — another  mashed 
— hand  crushed— unable  to  do  heavy 
work — earning  power  reduced  from 
$1.25  to  75  cents  per  day — $2,350. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams 
(Ga.),  14  S.  E.  120.  Car  inspector- 
three  fingers  of  right  hand  lost — idle 
about  seven  months — earning  $65 
per  month — in  another  position  he 
had  filled  could  earn  $75 — obtained 
position  afterwards  at  $2.00  per  day 
— subsequently  increased  to  $16  per 
week— $2,416.50.  Savannah,  F.  &  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  91  Ga.  99;  163  S. 
E.  306.  Brakeman — loss  of  finger — 
hand  crushed — probable  permanent 
impairment — earnings  reduced  from 
$60  to  $45  per  month — $1,500.  Strong 
v.  Iowa  C.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  62  N.  W. 
799.  Man — earning  $40  per  montb 
— age  23 — unable  to  work  for  eight 
months — finger  injured — thumb  am- 
putated— arm  weakened — injury  per- 
manent— unable  to  do  former  work 
— earnings  reduced  to  $1.10  per  day 
—$2,300.  Whalen  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  75  low;!.  563;  39  X.  W.  89  1. 
Boy— loss  of  three  fingers  on  one  hand 
—  $4,000.  Rarg  v.  Bonsfield,  65  Minn. 
355-;  68  N.  \V.  45.  Man— married- 
one  child — three  fingers  lo6t — wrist  j 


and  arm  injured — earning  $1.50  per 
day— $6,000.  Montaugb  v.  X.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  K.  Co.,  23  X.  Y.  Sr.  It. 
636.  Brakeman — age29 — lossof  two 
middle  fingers  and  also  top  half  of 
index  linger  of  right  hand — loss  "f 
use  of  hand  and  hand  movement  of 
wrist — intense  pain  and  suffering — 
earnings  reduced  from  $65  t  i  $25 
per  month — $8,000.  San  Antonio  & 
A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Pan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
26  S.  W.  861.  Lossof  little  finger  on 
right  hand — finger  next  to  it  drawn 
up  and  cannot  be  straightened — loss 
of  use  of  hand  for  four  months — 
ability  to  perform  manual  labor 
greatly  impaired — $2,500.  Campbell 
v.  McCoy,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  298;  28 
S.  \V.  34.  Switchman— loss  of  all 
the  fingers  of  right  hand — $7,5(XL 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hauer 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  1010. 
Railroad  section  hand— loss  of  two 
fingers  of  left  hand — others  man- 
gled, lacerated  and  devoid  of 
Strength  —  permanently  injured  — 
$3,300.  Chapman  v.  Southern  P.  R. 
Co.,  12  Utah,  30;  41  Pac.  551. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Employee 
in  paper  mill — loss  of  three  fingers. 
portion  of  fourth  linger  and  part  of 
outside  of  hand— $4,250  excessive. 
— $2,500  sufficient.  Sawyer  v.  Rum- 
ford  Falls  Paper  Co..  '.til  Me.  354; 
38  Atl.  318.  Boy— age  between  8 
and  9 — injury  necessitating  ampu- 
tation of  ring  and  middle  fingers 
of  left  hand  near  first  joint — $1,800. 
Gahagan  v.  Aer motor  <<>.,  67  Minn. 
252:  69  X.  W.  914.  Man— age  43— 
loss  of  middle  linger  of  left  hand  — 
first  and  third  fingers  of  left  hand 
permanently  stiffened — severe  pain 
for  several  weeks — medical  attend- 
ance costing  $25  $8,000  excessive. 
Reduced  to  $5,000.  Borgeson  v. 
United  States  Projectile  Co.,  2  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.157;  37   X.  Y.  Supp 

247 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  548.  Freight  conduc- 
tor— injury — necessary  to  amputate 
three  fingers— subsequently  neces- 
sary to  amputate  hand  at  wrist — 
prior  to  the  accident  one  of  the 
bones  of  the  hand  had  been  broken 
— and  one  or  two  fingers  had  be- 
come stiffened  and  withered — §8,000. 
Pittsburg  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Blair,  11 
Ohio  C.  C.  579.  Man— age  25— loss 
of  little  finger — next  finger  to  it 
broken  and  stiffened— $4,000.  Ma- 
hood  v.  Pleasant  Valley  Coal  Co. 
(Utah),  30Pac.  149. 

Fingers— fracture  of.  Employee — 
two  fingers  broken — $4,000  excessive. 
Remittitur  of  $1,000.  Mahood  v. 
Pleasant  Valley  Coal  Co.,  8  Utah,  85. 

Foot — loss  of .  Verdicts  not  exces- 
sive. Farmer — making  about  $500 
per  year — age  40 — loss  of  one  foot — 
$9,000.  Georgia  II.  &  Bkg.  Co.  v. 
Keating,  99  Ga.  308  ;  25  S.  E.  669  ;  5 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  331.  Brake- 
man  —  loss  of  one  foot  —  $1,000. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 
87  Ky.  327  ;  8  S.  W.  706.  Man- 
earning  $53.50  per  month — age  32 — 
foot  amputated  above  ankle  and  fur- 
ther amputation  necessary  later — in- 
tense pain — will  probably  suffer  more 
or  less  during  life — $9,000.  Manley 
v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  502  ;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  1076, 
rev'd  however  in  18  App.  Div. 
420;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  1108;  Man- 
age 23 — lost  part  of  foot — could 
not  leave  bed  without  assistance  for 
ten  weeks — unable  to  work  for  eight 
months  —  permanently  disabled  — 
could  subsequently  work  only  about 
three-quarters  of  the  time — physi- 
cian's bill  $200— $8,500.  Commer- 
ford  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  8 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  599;  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
391  ;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  51.  Man— age 
80 — part  of  foot  lost — incapacitated 

248 


from  attending  to  business — $11,500. 
.Ionian  v.  N.  Y.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  670;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  506. 
Young  man— good  health — age  18 — 
injury  necessitating  the  amputation 
of  one  foot — in  his  room  four  weeks — 
in  house  four  months — pain  in  leg 
results  from  changes  in  weather — 
$8,000.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Green,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  5  ;  49  S. 
W.  670.  Favor  of  father  for  loss 
of  services  of  minor  son — age  19 — 
employed  in  dangerous  business 
without  father's  consent  —  loss  of 
foot — use  of  arm  permanently  im- 
paired— earning  $65  per  month  at 
time  of  injury— $1,200.  Texas  &  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Brick  (Tex.),  18  S.  W. 
947.  Child  —  age  3  years  —  loss  of 
foot — due  to  gross  negligence  of 
employees  of  railroad  company  — 
$10,500.  Chipman  v.  Union  P.  R. 
Co.,     12     Utah,     68;    41     Pac.     562. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Switch- 
man— loss  of  one  foot  and  four  toes 
of  other  foot  —  $8,000.  Wood  v. 
Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.,  88  Fed. 
44;  11  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  525.  Loss  of  one  foot— $1,200— 
remittitur  $4,000.  Kroener  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  88  Iowa,  16. 
Laborer — earning  $1.50  per  day — age 
24 — loss  of  one  foot — $10,000  exces- 
sive and  should  be  reduced  to  $5,000. 
Peri  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  11.  R.  R.  Co.. 
87  Hun  (N.  Y.),  499;  68  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
844.  Injury  necessitating  amputa- 
tion of  both  feet — man — age  36 — 
earning  $8  per  week — $11,620  exces- 
sive and  judgment  ordered  reversed 
unless  plaintiff  accepted  $5,000. 
Pfeffer  v.  Buffalo  Ry.  Co.,  54  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  342  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  490  ;  4 
Misc.  465,  aff'd  144  N.  Y.  636  ; 
64  N.   Y.   St.   R.  868  ;  39  N.  E.  494. 

Hand — loss  of.  Verdicts  held  not 
excessive.    Man — age  29 — been  earn- 


PHYSICAL      IN. II   KIKS. 


§  214 


ing  $2.30  per  day— loss  of  one  hand 
— after  injury  obtained  employment 
without  difficulty  —  but  received 
only  $1  a  day— $6,500.  Wooster  v. 
Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  40  V  V. 
St.  R.  844  ;  16  X.  Y  Supp.  764- 
Loss  of  right  hand— $3,500.  Green- 
ville Oil  &  C.  Co.  v.  Harkey,  20  Tex. 
(iv.  App.  225  ;  48  S.  W.  1005. 
Injury  to  hand — run  over  by  car— 
$1,250.  Ft.  Worth  &  1).  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bell,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  28  ;  23  S. 
W.  922. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Child — 
age  two  and  a  half  years — loss  of 
both  hands  and  one  foot  — excru- 
ciating pain  —  $4,000,  excessive  in 
absence  of  claim  for  exemplary  dam- 
ages and  in  view  of  fact  that  ex- 
pectancy of  life  after  majority  is 
only  eighteen  and  a  half  years.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Waren,  65 
Ark.  619  ;  48  S.  W.  222  ;  13  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  729.  Loss  of  one 
hand — $15,000  excessive,  where  an- 
nual earnings  are  less  than  annual  in- 
terest on  such  sum.  Peoria,  D.  &  E. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hardwick,  53  111.  App.  161. 
Loss  of  right  hand  —  workman  — 
$25,000 excessive,  reduced  at  the  trial 
to  $15,000  ;  held  still  excessive  ;  re- 
duced to  $10,000.  O'Donnell  v.  Am- 
erican Sugar  Refining  Co.,  41  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  307;  58  X.  Y.  Supp. 
640;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  322. 

Hip— fracture  of.  Dressmaker — 
earning  $2  per  day — $15,000  exces- 
sive, should  be  reduced  to  $10,000. 
Coxhead  v.  Johnson,  20  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  605;  21  App.  Div.  626;  47 
X.  Y.  Supp.  389;  motion  to  dismiss 
appeal  denied  in  156  X.  Y.  680. 

Jaw— fracture  of.  Verdicts  held 
not  excessive.  Jaw  fractured — also 
collar  bone — severe  pain  for  several 
weeks — health  not  restored  at  time 
of  trial— $3,000.    Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L, 


R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  48  111.  App.  274. 
Badly  fractured— exceedingly  pain- 
ful— permanent  effects  and  disfigure- 
ment—$<;.'>"<>.  Miller  v.  Erie  R.  Co., 
;;i  App.  Div.  I  N.  Y.)  217;  54  X.  V. 
Supp.  606. 

/.,./   -loss  of.    Verdicts  held  not  ex- 
cessive.    Seaman  —  loss  of  leg  below 
knee— much  pain — 94,000  not  i 
sive,  as  recovery  was  considered  not 
more  than  half  the  actual  damages. 
The   Edenmore,  58   I      x.   App.   104; 
86  Fed.  886;  30  C.  C.  A.  675.     Bealthy 
man — able  to  earn   about   >1U0    per 
month— age  39— loss  of  both   legs — 
must  drag  himself  about  on  his  knees 
as  artificial  limbs  cannot  he  adjusted 
—$13,000.     Colorado  Midland  R.  Co. 
v.  O'Brien,  Hi  Colo.  219:  27  Pac.  701; 
10  Ry.  &  Corp.   L.   J.  351:  48  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.   Cas.  235.     Left  leg  severed 
from  body — collision  with  locomotive 
— permanent  injuries  to  head,  spine 
and    back — much    suffering— great 
expense — vocation  interfered  with — 
$6,500.     East  St.    Louis   Connecting 
R.  Co.   v.    Reames,  75   111.   App.  28, 
aff'd     173     111.    582  ;    51    X.     E.     68. 
Brakeman— earning  $60    per  month 
— injury  requiring  amputation  four 
and  one  half  inches  below  hip — $8,000 
Chicago  &  X.  W.    R.   C<>.  v.  Gillison, 
72  111.    App.  207.     Girl— age  6— loss 
of   right    leg— $12,000.     Sloniker   v. 
Great  Northern  R.  Co..  76  Minn.  306; 
79  X.  W.  168:  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.    S.   819  ;  6   Am.    Neg.    Rep.    298. 
Brakeman— earning    $65    per  month 
— age  32 — leg  crushed  below  knee — 
— amputation     necessary    and     per- 
formed   three    times,    the    last    time 
above  the  knee— long  and  severe  suf- 
fering—$10,000.     Holleubeck  v.  Mis- 
souri P.  R.  Co.,  1  11  Mo.  '.'7:  88  s.  W. 
7'-':>.:  B    Am.   &    Eng.    R.  Cas.    N.  S. 
277.    Boy— age  18  months— injury  re- 
quiring amputation  above  the  knee 
—nearly  $16,000.     Kalfur   v.    Broad- 

249 


§  214 


PHYSICAL      IN.J  TRIES. 


way  Perry*  M.  Ave.  R.  Co.,  34  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  267;  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  503; 
12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  850,  aff'g 
23  Misc.    417;  51   X.   Y.    Supp.    179. 
Boy — age     5— loss     of     one     leg— 
$12,000.     Akersloot  v.    Second   Ave. 
R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  St.  R.  231;  15  N.  Y. 
Supp.  «64,  aff'd  on  other  grounds  in 
131   N.  Y.  599;  15   L.    R.    A.   489;  43 
\.  Y.  St.  R.  290;  30  N.E.  105.   Healthy 
woman  in  prime  of  life — leg  ampu- 
tated below  knee— one  arm  enlarged 
—hearing  impaired— great  suffering 
and      pain— §23,000.       Erickson      v. 
Brooklyn    H.    K.    R.    Co..    11    Misc. 
(N.    Y.)    662,  aff'd   155  N.   Y.    643. 
Man  in  prime  of  life— loss  of  leg- 
also  arm— $18,000.    Murray  v.  Brook- 
lyn City  R.  R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  900. 
Boy — age   16 — loss   of  one   leg  just 
below  knee— $9,000,   not  excessive, 
though  plaintiff's  earning  power  is 
less  than  the  legal  interest  on  such 
amount.     Richmond  v.  Second  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  76  Hun  (N.  Y.),233;  59  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  113;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  780.  Brake- 
man— age  19— injury  requiring  am- 
putation of  leg  below    the    knee- 
strength  and  efficiency  of  right  hand 
impaired— $9,000.      Texas  &    P.    R. 
Co.  v.  Brick,  83  Tex.   598;  20  S.  W. 
511.      Strong    healthy     man— earn- 
ing from  $125  to  $150  per  month— 
age  32— loss  of  right  leg  below  knee 
— scalded   on  head,  face,  hands  and 
arms — loses  all   his  flesh    on    lower 
part  of  arms  and  on  his  hands — loses 
nearly  all   his  hair — right  arm   par- 
tially and   sometimes    totally  para- 
lyzed—$12,500.     Texas  &  P.   R.   Co. 
v.  Johnson  ( Tex.  Civ.  App. ),  34  S.  W. 
186,  reh'g   denied    in    14   Tex.   Civ. 
App.  566;  37  S.  W.  973;  which  has 
writ  of  error  denied  in  90  Tex.   304; 
38    S.    W.    520.     Boy— age    11— loss 
of  one  leg — permanently  weakening 
of  other  leg— $10,000.     Ft.  Worth  & 
D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson  (Tex.),  14 
L.  R.  A.  781 ;  16  S.  W.  1093.     Boy— 
250 


leg  crushed  so  amputation  necessary 
— -$15,000.  Roth  v.  Union  Depot 
Co.,  13  Wash.  525;  31  L.  R.  A.  855; 
43   Pac.  641;  44  Pac.   253. 


Verdicts  held  excessive.  Loss  of 
leg  below  knee — $10,000  excessive. 
Remittitur— $3,000.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dwyer,  36  Kan.  59.  Loss  of  leg— 
$8,500,  should  be  reduced  to  $6,000. 
Conway  v.  New  Orleans  City  &  L. 
R.  Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  146;  24  So.  780; 
5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  354. 

Verdicts    held   excessive.       Man — 
age  23 — earning  about  $480  a  year 
— injury    requiring   amputation   be- 
low knee — not  entirely  incapacitated 
from    earning     a    living— $17,000 — 
reduced    to     $6,000.       Brakeman — 
loss   of   leg— $25,000    excessive    but 
third    trial     refused     where    plain- 
tiff offered  to  remit  $5,000.     Wald- 
hier  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.   1!.  Co.,  87 
Mo.  37.     Man  in  good  health — cap- 
able of  earning  $12  per  week— age  28 
—suffered  great  pain— $25,000.  Tally 
v.  N.  Y.  &  T.  S.  S.  Co.,  10  App.  Div. 
( X.  Y. )  463 ;  42 1ST.  Y.  Supp.  29.     Loss 
of  leg  below  knee — hip,   right  arm 
and  leg  cut  and  knee  joint  stiffened 
— three  weeks  before  he  could  get 
around — leg  healed  in  four  months 
—$16,000  excessive,  $9,000  sufficient. 
Bailly  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.   R.   Co., 
84  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  4;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  490. 
Mason's    tender— wages     $2.00    per 
day— loss  of    leg— $9,000    excessive 
and  new  trial  unless  $5,000  accepted. 
Morris   v.    Eighth   Ave.    R.    Co.,   68 
Hun   (N.  Y.),  39;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  61. 
Laborer— capable    of    earning     but 
$8  per  week— age  36— loss  of  both 
leers— $11,620.11    excessive    and    re- 
duced to  $5,000.     Pfeffer  v.  Buffalo 
R.  Co.,  4  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  465;  24  N.  Y. 
Supp.  490.    Clergyman— salary  $1400 
per  year— age   30— injury  requiring 
I  amputation   of   leg  just   below   hip 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


> 


21  ) 


joint — collar  bone  broken  cuts  and 
bruises — $15,000  excessive  where 
exemplary  damages  an-  not  war- 
ranted. Honl.n  v.  l'eun.  R.  R.  Co. 
(Pa.  C.  P.),  7  Kulp,  52. 

L(  g,fracturt  h  <<''.   Verdicts  beld  not 

excessive.     Of  leg — dislocated  ankle 

—  medical  expense  $75-  in  house 
over  two  months — obliged  to  use 
crutches  for  a  time  ami  subsequently 
a  walking  stick — doubtful  as  to  ic- 
oovery  from  lameness  91,400.  Smith 
v.  Des  Moines  (lowai,  51  X.  W.  77. 
Of  leg— man— age  (57— • $2,000.  To- 
peka  v.  Bradshaw  (Kan.  C.  A.  1897), 
2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  535.  Small  bone  of 
leg  broken — boy — heel  also  smashed 

—  leg  bruised  and  injured — nervous 
By  stem  ami  general  health  materially 
impaired  —  $500.  Kentucky  Hotel 
Co.  v.  CambiKy.  1805),  30  S.  W. 
1010.  Leg  broken  between  knee 
and  ankle — in  bed  for  many  weeks 
— awarded  for  pain  and  suffering 
only — $1,500.  Shidet  v.  .Jules  Drey- 
fuss  Co.,  50  I.a.  Ann.  29(5;  23  So.  837. 
Leg  broken  in  three  places — perma- 
nently shorter — si, 200.  Rhoades  v. 
Varney.  91  -Me.  222:  .;'.•  Atl.  552.  Leg 
broken — in  bed  six  weeks — at  time 
of  trial  unable  to  walk  without  sup- 
port and  great  pain — permanent  im- 
pediment in  walk  because  of  foot 
turning  out — §5,1(5(5.  Meiners  v.  St. 
Louis,  130  Mo.  274;  32  S.  W.  037. 
Leg  broken,  shortened  and  use  of 
impaired  —  less  able  to  work — earn- 
ing $60  per  month--  $7,500.  Thomas 
v.Union  Ry.  Co..  18  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  185;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  920.  Leg 
broken  — fracture  a  simple  one — in 
plaster  cast  for  live  weeks — still 
painful  after  more  than  year—  $1,100. 
Stapleton  v.  Newburg,  9  App.  Div. 
( X.  Y.)  39;  41  X.  Y.  Supp.  96.  Both 
bones  of  leg  broken — 85,000.  Beltz 
v.  Yonkers,  74  Hun  (X.  Y.),  73;  56 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  205;  20  X.  Y.  Supp.  106. 


Leg      broken  —  permanent      internal 
injui  i'  0.      Brady     v.     Man- 

hattan Rj .  Co.,  6  N .  Y.  supp. 
."..,:;.  _5  V  1  .  St.  1:.  585;  15  Daly, 
272,  rev'd  127  N.  Y.  46;  :.7  V  V 
si.  R.  340;  27  N.  E.  368,  Cab-driver 
— earning  $12  per  week  -age  32— 
comminuted  fracture  of  both  legs- 
compound  fracture  of  jaw — $12,500. 
McDonnell  v.  Henry  Elias  Brew.  Co., 
1.5  App.  Div.  i  N.  Y.  i  223:  44  X.  Y. 
Supp.  652;  2  Am.  Neg.  Sep.  423.  cirl 
— both  bones  of  leg  fractured  be- 
tween kuee  and  ankle — leg  shortened 
. — toes  bent  downward  and  sore 
caused  by  bein<:  compelled  to  walk 
thereon — permanent  injury  and  de- 
formity in  leg  and  foot — $5,000. 
Missouri.  K.  &.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  \V.  771. 
Both  legs  broken — ankle  dislocated — 
using  crutches  at  time  of  trial  four 
months  after  accident — railroad  em- 
ployee— $7,500.  Evans  v.  Delk  (Tex. ), 
9  S.  W.  550.  Both  bones  of  leg 
broken  and  shortened— cannot  walk 
without  a  cane  over  two  years  after 
the  accident — $1,800.  Propson  v. 
Leathen,  80  Wis.  60S:  50  X.  W.  580. 

Verdicts  held  exc<  ssixn  .   Leg  broken 

—  man — age  67 — weight  240  pounds 
—$5,000  excessive;  $2,500  is  suffi- 
cient. North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wiswell,  68  111.  App.  443,  affd 
168  [11.  613;  48  X.  E.  407.  Employee 
— leg  broken — $4,000  excessive.  Re- 
mittitur of  $1,500.  Lombard  v.  Chi- 
cago R.  I.  &  V.  R.  Co..  17  Iowa.  494. 
Roth  legs  broken  —  $10. 000  i 
sive.  Reduced  to  $5,000.  Black  v. 
Carrolton  R.  Co.,  10  La.  Ann.  33. 
Railway  employee-  leg  broken- 
shortened  \  to  $  ofan  inch  -capacity 
to  labor  not  seriously  impaired — 
$4,100.  Slette  v.  Cirat  Northern  R. 
Co.  (Minn.).  55  X.  \Y.  137.  Leg 
broken-  simple  fracture  cured  in 
five      months — $3,500.      Dwyer      v. 

261 


S  214 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


Hickler,  43  N.  V.  St.  R.  221;  16  X. 
Y.  Supp.  814.  Leg  broken — person 
already  deprived  of  use  of  lower  part 
of  leg  for  ten  years — #7,500  exces- 
sive. Half  of  amount  sufficient. 
Texas  C.  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Burton  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  30  8.  W.  491. 

Malpractice,  negligence  of  surgeon 
in  failing  to  discover  a  dislocation  of 
the  shoulder  resulting  in  almost 
complete  paralysis  of  the  right  arm 
— $1,741.60  helu  not  excessive.  Has- 
tings v.  Stetson,  91  Me.  229;  39  All. 
580. 

Miscarriage  —  Injuries  causing. 
Verdicts  held  not  excessive.  Iujury 
causing  miscarriage — also  other  suf- 
fering— $2,000.  Joliet  v.  Conway,  17 
111.  App.  577.  Injuries  causing 
bearing  down  pain  and  ultimate  mis- 
carriage— #5,000.  Butler  v.  Manhat- 
tan B.  Co.,  3  Misc.  (N.  Y.)453;  52 
X.  Y.  St.  B.  498:  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  163; 
30  Abb.  N.  Cas.  78,  afFd  143  N.  Y. 
030.  Passenger  —  forced  to  make 
change  of  sleepers  with  no  time  to 
dress — miscarriage  as  result  thereof 
— $2,500.  McKeon  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  B.  Co.,  94  Wis.  477;  35  L.  R. 
A.  252;  69  N.  W.  175;  2  Chic.  L. 
J.  Wkly.  175. 

Nervous  system — Injury  to.  Ver- 
dicts held  not  excessive.  Nervous 
shock  from  which  he  may  never  re- 
cover— hearing  in  one  ear  perma- 
nently destroyed — sight  of  one  eye 
impaired — $2,000.  Clare  v.  Sacra- 
mento Electric  P.  &  L.  Co.,  122  Cal. 
504;  55  Pac.  326;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Bep.  115.  Active  woman — age  35 — 
nervous  system  permanently  shat- 
tered— great  pain — unable  to  indulge 
in  active  exercise  or  endure  fatigue 
—§7,000.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son, 58  111.  App.  181.  Strong  labor- 
ing   man — earning   $40   to   $45    per 

252 


month — age  46 — nervous  system  per- 
manently diseased — recovery  so  as  to 
perform  labor  doubtful— $6,500.  Ol- 
son v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  68 
Minn.  155;  71  N.  W.  5;  7  Am.  & 
Eng,  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  241.  Nervous 
shock  caused  by  injury  to  knee  and 
resulting  in  development  of  heart 
disease —  helpless  invalid —  $10,000. 
Galloway  v.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.  (Minn.  1894),  23  L.  R.  A.  442; 
57  X.  W.  1058.  Nervous  disorder 
— knee  impaired — urine  affected — 
bruises  and  pains — $7,500.  Quirk  v. 
Siegel,  Cooper  Co.,  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
244;  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  49.  Nervous  sys- 
tem injured  causing  paresis — $5,000. 
McMahon  v.  Eau  Claire  Waterworks 
Co.  (Wis.  1897),  95  Wis.  640;  70  N. 
W.  829;  2  Am.   Neg.  Rep.  478. 

Paralysis.  Verdicts  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Longshoreman — unmarried 
— earning  $3  per  day — age  29 — pa- 
ralysis resulting  from  fractured  skull 
— grave,  permanent  injuries  there- 
from also — possibility  of  imbecility 
or  insanity — earning  power  perma- 
nently destroyed— $6,000.  The  Jo- 
seph B.  Thomas  (D.  C.  N.  D.  Cal.), 
81  Fed.  578.  Man  —  age  50  —  in- 
jury resulting  in  incurable  paraly- 
sis, $15,000.  Bishop  v.  St.  Paul  City 
R.  Co.  (Minn.),  50  N.  W.  927. 
Injury  of  extreme  severity  causing 
progressive  paralysis — will  be  help- 
less after  a  time  and  necessary  to 
have  medical  attendance  and  one  or 
more  nurses — $18,500.  Tuthill  v. 
Long  Island  R.  Co.,  81  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
616;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  135;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  959. 

Permanent  injuries — Miscellaneous. 
Verdicts  held  not  excessive.  Girl 
— age  five — permanently  disfigured — 
$10,000.  Smith  v.  Pittsburg  &  W. 
R.  Co.  (C.  C.  N.  D.  Ohio),  90  Fed. 
78:1,;  13  Am.  &  Eng.    R.   Cas.  N.  S. 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§  214 


716;  41   Ohio    L.    J.  113.     Man— age 
73 — employed    as    street  sweeper — 
leg  permanently  shortened — less  able 
to   work   than    formerly — still    suf- 
fering pain  at  time  of  trial  one  year 
after  the  accident— $4,000.    Roche  v. 
Kedington,    125    Cal.   174;    57    Pac. 
890.     Leg    permanently    stiffened — 
unable  to  walk  securely  or  perform 
her  duties   as   a  housewift — $3,500. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Schwartz 
82    111.  App.  493.     Leg  permanently 
weakened — accident  cutting  through 
the  muscle   to   the  bone — unable  to 
walk  for  four  or  five  months  without 
crutch    or  cane— $3,000.     West  Chi- 
cago  St.    R.   Co.  v.  Johnson,  77  111. 
App.   142,  aff'd    180    111.    285;  54  N. 
E.   334.     Permanent    injury    to   hip 
joint— woman  strong  and  healthy — 
age    35  —  great    pain  —  in    hospital 
nearly   six   months — obliged   to  use  ' 
crutches    for    eight     months    after  | 
leaving  there—  $5, 000.     North    Chi- 
cago  St.   R.    Co.    v.    Brown,  76  111. 
App.  654.      Permanent  injury  to  one 
foot  which   incapacitates  from  con-  ! 
stant  use  of  same — unable  to  work  for 
a  year  and  a  half — medical  expenses 
$900 — easily  tired — nervous  and  irri-  j 
table — $5000.   Grossman  v.  Cosgrove, 
75  111.  App.  385,  aff'd    174   111.  383;  j 
51    N.    E.   094.     Permanent   enlarge- 
ment of  the  cartilages  of  the  bone 
and  knee — constant  pain — was  com- 
pelled  to   use   crutches   and   cane — 
$4,500.       Chicago    v.    Fitzgerald.    75 
111.  App.  174.     Man — earning  $58  per 
month — good     health — age     34 — un- 
able to  walk — constant  pain — prob- 
ably    hasten      his      death— $14,000. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Swan,  70  111. 
App.  331;  2   Chic.   L.   J.  Wkly.  419. 
Driver   of     horse    car — permanently 
disabled  from  all  bodily  exertions — 
still  suffering  much   pain  at  end  of 
four      years — temporarily      earning 
higher  pay  in  clerkship  than  he  was 
as  car  driver— $15,000.     Chicago  City 


R.  Co.  v.   Taylor,  68   111.   App.  613, 
aff'd    170    111.    49;     48    N.    E.  831. 
Brakeman — chronic   hip  disease  re- 
sulting  from   crushed    hips — $5,000. 
Elgin  J.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Eselin,  68  111. 
App.    96.       Mind     permanently    im- 
paired—boy—age    16— $10,000.      N. 
Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Luebeck, 
54  111.  App.  551.     Permanent   injury 
— boy — age  4 — Atchison,  T.   &  S.  F. 
R.   Co.   v.   Elder,   50    111.   App.    276, 
aff'd  149  111.  173;  36  N.  E.  565.    Young 
girl — permanent  scar  caused  by  lac- 
erated  wound  of    face    and  neck — 
medical  services  $75 — $1,500.     Cam- 
eron v.  Bryan   (Iowa),  56  N.  \Y.  434. 
I  tail  way  freight    conductor — earning 
$60  per    month — age  30 — unable  to 
perform    duties   of   conductor — only 
do  light  work — injuries  permanent — 
$7,660.     Harker  v.  Burlington  C.  R. 
&  N.   R.  Co.   (Iowa).  55  N.  W.  316. 
Serious     and    permanent    injuries — 
$7,175.     Wichita  v.  Stallings.  59  Kan. 
779;  54  Pac.  689.     Stiff  arm— $3,500. 
Detzer  v.  Stroh  Brew.  Co.,  119  Mich. 
282:  77  N.  W.  948:  44  L.  R.  A.  500; 
5  Am.  Ncg.   Rep.  371;  5  Det.   L.  N. 
803.     Shoulder  one  and  a  half  inches 
lower  than  other — as  result  thereof 
unable  to  obtain  position  as  a  teacher 
-$2,000.     Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mizell, 
100  Ky.  235;  38  S.  W.   5:  6  Am.   & 
Eng.  R.   Cas.  N.  S.  337;  18  Ky.   L. 
Rep.   738.     Hearing   in  one  ear  de- 
stroyed— sight      impaired— memory 
unreliable — health  seriously  affected 
— unable   to  work  as  effective  as  be- 
fore    injury — $4,000.       Kennedy     v. 
Chicago,  M.   &  St.  P.  R.   Co.  (Minn. 
1894),  58  N.  \Y.  878.    Permanent  limp 
and    incapacity  to   straighten   leg — 
boy— $3,000.      Buck   v.    Peoples   St. 
R.  *   E.  L.  &P.  Co.  (Mo.),  18  S.  W. 
1090,  aff  g  46  Mo.  App.  555.      I 
left  hand  permanently  lost — woman 
—$1,200.     Harvard  v.  Stiles.  54  Neb. 
26;  74  N.  W.  399.     School  teacher- 
woman — earning  $450  per  year— age 

253 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


48 — much  suffering  physical  and  men- 
tal—in bed  three  months — consider- 
able medical  expense — also  expense 
for  nursing — permanently  disabled 
and  obliged  to  use  crutches — $7,208. 
Burr  v.  I'enn.  R.  R.  Co.  (X.  J.  1899), 
44  Atl.  845.  Young  man  with  wife 
and  child — permanently  lame  as  re- 
sult of  injuries  to  kidneys  and  hips — 
$10,000.  Boyce  v.  Shawangunk,  40 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  593;  58  N..T.  Supp. 
26.  Woman — healthy  before  acci- 
dent— bruises  and  sprains — in  house 
two  or  three  months — suffering  also 
from  prolapsus  uteri  and  congestion 
— wearing  a  pessary — in  opinion  of 
physicians  condition  permanent — 
$3,750.  Rippe  v.  Met.  St.  R.  Co.,  35 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  321;  54  N.  Y.  Supp. 
958.  Roofer — permanent  injuries  to 
—$6,000.  Bryer  v.  Foerster,  9  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  542;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  617. 
Child — age  8 — permanently  disfig- 
ured— also  will  be  always  unable  to 
masticate  food  on  one  side  of  her 
mouth — collar  bone  and  four  ribs 
broken — injury  to  pelvis — $6,000. 
Bennett  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.,  1 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y. )  205  ;  37  N.  Y.  Supp. 
447:  72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  719.  Woman- 
age  27 — run  over  by  street  car — per- 
manent injuries — $15,000.  Mitchell 
v.  Broadway  &  S.  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  387;  54  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
116.  Permanent  injury  to  well  edu- 
cated and  healthy  married  man — 
$25,000.  Alberti  v.  X.  Y.  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Hun  (X.  Y.),  421. 
Woman — healthy— married — age  28 
— permanent  injury — great  sufferer. 
Groves  v.  Rochester,  39  Hun  (X.  Y. ), 
5.  Permanent  injuries  to  genital  or- 
gans— great  pain  and  suffering — un- 
able to  perform  ordinary  duties  and 
work — $12,500.  Cannon  v.  Brooklyn 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  282, 
aff'd  149  X.  Y.  615.  Van  driver— in- 
juries which  will  always  render  him 
a  sickly  man — $15,000.     Arnesen   v. 

254 


Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  270  ;  61  X.  Y.  St.  R.  324;  29 
X.  Y.  Supp.  748.  Laborer — age  35 
— injuries  likely  to  be  of  a  permanent 
character  wholly  disabling  him  from 
all  labor— $15,000.  Solarz  v.  Man- 
hattan R.  Co.,  8  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  656; 
59  X.  Y.  St.  R.  537;  31  Abb.  X.  Cas. 
426;  29  X.  Y'.  Supp.  1123.  Man- 
strong  and  powerful — age  22 — per- 
manent injury  to  muscular  power  of 
hand — intense  pain — still  suffers 
pain  after  several  years — $175  for 
medical  attendance — $3,250.  Wilson 
v.  Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  8  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  450;  28  X.  Y.  Supp.  781:  60 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  60.  Leg  permanently 
shortened — under  surgical  treatment 
for  3  months — great  pain — $7,500. 
Vail  v.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  6  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  20;  26  X.  Y.  Supp.  59;  58 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  124;  31  Abb.  X.  Cas. 
56.  Permanent  enlargement  of  knee 
joint— depression  of  skull— $3,000. 
Montgomery  v.  Long  Island  R.  R. 
Co.,  6  X.  Y.  Supp.  178.  Strong 
man — earning  $3.50  per  day — per- 
manent injury — life  shortened  eight 
years— $4,680.  Hughes  v.  Orange 
Co.,  Milk  Assoc,  10  X.  Y.  Supp. 
252.  Leg  permanently  shortened — 
man — age  32 — nervous  system  af- 
fected— in  bed  eight  weeks — $4,750. 
Dougherty  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co.. 
45  X.  Y.  St.  R.  154;  18  X.  Y.  Supp. 
841,  aff'd  138  X.  Y.  641:  53  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  929;  34  X.  E.  512.  Shoul- 
der permanently  disabled — woman 
pushed  from  train — $3,000.  Allen 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  42  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
227;  17  X.  Y.  Supp.  187,  aff'd  137 
X.  Y\  561;  50  X.  Y.  St.  R.  933;  33 
X.  E.  338.  Married  woman — age  52 
— severe  and  permanent  injuries — 
$10,000.  Althouse  v.  Sharpe,  13 
Wkly.  Dig.  (X.  Y~.)  478.  Woman— 
permanently  and  seriously  injured — 
torn  ligament  in  region  of  the 
womb— $1,000.     Toledo  v.   Clopeck, 


PHYSICAL      ENJURIES. 


§   214 


g  Ohio  C.  D.  432;  17  Ohio  C.  C.  585, 
aff'd  52  Ohio  St.  642.  Man— age  56 
— earning  $1.75  per  day — arm 
rendered  useless — $2,950.  Toledo 
Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Rohner,  9  Ohio 
C.  C.  702.  Railmad  engineer — earn- 
ing $1,320  per  year — age  43— good 
health  -permanent  injuries  disabling 
him — intense  Buffering  for  a  long 
time—  $19,000.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  Topliff,  2  Ohio  Dee.  522. 
Laborer — injury  to  right  leg  per- 
manently affecting  his  capacity  for 
lifting— $3,500.  West  Memphis 
Packet  Co.  v.  White,  99  Tenn.  25*;: 
41  S.  W.  583;  38  L.  R.  A.  427.  Rail- 
road employee— injuries  permanent, 
and  serious— health  and  earning 
capacity  greatly  impaired — unable 
to  work  at  all  for  about  ten  months 
— continual  suffering — $6,500.  Gal- 
veston, II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldo 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  32  S.  W.  783. 
Railroademployee — earning  $2.25  per 
day — age  30 — injuries  permanent  and 
one  leg  shortened — $4,600.  Galveston 
II.  A-  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Templeton 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1894),  25  S.  W.  135, 
aff'd  26  S.  W.  1066.  Man— earning 
from  $1,800  to  $2,400  per  year- 
age  37 — injury  causing  severe  suffer- 
ing and  total  disability — probably 
permanent — $15,000.  Galveston,  11. 
&  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  21  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  24;  50  S.  W.  477.  Permanent 
and  painful  internal  injuries — age  38 
— earning  $75  per  month  before  in- 
jury— also  other  injuries  which  may 
make  amputation  of  leg  necessary 
—$10,500.  Smith  v.  Spokane,  16 
Wash.  403;  47  Pac.  888.  Permanent 
and  almost  total  loss  of  use  of  left 
arm— age  17—84,000.  McCoy  v.  Mil- 
waukee St.  R.  Co.  (Wis.  1894),  59 
N.  W.  453. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.     Right  leg 
seriously  shortened  and   stiffened 
performance    of   manual   labor  seri- 


ously interfered  with  if  not  pre- 
vented—$5,000.  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Goltz,  71  111.  App.  414.  Rail- 
road conductor — age  30— distigured 
for  life  by  burns  about  the  face- 
loss  of  use  of  left  arm  —  right  hand 
and  both  feel  somewhat  injured — 
$2,500.  Standard  nil  Co.  v.  Tier- 
ney  (Ky.),  14  L.  R.  A.  677;  13  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  626;  49  Am.  A-  Eng.  l;.  Cas. 
117;  17  S.  YV.  1025:  11  Ry.  A-  Corp. 
L.  J.  92.  Employee — permanent  in- 
juries to — in  house  three  or  four 
weeks  —  on  crutches  live  or  six 
months — no  expense  on  account  of 
injuries — again  able  to  work  and 
capacity  to  labor  not  materially  af- 
fected— $8,(566.  Nicholds  v.  Crystal 
Plate  Glass  Co.  (Mo.  i,  27  S.  W.  516. 
Usefulness  of  left  arm  permanently 
impaired — difficult,  surgical  opera- 
tion necessary  at  cost  of  about 
$3,500 — ability  to  walk  and  read 
greatly  reduced— no  loss  of  earnings 
shown — duration  of  mental  and 
nervous  conditions  not  shown — 
$25,000,  reduced  to  $15,000,  and 
expenses.  De  Wardeuer  v.  Met.  St. 
R.  Co..  1  App.  Div.  (N.  V.)  240;  37 
N.  Y.  Supp.  133;  72  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
741.  Bartender — leg  shortened — 
other  injuries — $13,500  excessive — 
$7,000  sufficient  Coffins  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co..  48  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
292.  Man  earning  $12  per  week — 
only  permanent  injury  is  varicose 
veins  which  prevent  him  from  doing 
hard  or  heavy  work — in  hospital 
about  a  \  ear— suffered  pain  part  of 
such  time— $12,000.  Chapman  v. 
Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co..  14  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  404;  :;:.  V  Y.  Supp.  104:.;  70 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  753.  Man— age  06— 
earning  capacity  diminished  but  not 
destroyed— earning  capacity  before 
injury  only  $20  per  week — $7,500. 
Oeiler  v.  Manh.  P.  Co.,  11  Misc. 
(X.  Y.i  413;  65  X.  Y.  St.  P.  487;  32 
X.  Y.  Sup]..  254. 

255 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


Physical  wreck — totally  disabled. 
Verdicts  held  not  excessive.  Able- 
bodied  man — iron  worker — capable 
of  earning  $12  to  $18  per  week— 
totally  disabled— 87,500.  Alton  Pav- 
ing 15.  &  F.  Brick  Co.  v.  Hudson, 
74  111.  App.  612,  aff'd  17(5  111.  270: 
52  X.  E.  256.  Woman  strong  and 
healthy — injury  making  her  a  phys- 
ical wreck.  UeKalb  v.  Ashley,  61 
111.  App.  647.  Engineer — under  40 
years  of  age — helpless-  for  a  very 
short  residue  of  lite— 116,000.  Chi- 
cago v.  Edson,  4:3  111.  App.  417. 
Young  man — bodily  maimed  and  de- 
formed for  life— practically  a  phys- 
ical wreck  —  $14,500.  Howe  v. 
Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  R.  Co., 
62  Minn.  71;  30  L.  R.  A.  684;  64  N. 
W.  102;  2  Det.  L.  N.  537;  28  Chic. 
Leg.  News,  25.  Man — strong  and 
healthy— age  27— mental  and  phy- 
sical wreck— $11,400.  Cobb  v.  St. 
Louis  &  H.  R  Co.,  149  Mo.  609;  50 
S.  W.  894;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R  Cas.  N. 
S.  632.  Injuries  making  person  a 
physical  wreck— $10,000.  Dalzellv. 
Long  Island  K.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  Supp. 
167.  Woman — able  and  obliged  to 
earn  her  living — good  health — almost 
complete  wreck  as  result  of  injury — 
310,000.  Mattis  v.  Phila.  Traction 
Co.,  6  Pa.  Dist.  R.  94;  19  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
106.  Man — strong  and  healthy — vi- 
sion impaired — partially  paralyzed 
and  general  physical  wreck — $8,000. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R  Co.  v.  Long 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.   1895),  28  S.  W.  214. 

Ribs— fracture  of.  Verdicts  held 
not  excessi  ve.  Man — age  65— several 
ribs  broken — fracturing  a  lung — 
much  suffering — in  the  house  sev- 
eral weeks  —  injuries  apparently 
permanent— $8,250.  Reed  v.  Chi- 
cago, St.  P.  N.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa), 
37  N.  W.  149.  Physician— three  ribs 
broken  —  paralyzed  on  one  side — 
spine  and  left  hip  injured— dis- 
256 


figured  and  an  invalid  for  life — prac- 
tice of  $2,500  per  year  rendered  much 
less  by  accident— $10,175.  Gratiot 
v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),  21  S.  W. 
10'.»4.  liib  fractured — would  prob- 
ably always  have  more  or  less  trouble 
with  it— $700.  Aslen  v.  Charlotte,  35 
App.  Div.  ( N.  Y. )  625 ;  54  N.  Y.  Supp. 
754.  Rib  fractured — development  of 
tumor  and  pleurisy  therefrom — also 
adhesion  to  wall  of  chest— $3,200. 
Wynne  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Misc.  (N.  Y. )  394;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  1034, 
aff'd  156  N.  Y.  702.  Man— age  64— 
fifth  rib  fractured — rendered  uncon- 
scious for  a  time — in  house  two 
months  —  much  pain  —  permanent 
pleuritic  thickeuing  —  diminished 
respiration  —  insomnia  —  incapaci- 
tated from  work  over  half  the  time — 
druggist's  and  doctor's  bills  over  $100 
—$3,600.  Eifinger  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R. 
Co.,  13  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  389;  34  N.  Y. 
Supp.  239;  68  N.  Y.  St.  R.  118.  Fire- 
man —  age  30 — ribs  broken — badly 
scalded  and  burned  on  face,  hand 
and  arm — been  unable  to  work  since 
—$9,000.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Croskell,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  160; 
25  S.  W.  486. 

Rupture.  Verdict  held  not  exces- 
sive. Permanent  rupture — injury  to 
leg — constant  pain — ability  to  labor 
greatly  lessened— $4,000.  Dilling- 
ham v.  Richards  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27 
S.  W.  1061 ;  writ  of  error  denied  in  87 
Tex.  247 ;  28  S.  W.  272. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Switch- 
man— strong  and  healthy — age  30 
— permanent  rupture — much  pain — 
obliged  to  work  in  position  where 
he  receives  from  $20  to  $25  per 
month  less  —  $8,000.  Excessive, 
reduced  to  $5,000.  Bosworth  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  92  Hun  (N.  Y),  485; 
72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  195;  37  N.  Y.  Supp. 
43.     Child  —  age     4 — rupture  —  had 


PHYSK  AL      I  N.i  l   l;li:s. 


6  21  \ 


previous  rupture   but  that  had  die-  her  left  arm  and  shoulder  disabled— 

appeared— second     rapture    curable  compelled  as  a  reeull  of  the  injury  to 

by  use  of  truss  or  operation— $5,000.  wear  an  iron   frame   to  support  her 

Evers  v.  Will,  46  Bun  iN.  Y.).  622;  shoulder    $3,000.  Allen  v.  Manhattan 

17  N.    V.   Supp.   29;   43  N.  V.  St.  R.  R  Co.,  42  N.  Y.  St.  R  227;   IT  N.  Y. 

886,  aff'd  133  N.  Y.  649.  Supp.  181 


8ervia     loss  of    parent  for  child'8. 

Verdicts  held  not  excessive.  Loss 
of  services  of  seven  year  old  daugh- 
ter—medical expenses  $100— injury, 
loss  of  thumb— $2,000.  Kitchell  v. 
Brooklyn  11.  R  Co.,  L0  Misc.  (N.  Y.  | 
277;  63  N.  Y.  St.  K.  207;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  827.  Mother  for  loss  of  serv- 
ice of  child  aud  extra  care  and  ex- 
penses—$1,000  already  secured — ! 
$5,000.  Cumming  v.  Brooklyn  City  I 
K.  K.  Co.,  24  X.  Y.  St.  R.  718.  Loss 
of  services  son  14  years  of  age — sev- 
eral hundred  dollars  for  medical 
treatment— earning  capacity  largely 
diminished  —  out  of  work  about 
eleven  months— $1,940.  Tex. is  &  X. 
O.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  , 
L894),  24  S.  W.  509.  Son  18  years 
of  age — earning  capacity  diminished 
about  $40  per  month — expended  for 
medicine  and  medical  at  tendance 
about  $300 — $1,500.  San  Antonio  & 
A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Green  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
49   S.  W.  672. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Sou— age 
17 — injury  preventing  him  from  work 
until  after  majority— $2,050  exces- 
sive, ordered  remitted  to  $1,500. 
McGee  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (Pac.  P.),  33 
W.  N.  C.  15. 

Services  —  lost    of — husband    for 

Wife's.  Verdicts  hold  not  excessive. 
Strong  healthy  woman — age  39 — be- 
fore injury  —  since  then  confirmed 
invalid — can  never  be  a  wife  to 
plaintiff  again  —$10,000.  Cannon  v. 
Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co..  14  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  400:  35  X.  Y.  Supp.  1039;  70 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  75G.  Loss  of  services, 
society  and  companionship  of  wife — 

17 


Spine  and  bocJfc— injuries  to.     Ver- 
dicts   held    not    excessive.      Brake- 
man —  pernanent    injury    to    spine. 
bead,    legs    and    hip— much    mental 
and   physical    Buffering— unable    to 
work  for  a  long  time  -medical  at- 
tendance $300—  $2,000.      Kansas!  ity, 
M.  &    B.    It.    Co.  v.  Lackey,  114   Ala. 
152;  21  So.  444.     Strong  and  healthy 
man — age  33— injury  to  spine,  back 
and   side — in   bed   5    weeks — unable 
to   work    or  attend    to    business   for 
over  a  year  and  up   to  time  of  trial 
—still  suffering  pain — evidence  that 
injuries      were     permanent — $1,500. 
Spring  Valley  v.   Gavin   (111.    1899  1, 
:,4  X.  E.  1035,  aff'g  81  111.  App.  456. 
Permanent  injury  to  spine — $2,500. 
Union  Show  Case  Co.  v.  Blindauei. 
7.-..    111.    App.  358,  arid  175   111.  325; 
51  X.  E.  707.     Injury  to  spinal   cord 
— danger    of     permanent     paralysis 
$5,000.     Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.   v. 
Blaul,  70  111.  App.  518.     Strong    and 
vigorous    man — spine    and    hips    in- 
jured— continuous  bodily  pain— per- 
manently    disabled-    $6,500.     Hunt- 
ington   County   v.    Bonebrake,     140 
[nd.  311;  45    N.    E.   47*'.     Woman- 
injury     affecting    spinal     column 
much  pain  and  suffering     life  over- 
Bbadowed  if   not    blighted     $12,000. 
Louisville  &    X.    R.    Co.  v.    McEwan 
(  Ky.i.  21    Ky.  L.    Rep.  487;  51  S.  W. 
019.     Permanent  and  progressive  in- 
jury to  spine — impairment  of  mem- 
ory— insomnia,  hernia,  loss  of  vil  ility 
and   incontinence  of    urine     $13,500. 
Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  1 14  Mo.  519;  10 
Am.  A   Eng.    R.   (as.    N.    s.  729:  44 
S.    NY.    1053.      Financial    manager    of 
firm  doing  business  of  $750,000  per 

257 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


year — severe  injury  to  spine  and  pos- 
sibly  permanent  — confined    in   bed 
for  a  month— at   time   of  trial   still 
under   care    of     physician— medical 
expenses  $750— $7,500.    Clark  v.  Chi- 
cago &    A.    R.   Co.   (Mo.),  29  S.   W. 
1013.     Woman — good  health — age  33 
— injury  resulting  in  hemorrhage  of 
the    spinal  cord  and   traumatic  neu- 
rasthenia —  injury     to    spinal    cord 
probably  permanent— $8,000.     Kaker 
v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  28 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)316;  50  N.  Y.  Supp. 
999.     Spine  and   liver  probably  per- 
manently   affected — several  months' 
medical         treatment  —  headaches, 
stomach   and   liver   trouble— $1,500. 
Ferguson  v.  Ehret,    14  Misc.  (N.  Y. ) 
454;  35  N.    Y.    Supp.  1020;  70  N.   Y. 
St.  R.  725.     Permanent  curvature  of 
spine — permanent    paralysis   of   one 
of  shoulder  muscles— lifting  power 
of  arm  affected— $4,000.     Degnan  v. 
Brooklyn    City  R.   Co.,  14  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  408;  35  N.   Y.  Supp.  1047;  70  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  755.     Injury  to  spine  and 
brain — man — age  57 — also  numerous 
bruises  and  paralysis  of  bladder  and 
sphincter   muscle — in  bed  4  weeks — 
from  work  about  five  months — still 
suffering   pain   four  years  after   the 
accident— $3,600.     Paetzig  v.  Brook- 
lyn City  R.  R.   Co.,  12  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
573;  67  N.  Y.  St.  R.  607.     Brakeman 
— earning  $1.90  per  day — back  per- 
manently injured — severe   and   con- 
tinuous pain — unconscious  for   sev- 
eral   days    after    receiving    injuries 
— also    one    leg    made  smaller  and 
weaker  than   the  other — ability   to 
labor  materially   affected  — $10,000. 
Tierney  v.  Syracuse,  B.  &  N.  Y.  R. 
Co.,  85  Hun  (N.    Y.),   146;  66  N.    Y. 
St.    R.    85;    32    N.    Y.    Supp.     627. 
Healthy  woman — age  33 — permanent 
injury  to  spine — unable  to  work  since 
accident  —  growing   worse  —  $3,500. 
Morris  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.   R.  Co.,  73 
Hun  (N.   Y.),  560;  56  N.    Y.   St.   R. 
258 


231;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  342.  Severe 
spinal  trouble — incapacitated  from 
work  for  months — physician  testified 
that  he  could  never  do  anything  but 
light  work. —  $5,500.  Stephens  v. 
Hudson  Valley  Knitting  Co.,  66  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  628;  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  814. 
Spine  seriously  injured — $8,525.87. 
Stouter  v.  Manh.  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  683;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  163.  Spine  in- 
jured— permanent  prolapsus  uteri — 
$4,000.  Valentine  v.  Broadway,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  14  Daly(N.  Y.),  540.  Full 
vigor,  health — concussion  of  spine — 
faculties  largely  impaired — paralysis 
probably  ensue— $30,000.  Harroldv. 
N.  Y.  Elev.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Hun  ( N.  Y. ), 
184.  Newsboy — curvature  of  spine 
and  continual  pain — leg  broken  in  two 
places  and  shortened — also  some  ribs 
broken— $5,000.  Mexican  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mitten,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  653;  36 
S.  W.  282.  Railroad  fireman — inju- 
ries producing  spinal  trouble  and 
hernia — much  mental  and  physical 
pain— $5,000.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Gordon,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  672; 
33  S.  W.  484.  Injury  to  back  causing 
traumatic  fever — resulting  in  incur- 
able disease  of  spine — $4,000.  In- 
ternational &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mul- 
liken,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  663;  32  S.  W. 
152.  Child— injury  to  spine — par- 
tial and  probably  permanent  paraly- 
sis— double  fracture  of  limb— $5,000. 
Roanoke  v.  Shull  (Va.  1899),  34  S.  E. 
34.  Man — strong  and  vigorous — earn- 
ing $2  per  day  —  injury  to  back, 
shoulder,  arm  and  abdomen — proba- 
bly permanently  injured  —  $5,150. 
Sproul  v.  Seattle,  17  Wash.  256;  49 
Pac.  489. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Engineer 
— concussion  of  spinal  cord — $9,250 
excessive.  Remittitur  of  $3,000 
ordered.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Finlayson,  16  Neb.  578.  Un- 
married man— age  50— earning  $2.75 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§  214 


per  day — back  injured — also  knees 
— varicose  veins — not  entirely  pre- 
vented from  work  in  the  future — 
$8,000.  Campbell  v.  North  A  met. 
Brew.  Co.,  22  App.  Div.  i  N.  V.)  414; 
47  X.  Y.  Supp.  992.  Railway  pas- 
senger— bruise  on  nerves  of  spine  and 
injury  may  possibly  be  permanent  — 
severe  shock — numbness  of  leg  as  re- 
sult of  spinal  injury — $10,000.  For- 
dyce  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ),  22 
S.  W.  235. 

Temporary  injuries — miscellaneous 
cases.  Verdicts  held  not  excessive. 
Passenger — struck  on  shoulder  by 
falling  lantern — severe  pain  and  dis- 
abled for  sometime  —  no  dangerous 
or  permanent  injury  —  $150.  The 
Wasco  (  D.  C.  D.  Wash. ),  5:)  Fed.  546. 
Injury  to  arm — unable  to  use  it  owing 
to  severe  pain — no  external  marks — 
$1,500.  Joliet  v.  Looney,  159  111. 
471;  42  X.  E.  854.  Man— strong  and 
healthy — age  33 — in  bed  5  weeks — 
unable  to  attend  to  business  or  work 
for  a  year  —  still  suffering  pain  — 
$1,500.  Spring  Valley  v.  Gavin,  81 
111.  App.  456.  Sewing  woman — in 
bed  3  weeks — in  room  5  weeks — un- 
able to  run  sewing  machine  more 
than  an  hour  a  day— $1,500.  Chi- 
cago v.  Sanders,  50  111.  App.  136. 
Well  and  hearty  woman — great  pain 
— disabled  from  work — development 
of  a  necrosis  in  the  shinbone — forma- 
tion of  abscesses.  Joliet  v.  Mc- 
Crauey,  49  111.  App.  381.  Woman  in 
good  health — age  59 — in  bed  several 
weeks — severe  pain — several  months 
after  injury  still  Buffering  and  unable 
to  perform  her  customary  work 
about  house  or  weave  for  support  of 
family  as  formerly — $2,300.  Hill  v. 
Sedalia,  64  Mo.  App.  494;  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  1019.  Iu  hospital  two  months 
— much  pain  —  medical  expenses 
large — unable  for  considerable  time 
to  earn  his  wages   of   $25  per   week 


—$3,500.  Williams  v.  Brooklyn,  33 
App.  Div.  I  N.  Y.  i  539;  53  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1007.  Injuries  requiring  medical  at- 
tendance for  :>  weeks — (1,250,  liberal 
but  not  excessive — $1,250.  Clcg^  v. 
Met.  St.  By.  Co..  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.| 
207;  72  N.  V.  St.  R.  7:;7.  Brakeman 
—  in  room  three  and  a  half  weeks — 
unable  to  work  at  end  of  six  months 
— take  a  long  t  tme  to  recover — 92,500. 
Hayden  v.  Platt,84  Bun|  N.  Y .),  B7; 
05  X.  Y.  St.  R.  875;  32  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1144.  Injury  to  knee — necessary  to 
inject  morphine  because  of  pain — on 
couch  2  weeks — use  crutch  in  about 
3  weeks — 91,000.  Kirk  v.  Hower,T7 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  459;  00  N.  V.  St.  R.  594. 
Sprained  wrist — right  leg  injured — 
constant  pain — unable  to  attend  to 
outside  business — whether  injuries 
permanent  testimony  contlictiug— 
$5,000.  Kellon  v.  Long  Island  R.  K. 
Co.,  62  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  620;  42  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  SL!.  Serious  personal  injuries — 
$375.  Dise  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co..  22 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  97;  48  X.  Y.  Supp.  551. 
aff'd  21  Misc.  790;  47  X.  Y.  Supp. 
11:;  l.  Healthy  girl— age  14 — in  bed 
2  weeks — rendered  subject  to  dizzi- 
ness and  headache,  sleepless  at  nights 
— eyesight  and  ability  to  study  af- 
fected—probably not  permanent — 
$3,500  large,  but  not  excessive. 
Birmingham  v.  Rochester  City  &  B. 
R.  Co.,  45  X.  Y.  St.  R.  724;  18  X.  Y. 
Supp.  649.  Black  eye— $100.  Dun- 
lap  v.  Ross.  43  X.  Y.  St.  R.  509;  L8 
X.  Y.  Supp.  48.  Injury  to  eye  caus- 
ing pain  lor  a  period  of  three  years 
—9300.  Schuler  v.  Third  Ave.  R. 
C...  11  X.  Y.  St.  R.  774:  17  N.  Y. 
Supp.  834  Able-bodied  man — un- 
able to  perform  much  labor  since  in- 
jury— $1,350.  Oklahoma  City  v. 
WeUh.  SOkla  288;  11  Pac.598.  Boy 
— age  11 — scalp  torn  from  side  of 
head— 91,200.  McGaw  v.  Lancaster 
(C.  P.  Pa.),  14  Lane.  L.  Kev.  276. 
Healthy  man — age  28 — earning  $80  to 

259 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


$95  per  month— skull  crushed— por- 
tion of  removed — left  eye  destroyed 
—$10,000.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Parker,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  470;  49 
S.  W.  717,  reh'g  denied  in  50  S.  W. 
606.  Teeth  broken — knee  injured- 
lame  for  a  long  time — unable  to  work 
efficiently  at  his  trade  for  about  eight 
months— $1,000.  Richmond  R.  &  E. 
Co.  v.  Garthright,  92  Va.  627;  24  S. 
E.  267;  32  L.  R.  A.  220.- 


Verdicts   held   excessive.     Injuries 
consisting  of   bruises — discoloration 
and    jar  of    fall — not    permanent — 
no  medical    attendance    necessary — 
$1,500.     Dixon  v.  Scott,  74  111.  App. 
277.     Sprained   wrist— limb  bruised 
and  discolored — also  sides  and  back 
— pain — $2,500.     Lake    Street    Elev. 
R.   Co.  v.  Johnson,  70  111.  App.  413; 
2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  433.     Conductor 
— no  loss  of  time  from  usual  labor — 
no     physician— and     no     complaint 
made    for    a    year    after    the     acci- 
dent—injuries   only    slight — $1,725. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Banks,  17 
Ky.    L.    Rep.    1065;    33   S.    W.    627. 
Slight     temporary    injuries— $6,000. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sawant,  16 
Ky.   L.    Rep.    545;     27    S.     W.     999. 
Married     woman — age    32 — injuries 
resulting  in  uterine  and  other  painful 
difficulties— have  partially  yielded  to 
medical      treatment    and     probably 
curable— $20,000,  reduced  to  $7,500. 
Hamilton  v.  Great  Falls  St.  R.  Co., 
17    Mont.    334;    42    Pac.    860,    reh'g 
denied  in  17  Mont.  351;  43  Pac.  713. 
Injuries   requiring   medical    attend- 
ance five  weeks— $1,250.      Clegg  v. 
Met.  St.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  E.    1089,  aff  g 
1  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   207;  37  N.   Y. 
St.  R.   130.     Recovery  for  pain  and 
suffering  only— evidence  as  to   con- 
tinuation  of    suffering    indefinite— 
$10,000.     Becker  v.   Albany  R.   Co., 
35  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)   46;    54  N.   Y. 
Supp.  395;   12    Am.   &  Eng.    R.    Cas. 
260 


N.   S.  853;     5    Am.    Neg.  Rep.  231. 
!  Boy — earning  $10  to  $12  per  week — 
I  age    17 — earning    about    half    usual 
|  wages   four   mouths   after    injury — 
entire  recovery  probable  in  three  or 
i  four  years— $4,300     Levitt  v.  Nassau 
'Elec.  R.  Co.,   14  App.   Div.   (N.   Y.) 
'83;  43  N.  Y.   Supp.  426.     Teacher— 
j  earning   $1,750    per   year — age   54 — 
cut  on  forehead  and  bruises  on  body 
and  limbs — two  weeks  in  bed — brain 
!  irritation   at  time    of    trial — absent 
!  from  work    four   months   but    lost 
:  little    in   salary   or   money— $10,000 
I  excessive,     should    be     reduced    to 
$5,000.     Smith  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co., 
!  10  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  409:  41  N.  Y. 
j  Supp.      977.      Grocer— legs      badly 
bruised — in    bed     only    two    weeks 
and  in  house  only  five  weeks — $4,500 
reduced  to  $2,000.     Meade  v.  Brook- 
lyn  H.   R.   Co.,  3  App.   Div.  (N.  Y.) 
432;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  320.     Man— able 
before  injury  to  earn  about  $500  per 
year  and  possibly  able  since  injury 
to    earn   about  the     same — $16,000. 
Bailey  v.  Rome,  W.   &  O.    R.  Co.,  80 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  4;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  490; 
29  N.  Y.  Supp.  816.     Bruise  on   leg 
requiring  use  of  crutch  eight  weeks 
and  subsequently  use  of  cane — $200 
for  medicine — $450  for   medical  at- 
tendance— $12,500.     Swan     v.    Long 
Island    R.    R.   Co.,  79   Hun   ( N.    Y), 
612;  61  N.    Y.    St.    R.    28.     Washer- 
woman— confirmed  invalid  and  earn- 
ing but  $6  per  week— age  69— injury 
neither    painful,     serious,     nor     in- 
curable—$5,000     excessive;     $2,500 
sufficient.      Anderson     v.      Manhat- 
tan  R.    Co.,    1    Misc.    (N.    Y.)    504; 
49  N.  Y.  St.  R.  233;  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  1. 


Temporary  injuries  and  probably 
permanent.  Verdicts  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Child— age  three  months- 
injury  displacing  parietal  bone — 
atrophy  of  muscles  on  side  of  neck- 
spasms  not  previously  existing — may 


PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 


§214 


develop  seriously— 52,01)0.  Kowalski 
v.  Chicago  G.  W.  K.  Co.  (C.  C.  N. 
D.  Iowa),  84  Fed.  586.  Man— in 
good  health  and  prime  of  life — un- 
able to  follow  his  vocation  for  four 
months — evidence  tending  to  show 
thai  some  of  his  injuries  may  and 
probably  will  be  permanent — 15,000. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole, 62  111.  App. 
480.  Injuries  serious  and  liable  to 
be  permanent— $1,000.  Osborne  v. 
Jenkinson,  100  Iowa,  432;  69  N.  W. 
548.  Earning  ability  $2.50  per  day 
—injury  to  head,  chest  and  hip — 
much  suffering — numbness  in  hip 
aud  leg — sciatic  nerve  probably  in- 
jured and  perhaps  permanently — 
$2,405.  Wilkins  v.  Omaha  &  C.  B. 
R.  &  B.  Co.,  96  Iowa,  668;  65  N.  W. 
987.  Boy  injured  by  falling  from 
platform  of  street  car — complete  re- 
covery matter  of  uncertainty — $750. 
Jackson  v.  St.  Paul  City  K.  Co.,  74 
Minn.  48;  70  N.  W.  956;  5  Am. 
Neg.  Kep.  47.  Injury  which  accord- 
ing to  the  evidence  may  have 
been  the  cause  of  septicemia  which 
plaintiff  had— $2,500.  Miller  v.  St. 
Paul  City  R.  Co.,  66  Minn.  192;  68 
N.  \V.  862.  Conductor — earning  $75 
per  month — age  37— medical  ex- 
penses  result  of  injury  $750 — invalid 
and  unable  to  follow  his  occupation — 
condition  promises  to  be  permanent. 
Geary  v.  Kansas  City,  O.  &  S.  K.  Co., 
137  Minn.  251;  39  S.  W.  774;  60  Am. 
St.  Rep.  555. 

Verdicts  held  excessive.  Injury  to 
leg — continued  at  work  for  several 
months  after  injury  in  same  occupa- 
tion without  consulting  a  physician 
and  did  not  consult  one  for  nearly 
six  years — $3,500.  Shortsleeves  v. 
V  V.  ('.  A-  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  \.  Y. 
Sup]).  1105.  Woman — age  04 — ex- 
ceeding painful  injuries  aud  prob- 
ably permanent — $10,000  excessive. 
New  trial   granted    unless  $3,000  is 


remitted.  Taylor  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  K.  Co.,  103  Wis.  27:  79  N.  W.  17: 
15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  8.  1 

Thigh — Injuries  affecting.  Ver- 
dicts held  not  excessive.  Compound 
fracture  of  femur,  fibula  and  tibia- 
man     earning  $80  per  mouth — age  30 

in  hid  ten  weeks  anil  entirely  dis- 
abled     it-ii      months     strength      and 

plasticity  of  leg  permanently  impair 
ed — only  able  to  earn  $00  per  month 
at  time  of  trial — $4,400.  The  Alijau- 
ilroiC  C.  App.  9th.  C.)i  6C.  C.  A.  54; 
50  Fed.  621.  Child— age  5— simple 
fracture  of  thigh  bone— leg  per- 
manently shortened  one  fourth  of 
an  inch — pain  and  weakness  more 
thau  two  years  after  injury — $2,000. 
Met.  West  Side  Kiev.  1!.  Co.  v.  Ker- 
sey, 80  HI.  App.  301;  4  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  112.  Married  woman — im- 
pacted fracture  of  thigh  bone — in 
bed  six  months — great  pain — leg 
shortened— $5,000.  Young  v.  Webb 
City.  150  Mo.  333:  51  S.  W.  709. 
Fracture  of  thigh  bone — permanent 
injury— $5,000.  O'Connell  v.  St. 
Louis  Cable  &  W.  R.  Co.,  100  Mo. 
482;  17  S.  W.  494.  Woman— age  03 
— intense  pain— $7,000.  Fitch  v. 
Broadway  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  10  X.  Y. 
Supp.  225.  Thigh  broken  and  leg 
shortened— $7,500.  Danville  &  W.  K. 
Co.  v.  Brown  [Ya.  1894),  18  S.  E. 
278.  Girl — age  8 — injury  involving 
removal  of  portion  of  femur — in  bed 
about  eighteen  months — much  pain 
— more  or  less  pain  through  life  as 
result  of  injury— right  leg  shortened 
four  to  six  inches— $8,000.  Lorence 
v.  Kllensburgh,  13  Wash.  341:  43 
Pac.  20. 

Verdict  held  excessive.  Man— age 
forty-nine  and  a  half  years— earning 
$20  per  week— right  thigh  broken- 
arm  hurt  and  face  skinned — in  bed 
six  weeks  and  contracted  bed  soreB 


§214 


PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


—five  months  lost  time  after  which 
he  resumed  work  at  previous  wages 
— suffered  great  pain  and  still  suf- 
fers when  weather  changes  — leg 
shortened— bill  of  Sill. 50  for  medi- 
cal attendance  and  expenses — $5,561. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Syfan  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  43  S.  W.  551,  aff'd  91  Tex. 
502:  44  S.  W.  1064: 

Toe— Injury  to.  Verdicts  held 
not  excessive.  Loss  of  three  toes — 
woman— earning  $1.25  per  day- 
age  64 — also  head  injured — much 
pain — in  hospital  seven  weeks — 
earned  nothing  since — $3,500.     Lar- 

262 


kin  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  K  Y. 
St.  R.  658;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  479, 
aff'd  138  N.  Y.  634.  Man— age  33— 
injury  necessitating  amputation  of 
three  toes — in  house  five  months — 
unable  to  work  more  than  three 
fourths  of  his  time — $8,500.  Com- 
merford  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
8  Misc.  (N.  Y.J  599;  61  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  51.  Loss  of  great  toe — side 
and  leg  injured — disabled  two  and  a 
half  months — subsequent  occasional 
suffering  and  at  times  disabled — 
$2,000.  Reynolds  v.  Van  Beuren,  10 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  703;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
633;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  827. 


PAIN    AND    BUFFERING       MENTAL   SUFFERING.        §   215 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


PAIN  AND  SUFFERING— MENTAL  SUFFERING. 


215.  Pain  and  suffering—  Physical 

injury. 
210.   Pain  and  suffering— Evidence 
as  to. 

217.  Pain  and  suffering— Effect  of 

prior  injury  or  disease. 

218.  Mental  suffering— Physical  in- 

jury. 

219.  Same  subject  continued. 

220.  Fright — not  result  of  physical 

injury. 

221.  Fright— Physical     injury    re- 

sulting from. 


222.  Same  subject  continued. 

223.  Mental  suffering— Fear  of  con- 

sequences of  injury — Bite  of 
dog. 

224.  Mental    suffering   of    injured 

person — Disfigurement. 

225.  Mental    suffering — Action  by 

husband  for  injury  to  wife — 
Parent  and  child. 

226.  Mental  suffering— Pleading- 

Evidence. 


§  215.  Pain  and  suffering— Physical  injury.— Pain  and 

Buffering  are  naturally  connected  with  all  physical  injuries  and 
may  he  considered  as  the  direct  and  proximate  results  thereof. 
Whether  the  physical  injury  results  from  the  negligent  or  wilful 
act  of  another,  recovery  may  he  had  for  the  pain  and  suffering 
connected  with  such  injury,  both  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence 
and  subsequently,  the  recovery  being  in  the  nature  of  compen- 
satory damages,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  compensate  therefor.1 


1  Vicksburg,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Put- 
nam, 118  II.  S.  545;  7  S.  Ct.  1;  Rouse 
v.  Bornsby  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  67 
Fed.  219;  Robertson  v.  Cornelson, 34 
Fed.  71G;  Beardsley  v.  Swann,  4  Mc- 
Lean (U.  S.  C.  C),  333;  Wade  v. 
Leroy,  20  How.  (U.  S.  |  34;  Alabama 
G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  112  Ala.  167; 
20  So.  313;  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co. 
v.  Binion,  107  Ala.  645;  18  So.  75; 
Alabama  <;.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bill,  93Ala. 
514;  9  So.  722;  47  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  500;  St.  Louis.  S.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Dobbins,  GO  Ark.  481;  30  S. 
W.  887,  reh'g  denied,  60  Ark.   486; 


31  S.  W.  147:  Wall  v.  Livezay,  6  Colo 
4G5;  Maisenbacker   v.    Society    Con 
cordia,    71    Conn.   369;    42    Atl.    67 
Masters   v.   Warren,    27   Conn.  293 
Linsley   v.    Bushnell,   15    Conn.  22."> 
Warner   v.    Chamberlain,    7     Boust 
(Del.)  18;  Mills  v.  Wilmington    City 
R.    Co.,   1    Marv.  (Del.)  269;  46   Atl. 
1114;  Friedman  v.  McGowan,  1  IVnn. 
(Del.)    43G;  42    Atl.    72:5;    Brown   v. 
Green,    1   Penn.   (Del.)  535;  42    Atl. 
991;  Jones  v.    Bell,  8    Boust.  (Del.) 
562;    Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
Bon,  90  Ga.  500;    Atlanta  St.    R.  Co. 
v.  Jacobs,  SS   Ga.  647;  15  S.  E.  825; 

2G3 


8  21 n" 


PAIN    AM)    SUFFERING — MENTAL   SUFFERING. 


Pain  and  suffering,  however,  have  no  pecuniary  value  and  can- 
not be  measured  by  an  equivalent  in  money.  They  are  not 
capable  of  exact  proof  by  any  pecuniary  standard.     There  is  no 


Cooper  v.  Mnllins,  30  Ga.  146;  Chi- 
cago CityR.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  182111. 
298;  55  N.  E.  366,  affg  80  111.  App. 
71;  North  Chicago,  Street  It.  Co.  v. 
Fitzgihbons,  180  111.  466;  54  N.  E. 
483,  aff'g  79  111.  App.  632;  Chicago 
&  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleninger,  178  111. 
536;  53  N.  E.  320,  aff'g  77  111.  App. 
186;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Fos- 
ter, 175  111.  396;  51  N.  E.  690,  aff'g  74 
111.  App.  414;  Springfield  Consol.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hoeffner,  175  111.  634;  51  N. 
E.  884,  aff'g  71  111.  App.  162;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr,  170  111. 
478;  48  N.  E.  992,  aff'g  67  111.  App. 
530;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Serfass,  153 
111.  379;  39  N.  E.  119,  aff'g  53  111. 
App.  448;  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v. 
Haenni,  146  111.  614;  Pierce  v.  Millay, 
44  111.  189;  Peoria  Bridge  Assn.  v. 
Loomis,  20  111.  235;  Pittsburg,  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  152 
Ind.  1;  49  N.  E.  582;  9  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  792;  Linton  Coal  &  M. 
Co.  v.  Persons,  15  Ind.  App.  69;  43 
N.  E.  651;  Wabash  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Morgan  (Ind.),  31  N.  E.  661;  Haden 
v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Iowa, 
1895),  60  N.  W.  537;  Morris  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.,  R.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  29;  Atch- 
ison, T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowe,  56 
Kan.  411;  43  Pac.  683;  Abilene  v. 
Wright,  4  Kan.  App.  708;  46  Pac. 
715;  Cent.  Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  SQ 
Ky.  578;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Greer  (Ky.  1895),  29  S.W.  337;  16  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  667;  Stockton  v.  Frey,  4 
Gill  (Ind.),  406;  Canning  v.  Wil- 
liamstown,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  451; 
Tunnicliffe  v.  Bay  City  Consol.  R. 
Co.,  107  Mich.  261;  65  N.  W.  226;  2 
Det.  L.  N.  711;  Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
v.  Whitfield,  44  Miss.  466;  Covell  v. 
Wabash  R.  Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  190; 
264 


Hansberger  v.  Sedalia  Elec.  R.  L.  & 
P.  Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  566;  Gerdes  v. 
Christopher  &  S.  A.  Iron  &  F.  Co., 
124  Mo.  347;  27  S.  W.  615;  Riden- 
horn  v.  Kan.  City  Cable  R.  Co.,  102 
Mo.  270;  Whalen  v.  St.  Louis,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  323;  West  v.  Frost,  22 
Mo.  344;  Plummer  v.  Milan,  79  Mo. 
App.  439;  1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  600;  Fre- 
mont, E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  French, 
48  Neb.  638;  67  N.  W.  472;  4  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  365;  Sioux  City& 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Neb.),  36  N.  W. 
285;  Klein  v.  Jewett,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  474; 
Ehrgatt  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  New  York,  96 
N.  Y.  264;  Drink  water  v.  Dinsmore, 
80  N.Y.  390,  rev'g  16  Hun,  250;  Cur- 
tis v.  Rochester,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  18  N. 
Y.  534;  Ransom  v.  N.Y. ,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
15  N.  Y.  415;  Gilbertson  v.  Forty- 
Second  St.  R.  Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  294;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  782;  Cannon 
v.Brooklyn  CityR.  Co.,  9  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  282;  61  N.Y.  St.  R.  147;  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  722;  Doyle  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 
Co.,  37  N.  Y.  St.  R.  604;  Wallace  v. 
Western  W.  C.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  C.  442; 
Oliver  v.  North  Pac,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  3 
Oreg.  84;  Schenkel   v.    Pittsburg  & 

B.  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  1S99),  44  Atl. 
1072;  Bamford  v.  Pittsburg  &  B. 
Traction  Co.  (Pa.  1899),  44  Atl.  1068; 
Musick  v.  Latrobe,  184  Pac.  375;  39 
Atl.  22Q;  42  W.  N.  C.  209;  Smedley 
v.  Hestonville,  M.  &  F.  Pass.  R.  Co., 
184  Pa.  St.  620;  39  Atl.  544;  42  W.  N. 

C.  169;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
649;  Goodhart  v.  Perm.  R.  R.  Co., 
117  Pac.  1;  35  Atl.  191;  38  W.  N.  C. 
545;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  364; 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  132  Pa. 
St.  27;  18  Atl.  1087;  Penn.  &  Ohio  Ca- 
nal Co.  v.  Graham,  63  Pa.  St.  290;  3 
Am.  Rep.  549;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 


PAIN    AND    SUFFERING       MENTAL    SUFFERING.        vj 


8  216 


measure  of  damages,  therefore,  furnished  in  law  other  thao  the 
enlightened  conscience  of  impartial  jurors,  under  the  evidence 
and  instructions  of  the  court,  and  it  is  for  the  jury  to  estimate 
and  recompense  for  pain  and  suffering  on  the  ground  of  human 
experience,  guided  by  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  partic- 
ular case.2 

§  216.  Pain  and  suffering— Evidence  as  to.— The  existence 

of  pain  may  be  inferred  upon  proof  of  a  physical  injury,  the  de- 
gree of  pain,  of  course,  differing  according  to  the  nature  and 
character  of  the  injury.  So  pain  and  suffering  is  proved  by 
evidence  of  mangling  and  crushing.3  And  evidence  may  be  in- 
troduced as  to  the  existence  of  pains,  the  use  of  opiates,  etc., 
since  the  injury,  as  showing  that  pains  resulted  from  the  in- 
jury. So  a  person  was  permitted  to  testify  as  to  pains  suffered 
by  her  in  her  back  and  the  back  of  her  neck,  as  tending  to  show 
pains  resulting  from  the  injuries  described  in  the  declaration.' 
And  evidence  that  a  person  had  never  used  opiates  prior  to  the 
injury,  but  that  since  then  he  had  used  morphine  all  the  time  and 
could  not  live  without  it,  has  also  been  held  admissible,  as  teiid- 

Co.  v.  Hannig,  91  Tex.  347;  43  S.  W. 
508,  rev'g  41  S.  W.  196;  Howard  Oil 
Co.  v.  Davis,  76  Tex.  630;  Texas 
Brew.  Co.  v.  Dickey,  20  Tex.  C.  A. 
606;  49  S.  W.  935;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Malone,  15  Tex.  C.  A.  56;  38  S. 
W.  538;  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Berling,  14  Tex.  C.  A.  544;  37  S.  W. 
1083;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hansom,  13  Tex.  C.  A.  552;  36  S.  W. 
289;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Keller,  11  Tex.  C.  A.  569;  32  S.  W. 
847:  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rowell  (Tex.  C.  A.),  45  S.  \V.  763, 
aff'd  46  S.  W.  630;  11  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  597;  Giblin  v.  Mclntyre, 
2  Utah,  384;  Fulsome  v.  Concord,  46 
Vt.  135;  Thompson  v.  National  Exp. 
Co.  (Vt.  |,  29  A.tl.311;  Robinson  v. 
Marino,  3  Wash.  -134;  28  Pac.  752; 
Washington  A  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Patter- 
son, 25  Wash.  L.  Rep.  36;  9  App.  I). 
C.  423;  Carpenter  v.  Mexico  Nat.  K. 
Co.,  17    Wash.    L.    R.    630;   Bultz   v. 


Sullivan,  101  Wis.  608;  77  X.  W.870; 
5    Am.    Neg.   Rep.    508;  Phillips   v. 

!  Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  42  B.  D.   406. 

2  Illinois  C.    R.   Co.    v.    Barrow.  5 

Wall.    (U.S.)   90;  Western  &  A.  R. 

1  Co.  v.  Young  (Ga.),  7  S.  E.  -J1l': 
North  Chicago  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Fitz- 

1  gibbons,  180  111.  466;  54  N.  E. 
483,  atl'g  79  111.  App.  632;  Chicago, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,  108  111.  538; 
Salina  Mill  *  Elev.  Co.  v.  Hoyne 
(Kan.  App.  1900),  63  Pac.  660;  Mer- 
rill v.  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  App.  466; 
Leeds  v.  Metropolitan  (las  L.  Co., 
90  N.  Y.  26  ;  Goodhart  v.  Penn.  R. 
Co.,  177  Pa.  St.  1;  Bamford  v.  Pitts- 
burg &  B.  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  1899), 
44  Atl.  106S.  See  also  cases  cited 
in  first  note  in  this  section. 

8  Chicago,  etc.,   R.   R.  Co.  v.   War- 
ner, 108  111.  538. 

4  Thompson  v.  National  Expr.  Co. 
(Vt.),  29  Atl.  311. 

2G5 


§  217        PAIN    AND    SUFFERING— MENTAL   SUFFERING. 

ing  to  show  continued  physical  suffering  requiring  the  use  of 
morphine.5  Again,  where  in  an  action  by  a  woman,  for  personal 
injuries  it  was  shown  that  after  the  accident  her  menstruation 
had  stopped  for  a  period  of  two  months,  it  was  held  that  she 
might  testify  that  on  its  return  she  was  subjected  to  great  pain 
and  spasms.6 

§  217.  Pain  and  suffering— Effect  of  prior  injury  or  dis- 
ease.  Though  a  person  may  have  a  weak  constitution,  or  be 

subject  to  a  disease  which  will  render  him  more  susceptible  to 
suffering  in  case  of  an  injury,  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  such 
a  disease  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  for  the  pain  and  suffering 
caused  solely  by  such  injury.7  And  a  person  who  has  shortly 
before  an  accident  sustained  an  injury  causing  pain  may  recover 
for  the  increase  of  pain  and  suffering  caused  by  the  subsequent 
injury.8  So  though  the  amount  of  damages  which  a  person  sus- 
tains as  a  result  of  a  personal  injury  may  be  increased  by  rea- 
son of  his  weak  or  unsound  constitution,  yet  the  fact  that  they 
are  increased  by  such  cause  will  not  prevent  his  recovery  of  all 
damages  suffered  by  him,  including  the  increased  amount.9 
And  it  is  not  competent  to  ask  the  plaintiff  questions  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  several  years  previous  to  the  injury  he 
suffered  with  a  disease,  which,  though  dormant  until  the  injury, 
may  be  the  cause  of  his  present  sufferings,  since  they  relate  to 
matters  too  remote  and  conjectural.10 


&  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 
son, 13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  552;  36  S.  W. 
289. 

6  Cannon  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
9  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  282;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
147;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  722. 

^  Hall  v.  Cadillac,  114  Mich.  99;  4 
Det.  L.  N.  499  ;  72  X.  W.  33.  In 
this  case  it  was  held  where  a  person 
had  fallen  and  bruised  her  knee  and 
hip,  that  the  fact  that  she  had  pre- 
viously had  rheumatism  thus  ren- 
dering her  more  susceptible  to  pain, 
would  not  prevent  recovery  for  the 
pain  and  suffering  caused  solely  by 
the  injury.  See  also  Shumway  v. 
Walworth  &  M.  Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich. 
266 


411;  57  N.  W.  251;  Leclerc  v. 
Montreal,  Rap.  Jud.  Quebec,  15  C.  S. 
205;  Litten  v.  Detroit,  119  Mich. 
495;   78  N.  W.  543;  5  Det.  L.  X.  857. 

8  Schwingschlegl  v.  Monroe,  113 
Mich.  683;  72  N.  W.  7;  4  Det.  L.  N. 
447.  Where  the  pain  and  suffering 
resulting  from  an  injured  ankle  was 
subsequently  increased  by  a  fall  on  a 
defective  sidewalk,  it  was  held  that 
there  might  be  a  recovery  for  such 
increased  pain  and  suffering. 

9  Loranger  v.  Dominion  Transport. 
Co.,  Rap.  Jud.  Quebec,  15  C.  S.  195. 

i°  North  Chic.  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Cot- 
ton, 29  N.  E.  899,  aff'g  41  111.  App. 
311. 


FAIN    AND    SUFFERING       MENTAL   SUFFERING.        §   218 

§  218.  Mental  suffering— Physical  injury.— Mental  suffer- 
ing is  an  element  to  be  considered  and  for  which  damages  may  be 
awarded  in  an  action  to  recover  for  bodily  injuries.11     In  this 


11  Robertson  v.  Cornelson,  34  Fed. 
TIC:    Kennon  v.    Gilmer,  181   U.   S. 
22;   District    of    Columbia  v.    Wood- 
bury,  130  U.  S.   450;  10  S.    Ct.  990; 
South  &  North  A.  R.  Co.  v.  McLen- 
don,  63  Ala.  266;  St.  Louis  &  S.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dobbins,  60  Ark.  481;  30  S. 
W.  887,    reh'g  denied,  60  Ark.  486; 
81  S.  W.  147;  Trabing  v.  Cal.  Nav.  & 
Imp.   Co.,  133   Cal.  — ;  65    Pac.  478; 
Thomas  v.  Gates  (Cal.  1899),  58  Pac. 
315;    Fairchild  v.  Cal.   Stage  Co.,  13 
Cal.  599;  Masters  v.  Warren,  27  Conn. 
293;  Seger  v.  Barkhamsted,  22  Conn. 
290;  Jones  v.  Bell,  8  Houst.   (Del.) 
562;    Brush    Elec.    L.    &    P.    Co.    v. 
Simonsohn,  107  Ga.  70:  32  S.  E.  902; 
West  Chicago  St.    It.  Co.  v.  Foster, 
175  111.  396;   51  X.   E.   690,  aff'g  74 
111.  App.  414:  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  170   111.   49;    48  N.   E.  831;  9 
Am.   &    Eng.    Rep.   Cas.    X.   S.    513, 
aff'g    69     111     App.     613;     Western 
Brewery   Co.    v.    Meredith,    166    111. 
:509:  46   N.  E.  720,  aff'g  66  111.  App. 
4.".  I :    Central    R.   Co.  v.   Serfass,  153 
111.   :'.7'.i;  39    X.    E.    119,    affg  5::    111. 
App.  448:    Pittsburg,  C.  C.   &  St.  L. 
R.   Co.   v.  Montgomery,  152   [nd.   1; 
49   N.  E.  582;  9  Am.  &   Ens.  R.  Cas. 
\.  S.  792:  Wabash  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan   (Ind.),   31    X.    E.  661;    Wolf  v. 
Trimble,    103    Ind.    355;    Wright   v. 
Compton,    53    Ind.    :;:'.7:     Miller    v. 
Boone  County  (Iowa,  1895),  63  X.  W. 
352;  Root  \.  Stui'divant,  70  Iowa.  55; 
Ferguson  v.  Davis  Co.,  ;>7  Iowa,  601; 
Morris    v.    Chicago,   etc.,    R.    Co,  45 
Iowa,    29;    Union  Street    R.   Co.    v. 
Stone,:.!   Kan.  83;  37  Pac.   1012;  47 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  90;  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.   F.    R.  Co.  v.  Midget!    (Kan. 
App.),  40  Pac.  995;  Central  Pass.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kuhn,  86  Ky.   578;  Louisville 


ct    X.   R.  Co.  v.  Greer  ( Ky.  1895),  29 
s.  W.  337;  16  Ky.   I..  Rep.  667;  Wy- 
mau  v.  Leavitt,  71  Me.  229;   Prentiss 
v.  Shaw,  56  Me.   427;  Mason  v.  Ells- 
worth, 32  Mc  271 :  Sloan  v.  Edwards, 
01  Md.  89;  Bannonv.  Baltimore,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  108;  Smith  v.  Hol- 
comb,  99  Mass.  552;  Canning  v.  Wil- 
liamstown,    1     Cash.     (Mass.)     451; 
Sherwood  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  B2 
Mich.  374;  Geveke  v.  Grand  Rap.  & 
I.  R.  Co.,  57   Mich.  589:  Hansberger 
v.  Sedalia  Elec.   R.   L.   &  P.  Co.,  82 
Mo.  App.  566;  Porter  v.  Hannibal  & 
St.  Joseph  R.    R.   Co.,  71   Mo.  66;  36 
Am.  Rep.  454;   West  v.  Forrest,  22 
Mo.  344;  Schmitz  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&   S.   R.    Co.  (Mo.),  23    L.   It   A.  250; 
24  S.  W.  472;  Plummer  v.  Milan,  79 
Mo.   App.   439;  1    Mo.   A.   Pep.   600; 
American  Waterworks  Co.   v.   Doug- 
herty (Xeb.),55  X.  W.  1051;  Quigley 
v.   Central  P.  R.   Co..   11    Xev.  350; 
Shay  v.  Camden  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (X.   .1. 
1901),  49  Atl.  547;  Consolidated  Trac- 
tion Co.  v.   Lainbertson,  60  X.   J.   L. 
457;  38  Atl.  684;  10  Am.  ct  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  X.  S.  753,  alrg  59  X.  J.  L.  297; 
36   Atl.   100;  Quinn   v.   Long  Island 
It.  It.  Co.,  34  Hun  (X.   Y.),  331;  105 
X.  Y.  643;  Drinkwater  v.  Dinsmore, 
80    X.    Y.    390,    rev'g    16    Hun,    250; 
O'Neil  v.   Dry   Dock,  E.  B.   ct  B.  R. 
Co.,  36  X.   Y.  St.   R.   934;  59    X.    Y. 
Supr.  123:  15  X.   Y.  Supp.   84,    aff'd 
129    X.    Y.    125;    41     X.    V.     St.    R. 
107:     29    X.      E.    84;     Hamilton     v. 
Third    Ave.    R.    Co.,    53   X.    Y.    28; 
Ranson  v.   \ew  York  &  E.  R.   Co.. 
15  X.  Y.  415;   Matteson  v.  X'ew  York 
Cent.    It.     It.    Co.,  62  Barb.   (X.   Y. ) 
364;  Walker  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  0:",  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  260;  Demann  v.  Eighth  Ave. 
R.  Co.   (C.  P.),  10  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  191; 

267 


§  218        PATH    AND    SUFFERING      MENTAL   SUFFERING. 

connection  the  following  words  of  the  court  in  a  recent  Federal 
case  are  pertinent :  "  In  the  briefs  of  counsel  there  is  a  lengthy 
discussion  of  the  question  whether  fright  or  mental  distress 
alone  constitutes  such  an  injury  that  the  law  will  allow  a  re- 
covery for  it.  This  question  is  not  involved  in  this  case.  .  .  . 
Whatever  the  rule  in  such  cases  may  be,  en  passant,  we  appre- 
hend that  it  will  depend  upon  the  particular  facts  in  each  case. 
There  is  no  conflict  in  the  authorities  upon  the  question  that 
when  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant's  acts,  the  plaintiff  re- 
ceives a  bodily  injury,  he  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  not 
only  for  such  injury  but  for  all  the  injurious  results  which  are 
a  reasonable  and  natural  consequence  thereof  and  were  accurately 
and  proximately  occasioned  thereby.  We  all  know  by  common 
knowledge  that  serious  results  may  follow  from  bodily  injuries. 
.  .  .  The  body  and  mind  are  so  intimately  connected  that  the 
mind  is  very  often  directly  and  necessarily  affected  by  physical 
injuries.  A  nervous  shock  without  a  blow  to  the  person  might, 
under  some  circumstances,  be  so  great  as  to  cause  bodily  injury. 
In  estimating  the  amount  of  damages  which  the  defendants  in 
error  were  entitled  to  recover,  the  jury  had  the  right  to  take  into 
consideration  all  the  testimony  as  to  the  surrounding  facts  and 
circumstances  at  the  time  of  and  incident  to  the  collision  includ- 
ing the  position  and  situation  in  which  Mrs.  Roller  was  placed 
thereby;  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  truth  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
bodily  injuries  she  received  and  the  character  and  extent  of  the 
fright  or  shock,  if  any,  to  her  system  resulting  from  and  di- 
rectly attributable  to  the  collision  and  injury.     In  a  case  like 


62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  476;  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 
926;  Wallace  v.  Western,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
104  N.  C.  442;  Smith  v.  Pittsburg, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  23  Ohio  St.  10;  Scott  v. 


Civ.  App.  544;  37  S.  W.  1083;  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark; 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  167;  51  S.  W.  276; 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Keller, 


Montgomery,  95  Penn.  St.  444;  Penn.  I  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  569;  32  S.  W.  847; 


&  Ohio  Canal  Co.  v.  Graham,  63 
Penn.  St.  290;  3  Am.  Rep.  549;  Gill- 
man  v.  Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  53 
S.  C.  210;  31  S.  E.  224;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  125;  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hampton  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1900),  59  S.  W.  928;  Howard 
Oil  Co.  v.  Davis,  76  Tex.  630;  Hous- 
ton &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Berling,  14  Tex. 
268 


(iibbin  v.  Mclntyre,  2  Utah,  484; 
Robinson  v.  Marino,  3  Wash.  434; 
Carpenter  v.  Mexico  Nat.  R.  Co.,  17 
Wash.  L.  R.  630;  Boltz  v.  Sullivan, 
101  Wis.  608;  77  N.  W.  870;  5  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  508;  Fenelon  v.  Butts,  53 
Wis.  344;  Blake  v.  Midland  R.  Co., 
18  Q.  B.  110.  See  Joyce  on  Electric 
Law,  sees.  825,  825n,  826,  826n. 


PAIN  AND  BUFFERING   MENTAL  BUFFERING.    §  219 

the  present  the  proximate  damages  which  the  person  injur.-, 1  is 
entitled  to  recover  are  the  ordinary  and  natural  results  of  the 
collision  and  injury,  and  are  sucli  as  might  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected would  follow  therefrom.  This  general  principle,  where- 
ever  discussed,  is  expressly  recognized  by  all  the  authorities 
which  hold  that  damages  cannot  be  recovered  for  mere  fright 
alone,  without  any  bodily  injury.  If  there  was  any  t right  or 
shock  which  resulted  from  her  bodily  injury  in  connection  with 
the  collision,  the  accompanying  explosion.  lire  and  wreckage  of 
the  cars,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances  directly  conni 
therewith  and  solely  attributable  thereto,  there  is  no  substantial 
reason  why  she  should  not  be  allowed  to  recover  all  damages 
naturally  and  reasonably  and  approximately  arising  therefrom."  '- 

^  '219.  Same  subject  continued,— Such  suffering  must  pro- 
ceed from  the  injury  as  the  natural  and  proximate  result  thereof, 
for  if  independent  of  and  unconnected  with  any  injury,  it  will 
not  of  itself  in  this  class  of  cases  be  a  ground  for  recovery.1'' 
But  it  has  been  held  that  in  case  of  wilful  injuries  or  of  negli- 
gence which  is  gross  or  amounts  to  recklessness,  this  limitation 


u  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Roller, 
100  Fed.  748,  749,   per  Ilawley,  D.  J.  I 
This  was  an  action  for  damages  for 
injury  to  a  passenger  resulting  from 
a  collision. 

1:  Kennon  v.  Gilmer.  131  U.  S.  22: 
The  Queen,  40  Fed.  694  :  Tex- 
arkana  &  Ft.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson 
(Ark.),  53  S.  W.  673;  Chicago 
City  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  170  111.  40;  48 
N.  E.  831;  0  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  s.  513,  aff'g  69  111.  A  pp.  613; 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  80 
111.  App.  71;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  41, 
affM  182  111.  298;  55  \.  E.  366; 
Hi  aim  v.  Craven,  17-")  111.  40;  Indian- 
apolis, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Stables,  02  111. 
313;  Kalen  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R. 
Co.,  18  Ind.  App.  202;  47  X.  K. 
694;  Mahoney  v.  Dank  wait.  108  Iowa, 
321;  79  N.  W.  134;  ti  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
278;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  417:  Fer- 
guson  v.    Davis    Co..  57    Iowa,  001; 


Atchison,  etc..  R.  Co.  v.  McGinnis, 
4t>  Kan.  109;  Wyman  v.  Leavitt,  71 
Me.  227;  Me  Malum  v.  Northern  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  39  Md.  438;  White  v. 
.Sander,  108  Mass.  290;  47  X.  E. 
90;  Canning  v.  Williamstown,  1 
Cush.  i  Mass.  i  451  ;  Smith  v.  Hol- 
comb,  99  Mass.  552;  Keyes  v.  Minne- 
apolis, etc..  R.  Co.,  3(3  Minn.  290; 
Memphis,  etc.,  I!.  Co.  v.  Whitfield, 
4  1  Miss.  466;  Denning  v.  Chicago,  R. 
I.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  App.  152;  2 
Mo.  App.  Hep.  547;  Johnson  v. 
Wells,  <i  Nev.  221;  CodboI.  Traction 
Co.  v.  Lamheitson:  00  N.  .1.  I..  -157; 
10  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  7">:>: 
38  Atl.  084.  aff'g  59  X.  .1.  L.  297; 
:if,  Atl.  100;  <>•  Flaherty  v.  Nassau 
Elec.  R.  Co.,  :;4  App.  Div.  | N.  Y.) 
74:  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  90.  See  Joyce 
on  Electric  Law.  sec.  9s7.  Also  sees. 
825-830. 

269 


§  220 


PAIN    AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL    SUFFERING. 


of  the  rule  is  not  applicable.11  Though  the  general  rule  in  the 
above  class  of  cases  requires  that  the  mental  suffering  must 
proceed  from  or  be  connected  with  an  injury,  yet  the  fact  that 
the  injury  is  a  slight  one  will  not  prevent  the  consideration  of 
such  suffering  as  an  element  of  damage.15  Again,  in  the  case 
of  a  physical  injury  the  effect  thereof  on  the  mind  of  the  person 
may  be  aggravated  by  the  motive  or  wantonness  of  the  person 
inflicting  such  an  injury,  and  in  such  case  the  damages  may  be 
larger  than  where  there  is  a  similar  physical  injury  caused 
through  mere  carelessness.16  But  in  order  to  authorize  a  re- 
covery for  mental  suffering,  proof  as  to  the  damages  sustained  in 
dollars  and  cents,  on  account  of  such  suffering  is  not  essential,17 
and  direct  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  mental  an- 
guish is  unnecessary.18 

§  220.  Fright — Not  result  of  physical  injury. — In  an  action 
for  negligence  no  damages  are  recoverable  for  fright, terror,  alarm, 
or  distress  of  mind  where  no  physical  injuries  have  been  sus- 
tained in  connection  therewith.19     So  mental  anxiety  as  to  the 


»  Kalen  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R. 
Co.,  18  Ind.  App.  202;  47  N".  E. 
694;  Spade  v.  Lynn  &  B.  R.  Co.,  168 
Mass.  285;  47  N.  E.  88;  38  L.  R. 
A.  512;  14  Nat.  Corp.  Rep.  869;  Pur- 
cell  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  48  Minn. 
134;  16  L.  R.  A.  203;  Williams  v. 
Underbill,  63  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  223; 
71  X.  Y.  Supp.  291. 

15  Masters  v.  Warren,  27  Conn. 
293;  Canning  v.  Williamstown,  1 
Cusli.  (Mass.)  452;  Memphis,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Whitfield,  44  Miss.  466; 
Sidekuni  v.  Wabash,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  93 
Mo.  400;  4  S.  W.  701. 

16  Howes  v.  Knowles,  114  Mass. 
518.  See  Kellyville  Coal  Co.  v. 
Yehuka,  94  111.  App.  74. 

"  Bell  v.  Gulf  &  C.  R.  Co.,  76  Miss. 
71;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rhodes,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  459;  51 
S.  W.  517,  reh'g  denied  in  54  S.  W. 
979. 

18  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 

270 


Mitchell    (Tex.    Civ.   App.    1901),  60 
S.  W.  996. 

19  Lehigh  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Marcbant 
( C.  C.  App.  2d  C. ),  55  U.  S.  App.  427 ; 
28  C.  C.  A.  544;  84  Fed.  870;  The 
Queen,  40  Fed.  694;  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bragg  (Ark.  1901),  64 
S.  W.  226;  Braun  v.  Craven,  175  111. 
401;  51  N.  E.  657;  42  L.  R.  A.  199; 
Kalen  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.,  18 
Ind.  App.  202;  47  N.  E.  694;  Ma- 
honey  v.  Dankwart,  108  Iowa,  321;  79 
N.  W.  134;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  278;  4 
Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  417;  Salina  v. 
Trosper,  27  Kan.  544;  Spade  v.  Lynn 
&  B.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  285;  38  L.  R. 
A.  512;  47  N.  E.  88;  14  Nat.  Corp. 
Rep.  869;  Purcell  v.  St.  Paul  City  R. 
Co.,  48  Minn.  134;  Darrah  v.  Illinois 
C.  R.  Co.,  65  Miss.  14;  Johnson  v. 
Wells,  6  Nev.  224;  Buchanan  v.  New 
Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Vr.  (N.  J.)  265; 
Ward  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co.  (N. 
J.  Sup.  1900),  47  Atl.   561;  Consoli- 


PAIN    AND   BUFFERING — MENTAL    BUFFERING. 


§  220 


safety  of  the  plaintiff  or  of  Lis  family,  unaccompanied  by  phys- 
ical injury,  and  caused  .solely  by  negligent  blasting,  as  a  result 
of  which  rocks  were  thrown  upon  his  land  and  buildings,  is  not 
an  element  for  which  recovery  may  be  had.30  And  where  a 
stone  was  thrown  into  a  room  it  was  held  that  there  could  be 
no  recovery  for  injuries  sustained  by  the  wife  of  the  owner  who 
was  in  such  room  where  such  injuries  were  merely  the  result  of 
fright  alone,  though  the  throwing  was  done  with  intention  to 
injure  the  house  but  with  no  knowledge  of  her  being  in  the 
room  and  with  no  intention  to  injure  her.21  And  in  another  case 
it  was  held  that  the  act  of  a  landlord  in  suddenly  appearing  at 
the  open  door  of  a  woman's  bedroom  in  which  she  was  packing 
her  goods  and  his  forbidding  her  to  move,  accompanied  by  loud 
and  angry  words  on  his  part  and  a  waving  of  his  arms  together 
with  threats  to  call  the  constable,  were  not  such  acts  as  would 
constitute  negligence  which  would  render  him  liable  for  her  re- 
sulting excitement  and  fright  in  consequence  of  which  chorea 
or  St.  Vitus  dance  resulted.22  Nor  can  damages  be  recovered 
for  fright  which  produces  a  miscarriage,  such  fright  being  caused 
by  a  quarrel  between  defendant,  plaintiff's  husband  and  another. 
within  her  hearing  but  out  of  her  sight,  and  it  not  appearing 
that  the  defendant  knew  that  she  heard  it  or  knew  of  her  con- 
dition ;  -!  nor  can  there  be  a  recovery  for  fright  in  the  case  of  a 
seaman  thrown  into  the  water  by  a  collision,  in  the  absence  of 
evidence  showing  inability  to  pursue  his  employment,  some  sub- 


dated  Traction  Co.  v.  Lambertson, 
59  N.  J.  L.  297;  36  Atl.  100,  aff' d  38 
Atl.  683;  60  N.  J.  L.  457:  Mitchell  v. 
Rochester  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y.  107;  45 
N.  E.  354,  rev'g  77  Hun,  607;  59  \. 
Y.  St.  R.  892;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  844; 
O' Flaherty  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co., 
34App.  Div.  (N.  V.)  74;  54  X.  Y. 
Supp.  96;  58  Alb.  L.  J.  347;  Gulf,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Trott,  86  Tex.  412;  25  S. 
W.  419;  Victorian  Ry.  Com  mis.  v. 
Coultas,  13  App.  Cas.  222;  Lynch  v. 
Knight,  9  H.  L.  Cas.  598;  Hock  v. 
Denis,  4  Mont.  L.  R.  356.  But  see 
Mack  v.  South  Bound  R.  Co.,  52  S.  C. 
323;  40  L.  R.  A.  679;  29  S.  E.  905:  3 
Chic.  L.  J.   Wkly.   272;  Gulf  C.  &  S. 


F.  R.  Co.  v.  Trott,  86  Tex.  412;  25 
S.  W.  419;  Henderson  v.  Canada  At- 
lantic R.  Co.,  4  Ont.  App.  437.  See 
in  this  connection  Joyce  on  Electric 
Law,  sees.  825  831,  987,  988. 

20  Wynian  v.  Leavitt,  71  Me.  227. 

-i  White  v.  Sander,  168  Mass.  296; 
47  N.  E.  90.  See  also  Bucknam  v. 
Great  Northern  If.  Co.  (Minn.),  6 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  302;  79  N.  W.  98. 

M  Braun  v.  Craven,  175  111.  401;  51 
\.  E.  057;  42  1..  R.  A.  199,  aff'g  73 
111.  App.  189;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  77. 
But  sec  Brownback  v.  Frailty,  78 
111.  App.  262. 

-  Phillips  v.  Dickerson,  85  111.  11; 
27  Am.  Hep.  607. 

•271 


§  221         PAIN    AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL    SUFFERINGi 


stantial  injury,  or  expense  resulting  therefrom.-'  But  where, 
owing  to  the  negligence  of  a  railroad  company,  a  carriage  was 
struck  by  one  of  its  trains  and  the  person  riding  therein  was 
thrown  to  the  ground,  it  was  held  that  such  person  might  re- 
cover damages  for  fright  and  nervous  shock,  although  the  in- 
jury sustained  was  entirely  due  to  the  nervous  shock.23 

§  221.  Fright— Physical  injury  resulting  from. — In  some 
cases  it  may  happen  that  physical  injuries  are  not  the  direct  result 
of  a  negligent  act,  but  that  fright  alone  is,  and  that  as  a  result 
of  such  fright,  nervous  shock  or  some  physical  injury  subse- 
quently ensues.  In  this  class  of  cases  the  weight  of  authority 
supports  the  rule  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  such  injury 
or  shock,  since  such  injury  cannot  be  considered  as  a  conse- 
quence which  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  would  flow  from 
the  negligent  act.*  Thus  it  was  declared  in  an  English  case,'-'7 
where,  by  the  negligence  of  the  gateman  of  a  railroad  company, 
a  man  and  his  wife  while  driving  across  the  track  were  almost 
struck  by  the  train  and  she  suffered  greatly  from  fright  which 
resulted  in  illness,  that  "  her  fright  was  caused  by  seeing  the 
train  approaching  and  thinking  that  they  were  going  to  .be  killed. 
Damages  arising  from  mere  sudden  terror,  unaccompanied  by 


24  The  Queen,  40  Fed.  694. 

25  Warren  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co. 
(Mass.),  40  N.  E.  895. 

26  Braun  v.  Craven,  175  111.  401;  51 
N.  E.  657;  42  L.  R.  A.  199,  aff'g  73 
111.  App.  189;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  77; 
Malioney  v.  Dankwart,  108  Iowa,  321; 
79  N.  W.  134;  6  Am.  Neg.  Kep.  278; 
4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  417;  Spade  v. 
Lynn  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  285; 
38  L.  R.  A.  512;  47  W.  E.  88;  14  Nat. 
Corp.  Kep.  869;  Deming  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  *  P.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  App.  152;  2 
Mo.  App.  Rep.  152;  Mitchell  v.  Roch- 
ester R.  Co.,  151  N".  Y.  107;  45  N.  E. 
354,  rev'g77  Hun,  607;  59  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
892;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  844;  O'Flaherty 
v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co.,  34  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  74;  54  N.  Y.  Supp.  96;  58 
Alb.  L.  J.  347.  See  also  Haile  v. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  23  U.  S.  App.  80; 

272 


m  Fed.  557;  9  C.  C.  A.  134;  23  L.  R. 
A.  774;  Ewing  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  R.  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  40;  14 
L.  A.  666;  Joyce  on  Electric  Law 
sec.  831.  But  see  Sloan  v.  Southern 
Cal.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Cal.  698;  Purcell  v. 
St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  48  Minn.  134; 
16  L.  R.  A.  203;  Mack  v.  South  Bound 
R.  Co.,  52  S.  C.  323;  40  L.  R.  A. 
679;  29  S.  E.  905;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
272;  Bell  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
26 L.  R.  (Ire.)  428;  Henderson  v.  Can- 
ada Atlantic  R.  Co.,  4  Ont.  App.  437. 
But  see  Brownback  v.  Frailey,  78 
111.  App.  262.  The  questions  of  men- 
tal suffering  and  fright  may  be  found 
discussed  in  Joyce  on  Electric  Law, 
sees.  825-831,  987,  988. 

27  Victorian  Ry.  Commrs.  v.   Coul- 
tas,  13  App.  Cas.  222. 


PAIN    AND    SUFFERING    -MENTAL    BUFFERING.         §   222 

any  actual  physical  injury,  but  occasioning  a  nervous  or  mental 
shock,  cannot,  under  such  circumstances  (their  lordships  think;, 
be  considered  a  consequence  which  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things,  would  flow  from  the  negligence  of  the  gatekeeper.'1  *  So 
where  a  blast  was  negligently  set  off  it  was  held  that  there 
could  he  no  recovery  for  sickness  or  disease  occasioned  not  as 
a  direct  result  of  the  blast,  but  by  apprehension  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff  as  to  her  mother's  safety.3  And  in  another  case  it 
was  held  where  a  person  was  thrown  to  the  ground  and  injured 
by  an  electric  shock  that  there  could  be  no  recovery  for  injuries 
produced  by  fright  alone,  but  that  they  formed  a  hasis  of  re- 
covery when  accompanied  by  the  harm  occasioned  by  the  fall.80 

§  222.  Same  sub  ject  continued. — hi  a  case  before  the  courts 
of  Ireland,  however,  the  doctrine  is  asserted  that  even  though 
no  actual  physical  injury  results  by  impact  from  the  negligent 
act  of  another,  yet  if  a  person  is  so  frightened  by  such  act  that  a 
nervous  shock  ensues,  resulting  in  subsequent  physical  injury,  re- 
covery may  be  had  for  such  injury.31  The  evidence  in  tins  case 
showed  that  as  a  result  of  the  negligence  of  the  railroad  company. 
the  plaintiff  was  greatly  frightened ;  that  a  nervous  shock  resulted 
therefrom  ;  that  she  was  unable  to  perform  her  work  ;  and  that 
she  might  suffer  from  paralysis.  It  was  claimed  by  the  defense 
that  though  there  might  be  a  nervous  shock,  yet,  if  it  arose 
from  mere  fright,  unaccompanied  by  actual  physical  injury,  dam- 
ages therefor  were  too  remote  to  be  recoverable.  In  the  opinion 
in  this  case  the  decision  in  Victorian  Railway  Commissioners 
v.  Coultas,32  is  referred  to,  and  criticized,  and  the  court  declines 
to  follow  it,  holding  that  damages  for  injury  to  health,  resulting 
from  fright,  are  recoverable,  and  saying  in  conclusion  that  "  I 
am  of  the  opinion  that  as  the  relation  between  fright  and  injury 
to  the  nerve  and  brain  structures  of  the  body  is  a  matter  which 
depends   entirely  upon  scientific   and  medical  testimony,  it  is 


28  Per  Sir  K.  Couch. 

29  Mahoney  v.  Dankwart,  108  Iowa, 
321;  79  X.  W.  VM:  C,  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
278;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  417. 

80  O'Flaheity  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R. 
Co.,  34  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  74;  54  N. 
Y.  Supp.  98;  58  Abb.  L.  J.  347. 

18  278 


;1  Bell  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
26  L.  K.  lit-.  428,  cited  in  Mack  v. 
South  Hound  R.  Co.,  52  S.  C.  323; 
4u  L.  I:.  A.  679;  :.".<  S.  E.  905;  3 
Chic.  L.  .1.  Wkly.  417. 

n  13  App.  ('as.  222. 


§§  223,  224    PAIN    AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL   SUFFERING. 

impossible  for  any  court  to  lay  down,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  if 
negligence  cause  fright,  and  such  f right,,  in  its  turn  so  affects 
such  structures  as  to  cause  injury  to  health,  such  injury  cannot 
be  a  consequence,  which  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  would 
flow  from  the  negligence,  unless  such  injury  '  accompany  such 
negligence  in  point  of  time.' ',33  In  this  case  in  criticising  the 
Coultas  decision,34  it  was  also  said  by  the  court  that  "  although 
one  witness  spoke  of  nervous  shock  as  contradistinguished  from 
physical  damage,  the  question  would  still  have  been  open  for 
the  jury  whether  the  nervous  shock  was  not,  as  in  the  general- 
ity of,  if  not  indeed  in  all  cases,  it  must  necessarily  be — phys- 
ical injury."  In  California35  it  is  also  held  in  the  case  of  the 
ejection  of  a  passenger  from  a  train  that  paroxysms  of  the  nerv- 
ous sj^stem,  resulting  from  the  mental  suffering  of  the  passenger, 
constituted  a  bodily  injury,  and  that  damages  were  recoverable 
therefor.36 

§  223.  Mental  suffering — Fear  of  consequences  of  injury 
—Bite  of  dog. — In  some  cases  of  physical  injury  the  character 
thereof  is  such  that  unusual  and  excessive  pain  and  suffering 
and  possibly  death,  will  naturally  and  frequently  result  there- 
from. In  such  cases  the  fear  and  anxiety  of  such  result  may 
be  an  element  to  be  considered  in  determining  the  amount  of 
damages  recoverable.  So,  where  an  injury  is  inflicted  by  the 
bite  of  a  dog,  the  mental  suffering  of  the  person  injured,  his  fear 
and  apprehension  as  to  poison  and  hydrophobia  are  elements  to 
be  considered.3' 

§  224.  Mental  suffering  of  injured  person — Disfigure- 
ment.— Mental  suffering  arising  from  disfigurement,  deform- 
ity, or  a  knowledge  by  the  injured  person  that  his  earning 
capacity  is  impaired  for  life,  is  a  proper  element  of  damage.* 


33  Per  Palles,  C.  B. 

34  13  App.  Cas.  222. 

35  Sloan  v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co., 
Ill  Cal.  668;  44  Pac.  320;  111  Cal. 
668. 

86  See  sec.  221  herein  pn  fright  in 
connection  with  physical  injury — 
expulsion  of  passenger. 

274 


37  Warner  v.  Chamberlain,  7  Houst. 
(Del.)  18;  Godeau  v.  Blood,  5:3  Vt. 
251;  36  Am.  Rep.  751;  Robinson  v. 
Marino,  3  Wash.  434;  28  Pac.  752. 
But  see  Trinity  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  690;  46 
S.  W.  389. 

88  Mayor  of  Birmingham  v.  Lewis, 


PAIN    AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL    SUFFERING.    §§  225,  226 

So  it  was  held  not  to  he  error  to  instruct  the  jury  in  an  action 
where  it  appeared  that  the  hoy's  legs  had  been  amputated,  that 
damages  might  be  awarded  for  mortification  and  anguish  of  mind 
which  he  has  suffered  and  will  suffer  in  the  future  by  reason 
of  the  mutilation  of  his  body,  and  the  fact  that  he  has  become 
an  object  of  curiosity  or  ridicule  among  his  fellows.8 

§  225.  Mental  suffering— Action  by  husband  for  injury 
to  wife — Parent  and  child.— In  actions  to  recover  for  phys- 
ical injuries  attributable  to  negligence,  recovery  for  mental  suf- 
fering is  confined  to  the  person  receiving  the  physical  injury.* 
So  the  mental  suffering  of  the  wife  is  not  an  element  to  be  con- 
sidered in  an  action  by  the  husband  for  injuries  to  her.41  And 
in  an  action  by  a  wife,  the  mental  suffering  of  the  husband,  as  a 
consequence  of  injuries  to  her,  is  not  an  element  to  be  consid- 
ered in  the  estimation  of  the  damages  which  she  may  recover.12 
So,  also,  in  an  action  by  a  parent  to  recover  for  injuries  to  a  child, 
the  mental  suffering  of  the  parent  is  not  to  be  considered. Vl 

§  226.  Mental  suffering — Pleading — Evidence —  In  an  ac- 
tion for  personal  injuries,  damages  for  mental  suffering  arising 
from  the  injury  itself  may  be  recovered  although  not  specially 


92  Ala.  352;  Atlanta,  etc.,  K.  Co.  v. 
Wood,  48  Ga.  565;  Newbury  v. 
Getchel,  etc.,  Mfg.  Co.,  100  Iowa. 
441:  Brush  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Si- 
monsohn,  107  Ca.  70:  32  S.  E.  902; 
Sherwood  v.  Chic.  &  W.  M.  R.  Co., 
82  Mich.  374;  Schraitz  v.  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  256;  24  S. 
W.  472:  23  L.  K.  A.  250:  Rockwell 
v.  Eldred,  7  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  95:  Nich- 
ols v.  Brabazon,  94  Wis.  549;  B9  X. 
W.  342;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  C<>.  v. 
Miller  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  61  S. 
W.  978;  Heddles  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  228;  City  of  Decatur 
v.  Hamilton,  89  111.  App.  561.  But 
see  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
80  111.  App.  71:  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
41; West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  .lames, 
09  111.  App.  609;  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R. 


Co.  v.  Spurney.  69111.  App.  549;  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines,  45  111. 
App.  20'.):  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Caulfield,63Fed.396;  11  C.  C.  A. 552. 

» Heddles  v.  Chicago  City  R.  Co., 
77  Wis.  228;  40  N.  W.  115.  See 
also  Central  R.  <&  Bkg.  Co.  v.  Lanier. 
83  i. a.  587;   10  S.  K.  27:'. 

M  Hyatt  v.  Adams.  16  Mich.  ISO. 

41  Hyatt  v.  Adams.  16  Mich.  180. 
Bul  Bee  Campbell  v.  Harris,  4  Tex. 
civ.  App.  636;  2:*.  S.  W.  85. 

4-  Longv,  Morrison,  14  Ind.  505. 

*8  Black  v.  Carrollton  R.  Co.,  10 
La.  Ann.  33;  Cowden  v.  Wright,  24 
Wend,  i  N.  V.  i  429;  Penn.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Kelly.  31  Penn.  St.  372;  Galveston 
v.  Harbour.  02  Tex.  172:  Flemingtou 
v.  Smitheis,  2  C.  &  P.  292:  contra, 
I  Trimble  v.  Spiller,  7  Mon.  (Ky.)394. 
•27.-. 


§  226        PAIN    AND    SUFFERING — MENTAL    SUFFERING. 

alleged.14  But  in  order  to  admit  proof  of  such  suffering  there 
must,  in  the  absence  of  any  allegation  thereof,  be  facts  from 
which  it  may  be  directly  inferred.45  And  again,  no  direct  evi- 
dence of  mental  suffering  is  necessary  in  order  to  warrant  a 
recovery  where  the  physical  injury  appears  to  be  serious  and  its 
effect  permanent.46  But  it  is  declared  that  in  the  absence  of 
any  evidence  showing  that  the  plaintiff  suffered  in  the  slightest 
degree  from  apprehension,  it  is  error  in  an  action  for  personal 
injuries  to  submit  apprehension  as  an  element  of  damages  recov- 
erable.47 


44  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
170  111.  49;  48  N.  E.  831;  9  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  513,  aff'g  68  111. 
App.  613;  Western  Brewery  Co.  v. 
Meredith.  166  111.  306;  46  N.  E.  720, 
afFg66  111.  App.  454;  Ft.  Scott,  W. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lightburn  (Kau. 
App.  1899),  58  Pac.  1033;  McCoy  v. 
Milwaukee  Street  R.  Co.  (Wis.),  59 
N.  W.  453. 
276 


«  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Leh- 
man, 82  111.  App.  238. 

46  San  Antonio  v.  Krensel,  17  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  594;  43  S.  W.  615.  But 
see  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  7 
Kan.  App.  594;  52  Pac.  460. 

47Gilbertson  v.  Forty-Second  St., 
M.  &  St.  N.  Ave.  R.  Co.,  14  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)294;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  782. 


LOSS   oE   TIME,  EARNINGS,   ETC. 


§2S 


CHAPTER  IX. 


LOSS  OF  TIME,  EARNINGS    AND  IMPAIRED  EARNING    CAPACITY. 


§  227.  Loss   of  time — Earnings — Di- 
minished capacity  to  labor. 

228.  Loss  of  time— Earnings — Evi- 

dence of  must  be  given. 

229.  Evidence— Loss      of      time — 

Earnings     and    diminished 
ability. 

230.  Same  subject  continued. 

231.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Not 

recoverable     where     wageB 
are  paid — Evidence. 

232.  Prospect   of    increased   earn- 

ings. 

233.  Loss  of  time — Business. 

234.  Loss  of  time — Partners — Evi- 

dence. 

235.  Loss  of  profits. 

23(3.   Loss  of  time — Earnings— Pro- 
fessional men. 


237.  Loss  of  time— Earnings— Can- 

vasser or  travelling  sales- 
man on  percentage  basis. 

238.  Loss  of  time — Earnings— Ped- 

dler. 

239.  Total  or   partial   incapacity — 

English  workmen's  act  — 
Construction  of. 

240.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc., — 

Pleading  of  as  special 
damages. 

241.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc. — 

Recovery  for  and  evidence 
admissible  under  general 
allegations. 

242.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc. — 

Recovery  for  and  evidence 
admissible  under  general 
allegations — Continued. 


§  227.  Loss  of  time— Earnings  Diminished  capacity  to 
labor. — As  a  result  of  physical  injuries  a  person  is  in  most  cases 
incapacitated  either  partially  or  entirely  from  pursuing  his  pro- 
fession, business,  or  occupation.  Where  such  a  result  follows 
the  law  requires  that  the  person  responsible  for  the  injury  shall 
make  compensation  to  the  person  injured  for  the  loss  of  time 
which  he  lias  sustained,  or  in  other  words  give  damages  to  him 
for  the  loss  which  he  has  suffered  in  his  income,  wages,  or 
earnings  or  diminished  capacity  to  labor  as  a  result  of  such  in- 
jury, the  pecuniary  loss,  which  is  the  measure  of  damages,  vary- 
ing in  each  case  according  to  his  business  or  occupation  and 
the  degree  and  duration  of  his  disability.1      And  the  mere  possi- 

i  Wade  v.  Leroy,  20  How.  (U.  S. )  lumbia  v.  Woodbury,  lot.  U.  S.  450; 
34;  Vicksburg,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Put-  Rouse  v.  Eornsby  i  C.  C.  App.  8th 
nam,   118  U.  S.  54.J;  District  of  Co-    C. ),  07  Fed.  219;  Carpenter  v.  Biexi- 


>97 


§227 


LOSS    OF    TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 


bility  that  physical  injuries  which  result  in  one  being  disabled 
from  engaging  in  manual  labor  may  result  in  his  being  compelled 
to  enter  another  and  more  lucrative  field  of  employment  will 


can  Nat.  K.  R.  Co., ,39  Fed.  315;  Ne- 
braska v.  Campbell,  2  Black  (U.  S.), 
590;  Beardsley  v.  Swann,  4  McLean 
(C.  C.  U.  S.),  333;  South- &  N.  A.  R. 
R.   Co.   v.   McLendou,    63  Ala.   266; 
Masters    v.    Warren,   27    Conn.   293; 
Mills  v.  Wilmington  City   R.   Co.,   1 
Marv.  (Del.)  269;  46  Atl.  1114;  Jones 
v.  Bell,  8  Houst.  (Del.)  562;  Warner 
v.  Chamberlain,   7  Houst.   (Del.)  18; 
Cooper  v.  Mullins,  30  Ga.  146;  West 
Cbicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Foster,  175  111. 
396;  51   N.  E.  690,  affg  74  111.  App. 
414;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr, 
170   111.  478;  48   N.   E.   992,  aff'g  67 
111.   App.  530;    Consol.   Coal    Co.  v. 
Haenni,    146    111.    614;    Sheridan    v. 
Hibbard,  119  111.  307;  Peoria  Bridge 
Assoc,   v.   Loomis,   20  111.   235;  Cbi- 
cago v.  Elzeman,  71  111.   131;  Pierce 
v.  Millay,  44  111.  189;  Ripley  v.  Lev- 
erenz,  83  111.  App.  603;  Galesbury  v. 
Hall,  45  111.  App.  290;  Indianapolis 
v.  Gaston,  58  Ind.  224;  Linton  Coal 
v.  M.  Co.,  15  Ind.  App.  69;  43  N.  E. 
651;    American    Strawboard    Co.   v. 
Foust  (Ind.  App.  1895),  39  N.  E.  891; 
Keyes  v.  Cedar  Falls,  107  Iowa,  509; 
78  N.  W.  227;  Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa, 
64  la.  251;  Haden  v.  Sioux  City  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.  (Iowa,  1895),  60  N.  W.  537; 
McKinley  v.  Cbicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  44  la.  314;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Posten,  59  Kan.  449;  11 
Am.  &   Eng.   R.  Cas.   N.  S.   138;  53 
Pac.  465;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Weaver,    16  Kan.  456;  Kentucky,  C. 
R.  Co.   v.  Ackley,  87  Ky.  278;  Eden 
v.  Lexington,   etc.,  R.   R.   Co.,  14  B. 
Mod.   (Ky.)  204;  Parker  v.  Jenkins, 
3    Bush    (Ky.),    587;    Rutherford    v. 
Shreveport  &  H.  R.   R.  Co.,  41   La. 
Ann.   793;    Sanford  v.   Augusta,    32 
Me.     536;    Stockton  v.   Frey,   4  Gill 
278 


(Md.),  406;  Jordon  v.  Middlesex,  138 
Mass.  425;  Braithvvaite  v.  Hall,  168 
Mass.  38;  46  N.  E.  398;  1  Am.  Nag. 
Rep.  623;  Harmon  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
R.  Co.  (Mass.  S.   J.  C.  1897),  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  717;  Canning  v.  Williams- 
town,    1    Cush.    (Mass.)   451;  Ballon 
v.  Farman,  11   Allen  (Mass.),  73;  Os- 
trander  v.  Lansing,   115  Mich.  224; 
73  N.  W.  110;  4  Det.  L.  N.  833;  Moore 
v.  Kalamazoo,  109  Mich.  176;  66  N. 
W.  1089;  3  Det.   L.   M.  52;  66  N.  W. 
1089;    Kinney  v.  Folkerts,  84  Mich. 
616;   48  N.  W.    283;   Memphis,   etc., 
R.   R.   Co.,  44  Miss.    466;  Gerdes   v. 
Christopher  &  S.  A.  Iron  &   F.  Co., 
124  Mo.  347;  27  S.  W.   615;  Stephen 
v.  Hannibal  &  S.  J.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Mo. 
207;  Whalen  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  60  Mo.   323;   Pryor  v.  Met.   St. 
Ry.  Co.,  85  Mo.  App.  367;  Carpenter 
v.  McDavitt,   66  Mo.  App.   1;  Chart- 
rand  v.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Mo. 
App.  425;  Rogan  v.   Montana  C.   R. 
Co.,  20  Mont.  503;  52  Pac.  206;  Chi- 
cago &  C.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Starmer,  20 
Neb.  630;   42  N.   W.  706;    Cohen  v. 
Eureka  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb.  376; 
Hopkins  v.  Atlantic  R.  Co.,  36  N.  H. 
9;  Drinkwater  v.  Dinsrnore,  80  N.  Y. 
390,  rev'g  16  Hun  (N.  Y.),  250;  Shee- 
han   v.   Edgar,   58   N.    Y.   631;  Fein- 
stein  v.  Jacobs,  15  Misc.-  (N.  Y.)  474; 
72  N.  Y.  St.   R.  698;  37  N.  Y.  Supp. 
345;  Walker  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  63  Barb. 
(N.  Y. )  260;  Beckwith  v.  New  York 
Central   R.  R.  Co.,  64  Barb.   ( N.  Y. ) 
299;   .Masterton  v.  Mount  Vernon,  58 
N.  Y.  391,  396;  Curtis  v.   Rochester, 
etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  282; 
Cass  v.  Third  Ave.    R.   Co.,  20  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  91;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  356; 
Phyfe  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  30  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  377;  Klein  v.   Second  Ave. 


I.MI'AIKKI)    EARNING    CAPACITY. 


S   228 


not  deprive  him  of  the  right  to  recover  damages  based  on  his 
diminished  earning  power  in  the  vocation  which  he  has  fol- 
lowed.2 Damages  for  lost  time  are  not  to  be  assessed  at  the 
arbitrary  discretion  of  a  jury,  but  must  be  determined  on  a 
pecuniary  basis,  since  the  loss  is  purely  a  pecuniary  loss  or  in- 
jury for  which  only  a  fair  and  just  compensation  should  be 
given. :; 


§  228.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Evidence  of  must  be  given. 

— If  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  physical  injuries  a 
claim  is  made  for  loss  of  time,  evidence  showing  the  value  of 
such  time  and  of  the  damages  sustained  must  be  given,  or  there 
can  be  no  award  therefor,  except  nominal  damages.4     In  deter- 


R.  R.  Co.,  22  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  164; 
Brignioli  v.  Chicago  &  G.  E.  Ry.  Co., 
4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  182;  Grant  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 41  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  381;  Wallace  v. 
Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  C.  442; 
Oliver  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  3  Oreg. 
84;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Frantz,  127  Pa.  St.  297;  Scott  v. 
Montgomery,  95  Pa.  St.  444;  McLaugh- 
lin v.  Corry,  77  Pa.  St.  109;  Penn., 
etc.,  Canal  Co.  v.  Graham,  63  Pa.  St. 
290;  Hanover  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coyle,  55 
Pa.  St.  396;  Howard  Oil  Co.  v.  Davis, 
76  Tex.  630;  San  Antonio  &  P.  II.  R. 
Co.  v.  Keller,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  569; 
32  S.  W.  847;  Washington  &  <;.  K. 
Co.  v.  Patterson,  25  Wash.  L.  R.  36; 
9  App.  D.  C.  42:1 ;  Carpenter  v.  Mex- 
ico Nat.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Wash.  L.  R. 
630;  Woodward  v.  Hoscobel,  84  Wis. 
226;  54  N.  W.  332;  Kinney  v. 
Crocker,  18  Wis.  74;  Phillips  v. 
Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  4  Q.  B.  D.  406; 
Leclerc  v.  Montreal,  Rap.  Jud.  Que- 
bec, 15  C.  S.  205. 

-  Ostrander  v.  Lansing,  115  Mich. 
224;  73  N.  W.  110;  4  Det.  L.  N.  833. 

3  Leeds  v.  Metropolitan  Gas  L. 
Co.,  90  N.  Y.  26. 

*  Alabama  Mineral  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Marcus  (Ala.  S.  C.  1897),  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  490;  Seaboard  Mfg.  Co.  v. 


Woodson,  98  Ala.  378;  11  So.  733; 
Greensboro  v.  McGibbony,  93  Ga. 
672;  20  S.  E.  37;  Britton  v.  Grand 
Rapids  R.  Co.,  90  Mich.  159;  Howell 
v.  Independence,  67  Mo.  App.  317 
O'Brien  v.  Loomis,  43  Mo.  App.  29 
Baker  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  118  N 
Y.  533;  29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  936;  23  N.  E 
885,  arf'g  7  N.  Y.  St.  R.  68:  54  Supr 
394;  Staal  v.  Grand  St.  &  X.  R.  R 
Co.,  107  N.  Y.  625;  1  Silv.  C.  A.  516 
11  N.  Y.  St.  R.  352;  26  Wkly.  Dig.  241 ; 
Leeds  v.  Metropolitan  Gas  L.  Co., 
90  N.  Y.  26;  Nienclorfl  v.  Manhattan 
R.  Co.,  4  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  46;  38 
N.  Y.  Supp.  690;  Seitz  v.  Dry  Dock 
E.  B.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  56; 
If.  Daly,  204;  ION.  V.  Supp.  1;  Wood 
v.  Watertown,  34  N.  V.  St.  R.  808;  58 
nun(N.  Y.).  298;  Wynne  v.  Atlantic 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  11  Misc.  (N.  V.)  414;  35 
X.  Y.  Supp.  1034;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  737; 
McHugh  v.  Schlosser,  159 Pa.  St.  4S0; 
23  L.  R.  A.  574;  28  Atl.  291;  34 
W.  N.  C.  33;  24  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
285;  International  &  Or.  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sincock,  81  Tex.  503;  Houston  City 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Artusey  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1895),  31  S.  W.  819;  Gulf  C.  & 
S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Daniels  ilex.  Civ. 
App.  I,  29  S.  W.  426.  Dm  see  Fisher 
v.  Jansen,  128  111.  649;  21  V    E.  598. 

279 


§  229 


LOSS    OF    TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 


mining  what  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  value  of  plaintiff's  time  to 
permit  the  consideration  of  this  element  by  the  jury,  it  is  de- 
cided that  evidence  of  what  the  plaintiff  usually  did  and  of 
the  value  per  day  of  such  services  is  sufficient.5  So  in  another 
case  it  was  held  sufficient  where  the  plaintiff  testified  that  as  a 
result  of  the  injury  she  was  unable  to  do  the  work  which  she 
had  formerly  done  or  any  other  work  and  there  was  sufficient 
evidence  upon  which  an  estimate  could  be  made  by  the  jury  as 
to  the  length  of  her  disability  though  there  was  no  proof  as  to 
the  exact  time  thereof.6  And  again  where  loss  of  time  was 
shown,  but  there  was  no  evidence  of  what  the  plaintiff  actually 
lost  in  money,  it  was  held  that  nominal  damages  might  be  given.7 
But  proof  merely  of  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  had  been  engaged 
in  business  prior  to  the  injury  but  had  not  been  able  to  attend 
to  the  same  since  is  not  sufficient  to  permit  the  consideration  of 
loss  of  time  by  the  jury,  there  being  no  evidence  as  to  the  value 
of  his  time,  the  business  in  which  he  was  engaged  or  any  other 
facts  from  which  the  jury  might  be  able  to  estimate  the  value  of 
the  time  lost.8  Although  in  the  case  of  an  action  to  recover  for 
personal  injuries  to  a  minor  it  is  held  that  though  there  may  be 
no  evidence  specially  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  plaintiff's 
earning  capacity  after  reaching  the  age  of  twenty-one  it  will  not 
prevent  the  allowance  of  loss  of  future  earnings  as  an  element 
of  the  damages  which  he  may  recover.9 

§  229.  Evidence — Loss  of  time— Earnings  and  diminished 
ability. — For  the  purpose  of  showing  the  pecuniary  injury  sus- 
tained by  reason  of  loss  of  time  and  diminished  ability  to  labor, 
evidence  is  admissible  of  the  earnings  of  the  person  injured  be- 
fore and  at  the  time  of  the  injury  and  subsequent  thereto.10 


6  Wynne  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  Co., 
14  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  414;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1034;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  737. 

6  Howell  v.  Independence,  G7  Mo. 
App.  317. 

7Niendorff  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  4 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  46;  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
690. 

8  Leeds  v.  Me.  Gas  L.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  26. 

9  Bartley  v.  Trorlicht,  49  Mo.  App. 
214. 

280 


10  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Woods, 
115  Ala.  527;  22  So.  33;  Alabama 
M.  R.  Co.  v.  Marcus,  115  Ala.  389; 
22  So.  135;  Alabama  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Griffith,  63  Ark.  491;  39  S.  W.  550; 
Roche  v.  Redington,  125  Cal.  174;  57 
Pac.  890;  Atlantic  Consol.  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bates,  103  Ga.  333;  30  S.  E. 
41;  Broyles  v.  Prisock,  97  Ga.  643; 
25  S.  E.  389;  City  of  Kankakee  v. 
Steinbach,  89  111.  App.  513;  City  of 


IMPA1KKD    EARNING    CAPACITY. 


§229 


So  in  showing  an  impairment  of  earning  capacity  in  a  certain 
employment,  evidence  is  admissible  of  the  wages  usually  paid 
therein  for  expert  help  and  that  plaintiff  had  been  accustomed 
to  do  expert  work,  but  can  no  longer."  And  though  plaintiff 
may  at  time  of  injury  have  been  engaged  in  other  than  his 
regular  employment,  yet  evidence  is  admissible  of  his  average 
earnings  in  his  regular  employment.1-  So,  also,  though  the 
plaintiff  may  not  have  been  engaged  in  any  employment  for 
several  years  prior  to  the  injury,  yet  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
what  business  he  understood  and  could  enter  upon,  and  what 
wages  would  be  open  to  him  but  for  his  injuries,  evidence  is 
admissible  as  to  the  occupation  he  was  formerly  engaged  in.u 
And  it  has  been  held  proper  for  plaintiff  to  testify  as  to  the  rea- 


Elgin  v.  Anderson,  89  111.  App.  527; 
Chatsworth  v.  Rowe,  166  111.  114; 
46  N.  E.  763,  aff'g  66  111.  App.  55; 
Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Meeeh,  16:) 
111.  305;  45  N.  E.  290;  Bailey  v. 
Centreville,  108  Iowa,  20;  78  N.  W. 
831;  Grimmelnian  v.  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.  (Iowa.S.  C.  1897),  1  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  237;  Braithwaite  v.  Hale,  168 
Mass.  38;  46  N.  E.  398;  Murdock  v. 
N.  Y.  &  B.  Desp.  Co.  (Mass.  S.  J.  C. 
KS97),  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  263;  McKor- 
mick  v.  West  Bay  City,  110  Mich. 
265;  68  N.  W.  148;  3  Det.  L.  N.  342; 
Palmer  v.  Winona  Ry.  &  L.  Co. 
(Minn.  1899),  80  N.  W.  869;  Lincoln 
v.  Beekmau,  23  Neb.  677;  37  N.  W. 
693;  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  N.  Y. 
264;  Beisiegel  v.  New  York  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  9;  Mclntyre  v. 
N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  280; 
Grant  v.  Brooklyn,  41  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
381;  Walker  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  63  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  260;  Brignioli  v.  Chicago  & 
Great  E.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Daly  (N.  Y. ),  182; 
Palmer  v.  Conant,  58  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
33;  34  N.  Y.  St.  R.  816;  128  N.  V. 
577;  Stone  v.  Poland,  81  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
132;  62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  731;  30  N.  V. 
Supp.  748;  Simonin  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.),  214; 
Carples  v.  New  York  &  H.   R.  Co., 


16  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  158;  44  N.  Y. 
Supp.  670;  Quinn  v.  O'Keefe,  9  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.j  68;  41  X.  Y.  Supp.  116; 
Miller  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  73  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  512;  56  X.  Y.  .St.  R.  189;  26 
X.  Y.  Supp.  162;  Symous  v.  Met. 
St.  R.  Co.,  58  X.  Y.  Supp.  327;  27 
Misc.  502;  Campbell  v.  Syracuse,  20 
Wkly.  Dig.  (X.  Y.)  449;  Wallace  v. 
Western  X.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  X. 
C.  442;  10  S.  E.  552;  Alliance  v. 
Campbell  (C.  C),  3  Ohio  Dec.  630; 
Wade  v.  Leroy,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  343; 
Parshall  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  Fed.  649;  Phillips  v.  Southw. 
R.  R.  Co.,  5  C.  P.  Div.  280;  5  Q.  B. 
Div.  78;  4  Q.  B.  Div.  406. 

11  Fiukin  v.  Elm  City  Brass  Co.,  73 
Conn.  423;  47  Atl.  670. 

BGalesburg  v.  Hall,  45  HI.  App. 
290.  See  also  Rayburn  v.  Central 
Iowa  By.  Co.,  74  Iowa,  637. 

15  Peterson  v.  Seattle  Traction  To. 
(Wash.  1901),  65  Pac.  54:'>.  aff'g  6:: 
Pac.  539.  Where,  however,  plaintiff 
had  been  engaged  in  do  employment 
for  a  period  of  live  years  prior  to  the 
injury,  evidence  as  to  the  wages  he 
had  formerly  received  therein  was 
held  inadmissible.  West  Clue.  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Maday,  1S8  111.  308;  58  N. 
E.  933,  aff'g  S8  III.  App.  49. 

281 


§  230  LOSS    OF    TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 

sonable  worth  of  his  time  after  the  date  of  the  injury,  if  he  had 
been  in  his  usual  health.14  But  where  a  person  is  working  for 
a  certain  sum  per  day,  week  or  month,  the  wages  actually  lost 
is  the  measure  of  damages  and  not  the  market  value  of  the 
average  wages  of  a  man  of  the  plaintiff's  average  capacity  work- 
ing in  the  same  employment.15  And  evidence  as  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  continuance  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  employ  of  a 
company  after  he  was  injured,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
character  of  the  work  performed  by  him,  both  before  and  after 
the  injury,  is  competent  upon  the  question  of  how  much  the  in- 
juries have  impaired  his  earning  capacity.16  But  evidence  of 
the  plaintiff's  aggregate  earnings  which  are  the  result  of  the  use 
of  capital,  and  do  not  depend  upon  his  skill  or  services,  is  in- 
admissible.17 Nor  is  it  proper  for  a  plaintiff  to  testify  as  to 
what  his  time  is  worth  to  him.  The  evidence  should  be  as  to 
the  reasonable  value  of  his  time.18  And  again,  under  general 
allegations  of  loss  arising  from  inability  to  work,  evidence  is  not 
admissible  of  the  inability  to  fulfill  a  special  engagement,  but 
the  evidence  should  be  confined  to  the  ordinary  earnings  or 
wages  of  plaintiff.19 

§  230.  Same  subject  continued.— Where  in  an  action  for 
personal  injuries  the  plaintiff  seeks  a  recovery  for  loss  of  time 
or  diminished  capacity  for  earnings,  evidence  is  admissible  as 
to  the  occupation  of  the  injured  person  prior  to  the  injury  and 
that  he  received  a  stated  monthly  salary,  and  that  as  a  result  of 
the  injury  he  has  been  deprived  of  his  position  and  salary  for  a 
certain  length  of  time.3  And  he  may  show  that  in  addition  to  his 
salary  from  his  regular  employment  his  earnings  were  increased 
by  other  means.21  So  evidence  is  admissible  of  the  fact  that 
plaintiff  was  accustomed  to  go  out  nursing,  and  that  since  the 


14  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bell 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  58  S.  W.  614. 

15 Braithwaite  v.  Hall  (Mass.  S.  J. 
C.  1897),  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  623. 

^  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Volk,  151  U. 
S.  73;  38  L.  Ed.  78;  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 


Holland,    19    Wkly.    Dig.    (N.    Y.) 
312. 

18  Atchison    v.   Atchison,    9    Kan. 
App.  — ;  57  Pac.  248. 

19  North   Chicago  L.    &  R.  Co.   v. 
Barber,  77  111.  App.  277. 


239.  20Broyles   v.  Prisock,  97   Ga.  643; 

"Johnson  v.  Manhattan   Ry.  Co.,    25  S.  E.  389. 
52  Hun  (N.  Y.),  Ill;  23  N.  Y.  St.  R.        21  Wilkie  v.  Raleigh  &  C.  F.  R.  Co., 
388;  4  N.   Y.    Supp.    848;  Hartel  v.  I  127  N.  C.  203;  37  S.  E.  204. 

282 


IMPAIRED    EARNING    CAPACITY.  §   231 

injury  she  had  had  several  calls  to  go  out  for  this  purpc 
And  evidence  that  a  person  was,  prior  to  the  injury,  engaged  for 
a  period  of  two  years  in  studying  a  profession,  and  that  since 
the  injury  he  had  been  unable  to  labor,  was  held  admissible, 
such  evidence  in  connection  with  his  appearance  and  the  testi- 
mony of  physicians  that  he  was  permanently  disabled  by  dis- 
ease, being  held  sufficient  to  justify  a  finding  of  impairment  of 
earning  capacity.23  As  evidence  of  the  occupation  of  an  in- 
jured person  is  admissible,  so  on  the  other  hand  it  is  proper 
to  admit  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  learned  no  business  or 
trade,  lias  no  education  and  can  do  no  office  work.'1  But  evi- 
dence of  the  wages  paid  in  larger  towns  to  journeymen  dur- 
ing the  period  of  an  injured  journeyman's  disability,  where, 
prior  to  the  injury,  he  was  working  for  less  wages  than  those 
sought  to  be  proved,  has  been  held  to  be  inadmissible.''  And  in 
an  action  by  a  draughtsman  for  injuries  to  his  hands,  fancy 
drawings  and  sketches  made  by  him,  but  which  have  no  con- 
nection with  his  business,  are  inadmissible  on  the  question  of 
special  damages  claimed  by  him  for  inability  to  continue  his 
business.35 

§  231.  Loss  of  time— Earnings— Not  recoverable  where 
wages  are  paid  —Evidence. — In  an  action  to  recover  damages 
for  a  physical  injury,  loss  of  time  or  earnings  is  not  an  element 
to  be  considered  in  the  estimation  of  such  damages,  if  it  appear 
that  the  injured  person  has  been  paid  his  regular  salary  and 
been  in  receipt  of  the  same  earnings  during  the  period  of  his 
disability  that  he  was  before  the  injury.-'7  Therefore,  if  in  such 
an  action,  evidence  of  loss  of  wages  lias  been  given,  evidence  is 
competent  to  show  that  the  employer  paid  the  plaintiff's  wages 
while  he    was  disabled.'3"      But  where    evidence  is    introduced 


a  Heddle  v.  City  Elec.  R.  Co.,  112 
Midi.  547;  70  X.  W.  1006;  4  Det.  L. 
X.  104. 

•■"  McGanahan  v.  New  York,  XII  & 

II.  R.  Co.,  171  Miss.  I'll  :  .",0  X.  E.  CIO. 

«  McCoy  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co. 
(Wis.  i,  59  X.  W.  45:]. 

as  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Ry- 
burn  (Neb.),  58  X.  W.  541. 

•»  Freeland  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 


Co.,  54   A.pp.   Div.  (X.  V.)  90;  66  N. 
V.  Supp.  321. 

27  Ephland  v.  Missouri  P.  K.  Co., 
57  Mo.  App.  147;  Montfiim  >rj  .  etc., 
K.  Co.  v.  Mallear,  92  Ala.  209; 
Chelinsky  v.  Iloopes  &  T.  Co.,  I 
Marv.  (Del.)  -27:5;  40  Atl.  127. 

28  Drinkwatcr  v.  Dinsmore,  B0  X. 
Y.  390;  30  Am.  Hop.  624,  rev'g  16 
Hun  250. 

283 


§§  232,  233  LOSS   OE   TIME,  EARNINGS    and 

showing  that  the  plaintiff  had  received  other  employment  sub- 
sequent to  his  injury  in  the  same  line  in  which  he  was  em- 
ployed at  the  time  he  received  the  injury,  it  is  held  that  he  may 
give  in  evidence  the  fact  that  he  required  and  received  help 
from  others  in  his  work.29 


§  232.  Prospect  of  increased  earnings. — As  a  general  rule 
in  order  to  authorize  a  recovery  for  any  loss  in  the  future  as  a 
result  of  personal  injuries,  such  loss  must  be  reasonably  certain 
and  not  a  merely  possible  loss  or  damage  which  may  ensue.  So 
in  such  an  action  evidence  is  not  admissible,  as  bearing  on  the 
question  of  damages,  of  an  injured  person's  possible  chances  of 
promotion  or  of  his  obtaining  higher  wages.30  The  prospect  of 
increased  wages  or  earnings  of  an  injured  person  may,  however, 
in  some  cases  be  so  reasonably  certain  as  to  permit  of  a  recovery 
therefor.  So  where  an  injured  person  was,  as  a  result  of  an  in- 
jury, obliged  to  give  up  her  position,  it  was  held  that  evidence 
was  admissible  that  she  had  been  promised  an  increase  of  salary 
within  a  short  time  by  her  employer.31  And  in  another  case  it 
was  held  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  a  prospect  of  increased 
earnings  as  well  as  to  a  diminution  of  capacity  to  earn  money 
with  advanced  age,  though  there  was  no  allegation  in  reference 
thereto,  where  evidence  had  been  given  without  objection  as  to 
such  earning  capacity.32 

§  233.  Loss  of  time— Business. — In  an  action  to  recover  for 
an  injury  sustained  by  a  person  engaged  in  business,  loss  of  time 
is  an  element  to  be  considered  in  estimating  the  damages  recov- 
erable therefor,  and  in  order  to  assist  the  jury  in  arriving  at  a 
fair  estimate  of  the  compensation  allowable  for  this  element,  it  is 
proper  to  consider  the  business  the  plaintiff  is  engaged  in,  the 
nature  and  extent  of  such  business,  the  importance  of  his  per- 
sonal oversight  and  superintendence  in  conducting  it,  and  the 


29  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zapp  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  49  S.  W. 
673. 

80  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott, 
149  U.  S.  266;  3  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  837;  3 
L.  Ed.  728.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  1 

284 


3i  Bryant  v.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  R.  & 
B.  Co.,  98  L.wa,  483;  67  N.  W.  392. 

32  Atlanta  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Owings,  97  Ga.  663;  33  L.  R.  A. 
798;  25  S.    E.    377;  5   Am.    &    Eug. 


IMPAIRED    EARNING    CAPACITY. 


consequent  loss  arising  from  his  inability  to  prosecute  it.83  So 
in  a  New  York  case**  it  was  said  by  the  court  that  "  the  plain- 
tiff had  the  right  to  prove  the  business  in  which  he  was  engaged, 
its  extent,  and  the  particular  part  transacted  by  him  and,  if  he 
could,  the  compensation  usually  paid  to  persons  doing  such  busi- 
ness for  others."35  So  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  extent  of 
the  plaintiff's  business  in  an  action  by  a  contractor  for  personal 
injuries,  evidence  is  admissible  of  a  particular  contract  into 
which  he  has  entered.36  And  an  official  stenographer  may  in  an 
action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  him,  testify 
as  to  the  employment  of  typewriters  by  him  before  the  injury, 
and  the  amount  he  was  paying  them  per  month,  such  evidence 
being  relevant  as  to  the  extent  of  the  decrease  of  his  business.37 
So  again  it  has  been  held  proper  to  permit  the  plaintiff  to  testify 
that  he  had  been  compelled  to  sell  out  his  business  by  reason  of 
his  being  unable  to  attend  to  same,  although  it  was  said  that  the 
fact  that  he  had  sold  out  the  business  was  not  material  to  the 
question  of  damages,  but  that  the  fact  that  he  was  unable  to 
carry  on  the  same  was.5.  But  though  evidence  is  admissible  of 
the  nature  of  the  plaintiff's  business  and  the  value  of  his  services, 
yet  the  opinions  of  witnesses  as  to  the  amount  of  his  loss  is  held 
not  admissible.31'  Again,  it  may  be  impracticable  in  some  cases  to 
accurately  measure  the  value  of  the  plaintiffs  services  in  his  busi- 


88  Nebraska  v.  Campbell,  2  Black 
(U.  S. ),  590;  Wade  v.  Leroy,  20  How. 
(U.  S.)  34;  West  Chicago  Street  R. 
Co.  v.  Carr,  170  111.  478;  48  N.  E. 
992,  affg'  67  111.  App.  530;  Keyes  v. 
Cedar  Falls,  107  Iowa,  509;  78  X.  W. 
227;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  It.  Co.  v. 
Posten,  59  Kan.  449;  53  Pac.  465; 
11  Am.  &  Eng.  R  Cas.  X.  S.  138; 
Silsby  v.  Mich.  Car  Co.,  95  Mich. 
204;  54  N.  W.  761;  Joslin  v.  Graud 
Rapids  Ice  Co.,  53  Mich.  322;  Rogan 
v.  Montana  C.  R.  Co.,  20  Mont.  503; 
52  Pac.  206;  New  Jersey  Express 
Co.  v.  Nichols,  33  N.  J.  L.  434;  Wal- 
ker v.  Erie  Ry.  Co..  03  Barb.  ( N.  Y.) 
260;  Beckwith  v.  New  York  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  64  Barb.  ( N.  Y.)  299; 
Master  ton   v.   Mount  Vernon,  58  N. 


Y.  391;  Lincoln  v.  Saratoga,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)425;  Lynch  v. 
Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  Snpp. 
311;  1  Sil.  361;  123  N.  Y.  657;  Kin- 
ney v.  Crocker,  18  Wis.  74. 

;t4  Masterton  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  58  \. 
Y.  391. 

85  Per  Grover,  J.  See  also  Silsby 
v.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  95  Mich.  204; 
54  X.  W.  761. 

36  Schwartz  v.  North  Jersey  St.  Ry. 
Co.  (N.  J.  Sup.  1901),  49  Atl.  676. 

87  Macon  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barnes,  113  Ga.  212;  38  S.  E.  766. 

88  Keyes  v.  Cedar  Falls,  107  Iowa, 
509;  7S  N.  W.  227. 

89  Lincoln  v.  Saratoga  R.  R.  Co., 
23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  425. 

285 


§  234  LOSS   OF   TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 

ness  by  any  general  scale  of  remuneration,  owing  to  the  nature 
of  the  business.  In  a  ease  of  this  kind  it  was  held  not  errone- 
ous to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be 
awarded  for  time  lost  was  left  to  the  "sound  discretion  of  the 
jury  under  the  evidence."  *  In  another  case  where  the  plain- 
tiff:' was  engaged  in  the  restaurant  business  on  her  own  account, 
it  was  held  proper  to  admit  evidence  of  what  was  the  market 
value  of  her  services  to  others  in  that  business,  though  she  had 
never  worked  for  any  other  person.41 

§  234.    Loss   of  time — Partners — Evidence.— Where   the 

business  in  which  a  person  injured  was  engaged  was  a  partner- 
ship one,  he  may  give  evidence  of  his  earnings  from  such  busi- 
ness, where  the  partnership  was  one  which  merely  employed  the 
services  of  the  parties.43  And  evidence  of  the  value  of  the  serv- 
ices of  a  partner  to  his  firm  both  before  and  after  the  accident 
is  admissible.43  And  without  regard  to  a  person's  interest  in  a 
partnership  he  may,  in  case  of  physical  injury  causing  a  loss  of 
time  to  him  in  such  business,  recover  the  value  of  his  services.44 
But  where  a  person  was  in  partnership  with  another  engaged 
in  the  business  of  a  steam  thresher,  which  he  had  sold  out  but 
in  which  he  proposed  to  engage  in  again,  an  estimate  by  such 
person  of  the  annual  value  of  his  labor  was  held  incompetent  to 
show  the  extent  of  his  damages,  especially  where  it  was  not 
shown  in  what  proportions  the  earnings  of  the  former  business 
were  divided  between  the  partners.45  Again,  where  one  of  the 
members  of  a  partnership  is  injured,  an  agreement  entered  into 
between  the  partners,  subsequent  to  the  accident,  as  to  the 
amount  which  shall  be  deducted  from  the  injured  partner's  share 
in  the  business,  is  held  to  be  inadmissible  in  an  action  by  him  to 
recover  damages  for  such  injury.46 


40  Rogan  v.  Montana  C.  R.  Co.,  20 
Mont.  503;  52  Pac.  206. 

41  Harmon  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co. 
(Mass.  S.  J.  C.  1897),  2  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  717. 

42  Thomas  v.  Union  R.Co.,  18  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  185;  45  N.  Y.  Supp. 
920. 

286 


43  Mt.    Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Isaacs,  18  Ohio  C.  C.  177. 

44  Kendall  v.  Albia,  73  Iowa,  241. 
«  Boston  &  A.  R.    Co.  v.  O'Reilly, 

158  U.  S.  334;  39  L.  Ed.  1006;  15  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  830. 

46  Mt.   Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Isaacs,  18  Ohio  C.  C.  177. 


IMPAIRED    EARN1M.    CAPACITY 


§  235.  Loss  of  profits.— In  many  cases  where  the  plaintiff  lias 
been  engaged  in  business  there  lias  been  an  endeavor  to  recover 
for  a  loss  of  profits  which  he  claims  to  have  sustained.  There 
may  be  instances  where  the  profits  may  be  reasonablj  estimated 
by  calculation,  and  where  they  are  so  definite  and  certain  that 
this  is  possible,  then  damages  for  loss  thereof  may  be  allowed,  but 
as  a  general  rule  they  are  too  uncertain  in  amount  and  subject 
to  too  many  contingencies  to  constitute  a  sab-  guide  in  determin- 
ing the  amount  of  compensation.17  So  the  loss  of  profits  in  con- 
ducting a  business  in  which  the  labor  of  others  is  employed  is 
not  an  element  of  damages  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  ;  ls 
but  the  value  of  the  plaintiff's  services  in  conducting  such  a 
business  is  the  measure  of  damages.49  And  where  evidence 
was  offered  by  plaintiff  to  show  the  profits  of  bis  business  and 
was  admitted  under  objections,  it  was  held  not  to  be  such  as  to 
enable  the  jury  to  intelligently  perform  its  duty  of  finding  the 
earnings  of  the  plaintiff  after  allowing  for  interest  on  capital 
invested  and  for  the  energy  and  skill  of  his  partners.50  But  it 
has  been  held  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  "if  a  man  has  an 
ordinary  business,  yielding  ordinary  receipts,  he  will  be  entitled 
to  recover  the  diminution  of  those  receipts  resulting  from  such 
injury."  M 

§  236.  Loss  of    time— Earnings — Professional   men — In 

actions  by  professional  men  to  recover  for  physical  injuries  sus- 
tained by  them,  evidence  is  admissible  of  past  earnings  in  order 
to  enable  the  jury  to  properly  estimate  the  value  of  their  serv- 

Rubber  Co.,  54  Wis.  208;  41  Am.  Rep. 
19;  Kinney  v.  Crocker,  18  Wis.  74. 

«  Silsby  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  95 
Mich.  204;  54  X.  W.  761;  Blate  v. 
Third  Ave.  R  Co.,  29  App.  Div.  X. 
Y.  388;  51  X.  Y.  Supp.  590;  Marks 
v.  Long  Island  K.  R,  Co.,  3  X.  Y.  St. 
R  562. 

49Silsby  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  95 
Mich.  204;  54  X.  \V.  761;  Marks  v. 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  3  N.  V.  Si  R 
562. 

w  Boston  &  A.  K.i:.  Co.  \.  O'Reilly, 
158  U.  S.  334. 

61  Kinnev  v.  Crocker,  18  Wis.  74. 

287 


«  Boston*  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Reilly, 

158  U.  S.  334;  Lombardi  v.  Califor- 
nia Street  Cable  R.  Co.,  124  Cal.  311; 
57  Pac.  66;  Silsby  v.  Michigan  Car 
Co.,  95  Mich.  204;  54  N.  W.  761; 
Masterton  v.  Mt  Vernon,  58  X.  Y. 
391;  Blate  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  29 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)388;  51  N.  Y.  Supp. 
590;  Johnson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co., 
52  Hun  (X.  Y.),  Ill;  4  N.  Y.  Supp. 
848;  Mark  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
3  N.  Y.  St.  R.  562 :  Goodhart  v.  Penn. 
R.  Co.,  177  Pa.  St.  1;  35  Atl.  L91; 
5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  364;  38 
W.  X.  C.  545;  Bierbach  v.  Goodyear 


§  236 


LOSS    OF    TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 


ices,  and  therefore  the  damages  recoverable  for  loss  of  earnings 
and  diminished  capacity  for  labor.  Although  the  earnings  of 
professional  men  may  in  a  certain  sense  be  uncertain  and  for 
this  reason  have  been  said  to  be  similar  to  profits  of  a  business, 
yet  they  differ  from  the  latter  in  that  they  are  entirely  the  re- 
sult of  personal  labor  and  skill  aside  and  independent  of  the 
use  of  capital  and  the  labor  of  others,  while  the  latter  are  not  as 
a  general  rule.  The  earnings  of  a  professional  man  depend 
upon  his  personal  ability,  skill  and  learning  personally  and  in- 
dividually applied  to  the  pursuit  of  his  profession,  and  receipts 
in  past  years  therefrom  are  reasonably  certain  of  continuance 
subsequent  to  the  injury  to  the  same  or  to  an  increased  extent, 
so  that  the  loss  of  earnings  sustained  by  a  professional  man  as 
the  result  of  an  injury,  may  be  calculated  to  a  reasonably  certain 
degree  by  proof  of  his  earnings  prior  to  the  injury.52     So  a  phy- 


M  Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell,  2 
Black  (U.  S.),  590;  Wade  v.  Leroy, 
20  How.  (U.  S.)  34;  Parshall  v.  M. 
&  St.  L.  K.  Co.,  35  Fed.  649;  Cleve- 
land, C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Gray, 
148  Ind.  266;  46  N.  E.  665;  8  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  48;  Indianapo- 
lis v.  Gaston,  58  Ind.  224;  City  of 
Warsaw  v.  Fisber  (Ind.  App.  1899), 
55  N.  E.  42 ;  Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa, 
64  Iowa,  251;  Holmes  v.  Halde,  74 
Me.  28;  Collins  v.  Dodge,  37  Minn. 
503;  Mason  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  App.  1;  1  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  295;  New  Jersey  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Nicbols,  32  N.  J.  L.  166;  Quinn  v. 
O'Keefe,  9  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  68;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  116;  Nasi)  v.  Sharp,  19 
Hun  (N.  Y. ),  365;  Baker  v.  Manhat- 
tan Ry.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  Super.  394; 
Maclennan  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
20  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  22:  Phillips  v.  L. 
&  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Q.  B.  Div.  78;  41 
L.  T.  S.  121,  aff  g  4  Q.  B.  Div.  406. 
The  admissibility  of  snch  evidence, 
however,  was  commented  upon  in 
the  case  of  Masterton  v.  Mount  Ver- 
non, 58  N.  Y.  391,  in  the  following 
terms  :   "  In  Walker  v.  Erie  Railway 

288 


Company,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  260,  it  was 
held  that  proof  of  the  amount  of  in- 
come derived  by  the  plaintiff  for  the 
year  preceding  the  injury  from  the 
practice  of  his  profession  as  a  law- 
yer was  competent.  This  goes  be- 
yond the  rule  adopted  in  any  of  the 
other  cases,  and  it  certainly  ought 
not  to  be  further  extended.  Whether 
proof  of  the  income  derived  by  a 
lawyer  from  the  practice  of  his  pro- 
fession is  competent  for  the  purpose 
of  authorizing  the  jury  to  draw  an 
inference  as  to  the  extent  of  the  loss 
sustained  by  inability  to  personally 
attend  to  business  may,  I  think,  well 
be  doubted.  There  is  no  such  uni- 
formity in  the  amount  of  different 
years,  as  a  general  rule,  to  make  such 
inference  reliable. "  This  case,  how- 
ever, was  one  of  the  considerations 
of  profits  from  business  as  an  ele- 
ment of  damages,  and  did  not  involve 
the  question  of  evidence  as  to  past 
earnings  or  income  of  professional 
men.  The  principle  we  have  stated 
in  the  text  is  sustained  by  the  weight 
of  authority. 


IMPAIRED    EARNING    CAPACITY. 

sician  may  introduce  evidence  of  the  extent  of  his  practice  and  of 
his  earnings  prior  to  the  injury  and  subsequent  thereto,58  and  of 

the  loss  of  certain  patients  as  a  result  of  the  injury,5*  and  that  his 
profession  was  his  only  means  of  support.88  And  in  ;i  similar  ac- 
tion hy  a  lawyer  proof  of  the  income  derived  from  his  practice  for 
the  year  preceding  his  injury  is  admissible.38  So  also  in  the  case 
of  an  architect,  evidence  of  his  average  yearly  earnings  is  proper. 
Where,  however,  a  physician  seeks  to  recover  for  loss  of  practice 
sustained  as  a  result  of  an  injury,  the  defendant  may  introduce 
evidence  as  to  his  professional  reputation  and  as  to  the  unlaw- 
fulness of  his  practice.™  But  though  a  practicing  physician 
may  have  no  such  medical  degree  as  would  entitle  him  to  main- 
tain an  action  for  his  services  as  a  physician,  yet  he  may  recover 
for  loss  of  husiness  resulting  from  personal  injuries  due  to  the 
negligence  of  another.""9 

§  237.  Loss  of*  time— Earnings— Canvasser  or  travelling 
salesman  on  percentage  basis.— A  canvasser  or  travelling  sales- 
man whose  income  is  not  a  definite  fixed  sum  but  is  determined 
on  a  percentage  basis,  the  gross  amount  thereof  depending  upon 
the  individual's  personal  ability  and  skill,  may,  as  in  the  cases 
of  professional  men  where  a  physical  injury  has  been  sustained, 
show  the  amount  of  his  earnings  in  previous  years.  The  income 
of  this  class  of  men,  like  that  of  a  professional  man.  may  van  in 
the  years  prior  to  the  injury,  and  be  uncertain  for  any  period 
subsequent  thereto,  yet  the  proof  of  past  earnings  will  furnish 
the  best  possible  basis  to  estimate  the  pecuniary  loss.     This  evi- 


63  Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell,  2 
Black  (U.  S.),  590;  Wade  v.  Leroy, 
20  How.  (U.  S.)  34;  Cleveland,  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Gray,  148  Ind. 
2(50;  46  N.  E.  675;  8  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  48;  Mason  v.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  App.  1:  1 
Mo.  App.  Rep.  295;  Quinn  v.  O'Keefe, 
9  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  68;  41  N.  Y. 
Supp.  110;  Maclennan  v.  Long  Is- 
land R.  K.  Co.,  20  J.  &  S.  (  N.  Y.)  22; 
Phillips  v.  L.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  4  Q.  B. 
Div.  406;  5  Q.  B.  Div.  78. 

M  Maclennan  v.   Long  Island  R.  R.  | 

19  289 


Co.,  20  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.l  22;  Phillips 
v.  L.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  4Q.  B.  Div.  406. 

66  Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa,  C>4  Iowa. 
251. 

H  Walker  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
Barb.  (N.  V.)  200. 

,T  New  Jersey  Ex.  ('<■.  v.  Nichols, 
32  N.  J.  L.  166. 

68  Jacques  v.  Bridgeport  Horse 
R.  R.  Co.,  41  Conn.  61:  19  Am.  Rep. 
483. 

59  Holmes  v.  Ilalde,  74  Me.  28;  43 
Am.  Rep.  567. 


§§  238,  239        loss  of  time,  earnings  and 

dence  of  past  earnings  shows  what  the  services  of  the  plaintiff 
were  worth  to  himself,  and  what  he  was  capable  of  earning,  and 
show  with  sufficient  certainty  what  his  earnings  would  have 
been  subsequent  to  the  injury.60  So  it  is  proper  to  admit  evi- 
dence of  the  annual  earnings  of  a  book  canvasser,  who  was 
working  on  a  percentage  basis,  for  a  period  of  six  or  seven 
years  prior  to  the  accident.61  And  where  one  had  been  engaged 
in  selling  electrical  apparatus,  evidence  of  his  previous  earnings, 
consisting  of  the  difference  between  the  price  he  was  required 
to  obtain  for  the  manufacturer,  and  that  at  which  the  apparatus 
was  sold,  was  held  admissible.62 

§  238.  Loss  of  time — Earnings — Peddler. — A  peddler  suing 
to  recover  damages  for  a  negligent  physical  injury  may  give  evi- 
dence of  his  occupation,  the  amount  of  his  annual  sales,  and  the 
percentage  made  thereon  in  the  usual  course  of  business,  such 
evidence  being  competent  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  jury 
to  properly  estimate  the  damages  for  the  loss  of  time  which  he 
has  sustained.63 


§  239.  Total  or  partial  incapacity — English  workmen's 
act — Construction  of. — The  English  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  of  1897  w  provided  that  in  case  of  a  workman  being  totally 
or  partially  incapacited  by  an  injury,  he  should  receive  a  com- 
pensation of  a  weekly  payment,  during  the  period  of  his  inca- 
pacity after  the  second  week,  not  exceeding  fifty  per  cent  of  his 
average  weekly  earnings,  during  the  previous  twelve  months, 
if  he  had  been  so  long  employed,  but  if  not,  then  for  such  period 
as  he  had  been  in  the  employ  of  the  same  employer.  In  deter- 
mining the  average  weekly  wages  under  this  act,  it  is  held  that 


6»  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson  (C. 
C.  App.  7th  C),  76  Fed.  517;  46 
U.  S.  App.  300;  22  C.  C.  A.  306;  1 
Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  583;  Rio  Grande 
&  Western  R.  Co.,  5  Col.  App.  121; 
38  Pac.  76;  Paul  v.  Omaha  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  500;  Ehrgott  v. 
New  York,  96  N.  Y.  264,  rev'g  66 
How.  Pr.  161. 

si  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  N.  Y. 
264,  rev'g  66  How.  Pr.  161. 
290 


62 Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson 
(C.  C.  App.  7th  C),  76  Fed.  517;  46 
U.  S.  App.  300;  22  C.  C.  A.  306;  1 
Chic.  L.   J.  Wkly.  583. 

63  Hanover  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coyle,  55 
Pa.  St.  396.  See  also  Fenistein  v. 
Jacobs,  15  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  474;  72  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  698;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  345. 

<*Sched.  1,  cl.  1  (b). 


IMPAIRED    EARNING    CAPACITY.  §  240 

if  the  employment  is  under  the  same  employer,  the  entire  twelve 
months  are  to  be  considered,  and  this  is  not  altered  by  the  fact 
of  a  change  in  the  character  of  the  employment  or  of  the  amount 
of  wages."''  In  order,  however,  to  consider  the  entire  twelve 
months,  the  period  of  employment  must  have  been  a  continuous 
one.  Thus  where,  during  the  previous  twelve  months  there  had 
been  a  strike,  during  which  the  employee  had  not  worked,  it  was 
held  that  in  determining  his  average  weekly  wages  only  the  period 
of  time  he  had  worked  subsequent  to  the  termination  of  the  strike 
under  anew  agreement  was  to  be  considered,  and  not  the  period 
preceding  the  strike.66  The  injury,  however,  must,  it  would 
seem,  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  cause  a  decrease  in  the  em- 
ployee's earning  capacity  or  earnings,  in  order  that  he  may  lie 
entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act.  So  where  an  employee  lost 
a  part  of  his  thumb  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  it  was  held 
that  he  was  not  entitled  to  compensation  or  payment  under  the 
act,  as  for  a  partial  incapacity  for  that  period  of  time,  subse- 
quent to  the  accident,  during  which  he  was  employed,  though 
in  a  different  line  of  work,  at  the  same  wages  which  he  received 
prior  to  the  accident.'17 

§  240.  Loss  of  time,  earnings,  etc.— Pleading  of,  as  special 
damages. — As  a  general  rule,  if,  in  an  action  for  personal  in- 
juries, the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  for  any  special  loss  which  he 
has  sustained  as  a  consequence  of  such  injury,  the  pleadings 
must  contain  an  allegation  of  such  special  damage.  So  there 
are  numerous  cases  which  hold  that  in  such  an  action  there  can 
be  no  evidence  admitted  as  to,  and  no  recovery  for,  loss  of  time, 
earnings,  diminished  earning  capacity,  or  any  permanent  injury, 
unless  the  loss  thereof  is  averred  as  special  damages  in  the  com- 
plaint.68    So  it  has  been  held  that  there  must  be  allegations  of 

<*Price  v.   Marsden  (C.  A.)  [1899],  Taylor    v.     Monro.',     43    Conn.    36; 

1  Q.  B.  493;  08  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  307.  Tomlinson   v.   Derby,  4:5  Conn.   562; 

66  Jones  v.  Ocean  Coal  Co.  (C.  A.  i  Denton  v.  Ordway,  108  Iowa.  487;  79 
[1899],  2Q.  B.  124;  08  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  \.  \V.  271:  Shultz  v.  Griffith,  10:? 
S.  731.  I<»wa.  150;  72  N.  W.  445;  40  L.  R.  A. 

67  Irons  v.  Davis  (C.  A.)  [1899],  2  117;  Homan  v.  Franklin  Co.  (Iowa), 
Q.  B.  330;  08  L.  J.  Q.   B.  N.  S.  673.  57    N.  W.    70:5 :   Baldwin    v.  Western 

68Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Donnelly  Railroad,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  333;  Ed- 
(C.  C.  App.  7th  C),  87  Fed.  135  wards  v.  St.  Louis  K.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  IV 
59  U.  S.   App.   708;  30  C.    C.  A.  580;    Mo.  App.  257;  2  Mo.  A.pp.  Rep.  412; 

291 


§  241 


LOSS    OF    TIME.  EARNINGS    AND 


special  damage  to  permit  evidence  of  former  earnings  ; ro  of 
damages  to  the  business  of  a  farmer;70  of  occupation  and  means 
of  earning  support;71  of  loss  of  time  and  wages;7*  of  disability 
to  carry  on  business ; ",:!  of  future  pain  and  anguish,74  and  of  the 
permanency  of  personal  injuries." 

§  241.  Loss  of  time— Earnings— Recovery  for  and  evidence 
admissible  under  general  allegations.— Although  as  we  have 
stated  in  the  preceding  section  there  are  numerous  cases  hold- 
ing that  to  permit  a  recovery  for  loss  of  time,  earnings,  or  dimin- 
ished earning  capacity  there  must  be  special  averments  of  such 
damage,  yet  there  is  also  a  large  number  of  cases  in  which  such 
damage  has  not  specially  been  alleged,  but  the  court  has  per- 
mitted evidence  of  and  recovery  for  such  loss  under  general 
allegations.  So  a  plaintiff  may  recover  in  an  action  for  personal 
injuries  for  inability  to  work  at  his  ordinary  and  usual  employ- 
ment though  the  declaration  contains  only  a  general  averment 
of  such  inability  caused  by  the  injury,  and  consequent  loss 
and  damage,76     And  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  amount 


Safferv.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co., 

5  N.  Y.  Supp.  700;  24  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
210;  2  Silv.  S.  C.  43;  Texas  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Buckalew  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
34  S.  W.  165.  But  see  Ava  v.  Grena- 
walt,  73  111.  App.  633;  Heltonville 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fields  (Ind.),  36  N.  E. 
5-29;  Bavtley  v.  Trorlicht,  49  Mo. 
App.  214;  Schmitz  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 

6  S.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),  23  L.  R.  A.  250; 
24  S.  W.  472;  Howard  v.  Stiles,  54 
Neb.  26;  74  N.  W.  399;  Rosevelt  v. 
Man.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  St.  R.  894;  59 
N.  Y.  Supp.  197;  13  N.  Y.  Supp. 
598,  affd  133  N.  Y.  537;  44  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  929;  30  N.  E.  1148;  Tyler  v.  Third 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  18  Mise.  (N.  Y.)  165;  75 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  913;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  26. 
Also  see  cases  in  next  section  where 
such  evidence  is  held  admissible  and 
recovery  allowed  under  general  al- 
legations. 

69Fitchburg    R.    Co.    v.    Donnelly 
(C.  C.   App.  7th  C),  87  Fed.  135;  59 
V.  S.  App.  70S;  30  C.  C.  A.  580. 
292 


70Homan  v.  Franklin  Co.  (Iowa), 
57  N.  W.  703. 

71  Baldwin  v.  Western  Railroad  Co., 
4  Gray  (Mass.),  333. 

72  Edwards  v.  St.  Louis  K.  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  79  Mo.  App.  257;  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  412. 

73Saffer  v.  Dry  Dock  R.  Co.,  5  N. 
Y.  Supp.  700;  24  N.  Y.  St.  R.  210;  2 
Silv.  S.  C.  43. 

7*Shultz  v.  Griffith,  103  Iowa,  150; 
40  L.  R.  A.  117;  72  N.  W.  445. 

75  Denton  v.  Ordway,  108  Iowa,  487; 

79  N.  W.  271.  In  another  case  in 
this  same  state  evidence  of  plaintiff's 
future  disability  was  held  admissible 
under  an  allegation  that  plaintiff 
"believes  her  injuries  will  incapaci- 
tate her  from  performing  manual 
labor  for  the  rest  of  her  life."  Mc- 
Farland  v.  Muscatine,  98  Iowa,  199; 
67  N.  W.  233. 

76  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son, 182   111.  298;  55   N.  E.  366,  aff'g 

80  111.  App.  71;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co. 


IMPAIRED    EARNING    CAPACITY. 


§241 


of  wages  earned  by  the  plaintiff  under  an  allegation  that  he  is 
prevented  from  attending  to  his  duties  as  a  manufactory  em- 
ployee." Again,  where  the  declaration  contained  no  statement 
as  to  any  business  in  which  plaintiff  was  engaged  or  that  he 
was  obliged  to  relinquish  the  same  as  the  result  of  the  injury,  it 
was  held,  nevertheless,  that  evidence  was  admissible  as  to  the 
business  in  which  he  was  engaged  and  that  he  was  incapacitated 
from  pursuing  the  same,  as  exhibiting  the  extent  of  the  injury, 
and  that  it  was  followed  by  loss  of  time  which  had  to  him  a 
pecuniary  value.7.  And  again,  an  averment  that  plaintiff  was 
"  hindered  from  transacting  her  business  affairs  "  was  held  suffi- 
cient to  authorize  the  admission  of  evidence  that  she  was  engaged 
in  work  for  which  she  received  one  dollar  per  day.7'  And  under 
a  similar  averment  evidence  of  the  income  of  the  plaintiff  before 
and  after  the  injury,8"  and  of  her  employment  as  a  nurse  and  of 
her  earnings  in  such  capacity'1  has  been  held  admissible.  So 
where  the  defendant  fails  to  move  for  a  more  specific  statement, 
a  prayer  for  judgment  because  of  a  permanent  injury  to  plaintiff's 
limb  has  been  held  sufficient  to  permit  the  plaintiff  to  prove 
damages  for  loss  of  earning  capacity  resulting  from  such  in- 
jury/2 And  an  allegation  that  prior  to  the  injury  the  plaintiff 
was  healthy,  active,  and  able-bodied,  but  that  as  a  result  of  such 


v.  Meecb,  163  111.  305:  45    X.  E.  290.  I 
But  it  is  held  in  this  last  case  that  if 
the  plaiu  tiff  seeks  to  recover  for  loss 
of    profits    or    earnings,  which   are 
dependent  upon  the  performance  of 
some  special  contract  or  engagement,  ; 
such  special  contract  or  engagement 
together  with  the  facts    on  which   it . 
is  based   must  be  set  out  in  the  dec- 1 
laration. 

77  Russell  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  35 
Misc.  Rep.  (N.  Y. )  293:  71  X.  Y. 
Supp.  765. 

"Wade  v.  Leroy,  20  How.  (U.  S.) 
34. 

79  Chatsworth  v.  Rowe,  1G6  111.  114; 
40  N.  E.  763,  aff  g  66  111.  App.  55. 
See  also  North  Chicago  Street  R.  Co. 
v.  Brown,  178  111.  187;  52  N.  E.  804, 
affg  76  111.  App.  654,  where  recovery 


was  allowed  for  lessened  capacity  to 
attend  to  business,  the  allegation 
being  that  she  was  prevented  "from 
attending  to  the  transaction  of  her 
affairs."  See  also  Luck  v.  Ripon,  53 
Wis.  196.  But  in  a  ease  in  Connec- 
ticut it  was  held  that  evidence  of 
plaintiff's  occupation  and  earnings 
was  inadmissible  under  an  allegation 
that  he  was  "prevented  from  at- 
tending to  his  ordinary  business." 
Tomlinson  v.  Derby,  43  Conn.  562. 

"Chicago  A  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Meech, 
163  111.  305;  45  X.  E.  290. 

81  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
80  111.  App.  71;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
41,  aff'd  1S2  111.  298;  55  X.  E.  366. 

w  Bailey  v.  Centerville,  108  Iowa, 
20;  78  N.  W.  831. 

29S 


§242 


LOSS    OF    TIME,  EARNINGS    AND 


injury  she  has  been  totally  incapacitated  from  any  work  or  exer- 
cise, has  become  permanently  disabled  and  will  not  be  able  to  do 
any  work  or  exercise,  has  been  held  sufficient  to  permit  evidence 
of  inability  to  perforin  work  subsequent  to  the  injury  and  of 
what  she  could,  have  earned  by  ordinary  labor.83  And  plaintiff 
may,  it  is  held,  show  loss  of  earnings  where  the  complaint  al- 
leges that  he  is  unfitted  from  carrying  on  his  vocation  and  has 
lost  and  will  lose  the  earnings  of  his  labor.*1 


§  242.  Loss  of  time  Earnings,  etc.— Recovery  for  and  evi- 
dence admissible  under  general  allegations— Continued. — Un- 
der an  allegation  that  as  a  result  of  injuries  sustained  "  plaintiff 
has  suffered  great  bodily  and  mental  anguish  and  has  been  unable 
to  follow  his  business  or  perform  any  kind  of  labor,"  evidence 
is  admissible  of  his  inability  to  earn  such  wages  subsequent  to 
the  injury  as  he  had  received  before.85  So,  also,  under  the  allega- 
tion that  plaintiff  has  been  rendered  "  incapable  of  labor,"  evi- 
dence of  his  customary  earnings  is  admissible.86  And  again, 
evidence  of  loss  of  earnings  was  held  to  be  properly  admitted 
under  an  allegation  that  plaintiff  had  been  compelled  to  remain 
from  work  for  six  weeks,87  and  for  a  period  of  one  month.83  And 
similar  evidence  is  admissible  under  a  general  averment  of  dam- 
ages in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  though  the  complaint 
contains  no  allegation  as  to  loss  from  inability  to  pursue  his 
ordinary  vocation.89  So  again,  recovery  was  permitted  for  loss 
of  customers  and  consequent  profits  under  a  general  allegation 
of  damages  by  an  accident  in  which  the  plaintiff  received  per- 
sonal injuries,  and  his  milk  wagon  and  horse  were  injured,  where 


83  McKormick  v.  West  Bay  City, 
110  Mich.  26.:.;  68  N.  W.  148;  3  Det. 
L.  N.  342.  But  see  Slaughter  v. 
Met.  St.  R.  Co.,  116  Mo.  269;  23  S. 
VV.  760,  where  it  is  held  that  evi- 
dence is  not  admissible  of  loss  of  time 
and  earnings  under  an  allegation 
that  the  "  injury  is  permanent  and 
will  render  the  plaintiff  a  cripple  for 
life.1' 

84  Gerdes  v.  Christopher  &  S.  A.  I. 
&  F.  Co.  ( Mo. ),  25  S.  W.  557,  aff'd  27 
S.  W.  616. 

294 


85Gurley  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Mo.), 
26  S.  W.  953. 

86  Popp  v.  New  York  Central  Rail- 
road, 26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  639;  7  N.  Y. 
Supp.  249. 

87Carples  v.  N.  Y.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  158;  44  N.  Y. 
Supp.  670. 

88Doherty  v.  Lord,  8  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
227. 

89  Cabot  v.  McKane,  1  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
495. 


IMPAIRED    BARKING    CAPACITY. 


§  242 


there  was  no  .special  averment  of  such  damage.'0  So,  also, 
though  the  complaint  contained  no  allegation  as  to  the  rate  of 
earnings  of  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  that  evidence  was  admissi- 
ble as  to  the  rate  of  his  earnings  under  allegations  stating  that 
the  plaintiff  was  a  skill  till  carpenter,  the  nature  of  the  injuries 
which  were  necessarily  such  as  to  impair  his  ability  to  perform 
the  work  of  his  calling,  and  permanent  disability  from  transact- 
in^  his  business.91  And  evidence  of  plaintiff's  diminished  earn- 
ing  capacity  has  been  held  admissible  under  an  allegation  of  in- 
capacity to  make  a  livelihood.92  So  again,  under  the  allegation 
that  the  plaintiff  had  lost  the  permanent  and  efficient;  use  of  her 
foot  and  leg  and  was  a  cripple  for  life.93  And  damages  for  loss 
of  time  may  be  awarded  under  an  averment  that  plaintiff  was 
confined  to  his  bed  for  a  certain  length  of  time  and  stating  the 
amount  which  he  was  earning  at  sueh  time.34  And  in  trespass 
on  the  case  to  recover  for  injuries  caused  by  gunshot  wounds 
inflicted  by  defendant's  servants,  it  is  held  that  evidence  of  the 
loss  of  power  to  have  offspring,  resulting  directly  and  proxi- 
mately from  the  nature  of  the  wound,  may  be  received  and  con- 
sidered by  the  jury,  although  the  declaration  does  not  specify 
such  loss  as  one  of  the  results  of  the  wound.95 


*> O'Connor  v.  Nat.  Ice  Co.,  21  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  907;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  537, 
aff'd  121  N.  Y.  661;  30  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
1014;  24  N.  E.   1092. 

9i  Christie  v.  Galveston  City  R.  Co., 
39  S.  W.  638;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  260. 

»2  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beam  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  50  S.  W. 
411. 


93  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W.  771. 

94  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Templeton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  25  S. 
W.  135,  aff'd  2(5  S.  W.  1066;  59  Am. 
&  Eng.   R.  Cas.  191. 

as  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
122  l*.    S.  597;    1  Russell    &    Wins- 
low's  Syllabus  Dig.  U.  S.  Rep.  1118. 
295 


§248 


PERMANENT    INJURIES  — PROSPECT1VK    LOSS. 


CHAPTER  X. 


PERMANENT    INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE   LOSS. 


§  243.   Permanent  injuries — Prospec- 
tive loss — Generally. 

244.  Prospective    loss  —  Must    be 

reasonably  certain. 

245.  Same  subject  continued. 

246.  Prospective  loss — Permanent 

injuries — Must  be  evidence 
as  to. 

247.  Permanent  injury  or  disabil- 

ity may  be  inferred. 


248.  Prospective  loss — Permanent 

injury — Mode   of  assessing 
damages  for. 

249.  Prospective  loss — Permanent 

injury — Mode   of    assessing 
damages  for — Continued. 

250.  Past  and    prospective   loss — 

Recovery  for  in  one  action. 


§  243.  Permanent  injuries— Prospective  loss— Generally. 

— Where  a  personal  injury  has  been  sustained,  the  loss  or  dam- 
age resulting  therefrom  may  exist  not  only  in  the  past  or  up  to 
the  time  of  the  trial,  but  may  also  be  a  continuing  loss  extend- 
ing into  the  future.  There  may  be  an  impairment  of  the  mental 
or  physical  powers  which  is  a  permanent  one,  causing  future 
suffering  and  pain  as  well  as  a  prospective  decrease  in  earnings 
and  earning  ability.  For  this  future  or  prospective  damage 
there  can  be  no  positive  fixed  measure  of  compensation,  yet  in 
all  such  cases  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  that  the  one  responsible 
for  the  injury  or  damage  shall  make  compensation  to  the  person 
injured  for  such  prospective  loss  based  upon  the  facts  and  evi- 
dence in  each  case.1 


1  Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Put- 
nam, 118  U.  S.  545;  Campbell  v. 
Pullman  Pal.  C.  Co.,  42  Fed.  484; 
Robertson  v.  Cornelson,  34  Fed. 
716;  Steamer  New  World  v.  King,  16 
How.  (U.  S.)  472;  Soutb  &  N.  A.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  McLennon,  63  Ala.  266; 
Eddy  v.  Wallace  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C), 
4  U.  S.  App.  264;  49  Fed.  801;  Union 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones  ( C.  C.  App.  8th  C. ), 
4  U.  S.  App.  115;  49  Fed.  343;  St. 
296 


Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dobbins,  60 
Ark.  481;  30  S.  W.  887;  Bay  Shore 
R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  67  Ala.  6;  Malone  v. 
Hawley,  46  Cal.  409;  Brown  v.  Green, 
1  Penn.  (Del.)  535;  42  Atl.  991;  At- 
lanta, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  66 
Ga.  259;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shreve,  171  111.  438;  49  N.  E.  534, 
aff'g  70  111.  App.  666;  Central  R.  Co. 
v.  Serf  ass,  153  111.  379;  39  N.  E.  119, 
aff'g  53  111.  App.   448;  Lake  Shore, 


PERMANENT    I  N.I  (   I:  I  ES       PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


244 


§  244.  Prospective  loss-  Must  be  reasonably  certain.— In 
order  to  authorize  the  recovery  of  present  damages  for  a  pro- 
spective loss,  it  must  appear  that  the  occurrence  of  such  loss  or 


etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  135  III 
641;  20  N.E.  510;  Sheridan  v.  Hib- 
bard,  110  111.  307;  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  03  111.  107;  Kerr  v. 
Forgue,  54  111.  482;  5  Am.  Rep.  140 
ami  note  148;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cleminger,  77  111.  App.  180,  aff'd 
53  N.  E.  320;  178  111.  536;  Wabash 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan  (Ind.),  31  N.  E. 
661;  Indianapolis  v.  Gaston,  58  End. 
224;  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 20 Ind.  App.  576;  51  N.  E.  128; 
Nappanee  v.  Ruckman.  7  Ind.  App. 
361;  34  N.  E.  00!);  Laird  v.  Cliicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  100  Iowa,  336;  09 
N.  W.  414;  Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  & 
P.  R.  Co.,  71  Iowa,  41;  Fry  v.  Du- 
buque&S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  416: 
Collins  v.  Council  Bluffs,  32  Iowa, 
324;  Miller  v.  Boone  County,  95  Iowa, 
5;  63  N.  W.  352;  Townsend  v.  Paola, 
41  Kan.  591;  Kan.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pointer,  9  Kan.  620;  Central  P.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  86  Ky.  578;  Wardle 
v.  New  Orleans  City  K.  K.  Co.,  35 
La.  Ann.  202;  Jones  v.  City  of  Deer- 
ing,  94  Me.  165;  47  Atl.  140;  M.M.i 
hon  v.  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  3'.)  End.  438; 
Johnson  v.  Northern  Pac.  K.  R.  Co., 
47  Minn.  430;  50  X.  W.  473;  Mem- 
phis, etc..  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitfield,  44 
Miss.  466;  Taylor  v.  Scherpe  &  K. 
Architectural  Iron  Co.,  133  Mo.  349; 
34  S.  W.  581;  Gorham  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc,  K.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  408; 
Plumner  v.  Milan,  79  Mo.  App.  439; 
1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  000;  Sioux  City  &  1'. 
R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  22  Neb.  775;  36  X. 
W.  285;  Cohen  v.  Eureka  &  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  Nev.  370;  Bolyoke  v.  <;.  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  4S  X.  II.  542;  Shalor  v.  Bdwy 
Imp.  Co.,  102  X.  Y.  041;  57  X.  E. 
1124,  aff'g  22  App.  Div.  102;  47  X.  Y. 
Supp.  815;   Ayres  v.  Del.,  etc.,  R.    R 


Co.,  158  X.  Y.  254;  Kan.-  v.  N.  V.  V 
II.  A  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  132  X.  Y.  100;  4:i 
N.  V.  St.  R.  41)4;  30  V  E.  250:  Dol- 
lanl  v.  Roberts.  130  X.  V  269;  41  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  2:.:;:  II  L.  l;.  A.  238;  29  N. 
E.  104;  Feeney  v.  Lou«,r  Island  R.  R. 
Co.,  110  X.  Y.  375;  20  N.  V.  St.  R. 
729;  22  X.  E.  402;  Filer  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R,  R  Co.,  49  X.  Y.  42;  Drew 
v.  Sixth  Ave.  R  R.  Co.,  20  X.  V.  49; 
Curtis  v.  Rochester,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  18 
N.  Y.  534;  Crank  v.  Forty-Second 
St.,  etc.,  Ry.  Co..  53  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
425;  25  N.  Y.  St.  R.  53;  6N.  Y.  Supp. 
229,  aff'd  127  X.  Y.  048;  37  N.  Y.  St. 
R.966;  27  X.  1-;.  850;  Record  v.  Sara- 
toga Springs,  40  Hun  (X.Y.),  44S;  12 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  395;  27  W.  D.  500,  aff'd 
120  N.  Y.  046;  M  X.  Y.  St.  R.  998; 
24  N.  E.  1102;  filacer  v.  Third  A\e. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  J.  &  S.  ( X.  Y. )  401 ;  Pill 
v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  0  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  207;  57  X.  Y.  St.  R.  78:):  27 
X.  Y.  Supp.  230;  Beckwith  v.  N.  V. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Barb.  (X.  Y.  1 
299;  Walker  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
Barb.  (X.  Y. )  200;  Morse  v.  Auburn 
&  Syracuse  R.  I,'.  Co.,  10  Barb.  1  X. 
Y.)  021;  Clark  v.  Westcott,  2  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  503:  37  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1111;  Wallace  v.  Western  R  R.  Co., 
104  X.C.  442:Smedley  v.  Hestonville. 
M.  &F.  Pass.  R.  Co.,  is  l  Pa.  St.  020; 
39  Atl.  544;  0  Am.  &  Eng.  II.  Cas  N 
S.  649;  12  W.  X.  C.  169;  McLaughlin 
v.  Cony.  77  Pa.  si.  109;  Pittsburg,  V. 
&  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Donahue.  70  I'enn. 
St.  119;  Fort  Worth  &  1  >.  C.  R  Co. 
v.  Robertson  (Tex.  1892),  14  L.  R.  A. 
781;  16  S.  \Y.  1093;  Giblin  v.  Mc- 
Intyre,  2rt.ili.3Sl:  Fulsome  v.  Con- 
cord, 46  Vt.  135;  Whitney  v.  Claren- 
don, 18  Vt.  252;  Waterman  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc..  R  R.  Co.,  B2  Wis.  613;  52 

297 


§244 


PERMANENT    INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


the  existence  of  a  disability  in  the  future  is  something  more 
than  a  mere  possibility  or  probability.  That  it  is  possible  or 
probable  that  pain  and  suffering  will  exist  in  the  future  as  a 
result  of  the  injury,  or  that  a  person's  earning  capacity  will  be 
less  in  the  future  than  it  was  before  the  injury  as  a  result 
thereof,  or  that  he  lias  been  permanently  injured,  is  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  authorize  a  recovery  for  prospective  loss.  Such 
loss  or  future  consequences  for  which  damages  are  sought  must 
be  such  as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  are  reasonably  cer- 
tain to  result  from  the  injury.'     In  this  connection  it  is  said  in 


N.  W.  247;  Stutz  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R. 
R.  Co.,  73  Wis.  147;  40  N.  W.  653; 
Hulihan  v.  Green  Bay  W.  &  S.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  68  Wis.  520;  Weisenberg  v. 
Appleton,  26  Wis.  56;  7  Am.  Rep.  39; 
Phillips  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  4Q. 
B.  D.  406,  aff'd  5  Q.  B.  Div.  78;  Hod- 
soil  v.  Stallebrass,  11  Ad.  &  E.  301; 
Fair  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
L.  T.  Rep.  326;  Fox  v.  St.  John,  23 
N.  B.  244.  See  chapter  IX,  herein  on 
loss  of  time,  earnings  and  impaired 
earning  capacity. 

2  Washington,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon, 147  U.  S.  571;  Ford  v.  Charles 
Warner  Co.,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  88;  37 
Atl.  39;  Swift  v.  Raleigh,  54  111.  App. 
44;  Ford  v.  Des  Moines,  106  Iowa,  94; 
75  N.  W.  630;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kennedy,  2  Kan.  App.  693; 
43  Pac.  802;  McBride  v.  St.  Paul  City 
R.  Co.,  72  Minn.  291;  75  N.  W.  231; 
L'Herault  v.  Minnenpolis,  69  Minn. 
261;  72  N.  W.  73;  Covell  v.  Wabash 
R.  Co.,  82  Mo.  App.  180;  Chilton  v. 
St.  Joseph,  143  Mo.  192;  Bigelow  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App. 
367;  Ay  res  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
158  N.  Y.  254;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  683; 
Kane  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
132  N.  Y.  160;  43  N.  Y.  St.  R.  494;  30 
N.  E.  256,  aff'g  31  N.  Y.  St.  R.  741;  9 
N.  Y.  Supp.  879;  Feeney  v.  Long  Is- 
land R.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  375;  Tozer 
v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  105  N. 

298 


Y.  617;  6  N.  Y.  St.  R.  447;  11  N.  E. 
369;  1  Silv.  C.  A.  371,  rev'g  38  Hun, 
100;  Strohm  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  305;  Filer  v.  N.  Y. 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  42;  Curtis 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  534; 
Webb  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  44  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  413;  60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  1087; 
Miller  v.  Ft.  Lee  Park  &  Steamboat 
Co.,  73  Hun  (N.  Y.),  150;  56  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  94;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  924;  Mee- 
teer  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  63  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  533;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  561;  45  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  704;  Gregory  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Hun  (N.  Y.),  303; 
28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  726;  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 
525;  Miley  v.  Broadway  &  Seventh 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  107; 
8  jST.  Y.  Supp.  455;  Koetter  v.  Man. 
R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  St.  R.  611;  13  N.  Y. 
Supp.  458,  aff'd  129  N.  Y.  668;  42  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  946;  30  N.  E.  65;  Clark  v. 
Nevada  Land,  etc.,  Co.,  6  Nev.  203; 
Root  v.  Monroeville  (Ohio  C.  C),  1 
Toledo  Leg.  News,  208;  Mo.  Pac.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  75  Tex.  77;  41 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  224;  12  S.  W. 
810;  Cameron  v.  Union  Tr.  Line,  10 
Wash.  507;  39  Pac.  128;  Kenyon  v. 
Mondovi,  98  Wis.  50;  73  N.  W.  314; 
Groundwater  v.  Washington,  92  Wis. 
56;  65  N.  W.  871;  Kucera  v.  Merrill 
Lumber  Co.,  91  Wis.  637;  65  N.  W. 
374;  2  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S. 
590;  Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co., 


PERMANENT    INJURIES      PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


§  245 


one  case.  "  Future  consequences  which  are  reasonably  to  lie  ex- 
pected to  follow  an  injury  may  be  given  in  evidence  for  the 
purpose  of  enhancing  the  damages  to  be  awarded.  Bui  to  en- 
title such  apprehended  consequences  to  be  considered  by  the 
jury,  they  must  be  such  as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  are 
reasonably  certain  to  ensue.  Consequences  which  are  contin- 
gent, speculative  or  merely  possible,  are  not  proper  to  be  con- 
sidered in  ascertaining  the  damages.  It  is  not  enough  that  the 
injuries  received  may  develop  into  more  serious  conditions  than 
those  which  are  visible  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  nor  even  that 
they  are  likely  to  so  develop.  To  entitle  a  plaintiff  to  recover 
present  damages,  for  apprehended  future  consequences,  there 
must  be  such  a  degree  of  probability  of  their  occurring  as 
amounts  to  a  reasonable  certainty  that  they  will  result  from  the 
original  injury."8  And  where  the  evidence  shows  that  an  in- 
jury is  permanent  and  that  subsequent  mental  or  physical  pain 
is  reasonably  certain,  there  is  sufficient  basis  for  compensation 
for  future  suffering.4 

§  245.  Same  subject  continued.— An  instruction  in  an 
action  for  personal  injuries  that  recovery  may  be  had  for  such 
pain  and  suffering  as  the  plaintiff  is  "  likely  to  endure  in  the 
future"  as  a  result  of  the  injury  is  erroneous.3  As  is  also  an 
instruction  that  the  jury  may  award  damages  for  injuries  likely 
to  be  permanent.*'  And  an  instruction  that  to  justify  a  recovery 
of  damages  for  permanent  injuries  there  must  be  a  "reasonable 
probability"  of  the  permanency  of  the  injury  is  also  erroneous.7 
But  it  is  not  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they  may  award 
damages  for  such  future  pain  and  suffering  as  they  "may  be- 


89  Wis.  371;  27  L.  K.  A.  365;  61  N. 
W.  1101.  Hut  see  Ball  v.  Mabry  (Ga.), 
is  s.  E.  64. 

BStrohm  v.  \.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  K.  R, 
Co.,  9ti  N.  Y.  30."),  and  quoted  in  A\  res 
v.  Del.  L.  A.-  \V.  R.  R.  Co.,  158  N.  Y. 
254;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  G83. 

4  Smiley  v.  St.  Louis  &  H.  Ry.  Co., 
100  Mo.  629;  61  !S.  W.  667. 

kRurera  v.  Merrill  Lumber  Co.,  91 
Wis.  637;  65  N.  YV.  374;  2  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.   X.  S.  590;  Hardy  v. 


Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  183;  61  N. 
\V.  771.  But  see  Scott  v.  Montgo- 
mery, 95  Pa.  St.  444;  Cameron  v. 
Union  Trunk  Line,  10  Wash.  507; 
39  Pac.  128. 

1  Meeteer  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  63 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  533;  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
561;  45  N.  Y.  St.  K.  704. 

7  Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  < 
Wis.  371;  27  L.  R.  A.  865;  61  N.  W. 
1101.     But  see  Bailey  v.  Centerville, 
108  Iowa,  20;  78  X.  W.  831. 

299 


§  246 


PERMANENT     IN.HRIKS — PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


lieve  from  the  evidence  "  the  plaintiff  will  endure.8  And  an 
instruction  was  sustained  which  stated  that  if  the  jury  were 
satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  injury  was  per- 
manent, they  might  assess  damages  for  such  pain,  suffering  and 
impairment  of  ability  to  earn  a  livelihood  as  he  must  suffer  in 
the  future.9  So,  also,  a  charge  that  there  might  be  a  recovery 
for  "  all  damages  present  or  future  which,  from  the  evidence, 
can  be  treated  as  the  necessary  result  of  the  injury,"  was  held 
not  to  be  erroneous  where  the  court  also  enumerated  all  the  ele- 
ments of  damage  and  recovery.10  But  it  is  proper  to  refuse  to 
instruct  the  jury  that  they  should  not  assess  damages  for  merely 
possible  or  even  probable  future  effects  not  then  apparent,  since 
such  an  instruction  would  tend  to  convey  the  impression  that 
the  future  results  for  which  recovery  might  be  had  must  be  not 
merely  reasonably  certain,  but  absolutely  certain.11 

§  246.  Prospective  loss— Permanent  injuries — Must  be  evi- 
dence as  to. — As  a  general  rule,  in  order  to  justify  an  allowance 
of  damages  for  permanent  injuries  or  any  prospective  loss  as 
the  result  of  a  personal  injury,  there  must  be  some  evidence 
before  the  jury  upon  which  to  base  it,  and  the  proof  must  be 
such  as  shows  that  the  consequences  for  which  an  allowance  is 
sought  are  reasonably  certain  to  exist  in  the  future.12     So  where 


8  Bigelow  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  367;  Taylor  v. 
Scherpe  &  K.  Architectual  Iron  Co., 
133  Mo.  349;  34  S.  W.  581;  Cameron 
v.  Union  Trunk  Line,  10  Wash.  507; 
39  Pac.  128. 

9  Kenyon  v.  Mondovi,  98  Wis.  50; 
73  N.  W.  314. 

10  Fordyce  v.  Jackson,  56  Ark.  601; 
20  S.  W.  597,  denying  reh'g  56  Ark. 
594:  20  S.  W.  528. 

11  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stoner  (C.  C.  App.  8th  (:.),  4  U.  S. 
App.  109;  49  Fed.  209;  1  C.  C.  A.  231. 

12  Western  LTn.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Morri- 
son (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  55  U.  S.  App. 
211 ;  83  Fed.  992 ;  28  C.  C.  A.  56 ;  Dud- 
ley v.  Front  St.  Cable  R.  Co.  (C.  C.  D. 
Wash.),  73  Fed.  128;  South  Chicago 
City  R.  Co.  v.  Walters,  70  111.   App. 

300 


271;  Wheeler  v.  Boone,  108  Iowa, 
235;  78  N.  W.  909;  44  L.  R.  A.  821; 
Ford  v.  Des  Moines,  106  Iowa,  94; 
75  N.  W.  630;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Archer,  46  Neb.  907;  65  N.  W. 
1043;  Crawford  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  121  N.  Y.  652;  24  N.  E.  1092;  23 
J.  &  S.  255;  Mosher  v.  Russell,  44 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  12;  6  N.  Y.  St.  R.  407; 
26  W.  D.  234;  Staal  v.  Grand  St.  & 
X.  R.  R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  625;  1  Silv. 
C.  A.  516;  11  X.  Y.  St.  R.  352;  25 
W.  D.  241,  rev'g  36  Hun,  208;  Daw- 
son v.  Troy,  49  Hun  (N.  Y.),  322;  17 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  559;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  137; 
Bloom  v.  Manhattan  Elev.  R.  Co.,  43 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  378;  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  812; 
Hayes  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  18  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  582;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  703; 
La  Fave  v.  City  of  Superior  (Wis. 


PERM  AN  EN  I    IN.f  LRIES  —  I'ROSl'Kf  TI  \  K    LOSS. 


§  24' 


there  is  no  evidence  as  to  future  pain,  or  that  the  earnings 
of  the  plaintiff  will  be  affected,  or  in  any  other  way  showing 
the  injury  to  be  permanent,  it  is  error  to  submit  the  issue  of 
permanent  injury  to  the  jury  or  to  instruct  them  thai  damages 
may  be  given  for  future  pain  or  loss  of  earnings.13  Ami  a  charge 
which  authorizes  the  assessment  of  damages  for  permanent  im- 
pairment of  health,  where  there  is  no  evidence  upon  which  to 
base  them,  is  declared  to  be  a  ground  for  reversal  unless  it 
clearly  appears  that  it  has  done  no  harm.1'  So  an  instruction 
as  to  recovery  of  damages  for  future  pain  and  suffering  is  also 
held  to  be  erroneous  where  there  is  no  evidence  to  warrant  it.  ' 
And  where  it  is  merely  shown  that  pain  or  suffering  may  exist 
in  the  future  it  is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  an  allowance  for 
any  prospective  loss  or  permanent  injury.111  So  testimony  by 
a  physician  that  the  plaintiff  was  likely  to  be  bothered  with  the 
injury  for  several  years  and  might  be  always,  at  least  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  such  as  overuse,  was  held  not  sufficient  to 
authorize  the  allowance  of  damages  for  permanent  injuries.1. 
Again,  where  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  for  the  future  impair- 
ment of  earning  capacity,  it  is  held  that  to  justify  an  award  of 
damages  therefor,  there  must  be  evidence  of  his  skill  and  capacity 
for  earning,  and  that  the  injury  will  affect  such  earning  capacity.18 
And  as  a  general  rule,  a  plaintiff  who  seeks  to  recover  prospect- 
ive damages  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  has  the  burden  of 
showing  that  his  injury  is  reasonably  certain  to  be  permanent.11' 

§  247.  Permanent  injury  or  disability  may  be  inferred. — 

Although  as  a  general  rule  evidence  must  be  given  to  show  that 


1809),  80  X.  W.  742;  Collins  v.  Janes- 
ville,  99  Wis.  464:  75  X.  W.  88. 

13  Maimone  v.  Dry  Dock,   E.  B.  & 

B.  R.  Co.,  58  App.  Div.  (N.  V.  i  388; 
68  N.  Y.  Supp.  107.). 

14  Western    Union    Teleg.    Co..    55 
U.  S.  App.  211;  8:'.  Fed.   992;  28  C. 

C.  A.  56;  Ross  v.  Kansas  City,  48 
Mo.  App.  440;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  K. 
Co.  v.  Archer,  46  Neb.  907:  85  X.  W. 
1043. 

15  Wheeler  v.  Boone,  108  Iowa,  235; 
78  X.  W.  909:  44  L.  R.  A.  821. 


16  Ford  v.  Des  Moines.  10ti  Iowa. 
94:  75  X.  W.  630. 

17  Collins  v.  Janesville,  99  Wis. 
464;  75  X.  W.  88. 

18  Staal  v.  Grand  St.  &  X.  K.  R. 
Co..  107  X.  Y.  625;  1  Silv.  C.  A.  516: 
11  X.  Y.  St.  K.  352;  25  W.  I).  241: 
Bietton  v.  Grand  Rapids  Street  R. 
Co.  (Mich.),  51  X.  W.  276;  La  Pave 
v.  City   of  Superior  i  Wis.    1899 

N.  W.  742. 

19  Dudley  v.  Front  St.  Cable  R.  Co. 
(C.  C.  I).  Wash.},  7::  Fed  128. 

301 


§  248  PERMANENT    INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE   LOSS. 

an  injury  is  permanent  in  order  that  recovery  may  be  had  there- 
for, yet  it  is  not  strictly  necessary  that  direct  evidence  to  estab- 
lish this  be  given  in  all  cases,  since  there  are  many  instances 
where  an  injury  is  such  that  it  may  reasonably  be  inferred  from 
the  nature  thereof  that  it  will  be  permanent.'-10  So  in  the  absence 
of  direct  evidence  that  an  injury  will  be  permanent,  if  there  is 
testimony  from  which  such  fact  may  be  inferred,  an  instruction 
authorizing  the  jury  to  assess  damages  therefor  is  properly  given.21 
And  in  a  2s lew  York  case  it  is  said  that  "prospective  disablement 
may  be  inferred  from  the  nature  of  the  injur}'  or  proved  by  the 
opinion  of  experts." '  And  in  another  case  in  this  state  it  was 
held  that  though  there  was  no  expert  testimony  showing  that 
an  injury  would  be  permanent,  yet  the  court  was  justified  in  in- 
structing the  jury  that  they  might  consider  "  the  lasting  or  per- 
manent character  of  the  injury  "  where  it  appeared  from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  struck  a  violent  blow  upon  the 
back  or  spine,  and  that  though  at  the  time  of  the  accident  she 
was  a  strong,  healthy  woman  fifty  years  of  age,  yet  that  at  the 
time  of  the  trial,  nearly  three  years  later,  she  was  still  suffering 
from  that  injury  and  under  treatment  therefor,  and  was  reduced 
in  weight,  and  was  physically  feeble.^ 

§  248.  Prospective  loss — Permanent  injury — Mode  of  as- 
sessing damages  for — If  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  it  ap- 
pears that  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  an  injury  or  disability  which 
will  be  permanent,  damages  therefor  may  be  awarded,  the  jury 
taking  into  consideration  the  age  and  reasonable  expectancy  of 
life  of  the  plaintiff,  the  amount  he  could  earn  before  the  injury 


20  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 20  Ind.  App.  576;  51  N.  E. 
128;  Cook  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
Mo.  329:  Ayres  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  158  N.  Y.  254;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
683;  Record  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  46 
Hun  ( N.  Y. ),  448 ;  12  N.  Y.  St.  R.  395 ; 
27  W.  D.  500,  aff'd  120  N.  Y.  646; 
31  N.  Y.  St.  R.  998;  24  N.  E.  1102; 
Horowitz  v.  Hamburg  -  American 
Packet  Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  24;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  54;  13  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
212. 

302 


21  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 20  Ind.  App.  576;  51  N.  E. 
128. 

22  Ayres  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  46 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  448;  12  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
395;  27  W.  D.  500,  aff'd  120  N.  Y. 
646;  31  N.  Y.  St.  R.  998;  24  N.  E. 
1102,  per  Vann,  J. 

23  Horowitz  v.  Hamburg-American 
Packet  Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  24;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  54;  13  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
212. 


PEBMANENT    INJURIES — PEOSPECTIVE    LOSS.  jj  248 

and  the  amount  he  was  able  to  earn  subsequent  thereto,  and  also 
any  future  pain  and  suffering.''  The  amount  of  compensation, 
however,  for  future  pain  and  suite  ring  is  not  capable  of  exact 
proofs  by  any  pecuniary  standard  but  must  be  estimated  by  the 
jury  in  connection  both  with  the  evidence  before  them  and  with 
their  knowledge,  observation  and  experience  in  the  affairs  of 
life.'-'  And  where  injuries  are  permanent,  the  jury  may,  in  es- 
timating the  damages,  consider  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  may 
suffer  more  from  other  ailments  which  she  may  have  than  she 
would  have  suffered  had  it  not  been  for  the  injury.26  So  tes- 
timony by  a  surgeon  is  admissible  that  plaintiff's  injuries  are  of 
such  a  character  that  childbearing  will  be  perilous  to  life.-'7 
The  compensation,  however,  for  future  disability  and  loss  of 
earnings,  while  not  susceptible  of  being  computed  by  a  strictly 
mathematical  calculation,  is  capable  of  more  exact  calculation 
than  is  that  for  future  pain  and  suffering  and  is  based  upon  evi- 
dence showing  the  age  of  the  person  injured,  his  expectancy  of 
life,  business  habits,  and  his  earning  capacity  and  the  decrease  or 
reduction  therein.28  In  this  connection  it  is  said  in  a  recent 
case  :  "  Evidence  may  be  given  of  the  age  of  the  party  injured, 
the  probable  duration  of  life,  the  effect  the  injury  has  had  upon 
the  ability  of  the  person  to  earn  money,  of  the  probability  that 
the  injurious  effect  on  the  ability  to  earn  money  will  continue 
in  the  future,  either  during  life  or  for  a  lesser  period,  and  of  the 
business  or  occupation  in  which  the  person  was  engaged,  and 
the  compensation,  whether  by  wages,  fees,  by  a  fixed  salary  or 
profits  that  resulted  therefrom ;  and,  from  the  facts  thus  proven 
in  evidence,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  award  such  fair  sum  as  will,  in 


«  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
22  Neb.  775;  36  X.  W.  285. 

26  North  Chicago  St.  K.  Co.  v.  Fitz- 
gibbons,  180  111.  460:  :>4  X.  E.  483, 
alFg  79  111.  App.  632. 

25  Crank  v.  Forty-Second  St.,  etc., 
R.  Co.,  53  Hud  |  X.  Y.  |,  425;  25  X.  V. 
St.  R.  53;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  'J-J'.t.  aff'd 
127  N.  Y.  648;  37  X.  Y.  St.  K.  966; 
27  N.  E.  850. 

27  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93 
Ala.  514;  9  So.  7^2:  47  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  500.     See  South  Covington  & 


C.  St.   Ry.    Co.  v.  Bolt,  22   Ky.  Law 
Rep.  906;  59  S.  W.  26. 

28  Denver  v.  Sherret,  60  U.  S.  A.pp. 
104:  31  C.  ('.  A.  449:  88  Fed.  226;  •"> 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  520;  Seaboard  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Woodson,  98  Ala.  378:  11  So. 
733.  And  see  East  Tennessee.  V.  A 
(J.  R.  Co.  v.  McClure,  94  Qa.  658;  l'O 
S.  E.  93;  Savannah,  A.  A:  M.  R. 
Co.  v.  McLeod,  94  Ga.  530;  20  S.  E. 
434.  See  chapter  IX  on  loss  of 
earnings,  time  and  impaired  earning 
capacity. 

303 


§  249 


PERMANENT    LN JURIES  — PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


their  judgment,  compensate  the  party  for  the  decreased  or  de- 
stroyed ability  to  earn  money  in  the  future,  due  allowance  being 
made  for  the  contingencies  and  uncertainties  that  inhere  in  such 
matters."  s  And  in  estimating  such  damages  it  is  held  also  that 
due  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  decrease  in  earning  capacity 
naturally  resulting  from  increased  age.30 

§  249.  Prospective  loss — Permanent  injury — Mode  of  as- 
sessing damages  for — Continued. — The  amount  which  would 
purchase  a  life  annuity  equal  to  the  difference  between  the 
earning  capacity  of  a  person  before  and  after  the  injury,  is  held 
to  be  the  measure  of  damages  for  permanent  disability  or  im- 
pairment of  earning  capacity.31  But  where  payments  for  future 
earnings,  for  the  loss  of  which  damages  are  claimed,  are  to  be 
anticipated  and  capitalized  in  the  verdict,  only  the  present 
worth  of  such  earnings  should  be  allowed.32  But  it  is  proper 
to  refuse  an  instruction  which  limits  the  recovery  to  such 
sum  as  would  represent  the  present  worth  of  future  earnings, 
calculated  on  a  basis  of  a  certain  per  cent  per  annum.33  Again, 
it  is  competent  for  a  witness  to  testify  as  to  the  present  worth 
of  the  services  of  the  plaintiff,  based  upon  his  expectation 
of  life,  upon  the  basis  of  his  ability  to  earn  annually  the  dif- 


29  Denver  v.  Sherret,  60  U.  S.  App. 
104;  31  C.  C.  A.  449;  88  Fed.  226;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  520,  per  Shiras,  D.  J., 
citing  Railroad  Co.  v.  Putnam,  118 
U.  S.  545;  7  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1;  Railway 
Co.  v.  Xeedham,  10  U.  S.  App.  339, 
351;  3  C.  C.  A.  129,  148;  52  Fed.  R. 
371,  378. 

30  Savannah,  A.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Leod,  94  Ga.  530;  20  S.  E.  434. 

31  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
thorne  (C.  C.  App.  6th  C),  43  U.  S. 
App.  113;  73  Fed.  634;  Houston 
&  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Tex.  318;  37 
Am.  Rep.  756.  See  Morrison  v.  Long 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  3  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
205;  73  N.  Y.  St.  R.  732;  38  N.  Y. 
Supp.  393. 

32  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Fan- 
(C.    C.    App.  8th  C),  56    Fed.  994; 

304 


6C.  C.  A.  211;  Goodhart  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.   Co.,   177  Pa.   St.  1;  35  Atl.  191; 

5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  364;  38 
W.  N.  C.  545.  See  also  The  William 
Branfoot,  48  Fed.  914;  Kinney  v. 
Tolkerts,  84  Mich.  616;  Fulsome 
v.  Concord,  46  Vt.  135.  But  where 
there  was  evidence  that  plaintiff's 
earning  capacity  had  not  been  totally 
destroyed,  it  was  held  to  be  reversi- 
ble error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if 
they  find  that  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
recover,  they  will  find  what  his  earn- 
ings will  or  would  be  for  the  length 
of  time  he  is  expected  to  live,  and 
then  reduce  it  to  its  present  value. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 
106    Ga.   130;    32  S.  E.  78;    12  Am. 

6  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  286. 

33  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 


PERMANENT    INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE    LOSS.  §   249 

ferent  amounts  which  the  evidence  tends  to  show.31  But  an 
allowance  as  damages  of  such  sum  as  will  at  legal  interest  pro- 
duce the  annual  amount  of  plaintiff's  earnings  in  previous 
years  is  not  proper  ;r>  nor  is  it  the  rule  that  the  jury  must  de- 
termine the  number  of  years  that  the  disability  will  continue  to 
exist  and  then  multiply  this  number  by  the  yearly  compensa- 
tion the  party  has  earned  in  the  past.''  And  in  a  case  in  Geor- 
gia it  is  held  that  the  present  worth  of  future  earnings  is  not 
correctly  arrived  at  by  ascertaining  the  entire  amount  of  such 
earnings  and  deducting  seven  per  cent  from  the  whole.*1  In 
Massachusetts  it  has  been  decided  that  where  a  judge  is  acting 
without  a  jury,  he  may  assess  the  damages  at  a  sum  equivalent  to 
the  worth  of  an  annuity  for  a  certain  number  of  years,  computing 
the  interest  at  a  specified  rate,  and  this  though  there  be  no  evi- 
dence of  what  an  annuity  of  such  an  amount  would  cost  for  such 
a  length  of  time.8  In  another  case  in  the  same  state  where  the 
plan  proposed  by  the  plaintiff's  counsel  for  determining  the 
amount  to  be  awarded  for  a  permanent  impairment  of  earning 
capacity  was  the  capitalization  of  the  annual  impairment,  a  charge 
which  pointed  out  the  injustice  of  such  method  and  stated  the 
principle  upon  which  annuities  were  computed,  but  which  did 
not  suggest  the  adoption  of  either  method  by  the  jury,  leaving 
it  for  them  to  adopt  such  method  as  the  facts  might  warrant,  was 
held  not  to  be  erroneous  where  the  defendant  made  no  request 
for  an  instruction  on  the  point.39  And  where  a  charge  did  not 
contain  any  rule  for  the  estimation  of  damages  for  the  loss  of 
future  earnings,  but  stated  that  the  jury  might  consider  plain- 
Kief  (Tex.  Civ.   App.  1900),  58  S.  W.    X.  Y.  St.  R.   732;   Rapson    v.  Cubitt, 


625. 

MStorrs    v.    Grand      Rapids.     110 


1  Car.  &  Marsh.  64. 
36  Denver  v.  Sherret,  60  U.  S.  App. 


Mich.  483;   68    X.   W.    258;    3    Det    104:   31    C.   C.    A.    449:  88  Fed.    226; 
L.  X.  474.  5  Am.  Neg.  Hep.  520. 

35  Gregory  v.   New  York,    L.   E.  &  '■      37  Macon.  D.  &.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 


W.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Hun  (X.  Y.),  303: 
28  X.  Y.  St.  R.  726;  8  X.  Y.  Supp. 
525;  Houston  &  T.  ('.  K.  R.  Co.  v. 
Willie,  53  Tex.  318:  37  Am.  Kep. 
715.  And  see  McDonald  v.  Chicago, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  124;  Morrison  v. 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co..  3  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.i  205;  38  X.  Y.  Supp.  ;'.f>3:  7:', 


99  Ga.  •-'_".':  •_'-,  S.  E.  460:  5  Am.  & 
Eng.  R  Cas.  X.  S.  355. 

*>Copson  v.  X.  Y.  X.  II.  &  II.  R. 
Co.,  171  Mass.  233:  50  X.   E.  618. 

89Rooney  v.  X.  Y.  X.  II.  cfe  H.  R. 
Co.,  17::  Mass.  222:  58  V.  K.  435: 
11  \m.  A-  Kng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  4l':>:  6 
Am.  [leg.  Rep.  78. 


■20  305 


§  250 


PERMANENT    INJURIES  —  PROSPECTIVE    LOSS. 


tiff's  earning  ability  before  the  injury  and  also  subsequent  there- 
to, and  "  allow  him  such  amount  as  you  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence he  is  justly  entitled  to,"  it  was  held  not  erroneous.40 

§  250.  Past  and  prospective  loss— Recovery  for  in  one  ac- 
tion.— Where  a  physical  injury  is  the  result  of  a  single  act,  not 
only  may  past  damages  be  recovered,  but  also  those  which  will 
arise  in  the  future  as  a  direct  result  of  the  injury.  And  since 
in  such  cases  successive  actions  cannot  be  brought  for  damages 
as  they  may  accrue,  if  a  person  seeks  to  recover  for  permanent 
injury  or  prospective  loss,  the  recovery  therefor  not  only  may 
but  must  be  had  in  the  same  action  as  that  brought  to  recover 
for  past  loss  or  injury,  since  there  can  only  be  one  recovery  of 
damages  in  this  class  of  cases.41  So  it  is  said  that  "  successive 
actions  cannot  be  brought  by  the  plaintiff  for  the  recovery  of 
damages,  as  they  may  accrue  from  time  to  time,  resulting  from 
the  injury  complained  of,  as  would  be  the  case  for  a  continuous 
wrong  or  a  continued  trespass.  The  action  is  for  a  single  wrong, 
the  injury  resulting  from  a  single  act,  and  the  plaintiff  was  en- 
titled to  recover  not  only  the  damages  which  had  been  actually 
sustained  up  to  the  time  of  the  trial,  but  also  compensation  for 
future  damages."  *  And  again,  "  As  there  can  be  but  one  re- 
covery, it  may  include  damages  not  only  for  what  has  actually 
been  suffered  from  the  disabling  effect  of  the  injury  down  to  the 
time  of  the  trial,  but  also  for  such  pain  or  inconvenience  as  is 
reasonably  certain  in  the  future."  **  And  in  another  case  a 
charge  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  for  "the  in- 
juries that  he  has  sustained  and  that  the  jury  can  look  to  the 
future  as  well  as  to  the  past,  because  plaintiff  can  maintain  no 
other  action"  was  held  correct.44  As  was  also  a  charge  that  the 
jury  might  consider  past  damages,  and  also  "such  as  appears 
from  the  evidence  with  reasonable  certainty,  are  prospective."  te 


40  Lamb  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  108  Iowa, 
629:  79  N.  W.    366. 

41  The  numerous  cases  which  we 
have  cited  in  the  preceding  sections 
generally  sustain  the  text. 

42 Filer  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  49 N. 
Y.  42. 

43  Ayres  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
158  X.  Y.  254;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  683. 
306 


44  Kane  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  132  N.  Y.  160;  43  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
494;  30  N.  E.  256,  aff'g  31  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  741 ;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  879. 

45 Shaler  v.  Broadway  Imp.  Co.,  162 
N.  Y.  641;  57  N.  E.  1124,  aff'g  22 
App.  Div.  102;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  815. 


expe:n.-i>     physical  injuries. 


§  251 


CHAPTER  XI. 


EXPENSES — PHYSICAL   INJURIES. 


§  251.  Expenses  of  treating  injury 
Generally. 

252.  Expenses  of  treating  injury — 

Evidence  as  to,  necessary. 

253.  Evidence  as  to  expenses  inac- 

tion by  married  woman. 
■27)4.   Surgical     and    medical    treat- 
ment— Medicines  and  drugs. 

255.  Medical     expenses — Payment 

for,  not  prerequisite   to  re- 
covery. 

256.  Expenses  for  nursing. 


257.  Services     of    physician — Evi- 

dence of  payment  or  value 
of — Whether  necessary. 

258.  Same  subject  continued. 
250.   Same  subject— Conclusion. 

260.  Expenses   in  the  future — Re- 

covery of. 

261.  Expense  for  work  of  substi- 

tute in  place  of  injured  per- 
son. 

262.  Expense  of  repairing  wagon. 


§  251.  Expenses  of  treating  injury— Generally.— In  an  ac- 
tion to  recovery  for  physical  injuries  such  reasonable  sums  as  have 
been  necessarily  expended  or  incurred  in  treating  such  injury 
and  in  effecting  a  cure  are  recoverable,1  and  it  is  an  error  to 


i  Vicksburg,  etc..  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Put- 
nam, 118  U.  S.  545;  Wade  v.  Leroy, 
20  How.  (U.  S.)  34;  Whelan  v.  X.  V. 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co..  38  Fed.  15; 
Davidson  v.  South  Pac.  Co..  44  Fed. 
476;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Yar- 
brough,  83  Ala.  238;  :'.  So.  447: 
Adams  v.  Clymer,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  80; 
:\<)  Atl.  1104;  Robinson  v.  Simpson,  8 
Houst.  (Del.)  398;  32  Atl.  287;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr.  170  111. 
47S;  48  N.  E.  992,  affg  <">7  111.  App. 
;"):',<);  Peoria  Bridge  Assoc,  v.  Loomis, 
20  111.  23.");  Chicago  &  E.  1.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cleminger,  77  111.  App.  186,  aff'd 
178  111.  536;  53  N.  E.  3_'0:  Louisville 
N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind. 
409;  1  West.  808;  Ellsworth  v.  Flet- 
cher, 59  Kan.  772;  51  Pac  904; 
Alexander  v.  Humber.  86  Ky.  565;  6 


S.  W.  453;  Cent.  Pass.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kuhn,  86  Ky.  578;  6  S.  W.  441;  Par- 
ker v.  .Jenkins.  3  Bush  (Ky.),  587; 
Sauford  v.  Augusta,  32  Me.  536;  Mc- 
Ganahan  v.  V  V.  N.  H.  &  II.  R.  Co.. 
171  Mass.  I'll;  SON. E. 610;Schwing- 
schlegl,  113  Mich.  683;  72  V  W.  7: 
I  Det.  I-  V  447;  Sherwood  v.  Chic. 
&  W.  M.  R  Co..  82  Mich.  374;  44 
Am.  A-  Eng.  R.  Cas.  337;  46  N.  W. 
773;  Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Ft  C  O.  V. 
Whitfield.  44  Miss.  466;  Cobb  v.  St. 
Louis  &  II.  R.  (  ....  140  Mo.  609;  .".o 
S.  W.  894;  13  Am.  A  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X. 
s.  632;  Robertson  v.  Wabash  R,  R. 
Co.  i  Mo.  1899),  •'.:;  S.  W.  1082;  Char- 
trand  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  57  M->. 
App.  4_'7:  Hewitt  v.  Kisenbart.  36 
Neb.  794;  55  V  W.  252;  Corliss  v. 
Worcester.  N.  &  R.  R.  R.  Co..   63  N. 

307 


§  252  EXPENSES — PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 

charge  the  jury  that  such  expenses  may  be  allowed  without  lim- 
iting them  to  such  as  are  reasonable  and  necessary.2  In  deter- 
mining what  expenses  are  of  this  nature,  it  has  been  held  that 
where,  upon  the  advice  of  a  physician,  a  person  goes  to  a  distant 
city  to  be  specially  treated  for  troubles  resulting  from  an  injury, 
the  expense  incurred  pursuant  to  such  advice  is  a  reasonable 
and  necessary  outlay  in  an  attempt  to  effect  a  cure  and  is  recov- 
erable.3 And  where,  owing  to  the  unskillful  treatment  of  an  in- 
jury by  a  surgeon,  it  has  been  necessary  to  pay  an  increased 
amount  to  another  surgeon  to  effect  a  cure,  such  amount  may 
properly  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  estimating  the  damages, 
but  this  is  declared  to  be  the  proper  limit.4  The  expenses  rea- 
sonably and  necessarily  incurred  in  effecting  a  cure  may,  it  is 
decided,  be  recovered,  though  not  specially  alleged,  an  al- 
legation of  general  damage  being  sufficient.5 

§  252.  Expenses  of  treating  injury — Evidence  as  to,  neces- 
sary.  The  general  rule  seems  to  be  that  in  order  to  permit  a 

recovery  for  the  expense  reasonably  and  necessarily  incurred  in 
treating  the  injury  and  effecting  a  cure,  there  must  be  some  evi- 
dence offered  in  reference  thereto/'     So  there  can  be  no  recovery 


H.  404;  1  New  Eng.  163;  Leigh  ton  v. 
Sargent,  31  N.  H.  119;  Diinkwater  v. 
Dinsmore,  80  N.  Y.  390,  rev'g  16  Hun, 
250;  Sheehan  v.  Edgar,  58  N.  Y.  631; 
Metcalf  v.  Baker,  57  N.  Y.  662; 
Ganiard  v.  Rochester  City  &  B.  R. 
Co.,  50  Hun  (N.  Y.),  22;  18  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  692,  affd  121  N.  Y.  661 ;  Oliver  v. 
North  Pac.  Tr.  Co.,  3  Oreg.  84  ; 
Smedley  v.  Hestonville,  M.  &  F.  Pass. 
R.  Co.,  184  Pa.  St.  620;  39  Atl.  544; 
9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  649;  42 
W.  N.  C.  169;  Good  hart  v.  Penu.  R. 
R.  Co.,  177  Pa.  St.  1;  35  Atl.  191;  5 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  364;  38  W. 
N.  C.  545;  Wilson  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
132  Pa.  St.  27;  18  Atl.  1087;  Smith  v. 
East  Mauch  Chunk,  3  Super.  Ct.  ( Pa. ) 
495;  Hart  v.  Charlotte  C.  &  A.  R. 
Co.,  33  S.  C.  427:  12  S.  E.  9;  10  L. 
R.  A.  794;  Houston  &  T.  C.  K.  Co.  v. 
Rowell,    92   Tex.    147;  46  S.  \V.  630; 

:i08 


11  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  597, 
nff'g  45  S.  W.  763;  Folsom  v.  Under- 
bill, 36  Vt.  580;  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.  v.  Norment,  84  Va.  167;  4  S.  E. 
211. 

2  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowell, 
92  Tex.  147;  46  S.  W.  630;  11  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  597,  afTg  45  S.  W. 
763. 

s  Sherwood  v.  Chic.  &  W.  M.  R.  Co., 
82  Mich.  374;  46  N.  W.  773;  44  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  337. 

4  Leighton  v.  Sargent,  31  N.  H.  119. 

&  Folsom  v.  Underbill,  36  Vt.  580. 

e  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Uavis,  119 
Ala.  572 ;  24  So.  862 ;  Little  Rock  &  M. 
R.  Co.  v.  Barry,  58  Ark.  198;  25  L.  R. 
A.  386;  23  S.  W.  1097;  Chatsworth  v. 
Rowe,  53  111.  App.  3S7;  Eckerd  v. 
Chic,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Iowa,  353;  30 
N.  W.  615;  Reed  v.  Chic,  etc,  R.  R. 
Co.,  57  Iowa,  23;  10  N.  W.  285;  Nixon 


EXPENSES      PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


§  268 


for  medical  attendance  or  aid  unless  there  is  some  evidence  in- 
troduced as  to  the  nature  of  such  medical  attendance  and  the 
amount  of  liability  therefor.7  And  it  was  held  improper  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  the  plaintiff  might  recover  for  moneys  ex- 
pended and  for  which  she  was  liable  as  a  result  of  the  accident, 
where  there  was  no  proof  that  she  had  expended  any  money  or 
had  incurred  any  liability  for  such  expense."  And  in  another 
case  where  it  merely  appeared  that  the  plaintiff  had  been  treated 
in  a  city  hospital  and  it  was  not  shown  that  she  had  expended 
any  money  or  incurred  any  liability  for  such  treatment  or  for  any 
medical  services  as  a  result  of  the  injury,  and  no  evidence  was 
given  of  the  value  of  the  services  rendered  in  the  hospital,  it  was 
held  that  there  could  be  no  recovery  for  medical  services  or 
treatment.9  In  a  case  in  Massachusetts,  however,  it  is  held  that 
though  there  be  no  distinct  proof  of  the  amount  expended  for 
sickness  and  medical  attendance  as  a  result  of  the  injury,  yet  the 
jury  ma}-  allow  a  reasonable  sum  for  such  expenses.10  But  where 
such  expenses  were  not  claimed  in  the  plaintiff's  petition,  it  was 
held  that  though  he  was  erroneously  permitted  to  testify  as  to 
the  probable  amount  of  liability  incurred  by  him,  therefor,  such 
error  might  be  cured  b}r  a  remittitur  of  the  amount  stated  in 
such  testimony.11 

§  253.  Evidence  as  to  expenses  in  action  by  married  wo- 
man.—Evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  value  of  medical  services 


v.  Hannibal  &  St.  .J.  R.  Co.,  141  Mo. 
425;  42  S.  YV.  942:  Duke  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
R.  R.  Co.,  99  Mo.  347;  12  S.  YV.  636. 
Smith  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  108 
Mo.  243;  18  S.  W.  971 :  Evans  v.  Jop- 
lin,  76  Mo.  App.  20;  1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  485; 
Hewitt  v.  Eisenbart,  36  Neb.  794; 
55  N.  W.  252;  McKenna  v.  Brooklyn 
Beights  R.  Co.,  41  App.  Div.  |  \.  V.) 
255;  58  X.  Y.  Supp.  402;  Page  v. 
Delaware  &  II.  Canal  Co.,  34  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  618;  54  X.  Y.  Snpp. 
442;  Houston  &  T.  C.  11.  Co.  v.  Kim- 
bell  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  43  S.  W.  1049; 
Fry  v.  Hillan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37 
S.  YV.  359;  But  see  Evansville  &  T. 
H.  R.  Co.  v.   Holcomb,  9  Ind.   App. 


198;  Scullane  v.  Kellogg,  169  Mass. 
544;   48  X.  E.  622. 

7  Page  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 
34  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  (518;  54  N.  Y. 
Supp.  442;  Nixon  v.  Hannibal  &  St. 
J.  R.  Co.,  141  Mo.  425;  42  S.  W.  942; 
Evans  v.  Joplin,  70  Mo.  App.  20;  1 
Mil  A.  Kep.  486;  Houston  A:  T.  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kiml.ell  i  Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
13  s.  \\\  1049. 

y  <  hatswortb  v.  Rowe,  53  111.  App. 
387. 

•'  Duke  v.  Mo.  Par.  R.  R.  Co.,  99 
Mo.  347;    12  S.  W.  636. 

10  Scullane  v.  Kellogg,  169  Mass. 
544;  48  X.  K.  622. 

11  Galveston,  H.  &  S.    A.  R.  Co.  v. 

309 


§  254 


EXPENSES — PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


rendered  in  an  action  by  a  married  woman  as  tending  to  show 
that  credit  therefor  was  extended  solely  to  her.12 

§  254.  Surgical  and  medical  treatment— Medicines  and 
drugs. — Such,  reasonable  sums  as  have  been  paid  or  incurred 
for  surgical  or  medical  treatment  and  for  medicines  rendered 
necessary  as  a  result  of  the  injury  are  included  in  those  expenses 
which  may  be  recovered.13  And  it  has  been  held  that  where 
there  is  evidence  as  to  the  employment  of  physicians  by  the 
plaintiff,  the  question  of  medical  expenses  may  properly  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury.14  So  evidence  showing  that  the  plaintiff 
was  attended  by  a  practicing  physician  or  surgeon  will  justify  a 
rinding  that  such  professional  services  were  rendered  for  a  pe- 
cuniary recompense.13  And  evidence  of  the  continued  and  nec- 
essary use  of  morphine  since  the  injury,  and  that  before  the 
injury  the  plaintiff  had  never  used  opiates,  is  admissible  to 
show  a  continued  expense  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  which 
did  not  exist  before  the  injury.16  Again  although  the  amount 
expended  for  medicine  and  medical  attendance  is  not  alleged 


Duelin,  86  Tex.  450;  25  S.  W.  406, 
affg  23  S.  W.  596;  24  S.  W.  334. 

12  Vergin  v.  City  of  Saginaw 
(Mich.  1901),  84  N.  W.  1075;  7  Det. 
L.  N.  602.  See  City  of  San  Antonio 
v.  Porter  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  59 
S.  W.  922.  See  sees.  325  et  seq,  herein, 
as  to  recovery  by  married  woman. 

is  Whelan  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  (C.  C.  M.  D.  Ohio),  38  Fed. 
15;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Siniard 
(Ala.),  26  So.  698;  Warner  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 7  Houst.  (Del.)  18;  Wash- 
ington &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson, 
9  App.  D.  C.  423;  25  Wash.  L. 
Rep.  36;  Chic.  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holland,  122  111.  461;  13  N.  E.  145; 
11  West.  51;  McDonald  v.  Illinois 
C.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  155  N.  W.  102; 
McGanahan  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 
Co.,  171  Mass.  211;  50  N.  E.  610; 
Kupi'erschmid  v.  Southern  Elec.  R. 
Co.,  70  Mo.  App.  438;  Chartrand  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.,  57  Mo.  App.  425; 
McLean  v.  Kansas  City,  2  Mo.  A. 
310 


Rep.  681;  Feeney  v.  Long  Island 
R.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  375;  26  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  729;  22  N.  E.  402;  35  L.  R.  A. 
544;  39  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  639; 
Morsemann  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  16 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  249;  10  N.  Y.  Supp. 
105;  Farley  v.  Charleston  Basket  & 
V.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  222;  28  S.  E. 
193,  reh'g  denied  28  S.  E.  401; 
Dallas  v.  Jones  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  54 
S.  W.  606;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dickey  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  48  S.  W. 
626;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 
son, 13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  552;  36  S.  W. 
289;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Keller,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  569;  32  S. 
W.  847. 

14  Farley  v.  Charleston  Basket  & 
V.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  222;  28  S.  E.  193, 
reh'g  denied  28  S.  E.  401. 

15  McGanahan  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H. 
R.  Co.,  171  Mass.   211;  50  N.  E.  610. 

16  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 
son, 13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  552;  36  S.  W. 
289. 


EXPENSES       PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


§  255 


in  the  petition  in  au  action  for  personal  injuries,  yet  it  is 
held  that  evidence  of  the  amount  expended  by  the  plaintiff 
for  such  purposes  is  admissible  under  an  averment  that  the 
plaintiff  has  incurred  great  expense  for  medicine  and  medical 
attendance.17  In  another  case,  however,  under  an  averment 
similar  to  the  above,  and  which  also  contained  the  additional 
statement  that  the  plaintiff  would  in  the  future  have  to  incur 
such  expense  to  her  damage  in  an  amount  stated,  it  was  held 
that  such  averment  was  too  general  to  furnish  proper  notice 
to  the  defendants  of  the  facts  intended  to  be  established  there- 
under.1" Where  evidence  as  to  the  amount  of  expense  incurred 
for  medicines  has  been  improperly  admitted,  it  is  held  that  this 
is  not  sufficient  ground  for  reversal  of  a  judgment  in  plaintiff's 
favor  if  the  extent  of  the  injuries  have  been  thoroughly  shown 
by  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  the  amount  of  such  account  is 
remitted  by  the  plaintiff.19 

§  255.  Medical  expenses— Payment  for,  not  prerequisite 
to  recovery.— The  fact  that  the  bills  for  surgical  or  medical 
treatment  or  for  medicines  rendered  necessary  as  a  result  of  an 
injury  have  not  been  paid,  will  not  prevent  a  recovery  there- 
for.20    In  many  of  the  cases  it  is  declared  that  it  is  sufficient 


17  Kupferschmid  v.  Southern  Elec- 
tric Co.,  70  Mo.  App.  438. 

18  The  Oriental  v.  Barclay,  16  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  193;  41  S.  W.  117. 

m  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Duelin  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23  S.  W. 
596;  24  S.  W.  334. 

2°  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Lorent- 
zen  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  79  Fed.  291; 
24  C.  C.  A.  592;  49  U.  S.  App.  81; 
Donnelly  v.  Hufschmid,  79  Cal.  74: 
21  Pac.  546;  Chicago  <fc  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
deminger,  178  111.  536;  53  N.  E.  320, 
aff'g  77  111.  App.  186;  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Harrington,  77  111.  App.  499; 
Consol.  Coal  Co.  v.  Scheiher,  65  111. 
App.  304;  Flanagan  v.  Bait  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.  (Iowa),  50  N.  W.  60;  Hutchin- 
son v.  Van  Cleve,  7  Kan.  App.  676; 
53  Pac.  888;  Ahilene  v.  Wright,  4 
Kan.  App.  708;  46  Pac.  715;  Lammi- 


man  v.  Detroit.  Citizens,  St.  R.  Co., 
112  Mich.  602;  71  N.  W.  153;  4  Det. 
L.  X.  134;  Lacas  v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  92 
Mich.  412;  52  X.  W.  745;  Morris  v. 
Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.,  144  Mo.  500;  46 
S.  \V.  170;  Gorham  v.  Kansas  City  & 
S.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  408;  20  S.  W.  1060; 
Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleminger,  57 
Neb.  240;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  188;  77  X.  W.  675;  McNair  v.  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.,  22  X.  Y.  Si.  R.  840; 
4  N.  Y.  Snpp.  310,  aff'd  123  X.  Y.  684; 
34  N.  Y.  Supp.  1010;  26  X.  E.  750; 
Reynolds  v.  Niagara  Falls,  81  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  353;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  118;  30 
X.  Y.  Supp.  954;  Gries  v.  Zeck,  24 
Ohio  St.  329;  Parker  v.  So.  Car.  &  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.  (S.  C.  1S97),  1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep. 
881;  Wilson  v.  Southern  Pac.  K.  R. 
Co.,  13  Utah, 352;  44  Pac.  104U;  4  Am. 
&    Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  1040.     Rut  see 

311 


§  255 


EXPENSES — PHYSICAL      1N.JITKIES. 


if  the  plaintiff  has  incurred  liability  for  such  expenses.  So  it 
is  held  that  a  recovery  for  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  and 
surgical  aid  is  justified  by  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  has  in- 
curred liability  to  a  specified  amount.-1  And  in  another  case  it 
is  held  that  the  plaintiff  may  recover  for  medical  services, 
though  not  paid,  upon  proof  that  the  physicians  have  charged 
for  their  services  and  that  the  charge  is  reasonable."  And  again 
it  is  declared  that  recovery  for  medical  and  surgical  expenses 
may  be  had  where  they  have  been  actually  incurred,  though 
not  paid.3  And  in  Missouri  it  has  been  decided  that  in  order 
to  entitle  plaintiff  to  recover  for  medical  services,  he  must  either 
have  paid  the  same  or  be  liable  therefor.24  And  in  another  case 
in  the  same  state  it  was  held  to  be  error  to  instruct  the  jury 
that  there  might  be  a  recovery  for  such  services  in  the  absence 
of  any  evidence  showing  that  the  plaintiff  had  incurred  any  lia- 
bility on  that  account.25  We  think,  however,  that  the  rule  is 
somewhat  broader  than  this  and  that  the  courts  are  not  inclined 
to  restrict  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  such  expenses  to  those 
cases  where  he  has  actually  paid  them  or  become  liable  therefor. 
Thus  it  is  declared  that  it  is  immaterial,  as  affecting  the  plain- 
tiff's recovery,  what  arrangement  may  have  been  made  by  him 
for  the  payment  or  whether  he  ever  paid  them.26  And  though 
medical  services  and  treatment  may  be  rendered  gratuitously, 
yet  this  will  not  prevent  the  recovery  by  the  injured  person  of 
the  fair  value  of  such  services,  since  the  giving  of  such  services 
is  intended  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  injured  and  can- 
not be  considered  as  for  the  benefit  of  the  person  at  fault.27     So 


Madden  v.   Mo.   Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Mo. 
App.  606. 

21  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleminger, 
178  111.  536;  53  N.  E.  320,  aff'g  77  111. 
App.  186 ;  Consol.  Coal  Co.  v.  Scheiber, 
65  111.  App.  304;  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Emminger,  57  Neb.  240;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  188;  77  N.  W.  675. 

22  Reynolds  v.  Niagara  Falls,  81 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  353;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  US; 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  954. 

23  Wilson  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  13 
Utah,  352;  44  Pac.  1040;  4  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  40. 

312 


24  Morris  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co., 
144  Mo.  500;  46  S.  W.  170.  See 
also  Robertson  v.  Wabash  R.  Co. 
(Mo.  1899),  53  S.  W.  1082. 

25  Madison  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  60 
Mo.  App.  44. 

26  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Lorent- 
zen  ( C.  C.  App.  8th  C. ),  79  Fed.  291 ; 
24  C.  C.  A.  592;  49  U.  S.  App.  81. 
But  see  Morris  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co., 
144  Mo.  500;  46  S.  W.  170. 

27  Brosuan  v.  Sweetser,  127  Ind.  1; 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marion,  104  Ind. 
239;  Indianapolis  v.  Gaston,  58  Ind. 


EXPENSES      PHYSICAL     [NJURIE8.  §  256 

again,  it  is  lield  that  though  such  expenses  may  have  been  paid 
by  a  stranger,  this  will  not  defeat  recovery  therefor.  Nor  can 
recovery  therefor  be  defeated  by  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  could 
have  obtained  such  services  for  nothing/3  In  Illinois  it  has  been 
held  that  where  medical  services  have  not  been  paid  for  and  they 
cannot  be  recovered  from  the  injured  person  by  reason  of  ain 
incapacity,  the  latter  cannot  recover  them  from  the  person  caus- 
ing the  injury.30  In  a  case  in  Missouri  it  is  held  to  be  error  to 
give  an  instruction  to  the  jury  authorizing  them  to  allow  the 
plaintiff  the  amount  which  he  has  paid  or  obligated  himself  to 
pay  for  medical  services,  without  also  instructing  them  that  they 
must  determine  whether  such  amount  was  reasonable.31 

§  256.  Expenses  for  nursing. — A  person  injured  by  the 
negligence  or  wrongful  act  of  another  is  entitled  to  recover  the 
reasonable  and  necessary  expense  incurred  for  nursing  as  a 
result  of  the  injury  sustained.32  And  there  may  be  a  recov- 
ery for  such  expenses,  though  there  is  no  evidence  as  to  their 
value,  the  jurors  being  presumed  to  be  reasonably  familiar 
with  the  value  of  such  services.33     So  also  the  fact  that  mem- 


227;  Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs,  52 
Iowa,  698;  3  X.  W.  792;  Klein  v. 
Thompson,  19  Ohio  St.  569.  But  see 
Minster  v.  Citizens  R.  Co.,  53  Mo. 
App.  276. 

28  Klein  v.  Thompson,  19  Ohio  St. 
569. 

2»  Kendall  v.  Albia,  73  Iowa,  241; 
34  N.  W.  833. 

80  Chicago  v.  Honey,  10  111.  App. 
535.  See  also  Dixon  v.  Bell,  1 
Starkie,  287.  And  see  sectious  305, 
306,  310,  322,  325,  "  Married  women  " 
— "  minors." 

81Orscheln  v.  Scott,  79  Mo.  App. 
534:  2  Mo.  A.  Rep.  477. 

82  Jones  v.  Bell,  8  lloust.  (Del.) 
562;  Warner  v.  Chamberlain,  7 
Houst.  (Del.)  18;  Brown  v.  Green,  1 
Penn.  (Del.)  535;  42  Atl.  991;  Chi- 
cago &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Holland, 
122  111.  461;  13  N.  E.  145;  11  West. 
51;  Brosnan  v.  Sweetser,  127  Ind.  1; 


Lamb  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  108  [owa,  629; 
79  N.  W.  366;  Kendall  v.  Albia.  7:5 
Iowa,  241;  Varnham  v.  Council 
Bluffs,  52  Iowa,  698;  Consol.  Kan. 
City  S.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Tinchert,  5  Kan. 
App.  130;  44  Pac.  889:  Capithorne  v. 
Hardy,  173  -Mass.  400;  53  X.  E.  915; 
Turner  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  158 
Mass.  261;  33  N.  E.  520:  Murray  v. 
Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Mo.  236;  13 
S.  \Y.  817;  Buck  v.  Peoples,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  555;  Goodhart  v. 
Penn.  R,  R.  To.,  177  Pa.  St.  1;  5  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas. .  N.  S.  364;  35  Atl. 
191;  38  W.  X.  O.  :>4:>:  Mo  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Holman,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
16;  :)'.»  S.  W.  130:  May  v.  Ilahu 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.), 54 S.  W.  lit!:  Crouse 
v.  Chicago  A-  X.  W.  R.  Co..  102  Wis. 
196;  14  Am.  cV:  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
780:  78  N.  W.  446. 

33  Mm  ray  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  101 
Mo.  236;   13   S.  W.  817. 

313 


§  257  EXPENSES — PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

bers  of  the  injured  person's  family  could  have  given  him  the 
care  and  attention  needed  without  expense,  is  no  defense  to  an 
allowance  of  the  amount  paid  for  the  services  of  a  trained 
nurse.31  And  though  the  services  in  nursing  are  gratuitously 
rendered  by  a  member  of  the  family,  there  may  be  a  recovery 
of  the  fair  value  of  such  services,35  and  the  value  of  the  wife's 
services  may  be  recovered.36  In  some  cases,  however,  it  has  been 
held  that  in  absence  of  an  express  contract  to  pay  for  the  ser- 
vices of  a  wife  or  child  in  nursing  a  person  who  has  suffered  a 
personal  injury,  there  can  be  no  recovery  therefor.07  But  a 
parent  may  recover  for  the  services  of  a  daughter  who  has  nursed 
him,  though  such  services  were  gratuitous.38  And  the  mother 
of  the  plaintiff  may  testify  as  to  what  was  a  fair  charge  for  ser- 
vices rendered  by  her  to  the  plaintiffs  In  the  absence,  however, 
of  any  evidence  of  any  charge  being  made  by  the  members  of  the 
family  for  care  and  attention  given  to  an  injured  person,  there 
should  be  some  evidence  of  the  value  of  the  services  rendered.40 
Where  a  child  has  been  injured  it  is  held  that  the  parent  may 
recover  a  reasonable  compensation  for  nursing.41 

§  257.  Services  of  physician— Evidence  of  payment  or 
value  of — Whether  necessary — The  plaintiff  in  an  action  for 
personal  injuries  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  the  services  of  a 
physician  in  the  absence  of  some  evidence  either  of  payment  or  of 
the  value  of  such  services.  While  payment  is  not  a  prerequisite 
to  recovery  therefor,  yet  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  payment 
there  should  be  some  evidence  showing  the  value  of  the  services 
rendered.42     In  this  connection  the  following  words  from  a  late 


3*  Kendall  v.  Albia,  73  Iowa,  241. 

35  Brosnan  v.  Sweetser,  127  Ind. 
1;  Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs,  52 
Iowa,  698;  Capithorne  v.  Hardy,  173 
Mass.  400;  53  N.  E.  915;  Dormer 
v.  Alcatraz  Pav.  Co.,  16  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  407. 

36  Mo.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Holman, 
15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  16;  39  S.  W. 
130;  Crouse  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  102  Wis.  196;  14  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  780;  78  N.  W.  446,  cit- 
ing some  of  the  cases  here  given. 

37  Goodhart  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  177 

314 


Pa.  1;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  364;  35 
Atl.  191;  38  W.  N.  C.  545.  But 
see  Peoria,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Johns, 
43  111.  App.  83. 

38  Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs,  52 
Iowa,  698. 

39  Capithorne  v.  Hardy,  173  Mass. 
400;  53  N.  E.  915. 

40  Trapnell  v.  Red  Oak  Junction 
(Iowa),  39  N.  W.  884. 

«  Buck  v.  Peoples,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  40 
Mo.  App.  555. 

42  Bedford  v.  Moody  (Ind.  App. 
1899),  55    N.     E.    499;    Bowsher   v. 


EXPENSES       PHYSICAL      tXJl   l:li  §   -_'o7 

Pennsylvania  decision  are  pertinent:  "There  was  no  evidence 

showing  the  amount  of  money  expended  for  these  services,  nor 
what  the  services  wen-  reasonably  worth.  '1  "he  Learned  trial 
judge,  however,  held  that  in  estimating  the  damages  the  jury 
should  allow  for  the  direct   expenses   incurred  by  the  plaintiff 

by  reason  of  the  injury,  and  instructed  the  jury  that  'the  mere 
fact  that  it  docs  not  appear  from  the  evidence  that  she  has  paid 
her  medical  aid  will  not  prevent  her  from  recovering  in  this 
case  for  what  would  reasonably  compensate  her  physicians.' 
It  is  quite  true,  as  the  learned  judge  suggests,  that  the  fact 
that  the  plaintiff  had  not  paid  her  physician,  would  not  prevent 
her  recovering  the  value  of  his  services.  I>ut  that  is  not  the 
question.  In  the  absence  of  any  evidence  of  the  value  of  such 
services,  or  what  they  are  reasonably  worth,  was  the  plaintiff 
entitled  to  recover  anything  on  account  thereof ?  It  seems  to 
us  lather  singular  that  when  the  physicians  who  rendered  these 
services  were  on  the  witness  stand,  and  detailed  the  character 
and  extent  of  their  services,  they  were  not  interrogated  as  to 
their  value.  It  is  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the 
plaintiff  that  in  the  light  of  their  testimony  'the  average  jury, 
from  their  own  experience,  could  estimate  with  considerable 
accuracy  what  would  be  reasonable  compensation.'  We  can- 
not assent  to  this  proposition.  On  the  contrary,  the  average 
juryman  is  not  a  professional  man  and  is  not  presumed  to  know 
the  value  of  such  services.  What  would  have  been  reasonable 
compensation  for  the  medical  services  rendered  the  plaintiff 
might  have  been  shown  by  the  physicians  who  attended  her,  or 
by  others  who  wen1  acquainted  with  the  value  of  similar  ser- 
vices in  the  community  in  which  they  were  rendered.  It  was 
incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  before  she  could  recover  from  the 
defendant   compensation    for   medical   aid,   to   furnish    the  jury 


Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  |  L.wa,  1901),  84 
N.  W.  958;  Reed  v.  Chic.  R.  1.  <fi  K. 
Co.,  57  Iowa,  23;  Gumb  v.  Tweuty- 
Third  St.  Ry.  Co.,  114  N.  V.  411:  23 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  748,  rev'g  21  J.  A-  s. 
466;  Schmitt  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  & 
B.  R.  R.  Co.,  :S  X.  V.  St.  R.  257;  -' 
City  Ct.  359;  Scott  v.  Banks,  60  X. 
Y.  Supp.  397;  Olliger  v.  City  of  To- 


led...  L'O  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  142:  10  O. 
CD.  762;  Wheeler  v.  Tyler  S  E  l;. 
Co.,  91  Tex.  356;  4::  S.  W.  876, 
rev'g  41  S.  W.  517:  Gulf  C.  A-  S. 
!'.  K.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  7'i  Tex.  174: 
41  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  100:  13  S.  W 
19;  IlnUSlOQ  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  V. 
Pereira  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ),  45  S.  W. 
767. 

315 


§258  EXPENSES      PHYSICAL      INJURIES. 

evidence  from  which  they  (-ould  determine  what  had.  been  paid 
for  such  services  or  such  amounts  as  the  services  were  reasona- 
bly worth."  B 

§  258.  Same  subject  continued. — The  amount  charged  by  a 
physician  or  surgeon  for  his  services  is  not  sufficient,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  other  testimony  showing  the  services  were  worth  the 
sum  charged,  to  authorize  a  recovery  for  such  expenses.44  Nor 
is  the  proper  measure  of  damages  the  usual  charge  by  the  par- 
ticular physician  who  is  testifying,  but  rather  the  usual  and 
reasonable  charges  of  the  profession  generally J5  But  it  has 
been  decided  that  an  injured  person  may  recover  the  reasonable 
value  of  an  attending  physician's  services,  though  there  is  no 
intention  to  make  any  charge  for  the  same.46  The  amount  of  the 
bill  rendered,  however,  is  admissible  as  an  item  of  the  evidence 
establishing  the  value  of  such  services,47  although  other  evidence 
should  supplement  it  showing  that  the  bill  was  a  reasonable 
one.48  And  it  is  held  to  be  error  to  permit  evidence  of  the 
amount  charged  by  the  physician  of  the  plaintiff  where  no  evi- 
dence is  introduced  either  of  payment  of  such  bill  or  the  value 
of  such  services.49  So  in  a  case  in  the  same  state  it  is  decided 
that  there  can  be  no  recovery  of  the  amount  of  a  physician's  bill 
where  it  is  not  shown  either  that  the  bill  had  been  paid  or  that 
the  services  were  worth  the  amount  charged  in  the  bill.50  And  in 
another  case,  it  was  held  to  be  error  to  admit  evidence  of  the 
amount  which  a  physician  had  charged  for  his  services,  where 
but  a  small  part  of  such  bill  had  been  paid  and  no  other  evidence 
was  given  as  to  the  value  of  his  services.51  But  if  the  bill  has 
been  paid,  evidence  of  such  fact  and  of  the  amount  thereof  is 

43  Brown  v.  White  (Perm.  S.  C.  |  47  Clarke  v.  Westcott,  2  App.  Div. 
1902),  51   Atl.  962,  per  Mestrezat,  J.  j  (N.  Y.)  503;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  1111. 

44  Bowsher  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  48  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Meneely, 
(Iowa,  1901),  84  X.  W.  958;  Houston  j  78111.  App.  679. 

&  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.   Pereira  (Tex.  Civ.  i      49Gumb    v.   Twenty -Third    St.    R. 
App.),  45  S.  W.  767.  I  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  411;  23  N.   Y.  St.   K. 


«  Chic.  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wall,  93 
111.  App.  411.  See  Bowsher  v.  Chic. 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (Iowa,  1901),  84  N.  W. 


748,  rev'g  21  J.  &  S.  466. 

60  Schmitt  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  N.  Y.  St.  R.  257;  2  City 


958.  Ct.  359. 

46  Olliger   v.    City  of    Toledo,    20        51  Bedford  v.  Moody  (Ind.  1899),  58 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  142;  10  O.  C.  D.  762.  j  N.  E.  499. 

316 


EXPENSES — PHYSICAL     INJURIES.  269 

admissible  without  proof  of  the  value  of  the  services  rendered 
by  him.52  So  where  the  plaintiff  sought  to  recover  for  the  ser- 
vices of  a  nurse,  evidence  of  the  fact  that  one  hundred  dollars 
had  been  paid  a  nurse  for  services  was  decided  to  be  some  evi- 
dence of  the  value  of  such  services  authorizing  the  consideration 
of  that  item  by  the  jury/"  In  a  case  in  the  United  States  circuit 
court,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  though  there  may  be  no 
evidence  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  the  amount  charged  by  a 
physician  for  services  rendered  on  account  of  an  injury,  yet  evi- 
dence of  the  amount  of  his  bill  may  be  submitted  to  the  jury.* 

§  259.  Same  subject  Conclusion. — It  will  be  seen  from  the 
foregoing  cases  that  the  authorities  are  not  in  harmony  as  to  the 
admission  in  evidence  of  the  amount  charged  by  a  physician  and 
surgeon.  In  some,  it  is  determined  that  evidence  of  such  amount 
is  not  admissible  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  payment,  or  of 
the  value  of  the  services.  From  these  cases  the  conclusion  may 
be  drawn  that  evidence,  either  of  payment  or  of  the  value  of  the 
services  rendered,  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  admission  of  the 
amount  charged.  In  other  decisions,  it  is  held  that  evidence  of 
the  value  of  the  services  is  necessary  in  addition  to  evidence  of 
payment,  and  that  evidence  of  payment  is  some  evidence  of  the 
value  of  the  services  and  sufficient  to  authorize  the  consider- 
ation of  that  item  by  the  jury.  And  in  the  United  States  circuit 
court  of  appeals,  evidence  of  the  amount  is  held  admissible, 
though  no  evidence  be  given  as  to  value.  It  would  seem  that 
the  true  rule  in  this  class  of  cases  would  be  that  evidence 
either  of  payment  or  of  the  value  of  the  services  would  be 
sufficient  and  necessary  to  justify  the  admission  of  the  amount 
charged  and  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  for  such  services. 
Evidence  of  the  value  of  the  services  would  probably  enable  the 

MMorseraann  v.  Manhattan  R.  C<>.,  (N.  Y.),  463;  46  N.  Y.  St.  R.   225;   19 

10  N.  Y.  Supp.  105;  lti  Daly,  -'49;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  644. 

N.  Y.  St.  R.  61.     But  see  Wheeler  v.  53  Colwell  v.  Manhattan  Ry  Co.,  57 

Tyler  S.  E.  It.  Co.,  91  Tex.  356;  43S.  Hun  (N.Y.),  452;  30  N.  Y.  St.  R.  991; 

W.  876,  rev'g  41  S.  W.  517,  where  it  is  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  636.     As   to  recovery 

held  that  though   the  hill   has  heen  for  services   of    nurse,  see  sec.  305, 

paid  evidence  of  such  fact  and  of  the  herein. 

amount  is  not  sufficient,  but  the  M  Western  Gas  Const.  Co.  v.  Dan- 
value  of  the  services  must  be  shown.  »er  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  Cal. ),  97  Fed. 
And    sec    Sehiupf  v.   Sliter,   64    Ilun  882. 

317 


§§  260,  201         EXPENSES— PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 

jury  to  estimate  the  allowance  for  this  item  on  a  better  basis 
than  mere  evidence  of  payment.  Proof  of  payment  however, 
would  seem  to  be  some  evidence  as  to  the  value  of  the  services 
rendered,  or  at  least,  of  the  amount  expended  therefor,  but 
would  give  the  jury  less  foundation  upon  which  to  determine 
whether  the  amount  of  the  bill  was  reasonable.  Such  proof 
should,  however,  we  believe,  be  sufficient  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to 
recover  for  this  item  of  damages,  and  we  cannot  view  with  favor 
the  proposition  that  he  cannot  recover  therefor  on  proof  of  pay- 
ment alone,  but  must  also  show  the  value  of  the  services  rendered. 

§  260.  Expenses  in  the  future — Recovery  of. — In  actions 
for  personal  injuries,  where  it  is  sought  to  recover  for  prospec- 
tive or  future  loss,  the  rule  is  that  in  order  to  authorize  any 
allowance  therefor,  the  loss  must  be  such  as  is  reasonably  certain 
to  ensue.  So  the  rule  applies  in  order  that  there  may  be  an  allow- 
ance made  for  the  expense  of  medical  attention  which  will  be 
needed  in  the  future.55  And  the  evidence  should  show  what 
such  expenses  will  be.  So  an  instruction  that  the  plaintiff  might 
recover  "  his  reasonable  expenses  incident  to  his  condition  in  the 
future  "  was  held  to  be  erroneous  where  there  was  no  evidence 
showing  what  the  expenses  had  been  or  would  be,  though  the 
necessity  of  medical  care  and  of  the  services  of  an  attendant  had 
been  shown.56 

§  261.  Expense  for  work  of  substitute  in  place  of  injured 
person. — Where  a  person  as  a  result  of  an  injury  is  incapacitated 
from  his  business  or  occupation,  and  is  under  the  expense  of 
hiring  another  person  to  do  the  work  which  he  customarily  did, 
he  may  recover  such  expense  in  an  action  for  damages  resulting 
from  such  injury.52  But  in  order  to  recover  this  item  of  dam- 
ages, it  must  be  alleged  in  the  complaint.58 


56Feeney  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
116  N.  Y.  375;  26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  729; 
22  X.  E.  402,  affg  5  N.  Y.  St.  R.  63. 

56  McKenna  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co., 
41  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  255;  58  N.  Y. 
Supp.  462. 

57  Ashcroft  v.  Chapman,  38  Conn. 
230;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zeiger,  78  111.  App.  463;  Langworth 
v.  Green   Twp.,  88  Mich.  207;  50  N. 

318 


W.  130;  Gumb  v.  Twenty-Third  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  114  X.  Y.  411;  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
748.  See  Lombardi  v.  California  St. 
Cable  Co.,  124  Cal.  311;  57  Pac.  66. 
But  see  Blackman  v.  Gardiner 
Bridge,  75  Me.  514;  Chic.  R.  I.  &  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sheldon,  6  Kan.  App.  347; 
51  Pac.  808. 

58  Gumb  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  114  N.    Y.  411;  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 


EXPENSES      PHYSICAL     INJURIES. 


§    262 


§  262.  Expense  of  repairing  wagon.  -In  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  injuries  sustained  from  being  thrown  from  his 
wagon  as  a  result  of  a  collision  with  cars  of  defendant,  evidence 
that  a  certain  amount  was  expended  in  repairing  the  wagon  is 
declared  to  be  inadmissible,  unless  it  also  appear  that  such 
repairs  were  proper  and  worth  the  sum  paid.™ 


748,  rev'g  26  J.  &  S.  7;  30  N.  Y.  St. 
R.253;9N.  Y.Supp. 316;  Haszlacher 

v.  Third  Ave.   Ry.  Co.,  26  Misc.  (X. 
Y.)  865;  56  N.   Y.  Supp.   380.     See 


also    North    Chicago  St.    R.    Co.    v. 
Zeiger,  78  111.  App.  463. 

69  Edge  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  57 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)29;  67  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1002. 

319 


§  263 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN  J  UK  Y    CASES. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL   INJUKY    CASES. 


263.  Evidence  as  to  plaintiff's  con- 

dition in  life. 

264.  Same  subject  continued. 

265.  Evidence    as    to    defendant's 

condition  in  life. 

266.  Evidence   as  to   character  of 

plaintiff  —  Chastity  of  fe- 
male. 

267.  Evidence  as  to  expectancy  of 

life — Mortality  tables. 

268.  Same  subject  continued. 

269.  Same     subject     continued  — 

Cases. 

270.  Presumption  against  serious- 

ness of  injury — Evidence  to 
rebut. 

271.  Admission  in  evidence  of  dep- 

osition charging  attempt  to 
make  in  j  uries  appear  worse, 
erroneous — Case. 

272.  Action    against    city — Judg- 

ment roll  conclusive  in  ac- 
tion on  bond. 

273.  Exemplary      damages  —  Evi- 

dence in  mitigation  of. 

274.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — 

Future  consequences  of 
physical  injuries. 

275.  Same  subject  continued. 

276.  Expert  evidence  not  admissi- 

ble as  to  speculative  or  pos- 
sible future  consequences. 

277.  Same  subject  continued. 

278.  Evidence   of   physician  based 

on  examination  of  injured 
person  as  to  his  condition. 


279.  Expert     evidence    based    on 

statements  of  injured  per- 
son. 

280.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence 

— Appearance    and     condi- 
tion before  and  after  injury. 

281.  Expert  evidence  as  to  cause 

of  condition. 

282.  Same  subject  continued. 

283.  Expert    evidence  —  Ordinary 

results  from  injury  of  like 
character. 

284.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — 

Malpractice — Cases. 

285.  Opinions  as  to  amount  of  dam- 

ages— Elements  of  damages. 

286.  Evidence  as  to  feigning — Per- 

sonal injuries. 

287.  Hypothetical  questions. 

288.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence 

— Cases  generally. 

289.  Same  subject  continued. 

290.  Statements  and  complaints  of 

injured  person. 

291.  Same  subject  continued. 

292.  Same  subject  concluded. 

293.  Physical    examination   of   in- 

jured person. 

294.  Same  subject  continued. 

295.  Physical  examination  of  plain- 

tiff— New  York. 

296.  Same  subject  continued. 

297.  Exhibiting  injuries  to  jury. 
29S.  Evidence      admissible    under 

pleadings — Cases. 
299.   Same  subject  continued. 


§  263.  Evidence  as  to  plaintiff's  condition  in  life.— As  a 

general  rule  it  may  be  stated  that  evidence  of  the  financial  con- 
320 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


dition  of  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  or  of  the 
fact  that  he  has  a  wife,  children  or  others  dependent  upon  him 
for  support,  is  not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  the 
damages.  The  admission  of  such  evidence  would  in  many  cases 
tend  to  arouse  the  sympathy  of  the  jury  and  cause  them  to 
render  a  verdict  in  excess  of  the  amount  properly  justified  un- 
der the  facts  of  the  case.1  So  in  a  late  case,2  it  was  said  :  "  The 
court  erred  in  allowing  plaintiff  to  prove  that  he  was  a  married 
man  with  three  young  children.  The  United  States  supreme  court 
in  Railroad  Company  v.  Roy3  held:  'In  such  a  case  the  injured 
passenger  being  entitled  only  to  compensatory  damage,  evidence 
of  his  poverty  or  the  number  and  ages  of  his  children  is  irrele- 
vant."* This  court  has  held  such  evidence  improper  and  errone- 
ous.1    It  is  very  readily  perceptible  that  such  evidence  appealed 


1  Penn.  Co.  v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  451; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp  (C. 
C.  App.  0th  C. ),  54  U.  S.  App.  110;  81 
Fed.  807;  20  C.  C.  A.  626;  Alabama 
G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll  (C.  C.  App. 
5th  C),  52  U.  S.  App.  44-2;  84  Fed. 
772;  28  C.  C.  A.  207;  9  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  759;  Postal  Teleg.  Cable 
Co.  v.  Hulsey,  115  Ala.  193;  22  So. 
854;  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Billion, 
1<)7  Ala.  645;  18  So.  75;  Barbour  Co. 
v.  Horn,  48  Ala.  566;  Shea  v.  Potrero, 
etc.,  Railroad  Co.,  44  Cal.  414;  Wil- 
cox v.  Wilmington  City  R.  Co.  (Del.) 
44  Atl.  686;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
51  Ga.  151;  Joliet  v.  Conway,  119111. 
489;  ION.  E.  223;  Pittsburgh,  F.  W. 
&  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Powers,  74  111.  341; 
Denton  v.  Ordway,  108  Iowa,  487;  79 
\.  W.  271;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Young, 
57  Kan.  168;  45  Par.  580:  For!  Scott! 
W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ligbtburn  |  Kan. 
App.),  58Pac.  1033;  Junction  City  v. 
Blades,  1  Kan.  App.  85;  41  Pac.  677; 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney,  1:!  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  626;  14  L.  R.  A.  077;  11  Ry. 
&  Corp.  L.  J.  92;  49  Am.  A  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  117;  17S.  W.  1025;  Stockton  v. 
Frey,  4  Gill  (Md.),  400:  Shaw  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.,  R,  R.  Co.,  s  Gray  (Mass.), 
45:  Rossv.  Kansas  City,  48  Mo.  App. 

21 


440;  Alberti  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  77;  27  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  805;  23  N.  E.  35,  aff'g  43  Hun, 
421;  Moody  v.  Osgood,  50  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  628;  Galion  v.  Lauer,  55  Ohio  St. 
392;  45  N.  E.  1044;  37  Ohio  L.  J.  97; 
Nutt  v.  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  (Oreg.),  35 
Pac.  653;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cower,  85  Tenn.  465;  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lyde,  57  Tex.  505;  Gulf  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  17  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  76;  42  S.  W.  358;  Trinity  &  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
600;  46  S.  W.  389;  Mulcairns  v. 
Zanesville,  67  Wis.  24;  29  N.  W.  565. 
But  see  Robertson  v.  Cornelson,  34 
Fed.  710;  McXamara  v.  King,  7  111. 
432;  Hunt  v.  Chic,  etc.,  II.  R.  Co., 
26  Iowa,  363;  Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa, 
64  Iowa,  251;  Eltringhamv.  Earhart, 
07  Miss.  488;  Carpenter  v.  McDavitt, 
66  Mo.  App.  1;  Dailcy  v.  Houston. 
58  Mo.  301;  Youn<jblood  v.  So.  Car. 
&  <;.  R.  Co.,  00  S.  C.  9;  38  S.  E.  232. 
2Seslerv.  Rolfe  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
(  W.  Va.  1902),  41  S.  E.  210,  per  Bran- 
non. 

3  102  U.  S.  451;  26  L.  Ed.  141. 

4  Moore  v.  City  of  Huntington.  31 
W.  Ya.  842:  8  S.  E.  512. 

321 


§264 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY   CASES. 


to  human  sympathy  and  tended  both  to  induce  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff  and  to  aggravate  damages.  Where  improper  evidence 
is  given  it  is  presumed  to  work  injury  unless  it  very  plainly 
appears  not  to  have  done  so."  5  So  it  has  been  decided  that  evi- 
dence is  not  admissible  of  plaintiff's  poverty  or  of  the  number 
and  ages  of  his  children,5  or  that  he  is  poor  and  has  no  means  to 
live  upon  except  his  earnings,7  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  way  of 
supporting  himself,  of  the  financial  condition  of  his  mother  and 
brother,8  or  that  plaintiff  had  been  committed  to  the  almshouse.9 
But  where  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  injuries  were 
in  dispute  and  the  wife  of  the  plaintiff  had  testified  as  to  the 
manifestation  of  disease  in  her  husband,  it  was  held  that  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining  why  no  other  member  of  the  family  had 
been  called  for  the  purpose  of  testifying  in  reference  thereto, 
evidence  was  admissible  that  the  plaintiff's  family  consisted  of 
his  wife  and  two  children,  aged  seven  and  five  years  respect- 
ively.10 So,  also,  in  the  case  of  an  action  by  a  widow  for  per- 
sonal injuries  evidence  that  she  had  children  dependent  upon  her 
for  support  was  held  not  admissible.11 

§  264.  Same  subject  continued. — The  financial  condition 
of  the  parent  should  not  be  considered  in  an  action  to  recover 
for  an  injury  to  a  minor.12  So  the  jury  in  assesssing  the  dam- 
ages should  not  consider  the  plaintiff's  membership  in  any 
church  or  society.13  In  a  case  in  Iowa,  it  was  held  proper  to 
permit  plaintiff  to  prove  "  that  he  had  no  means  or  property  to 
subsist  upon  and  that  he  was  entirely  dependent  upon  his  la- 


6  Taylor  v.  Kailroad  Co.,  36  W.  Va. 
39;  10  S.  E.  29. 

«  Penn.  Co.  v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  451. 
But  in  an  action  by  a  husband  to  re- 
cover for  the  loss  of  his  wife's  ser- 
vices to  himself  and  children  as  a  re- 
sult of  a  personal  injury,  evidence 
is  admissible  as  to  the  number  and 
ages  of  the  plaintiff's  children.  Con- 
way v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.,  46 
La.  Ann.  1429;  16  So.  362. 

7  Trinity  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  18 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  600;  46  S.,W.  389. 

8  Alabama  C  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll 
( C.  C.  App.  5th  C. ),  52  U.  S.  App.  442 ; 

322 


84  Fed.  772;  28  C.  C.  A.  207;  9  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  759. 

9Schwanzenv.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co., 
18  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)205;  45  N.  Y. 
Supp.  389. 

10  Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Rauh  ( C.  C. 
App.  9th  C),  -19  Fed.  696;  7  U.  S. 
App.  84. 

11  Shaw  v.  Boston,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
8  Gray  (Mass.),  45. 

12  Barnes  v.  Keene,  132  N.  Y.  13; 
Vosburg  v.  Putney,  78  Wis.  84;  47 
N.  W.  99. 

13  Denton   v.    Ordway,   108    Iowa, 
;487;  79  N.  W.  276. 


EVIDENCE    r.V    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES.  §  265 

bor  for  support."  This  decision  1ms  been  followed  by  later 
cases  in  that  state,  so  that  the  rule  now  seems  to  be  settled  there 
that  such  evidence  is  admissible.15  In  Illinois  it  has  been  de- 
cided that  the  husband's  financial  condition  may  be  admissible  in 
certain  cases  as  tending  to  show  the  extent  of  the  injury  to  the 
wife,  since,  owing  to  his  pecuniary  condition,  preventing  him 
from  furnishing  medical  aid.  remedies,  apartments  and  nursing 
such  as  ample  means  would  afford,  the  pain  and  suffering  may 
be  much  greater.1"  And  on  similar  grounds  such  evidence  was 
admitted  in  a  case  in  Mississippi. '•'  And  the  extent  of  the 
plaintiff's  accumulations  as  a  result  of  his  personal  labor  and 
work  may  be  given  in  evidence  as  bearing  upon  his  earning  ca- 
pacity.18 Although  evidence  of  the  financial  condition  of  the 
plaintiff  or  that  he  is  dependent  upon  his  earnings  is,  as  we  have 
stated,  generally  inadmissible  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  dam- 
ages, yet  where  the  object  of  such  evidence  was  to  show  that  the 
plaintiff  had  resorted  to  the  best  medical  advice  within  his  reach, 
it  was  held  to  be  properly  admitted.19  And  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  was  a  widow  is  admissible  as  tending  to  show  that  what- 
ever time  was  lost  by  reason  of  her  disability  was  her  own.-"'  So 
again,  in  reply  to  evidence  that  the  attorneys  of  the  plaintiff 
were  to  share  in  any  judgment  recovered  by  her,  evidence  was 
admitted  that  the  plaintiff  was  poor,  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
that  she  was  unable  to  employ  counsel  in  any  other  way.'1 

§  265.  Evidence  as  to  defendant's  condition  in  life — -Evi- 
dence of  the  defendant's  financial  condition  or  of  his  ability  to 
pay  is  as  a  general  rule  inadmissible  in  an  action  to  recover  for 
personal  injuries.22     In  this  connection  it  is  said  in  a  late  case  in 


"Hunt  v.  Chic,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
26  Iowa,  30:3. 

15  Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa,  64  Iowa, 
251;  Moore  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  47 
Iowa,  688. 

16  Coehran  v.  Amnion,  16  111.    316. 
w  Eltringham  v.  Earhart,  67  Miss. 

488. 

i8  Shaber  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  28  Minn.  104 


R.  865;  23  N.    E.  35.   affg   43   Hun. 
421. 

-"Werner  v.  Chic.  A-  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.  |  Wis. ).  81  X.  W.  416.  See  Corri- 
gan  v.  Dry  Dock  R.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  243. 

-'  Armlt  v.  Bourke  (Mich.),  79  N. 
W.  100;  6  Det.  L.    X.  140. 

-  Toledo,  Wabash  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Smith,    57    111.    517  ;    Hunt  v.   Chic. 


19Alberti  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  *  W.    etc.,  R.    R.  Co.,  26   Iowa,  363;  Laid- 
R.  R.  Co.,  118  X.  Y.  77;  27  X.  Y.    St.    law  v.  Sage,  158  X.    Y.    73;  52  X.  E. 


321 


§  266  EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL   INJURY   CASES. 

New  York:  i;  "  It  has  ever  been  the  theory  of  our  government 
and  a  cardinal  principle  of  our  jurisprudence  that  the  rich  and 
poor  stand  alike  in  courts  of  justice  and  that  neither  the  wealth 
of  the  one  nor  the  poverty  of  the  other  shall  be  permitted  to 
affect  the  administration  of  the  law.     Evidence  of  the  wealth  of 
a  party  is  never  admissible,  directly  or  otherwise,  unless  in  those 
exceptional  cases  where  position  or  wealth  is  necessarily  involved 
in  determining  the  damages  sustained.     As  to  this  general  prop- 
osition there  can  be  no  doubt  and  no  authorities  need  be  cited. 
Notwithstanding  this  well-established  principle  the  plaintiff  was 
permitted  to  show  by  the  defendant  upon  his  cross-examination 
substantially,  or  at  least  to  a  great  extent,  the  amount  of  prop- 
erty possessed  by  him,  its  character,  and  his  business.     He  was 
permitted  to  show  the  number  of  railroads  the  defendant  oper- 
ated, the  banks  in  which  he  was  a  director,  that  he  dealt  in 
stocks,  that  he  loaned  money  and  other  details  of  his  affairs."  'u 
But  where  the  person  responsible  for  the  injury  was  actuated 
by  a  bad  motive  and  where  other  facts  exist  winch  would  au- 
thorize the  jury  to  award  exemplary  damages,  evidence  of  the  de- 
fendant's pecuniary  circumstances  may,  it  is  held,  be  admitted.*5 
In  a  case  in  Louisiana  it  is  decided  that  in  estimating  the  dam- 
ages in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  the  jury  may  properly 
consider  the  defendant's  circumstances  to  a  reasonable  extent.26 

§  266.  Evidence  as  to  character  of  plaintiff— Chastity  of 
female.— In  actions  to  recover  for  personal  injuries,  the  general 
rule  seems  to  be  that  evidence  either  as  to  the  good  or  bad  char- 
acter of  the  plaintiff  is  inadmissible  on  the  question  of  damages 
unless  it  in  some  way  contributed  to  the  injury.27  So  evidence 
that  the  plaintiff  who  had  been  teaching  school  in  another  state 


679;  44  L.  K.  A.  216,  rev'g  2  App. 
Div.  374;  73  N.  Y.  St.  R.  469;  37  N.  Y. 
Supp.  770  ;  Moody  v.  Osgood,  50 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  628;  Englert  v.  Kruse, 
8  N.  Y.  St.  R.  375. 

2«  Laidlaw  v.  Sage,  158  N.  Y.  103; 
52  IS".  E.  679;  44  L.  R.  A.  216. 

24  Per  Martin,  J. 

26  Courvoisier  v.  Raymond,  23  Colo. 
114;  47  Pac.284;  Hunt  v.  Chic,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  363;  Eagle  v. 
324 


Kabrick,  66  Mo.  App.  231 ;  Meibus  v. 
Dodge,  38  Wis.  300;  20  Am.  Rep.  6. 

26  Loyacanov.  Jurgeus,  50  La.  Ann. 
441;  23  So.  717.  See  Belknap  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  H. 
358. 

^Indianapolis,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bush,  101  Ind.  582;  Baltimore,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boteler,  38  Md.  568  ; 
Bruce  v.  Priest,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  100; 
Littlehale   v.   Dix,   11   Cusb.  (Mass.) 


EVIDENT!-;    IX    PHYSICAL    IN.ri'KY    CASES. 


had  been  compelled  to  leave  such  state  because  of  his  immorality 

was  held  inadmissible.28  Nor  in  an  action  for  an  assault  is  evi- 
dence for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  plaintiff's  character  admis- 
sible.'-' And  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  is  a  vagrant  or  a  profes- 
sional gambler  should  not  affect  the  damages  to  be  awarded  him 
for  his  mental  and  physical  pain  and  suffering.3"  Again,  evi- 
dence that  the  plaintiff  was  a  man  of  intemperate  habits  and  that 
he  was  unable  to  transact  business  when  intoxicated,  has  been 
held  inadmissible  on  the  question  of  damages.'1  It  is  held, 
however,  that  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  sober  and  indus- 
trious man  is  admissible  on  such  question.88  And  in  Wis- 
consin in  an  action  by  a  passenger  to  recover  for  personal  in- 
juries, it  -was  declared  by  the  appellate  court  that  a  charge  by  the 
trial  court  that  the  amount  of  damages  was  not  to  l>e  affected 
by  the  unchastity  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that  she  was  entitled  to 
the  same  amount  as  a  chaste  woman,  had  a  tendency  to  mislead 
the  jury.  The  court  declared  that  while  an  unchaste  woman 
might  suffer  as  much  mental  and  physical  pain  as  a  chaste  woman, 
yet  the  jury  might  not  and  perhaps  ought  not  to  give  the  same 
damages  to  an  unchaste  woman  as  they  would  to  a  virtuous,  intel- 
ligent and  industrious  woman  who  could  command  good  wages 
or  take  care  of  a  family,  and  that  the  chastity  of  the  plaintiff  as 
well  as  other  personal  virtues  and  business  qualifications  might 
properly  be  considered  in  determining  the  amount  of  damages  to 
be  awarded.33  There  are  certain  actions  in  which  the  unchastity 
of  a  woman  may  properly  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  deter- 
mining what,  if  any.  damages  she  is  entitled  to  recover.'1  But  to 
hold  that  in  an  action  for  physical  injuries  the  fact  of  a  woman 
being  unchaste  may  be  considered  by  the  jury  on  the  question 
of  damages  and  that  a  chaste  woman  may  recover  more  than 
an  unchaste   woman  is  a  proposition  of  which  it  is  hard  to  ap- 


364;  Johnson  v.  Wells,  6  Nev.  224; 
Coining  v.  Corning,  (5  X.  Y.  97;  Mr- 
Kenzie  v.  Allen,  3  Strobh.  (S.  C.  I  ",4ti. 
And  see  Hardy  v.  Minneapolis,  etc., 
Ry.  Co.,  3(5  Fed.  657. 

28  Lord  v.     Mobile,     113  Ala.   360; 
21  So.  866. 

29  Corning  v.  Corning,  6  N.  Y.  97. 
80  Boyle  v.  Case,  18  Fed.  880. 


31  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bote- 
ler,  38  Md.  568. 

83  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy (C.  C.  App.  2d  C.|,  51  T.  S. 
App.  503;  82  Fed.  158. 

88 Abbott  v.  Tolliver,  71  Wis.  74: 
36  V  W.  622. 

84 See  chaps.  XX,  XXI,  herein. 

325 


$§  207,  268    EVIDENCE    IX    PHYSICAL    INJURY   CASES. 


prove.  Unless  a  woman's  chastity  is  directly  involved  by  the 
character  of  the  action,  it  would  seem  that  evidence  upon  that 
point  would  be  incompetent  on  the  question  of  damages  and 
such  we  believe  is  the  proper  rule. 

§  267.  Evidence  as  to  expectancy  of  life— Mortality  tables. 

— In  actions  to  recover  for  personal  injuries,  evidence  is  admis- 
sible in  certain  cases  as  to  the  life  expectancy  of  the  person 
injured.1*  Such  evidence  is,  however,  only  admissible  in  those 
cases  where  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  for  a  permanent  injury 
and  where  there  is  some  evidence  tending  to  show  that  such  an 
injury  has  been  sustained,  and  where  proof  to  this  effect  has  been 
given,  mortality  tables  such  as  the  Northampton,  Carlisle  or  other 
standard  ones  may  be  admitted  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
life  expectancy  of  the  person  injured.36 

§  268.  Same  subject  continued. — As  to  the  admissibility  of 
mortality  tables  in  evidence,  it  has  been  declared  by  the  United 
States  supreme  court  that  courts  may  take  judicial  notice  of 
the  Carlisle  tables,  and  may  use  them  for  the  purpose  of  esti- 
mating the  probable  duration  of  life  without  regard  to  whether 


85 Missouri,  K.  &  T.  It.  Co.  v.  St. 
Clair,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  345;  51  S. 
W.  666;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Simmons,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  501;  33 
S.  W.  1096;  Waterman  v.  Chic.  & 
A.  R.  Co.  (Wis.),  52  N.  \V.  247. 

36  Whelan  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  38  Fed.  15;  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hissong  (Ala.),  13  So.  209; 
Arkansas  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffith,  63 
Ark.  491;  39  S.  W.  550;  Townsend 
v.  Brings  (Cal.),  32  Pac.  307:  Collins 
Park  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Ware.  112  Ga. 
663;  37  S.  E.  975;  Columbus  v.  Ogle- 
tree,  102  Ga.  293;  29  S.  E.  749;  Co- 
lumbus v.  Sims,  94  Ga.  483;  20  S. 
E.  332;  Savannah,  A.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
McLeod,  94  Ga.  530;  20  S.  E.  434: 
Huntington  v.  Burke,  21  Ind.  App. 
655;  52  X.  E.  415;  1  Repr.  435;  Stomne 
v.  Hanford  Produce  Co.',  108  Iowa, 
437:  78  X.  W.  841;  Keyes  v.  Cedar 
326 


Falls,  107  Iowa,  509;  78  N.  W.  227: 
Allen  v.  Ames  &  C.  R.  Co.,  106  Iowa, 
602;  76  N.  W.  848;  McDonald  v. 
Chic,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  124; 
Greer  v.  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.,  14  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  876;  21  S.  W.  649;  Foster  v. 
Village  of  Bellaire  (Mich.  1901),  86 
N.  W.  383;  8  Det,  L.  N.  203;  Leacli 
v.  Detroit  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.  1900), 
84  N.  VV.  316;  7  Det.  L.  N.  747;  Mott 
v.  Detroit  (Mich.),  15  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  113;  79  N.  W.  3;  6  Det. 
L.  X.  87;  Deisen  v.  Chic,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  43  Minn.  454;  45  N.  W.  864; 
Swift  &  Co.  v.  Holonbeck,  55  Neb. 
228;  75  N.  W.  584;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
509;  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams. 
01  X.  J.  L.  646;  40  Atl.  634:  11  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  600;  Campbell  v. 
York,  172  Pa.  205;  33  Atl.  879;  Ker- 
rigan v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  (Pa.  1899), 
44  Atl.    1069;  Steinbrunner  v.   Pitts- 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    ('ASKS.  §  2G8 

they  have  l>een  introduced  in  evidence  or  not.17  And  in  New 
York  it  is  decided  that  the  court  may  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
Northampton  tables,  though  they  arc  not  put  in  evidence,  since 
they  are  referred  to  and  made  a  part  of  its  nil  The  admis- 

sibility of  such  tables  is  held  not  to  depend  upon  the  condition 
of  the  health  of  the  person  whose  expectancy  of  life  is  a  subject 
of  inquiry,  bu1  such  condition  may  be  considered  as  a  qualifica- 
tion of  the  tables  in  evidence  and  in  determining  the  probable 
duration  of  life.  So  the  existence  of  a  disease,  and  its  ten- 
dency to  shorten  the  life  of  the  injured  person,  is  to  be  considered 
in  connection  with  such  tables.39  But  where  the  jury  were  in- 
structed that  the  plaintiff's  expectation  of  life  was  "  estimated 
by  the  Carlisle  and  oilier  life  tables  at  forty  to  forty-five  years, 
and  that  they  could  take  that  as  a  means  of  estimation  of  what 
would  compensate  him  for  his  loss,"  it  Was  held  that  such  in- 
struction was  erroneous  since  it  allowed  the  jury  to  infer  that 
plaintiff's  expectancy  was  established  by  the  tables,  and  that 
they  were  not  to  be  given  such  weight  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  that  the  plaintiff  was  clearly  within  the  class  of 
lives  tabulated  therein.40  It  was  declared  in  this  case  that  Car- 
lisle tables  are  admissible  only  as  some  evidence  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  jury  in  determining  the  expectancy  of  life 
where  that  question  becomes  material,  but  they  are  by  no  means 
conclusive,  and  their  value  depends  greatly  on  similarity  of  the 
life  in  question  to  the  conditions  and  habits  of  those  tabulated 
a  century  ago.  While  they  are  some  evidence  thereof  they  do 
not  establish  plaintiff's  expectancy  unless  by  precedent  proof ; 
the  person  whose  life  expectancy  it  is  intended  to  show  has 
brought  himself  clearly  within  the  class  of  selected  lives  tabu- 
burp,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  504;  X.  Y.  592,  aff'g  46  How.  11;  10  Abb. 
23  Atl.  239;   .Missouri.  K.  &  T.  U.  Co.    N.  S.  19. 

v.  Simmons,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  501;  39  Greer  v.  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co., 
33  S.  \Y.  1096;  Waterman  v.  Chic.  &  14  Ky.  L.  Rep.  870;  21  S.  W.  649; 
A.  R.  Co.  (Wis.).  52  N.  W.  247.  Arkansas,  M.  R.    Co.    v.    Griffith,  63 

-Lincoln  v.  Power,  151  V.  S.  436;    Ark.   491;  39  S.    W.  550;  Camden  & 
88  I..  Ed.  224;  14  Sup.  Ct   Rep.  387.    A.  R.   Co.    v.  Williams,  61    X.  J.  L 


88  Davis  v.  Standish,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
608.  See  as  to  admissibility  of  such 
tables  in  this  state,  Sauter  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  06  N.  Y.  50,  aff'g 
6    Hun.    446;    Schell     v.    Plumb,   55 


646;  40  Atl.  634:  11    Am.  &  Eng.   R. 
Cas.  X.  S.  GOO. 

"Kerrigan  v.  Penn.  R.   R.  Co.,  194 
Pa.  St.  98,  105,  106;  44  Atl.  1069. 

327 


§269 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL   INJURY   CASES. 


lated.  But  mere  proof  of  age  and  occupation  without  evidence 
of  habits  or  health  gives  to  such  tables  but  little  weight,  and 
this  is  substantially  true  of  tables  made  up  by  actuaries  of  rep- 
utable insurance  companies.41  In  Wisconsin  it  is  held  that  the 
annuity  tables  given  in  certain  statutes42  of  that  state  form  no 
mathematical  basis  for  the  estimation  of  damages  for  personal 
injuries  not  resulting  in  death.43  And  in  Pennsylvania  in  an 
action  for  personal  injury,  annuity  tables  are  not  admissible. 
Such  a  table  is  based  on  the  average  anticipation  of  death,  with- 
out taking  account  of  capacity  to  work,  indolence,  vicious  habits 
or  tendency  thereto,  or  diminution  of  ability  to  earn.  The 
health,  earning  power  or  industry  of  the  particular  individual 
have  no  place  in  the  calculation.44 

§  269.  Same  subject  continued — Cases. — AVhereit  is  alleged 
that  the  injuries  are  permanent,  it  is  held  that  mortality  tables 
are  not  properly  admissible  unless  there  be  some  evidence  as  to 
the  value  of  plaintiff's  services.45  In  another  case  an  instruction 
to  the  jury  which  in  substance  authorized  them  to  determine  the 
yearly  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  diminished  earning  capacity  and 
then  after  multiplying  this  by  the  number  of  years  of  his  expect- 
ancy of  life  to  reduce  the  entire  amount  to  its  present  value  was 


41  Kerrigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
194  Pa.  98,  105,  106,  per  Dean,  J., 
44  Atl.  1069.  This  was  a  case  of 
suit  for  damages  for  personal  injury 
to  a  brakeman  on  defendant's  rail- 
road, who  had  his  right  arm  crushed 
while  coupling  cars.  The  plaintiff 
offered  in  evidence  2  Scribner  on 
Dower  (ed.  1883),  pp.  811,  812,  818, 
containing  the  Carlisle  and  other  ta- 
bles for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
expectancy  of  life  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
it  was  declared  that  the  offer  was  gen- 
eral in  its  character  and  pointed  to 
no  particular  life  table  as  applicable 
to  the  special  facts  of  this  case.  It 
was  not  suggested  whose  lives,  or 
what  class  of  persons,  or  what  the 
perils  of  their  daily  employment  or 
avocation.     "  The  court  without  the 

328 


least  aid  from  either  counsel  admit- 
ted the  offer,  we  do  not  doubt  inad- 
vertently, and  thus  fell  into  error." 
Id.  105,  per  Dean,  J.  The  cases  cited 
in  connection  with  the  above  text 
herein  are  Steinbrunner  v.  R.  Co., 
146  Pa.  504;  Kraut  v.  Ry.  Co.,  160 
Pa.  327,  and  Campbell  v.  York,  172 
Pa.  222. 

42  Wis.  Rev.  Stat.  1898,  p.  2461. 

43Crouse  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
102  Wis.  196;  78  N.  W.  446;  14  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  780. 

44  Kerrigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
194  Pa.  98,  106,  107;  44  Atl.  1069, 
per  Dean,  J. 

45  Macon,  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
99  Ga.  229;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  355;  25  S.  E.  460. 


EVinr.xrr.  tn    PHYSICAL   iN.irirv   CASES.   §§  270,271 

held  not  erroneous/'  In  an  earlier  case  in  the  same  slab-  it  was 
decided  that  in  using  annuity  tables  as  a  basis  of  earnings  and  age 
in  an  action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  by  which  the  earning 
capacity  of  the  plaintiff  was  diminished  one  half,  there  should 
be  made  a  proportionate  deduction  for  his  continuing  ability  to 
labor,  an  allowance  for  probable  decreased  ability  as  a  result  of 
old  age  and  for  contributory  negligence  if  the  jury  found  that 
he  had  been  guilty  thereof.47  But  where  there  has  been  only  a 
partial  impairment  of  ability  to  earn  money,  it  has  been  declared 
error  to  admit  evidence  of  life  expectancy. B  In  determining  the 
expectancy  of  life  by  the  use  of  mortality  tables  in  the  case  of  a 
minor,  the  expectancy  must  be  based  upon  the  actual  age  of  the 
minor  and  not  from  the  age  of  twenty-one.  although  in  the  absence 
of  evidence  of  emancipation  he  cannot  recover  for  loss  of  earnings 
prior  to  his  majority.1'*  Where  a  person  is  suing  for  a  physical 
injury  which  lias  been  inflicted  upon  him,  the  shortening  of  his 
expectancy  of  life  is  held  not  to  be  recoverable  by  the  person 
injured.50 

§  270.  Presumption  against  seriousness  of  injury— Evi- 
dence to  rebut.— Where  it  appears  in  evidence  that  the  plain- 
tiff resumed  work  shortly  after  receiving  the  injury,  whatever, 
if  any,  presumption  may  arise  against  the  seriousness  of  the  in- 
juries from  such  fact  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence  that  circum- 
stances compelled  him  to  resume  his  work.51 

§  271.  Admission  in  evidence  of  deposition  charging  at- 
tempt to  make   injuries  appear  worse,  erroneous— Case. — 

Where  a  deposition  which  charges  that  the  plaintiff  is  attempt- 
ing to  make  his  injuries  appear  worse  than  they  really  are  is 
erroneously  admitted,  the  admission  thereof  is  reversible  error."'-' 


«  Columbus  v.  Ogletree,  102  On.  •_".>:; ; 
29  S.  E.  749.    See  Sees  242-249,  herein. 

«  Savannah,  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Leod,  94  Ga.  530;  20  S.  E.  4:;4. 

48  Honey  drove  v.  Lamaster  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  50  S.  W.  in.,;*.. 

49  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Holonbeck,  55 
Neb.  228;  79  N.  W.  584;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  509. 


50  Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Baker,  140 
Ind.  GOO;  3(3  L.  R.  A.  683;  45  NT.  E. 
1049. 

C1  Burleson  v.  Reading.  110  Misc. 
512;  68  \.  W.  294;  3  Det.  L.  N.  476; 
29  Chic.  Leg.  News  27. 

M  Boise  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.,  6  Okla.  243;  51  Pac.  662. 

329 


S§  272-274  EVIDENCE  IN    physical  injury  cases. 

§  272.  Action  against  city— Judgment  roll  conclusive  in 
action  on  bond.  — Where  in  an  action  against  a  city  for  per- 
sonal injuries  caused  by  an  obstruction  placed  in  the  street  by 
contractors  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  such  contractors  to- 
gether with  the  sureties  on  the  bond  had  notice  of  the  pendency 
of  the  suit  and  opportunity  to  defend  the  same,  the  judgment 
roll  in  such  action  is  conclusive  evidence,  in  an  action  by  the 
city  on  a  bond  indemnifying  it  from  all  actions  against  it  for 
damages  for  personal  injuries,  of  the  existence  of  the  obstruc- 
tion, of  the  freedom  of  the  injured  party  from  contributory 
negligence,  and  of  the  amount  of  the  damages.33 

§  273.  Exemplary  damages— Evidence  in  mitigation  of — 

Where  a  person  has  been  injured  by  the  negligence  of  another 
and  the  evidence  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  to  re- 
cover therefor  tends  to  show  that  the  negligence  was  of  such  a 
character  as  to  authorize  the  award  of  vindictive  damages,  evi- 
dence in  behalf  of  the  defendant  is  admissible  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  that  the  negligence  was  not  of  such  a  character,  and 
to  thus  keep  down  exemplary  damages.  So  where  the  complaint 
in  an  action  by  a  person  who  had  been  injured  by  the  bursting 
of  a  steamboat  boiler  alleged  that  the  engineer  was  "  unlicensed  " 
and  that  the  explosion  was  due  to  his  negligence  and  unskill- 
fullness,  and  evidence  was  given  tending  to  show  a  flagrant 
violation  of  duty  in  employing  him,  it  was  held  that  it  was 
proper  for  defendant  to  prove  that  he  was  a  competent  engineer 
for  the  purpose  of  rebutting  such  evidence  and  keeping  down 
vindictive  damages.54 

§  274.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence— Future  consequences 
of  physical  injuries. — Where  medical  men  have  attended  and 
examined  an  injured  person  their  opinions  as  to  the  future  con- 
sequences and  permanency  of  such  injuries  are  admissible  in 
evidence.55     So  the  opinion  of  a  physician  who  has  attended  an 


53  New  York  v.  Brady,  151  N.  Y. 
611;  45  N.  E.  1122. 

64  Fay  v.  Davidson,  13  Minn.  523. 

«  Cunningham  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.  (C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.),  49  Fed. 


Co.,  101  Cal.  585;  36  Pac.  125; 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Reid  (Colo. 
App.),  35  Pac.  269;  Chattanooga 
R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Huggins,  89  Ga. 
494;    15  S.   E.  848;    52  Am.  &   Eng. 


439;     Healy    v.    Visalia     &     T.    R.    R.   Cas.  473;  Springfield  Consol.  R. 
330 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.HRY    CASES. 


S  27  I 


injured  person,  whether  the  fact  that  BUch  person  had  not  re- 
covered from  his  injuries  at  the  time  of  the  trial  would  indi- 
cate that  such  injuries  were  permanent,  is  admissihkv6  as  is 
also  his  opinion  as  to  the  permanency  of  the  shortening  of  an  in- 
jured person's  leg  as  a  result  of  an  injury,  from  its  known  con- 
dition at  the  time  of  the  trial.'7  And  again,  the  opinion  of  a 
witness  that  the  plaintiff  could,  since  the  injury,  perform  no 
duties  requiring  the  slightest  physical  exercise,  and  that  during 
his  severe  attacks  he  could  do  nothing  and  that  at  his  best  he 
cannot  do  anything  but  jobs  of  a  light  nature  has  been  held 
properly  admitted/*     So,  also,  it  is  competent  for  a  physician  to 


Co.  v.  Welsh,  155  111.  511;  40  N.  E. 
1084,  aff'jr  56  m.  App.  196;  Lake 
Erie  &  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Wills,  39  111. 
App.  649;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  K. 
Co.  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  544;  14  N.  E. 
572;  12  West.  30:i ;  Erickson  v. 
Barber  (Iowa),  49  N.  W.  838;  Hol- 
man  v.  Union  St.  R.  Co.,  114  Mich. 
208;  72  N.  W.  202;  9  Am.  &  Eng. 
K.  Cas.  N.  S.  105;  4  Det.  L.  N.  518; 
Cole  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 

05  Mich.  77;  54  N.  W.  638;  Lang- 
worthy  v.  Green  Twp.,  88  Mich.  207; 
50  N.  W.  130;  Brazil  v.  Pierson,  44 
Minn.  212;  4U  \.  W.  331;  Peterson 
v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  38 
Minn.  511;  39  \.  W.  4S5 ;  Ban  v. 
Kansas  City  (Mo.),  25  S.  W.  562; 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Archer, 
4H  Neb.  907:  G5  N.  W.  1013:  Knoll 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  I  \.  V.  1901),  CO 
N.  E.  1113,  aff'g  40  App.  Div.  527: 
82  N.  V.  Supp.  10;  Ayres  v.  Del.  L. 

6  W.  R.  Co.,  158  X.  V.  254;  53N.  E. 
22;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Pep.  683,  aff'g  I  App. 
Div.  511;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  11;  Gris- 
wold  v.  X.  V.  ('.  &  II.  R.  P.  Co  ,  115 
X.  V.  61;  23  X.  Y.  St.  R.  729;  21 
X.  E.  72(i;  Clegg  v.  Metropolitan  St. 
R.  Co.,  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  207;  72 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  737:  37  X.  Y.  Supp.  130, 
aff'd  54  X.  E  1089;  Stever  v.  \.  V. 
C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  App.  Div.  (  X.  Y. ) 
302;  39  X.  Y.  Supp.  941;  appeal  dis- 


missed in  151  N.  Y.  50:  45  X.  E. 
371;  64  Alb.  L.  J.  377:  O'Flaherty  v. 
XTassau  Elec.  R.  Co.,  34  App.  Div. 
(X.  V.)  74;  54  X.  V.  Supp.  96;  58 
Alb.  L.  J.  347;  Barkley  v.  X.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.) 
228:  54  X.  Y.  Supp.  760;  5  Am.  Xeg. 
Rep.  218:  Reynolds  v.  Niagara  Falls, 
81  Hun  (X.  Y.),  353:  03  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
118;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  954:  McCooey 
v.  Forty-St-cond  St.  &  C.  St.  Ferry 
R.  Co.,  79  Hun  |  X.  Y. ).  255:  61  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  34;  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  368;  Saltz- 
inan  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  73  Hun 

IX.  Y.),  567;  56  X.  Y.  St.  R.  220:  26 
XT.  Y.  Supp.  311;  Cannon  v.  Brook- 
lyn City  P.  Co..  9  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  2S2; 
61  X.  Y.  St.  P.  147:  29  X.  Y.  Supp. 
722;  Coyne  v.   Manhattan   P.  Co.,  42 

X.  Y.  St.  R.  017:  16  X.  V.  Supp. 
686;  Cook  v.  X.  Y.  C.  A-  II.  P.  P.  Co., 
1  N.  V.  Supp.  711:  Sabine  &  E.  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ewing  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26 
s  \v.  638;  Curran  v.  A.  II.  Stange 
Co.,  9S  Mis.  59S;  74  X.  W.  377;  La-jo 
v.  Walsh,  98  Wis.  348;  74  X.  W.  212. 

'"'  Erickson  v.  Barber  (Iowa),  49 
X.  \Y.  838. 

i7  Reynolds  v.  Niagara  Falls,  81 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  353;  63  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
lis;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  954. 

68  Chattanooga,  R.  *  C.  P.  Co.  v. 
Hoggins,  89  Ga.  494;  15  S.  E.  848; 
52  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  473. 

331 


S  2Y5 


EVIDENCE    TN    PHYSICAL   INJURY   CASES. 


testify  that  he  knows  to  a  reasonable  certainty  that  the  thicken- 
ing of  pleura  which  he  has  found  will  be  permanent;59  that  as 
a  result  of  an  injury  to  a  boy  his  ability  to  work  when  on  his 
feet  will  be  somewhat  impaired  and  that  he  is  a  cripple,  though 
the  witness  cannot  state  the  extent  of  his  disability ; m  and  that 
a  person's  life  will  probably  be  shortened  as  a  result  of  the  in- 
juries sustained.61 

§  275.  Same  subject  continued. — It  is  proper  to  ask  a  phy- 
sician as  to  the  probability  of  an  injuried  person's  recovery.88 
So  it  is  declared  in  a  late  decision  that  "  it  is  well  settled  by 
our  decisions  that  in  establishing  the  future  physical  and  men- 
tal impairment  of  which  damages  may  be  recovered  in  such 
cases,  by  the  testimony  of  duly  qualified  witnesses,  they  may 
be  permitted  to  give  their  opinion  as  to  the  probability  of  such 
disability  as  a  direct  and  natural  effect  of  the  injury  in  question. 
In  Railway  Company  v.  Wood,63  it  is  said  :  '  The  questions  asked 
the  medical  witnesses  were  as  to  the  probable  results  that  would 
follow  from  an  injury  described  by  the  witnesses,  who  testified 
on  the  trial.  We  understand  it  to  be  well  settled  that  such 
questions  are  proper.  .  .  .  The  cases  cited  by  counsel  are  di- 
rectly against  them  for  they  both  concede  that  it  is  competent 
to  ask  an  opinion  as  to  probable  results,  although  it  is  held  that 
merely  speculative  opinions  are  not  competent.'  "  w  And  expert 
evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  a  person  is  permanently  in- 
jured under  a  complaint  alleging  incapacity  to  work  for  a  cer- 
tain length  of  time  past,  permanent  injury,  and  that  the  plaintiff 
will  continue  to  suffer  pain  and  anguish  for  the  rest  of  his  life.65 
So,  also,  a  physician,  who  has  attended  the  injured  person  and 
has  testified  as  to  her  condition  and  the  probable  cause  thereof, 
may  also  testify  as  to  what  percentage  of  persons  in   her  con- 


59  Eifiuger  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 
Co.,  13  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  389;  34  N.  Y. 
Supp.  239;  68  N.  Y.  St.  R.  118. 

60  Springfield  Consol.  R.  Co.  v. 
Welsh,  155  111.  511;  40  N.  E.  1034, 
aff'g  5G  111.  App.  196. 

61  Ban-  v.  Kansas  City  (Mo.),  25 
S.  W.  562. 

«  Clegg  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  207;  37  N.  Y.  St.  R.  130, 
332 


aff'd  54  N.  E.  1089;  Peterson  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn. 
511;  39  K  W.  485. 

63  113  Ind.  544,  558;  14  N.  E.  572, 
580. 

64  Lake  Lighting  Co.  v.  Lewis 
(Ind.  App.  1902),  64  N.  E.  35,  per 
Black,  J. 

65  Taylor  v.  City  of  Ballard,  24 
Wash.  191 ;  64  Pac.  143. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IX.JCKY    CASES.  §   276 

dition  recover  their  health,  his  statement  being  based  upon  his 
experience,  practice  and  observation/*  And  where  a  medical 
expert  in  reply  to  a  question  as  to  the  possible  future  conse- 
quences of  an  injury  states  that  there  are  cases  on  record  of 
such  injuries  producing  death  in  future  years,  such  testimony 
is  not  inadmissible  as  in  effect  permitting  the  introduction  of 
medical  books  to  the  jury,  since  the  reference  to  such  cases  is  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  the  basis  of  the  opinion  and  information 
of  the  witness."  So  the  opinion  of  medical  experts  as  to  the 
nature  and  future  consequences  of  personal  injuries  is  admis- 
sible, though  learning  derived  from  the  study  of  standard  medi- 
cal works  is  the  basis  of  such  opinion  and  not  experience  ac- 
quired from  actual  practice.08  Again,  the  testimony  of  a  phy- 
sician is  admissible  as  to  the  length  of  time  that  a  person 
will  live  under  certain  conditions,  although  he  states  that  he 
can  only  give  the  probability  as  to  this  based,  on  the  history  of 
other  cases.69  But  a  physician  cannot  be  asked  his  opinion  as 
to  the  permanency  of  injuries  from  his  examination  of  the  plain- 
tiff made  a  few  days  after  the  injury  and  the  history  of  the  case 
where  no  evidence  touching  such  history  had  been  given  on  the 
trial.™ 

§276.  Expert  evidence  not  admissible  as  to  speculative  or 
possible  future  consequences.  While  expert  evidence  is  ad- 
missible as  to  the  future  consequences  of  an  injury,  yet  to 
authorize  its  admission  the  consequences  must  be  such  as  are 
reasonably  certain  to  ensue,  and  evidence  is  not  admissible  as  to 
consequences  which  it  is  merely  possible  may  ensue.71  So  where 
a  medical  expert  declined  to  say  that  the  future  results  concern- 


66  Cole  v.  Lake  Shore  A-  Si.  S.  R. 
Co.,  95  Mich.  77:  .-)4  X.  W.  638;  Budd 
v.  Salt  Lake  City  K.  Co.(Utah,  1901  ), 
65  Pac.  486. 

67  Healy  v.  Visalia  A-  T.  II.  Co.,  101 
Cal.  585;  30  Pac.  125. 

68  Fordyce  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  22  S.  W.  235.  See  also  Jack- 
son v.  Boone,  !»::  Ga.  662;  20  S.  E.  46; 
47  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  54;  Mo.  K. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rose,  19  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  470:  49  S.  W.  133. 


e»  Alberti  v.  X.  Y.  L.  E.  &  \V.  R. 
Co.,  118  X.  Y.  77:  G  L.  K.  A.  765;  2 
\.  V.  St.  R.  865;  •-'  X.  E.  35;  4  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  201. 

7°  McCabe  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  22 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  707;  50  X.  Y.  Supp.  34. 

"Ganiard  v.  Rochester,  C.  A  B.  R. 
R.  Co.,  50  Him  (X.  Y.i.  22;  is  N.  V. 
St.  R.  692;  2  X.  Y.  Supp.  470;  121 
X.  Y.  661;  Magee  v.  Troy.  48  Him 
(X.  Y.i,  383;  119  X.  Y.  040;  Reich- 
man   v.   Second  Ave.    By.  Co..  15  X. 

333 


§277 


EVIDENCE    IN     PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


ing  which  he  was  testifying  would  ensue  with  reasonable  cer- 
tainty and  confessed  that  there  was  a  certain  amount  of  uncer- 
tainty in  reference  thereto,  it  was  held  that  the  testimony  was 
incompetent.72  So  it  is  error  to  allow  a  physician  to  testify  as 
to  the  merely  possible  outbreak  of  some  new  disease  or  suffering 
due  to  the  original  injury,"  or  that  the  pain  and  suffering 
resulting  from  the  injury  "might"  be  permanent.74  And  where 
the  plaintiff  was  suffering  from  neuritis,  it  was  held  proper  to 
exclude  a  question  as  to  the  effect  if  such  disease  extended  up- 
ward so  as  to  affect  the  spinal  cord,  since  such  consequences 
were  too  remote  and  speculative.75  Again,  it  is  incompetent 
for  a  physician  to  testify  that  in  many  cases  of  injuries  similar 
to  those  from  which  plaintiff  is  suffering,  certain  consequences 
result,  since  such  testimony  is  declared  to  be  speculative  and 
conjectural.7"  So  also  for  the  same  reasons  was  it  held  improper 
to  admit  testimony  of  a  physician  that  the  injury  from  which 
plaintiff  was  suffering  was  liable  to  trouble  him  for  several  years, 
and  that  he  knew  of  a  case  where  an  injury  of  that  kind  had 
troubled  a  man  for  about  thirty  years.'7 

§277.  Same  subject  continued. — A  question  to  a  medical 
expert  as  to  what  results  are  likely  to  follow  from  the  injuries 
is  improper. 7S  But  a  physician  may  be  asked  whether  he  can 
state  with  reasonable  certainty  whether  or  not  injuries  are  per- 
manent in  their  nature.79  And  a  question  to  a  physician  as  to 
what  in  his  opinion  will  in  the  "  natural  and  ordinary  course  of 
events  "  be  the  result  of  plaintiff's  injuries  is  not  objectionable* 


Y.  St.  R.  928;  Butler  v.  Manh.  K. 
Co.,  3  Misc.  (N~.  Y.)  353;  52  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  498;  30  Abb.  X.  Cas.  78;  23 
X.  Y.  Supp.  163.  See  also  sec.  275 
herein. 

72 De  Soucey  v.  Manhattan  R.  .Co., 
39  N.  Y.  St.  R.  79;  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  108. 

73  O'Brien  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  St.  R.  801;  13 
N.  Y.  Supp.  305. 

74Elsas  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
56  Hun  (N.  Y.),  161;  30  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  414;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  210. 

75Yaeger  v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  R. 
Co.  (Cal.),  51  Pac.  190. 

334 


™  Jewell  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  27  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  500;  50 
N.  Y.  Supp.  848. 

77  Miley  v.  Broadway  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.,  29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  107;  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 
455. 

78  Atkins  v.  Man.  R.  Co.,  57  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  102;  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  214;  10 
N.  Y.  Supp.  432. 

79  Cass  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  20 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  591;  47  N.  Y. 
Supp.  356. 

80  Loudoun  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co., 
16  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  152;  44  N.  Y. 
Supp.  742. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.M'i:\    CASES. 


§  J7- 


So,  also,  a  physician  may  testily  as  to  what  would  be  the  future 
result  judging  from  the  present  condition  of  the  plaintiff  as  in- 
dicated from  her  testimony  and  assuming  it  to  he  true.8  And 
where  a  medical  expert  in  stating  his  opinion  that  the  plaintiff 
would  never  recover,  qualified  it  by  adding  "so  far  as  to  be 
capable  of  any  persistent  occupation,"  it  was  decided  that  such 
qualification  was  not  a  second  speculative  opinion  based  upon 
the  first  opinion  and  was  not  objectionable.*2  Again,  where  a 
plaintiff  was  suffering  from  spinal  irritation,  it  was  held  that  the 
testimony  of  an  expert  that  he  was  inclined  to  think  that  such 
irritation  would  prove  permanent  and  that  certain  conditions 
and  results  were  produced  by  permanent  spinal  irritation  was 
not  obnoxious  to  the  objection  that  it  was  merely  conjectural.s! 
And  it  was  similarly  determined  where  a  physician  had  testified 
that  from  the  fact  that  a  wound  had  once  broken  out  it  was  liable 
to  do  so  again  and  he  was  asked  whether  such  result  was  prob- 
able and  likely  to  occur."4  So,  also,  where,  the  plaintiff  was 
suffering  from  a  fracture  of  a  leg,  it  was  held  that  a  medical 
witness  might  testify  as  to  the  probability  of  complete  recovery 
therefrom  and  that  such  evidence  was  not  objectionable  as 
being  too  remote  and  speculative.85  Again,  it  has  been  decided 
that  a  physician  may  be  asked  whether  a  "  direct  hernia  "  ever 
becomes  dangerous  to  life  or  dangerous  or  painful  in  any  way, 
where  such  question  calls  for  no  opinion  as  to  some  possible 
future  complication,  but  rather  as  to  some  result  which  may 
ensue  from  existing  conditions.86 

§  278.  Evidence  of  physician  based  on  examination  of 
injured  person  as  to  his  condition. — Where  a  personal  ex- 
amination has  been  made  by  a  physician  of  an  injured  person, 
the  testimony  of  such  physician  as  to  the  details  of  such  examina- 


81  Mitchell  v.  Tacoma  R.  &  M.  Co., 
13  Wash.  560;  43  Pac.  528. 

82Lehi£h  &  II.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
chant  (C.  C.  App.  2d.  C),  84  Fed. 
870 ;  55  U.  S.  App.  427 :  28  C.  C.  A  .544- 

WMahar  v.  New  York  C.  A-  II.  1!. 
R.Co.,  20  App.  Div.  (V  V.)  161;  40 
N.  V.  Supp.  847. 

M  Penny    v.    Rochester     R.    Co.,   7 


App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  595;  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
172;  71  N.  V.  Si.  R.  732. 

wRhinefl  v.  Royalton,  40  N.  V.  St 
R.  662;  i:>  X.  V.  Supp.  944. 

^Stever  v.  Now  York  C.  &  II.  R. 
R.  Co.,  7  A  pp.  Div.  (X.  Y.)892;  39  X. 
Y.  Supp.  1)44 ;  appeal  dismissed  in 
151  N.  Y.  50;  45  N.  E.  371:  54  Alb. 
L.  J.  377. 

335 


§ 278 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


tion  is  admissible  in  evidenced  So  the  attending  physician  may 
testify  as  to  the  condition  of  a  person  when  she  reached  her  home 
and  he  first  examined  her,88  and  as  to  the  plaintiff's  subjective 
symptoms,89  and  as  to  any  flinching  or  exclamations  of  the  injured 
person  when  he  pressed  upon  certain  portions  of  the  body.93 
And  where  a  physician  testified  that  he  observed  certain  symp- 
toms in  his  examination  of  the  plaintiff  from  which  the  existence 
of  a  certain  disease  might  be  inferred,  it  was  held  that  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  have  such  disease  in  mind  at  the  time  of  such 
examination  or  make  a  special  examination  in  reference  thereto, 
did  not  make  such  testimony  inadmissible.91  Again,  where  an 
examination  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  physician  was  made  two 
years  after  the  injury,  it  was  decided  that  his  testimony  as  to  the 
plaintiff's  condition  at  that  time  was  not  rendered  inadmissible 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  he  was  unable  to  state  the  cause  of 
such  condition,  where  it  appeared  from  other  evidence  that  prior 
to  the  accident  the  .plaintiff  was  sound  and  well,  but  subsequent 
thereto  was  unable  to  do  hard  work.92  Where,  however,  a  phy- 
sician examines  an  injured  person  merely  for  the  purpose  of  be- 
coming a  witness  in  the  plaintiff's  behalf  or  for  any  purpose 
other  than  advice  or  treatment,  it  is  held  that  he  cannot  testify 
as  to  statements  or  complaints  made  by  the  plaintiff  at  the  time 
of  such  examination  in  reference  to  his  symptoms,  sufferings  or 
condition.93  But  where  statements  have  been  made  by  the  plain- 
tiff to  his  attending  physician  in  order  to  enable  the  latter  to 
prescribe  for  him,  the  physician  may  testify  in  reference  thereto.94 


87  Stone  v.  Moore  (Iowa),  49  N.  W. 
76;  Sherwood  v.  Chic.  &  W.  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  88  Mich.  108;  50  N.  W.  101; 
Jones  v.  Chic.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co. 
(Minn.),  45  N.  W.  444;  Eifinger  v. 
Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
389;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  239;  68  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  118. 

88  Griffith  v.  Utica  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
4:5  X.  Y.  St.  R.  835;  17  N.  Y.  Supp. 
692. 

&    S.    F.   R.   R.    Co.   v. 
Civ.  App.  93;  40  S. 


«9  Gulf   C. 
Brown,  16    Tex. 
W.  608. 

90  Zingrebe   v. 

336 


Union   Ry.   Co.,  56 


App.  Div.  ( N.  Y. )  555 ;  67  N.  Y.  Supp. 
554. 

91  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spilker  (Ind.),  32  Am.  L.  Reg.  763; 
33  N.  E.  280,  reh'g  denied  34  N.  E. 
218. 

92  Hall  v.  St.  Joseph  Water  Co.,  48 
Mo.  App.  356. 

93  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
YTokes,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  499;  1  Ohio  C. 
D.  599.  See  Abbot  v.  Heath,  84  Wis. 
314;  54  N.  W.  574. 

94  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  93;  40  S.  W.  608. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.IIUV    CASES. 


6  279 


And  an  attending  physician  who  has  testified  as  to  complaints 
as  to  pains  made  by  the  injured  person  may  express  his  opinion 
as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  in  juries/6  So  in  a  case  in 
Illinois  it  is  declared  that  where,  from  a  personal  examination  of 
the  plaintiff,  an  expert  witness  has  formed  an  opinion  in  refer- 
ence to  sueh  injury,  such  opinion  is  admissible  in  evidence  for 
whatever  it  may  be  worth.96 

§  279.  Expert  evidence  based  on  statements  of  injured 
person. — The  testimony  of  an  expert  in  an  action  for  personal 
injuries  may  be  based  in  part  upon  the  statements  of  the  injured 
person  where  such  statements  are  made  to  the  physician  for  the 
purpose  of  medical  treatment.''7  And  a  physician  may  from 
knowledge  gained  by  an  examination  and  inquiries  of  the  injured 
person  state  the  conclusions  at  which  he  has  arrived.'*  So  the 
opinion  of  a  physician  based  in  part  upon  the  statements  of  the 
person  injured  may  be  given  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
injury,"  and  as  to  the  probable  duration  of  physical  suffering 
and  disability.100  And  where  a  medical  expert  on  cross-examina- 
tion testified  that  his  opinion  as  to  a  person's  physical  condition 
was  based  on  the  facts  stated  by  the  patient,  it  was  decided  that 
the  court  properly  refused  to  strike  out  such  opinion,  it  not 
appearing  any  of  the  statements  related  to  past  events.1  Hut 
the  opinion  of  a  physician  that  his  patient's  condition  might 
readily  have  followed  as  a  result  of  the  injury  complained  of  is 
inadmissible  where  no  evidence  is  given  showing  the  statements 
upon  which  it  was  based.'  And  where  a  deposition  of  the  pa- 
tient had  been  made  relating  to  the  injury,  it  was  declared  that 


96  Austin  &  N.  W.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Mo- 
Elmurry  ( Tex.  Civ.  App. ),  38  S.  W.  249. 

96  Cliatsworth  v.  Rowe,  161)111.  114; 
40  \\  E.  7(5:5,  aff'g  66  111.  App.  •">•".. 

97Cunan  v.  A.  11.  Stange  Co..  98 
Wis.  598;  74  \.  W.  ■'".  See  also 
Jones  v.  Chicago  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R, 
Co.  (Minn).  45  X.  W.  444;  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Click  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  32  S.  W.  226. 

9S  Chicago.  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spilker  iliul.),  :*.:'.  N.  E.  280;  32  Am. 
Leg.  Rep.  763,  reh'g  denied.34  N.  E. 
•j  is. 

•  )•; 


''"Louisville,  X.  A.  A-  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Snider,  117  [nd.  435;  3  L.  R.  A.  434; 
20  \.  E.  284;  .Johnson  v.  Northern 
1'.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Minn.  430:  50  V  W. 
47:1. 

100Consol.  Tract.  Co.  v.  Lambert- 
son.  .".'••  X.  J.  L.  297;  36  Atl.  100,  aff'd 
38  Atl.  683. 

i  Fulmore  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co., 
72  Minn.  448;  75  X.  W.  589;  11  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  636. 

-'  Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago.  M.  &  St. 
P.  li.  R.    Co.  (Iowa),  61  X.  W.  929. 


280 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL   INJURY   CASES. 


it  would  not  be  assumed  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  as  to 
the  statements  upon  which  the  opinion  of  the  physician  was 
based,  that  it  was  based  upon  the  same  statements  as  those  con- 
tained in  the  deposition.3  So  the  opinion  of  an  expert  as  to  a 
person's  condition  and  the  probable  future  result  of  his  injuries 
is  not  admissible  where  founded  only  upon  statements  made  by 
such  person  a  year  after  the  accident,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  the  physician's  medical  services  and  aid,  but  merely 
to  qualify  him  as  an  expert.4  Nor  is  the  opinion  of  a  physician 
as  to  the  plaintiff's  condition  admissible  in  evidence  where 
founded  in  part  upon  the  statements  of  third  persons.5 

§  280.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — Appearance  and  con- 
dition before  and  after  injury. — A  witness,  whether  he  be  an 
expert  or  not,  who  knew  the  person  injured  both  prior  and  sub- 
sequent to  the  injury,  may  testify  to  his  apparent  physical 
condition  at  both  periods,  since  this  is  a  matter  of  ordinary 
observation.6  So  witnesses  who  are  not  experts  may  testify  that 
prior  to  the  accident  they  had  seen  the  plaintiff  about  her 
household  work  and  that  she  was  apparently  healthy  and  had  a 
rosy  complexion,  but  not  afterwards  ; 7  or  that  before  the  accident 
plaintiff's  complexion  was  strong  and  healthy  looking,  but  that 


3  Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  61  N.  VV.  929. 

4  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Roalefs  (C.  C.  App.  3d  C),  70  Fed. 
21;  28  U.  S.  App.  569;  16  C.  C.  A. 
601. 

5  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sheldon,  6  Kan.  App.  347;  51  Pac. 
808. 

eHealy  v.  Visalia  &  T.  R.  Co.,  101 
Cal.  585  ;  36  Pac.  125  ;  District  of 
Col.  v.  Haller  (D.  C.  App.),  22  Wash. 
L.  Rep.  761  ;  North  Chic.  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Gillow,  166  111.  444  ;  46  N.  E.  1082, 
aff'g  64  111.  App.  516  ;  West  Chic.  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  165  111.  496  ;  46 
N.  E.  368,  aff'g  64  111.  App.  539  ;  1 
Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  341  ;  Chicago  City 
R.  Co.  v.  Van  Vleck,  143  111.  480  ; 
32  N.  E.  262  ;  Chicago  St.  L.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Spilker  (Ind.),  33  X.  E.  280  ; 
338 


32  Am.  L.  Reg.  763,  reh'g  denied 
34  N.  E.  218  ;  Weber  v.  Creston, 
75  Iowa,  16  ;  39  N.  W.  126  ;  Gardner 
v.  Detroit  St.  R.  Co.,  99  Mich.  182  ; 
58  N.  W.  49  ;  Reardon  v.  Missouri  P. 
R.  Co.  (Mo.),  21  S.  W.  731  ;  Hewitt 
v.  Eisenbart,  36  Neb.  794  ;  55  N.  W. 
252;  Quinn  v.  O'Keefe,  9  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y. )  68  ;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  116  ;  Can- 
non v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  9  Misc. 
(N.  Y. )  282  ;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  147  ;  29 
N.  Y.  Supp.  722  ;  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W. 
1007  ;  Sanson  v.  Conaway,  37  W.  Va. 
159;  18  L.  R.  A.  627  ;  16  S.  E.  564; 
Bridge  v.  Oshkosh,  71  Wis.  363;  37  N. 
W.  409. 

7  Cannon  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
9  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  282;  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
722;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  147. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURE     CASES. 


since  such  injury  she  looked  pale,  delicate  and  unhealthy.8  Si. 
evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  difference  in  plaintiff's  weight 
before  and  after  the  accident.9  And  where  a  witness  testified 
that  she  had  seen  the  plaintiff  several  times  directly  after  the 
injury,  and  had  then  seen  him  again  about  a  month  after  that, 
and  she  described  the  apparent  condition  of  the  plaintiff,  it  was 
held  that  the  opinion  of  the  witness  that  the  plaintiff  had  grown 
worse  in  the  interval  was  admissible.1"  The  plaintiff  may  also 
testify  as  to  the  condition  of  his  health  before  and  after  an  in- 
jury.11 Photographs  of  a  person  taken  prior  to  an  injury  sus- 
tained by  him  may  be  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
his  physical  appearance  at  the  time  taken,  provided  there  is  no 
direct  evidence  in  reference  thereto,  but  where  direct  evidence 
may  be  easily  obtained,  it  is  no  abuse  of  discretion  to  exclude 
a  photograph.12 

§  281.    Expert   evidence  as  to  cause   of  condition.— The 

opinion  of  a  physician  is  admissible  as  to  the  cause  of  an  in- 
jured person's  condition. 1::  So  upon  an  issue  whether  a  fall 
upon  a  defective  sidewalk  or  a  disease  of  several  years'  stand- 
ing was  the  cause  of  paralysis,  it  was  held  that  a  medical  ex- 
pert might,  in  answer  to  a  hypothetical  <|uestion,  state  his 
opinion  as  to  the  proximate  cause  of  such  paralysis.14  But  the 
opinion  of  a  physician  based  on  the  examination  of  a  witness 
and  the  facts  stated,  and  the  testimony  given  during  the  trial, 
is  not  admissible  as  to  the  cause  of  such  witness's  condition,1"' 
although  in  another  case  it  was  decided  that  where  medical  ex- 


8  Cannon  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
it  Misc.(N.  V.i  282;  29  \.  Y.  Supp. 
722;61  X.  V.  St.  R.  147. 

"Quinn    v.   O'Keefe,  9  App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.i  68;  41  X.  Y.  Supp.  ut;. 

10 Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
\V.»,xl  (Ind.),  14  X.   K.  572. 

uWest  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Can-, 
170  111.  478;  48  X.  E.  992,  aff'g67  111. 
App.  530. 

!- Gilbert  v.  West  End  St.  R.  Co., 
100  Mass.  40:5:  .",(1  X.  E.  60. 

1:1  Flaherty  v.  Towers.  167  Mass. 
61;  44  X.  E.  1074:  Tullis  v.  Rankin, 
C  X.  D.  44;  35  L.  R,  A.  449;  68  X.  W. 


187;  St.  Louis  S.  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Freed  - 
man.  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  533:  46  S. 
W.  101. 

"  Bowen  v.  Huntington,  35  W.  Va. 
682;  14  S.  E.  217.  See  Crone  v. 
Chic.  &  X.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Wis. 
196;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
780:  78  X.  W.  446. 

•■  McGuire  v.  Brooklyn  II.  R.  Co., 
30  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  227:  51  X.  Y. 
Supp.  1075.  See  Page  v.  New  York, 
57  Hun  iX.  Y.i,  123;  32  \.  Y.  St.  R. 
563;  10  X.  Y.  Supp.  826:  Yusherg  v. 
Putney,  78  Wis.  si;   17  X.  W.  09. 


§  -82 


EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL   INJURY    CASES. 


perts  had  heard  the  plaintiff  give  part  of  her  testimony,  and 
had  heard  the  balance  read,  they  might  express  their  opinion 
as  to  the  cause  of  a  miscarriage,  assuming  such  testimony  to  be 
true.16  Again,  where  it  was  claimed  that  a  miscarriage  was  the 
result  of  an  injury,  it  was  held  that  it  was  competent  for  the 
plaintiff's  physician  to  testify  that  such  miscarriage  might  be 
traced  to  the  injury.17  And  where  a  medical  witness  had  tes- 
tified to  the  existence  of  a  bruise  and  fracture,  and  of  a  subse- 
quent abscess  and  inflammation  in  the  same  place,  it  was  de- 
clared that  he  might  express  his  opinion  whether  the  former 
were  the  cause  of  the  latter.18  So  in  other  cases  it  has  been  com- 
petent for  a  physician  to  testify  as  to  what  in  his  opinion  pro- 
duced the  symptoms  which  he  observed  in  plaintiff's  case,19  and 
whether  plaintiff's  condition  when  he  last  called  was  due  to  the 
injuries  as  he  discovered  them  on  his  first  visit,20  and  whether 
the  physical  condition  in  which  he  found  an  injured  person 
could  have  resulted  from  the  injury;21  and  again  whether  plain- 
tiff's suffering  could  have  resulted  from  the  accident,22  or  his 
physical  condition  and  suffering  at  the  time  of  the  trial,23  or 
the  impairment  of  his  nervous  system.24 


§  282.  Same  subject  continued — A  physician  who  has  at- 
tended the  plaintiff  may  testify  whether  any  other  cause  ex- 
isted which  might  have  produced  his  condition  as  testified  to 
by  him.25     So,  also,  the  opinion  of  a  physician  whether  fright 


i6  McKeon  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  S.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  94  Wis.  477;  35  L.  R.  A. 
252;  69  N.  W.  175;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  175.  See  also  Mitchell  v.  Ta- 
coma  R.  &  M.  Co.,  13  Wash.  560:  43 
Pac.  528. 

17<;ihbons  v.  Phoenix,  39  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  658:  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  410.  See  State 
v.  Ginger,  80  Iowa,  574;  40  N.  W.  057. 

18  Stouter  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  38 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  162;  27  N.  E.  805. 

19  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wood  (Inch),  14  N.  E.  572. 

20  McDonald  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co. 
(Iowa),  55  N.  W.  102. 

21  Hunter  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  21 
Misc.    (N.    Y.i    1;   40   N.    Y.    Supp. 

340 


1010,  affg  20  Misc.  432;  45  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1041.  But  see  Chic.  R.  I.  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheldon,  6  Kan.  App. 
347;  51  Pac.  808. 

22  Tnrner  v.  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y. 
301;  16  N.  E.  344;  12  Cent.  215. 

23  McDonald  v.  New  Y'ork  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  651; 
34  N.  T.  Supp.  921.  But  see  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheldon,  6 
Kan.  App.  347;  51  Pac.  808. 

24  Clegg  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  207;  37  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
130,  aff'd  54  N.  E.  1089. 

25  Friess  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
07  Hun  (N.  Y.),  205;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
391;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  104. 


EVIDENCE    IN     PHYSICAL    IN.M'UY    CARER. 


8    283 


would   produce  heart   trouble   is  admissible.9     And  in   a 
where  it  was  claimed  that  retroversion  of  the  woifab  was  ca 
by  the  injury,  it  was  held  proper  to  permit  a  medical  experl 
to  testify  that  a  blow  upon  the  stomach  would  produce  such 

effect.'7  So,  again,  testimony  that  a  person's  condition  could 
have  been  produced  by  contact  with  a  heavily  charged  electric 
wire  has  been  held  admissible.-"  And  whore  it  was  claimed  by 
the  defendant  that  the  serious  results  complained  of  by  the 
plaintiff  as  arising  from  a  fall  were,  in  fact,  caused  by  a  per- 
manent ailment  affecting  plaintiff's  whole  system,  it  was  decided 
that  expert  evidence  that  a  breast  trouble  not  alleged  in  the 
complaint  might  have  been  aggravated  by  the  fall,  was  admis- 
sible for  the  purpose  of  rebutting  such  claim  and  to  corroborate 
the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff  that  it  broke  out  anew  as  a  result 
thereof,  though  such  evidence  was  not  admissible  in  aggravation 
of  damages.-"'  In  those  cases  where  evidence  has  been  given 
tending  to  show  that  the  condition  of  the  plaintiff  is  attributable 
to  a  cause  for  which  the  defendant  is  responsible,  it  is  held  that 
the  witnesses  giving  such  testimony  may  be  cross-examined  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  that  such  condition  is  in  part  attribu- 
table to  other  causes.* 

§  283.  Expert  evidence — Ordinary  results  from  injury  of 
like  character. — A  medical  expert  who  has  properly  qualified 
may  be  asked  what  symptoms  or  results  ordinarily  and  neces- 
sarily accompany  or  follow  an  injury  such  as  that  which  the 
plaintiff  has  sustained,  the  purpose  of  such  evidence  being  to 
show  that  the  plaintiff's  condition  is  a  result  of  the  injury."     So, 


20  Illinois  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Latimer,  L28 
111.  103;  21  N.  E.  7. 

27  Cannon  v.  Brooklyn  City  K.  Co., 
9  Misc.  (X.  V.)  282;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
147;  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  7-22. 

"  Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co., 
89  Wis.  371;  27  L.  R.  A.  305;  01  X. 
W.  1101. 

29  Fuller  v.  Jackson,  92  Mich.  197: 
52  N.  W.  1075;  21  Wash.  L.  Rep.  378: 
12  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  173.  See  also 
Niendorf  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  4  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  4G;  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  090. 


w  West  Chic.  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Reddy, 

09  111.  App.   53;   2   Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
17:;. 

:!l  Cole  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.,  159 
X.  Y.  59:  53  X.  E.  670,  affg  87  H uu 
(N.  Y.l,  584:  34  N.  V.  Supp  572. 
See  also  Evansville  &  T.  II.  R.  R, 
Co.,  116  Ind.  440:  19  X.  E.  310;  L. 
R.  A.  450:  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  K. 
Co.  v.  Wood  (Ind.).  14  X.  E.  572: 
( 'rites  v.  New  Richmond,  98  Wis. 55: 
73  N.  W.  322. 

341 


§§   284,  285    EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.HRY    CASES. 

where  a  medical  expert  testified  that  the  injury  which  the  plain- 
tiff had  sustained  was  a  severe  sprain,  it  was  held  proper  for  him 
to  state  what  results  usually  accompany  or  follow  such  an  in- 
jury.32 But  it  has  been  declared  improper  to  ask  a  physician 
whether  he  can.  state  with  reasonable  certainty  that  the  conse- 
quences which  have  followed  a  certain  injury  are  natural  and 
usual.35 

§  284.  Expert  and  opinion  evidence — Malpractice — Cases. 

— In  an  action  for  malpractice  where  it  was  claimed  that  a 
wounded  thumb  had  been  negligently  treated,  it  was  decided  that 
a  physician  might  examine  the  thumb  in  the  presence  of  the 
jury  and  exhibit  and  describe  its  condition  to  them.34  But 
where  in  a  like  action  it  was  claimed  by  the  defendants  that 
they  were  prevented  by  the  parents  of  the  injured  child  from  re- 
dressing a  broken  arm  on  a  certain  night,  it  was  held  that  it 
would  be  incompetent  as  calling  upon  the  witness  to  pass  on  the 
testimony  to  ask  a  physician  who  had  no  personal  knowledge  of 
the  case,  whether  he  would  trace  any  of  the  results  he  had  heard 
stated  in  evidence  to  the  failure  to  redress  the  arm  on  that 
night.53  And  where  a  witness  was  called  upon  to  testify  whether 
proper  treatment  had  been  given  in  a  certain  case,  it  was  de- 
termined that  he  could  not  testify  whether  his  opinion  was 
"  sustained  amply  by  the  authorities  "  since  this  would  indi- 
rectly call  for  statements  from  medical  books.36  So  also,  where 
a  defendant  testified  that  he  had  treated  twenty-five  or  thirty 
cases  of  a  Colles  fracture,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  testify 
as  to  the  results  in  such  cases  since  specific  acts  were  held  not 
to  be  competent  on  the  question  of  general  reputation  as  to 
skill.3' 

§  285.  Opinions  as  to  amount  of  damages — Elements  of 
damages.—  The  opinion  of  the  plaintiff  as  to  the  amount  of 


32  Crites  v.  New  Richmond,  98  Wis. 
55;  73  N.  W.  322. 

33  Page  v.  New  York,  57  Hun  ( N". 
Y.),  123;  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  563;  10  .V. 
V.  Supp.  82G. 

34  Freeman  v.  Hutchinson,  15  Ind. 
App.  fi39;  43  N.  E.  1G. 

342 


35  Link  v.  Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
815. 

36  Link  v.  Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
815. 

37  Link  v.  Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
815. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.MUY    CASES. 


*-'*'• 


damages  which  lie  has  suffered  as  a  result  of  a  personal  injury, 
is  not  admissible.86  Thus  it  was  so  held  in  an  action  for  mal- 
practice,  it  being  declared  that  instead  of  the  plaintiff's  opinion, 
all  the  facts  bearing  on  such  question  should  be  presented  to 
the  jury.89  And  again,  in  an  action  by  a  parent  for  an  injury 
to  his  child,  a  question  to  the  parent  as  to  the  amount  of 
damage  he  thought  he  had  sustained  by  reason  of  such  injury, 
taking  into  consideration  the  value  of  the  child's  services  until 
his  twenty-first  year,  together  with  the  trouble  and  expense 
caused,  should,  it  was  held,  be  excluded.4"  But  it  is  held  that 
the  admission  of  evidence  as  to  the  amount  of  damages,  though 
it  may  be  incompetent,  is  not  reversible  error  where  a  larger 
verdict  would  be  justified  from  the  uncontroverted  competent 
evidence.41  So  also,  the  opinions  of  witnesses  are  not  admissible 
as  to  what  plaintiff  would  be  capable  of  earning  in  some  em- 
ployment or  vocation  in  which  he  had  never  been  engaged  as 
bearing  upon  the  question  of  loss  of  time.42  But  the  plaintiff 
may  give  his  opinion  as  to  the  fair  and  reasonable  pecuniary 
value  of  his  services  by  the  day  during  the  period  of  his  dis- 
ability from  work  as  a  result  of  the  injury.43  So  also,  in  actions 
of  this  nature,  the  plaintiff's  attending  physician  may  testify  as 
to  the  value  of  the  services  rendered  by  him  to  the  plaintiff  in 
connection  with  the  injury.14  And  a  person  who  takes  care  of 
and  nurses  an  injured  person  is  competent  to  express  an  opinion 
as  to  the  value  of  such  services.45  Opinions  of  experts,  however, 
are  not  absolutely  binding  upon  the  jury  as  to  the  value  of 
services  rendered,  but  the  jury  are  to  exercise  their  own  judg- 
ment after  a  consideration,  not  only  of  the  expert  evidence,  but 


38  Pierce  v.  Lutesville,  25  Mo.  A.pp. 
317.  See  also  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Snedeger,  5  Kan.  App.  700; 
49  Pac.  103. 

89 Bain  v.  Cushman,  GO  Vt.  343;  15 
Atl.  171;  6  X.  Eng.  805. 

«  Hurt  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
(Mo.),  7  S.  W.  1. 

41  Keller  v.  Oilman,  93  Wis.  9;  66 
X.  W.  800. 

"Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chance,  57  Kan.  40;  4  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  X.  S.  328;  45  Pac.  60. 


43  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bivans, 
142  111.  401;  32  X.  E.  456,  afTg  42111. 
App.  450. 

«  Williams  v.  West  Hay  City,  119 
Mich.  395;  71  X.  W.  328;  5  Det.  L. 
X.  845. 

*6Wahl  v.  Shoulder,  14  Ind.  App. 
CO:,;  43  N.  E.  458.  See  Keenan  v. 
Getsinger,  1  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  172; 
73  X.  Y.  St.  R.  413;  37  X.  Y.  Supp. 
826. 


343 


§§  286,  2<S~    EVIDENCE    IX    PHYSICAL    IN.HItY    CASES. 

also  of  the  nature  of  the  services,  time  required  to  render  them, 
and  all  other  circumstances  in  connection  therewith.46 

§  286.  Evidence  as  to  feigning— Personal  injuries. — The 

question  may  arise  in  some  cases  of  actions  to  recover  for  per- 
sonal injuries  whether  a  person  is  feigning  his  manner,  move- 
ments, actions,  pain  and  suffering  to  affect  his  recovery.  In 
cases  where  such  a  question  arises  evidence  of  expert  medical 
men  is  admissible  in  reference  thereto.47  So,  where  it  was 
claimed  that  the  plaintiff  was  feigning  as  to  the  power  to  use 
his  arm  being  impaired,  it  was  held  that  an  expert  medical  wit- 
ness who  had  testified  as  to  the  shrunken  condition  of  the  arm 
might  give  his  opinion  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  simulating.41 
And  where  experiments  had  been  made  by  an  expert  for  the 
defendant  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  plaintiff's  symptoms 
were  feigned  or  real,  it  was  held  that  his  opinion  as  to  whether 
the  symptoms  were  feigned  was  admissible  although  the  defend- 
ant could  not  ask  him  if  he  would  say  plaintiff  was  a  "  malin- 
gerer."4!)  Again,  where  a  person  claimed  that  his  spine  had 
been  injured,  it  was  decided  that  testimony  by  a  physician  was 
admissible  that  the  manner,  movements  and  actions  of  the  plain- 
tiff could  not  have  been  feigned.*  But  the  opinion  of  a  phy- 
sician that  he  believes  plaintiff's  injuries  to  be  real  and  not 
simulated  cannot  be  based  on  the  mere  fact  that  he  has  known 
him  for  a  long  time.51 

§  287.  Hypothetical  questions. —  Hypothetical  questions 
should  cover  the  entire  field  of  inquiry.  So,  where  the  proof 
showed  causes  for  the  symptoms  of  suffering  exhibited  by  the 
plaintiff  in  addition  to  those  alleged  in  the  complaint,  it  was 


46  Baker  v.  Richmond  City  Mill 
Works,  105  Ga.  225;  31  S.  E.  416. 

47  Hanold  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.,  47  Minn.  17;  49  X.  W.  3S9;  Brown 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  19  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
504  ;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  1094,  aff'g  18 
Misc.  584;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  700;  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  19 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  47;  47  S.  W.  56.  But 
see  Cole  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  95  Mich.  77;  54  N.  W.  638. 

3U 


48  Hanold  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.,  47  Minn.  17;  49  N.  W.  389. 

49  Brown  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  19 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  504;  43  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1094,  aff'g  18  Misc.  584;  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 
700. 

50  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wright,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  47;  47  S. 
W.  56. 

51  Austin  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Elmurry  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  249. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    tNJURY    OASES. 

held  that  a  hypothetical  question  which  asserted  such  additional 
causes  was  proper.8  But  where  in  an  action  to  recover  for  an 
injury  to  an  arm,  the  evidence  showed  that  then-  had  been  but 
very  little  improvement  in  the  use  of  the  arm  since  a  specified 
time,  it  was  decided  that  a  hypothetical  question  should  not  l>e 
disallowed  merely  because  it  omitted  to  make  any  mention  of  an 
improvement  in  some  of  the  functions  of  the  arm.''  In  another 
ease  the  question,  "  Suppose  during  the  first  three  months  of 
the  confinement  of  the  patient,  the  attending  surgeon  would  re- 
move the  splint  for  the  purpose  of  permitting  the  bones  to  rub 
against  each  other  and  would  put  the  splint  hack  again,  ami  you 
found  the  condition  you  now  find,  would  you  say  the  present 
condition  is  the  result  of  proper  or  improper  treatment  ?  "  was 
held  not  sufficiently  comprehensive  and  therefore  not  a  proper 
hypothetical  question.' 

§  288.  Export  and  opinion  evidence— Cases  generally — 

Where  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  it  was  claimed  that 
the  plaintiff's  arm  had  been  injured,  testimony  of  a  medical  ex 
pert  was  declared  to  be  admissible  to  determine  whether  an  in- 
jured condition  could  co-exist  with  the  plaintiffs  ability  to  use 
the  arm  in  the  manner  witnessed  by  the  jury ; B  and  a  physician 
who  has  examined  a  plaintiff  may  testify  whether  the  existence 
of  certain  symptoms  as  shown  to  exist  in  plaintiff's  case  indi- 
cated a  disordered  eondition  of  the  spinal  cord.a  So  also,  a 
physician  may  be  asked  whether  since  the  trial  commenced  he 
has  seen  sufficient  of  the  plaintiff  to  be  able  to  state  whether  or 
not  an  abnormal  nervous  condition  exists  in  his  ease."'7  And 
a  physician  may  testify  that  the  plaintiff  was  examined  while 
under  the  influence  of  chloroform  and  as  to  her  condition  at 
the  time  of  such  examination  where  the  chloroform  was  given 
as  part  of  the  treatment  and  there  was  no  evidence  given  to 


M  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Criffin  (('.  C. 
A  pp.  7th  C. ),  53  I".  S.  A  pp.  22;  25  C. 
0.  A.  413;  SO  Fed.  278. 

88  Cass  v.  Third  Ave.  R.Co.,20App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  591;  47  N.  Y.  Supp.  856. 

64  Atchison  v.  Acheson,  0  Kan. 
App.  33 ;  57  Pac.  248. 


55  Craves  v.  Battle  ('reck.  !>.">  Mich. 
266;   19  L.  R.  A.  041;  54  X.  VV.  757. 

^Qninn  v.   O'Keefe,   '.i  App.    Div. 
iN.  7.)  68;   n  v  v.  Supp.  116. 

•  [llinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin  (C. 
C.  App.  7th  <'.).  80  Fed.  278;  26  C. 
C.  A.  413;  53  U.  S.  App.  22. 

345 


§  288  EVIDENCE    TN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 

show  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  have  administered  it  or  that 
it  was  given  for  the  purpose  of  the  trial  of  the  case.58  So 
where  plaintiff  is  suing  to  recover  for  injuries  resulting  in  an 
abortion,  it  is  proper  to  ask  a  medical  expert,  "  How  would 
these  troubles,  affect  the  nervous  system  ?  "  K  And  again,  where 
plaintiff's  eye  had  been  injured,  it  is  competent  in  an  action  to 
recover  damages  therefor  for  a  physician  to  express  the  opinion 
that  it  was  necessary  to  remove  the  eye  in  order  to  save  the 
sight  of  the  other  which  was  endangered  by  sympathetic  in- 
flammation.60 But  a  question  to  a  physician  as  to  the  symptoms 
he  treated  the  plaintiff  for  between  the  time  of  the  injury  and 
the  trial,  "  due  entirely  to  the  injuries  she  received  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,"  was  held  to  be  improper,  since,  if  the  witness 
were  allowed  to  answer  such  question  it  would  be  permitting 
him  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the  jury.61  And  a  medical  ex- 
pert in  reply  to  a  question  as  to  the  treatment  and  course  of 
disease  in  plaintiff's  case  as  a  result  of  the  injury  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  enter  into  a  general  discussion  of  the  disease,  the 
causes  producing  it  and  also  the  possible  results  thereof,  in  the 
absence  of  any  opinion  as  to  the  course  of  such  disease  in  the 
plaintiff's  case.62  So  the  opinion  of  an  expert  whether  a  seaman 
who  had  been  injured  was  competent  to  perform  the  duties  of 
a  quartermaster  was  held  inadmissible.63  Again,  in  an  action  to 
recover  for  an  injury  by  which  plaintiff's  leg  was  broken  and  the 
character  of  the  injury  had  been  fully  and  minutely  described 
by  a  physician,  it  was  decided  that  he  might  also  testify  as  to 
the  position  of  the  leg  and  the  point  from  which  the  blow 
came.64  And  a  physician  may  be  asked  whether  an  examination 
of  an  injured  person  was  conducted  in  a  superficial  or  in  a 
careful  and  thorough  manner,  the  answer  to  such  question  not 

58  Holman  v.  Union  St.  R.  Co.,  114  I      62  Swenson  v.  Brooklyn  H.  R.  Co., 
Mich.  208;  72  N.  W.  202;  9  Am.   &    15  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  69;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 


Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  105 ;  4  Det.  L.  N.  518. 
59  Powell  v.  Augusta  &  S.  R.  Co., 


445;  71  X.  Y.  St.  R.  496. 

63  Eldrirlge  v.  Atlas  Steamship  Co., 


77  Ga.  192;  3  S.  E.  757.  58  Hun  (N.  Y.),  96;  33  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

60  Reed  v.   Madison,  85  Wis.  667;    1016;  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  468. 


56  N.  W.  182. 

61  Atkins  v.  Manh.  R.  Co.,  57  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  102;  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  214;  10 
N.  Y.  Supp.  432. 

346 


64  Johnson  v.  Steam  Guage  &  L. 
Co.,  146  N.  Y.  152;  66  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
276;  40  N.  E.  773. 


EVIDENCE    IN     PHYSICAL    INJURY    OASES.    §289,290 

being  considered  as  a  substitution  of  the  opinion  of  the  witness 
for  the  judgment  of  the  jury." 

§  289.  Same  subject  continued.  In  the  case  of  non-pro- 
fessional witnesses  their  opinions  as  to  the  physical  condition  or 
pain  suffered  by  an   injured  person  are  admissible  in  evidence 

when  based  upon  personal  observations  of  the  person  while  in 
attendance  upon  him,™  although  in  a  case  in  Pennsylvania  it 
was  decided  that  a  daughter  of  the  injured  person,  not  an  ex- 
pert, was  incompetent  to  testify  that  her  mother  suffered  in  her 
head  and  stomach."7  And  testimony  by  the  plaintiff  that  his 
head  would  never  be  the  same  as  it  was.'is  or  that  lie  would  never 
recover  from  his  injuries  or  be  able  to  do  a  good  day's  work,  is 
not  admissible.61'  Again,  it  has  been  held  that  the  plaintiff  is 
incompetent  to  express  his  opinion  that  his  injuries  are  perma- 
nent.10 Where  a  plaintiff  has  received  a  physical  injury,  and 
has  exhibited  such  injury  to  the  jury,  it  is  determined  that  the 
defendant  is  not  obliged  to  accept  such  experts  as  may  he  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties  and  appointed  by  the  court  to  examine  such 
injury,  but  is  entitled  to  select  his  own  experts.71 

§  290.  Statements  and   complaints  of  injured   person.— 

Statements,  exclamations,  or  complaints  made  by  the  injured 
person  to  an  attending  physician  as  to  his  pain  and  suffering 
and  the  symptoms,  when  they  relate  to  the  part  of  tin-  body  in- 
jured, are  admissible  in  evidence."     In  this  connection  it  is  said 


66  Northern  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Urlin,  L58 
U.S.  271;  15  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  840;  39 
L.  Ed.  977. 

«« Shelby  v.  Clagett,  46  Ohio  St. 
549;  5  L.  K.  A.  606;  22  N.  E.  407;  22 
Ohio  L.  J.  294;  Saddles  v.  Chic.  & 
N.  W.  K.  Co.  (Wis. )  40  N.  W.  115; 
Girard  Coal  Co.  v.  Wiggins,  52  111. 
App.  69. 

«  Lombard  &  S.  St.  Pass.  R.  Co.  v. 
Christian,  124  Pa.  St.  Ill:  L6  Ail. 
628;  23  W.  N.  C.  27:'-;  46  Phila.  Leg. 
Intel.  210;  19  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  404. 

«8Pfan  v.  Alteria.  23  Misc.  |N.  Y.) 
693;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  88. 


69  Pride  v.  Charles  Warner  Co..  1 
Perm.  (Del.)  462:  42  All.  699. 

"'Atlanta  St.  K.  Co.  v.  Walker,  93 
Ga.  462;  21  S.  E.  48. 

"Chicago,  R.  I.  &  T.  U.  Co.  v. 
Langston,  92  Tex.  709:  51  S.  \V.  331, 
modifying  on  reh'g,  50  S.  W.  "'7  4, 
which  affirms  47  S.  W.  1027;  48  Cent. 
L.  J.  35;  4SS.  \\\  (ilO. 

72  Globe  Ace.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gerisch, 
163  111.  625;  45  N.  E.  563;  Peirce  v. 
Jones.  22  Ind.  App.  163;  53  V  E. 
431;  1  Repr.  864:  Jackson  Co. 
Comrnrs.  v.  Nichols  ( Ind. ),  47  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  198:  38  N.  E.  526: 

347 


S  201 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


in  a  late  case  :  "  Testimony  of  other  witnesses  was  admissible  of 
such  complaints  of  pain  by  the  plaintiff  after  the  accident  as 
might  properly  be  regarded  as  expressive  and  elicited  by  existing 
feeling.  '  An  individual  receives  a  wound  and  before  his  recov- 
ery complains  of  suffering  from  it.  His  complaint  is  evidence 
of  his  suffering  and  its  degree  because  it  is  the  natural  language 
of  the  feelings  which  such  a  cause  produces.  .  .  .  ' ffl  But  un 
less  the  complaints  are  made  to  a  physician  with  a  view  to  medi- 
cal treatment,74  the  proof  should  be  limited  upon  proper  objection 
to  such  complaints  as  are  the  natural  and  instinctive  expres- 
sions of  present  suffering.  Evidence  is  not  admissible  of  com- 
plaints which  are  but  narrations  of  past  sufferings,75  or  which 
consist  simply  of  answers  to  questions  or  are  merely  descriptive 
statements  or  assertions  of  the  existence  of  present  suffering, Tf' 
or  which  though  made  to  a  physician  are  with  a  view  of  using 
him  as  a  witness  at  the  trial."  7; 

§291.  Same  subject  continued.— Under  the  rule  stated  in 
the  preceding  section  complaints  of  a  child  have  been  held  ad- 
missible where  made  during  an  examination  of  the  injured  parts 
by  the  attending  physician.'8  And  complaints  made  by  the  in- 
jured person  to  his  physician  of  pain  in  his  chest,  side  and  leg, 


Smith  v.  Dawley  (Iowa),  60  N.  W. 
625;  Mott.  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  R. 
(Jo.  (Mich.),  15  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas. 
N.  S.  113:  79  X.  W.  3;  6  Det.  L.  N. 
87;  People  v.  Foglesong,  116  Mich. 
556;  74  N.  W.  730;  5  Det.  L.  N.  51; 
Brusch  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co. 
(Minn.),  55  N.  W.  57;  Omaha  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Emminger,  57  Neb.  240;  77  N. 
W.  675;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  188;  Martin  v.  Wood,  23  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  457;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  274,  aff'g  18 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  274;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  208; 
Geiler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  11  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  413;  65  N.  Y.  St.  R.  437;  32 
N.  Y.  Supp.  254;  Weiser  v.  Broad- 
way &  N.  St.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  14; 
2  Ohio  Dec.  463;  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Saunders,  12  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  5;  33  S.  W.  245;  Block  v.  Mil- 
348 


waukee  St.   R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  371;  27 
L.  R.  A.  365;  01  N.  W.  1101. 

73  State  v.  Dart,  29  Conn.  153-155; 
36  Am.  Rep.  51. 

74  Wilson  v.  Town  of  Granby,  47 
Conn.  59-76;  36  Am.  Rep.  51. 

75  Rowland  v.  Railroad  Co.,  63 
Conn.  415-419;  28  Atl.  102. 

76  Williams  v.  Ry.  Co.,  68  Minn.  55- 
59;  70  N.  W.  860;  37  L.  R.  A.  199; 
Keller  v.  Town  of  Oilman,  93  Wis.  9; 
66  N".  W.  800. 

77  Martin  v.  Sherwood  ( Conn.  1902 ), 
51  Atl.  526,  per  Hall,  J.,  citing  on 
this  last  point,  Darrigan  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  52  Conn.  285-309 ;  52  Am.  Rep.  590. 

78  Martin  v.  Wood,  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
457;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  274,  aff'g  18 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  274;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  208; 
1  Sil.  S.  C.  212. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.ICRV    CASES.  §  292 

and  that  his  wrist  hurt  him  have  been  admitted.''  So  also,  evi- 
dence by  the  attending  physician  of  an  injured  person,  that  dur- 
ing his  attendance  of  several  weeks  the  plaintiff  complained  of 
pain,  and  indicated  the  locality  of  same,  is  admissible  in  connec- 
tion with  a  description  of  the  symptoms  which  he  observed.8 
And  where  a  physician  made  an  examination  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ascertaining  the  extent  of  the  person's  alleged  injuries, 
exclamations  or  complaints  made  by  such  person  apparently  in 
response  to  the  manipulations  by  the  physician  of  members  of 
plaintiff's  body  were  admitted.81  And  though  exclamations  or 
complaints  of  an  injured  person  may  be  made  some  time  after  an 
injury,  yet  if  they  are  indicative  of  present  existing  pain  or  suf- 
fering at  the  time  made,  they  are  admissible.^  So  such  state- 
ments are  not  inadmissible  because  made  while  suit  was  pending 
if  they  were  of  such  a  character  as  to  be  admissible  if  made 
before  suit  was  brought.83 

^  292.  Same  subject  concluded. — Persons  other  than  a 
physician  or  nurse  may  testify  to  exclamations  of  pain  made  by 
an  injured  party.81  So  a  witness  to  whose  house  an  injured 
person  was  taken  after  an  injury  was  permitted  to  testify  as  to 
complaints  of  pain  and  suffering  made  by  such  person  on  the 
morning  after  the  accident.^'  And  where  a  child  of  tender  years 
was  injured  by  stepping  into  a  hole  in  a  defective  sidewalk, 
exclamations  of  pain  made  by  such  child  in  his  own  home  under 
circumstances  indicating  that  they  were  the  natural  and  ordinary 
expressions  caused  by  suffering  are  admissible.86     But  in  another 

78  Missouri,     K.    &    T.     II.    Co.    v.  .v.    Rapid  R.   Co.,   119   Mich.  512;  78 

Saunders,   12  'lex.    Civ.    App.    5:    S3  N.  W.   537;   15   Am.    &    Hug.   R.   Cas. 

S.  W.  245.                                             I  N.  S.  7!):' :  5  Det.  L.  X.  90") ;  Girard  v. 

»  East  Tennessee,  V.    £  G.  R.    Co.  Kalamazoo.  92   Mich.  010;  52  \.  W. 

v.  Smith,  94  Ca.  580;  20  S.  E.  127.  1021;  City  R.  Co.  v.   Wiggins    (Tex. 

81  Boyles   v.    Prisock,   97  (ia.   64:'.;  Civ.  App. ),  52  S.  W.  ">77. 

25  S.  E.  3S9.     See  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  m  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co. 

P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker(Ind.),  32  Am.  L.  v.  Stonrr  (C.  C.  App.  8th  C),  10  U.  S. 

Reg.  763;  33  N.  E.  280,  reh'g  denied  App.  209;  2   C.    C.   A.   437;  51   Fed. 

34  E.  218.  649;  52  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  462. 

«2  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.   I'rlin,  158  M  Brown  v.  Mt.    Holly,  09  Vt.  364; 

U.  S.  271;  39  L.  Ed.  977;  15  Sup.  Ct.  38  Atl.  69. 

R.  840;  Island  Coal  Co.  v.  Risher  ( Ind.  **  De  Long  v.  Delaware,  Lack.  &  W. 

App.).  10  \.  E.   158;  Crippen  v.  Des  R.  It.  Co.,  37  Hun  |  N".  Y.>,  282. 

Moines  (Iowa),  78  N.  W.  OSS;   Heath  ^Strudgeon    v.    Sand     Beach,    107 

349 


§  29o  EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 

case  it  has  been  decided  that  complaints  as  to  suffering  heard  by 
a  physician,  but  which  were  not  shown  to  have  been  made  for 
his  professional  guidance,  should  be  excluded.87  As  it  is  permis- 
sible to  introduce  in  evidence  the  exclamations  or  complaints 
of  the  injured  person,  so  also  it  has  been  held  proper  to  admit 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  he  had  made  no  complaints  among  his 
neighbors.*  Though  statements  of  an  injured  person  may  be 
admissible  in  evidence,  yet  where  they  are  not  indicative  of 
present  pain  but  are  rather  in  the  nature  of  a  narration  of  her 
bodily  feelings  they  should  not  be  admitted.^  And  a  husband 
may  not  testify  as  to  complaints  made  by  his  wife  as  to  her  pains 
and  hurts  resulting  from  an  injury.1*  Declarations  or  statements, 
however,  which  relate  to  the  cause  of  the  injury  should,  it  is  held, 
be  excluded.91  But  in  a  case  in  the  United  States  courts  it  is 
decided  that  declarations  as  to  the  cause  of  an  accident  made  at 
the  time  of  the  injury  are  admissible  in  an  action  to  recover  upon 
an  accident  insurance  policy  against  death.92  Although  the 
statement  of  a  plaintiff  that  defendant  was  responsible  for  the 
accident  may  be  admissible,  yet  the  latter  is  entitled  to  an  in- 
struction that  he  is  not  thereby  rendered  liable  unless  the  entire 
evidence,  including  such  statement,  show  that  his  negligence 
was  the  direct  and  proximate  cause  of  the  accident.'13 

§  293.  Physical  examination  of  injured  person.— In  an  ac- 
tion for  personal  injuries  the  granting  of  a  motion  for  the  physi- 
cal examination  of  the  injured  person  is  generally  declared  to 
be  discretionary  with  the  court  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the 
power  of  the  court  to  order  such  an  examination  is  recognized.94 


Mich.  496;  65    N.  W.  616;  2    Det.  L. 
N.  749. 

«  Hillesum  v.  New  York,  24  J.  & 
S.  (N.  Y.)  596;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  420; 
4  N.  Y.  Supp.  806. 

88  Barrelle  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  N. 
Y.  Supp.  127;  21  N.  Y.  St.  R.  109; 
121  N.  Y.  697. 

Keller  v.  Gilman,  93    Wis.  9;  66 


91  Globe  Ace.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gerisch, 
163  111.  625;  45  N.  E.  563;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Yokes,  12  Ohio  C. 
C.  499;  1  Ohio  C.  D.  599.  But  see 
Bowles  v.  Kansas  City,  51  Mo.  App. 
416. 

92  North  Araer.  Ace.  Asso.  v.  Wood- 
son (C.  C.  App.  7th  C),  64  Fed.  689; 
12  C.  C.  A.  392. 


N.  W.  800.  93  Schwartz   v.   Shull,   45   W.    Va. 


90  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wainwright,  99  Ga.  255;  25  S.  E. 
622. 

350 


405;  31  S.  E.  914;    5  Am.   Neg.  Rep. 
496. 

w  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  90 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.MKY    CASES. 


So,  where  plaintiffs  evidence  had  been  closed  and  there  had  been 
no  previous  request  for  his  medical  examination  and  a  proper 
one  could  not  at  the  time  be  procured  without  too  long  a  delay 
of  the  trial,  it  was  decided  that  the  motion  therefor  was  properly 
refused  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.T>  In  a  case  in  Illinois  it 
is  held  that  if  the  court  lias  power  to  order  such  an  examination, 
such  power  is  discretionary,  and  where  the  plaintiff  does  not 
pretend  to  suffer  from  any  secret  malady,  it  should  not  be  ex- 
ercised.96  In  another  case  in  that  state  it  was  determined  that 
the  court  had  no  power  to  order  a  medical  examination  of  the 
injured  person  as  to  the  measure  and  extent  of  his  injuries  for 
the  purpose  of  learning  whether  he  was  in  the  condition  he 
had  testified  to  on  the  trial.  It  was  also  declared  that  if  such 
power  did  exist  the  court  should  refuse  to  order  an  examination 
where  no  necessity  therefor  was  shown,  and  the  plaintiff  had 
already  submitted  to  one  examination.07  In  a  case  in  Wisconsin 
it  was  held  that  a  refusal  by  the  court  to  order  a  second  ex- 
amination of  the  plaintiff  by  the  X-ray  process  was  not  an  abuse 
of  discretion  where  he  had  already  submitted  to  one  examination 
lasting  about  two  hours  and  had  been  accidentally  burned  during 


Ala.  71;  8  So.  90;  9  L.  R.  A.  442;  44 
Am.  &  Eng.  II.  (as.  441;  31  Cent.  L. 
.1.  376;  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wainwright,  99  Gra.  255;  25  S.  E.  622; 
Chic.  15.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Reith,  65  111. 
App.  461;  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Michaels,  57  Kan.  474;  46  Pac.  938; 
Belt  Elec.  Line  Co.  v.  Allen,  19  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  1656;  44  S.  W.  89;  Relle  of 
Nelson  Distilling  Co.  v.  Riggs,  20  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  499;  45  S.  W.  99;  Graves  v. 
Hat  tie  Creek,  95  Mich.  266;  19  L.  R. 
A.  641;  54  \.  W.  757:  Wanck  v.  City 
of  Winona  (Minn.),  so  X.  W.  851; 
Hill  v.  Sedalia,  64  Mo.  App.  494;  2 
Mo.  App.  Rep.  1019;  Norton  v.  St. 
Louis*  II.  R.  ('«>.,  40  Mm.  App.  642; 
Lawrence  v.  Samuels,  20  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  15;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  602;  appeal 
dismissed  in  20  Mise.  278;  45  X.  Y. 
Supp.  743;  Demenstein  v.  Richard- 
son. 2  Penn.  Dist.  R.  825;  48  Alb.  L. 
J.    452;    34   W.    X.    C.    295;  Smith   v. 


Spokane,  16  Wash.  403;  47  Pac.  888. 
It  is  held  that  the  court  may  in  its 
discretion  order  an  examination  of 
an  injured  person  to  be  made  at  the 
home  of  the  plaintiff,  though  in  an- 
other state,  instead  of  in  court.  St. 
Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dobbins,  60  Ark. 
481:  30  S.  W.  887,  reh'g  denied  60 
Ark.  486;  31  S.  W.  147. 

«  Savannah.  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wainwright,  99  Ga.  255:  25  S.  K.  622. 
See  also  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v. 
Greenwood  (Ala.),  14  So.  495;  South- 
ern K.  R.  Co.  v.  Michaels,  57  Kan. 
174:  46  Pac.  938;  Marler  v.  Spring- 
field, 65  Mo.  App.  301;  Smith  v. 
Spokane,  If.  Wash.  403;  47   Pac.  888. 

'"  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Reith, 
65  111.  App.   161. 

"  Peoria,  D.  *   E.  R.   Co.  v.   Rice, 

1  It    111.    227:  •".:'.  X.  E.  951.    See   also 

JolietSt.  R.  Co.  v.  Caul.  143  111.  177; 

32   X.    E.   389,   iffg  42   111.   App.   41; 

35] 


§   294  EVIDENCE   IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 

the  continuance  thereof.93  And  in  another  decision  in  that  state 
where  the  plaintiff  claimed  that  his  bladder  had  been  injured, 
it  was  declared  that  it  would  be  an  abuse  of  discretion  on  the 
part  of  the  court  to  order  an  examination  by  instruments  to  de- 
termine the  condition  of  the  bladder  where  the  plaintiff's  phy- 
sicians had  testified  that  such  examination  would  not  be  pru- 
dent, and  the  defendant's  physician  had  stated  that  if  the  bladder 
was  unhealthy  it  would  be  absolutely  dangerous,  but  if  healthy 
it  would  be  safe." 

§  294.  Same  subject  continued. — Where  the  plaintiff  is 
willing  to  be  examined  by  competent  and  disinterested  men 
without  an  order  by  the  court,  an  order  should  not  be  made  re- 
quiring him  to  submit  to  an  examination.111"  And  in  a  case  in 
Michigan  it  is  declared  that  the  plaintiff  should  not  be  required 
to  submit  to  a  physical  examination  by  medical  experts  in  open 
court  where  such  examination  would  necessarily  involve  the 
use  of  anaesthetics.'  In  the  United  States  courts  it  is  held  that 
the  plaintiff  cannot  be  required  to  submit  to  a  compulsory  ex- 
amination upon  the  trial  of  an  action  for  personal  injuries  :  '- 
and  that  the  court  has  no  legal  power  or  right,  on  applica- 
tion of  the  defendant  and  in  advance  of  the  trial  to  order  the 
plaintiff  to  submit  to  a  medical  or  surgical  examination  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  the  extent  of  the  injury  sued  for,  with- 
out the  consent  of  such  plaintiff.3  So  in  Indiana  it  is  declared 
that  unless  such  authority  be  conferred  by  statute,  the  court  can- 
not issue  an  order  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  submit  to  an  exami- 
nation by  medical  men  appointed  by  the  court  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  evidence  to  be  used  on  the  trial.1      In  New  Jersey 


St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller.  188 
111.  4(3:>;  2S  X.  E.  1091,  aff'g  39  111. 
App.  366. 

98  Boelter  v.  Ross  Lumber  Co.,  103 
Wis.  324;  79  N.  W.  243. 

a9  O'Brien  v.  La  Crosse.  75  N.  W". 
81:  40  L.  R.  A.  831;  30  Chic.  Leg. 
News.  342. 

i°o  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Nor- 
fleet,  78  Tex.  321:  14  S.  W.  703:  45 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  207. 

1  Strudgeon    v.    Sand    Beach,    107    401 ;  28  N.  E.  860. 

352 


Mich.  496;  65  N.  W.  616;  2  Det.   L. 
N.  749. 

2  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin  (C.  C. 
App.  7th  V.).  58  U.  S.  App.  22;  80 
Fed.  278;  25  C.  C.  A.  413;  Union  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Botsford,  141  U.  S.  250;  35 
L.  Ed.  734;  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1000. 

3  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Botsford,  141 
U.  S.  250;  35  L.  Ed.  734;  11  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  1000. 

4  Penn.  Co.  v.  Newmever,  129  Ind. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.HUY    CASES.  §  295 

where  the  court  is  authorized  by  statute  to  issue  au  order  requir- 
ing the  plaintiff  to  submit  to  a  physical  examination  by  medical 
men  who  may  testify  at  the  trial  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  plaintiff's  injuries,"'  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  statute  does 
not  violate  the  express  or  implied  restraints  upon  the  legislative 
power  in  the  federal  or  state  constitutions.6  Though  an  order 
requiring  a  plaintiff  to  submit  to  such  an  examination  may  be 
erroneously  granted  by  the  court,  yet  if  such  order  is  acquiesced 
in  by  the  plaintiff  by  his  selection  of  a  physician  to  act  as  one 
of  the  examiners,  by  his  submission  to  the  examination  without 
objection  and  by  his  failure  to  question  the  judge's  want  of 
power,  either  at  the  time  of  the  order  or  when  the  physicians 
give  their  testimony  as  to  the  result  of  the  examination,  a  judg- 
ment will  not  be  reversed  because  of  the  error  in  granting  the 
order.'  Again,  where  a  physical  examination  of  the  plaintiff 
is  desired  by  the  defendant,  the  latter  is  not  entitled  to  have 
such  examination  made  by  physicians  selected  entirely  by  him- 
self/ Nor  should  the  plaintiff  be  compelled  to  submit  to  an 
examination  by  physicians  who  have  testified  adversely  to  him,'' 
or  by  those  who  are  unfriendly  to  him.10  But  where  persons 
are  ordered  to  make  a  physical  examination  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
fact  that  they  were  rude  and  uncivil  in  their  conduct  towards 
him  is  not  to  be  considered  on  the  question  of  damages." 

§  295.    Physical  examination  of  plaintiff — New  York.— 

Courts  have  no  authority  either  under  the  common  law  or  by 
virtue  of  their  inherent  power  to  order  a  physical  examination 
of  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries.1-  Such  author- 
ity can  only  exist  where  expressly  conferred  by  a  statutory  en- 
actment.13    So  in  this  state  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  amend- 


«  X.  J.  P.  L.  1896,  p.  344. 

6  McGovern   (X.   J.).  42    Atl.   830. 

7  Ellsworth  v.  Fairbury,  41  Neb. 
ssi;  60  N.  W.  336. 

8  Smith  v.  Spokane,  16  Wash.  403; 
47  Pac.  888. 

9  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Berlin^, 
14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  544;  37  S.  W.  1083. 

10  Stack  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 
H.  R.  Co.,  177  Mass.  155 j  52  L.  R.  A. 
328;  58  N.  E.  686. 


11  Goodhart  v.  Penn.  R.  Co..  177  Pa. 
St.  1:  35  Atl.  1;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.   X.   S.  3G4:  38  Wkly.  X.  C.  545. 

^Cole  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  C 
Hun  (X.  V.  i.  584;  34  X.  V.  Supp.  572. 
See  Roberts  v.  Ogdensburgh  &  Lake 
Chaiuplain  R.  R.  Co..  29  Hun  (X.  V.  i, 
154. 

15  McQuigan  v.  Del.  L.  A-  W.  R. 
Co..  1_'0  X.  Y.  50;  14  L.  It.  A.  4<>r,: 
41  X.   Y.    St.    R.   382;  'J9    X.    E.  235; 


23  353 


§  295 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


ment  to  the  code, 14  there  was  no  authority  possessed  by  the 
court  which  authorized  the  issuance  of  an  order  requiring  the 
plaintiff  to  submit  to  a  physical  examination,  or,  in  case  of  his 
failure  or  refusal  to  comply  with  such  order,  the  striking  out  by 
the  court  of  the  testimony  of  medical  experts  who  had  examined 
him  and  testified  in  his  behalf.15  Under  the  amendment  to  the 
Code,16  providing  for  an  order  for  a  physical  examination  by 
surgeons  of  the  injured  person,  such  examination  cannot  be 
authorized  as  an  independent  proceeding,  but  must  be  in  connec- 
tion with  or  as  a  part  of  an  order  for  the  examination  of  the  per- 
son before  trial,  and  in  conformity  to  the  general  provisions  for 
such  examinations.17  If  the  plaintiff  has  voluntarily  submitted 
the  injured  part  to  the  jury,  he  may  be  required  to  submit  to  a  per- 
sonal or  professional  examination  of  such  part  by  the  defendant  in 
the  presence  of  the  jury.18  And  where  the  defendant  asks  for  an 
examination  in  good  faith  and  makes  a  proper  showing  therefor, 
the  plaintiff  should  be  required  under  the  New  York  Code  19  to 
submit  to  such  examination,  unless  there  has  been  a  stipulation 
by  the  plaintiff  for  use  on  the  trial  that  he  has  entirely  recovered 
from  his  injuries  and  this  is  true  notwithstanding  statements  by 
him  in  his  affidavit  that  he  believes  the  examination  is  applied 
for  for  the  purpose  of  harassing  and  annoying  him.20  Again,  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  such  examination  where  he  has  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  injuries,  and  so  far  as  he 
knows  the  plaintiff  is  the  only  one  having  any  knowledge  in 
reference  to  them.-1     And  where  an  order  for  an  examination  is 


45  Alb.  L.  J.  68;  48  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  490;  11  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  62. 

14  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  873, 
amended  1894. 

is  Cole  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.,  159 
N.  Y.  59;  53  N.  E.  670,  affg  87  Hun 
584;  34  N.  Y.  Sup  p.  572. 

16  N.  Y.  Laws,  1893,  chap.  721, 
amending  X.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec. 
873. 

17  Lyon  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  142 
N.  Y.  298;  58  N.  Y.  St.  R.  860;  31 
Abb.  N.  Cas.  356;  37  N.  E.  113,  aff'g 
7  Misc.  401;  58  N.  Y.  St.  R.  50;  27 
N.  Y.  Supp.  966. 

18  Winner  v.  Lathrop,  67  Hun  (N. 

354 


Y.),  511;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R.  258;  22  N. 
Y.  Supp.  510. 

19  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  873. 

20  Sewell  v.  Butler,  16  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  77;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  1074. 

21  Bell  v.  Litt,  12  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y. )  626;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  112;  Green 
v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  10  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
473;  65  N.  Y.  St.  R.  257;  24  Civ. 
Proc.  272 ;  32  K  Y.  Supp.  177.  Where 
it  is  held  that  he  is  entitled  to  such 
examination  upon  an  affidavit  show- 
ing such  facts.  Moses  v.  Newburgh 
Elec.  R.  Co.,  91  Hun  278;  36  N.  Y. 
Supp.  149;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  50. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.JtRY    CASES.  §   296 

granted  upon  an  affidavit  showing  such  facts,  such  oral  questions 
may  be  asked  the  plaintiff  by  the  physician  as  in  the  opinion  of 
the  latter  are  necessary  to  enable  him  to  ascertain  and  report 
fully  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  plaintiff's  injuries.8 

§  296.  Same  subject  continued. — Under  the  New  York 
Code,25  providing  that  the  physical  examination  of  a  female 
plaintiff  shall  he  "before"  physicians  or  surgeons  of  her  own 
sex,  it  is  not  intended  that  such  examination  shall  be  in  the 
presence  of  the  referee  and  counsel.-4  And  where  an  order  is 
issued  under  said  Code  a  for  such  examination,  plaintiff  is  en- 
titled not  as  a  matter  of  favor  or  privilege  but  as  a  matter  of 
right,  to  have  inserted  therein  a  provision  that  the  examination 
be  made  by  a  female  physician.'-*  In  a  former  trial  of  this  ease, 
it  was  held  that  though  a  female  plaintiff  has  the  right  to  have 
a  physical  examination  made  by  a  female  physician,  yet  if  she 
makes  no  effort  to  have  such  a  provision  inserted  in  the  order 
and  seeks  to  have  the  order  vacated  merely  on  the  ground  that 
the  papers  upon  which  it  is  granted  are  insufficient,  she  thereby 
waives  her  right.27  Where  an  order  for  a  physical  examination 
is  granted,  it  should  direct  the  time  of  service  of  a  copy  thereof/-1 
and  should  be  returnable  within  not  less  than  five  days  unless 
special  circumstances  be  shown  in  the  affidavit  and  recited  in 
the  order.29  The  affidavit  need  not  state  that  it  is  the  purpose 
of  the  defendant  to  make  use  of  such  examination  upon  the 
trial.30  And  if  the  affidavit  on  which  the  order  is  granted  makes 
out  a  case  within  the  provisions  of  the  Code  it  may  not  be  vacated 
although  the  witness  fees  required  by  the  Code31  have  not  been 
paid  or  tendered,  since  it  is  not  obligatory  to  pay  such  fees  be- 


22  Wunsch  v.  Weber,  81  Abb.  X. 
(as.  365;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  1100;  49  Alb. 
L.  J.  176. 

»  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  873. 

24  Lawrence  v.  Samuels,  20  Misc. 
(N,  Y.)  278;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  743, 
dismissing  appeal  20  Misc.  15;  44  N. 
Y.  Supp.  002. 

25  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  872. 

26  Lawrence  v.  Samuels,  17  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)559;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  086;  26 
Civ.  Proc.  10;  28  Chic.  L.  N.  420. 


27  Lawrence  v.  Samuels,  16  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  501;  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  976. 

28  Bowe  v.  Brunnbauer,  13  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  831;  34  X.  Y.  Supp.  919. 

29  Bowe  v.  Brunnbauer,  13  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  631;  34  \.  V.  Supp.  919. 

30  Moses  v.  Xewburgb  Elec.  K.  Co., 
91  Hun  (N.  Y).  276;  72  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
50;  36 N.  Y.  Supp.  149. 

31  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  874. 


355 


§  291 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL   INJURY    CASES. 


fore  the  party  submits  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.32  Under 
the  Code  provision  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  required  to  ap- 
pear before  the  judge  or  referee,  it  is  held  that  he  cannot  be  re- 
quired to  appear  before  the  court  at  special  term.33  The  fact 
that  in  the  papers  upon  which  an  order  is  sought,  the  plaintiff's 
injuries  are  averred  in  the  most  general  form  will  not  render  the 
papers  insufficient  where  the  formal  part  thereof  complies  with 
the  statute  and  it  is  evident  therefrom  that  the  defendant  is  un- 
able to  inform  himself  as  to  the  plaintiff's  injuries  except  by 
such  examination.34 


§  297.  Exhibiting  injuries  to  jury. — In  order  to  enable  the 
jury  to  more  accurately  perceive  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
plaintiff's  injuries  for  which  he  seeks  to  recover  damages,  it  is 
proper  that  he  should  in  some  cases  exhibit  his  injuries  to  the 
jury.35  So  an  exhibition  of  an  injured  limb  is  proper  where 
made  for  the  purpose  of  showing  its  condition  at  the  time  of 
the  trial,36  as  that  it  is  shriveled  and  withered.37  And  where  part 
of  a  limb  has  been  amputated  it  is  not  error  to  permit  an  exhibi- 
tion to  the  jury  of  the  remnant  of  such  limb.38  So  the  fact  that 
an  injury  has  not  been  properly  treated  is  not  ground  for  ex- 
cluding an  exhibition  of  the  injury  to  the  jury.39  Again,  the 
injury  in  such  cases  may  be  exhibited  for  the  purpose  of  having 
the   nature  and  extent   thereof   explained  by   a  medical   wit- 


32  Campbell  v.  Joseph  H.  Bauland 
Co..  41  App.  Div.  474;  58 N.  Y.  Supp. 
984. 

33  Bowe  v.  Brunnbauer,  13  Misc. 
631 ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  919. 

34  Campbell  v.  Joseph  H.  Bauland 
Co.,  41  App.  Div.  474;  58  N.  Y.  Supp. 
984. 

35  Swift  v.  Rutkouski,  82  111.  App. 
108;  Citizens  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
loeby,  134  Ind.  563;  33  N.  E.  627; 
Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers,  96  Mich. 
625;  55  N.  W.  1003;  Langworthy  v. 
Green  Twp.,  95  Mich.  93;  54  X.  W. 
697;  Plummer  v.  Milan,  79  Mo.  App. 
439;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  600;  Omaha 
Street  R.  Co.  v.  Emminger,  57  Neb. 

356 


240;  77  N.  W.  675;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  188;  Carrico  v.  West 
Virginia,  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  39  W. 
Va.  86;  24  L.  R.  A.  50;  19  S.  E. 
571;  Sornberger  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  24  Ont.  App.  263.  But  see 
Laughlin  v.  Harvey,  24  Ont.  App.  438. 

36  Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers,  96 
Mich.  625;  55   N.  W.  1003. 

37  Langwortby  v.  Green  Twp.,  95 
Mich.  93;  54  N.  W.  697. 

38  Carrico  v.  West  Virginia,  C.  & 
P.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  86;  24  L.  R.  A. 
50;  19  S.  E.  571. 

33  Plummer  v.  Milan,  79  Mo.  App. 
439;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  600. 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    IN.nitv    casks.  E  298 

ness."1  And  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  jury  to  determine 
the  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  injury,  the  plaintiff  may  be  placed 
in  different  attitudes  by  the  physician." 

§  298.  Evidence  admissible  under  pleadings— Cases. — In  an 

action  to  recover  for  physical  injuries  it  is  not  necessary  to  de- 
scribe all  the  characteristics  and  consequences  of  a  wound  in 
order  to  render  proof  thereof  admissible.'-  So,  under  an  allega- 
tion in  a  complaint  in  general  terms  evidence  is  admissible 
of  all  specific  hurts  and  direct  results  therefrom.43  A  general 
averment  in  such  cases  is  sufficient  if  the  specific  hurts  or  in- 
juries are  such  as  can  be  traced  to  the  act  complained  of  or 
are  such  as  would  naturally  follow  from  it."  So  where  a  com- 
plaint contained  a  general  averment  of  severe  personal  injuries 
from  which  it  was  declared  the  plaintiff  had  not.  recovered  and 
would  not  recover,  and  that  as  a  result  thereof  he  had  been  un- 
able to  follow  his  usual  occupation  or  do  any  work  whatever 
and  had  suffered  great  pain  and  agony,  it  was  held  that  such 
allegations  were  sufficient  to  permit  the  admission  of  evidence 
as  to  all  the  effects  of  the  injuries.45  Again,  a  general  allega- 
tion of  damages  caused  by  a  personal  injury  is  sufficient  to  per- 
mit the  plaintiff  to  recover  for  loss  of  time,  physical  suffering 
and  permanent  disability,  and  in  fact,  all  such  damages  as  are 
the  natural  and  necessary  results  of  the  injury."''  And,  under 
an  averment  that  as  a  result  of  the  injuries  plaintiff  was  "made 
sick,  sore  and  disabled,"  evidence  of  pleurisy  is  admissible.17 
And  where  a  person  sued  to  recover  for  injuries  inflicted  by  a 
dog,  proof  of  epilepsy  as  a  result  of  the  injury  was  admitted  under 
allegations  in  the  complaint  that  she  was  injured  for  life,  that 


40 Sornberger  v.   Canadian   Pac.  R. 
Co.,  24  Out.  App.  203. 

41  Citizens  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Willoeby* 
134  Ind.563;  33  X.  E.  627. 

42  Joliet   v.  Johnson,   177    111.  178; 
52  N.  E.  498,  aft'g  71  111.  App.  423. 


Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  61;  Parker 
v.  Burgess  (Vt.),  24  Atl.  74:;. 

45  Bolte  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  38 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  234;  56  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1038. 

46  Abilene  v.  Wright,  4   Kan.  App. 


43  Quirk    v.   Siegel-Cooper  Co.,  26)708;  40  Pac.  715. 

Misc.  (N.  Y.)  244;  50  X.  Y.  Supp.  4!».        4T  Hunter  v.  Third   Ave.  R.  Co.,  21 

44  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ed-  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  1;  40  X.  Y.  Supp.  1010, 
ling,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  171;  45  S.  \V.  aff'g  20  Misc.  432;  45  X.  Y.  Supp. 
406;  Williams  v.  Oregon  Short  Line    1044. 

R.  Co.,  18  Utah,  210;  54  Pac.  991;   12 

357 


§  299  EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 

her  whole  nervous  system  had  been  permanently  injured  and  her 
mental  faculties  ruined,  that  she  had  suffered  great  bodily  and 
mental  pain  and  would  continue  so  to  suffer  in  the  future,  and 
that  her  blood  had  been  poisoned  and  contaminated.48  But 
where  a  person  sought  to  recover  for  injuries  due  to  an  assault, 
it  was  decided  that  proof  of  epilepsy  was  not  admissible  unless 
alleged  in  the  declaration.49  In  the  application  of  the  same 
rule  that  evidence  is  admissible  of  an  injury  which  is  an  effect 
resulting  from  the  injury  alleged  without  a  special  allegation 
thereof  in  the  complaint,  it  was  held  that  where  the  complaint 
alleged  an  injury  to  the  back,  spine  and  brain  of  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  evidence  showed  that  such  injuries  were  the  natural  and 
proximate  cause  of  defective  nutrition  of  the  optic  nerve  which 
caused  the  eyesight  to  be  impaired,  damages  therefor  need  not 
be  specially  pleaded  and  could  be  recovered  under  the  allega- 
tion of  the  complaint.50  And,  again,  under  allegations  of  numer- 
ous injuries  to  the  head,  back  and  spine,  and  that  "  other  serious 
injuries  were  done  him,"  evidence  is  admissible  of  an  impair- 
ment of  plaintiff's  eyesight  and  hearing.51  So,  also,  under  an  al- 
legation of  an  injury  to  the  left  eye,  evidence  is  admissible  as 
to  the  effect  of  such  injury  on  the  right  eye.52  And.  evidence  of 
a  disease  of  the  sciatic  nerve  has  been  held  admissible  in  an  ac- 
tion for  personal  injuries  though  not  alleged  in  the  declaration.53 

§  299.  Same  subject  continued. — Evidence  of  a  miscar- 
riage, as  a  result  of  injuries  received,  is  admissible  under  an 
averment  that  the  plaintiff  was  greatly  hurt  and  bruised  and 


«  Fye  v.  Chapin  (Mich.  1899),  80 
N.  W.  797. 

49  Kuhn  v.  Freund,  87  Mich.  545; 
49  N.  W.  867. 

50  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Levy, 
182  111.  525;  55  N.  E.  554,  aff  g  82  111. 
App.  202. 

61  Curran  v.  Stange  Co.,  98  Wis. 
598;  74  N.  W.  377. 

52  Maitland  v.   Gilbert   Paper  Co., 

97  Wis.  476;  72  N.  W.  1124.     But  in 

a  case  where  the  complaint  alleged 

that  the  plaintiff's  head  was  cut  to 

358 


the  skull  for  about  an  inch  in  length 
over  the  right  eye,  it  was  held  that 
under  such  allegation  evidence  was 
inadmissible  of  an  injury  to  one  or 
both  of  the  plaintiff's  eyes  and  of 
pain  suffered  by  reason  thereof. 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Warlick 
(Ind.  Terr.),  4  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas. 
N.  S.  32;  35  S.  W.  235. 

^  Beath  v.  Rapid  R.  Co.,  119  Mich. 
512;  78  N.  W.  537;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  793;  5  Det.  L.  N.  905. 


EVIDKNCK    IN     PHYSICAL     IN.IIRV    CASKS. 


§  299 


suffered  great  bodily  injury.51  And  under  an  allegation  of 
severe  nervous  shock,  as  a  result  of  the  injuries  received,  evi- 
dence is  admissible  to  show  that  in  consequence  of  the  plain- 
tiff's injuries  she  suffered  from  heart  trouble,  curvature  of  the 
spine,  chronic  meningitis  and  neurasthenia.58  So,  also,  where 
the  complaint  contained  an  averment  that  the  plaintiff  intended 
to  prove  an  injury  to  lier  leg  as  a  result  of  a  fall,  evidence  was 
admitted  to  slmw  that  varicose  veins  resulted  from  the  injury, 
though  there  was  no  allegation  in  the  complaint  of  enlargement 
of  the  leg  or  affection  of  the  blood  vessels  thereof.56  Again, 
where  the  complaint  contained  an  allegation  that  the  "plaintiff 
was  greatly  and  permanently  injured  upon  her  foot,  ankle,  body 
and  head,  the  bones  of  her  ankle  and  foot  were  broken,  the  liga- 
ments, tendons  and  flesh  crushed,  her  head  was  lacerated  and 
wounded,  and  her  mind  and  memory  were  permanently  injured, 
and  the  plaintiff  otherwise  injured  upon  her  body,"  evidence 
was  admitted  that  a  tumor  developed  upon  plaintiff's  breast,  as 
a  result  of  the  injuries,  and  was  necessarily  removed.5'  And 
where  the  complaint  alleged  that  plaintiff  was  badly  bruised, 
wounded,  sprained  and  injured  in  and  about  her  body,  it  was 
held  proper  to  admit  evidence  of  an  injury  to  the  back  and  spine 
of  the  plaintiff.88  So  again,  under  allegations  of  injuries  to  plain- 
tiff's body  by  straining,  laceration  and  discoloration  and  injuries 
of  muscles,  nerves  and  otherwise,  evidence  is  admissible  of  in- 
jury to  the  knee  and  hip,  and  of  inflammation  of  the  sciatic 
nerve  as  a  result  of  same.59  And  under  a  general  averment  of 
bodily  injuries  evidence  of  resulting  uterine  trouble  is  admissi- 
ble.60 So  evidence  as  to  the  condition  of  the  plaintiff's  uterus 
and  the  nerves  of  her  leg  was  held  admissible  where  the  complaint 
alleged  nervous  prostration  and  numbness  and  pain  in  the  neck, 
arm,  side  and  other  portions  of  her  body.61     And  where  the  plain- 


M  Tobiu  v.  Fairport,  12  N.  Y.  Supp. 
224. 

66  Kleiner  v.  Third  Ave.  It.  Co.,  36 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  191;  53  N.  Y. 
Supp.  :l!)4. 

5';  Joliet  v.  Johnson,  71  111.  App.  423. 

"Baltimore  &  O.  S.  It.  Co.  v. 
Slauker,  ISO  111.  357;  54  N.  E.  309, 
aff'g  77  111.  App.  567. 


68 Missouri,  K.  &  T.  It.  Co.  v.  Wal- 
den  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W.  87. 
("•"Williams  v.Cleveland,  C.  C.  4  St 

L.  It.  Co.,  102  Mich.  :>M;  01  N~.  W.  ;>l'. 

c0Samuels  v.  California  St.  Cable 
R.  Co.,  124  Cal.  294;  56  Pac.  111"). 

«  Illinois  C.  It.  Co.  v.  Griffin  (C. 
C.  App.  7th  C),  25  C.  C.  A.  413; 
80  Fed.  278;  53  U.  S.  App.  22.  But 
359 


§  299 


EVIDENCE    IN    PHYSICAL    INJURY    CASES. 


tiff  seeks  to  recover  for  permanent  disability,  and  so  alleges  in 
his  complaint,  the  character  of  his  occupation  and  the  particulars 
of  his  earnings  need  not  be  alleged  in  order  to  authorize  the  ad- 
mission of  evidence  in  reference  thereto.62  Nor  in  an  action 
against  a  street  railway  company  is  it  necessary  to  allege  the 
loss  of  a  certain  amount  of  earnings  or  the  expenditure  of  a 
specified  amount  for  medicine  where  such  allegations  are  gen- 
erally made.63  And  where  a  married  woman  sued  to  recover  for 
personal  injuries,  alleging  in  her  complaint  that  she  was  not 
only  prevented  from  attending  to  her  household  duties  but  also 
from  engaging  in  any  other  employment,  it  was  held  that  such 
allegations  were  sufficient  to  permit  her  to  recover  for  loss  of 
salary  which  she  had  been  accustomed  to  receive  from  her  hus- 
band for  services  rendered  by  her  to  him.64  And  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  the  seriousness  of  the  plaintiff's  injuries  evi- 
dence that  prior  to  the  injury  the  plaintiff  could  read,  was  study- 
ing medicine  and  going  to  school,  but  subsequent  thereto  he 
was  unable  to  read,  admissible,  though  not  specially  pleaded.65 


in  another  case  where  the  complaint 
alleged  that  the  plaintiff  was 
wounded,  bruised  and  skinned,  his 
nervous  system  seriously  impaired, 
and  that  serious  injuries,  both  exter- 
nal and  internal  had  been  sustained, 
it  was  held  that  proof  was  not  ad- 
missible as  to  an  impairment  of  his 
genital  and  urinary  organs.  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W.  7G9. 

62  Flanagan  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
R.Co.  (Iowa),  SON.  W.  60. 

63  Cooney  v.  Southern  Elec.  R.  Co., 
80  Mo.  App.  226;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep. 
646.     See  also   Abilene  v.  Wright,  4 

360 


Kan.  App.  708;  46  Pac.  715.  See 
Sloane  v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
Cal.  220;  32  L.  R.  A,  193;  44  Pac. 
320. 

^Blacchinska  v.  Howard  Mission 
&  H.  for  L.  W.,  56  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
322;  31  N.  Y.  St.  R.  159;  9  N.  Y. 
Supp.  679.  See  also  as  to  evidence 
of  loss  of  earnings  in  action  by  mar- 
ried woman,  Mellwitz  v.  Manhattan 
R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  St.  R.  354;  17  N.  Y. 
Supp.  112. 

e5  Bruce  v.  Beall,  99  Tenn.  303;  41 
S.  W.  445;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  841;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  464. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD  -  PHYSICAL    INJTJBY. 


§  BOO 


CHAPTER   XIII. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJURY. 


300.  Recovery  by  parent — Loss  of 

services  of  minor  child, 

301.  Judgment    for  parent  in  be- 

half of  child  not  bar  to  ac- 
tion for  loss  of  services. 

302.  Action  by  widow  for  loss  of 

services  of  minor  child. 

303.  Recovery  by  parent — Loss  of 

services — Minor  in  employ 
of  another. 

304.  Statute   as   to   employee  not 

applicable  to  parent. 

305.  Injury  to  child — Parent's  re- 

covery for  expenses,  nurs- 
ing, etc. 

306.  Injury  to  child— Parent's  re- 

covery for  future  expenses. 


307.  Evidence  as  to  parent's  con- 

dition in  life. 

308.  Child  en  ventre  sa  mere — Dam 

ages  for  injury  to. 

309.  Pain  and  suffering— Minors. 

310.  Expenses— Recovery     of     by 

minor. 

311.  Loss      of     time— Diminished 

earning  capacity — Minor. 

312.  Prospective    loss — Permanent 

injury  —Minor. 

313.  No  recovery  by  minor  for  in- 

juries to  mother. 

314.  Recovery  by  minor  for  loss  of 

wages  in  past. 

315.  Negligence  of  parent 


§  300.  Recovery  by  parent — Loss  of  services  of  minor 
child. — In  case  of  an  injury  to  a  minor  child  which  deprives  a 
parent  of  his  services,  the  parent  may  recover  for  such  loss,1  and 


1  St.  Louis,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Free- 
man, 36  Ark.  41 ;  Morgan  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  95  Cal.  510;  Durkee  v. 
Central  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Cal.  388; 
38  Am.  Rep.  59;  Karr  v.  Parks,  44 
Cal.  46;  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hughes  (Ga.),  17  S.  E.  949; 
Bradley  v.  Sattler,  156  111.  603;  41 
N.  E.  171;  aff'g  54  111.  App.  504: 
Adams  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cobb  (Ind.  T. 
1899),  53  S  W.  478;  Penn.  Co.  v. 
Lilly,  73  Ind.  252;  Burnett  v. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co..  55  Iowa, 
496;  Meersv.  McDowell,  28  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  461;  53  L.  R.  A.  789;  62  S.  W. 
1013;   Union   News   Co.   v.    Morrow, 


20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  302;  46  S.  W.  6:  Ber- 
nard v.  Merrill.  91  Me.  358;  40  Atl. 
136;  Horgan  v.  Pacific  Mills,  158 
Muss.  402:  33  N.  E.  5S1;  Bamka  v. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co. 
I  Minn. ).  63  N".  W.  1116:  Meade 
v.  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo. 
App.  61;  Buck  v.  Peoples  St.  R.  E. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555,  aff'd 
18  S.  W.  1090;  Barnes  v.  Keene, 
132  N.  Y.  13;  Drew  v.  Sixth  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  26  N.  Y.  49:  Dollardv.  Roberts, 
28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  569;  8  V  Y.  Supp. 
432,  aff'd  41  X.  Y.  St.  R.  258;  Cam- 
ming v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
Abb.  N.  C.  1;  109  N.  Y.  95,  rev'g 
361 


§301 


PARENT    AND    CHILD — PHYSICAL    INJURY. 


the  recovery  is  not  limited  to  the  damages  sustained  up  to  the 
time  of  the  trial,  but  may  also  include  prospective  loss  during 
the  child's  minority.2  But  it  is  decided  that  for  loss  of  future 
services  there  can  he  no  recovery  unless  specially  declared  for.3 
Although  the. parent  may  recover  for  loss  of  services  of  a  minor 
child,  past  and  prospective,  yet  there  are  some  cases  in  which  it 
has  been  held  that  a  deduction  must  be  made,  from  the  probable 
gross  earnings,  of  the  cost  of  maintenance  and  support  of  the 
child.4  Again,  in  an  action  to  recover  for  injuries  to  an  adopted 
child,  the  complaint  should  allege  the  fact  of  the  adoption, 
showing  the  child's  emancipation  by  his  parents  in  order  to  re- 
cover for  loss  of  services.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  merely  describe 
such  child  as  an  adopted  child.5 

§  301.  Judgment  for  parent  in  behalf  of  child  not  bar  to 
action  for  loss  of  services — The  fact  that  a  parent  may  have 
obtained  a  judgment  in  an  action  prosecuted  by  him  in  behalf 
of  a  minor  child  for  injuries  sustained  by  such  child,  will  not 
operate  as  a  bar  to  the  father's  maintaining  an  action  for  the 
loss  of  the  services  of  the  child  resulting  from  the  same  injury 


38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  362;  Gilligan  v. 
New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co.,  1  E. 
D.  Sm.  453:  Oakland  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Fielding,  48  Pa.  St.  320;  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kelly,  31  Pa.  St.  372;  Gavi- 
gan  v.  Atlantic  Refining  Co.,  3 
Super.  Ct.  (Pa.)  623:  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodgers  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  39  S.  W.  383;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
708;  Taylor  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  41  W.  Va.  704;  24  S.  E.  632;  4 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  115. 

2  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hughes  (Ga.),  17  S.  E.  949; 
Traver  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Abb.  N.  S.  46;  4  Abb.  Ct.  App.  42: 
dimming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co., 
21  Abb.  N.  C.  1;  109  N.  Y.  95,  rev'g 
38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  362:  Drew  v.  Sixth 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  49;  Dollard  v. 
Roberts,  28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  569;  8  N.  Y. 
Supp.  432,  aff'd  41  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
362 


253;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Putnam 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  63  S.  W.  910; 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodgers 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  39  S.  W.  383;  1 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  708;  San  Antonio  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Muth  (Tex.  C.  A.  1895),  27 
S.  W.  752. 

3  Gilligan  v.  New  York  &  Harlem 
R.  R.  Co.,  1  E.  D.  Sm.  453. 

4  Morgan  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  95  Cal.  510;  Penn.  Co.  v.  Lilly, 
73  Ind.  252;  Benton  v.  Chic,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  55  Iowa,  496;  Matthews  v. 
Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  Mo.  App.  75. 
But  see  Schniitz  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  381; 
Mauerman  v.  St.  Louis,  etc..  Ry. 
Co.,  41  Mo.  App.  349;  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Morin,  66  Tex.  133. 

5  Citizens  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
loeby,  15  Ind.  App.  312;  43  N.  E. 
1058. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD       PHYSICAL    IN.M    BY.    §§   302,  303 

for  which  the  former  action  was  brought.6  But  where  the  judg- 
ment obtained  by  the  father  in  behalf  of  his  minor  child  in- 
cludes damages  for  loss  of  earning  capacity  from  the  time  of  the 
injury,  such  judgment  is  a  bar  to  an  action  by  the  father  per- 
sonally to  recover  for  a  loss  of  the  services  of  the  child  during 
minority." 

£  'M)2.  Action  by  widow  for  loss  of  services  of  minor  child. 

— While  a  widowed  mother  may  recover  for  the  loss  of  services 
of  a  minor  child,8  yet  where  the  injury  was  received  during  the 
life  of  the  father,  and  the  latter  commenced  no  action  to  re- 
cover  for  such  loss,  there  can  be  no  recovery  by  the  mother, 
since  it  is  declared  that  the  right  of  a  parent  to  recover  is  based 
on  the  supposed  relation  of  master  and  servant,  and  it  was  the 
father  who  was  entitled  to  the  services  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
jury and  not  the  mother.9  And  where  a  widow  sues  for  her 
separate  use  and  benefit  to  recover  for  injuries  to  a  minor  child, 
there  can  be  no  recovery  by  her  in  the  absence  of  any  allegation 
of  loss  of  services  of  such  child  or  that  she  has  incurred  some 
expense  on  her  own  account  by  reason  of  such  injuries.10  Hut 
in  an  action  by  her  as  guardian  of  an  infant  son,  there  may  be  ;i 
recovery  for  impairment  of  his  ability  to  earn  money  during  his 
infancy,  since  it  is  said  her  bringing  of  the  action  and  her  testi- 
mony will  be  in  effect  a  transfer  to  him  of  any  cause  of  action  she 
may  have  had  by  reason  of  the  injury." 

§  303.  Recovery  by  parent — Loss  of  services— Minor  in  em- 
ploy of  another. —If  a  person  knowingly  employs  a  minor  to 
work  in  a  dangerous  employment  against  the  known  wishes  of  the 


■Bernard  v.  Merrill,  91  Me.  358; 
40  Atl.  156;  Bamka  v.  Chicago,  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (Minn.),  63  X.  W. 
1116.  .See  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Moiin,  56  Tex.  133.  See  Bridger  v. 
Asheville  &  S.  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C. 
456;  3  S.  E.  8G0;  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  653, 
where  it  is  held  that  a  judgment  for 
personal  injuries  iu  favor  of  a  minor 
child  is  inadmissible  in  an  action  by 
the  father  against  the  same  defend- 
ant to  recover  damages  for  the  same 
injury. 


7  Baker  v.  Flint  &  P.  M.  R.  Co., 
91  Mich.  298;  16  L.  R.  A.  154;  51  N\ 
\V.  897;  11   Ry.  &  Cor,,.  L.  J.  273. 

BHorgan  v.  Pacific  Mills.  158 Mass. 
402;  33  X.  E.  581.  See  sees.  :)00,  303 
herein,  action  by  parent,  etc. 

9Geraghty  v.  New,  7  Misc.  (X.  V.) 
30;  57  X.  Y.  St.  K.  497:  27  X.  Y. 
Supp.  403. 

10Corsicana  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Val- 
ley, 14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  250;36  S.  W.  999. 

"Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  748;  58  S.  W.  098. 
363 


§§  304,  305    PARENT    AND    CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJURY. 

father,  and  the  minor  sustains  injuries  while  engaged  in  his  work, 
the  father  may  recover  from  the  employer  for  the  loss  of  the 
services  of  the  minor,  regardless  of  the  question  of  negligence 
as  to  the  injury.12  But  where  a  minor  was  injured  by  accident, 
through  no  negligence  on  the  part  of  his  emplo}rer,  and  the 
parent  had  not  consented  that  the  boy  might  work  for  himself, 
although  the  latter  had  stated  at  the  time  of  his  employment 
that  his  father  had  consented,  it  was  decided  that  there  could 
be  no  recovery  by  the  parent  for  loss  of  services.13  In  those 
cases,  however,  where  a  minor  child  is  injured  owing  to  his  em- 
ployer's negligence,  the  right  of  the  father  to  recover  is  not 
precluded  by  the  fact  that  he  consented  to  such  employment  or 
agreed  not  to  trouble  the  employer  in  case  of  injury.14 

§  304.  Statute  as  to  employee  not  applicable  to  parent. — 

Where  a  statute  permits  the  recovery  of  damages  for  personal 
injuries  by  an  employee  from  an  employer  in  certain  specified 
cases,  it  will  not  be  construed  as  authorizing  the  recovery  of 
such  damages  by  a  parent  of  a  minor  servant.15 

§  305.  Injury  to  child — Parent's  recovery  for  expenses, 
nursing,  etc. — In  an  action  by  a  parent  to  recover  damages  for 
an  injury  to  a  child,  he  may  recover  the  expenses  incurred  for 
medical  attendance,  medicine,  nursing,  and  in  fact  all  expenses 
which  have  been  sustained  as  a  result  of  the  injury.16     And  in 


12  Taylor  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  41  W.  Va.  704;  24  S.  E.  632;  4 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  115.  See 
Union  News  Co.  v.  Morrow,  20  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  302;  46  S.  W.  6. 

13  Williams  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
121  N.  C.  512;  28  S.  E.  367. 

"  So  held  in  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Putnam  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  63  S. 
W.  910.  Consent  of  parent  to  the  em- 
ployment is  presumed  in  absence  of 
evidence  to  the  contrary.  Wood- 
ward Iron  Co.  v.  Cook,  124  Ala.  349; 
27  So.  455. 

15  Woodward  Iron  Qo.  v.  Cook,  124 
Ala.  349;  27  So.  455. 

16  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones  (Colo. ), 

364 


40  Pac.  891;  East  Tennessee,  V.  & 
G.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes  (Ga.),  17  S.  E. 
949;  County  Commrs.  v.  Hamilton. 
60  Md.  340;  Morgan  v.  Pacific  Mills. 
158  Mass.  402;  33  N.  E.  581;  Meade 
v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo. 
App.  61;  Buck  v.  Peoples  St.  R.  E. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555,  affd 
18  S.  W.  1090;  Connell  v.  Putnam. 
58  N.  H.  535;  Barnes  v.  Keene,  132 
N.  Y.  13;  42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  853,  reh'g 
32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  1138;  Dollard  v. 
Roberts,  130  N.  Y.  269;  dimming 
v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Abb. 
N.  C.  1;  109  N.  Y.  95,  reh'g  38  Hun, 
362;  Martin  v.  Wood,  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
457;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  274,  aff'g  18  N.  Y. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJUBY. 


8  305 


this  connection  the  rule  seems  to  be,  that  a  father  may  recover 

compensation  for  his  own,  or  his  wife's  services  in  nursing  an  in- 
jured child."  So  evidence  of  the  value  of  the  services  of  the 
plaintiff's  wife  in  attending  to  an  injured  child  is  admissible. 1S 
And  a  widowed  mother,  may  recover  for  labor  performed  in 
caring  for  and  attending  to  her  child.1-'  Again,  the  father  may 
recover  the  value  of  his  own  services  in  nursing  his  child,  but 
where  he  gives  up  a  lucrative  business  engagement  for  this  pur- 
pose, he  cannot  recover  in  addition  to  the  value  of  his  services 
as  nurse  what  he  might  have  made  if  he  had  not  given  up  such 
engagement.'*  In  Pensylvania,  however,  it  is  held  that  a  father 
cannot  recover  for  the  services  of  the  members  of  the  family  in 
caring  for  his  child  unless  such  care  and  attention  deprived  him 
of  their  services  in  his  business.21  In  this  case  it  was  said  :  "  In 
an  action  by  a  parent  to  recover  for  loss  occasioned  by  injury  to 
his  child,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  pecuniary  loss  to  him. 
His  action  is  for  the  injury  done  to  him,  not  for  the  injury  done 
his  child  or  for  the  loss  or  inconvenience  to  other  members  of 
his  family,  whose  cares  and  burdens  have  been  increased.  .  .  . 
The  jury  was  allowed  to  consider  as  elements  of  damage  the  in- 


St.  R.  274;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  208;  1  Sil. 
S.  C.  312;  Kennedy  v.  X.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.),  186;  <iil- 
ligan  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R. 
Cm..  1  E.  D.  Sm.  453;  Woeckner  v. 
Erie  Elee.  Motor  Co.,  187  Pa.  St. 
206;  43  W.  N.  C.  50:  Oakland  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Fielding,  48  Pa.  St.  320;  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  31  Pa.  St.  372; 
Gavigan  v.  Atlantic  Refining  Co.,  3 
Super.  Ct.  (Pa.)  628;  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rodgers  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  39  S.  W.  383;  1  Am.  Nog.  Rep. 
708;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cornelius 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  720; 
Lutcher  &  M.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Dyson 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  61;  San 
Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Muth  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  752;  Trow  v. 
Thomas,  70  Vt.  580:  41  Atl.  652. 
In  this  last  case  it  is  held  that  the 
father  cannot  recover  the  expenses 
of  providing  a  suitable  burial  for  a 


child  though  he  may  recover  for  ex- 
penses incurred  up  to  the  time  of 
death. 

17  County  Commrs.  v.  Hamilton, 
GO  Md.  340;  Morgan  v.  Pacific  Mills. 
158  Mass.  402;  33  N.  E.  5S1;  Schmitz 
v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  46 
Mo.  App.  380;  Connell  v.  Putnam, 
58  N.  H.  535;  Barnes  v.  Keene,  132 
N.  Y.  13;  42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  853,  rev'g 
32  X.  Y.  St.  R.  1138. 

«  Martin  v.  Wood,  23  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
457;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  274.  aff'g  18  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  274;  4  X.  Y.  Supp.  208;  1 
Sil.  S.  C.  312. 

19  Horganv.  Pacific  Mills,  158  Mass. 
402;  33  X.  E.  581. 

20  Barnes  v.  Keene,  132  N.  Y.  13; 
42  X.  Y.  St.  R.  S53,  rev'g  32  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  113S. 

-1  Woeckner  v.  Erie  Elec.  Motor 
Co..  187  Pa.  St.  206;  4;!  W.  N.  C.  50: 
3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  601. 

365 


§  306  PARENT    AND    CHILD — PHYSICAL    INJURY. 

creased  inconvenience  and  troubles  caused  other  members  of  the 
family.  The  duties  performed  by  them  in  the  care  of  the  in- 
jured child  cost  the  plaintiff  nothing  and  caused  him  no  pecu- 
niary loss  and  they  cannot  be  made  the  ground  of  a  recovery  by 
him.  ...  If  the  increased  attention  required  by  the  child  had 
deprived  the  plaintiff  of  the  services  of  other  members  of  his 
family  in  his  business  and  thus  caused  him  direct  pecuniary  loss, 
his  claim  for  compensation  would  rest  on  substantially  the  same 
ground  as  if  he  had  been  required  to  employ  additional  help ; 
but  for  the  mere  inconvenience  to  others  not  affecting  him 
pecuniarily,  there  can  be  no  recovery."  a 

§  306.  Injury  to  child— Parent's  recovery  for  future  ex- 
penses.— A  parent's  recovery  for  expenses,  in  an  action  for  an 
injury  to  a  minor  child,  is  not  in  all  cases  limited  to  those  which 
have  been  paid  or  incurred  prior  to  the  time  of  trial.  In  many 
cases  there  may  be  expenses  which  may  be  immediately  and 
surely  necessary  subsequent  to  the  trial,  and  which  it  is  possible 
to  definitely  ascertain  or  determine.  In  such  cases  it  has  been 
decided  that  they  may  be  recovered.23  But  where  such  expenses 
are  merely  contingent  or  possible  in  the  remote  future,  they  are 
not  recoverable  in  an  action  by  the  parent.21  So  where  in  an  ac- 
tion by  a  parent  for  an  injury  to  a  child,  a  surgeon  was  permitted 
to  testify  as  to  an  operation  which  would  become  necessary  at 
some  remote  period  during  the  child's  minority,  and  a  recovery 
was  allowed  for  the  expenses  of  such  operation,  it  was  held  to 
be  error  to  allow  the  admission  of  such  evidence  and  of  a  re- 
covery for  such  expenses.25  It  is  proper,  however,  to  permit  a 
recovery  for  the  future  increased  expenses  in  maintaining  and 
brino-ing  up  a  child,  which  has  been  rendered  necessary  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  injury.'26     And  it  has  been  decided  that  expenses  for 


22  Per  Fell,  J.  See  in  this  connec- 
tion Goodhart  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
177  Pa.  Ht.  10;  35  Atl.  192. 

23Dollard  v.  Roberts,  130  N.  Y. 
269. 

24Cumrning  v.  Brooklyn  R.  R.  Co., 
21  Abb.  N.  C.  1;  109  N.  Y.  95,  rev'g 
38  Hun,  362,  which  holds  that  such 
expenses  are  only  recoverable  by  the 
child.     See  also   Netherland    Anier. 

366 


Steam  Co.  v.  Hollander,  59  Fed.  417; 
8  C.  C.  A.  169. 

25  Cumming  v.  Brooklyn  R.  R.  Co., 
21  Abb.  N.  C.  1;  109  N.  Y.  95,  rev'g 
38  Hun  362. 

26  Lang  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  Hun  (N.  Y.),  603;  4  N.  Y. 
Supp.  565;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  110,  aff'd 
123  N.  Y.  666;  33  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
1030;  25  N.   E.  955;  San  Antonio  St. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJURY.    §§  307,  308 


medical  and  surgical  attention,  nursing,  and  the  like,  may  be 
recovered  by  the  parent  for  a  period  extending  beyond  the 
maturity  of  the  child." 

§  307.  Evidence  as  to  parent's  condition  in  life. — In  an  ac- 
tion by  a  parent  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  services  of  a  minor 
child,  evidence  is  inadmissible  as  to  the  size  of  plaintiff's  family, 
his  pecuniary  condition,  or  his  earnings.3 

§  308.  Child  en  ventre  sa  mere— Damages  for  injury  to. — 

Where  a  child  en  ventre  sa  mere  is  injured  by  the  negligence  of 
another  no  action  lies  in  his  behalf  after  birth  to  recover  for 
such  injury  since  at  the  time  of  the  injury  he  is  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  mother  and  as  having  no  separate  entity.3  And  in  a 
case  in  Massachusetts  where  by  reason  of  a  defective  highway 
a  woman  was  injured  causing  her  to  give  premature  birth  to  a 
child  which  died  a  few  moments  after  it  was  born,  it  was  held 
that  such  a  child  was  not  a  "person"  within  the  contemplation 
of  the  statute  giving  a  right  of  action  against  the  town  in  cases 
of  death  caused  by  a  defective  highway  within  the  town's  limits.* 
In  this  decision  it  was  declared  that  the  unborn  child  was  a  part 
of  the  mother  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  and  that  any  damage 
to  the  child  which  was  not  too  remote  to  be  recovered  was  re- 
coverable by  the  mother.  Upon  the  decisions  in  the  fore- 
going cases  the  rule  may  be  said  to  be  that  if  a  child  en  ventre 
sa  mere  is  injured  so  that  he  is  deformed  or  his  health  or  physi- 
cal condition  impaired,  there  can  be  no  recovery  in  behalf  of 
the  child  for  such  injury,  or  if  he  is  injured  while  in  that  state 
and  death  ensues  immediately  following  his  birth,  he  is  not 
a  "person"  within  the  contemplation  of  a  statute  which  gives 
an  action  for  a  loss  of  life  caused  by  a  negligent  act.  This  par- 
ticular phase  of  damages  opens  up  a  new  field  of  inquiry,  and 


R.  Co.,  v.  Muth  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27 
S.  W.  752.  See  Buck  v.  Peoples  St. 
R.  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555, 
aff'd  18  S.  W.  1090. 

27  Buck  v.  Peoples  S.  R.  E.  L.  &  P. 
Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555,  aff'd  18  S. 
W.  1090. 

28Holdridge  v.  Mendenhall,  108 
Wis.  1;83  X.  W.  1109. 


29  Allaire  v.  St.  Luke's  Hospital, 
76  111.  441;  30  Chic.  Leg.  News,  333; 
Walker  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co., 
Ir.  L.  R.  28  C.  L.  69.  See  discussion 
of  this  in  32  Cent.  L.  J.  197. 

30  Dietrich  v.  Northampton,  138 
Mass.  14;  52  Am.  Rep.  422. 


367 


§§   309,  310    PARENT    AND    CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJURY. 

the  few  decided  cases  cannot  be  said  to  have  definitely  settled 
the  rule.  It  may  seem  and  is  hard  in  some  cases  to  say  that 
though  an  injury  to  an  unborn  child  may  cause  him  to  be  de- 
formed or  otherwise  permanently  injured  from  the  time  of  his 
birth,  yet  there  can  be  no  recovery  thereof.  The  injury  is 
not  alone  to  the  parent  but  is  also  in  such  a  case  as  we  have 
mentioned  an  injury  to  the  child  extending  beyond  his  minority. 
For  many  purposes  an  unborn  child  is  recognized  by  the  law  as 
being  in  esse.  Should  the  rule  be  extended  so  as  to  consider  a 
child  in  such  cases  as  in  esse  and  therefore  entitled  to  recover 
for  his  personal  damages?  Certainly  the  damages  which  the 
parent  recovers  in  no  way  compensate  him  for  the  injury  he  has 
sustained  and  will  sustain  independent  of  the  parents.  In  one 
of  the  cases  31  it  was  said  by  the  court  that  it  was  not  intended 
to  declare  that  if  a  woman  while  pregnant  was  wilfully  injured 
by  another  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  the  child,  and  such  child 
as  a  result  of  such  injuries  became  a  cripple,  there  could  be  no 
recovery  therefor  in  an  action  by  the  child  ;  and  if  such  an 
action  would  lie  in  case  of  wilful  injuries,  why  not  in  case  of 
negligence?  Ignorance  as  to  the  condition  of  the  mother  should 
be  no  defense,  since  in  cases  of  physical  injuries  where  a  person 
injured  is  afflicted  with  some  disease  of  which  the  negligent 
party  is  not  aware,  evidence  of  the  aggravation  of  such  disease 
is  admissible. 

§  309.  Pain  and  suffering— Minors. — In  an  action  by  a  minor 
for  physical  injuries  sustained  by  him,  there  may  be  a  recovery 
for  the  pain  and  suffering  resulting  therefrom.32  But  the  pain 
and  suffering  of  a  minor  as  a  result  of  injuries  he  has  sustained 
are  not  elements  to  be  considered  in  an  action  by  the  father  to 
recover  damages  therefor.55 

§  310.  Expenses — Recovery  of  by  minor. — In  an  action  by  a 
minor  child  to  recover  for  injuries  sustained  by  him,  the  moneys 
paid  or  liabilities  incurred  by  a  parent  for  necessary  medical 


31  Walker  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.,  Ir.  L.  R.  28  C.  L.  69. 

82  McMillan  v.  Union  P.  B.  W.,  6 
Mo.  App.  434;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly, 
31  Penn.  St.  372;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co 
368 


v.  Malone,    15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  56;  38 
S.  W.  538. 

53  Bait.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keck, 
89  111.  App.  72;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Malone,  15  Tex.  Civ.   App.  56;  38  S. 


PARENT    AND   CHILD— PHYSICAL    INJURY. 


§  311 


or  surgical  treatment,  or  for  medicines  or  other  necessary  pur- 
poses in  effecting  a  cure,  are  not  recoverable  by  the  child.'1 
But  if  a  minor  has  no  parent  or  guardian,  it  is  held  that  he  may 
recover  the  amount  of  such  expenses.5  And  in  another  case  it 
was  decided  that  although  the  physician  had  charged  the  father  for 
services  rendered  to  a  minor,  yet  the  hitter  might  recover  the 
amount  of  such  bill,  where  he  was  employed  and  promised  pay- 
ment by  the  minor  after  he  became  of  age.36 

§  311.  Loss  of  time  -Diminished  earning  capacity— Minor. 

— The  services  and  earnings  of  a  minor  child  primarily  belong 
to  the  parent,  the  right  of  the  parent  thereto  being  based  upon 
the  duty  which  he  owes  to  his  child  to  maintain  and  educate 
him  during  his  minority.  If,  however,  for  any  reason  a  minor 
becomes  emancipated,  he  is  then  entitled  to  his  own  earnings, 
and  for  any  injury  which  lessens  his  capacity  to  earn  money,  he 
may  recover  damages.  So  as  a  general  rule  where  a  minor  has 
sustained  an  injury,  there  can  be  no  recovery  by  him  of  dam- 
ages for  loss  of  time,  during  minority,  as  a  result  of  such  injury 
in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  his  earnings  during  the 
period  of  minority  would  have  belonged  to  himself.37     But  the 


W.  538.  See  in  this  connection  Walker 
v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  Supp. 
536;  24  N.  Y.  St.  R.  961;  57  Supr.  14, 
aff'd  126  X.  Y.  668;  37  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
963;  27  N.  E.  854. 

M  Peppercorn  v.  Black  River  Falls, 
89  Wis.  38;  61  N.  W.  79.  In  this  case 
it  was  also  held  that  the  same  rule 
applied  where  a  brother  incurred  lia- 
bilities or  expended  moneys  under 
such  circumstances.  See  Newbury 
v.  Getchell  &  M.  Lumber*  Mfg.  Co., 
100  Iowa,  441;  69  N.  W.  743,  where  it 
is  held  that  the  cost  of  medical  ex- 
penses are  not  recoverable  by  a 
minor,  unless  he  has  paid  the  bill  for 
the  same,  as  the  parents  are  pri- 
marily responsible  therefor. 

a*  Forbes  v.  Loftin.  50  Ala.  396. 

HJudd  v.  Ballard,  66  Yt.  068;  30 
Atl.  90. 

3T  Atlanta  &  \\.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith 
24 


(Ga.  1895),  20  S.  E.  763;  Western  Un. 
Teleg.  Co.  v.  Woods,  88  111.  App.  375; 
Jordan  v.  Bowen,  46  N.  Y.  Super. 
355;  Gulf  C.  &.  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 91  Tex.  569;  11  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  261 :  44  S.  W.  1067,  rev'g 
42  S.  W.  584;  43  S.  W.  583;  Railway 
Co.  v.  Whitten,  74  Tex.  202;  11  S.  W. 
1091 ;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morin, 
06  Tex.  225;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Evansich,  63  Tex.  54;  Peppercorn 
v.  Black  River  Falls,  89  Wis.  38;  61 
X.  W.  79;  Stewart  v.  Ripon,  38  Wis. 
584.  See  in  tin's  connection  Abides  v. 
Bransfield,  18  Kan.  10.  Where, 
however,  the  court  failed  to  instruct 
the  jury  in  an  action  by  a  minor  to 
recover  for  personal  injuries,  that 
there  could  be  no  recovery  by  him 
for  loss  of  time  or  impaired  ability 
to  labor  during  his  minority,  it  was 
held  that  such   failure    was  not   re- 

369 


§312 


PARENT   AND    CHILD — PHYSICAL   INJURY. 


parent  may  waive  his  right  to  recover  for  loss  of  time  of  a  minor 
child,  and  where  this  is  done  the  minor  may  recover  therefor.*3 
Thus,  it  was  held  that  a  minor  might  recover  for  loss  of  time 
where,  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit  by  him,  the  father 
filed  a  release. of  any  claim  on  his  part.39  And  where  a  parent 
of  an  injured  child  dies  without  bringing  suit  to  recover  for  such 
injury  or  making  any  claim  or  settlement  whatever,  if  the  parent 
dies  during  the  minority  of  the  child,  the  latter  may  recover 
for  diminished  ability  to  earn  money  during  his  minority,  from 
the  date  of  his  parent's  death,  as  well  as  for  the  time  subse- 
quent to  his  majority.40 

§312.  Prospective  loss— Permanent  injury— Minor.— A 

minor  who  sues  to  recover  for  a  physical  injury  as  a  result  of 
which  he  has  sustained  a  permanent  injury  impairing  his  capac- 
ity to  pursue  the  ordinary  avocations  of  life,  and  for  which  he 
seeks  compensation,  may  recover  only  for  the  loss  he  will  sus- 
tain as  a  result  of  such  impaired  capacity  at  and  after  his  majority. 
For  any  loss  of  future  earnings  prior  to  his  majority  there  can 
be  no  recovery  by  him  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  emancipa- 
tion.41 Where  tables  of  expectancy  are  introduced,  in  evidence 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  a  minor's  estimated  duration  of  life 
as  an  aid  in  determining  the  measure  of  damages  for  impaired 
capacity  to  labor  in  the  future,  his  expectancy  should  be  shown 
not  from  the  age  of  majority,  but  from  the  present  age  of  the 
minor,  since  the  tables  are  merely  an  aid  in  determining  the  prob- 
able duration  of  life,  the  damages,  however,  as  we  have  stated 
above,  are  to  be  restricted  in  the  absence  of  emancipation  to 
those  occurring  after  majority,  there  being  no  recovery  allowed 


versible  error,  where  the  attention 
of  the  court  was  not  called  to  the 
Bubject.  McCoy  v.  Milwaukee  St.  K. 
Co.  (Wis.),  59  N.  W.  453. 

38  Abeles  v.  Bransfield,  18  Kan.  16; 
Judd  v.  Ballard,  66  Vt.  668;  30  Atl. 
96. 

39  Judd  v.  Ballard,  66  Vt.  668;  30 
Atl.  96. 

40  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Tona- 
hill,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.'  625;  41  S.  W. 
875;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  287. 

370 


41  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Young, 
81  Ga.  397;  7  S.  E.  912;  Schmitz  v. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),  23 
L.  R.  A.  250;  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Holon- 
beck,  55  Neb.  228;  75  N.  W.  484;  4 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  509;  Dublin  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  v.  Jarrard  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40 
S.  W.  531,  aff'd  91  Tex.  289;  42  S. 
W.  959.  But  see  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kelley,  31  Pa.  St.  372. 


PARENT    AND    CHILD       PHYSICAL    INJURY.    §§313-315 

to  him  for  those  occurring  prior  thereto  «  In  the  case  of  a  very 
young  child  it  may  be  often  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  give 
direct  proof  of  the" extent  to  which  such  child's  earning  capacity 
has  been  impaired,  and  where  such  is  the  case  the  determi- 
nation of  the  amount  of  damages  to  be  awarded  therefor  must 
be  left  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the  jury  according  to  the  facts 
of  the  particular  case.43 

§  313.  No  recovery  by  minor  for  injuries  to  mother. -A 

child  cannot  recover  for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  a  parent. 
So  where  an  instruction  was  given  which  could  be  construed  as 
authorizing  a  recovery  by  the  child  for  injuries  sustained  by  the 
mother  in  whose  care  he  was  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  it  was 
held  to  be  erroneous." 

§  314.  Recovery  by  minor  of  loss  of  wages  in  past — Where 
an  unemancipated  minor  brings  an  action  to  recover  for  personal 
injuries  which  he  has  sustained,  loss  of  wages  in  the  past  is  not 
an  element  of  damage  to  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  estimating 
the  amount  of  his  recovery.45  But  where  a  father  consented  to 
act  as  the  guardian  of  the  minor,  appointed  on  a  petition  claim- 
ing loss  of  wages  as  an  element  of  his  damages,  it  was  held  that 
the  father  by  so  consenting  acquiesced  in  the  claim  of  the  minor, 
and  that  the  latter  could  recover  such  wages  while  the  father  by 
such  act  was  precluded  from  recovery  therefor.16 

8  315.  Negligence  of  parent.— Where  in  an  action  by  a 
parent  there  is  evidence  tending  to  show  negligence  on  his  part 
which  contributed  to  the  injury  to  the  child,  it  is  proper  to  in- 


*2  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Ilolonbeck,  55  Neb. 
228;  75  N.  W.  584;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
509. 

«  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Co.  v.  Clark, 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  167;  51  S.  W.  276. 
See  also  Rosenkranz  v.  Lindell  Ry. 
Co.  (Mo.),  18  S.  W.  890. 

**  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Beck  worth, 
11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  153;  32  S.  W.  347. 


«  Clark  Mile-End  Spool  Co.  v. 
Shaffery,  58  N.  J.  L.  229;  33  Atl. 
284. 

46  Lieberman  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co., 
25  Misc.  (N.  Y.  )  296;  .",4  X.  Y.  Supp. 
574:  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R  Cas.  N.  S.  858, 
mod'd  25  Misc.  704  ;  55  N.  Y. 
Supp.  677. 

371 


§315 


PARENT    AND    CHILD — PHYSICAL    INJURY. 


struct  the  jury  that  damages  for  such  iujury  are  not  recoverable 
by  the  parent  if  it  could  have  been  avoided  or  prevented  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  diligence  on  his  part.47 


*7  Hooper  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  112 
Ga.  96;  37  S.  E.  165,  wherein  it  was 
so  held  in  an  action  by  a  parent  for 
injuries  received  by  his  son  in  driv- 

372 


ing  across  a  bridge  of  which  one  of 
the  flooring  planks  was  insecurely 
fastened. 


HUSBAND    AND    WIFE — PHYSICAL    INJUBIBS. 


§316 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


HUSBAND  AND  WIFE — PHYSICAL  INJURIES. 


316.  Husband's    recovery  for  loss 

of    services  and  society  of 
wife — Loss  of  earnings. 

317.  Husband     cannot   recover  for 

wife's  suffering. 

318.  Loss       of        time  —  Married 

woman. 

319.  Same  subject  continued. 

320.  Wife's    right  to  recover  not 

precluded      by      husband's 
right. 

321.  Sale   of     laudanum    to   mar- 

ried woman — Recovery    by 


husband  for  loss  of  services 
— Case. 
'621.  Injury  to  wife — Expenses  for 
medical  treatment  recover- 
able by  husband. 

323.  Recovery      for      services     ol 

husband  in  nursing  injured 
wife. 

324.  Recovery      for      services     of 

daughter  as  nurse. 

325.  Expenses — Recovery    of      by 

married  woman. 

326.  Pain   and   suffering — Married 

woman. 


§  316.  Husband's  recovery  for  loss  of  services  and  society 
of  wife — Loss  of  earnings. — In  case  of  an  injury  to  a  married 
woman,  her  husband  may  recover  damages  for  the  loss  of  her 
services  and  society,  both  past  and  prospective,  if  the  latter  be 
reasonably  certain.1     And  his  right  to  recover  damages  for  loss 


iRedfield  v.  Oakland  Consol.  St. 
R.  Co.,  112  Cal.  220;  43  Pac.  1117; 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  21  Colo. 
340;  40  Pac.  801;  Denver  Consol. 
Tramway  Co.  v.  Riley  (Colo.  App. ), 
59  Pac.  47(5;  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hickey,  12  App.  D.  C.  269;  26 
Wash.  L.  R.  198;  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Johnson  (Ga.),  18  S.  E.  816; 
Tuttle  v.  Chic,  etc.,  R.  K.  Co.,  42 
Iowa,  518;  McDevitt  v.  St.  Paul,  66 
Minn.  14;  33  L.  R.  A.  601;  08  N.  W. 
178;  Cullar  v.  Mo.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
84  Mo.  App.  347;  Smith  v.  City  of 
St.  Joseph,  55  Mo.  456;  Furnish  v. 
Mo.  Par.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  669;  Riley 
v.  Lidtke,  49  Neb.  139;  68 N.  W.336; 


Hopkins  v.  Atlantic,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
36  N.  H.  !»;  Jones  v.  Utica  &  B.  R. 
R.  Co.,  40  Hun  I  N.  Y.).  349:  Ainley 
v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Hun  (N.  Y.  i.  208; 
13  N.  V.  St.  R.  557 ;  28Wkly.  Dig.  244; 
London  v.  Cunningham,  1  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  40S:  49  X.  V.  St.  R.  447:  -_'0  N. 
V.  Supp.  882;Schukle  v.  Cunningham, 
13  X.  Y.  St.  R.  si:  Meigs  v.  Buffalo, 
23  Wkly.  Dig.  IN.  Y.)  497:  Kelly  v. 
Mayberry  Twp.,  154  Pa.  St.  440;  jo 
Atl.  595;  Reathly  v.  Shamokin,  137 
Pa.  St.  98:  Henry  v.  Stopfer,  1  Pa. 
Adv.  R.  80:  28  Atl.  337;  29  W.  N.  C. 
331;  22  Pitts.  L.  J.  X.  s.  385;  Ft. 
Wmth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  12 
Tex.   Civ.    App.  654;  35   S.   W.   335; 

373 


§  316  HUSBAND    AND    WIFE — PHYSICAL   INJURIES. 

of  the  wife's  domestic  services  is  not  affected  by  a  statute  en- 
larging the  property  and  contractual  rights  of  married  women.- 
The  damages  recoverable  in  such  cases  are  based  on  the  value  of 
the  wife's  services  rendered  by  reason  of  the  marriage  relation.* 
And  this  includes  the  value  of  the  services  which  a  wife  cus- 
tomarily renders  in  caring  for  and  training  their  children.4  The 
services  of  a  wife  for  the  loss  of  which  a  husband  may  recover 
are  not,  however,  merely  limited  to  those  which  a  servant  might 
perform.5  And  evidence  of  pecuniary  loss  due  to  the  husband 
being  deprived  of  the  services  of  his  wife  is  not  necessary  in 
order  to  authorize  a  recovery  by  him  for  such  loss.6  Again, 
evidence  of  disturbed  marital  relations  between  the  plaintiff  and 
his  wife  at  particular  times  is  not  admissible.7  Nor  is  the  defend- 
ant entitled  to  an  instruction  that  in  estimating  the  amount  of 
damages  the  necessary  expenses  of  maintaining  the  wife  should 
be  deducted  from  the  value  of  her  services.8 


Hawkins  v.  Front  St.  Cable  Ry.  Co., 
3  Wash.  592;  Selleck  v.  City  of  Janes- 
ville,  100  Wis.  157:  80  N.  W.  944; 
Hunt  v.  Town  of  Winfield,  36  Wis. 
154;  27  Am.  Rep.  482;  Hodsoll  v. 
Stallebrass,  11  A.  &  E.  301.  In  a  case 
in  Connecticut,  however,  where  a 
statute  provided  that  if  any  person 
received  any  bodily  injury  by  reason 
of  a  defective  road  or  bridge,  the 
town  should  pay  to  the  person  so 
hurt  or  wounded  just  damages  and 
that  if  any  property  should  receive 
any  injury  or  damage,  just  damages 
should  be  paid  by  the  town  to  the 
owner  thereof,  it  was  held  that  the 
substitution  in  a  subsequent  statute 
of  the  words  "  injured  in  person  or 
property  "  for  such  provisions  did 
not  authorize  a  recovery  by  the 
husband  of  damages  for  the  loss  of 
his  wife's  services  and  society  due  to 
injuries  received  from  a  defective 
crosswalk.  Lounsbury  v.  Bridge- 
port, 66  Conn.  360:  34  Atl.  93;  Conn. 
Gen.  Stat.  sec.  2673.  See  Starbird  v. 
374 


Frankfort,  35  Me.  89;  Harwood  v. 
Lowell,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  310. 

2Cullar  v.  Mo.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  84 
Mo.  App.  347. 

3  Redfield  v.  Oakland  Consol.  St. 
R.  Co.,  112  Cal.  220;  43  Pac.  1117: 
Riley  v.  Lidtke,  49  Neb.  139;  68  N. 
W.  356;  Henry  v.  Klopfer,  1  Pa. 
Adv.  R.  80;  23  Atl.  337;  29  W.  N.  C. 
331;  22  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  385;  Selleck 
v.  City  of  Janesville,  100  Wis.  157; 
80  N.  W.  944. 

*  Redfield  v.  Oakland  Consol.  St. 
R.  Co.,  112  Cal.  220;  43  Pac.  1117. 

6 Selleck  v.  City  of  Janesville,  100 
Wis.  157;  80  N.  W.  944.  See  also 
Furnish  v.  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.,  102  Mo. 
119. 

6 Kelly  v.  Mayberry  Twp.,  154  Pa. 
St.  440;  26  Atl.  595;  32  W.  N.  C.224. 

7 Sullivan  v.  Lowell  &  D.  St.  R.  Co., 
162  Mass.  536;  39  N.  E.  185. 

8  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Belt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  59  S.  W. 
607. 


HUSBAM'    AND    WIFE — PHYSICAL    IN.HKIKS.    §§  317,  318 

§  317.  Husband  cannot  recover  for  wife's  suffering. — In 

an  action  by  a  husband  for  injuries  sustained  by  his  wife  there 
can  be  no  recovery  by  him  for  suffering-  which  she  has  endured.9 

§  318.  Loss  of  time—  Harried  woman. — The  rights  of  a  mar- 
ried woman  as  defined  under  the  common  law  have  been  so  ex- 
tended and  broadened  by  statute  that  it  is  impossible  to  state  any 
general  rule  applicable  in  all  cases  and  in  the  different  states  as 
to  her  right  to  recover  damages  for  Loss  of  time.  In  the  absence, 
however,  of  any  statute  making  her  earnings  her  separate  estate 
and  giving  her  the  right  to  recover  therefor,  it  may  be  stated 
that  a  husband  is  entitled  to  the  services  of  his  wife  and  to  re- 
cover damages  for  any  injury  depriving  him  thereof,  and  if  the 
wife  sustains  a  physical  injury  she  cannot  recover  for  loss  of 
time  unless  the  presumptive  right  of  the  husband  to  recover 
therefor  is  rebutted.10  So  where  she  is  a  mere  housewife,  her 
only  occupation  being  that  of  keeping  house  for  her  husband 
and  family,  she  cannot  recover  for  loss  of  time  as  a  result  of  a 


9  Met.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson.  90  Ga. 
500;  Cullar  v.  Mo.  K.  &  T.  Ky.  Co., 
81  Mo.  App.  347:  Howells  v.  North 
Amer.  Transp.  &  Trad.  Co.,  24  Wash. 
G89;  64  Pac.  786. 

io  Fuller  v.  Naugatuck  R.  Co.,  21 
Conn.  557;  Ohio,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Cosby,  107  Ind.  32;  Nichols  v.  Du- 
buque, etc.,  R.  Co.,  68  Iowa,  732; 
Thomas  v.  Brooklyn,  58  Iowa,  438; 
Fleming  v.  Shenandoah,  67  Iowa, 
508;  Union  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Stone,  54 
Kan.  83;  37  Pac.  1012;  47  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  90;  Atchisou,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  McGinnis,  46  Kan.  109;  <  ity 
of  Holton  v.  Hicks  (Kan.  App.  1899), 
58  Pac.  998;  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kemp,  01  Md.  74;  Jordan  v. 
Middlesex  R.  R.  Co.,  138  Mass.  425: 
Plummer  v.  Milan,  70  Mo.  App.  598; 
Klein  v.  Jewetf,  26  X.  J.  Eq.  474; 
Blaechinska  v.  Howard  Mission,  130 
N.  Y.  497;  15  L.  R.  A.  215;  42  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  378;  29  N.  E.  755;  45  Alb.  L. 
J.  255,  rev'g  56  Hun,  322;  31  N.  Y. 


St.  R.  159:  9N.  Y.  Supp.  679:  Uransky 
v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &   B.  R.  R.  Co., 

118  N.  Y.  304:  28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  711; 
23  N.  E.  451,  rev'g  44  Dun,  119;  7 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  395;  Filer  v.  New  York 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  47;  10 
Am.  Rep.  327;  Thuringer  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  526:  55  N.  Y.  St.  R.  87;  24 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1087 ;  Becker  v.  Janinski, 
27  A  hi..  V  Cas.  45;  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
675;  Minick  v.  Troy,  19  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
253;  'lark  v.  Dillon,  6  Daly  (X.  Y. ), 
526:  Atlantic  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Iron- 
monger, 95  Va.  625:  29  S.  E.  819; 
Richmond  R.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Bowles, 
92  Va.  738;  24  S.  E.  388:  2  Ya.  L, 
Beg.  14;  Barnes  v.  Martin,  15  Wis. 
240.  But  see  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  90  Ga.  500;  16  S.  E.  49, 
where  it  is  held  that  the  impairment 
of  a  married  woman's  capacity  to 
labor  is  to  be  classified  with  pain  and 
suffering  and  may  be  recovered  by 
the  wife  herself. 

375 


§  818  HUSBAND    AND    WIFE— PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 

physical  injury.11  And  it  is  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  she 
may  recover  damages  for  inability  to  perform  the  ordinary  avo- 
cations of  life,  as  the  husband  only  can  recover  such  damages.13 
And  where  a  woman  had  lived  apart,  from  her  husband  fora  period 
of  twelve  years,  working  out  her  own  support  and  maintenance, 
it  was  held  that  there  could  be  no  recovery  by  her  for  loss  of 
time  applied  to  household  duties,  there  being  no  proof  of  her 
husband's  death,  or  that  she  had  not  received  assistance  from 
him  or  heard  from  him  during  such  period,  or  any  evidence  show- 
ing a  dissolution  of  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  or  of 
any  agreement  by  which  she  was  entitled  to  her  earnings  sepa- 
rate and  independent  of  any  claim  by  him.13  Nor  will  her  dam- 
ages include  anything  for  loss  of  earnings  where  such  earnings 
consisted  of  compensation,  received  by  her  from  her  husband 
for  work  done  by  her  for  him  under  contract.14  But  it  is  held 
in  another  case  in  New  York  to  be  otherwise  where  she  labors 
for  another,15  as  is  also  the  case  where  she  is  engaged  in  a  sepa- 
rate business  alone  and  apart  from  her  husband.16  So  under 
the  Wisconsin  statute,17  which  provides  that  the  earnings  of  a 
married  woman  shall  be  her  separate  property  except  where  they 
are  the  result  of  labor  performed  for  her  husband,  and  which 
gives  to  her  all  the  rights  of  an  unmarried  woman  in  regard  to 
her  separate  property,  where  she  conducts  business  in  her  own 
name  separate  from  and  independent  of  her  husband's  business, 
she  may  recover  damages  in  her  own  name  for  loss  of  time.18 


11  Fleming  v.  Shenandoah,  67  Iowa, 
508;  Union  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Stone,  54 
Kan.  83;  37  Pac.  1012;  47  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  90;  City  of  Holten 
v.  Hicks  (Kan.  App.  1899),  58  Pac.  998. 

w  Wallis  v.  City  of  Westport,  82 
Mo.  App.  522. 

13  Thurinser  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  526;  55 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  87;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1087. 

14  Blaechinska  v.  Howard  Mission, 
130  N.  Y.  497;  15  L.  R.  A.  215;  42 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  378;  29  N.  E.  755;  45 
Alb.  L.  J.  255,  rev'g  56  Hun,  322;  31 
N.  Y.  St.   R.  159;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  679. 

15  Brooks  v.  Schwerin,  54  N.  Y. 
343. 

376 


16  Nichols  v.  Dubuque,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  68  Iowa,  732;  Thomas  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 58  Iowa,  438;  Filer  v.  New  York 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  47;  At- 
lantic &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironmonger,  95 
Va.  625;  29  S.  E.  319;  Fife  v.  Oshkosh, 
89  Wis.  540;  62  N.  W.  541. 

17  Wis.  Rev.  St.  sees.  2343,  2345. 

18  Fife  v.  Oshkosh,  89  Wis.  540;  62 
N.  W.  541.  So  under  the  Illinois 
statute  which  provides  that  a  woman 
is  entitled  to  her  own  earnings,  it  is 
held  that  she  may  recover  for  loss  of 
time.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Carr,  67  111.  App.  530.  And  in  Missouri 
under  a  similar  statute  a  woman  may 
recover  for  loss  of  wages.     Smith  v. 


HUSBAND    AND    \V[FE — PHYSICAL    IN.MRIES.  §   319 

And  in  Massachusetts  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  married 
woman  is  authorized  by  statute  to  make  contracts  on  her  own  ac- 
count and  is  entitled  to  her  own  earnings,  she  may  recover  for 
impairment  of  her  earning  capacity.19  Since,  presumptively, 
damages  for  the  impairment  of  the  earning  capacity  of  a  married 
woman  belong  to  her  husband,  if  she  seeks  to  recover  such 
damages,  there  must  be  alleged  in  her  complaint  some  reason 
which  entitles  her  to  the  fruits  of  her  own  labor,30  and  in  the 
absence  of  such  allegations  evidence  that  she  was  carrying  on 
a  separate  business  and  that  the  proiits  thereof  belonged  to  her 
is  inadmissible.21 

§  319.  Same  subject  continued. — In  many  of  the  states 
statutes  have  been  passed  which  provide  that  the  earnings  of  a 
wife  shall  be  her  separate  property.22  And  where  such  statutes 
are  in  existence  the  husband's  recovery  for  loss  of  services  could 
not  include  damages  for  loss  of  earnings  which  she  had  sus- 
tained. So  under  a  Nebraska  statute a  which  so  provided,  it 
was  decided  that  the  husband  could  not  recover  for  losses  due  to 
the  wife's  failure  to  perform  laundry  work  and  sewing  for  others, 
though  she  wras  accustomed  to  contribute  such  earnings  to  the 
support  of  the  family.24  But  in  New  York  '*  it  is  held  that  where 
the  evidence  did  not  show  that  the  earnings  of  the  wife  were 
kept  apart  by  her  as  her  separate  estate  and  she  and  her  hus- 
band were  living  together,  it  would  be  presumed  that  her  earn- 
ings were  used  as  part  of  the  family  resources  and  a  refusal  to 
instruct  that  her  husband  had  no  absolute  legal  claim  to  such 
earnings  was  proper.     In  another  case  in  the  same  state  a  where 


Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.   246;  23 
S.  W.  784. 

19  Harmon  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co., 
1G5  Mass.  100;  40  N.  E.  505;  30  L. 
R.  A.  658;  42  Cent.  L.  J.  247;  2  Va. 
Law  Re<j.  9. 

20  Uransky  v.  Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B. 
R.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  304;  28  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  711;  23  N.  E.  451,  rev'g  44 
Hun,  119;  7  N.  Y.  St.  R.  395;  Atlan- 
tic &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironmonger,  95 
Va.  625;  29  S.  E.  319. 


21  Woolsey  v.  Ellenville,  39  N.  V. 
Sr.  744. 

22  See  sec.  31S  herein. 

23 Neb.  Comp.  Stat.  chap.  53,  sec.  4. 

a* Riley  v.  Lidtke,  49  Neb.  13'.*:  88 
N.  W.  356. 

2i  Brown  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  19 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  504;  43  >\  Y.  Supp. 
1094,  aff'g  18  Misc.  584;  42  X.  V. 
Supp.  700. 

26  London  v.  Cunningham.  1  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  408;  49  N.  Y.  St.  K.  447;  20 
N.  Yr.  Supp.  882. 

377 


§  320  HUSBAND    AND    WIFE— PHYSICAL   INJURIES. 

the  husband  was  engaged  in  the  restaurant  business,  it  was  de- 
cided that  he  could  not  recover  for  a  loss  of  his  wife's  services  in 
such  business  since  a  wife  can  herself  recover  for  loss  of  earn- 
ing power.27  And  where  the  husband  has  released  to  his  wife  all 
claim  to  her  services  as  provided  by  a  statute,28  and  such  release 
has  been  filed,  the  wife  may  recover  what  the  husband  might 
have  recovered  in  his  own  name  for  the  loss  of  her  services  in- 
cluding her  domestic  services  and  also  loss  of  earnings  outside 
of  her  domestic  services.29  Though  it  may  be  stated  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  that  the  services  of  a  married  woman  belong  to  her 
husband  and  that  he  alone  can  recover  for  the  loss  thereof,  yet 
for  such  loss  as  is  personal  to  herself  she  may  recover.30  And 
her  right  to  recover  for  loss  of  capacity  to  labor  or  earn  money 
will  not  be  denied  because  there  is  no  evidence  showing  such 
capacity  at  and  just  before  the  time  of  her  being  injured,  where 
the  evidence  shows  that  she  had  been  in  business  for  a  long 
time  prior  thereto,  such  business  being  discontinued  at  the 
time  of  the  injury  because  of  temporary  illness.31  But  a  statute 
giving  to  a  married  woman  the  control  of  her  time  and  actions 
does  not  take  away  from  her  husband  the  right  of  action  for 
loss  of  consortium  due  to  the  negligence  of  another.3'  And 
under  an  allegation  of  injury  to  the  wife's  spine  whereby  the 
husband  has  lost  her  services  and  society,  it  is  held  that  evidence 
is  admissible  showing  that  as  a  result  of  such  injury  the  husband 
is  prevented  from  having  intercourse  with  his  wife  where  it  is 
shown  that  this  is  the  natural  and  proximate  result  of  the  in- 
jury.33 

§  320.  Wife's  right  to  recover  not  precluded  by  husband's 
right. — Where  the  right  is  conferred  by  statute  upon  a  married 
woman  to  recover  damages  for  a  personal  injury,  and  she  is  also 


27  But    see  Citizens   St.   R.   Co.   v. 
Tiviname,    121   Ind.   375.    See  sec. 
herein  as  to  wife's  recovery  for  loss 
of  earnings. 

28  Pa.  Act,  June  11,  1879. 

29  Kelley  v.  Mayberry  Twp.,  154 
Pa.  St.  440;  26  Atl.  595;  32  W.  N. 
C.  224. 

30Minick  v.  Troy,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
253,  aff'd  83  N.  Y.  514.  Civ.  App.),  54  S.  W.  606. 

378 


31  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Humble, 
181  U.  S.57;  45  L.  Ed.  747;  21  S.  Ct. 
526,  aff'g  97  Fed.  837;  38  C.  C.  A. 
502. 

32  Kelley  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &■  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  308;  46  N.  E. 
1063;  38  L.  R.  A.  631;  2  Cbic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  326. 

33 City   of  Dallas   v.    Jones    (Tex. 


HUSBAND    AM)    win-:      PHYSICAL    [NJURIES.      §321,322 

entitled  to  recover  under  such  ;t  statute  for  any  impairment  of 
her  capacity  to  labor,  the  fact  that  her  husband  may  recover  for 
loss  of  her  services  will  not  preclude  her  right  to  recover  for 
loss  of  capacity  to  earn  for  herself." 

§  321.  Sale  of  laudanum  to  married  woman  -Recovery  by 
husband  for  loss  of  services — Case.  Where  a  person  sells 
Laudanum  as  a  beverage  to  a  married  woman  with  knowledge  of 

the  fact  that  her  mind  and  body  are  being  destroyed  thereby 
and  that  its  use  Ls  causing  a  loss  to  her  husband  who  has  re- 
peatedly warned  such  person  and  protested  against  the  sale 
thereof,  the  latter  will  be  responsible  to  the  husband  for  such 
damages  as  he  sustains  by  reason  of  the  loss  of  her  services.33 

§  322.  Injury  to  wife — Expenses  for  medical  treatment 

recoverable  by  husband. — Moneys  expended  by  a  husband  or 
for  the  expenditure  of  which  liability  has  been  incurred  by  him, 
where  rendered  necessary  as  a  result  of  an  injury  to  his  wife 
for  medical  treatment  or  nursing,  are  recoverable  by  him  in  an 
action  against  the  person  responsible  for  the  injury.86  But  it  is 
held  that  such  expenses  cannot  be  recovered  in  an  action  by  the 
husband  and  wife  for  injuries  sustained  by  her  since  the  right 
of  action  therefor  is  in  the  husband  alone.5'  And  where  in  an 
action  by  a  wife  she  alleged  in  the  complaint  that  she  had  been 


»4  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heimble, 
181  U.  S.  57;  45  L.  Ed.  747;  21  S. 
Ct.  526,  aff'g  07  Fed.  8:17:  38  C.  C. 
A.  502  (under  Sand  &  H.  Dig.  Ark. 
Bee.  5641). 

36  Hoi le man  v.  Harward,  119  X. 
C.  1")();  25  S.  E.  072;  34  L.  K.  A. 
803;  2  Cine.  L.  J.  Wkly.  20. 

36  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  21 
Colo.  340;  40  Pac  801;  Denver 
Consol.  Tramway  Co.  v.  Riley  (Colo. 
App. ),  59  Pac.  476;  Tompkins  v. 
West,  56  Conn.  178;  Washington  & 
G.  R.  Co.  v.  Hickey,  li'  App.  D.  C. 
260;  26  Wash.  L.  Rep.  208;  Tut  tic  v. 
Chic.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa, 
518;  Eden  v.  Lexington,  etc..  P.  P. 
Co.,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  204;  Northern 
Cent.   Ry.   Co.    v.   Mills,  61   Md.  355; 


McDevitt  v.  St.  Paul,  66  Minn.  14; 
68  X.  W.  178;  33  L.  R.  A.  601:  Blair 
v.  Chic.,  etc..  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  .°,34; 
Hopkins  v.  Atlantic,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 
36  X.  II.  0;  Robinson  v.  Met.  St.  Ry. 
('....  34  Misc.  R.  (N.  Y. )  70:»:  69  \. 
Y.  Sup]..  891;  Filer  v.  New  York 
Cent.  P.  R.  Co.,  -10  \.  V.  47;  Henry 
v.  Klopfer.  147  Pa.  St.  178;  23  At  1. 
337;  20  W.  N.  C.  331;  22  Pitts.  L. 
.1.  N.  8.  3s.-):  Lindsey  v.  Danville,  If. 
Vt.  144:  Hawkins  v.  Front  St.  Cable 
Ry.  Co.,  :'.  Wash.  592 ;  Kavanangh  v. 
Janesville.  24  Wis.  618. 

37  Smith  v.  Thompson,  1  Penn. 
(Del.)  140;  30  Atl.  1100;  Friedman 
v.  M.Cowan,  1  Penn.  (Del.)  436;  42 
Atl.  723. 

379 


§§  323,324    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE       PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 

permanently  injured  so  as  to  be  unable  to  labor  and  had  ex- 
pended large  sums  of  money,  not  stating  the  amount,  in  attempt- 
ing to  effect  a  cure,  it  was  decided  that  such  statements  were 
in  aggravation  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  severity  of  the  in- 
juries and  that  the  husband  was  not  thereby  precluded  from  re- 
covering for  loss  of  her  services  and  society  and  for  money 
expended  by  him  in  her  care  and  treatment.^ 

§  323.  Recovery  for  services  of  husband  in  nursing  injured 
wife.^— If  a  husband  devotes  his  time  to  nursing  and  caring  for 
his  injured  wife  or  in  doing  her  work,  he  may  recover  for  his 
services  so  rendered  from  the  persons  causing  such  injury.*1 
The  amount  recoverable  by  him,  however,  is  not  the  salary  which 
he  may  have  lost  or  the  wages  which  he  might  have  earned  in 
working  at  his  business  or  trade,  but  is  determined  by  the  value 
of  his  services  in  such  capacities.40  In  other  cases,  however, 
it  is  held  that  the  amount  which  a  husband  may  recover  for 
his  services  in  nursing  and  attending  an  injured  wife  is  limited 
to  the  sum  for  which  he  could  have  hired  other  reasonably  com- 
petent persons  in  such  capacity.41 

§  324.  Recovery  for  services  of  daughter  as  nurse. — A 

husband  suing  to  recover  for  injuries  to  his  wife  is  entitled  to 
an  allowance  for  the  services  of  a  daughter  as  nurse  to  her,  but 
he  is  not  entitled  to  recover  therefor  the  specific  amount  which 
she  was  earning  in  another  capacity  simply  because  her  mother 
desired  or  required  her  services.42 


88  Denver  Consul.   Tramway  Co.  v. 
Riley  (Colo.  App. ),  59  Pac.  476. 

39  Hazard  Powder  Co.  v.  Voider 
(C.  C.  App.  8th  A.),  7  C.  C.  A.  130; 
58  Fed.  152;  Salida  v.  McKinna,  16 
Colo.  523;  27  Pac.  810;  Union  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  21  Colo.  340;  40  Pac. 
891;  Smith  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  55 
Mo.  456;  Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Kennedy,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  654; 
35  S.  W.  335;  Lindsey  v.  Danville. 
46  Vt.  144;  Selleck  v.  City  of  Janes- 
ville,  104  Wis.  570;  80  N.  W.  944;  47 
L.  R.  A.  691. 
380 


40  Hazard  Powder  Co.  v.  Volger 
(C.  C.  App.  8th  A.),  7  C.  C.  A.  130; 
58  Fed.  152;  Salida  v.  McKinna,  16 
Colo.  523;  27  Pac.  810.  But  see 
Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Smith,  79 
Tex.  478;  14  S.  W.  993. 

41  Howells  v.  North  Anier.  Transp. 
&  Trad.  Co.,  24  Wash  689;  64  Pac. 
786;  Selleck  v.  City  of  Janesville, 
104  Wis.  570;  80  N.  W.  944;  47  L.  R. 
A.  691. 

42  Dormer  v.  Alcatraz  Pav.  Co.,  16 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  407. 


HUSBANM    AND    WIFE — PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


:  325 


§  325.  Expenses— Recovery  of  by  married  woman.  —A  wife 
is  entitled  to  support  from  her  husband,  and  it  may  be  stated  as 
a  general  rule  that  where  living  with  her  husband  she  cannot, 
in  an  action  for  personal  injuries  suffered  by  her,  recover  ex- 
penses for  medical  treatment  or  other  expenses  incurred  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  injury,  since  the  husband  being  liable  for  her  support 
and  therefore  for  her  expenses  is  entitled  to  recover  therefor.4' 
If,  however,  it  appears  that  she  has  paid  such  bills  out  of  her 
separate  estate  or  become  liable  therefor,  then  she  may  recover 
the  same."  Thus  it  is  decided  that  a  married  woman  may  re- 
cover the  expenses  of  her  sickness  as  the  result  of  an  injury, 
though  she  had  not  paid  the  bill  therefor,  where  it  appeared  that 
such  expenses  were  incurred  by  and  charged  to  her.15  In  a  case 
in  Virginia,  however,  it  is  held  that  a  married  woman  cannot 
recover  the  expenses  of  her  cure  unless  it  is  averred  and  proved 
that  she  paid  such  expenses  out  of  her  separate  estate.46  Where 
a  married  woman  has  not  lived  with  her  husband  for  several 
years,  during  which  time  she  has  supported  herself,  her  medical 
expenses  may  be  recovered.17  So  in  Illinois  it  is  held  that  a 
married  woman  may  recover  the  expense  of  her  cure,  since  un- 


48  Tompkins  v.  West,  56  Conn.  478; 
16  Atl.  237;  Lewis  v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga. 
756;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cosby. 
107  Ind.  32;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  McGinnis,  46  Kan.  109;  26 
Pac.  453:  Jordan  v.  Middlesex  R.  R. 
Co.,  138  Mass.  425;  Rogers  v.  Orion, 
116  Mich.  324:  74  N.  \V.  463;  4  Det 
L.  N.  1086;  State  v.  Detroit,  113 
Mich.  643;  72  X.  W.  8;  4  Det.  L.  N. 
431;  Belyea  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  & 
S.  S.  M.  R.  Co.,  61  Minn.  224:  63  NT. 
W.  627;  Klein  v.  Jowett,  26  N.  J. 
Kq.  474;  Moody  v.  Osgood.  50  Barb. 
(N.  Y. )  628;  Burnham  v.  Webster, 
.-)4  X.  Y.   Super.   30;  Met.    Adams   & 

B.  R.  R.    Co.   v.  Wysong,  8  Ohio   C. 

C.  211;  Atlantic  &  I).  R.  Co.  v.  Iron- 
monger, 95  Va.  620;  20  S.  E.  319; 
Richmond  R.  &  E.  Co.  v.  Bowles,  02 
Va.  738;  24  S.  E.  388;  2  Va.  Law 
Reg.  14. 

44  Lewis   v.    Atlanta,    77     Ga.  756; 


Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cosby,  107  Ind. 
32;  Shelby  v.  Castetter,  7  Ind.  App. 
318;  Jordan  v.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co., 
138  Mass.  425;  Lacas  v.  Detroit  City 
R.  Co.  ( Mich. ).  52  X.  W.  745  ;  McLean 
v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  81  Mo.  App. 
72:  Klein  v.  Jewett,  26  X.  J.  Eq. 
474;  Moody  v.  Osgood.  50  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)628;  Burnham  v.  Wester.  54 
N\  Y.  Super.  30;  Chacey  v.  Fargo,  ."> 
X.  D.  173:  64  X.  W.  932;  Atlantic 
&  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironmonger.  95  V a. 
625;  20  S.  E.  310. 

45  Lacas  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co. 
(Mich.),  52  X.  W.  745;  Chaccy  v. 
Fargo,  5  N.  D.  173;  64  X.  W. 
932. 

46  Atlantic  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Iron- 
monger, 95  Va.  625:  29  S.  E.  310. 

47  Lammiman  v.  Detroit  Citizens 
St.  R.  Co..  112  Mich.  602;  71  X.  W. 
153;  4  Det.  L.  X.  134. 

381 


§  326 


HUSBAND    AND    WIFE — PHYSICAL    INJURIES. 


der  the  statute  of  that  state  she  is  personally  liable  therefor.48 
And  in  Indiana  a  married  woman  may  recover  such  expenses 
though  her  husband  is  liable  for  the  same.49  But  expenses  for 
domestic  service  during  the  disability  of  a  married  woman  as  a 
result  of  an  injury  cannot,  it  is  held,  be  recovered  by  her.'*  Ex- 
penses for  such  service  would,  however,  probably  be  controlled 
by  the  same  principles  as  control  in  the  case  of  the  allowance 
of  medical  expenses. 


§  326.  Pain  and  suffering— Married  woman. — In  an  action 
by  a  married  woman  to  recover  damages  for  physical  injuries 
sustained  by  her,  recovery  may  be  had  for  such  pain  and  suffer- 
ing as  are  the  direct  result  of  the  injury.51  And  in  an  action 
by  the  husband  and  wife  jointly  to  recover  for  injuries  sustained 
by  her,  the  measure  of  damages  is  such  sum  as  will  compensate 
them  for  her  injuries,  and  they  may  recover  for  her  pain  and 
suffering,  past  and  prospective.02 


*s  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr, 
67  111.  App.  530,  aff'd  170  111.  478; 
48  N.  E.  992. 

*9  Columbus  v.  Strassner,  138  Ind. 
301;  34  N.  E.  5. 

«>Frolisv.  Dubuque  (Iowa,  1899), 
80  N.  W.  341. 

si  Green  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  36  Fed. 
66;  Tompkins  v.  West,  56  Conn.  478; 
Friedman     v.     McGowan,     1    Penn. 

382 


(Del.)  436;  42  Atl.  7^3;  Metropolitan 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  90  Ga.  500; 
Ohio  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cosby,  107 
Ind.  32;  Klein  v.  Jewett,26N.  J.  Eq. 
474. 

52  Friedman  v.  McGowan,  1  Penn. 
(Del.)  436;  42  Atl.  723,  which  was 
an  action  to  recover  for  injuries  sus- 
tained by  the  wife  from  a  bite  of  a 
dog. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGEBS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 


§  327.  Actions  by  passengers  may  be 
in  contract  or  tort. 

328.  Physical  injuries — Passengers 

— Generally. 

329.  Permanent   physical   injuries 

— Passengers — Cases. 

330.  Passenger    injured   alighting 

from  car. 

331.  Passenger   injured — Lex   loci 

contractus — Statutory  limi- 
tation as  to  recovery. 

332.  Exemplary  damages. 

333.  Exemplary  damages — As- 

saults on  passengers. 

334.  Exemplary  damages— Failure 

or  refusal  to  transport  pas- 
senger. 

335.  Same  subject  continued. 

336.  Penalty    statute— Failure    to 

transport  and  discharge  pas- 
sengers at  destination — 
"  Legal  or  just  excuse." 

337.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train. 

338.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train 

— Contiuued. 

339.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train 

— Concluded. 

340.  Exemplary      damages — Ejec- 

tion of  passenger. 

341.  Exemplary     damages  —  Ejec- 

tion of  passenger — Unneces- 
sary force  or  violence. 

342.  Exemplary     damages  —  Ejec- 

tion of  passenger — When 
not  recoverable. 

343.  Exemplary     damages  —  Ejec- 

tion of  passenger— Cases. 

344.  Passenger  left  at  wrong  sta- 

tion. 


?,}.">.   Duty  to  minimize   damages — 
Ejection  of  passenger. 

346.  Passenger  carried  beyond  des- 

tination. 

347.  Passenger  carried  beyond  des- 

tination— Continued. 

348.  Exemplary  damages— Passen- 

ger carried  beyond  destina- 
tion. 

349.  Passenger — Illness  due  to  ex- 

posure— Walking   to   desti- 
nation. 

350.  Same  subject — Conclusion. 

351.  Passenger — Injury   to   health 

by  exposure. 
35'-'.  Fright  in  connection  with  phy- 
sical   injury— Expulsion  of 
passenger. 

353.  Mental    suffering,    etc. — Pas- 

senger carried  beyond  des- 
tination. 

354.  Mental     suffering — Injury  to 

feelings,  etc.  —  Ejection   of 
•  passenger. 

355.  Mental  suffering — Passengers 

— Cases  generally. 

356.  Failure     to    give     passenger 

proper  accommodations. 

357.  Injury  or  insult  by  third  per- 

sons to  passenger. 

358.  Wrongful    charge     of   fare- 

Taking  up  tickets,  etc. 

359.  Stipulations    exempting   car- 

rier from  liability. 

360.  Statutory  exemption  from  lia- 

bility—  Passengers     riding 
on  platforms  of  cars. 


383 


§  327  ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 

§  327.  Actions  by  passengers  may  be  in  contract  or  tort — 

The  duties,  obligations  and  responsibilities  which  a  carrier  owes 
to  its  passengers  do  not  arise  merely  out  of  contract  but  are  im- 
posed also  by  law.  While  a  carrier  may  by  contract  limit  to  a 
certain  degree  the  extent  of  his  obligation,  yet  the  law  will  not 
permit  him  by  contract  to  release  himself  from  all  obligations 
or  to  seriously  impair  or  affect  those  which  are  imposed  upon 
him.  So  while  to  a  certain  extent,  it  may  be  said  that  the  re- 
lation between  the  carrier  and  passenger  is  a  contract  relation, 
yet  the  contract  is  one  which  the  law  imposes  upon  the  carrier 
the  duty  to  make,  and  it  necessarily  follows  that  where  a  car- 
rier incurs  any  liability  for  a  breach  of  any  of  its  obligations 
towards  its  passengers,  the  action  may  either  be  in  contract  or 
for  a  tort.1  So  where  a  passenger  is  wrongfully  ejected  from  a 
train  he  may  recover  damages  as  for  a  tort  though  the  relation 
of  the  parties  be  in  the  nature  of  a  contract.2  Again,  where  a 
passenger  owing  to  the  fault  of  tlie  station  agent  was  induced 
to  board  a  train  which  did  not  stop  at  the  station  where  he 
wished  to  alight,  it  was  held  that  his  recovery  for  his  ejection 
before  he  reached  his  destination  was  not  merely  for  breach  of 
the  contract  but  for  the  tort.3  And  in  most  of  the  cases  the 
action  is  generally  in  tort  in  which  form  of  action  the  damages 
are  not  limited  as  they  would  be  were  the  action  purely  upon 
the  contract.  So  where  a  passenger  was  wrongfully  and  vio- 
lently expelled  from  a  train,  it  was  held  that  though  the  decla- 
ration allege  a  contract  for  carriage,  the  action  was  not  for  a 
breach  of  the  contract  but  in  the  nature  of  a  tort  for  breach 
of  the  duty  the  carrier  owed*  to  the  passenger  and  that  punitive 
damages  were  recoverable.4  But  where  the  complaint  alleged 
an  agreement  to  carry  plaintiff  and  others  by  a  special  train  to 
a  certain  destination  and  back  on  a  certain  day  and  that  the 
defendant  wilfully,  fraudulently  and  negligently  failed  and  re- 
fused to  carry  them  back  from  their  destination,  whereby  plain- 
tiff was  injured  in  health  and  business  and  suffered  pain  and 
anxiety  of  mind,  it  was  decided  that  the  action  was  upon  special 

3  Reynolds  v.  Railway  Co.,  13  Ohio 
C.  C.  39. 


i  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hine, 
121  Ala.  234;  14  Am.  &  Eug.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  382;  25  So.  857. 

*Book  v.  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  75 
M<>.  App.  604;  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  423. 
384 


4  Head   v.    Georgia   Pac.    Ry.  Co., 
79  Ga.  358;  7  S.  E.  217. 


ACTIONS    l;v    PASSENGERS. 


5  328 


contract  and  not  in  tort  and  that  the  plaintiff's  recovery  was 
limited  to  such  damages  as  naturally  resulted  from  the  breach 

of  the  contract  and  that  he  could  not  recover  for  pain  and 
anxiety  of  mind/' 

§328.  Physical    injuries  —  Passengers — Generally. — The 

various  elements  which  are  to  be  considered  in  the  estimation 
of  the  damages  recoverable  by  a  passenger  in  an  action  for  phy- 
sical injuries  are  similar  to  those  which  enter  into  the  determina- 
tion of  the  amount  recoverable  in  other  actions  for  physical 
injuries  due  to  the  negligence  of  another.  So  where  a  passenger 
is  entitled  to. recover,  the  jury  in  estimating  the  damages  may 
consider  all  the  damages  which  he  has  sustained  from  the  date 
of  the  injury  up  to  the  time  of  the  trial  and  those  which  he  will 
sustain  in  the  future  as  a  result  of  the  injury,  the  various  ele- 
ments to  be  considered  being  physical  and  mental  suffering,8  ex- 
penses actually  paid  or  incurred,7  loss  of  time  and  earnings,8 
diminution  of  ability  to  labor,9  and  any  permanent  disability  as  a 
result  of  the  injury.11'  As  a  general  rule  only  such  damages  can 
be  recovered  by  a  passenger  in  this  class  of  cases  as  will  com- 
pensate him  for  the  injury  which  he  has  sustained.11    Exemplary 


6  Walsh  v.  Chic,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  42 
Wis.  23;  24  Am.  Rep.  376.  See  also 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Cloud  (Colo. 
A  H>.),  40  Pac.  779. 

6  See  sees.  215  et  seq.,  herein. 

7 See  sees.  250  et  seq.,  herein. 

8  See  sees.  226  et  seq.,  herein. 

9  See  sees.  226  et  seq.,  herein. 

10  See  sees.  242  et  seq.,  herein.  These 
various  elements  as  affecting  the 
measure  of  damages  have  already 
liiM'ii  fully  considered  in  the  sections 
above  referred  to,  but  see  also  the 
following  cases  of  actions  by  passen- 
gers where  they  have  been  consid- 
ered :  Wade  v.  Leroy,  20  How.  (N.  S. ) 
34;  Atlanta  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bates, 
103  Ga.  333;  30  S.  E.  41;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  128;  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Iud.  400;  1  West. 
868;  2  West.  686;  Donaldson  v.  Mis- 

25 


sissippi,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Iowa,  280; 
Chic.  It.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Posten, 
59  Kan.  449;  53  Pac.  465;  11  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  138;  Black  v. 
Carrol  ton  R.  Co.,  10  La.  Ann.  33; 
Memphis,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitfield, 
14  Miss.  466;  Holyoke  v.  Grand  Trunk 
R.  R,  Co.,  48  X.  H.  541;  Orsor  v. 
Metropolitan  Crosstown  R.  Co.,  78 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  169;  60  X.  Y.  St.  II.  193; 
28  X.  Y.  Supp.  966;  Sevarthout  v. 
Xew  Jersey,  etc.,  Co.,  46  Barb.  (X. 
Y.)  222;  Filer  v.  \e\v  York,  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  46  X.  Y.  42;  Lincoln  v.  Saratoga 
&  Schenectady  R.  II.  Co.,  23  Wend. 
425;  Walker  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  83  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  260;  Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.Cooper  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  20  S. 
W.  990. 

"Fremont   E.    &    M.  V.    H.  Co.  v. 
French,  48  Xeb.  038;  67  X.  W.  472; 
385 


§§  329,  330 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 


damages  will  not  be  awarded  in  the  absence  of  gross  negligence 
or  wanton  recklesness.12 

§  329.  Permanent  physical  injuries— Passengers— Cases. 

— Where  as  a  result  of  an  injury  to  a  passenger  he  was  subse- 
quently, though  a  considerable  time  after  the  injury,  troubled 
with  nervousness,  his  mental  faculties  became  somewhat  im- 
paired, and  this  was  followed  by  paralysis,  though  not  until 
about  seven  months  after  the  injury,  the  injury  being  the 
direct  cause  of  the  paralysis,  the  company  was  liable  in  dam- 
ages therefor.13  And  it  was  similarly  decided  where  an  injury 
resulted  in  a  cancer.14  So  also,  where  as  a  result  of  a  colli- 
sion of  a  vessel  on  which  a  woman  was  a  passenger,  she  was 
thrown  against  a  chair,  but  exhibited  no  signs  of  injury  for 
several  days,  and  did  not  call  a  physician  for  nine  days,  it  was 
held  that  damages  were  recoverable  for  spinal  irritability  re- 
sulting: from  the  collision.15  And  in  another  case  where  in  a 
railroad  accident  a  passenger  who  had  never  been  troubled  with 
catarrh,  was  injured  on  the  nose  and  catarrh  subsequently  de- 
veloped, and  evidence  of  medical  experts  was  given  showing 
that  catarrh  might  result  from  such  an  injury  under  certain 
exceptional  circumstances,  it  was  determined  that  a  refusal  by  the 
court  to  charge  that  there  was  not  sufficient  evidence  to  show 
that  the  catarrh  resulted  from  the  injury  was  proper.16 

§  330.  Passenger  injured  alighting  from  car. — If  a  pas- 
senger while  alighting  from  a  street  car  or  railroad  train  is  in- 
jured owing  to  the  negligent  starting  of  such  car  or  train,  he 
may  recover  damages  for  such  injuries  as  he  has  sustained,  in- 
cluding physical  pain  and  suffering,  mental  suffering,  and  for 
all  other  injuries  both  past  and  prospective.17     The  measure  of 


4  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  ST.  S.  365; 
Kentucky,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dills,  4 
Bush  (Ky.),  593. 

12 Kentucky*  R.   R.   Co.  v.  Dills., 
4  Bush  (Ky.),  593. 

13  Bishop  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 
48  Minn.  26;  50  N.  W.  928. 

14  Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Kemp,  61  Md.  619;  48  Am.  Rep.  134. 

386 


is  The  Rosedale  (D.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.), 
88  Fed.  324. 

16  Quackenbush  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  73  Iowa,  458;  35  N.  W.  523. 
See  chaps.  III-VI,  herein. 

17  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Emminger, 
57  Neb.  240;  77  N.  W.  675;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  188.  As  to 
duty    of    company  when    passenger 


Ac  l  loss    r.v    PASSENGERS. 


§§  331,332 


damages  in  such  cases  is  the  same  as  in  all  cases  of  personal  in- 
juries sustained  as  the  result  of  the  negligence  of  another.  So 
it  was  held  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  in  an  action  by  a  pas- 
senger for  injuries  received  while  alighting  from  a  train,  that 
in  estimating  the  damages  they  might  consider  evidence  show- 
ing mental  and  physical  pain  and  suffering,  expenses  incurred, 
loss  of  time  while  disabled,  and  permanent  diminution  of  ability 
to  earn  money. ls  And  where  a  female  passenger  was  severely 
injured  while  alighting  from  a  train,  a  verdict  of  83,000  was 
held  not  to  be  so  excessive  as  to  justify  the  appellate  court  in 
holding  that  it  was  the  result  of  passion  or  prejudice.1'1  But 
where  a  passenger  was  injured  by  attempting  to  alight  from  a 
moving  car  which  did  not  stop  at  the  place  he  expected,  it  was 
decided  that  he  could  not  recover  in  contract  for  such  injuries 
because  of  the  failure  to  stop,  since  such  failure  could  not  be 
considered  as  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injuries.'30 

§  331.  Passenger  injured— Lex  loci  contractus— Statutory 
limitation  as  to  recovery. —  A  passenger  who  procures  a 
ticket  between  two  stations  within  a  state  over  a  line  of  railroad 
which  passes  through  another  state,  and  who  while  passing  over 
that  portion  of  the  road  situate  within  such  other  state  is  in- 
jured by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  the  carrier  is  not  limited 
as  to  the  amount  of  damages  recoverable  by  the  statutes  of  such 
state,  since  the  contract  of  carriage  is  to  be  construed  with  ref- 
erence to  the  laws  of  the  state  wherein  he  procured  his  ticket 
and  from  which  his  journey  commenced,  and  within  which  it 
was  to  terminate.  In  such  cases  the  lex  loci  contractus  gov- 
erns."1 

§  332.  Exemplary  damages. — The  question  as  to  the  al- 
lowance of  exemplary  damages  against  coporations  has  been,  as 


alighting  from  electric  car,  and  de- 
gree of  care  imposed  on  passengers, 
see  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law,  sees.  562- 
569. 

18  Houston  A-  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rowell  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  45  S.  W. 
763,  aff'd  46  S.  W.  630;  11  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  S.  597. 

19  Illinois  C.    R.  Co.    v.   Bayse,   17 


Ky.  L.  Rep.  105;  30  S.  W.  000.  See 
Weinberg  v.  Met.  St.  Ky.  Co..  130 
Mo.  286;  40  S.  W.  882,  where  it  was 
held  that  a  verdict  for  nominal 
damages  would  not  be  disturbed. 

-   White  v.  West  End  St.   R.   Co., 
105  Mass.  522 :  43  N'.  E.  298. 

2i  Dyke  v.  Erie   Ry.   Co.,  45   N.  Y. 
113. 

387 


§  333  ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 

we  have  hereinbefore  stated,  the  subject  of  much  discussion  in 
the  various  courts  where  it  has  arisen,  and  the  allowance  is  in 
many  cases  made  dependent  upon  the  fact  whether  there  has  been 
in  any  way  a  ratification  by  the  corporation  of  the  servant's 
wrongful  act.  As  this  question  is  discussed  elsewhere  in  this 
work,  we  refer  thereto22  for  the  general  principles  controlling 
the  various  decisions,  and  will  only  state  generally  that  we  be- 
lieve the  weight  of  authority  sustains  the  allowance  of  ex- 
emplary damages  against  carriers  for  the  wrongful  act  of  a  servant 
or  agent  towards  a  passenger,  without  regard  to  the  question 
whether  such  act  has  been  ratified  by  the  carrier  or  not.23 

§  333.  Exemplary  damages— -Assaults  on  passengers.— The 

majority  of  the  cases  uphold  the  rule  that  a  carrier  is  liable  for 
an  assault  and  battery  committed  by  one  of  its  servants  upon  a 
passenger,  and  that  if  the  former  without  provocation  wrong- 
fully assault  a  passenger,  the  latter  may  recover  exemplary 
damages.  So  where  a  brake  man  attempted  to  eject  a  dog  be- 
longing to  a  passenger,  and  which  had  entered  the  car  with 
him,  but  was  prevented  by  the  latter  from  so  doing,  and  after- 
ward the  brakeman  suddenly  assaulted  the  passenger  and 
seriously  injured  him,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  against  the  com- 
pany for  such  assault  and  injury,  that  it  was  proper  to  charge 
the  jury  that  if  the  brakeman  was  acting  in  the  performance  of 
his  duty  as  brakeman  "  he  would  be  justified  in  using  a  reason- 
able degree  of  force,  necessary  and  proper  to  accomplish  the  re- 
moval of  the  dog  from  the  car,  but  if  he  used  more  violence 
than  was  necessary  and  inflicted  on  plaintiff  blows  that  were  un- 
necessary to  perform  his  duty,  the  company  would  be  liable,  and 
the  jury  may,  in  that  case,  award  punitive  or  exemplary  dam- 
ages."24 And  in  another  case  where  a  conductor  rudely  as- 
saulted a  passenger,  used  abusive  and  insulting  language  towards 
him,  roughly  seized  and  pulled  him  to  the  end  of  the  car,  acted 


22  See  sees.  135-141,  herein,  where 
the  question  of  the  allowance  of  ex- 
emplary damages  against  corpora- 
tions is  discussed. 

23  See  sees.  139-141,  herein,  and 
also  the  various  sections  in  this 
chapter  on  exemplary  damages. 

388 


24  Hanson  v.  European  &  American 
Ry.  Co.,  62  Me.  84;  16  Am.  Rep.  404. 
In  this  case  a  verdict  of  $4,000  was 
given  and  was  held  not  excessive. 
See  also  Hinkley  v.  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis.  194. 


ACTIONS    IIY    PAfiSJfitfGfi&d.  §  333 

as  if  about  to  draw  a  pistol,  threatened  to  kill   him,  and  spit 

tobacco  juice  in  his  tare,  it  was  decided  that  the  company  was 
liable  in  punitive  damages.2  Agaiu  such  damages  were  al- 
lowed to  a  passenger  who  upon  demand  had  given  his  ticket  t<> 
a  brakeman  authorized  to  receive  it,  but  was  shortly  after  ap- 
proached by  the  same  brakeman,  who  denied  that  lie  had  Item 
given  the  ticket  and  grossly  insulted  and  assaulted  him."  So 
also  a  sleeping  car  company  has  been  held  liable  in  punitive 
damages  for  an  unprovoked  assault  by  a  porter  upon  one  of  its 
passengers.27  In  this  case  it  was  also  held  that,  even  if  ratifica- 
tion by  the  company  was  necessary  in  order  to  render  it  liable 
in  punitive  damages  for  such  assault,  the  company  sufliciently 
ratified  the  act  of  the  porter  by  attempting  to  prove  upon  the 
trial  that  his  conduct  was  not  improper  or  wrongful,  and  by 
making  a  violent  and  unwarrantable  attack  upon  the  conduct 
and  character  of  the  plaintiff  with  knowledge  derived  from  the 
conductor's  report  of  the  facts  of  the  ease.  In  an  earlier 
case  in  the  same  state,  where  a  passenger  was  assaulted  by  fel- 
low passengers,  who  were  employees  of  defendant,  but  off  duty, 
and  the  conductor  made  no  particular  effort  to  prevent  the 
assault  or  protect  plaintiff,  and  the  company  retained  such  ser- 
vants in  their  employ,  it  was  decided  that  punitive  damages  could 
be  recovered.'-*1  While  it  is  declared  that  exemplary  damages 
may  be  recovered  for  an  unprovoked  and  malicious  assault!)}'  an 
employee  of  a  railroad  upon  a  passenger,  yet  provocation  even 
does  not  necessarily  defeat  the  recovery  of  exemplary  damages, 
but  the  conduct  of  both  parties  may  be  considered  by  the  jury.89 
In  this  class  of  actions,  as  also  in  actions  to  recover  exemplary 
damages  for  the  wrongful  ejection  of  a  passenger,  the  ques- 
tion of  liability  of  the  company  is   made  to  depend,   in    many 


86  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fleetwood,  '.><>  Ga.  2:'.:  1.".  S.  E.  778. 

20  Goddard  v.  < ;  rand  Trunk  Ry.  Co., 
57  Me.  202;  2  Am.  Rep.  39,  Tap- 
ley,  J.,  dissenting.  In  this  case  it 
also  held  that  as  the  defendants  bad 
retained  the  brakeman  in  their  em- 
ploy after  not  ire  of  the  assault,  a 
verdict  for  $4,H50  would  not  ho  set 
aside  as  excessive. 

27  Pullman  I'alace  Car  Co.  v.  Law- 


rence, 74  Miss.  782  ;  22  So.  53;  15 
Nat.  Corp.  Rep.  124;  8  Am.  A  Bng. 
R.   Cas.  N.  S.   59;  2  Am.  ffeg.   Rep. 

580;  1  Miss.  Dec.  (No.  5.), 

«  \ew  Orleans,  etc..  R.  U.  Co.  v. 
Burke,  53  Miss.  200:  2  1  Am  lie].. 
689. 

-"'  Baltimore  &  <  >.  1;.  R,  Co.  v.  Bar- 
ker. 80  Md.  2;!;  30  Atl.  220;  26  L. 
R.  A.  220. 


§§  334,  335  actions  p.y  passengers. 

cases,  upon  the  fact  whether  the  company  has  by  any  act  rati- 
fied the  conduct  of  the  employees.30  In  many  states,  however, 
statutes  have  been  passed  in  reference  to  the  allowance  of  exem- 
plary damages  in  one  or  both  class  of  cases,  and  where  such  stat- 
utes exist,  their  provisions  in  reference  thereto  will  control. 

§  334.  Exemplary  damages — Failure  or  refusal  to  transport 
passenger. — A  railroad  company  owes  to  the  public  the  duty 
of  stopping  its  trains  at  places  and  times  designated  by  its  sched- 
ule or  time  table,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  intending  passen- 
gers to  board  such  trains,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  company  to 
transport  such  passengers  to  the  destination  called  for  by  the 
passenger  in  accordance  with  his  ticket,  or  upon  the  payment  of 
the  proper  fare  to  the  conductor,  provided  the  train  is  scheduled 
to  stop  at  such  point.  And  where  a  railroad  company  has  ad- 
vertised for  passengers  for  a  certain  train  at  a  certain  station  and 
has  or  could  have  had  by  reasonable  diligence  sufficient  room 
to  accommodate  them,  but  in  violation  of  its  statutory  duty  fails 
to  stop  at  such  station  for  a  passenger,  punitive  damages  are 
recoverable.31  And  where  in  pursuance  of  an  unreasonable 
regulation  of  the  company,  its  agents  refuse  to  sell  an  intending 
passenger  a  ticket  or  check  his  baggage  to  a  regular  station  of  a 
passenger  train,  such  regulation  and  refusal  indicate  such  a 
wanton  disregard  of  the  rights  of  passengers  as  will  warrant  the 
recovery  of  exemplaiy  damages.^  Again,  where  the  employees 
of  a  carrier,  acting  within  the  scope  of  their  authority,  wilfully 
and  wantonly  refused  to  accept  a  round  trip  ticket  which  a 
passenger  tendered  for  the  return  trip,  and  he  was  by  such  act 
obliged  to  borrow  money  in  order  to  reach  home,  it  was  held 
that  the  passenger  was  entitled  to  recover  exemplary  damages 
against  the  company.33 

§  335.  Same  subject  continued. — It  will  be  observed  that  in 
this  class  of  cases  as  in  all  others,  the  recovery  of  exemplary 


30  See  sees.  130-141,  herein. 

81  Purcell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.,  108  N.  C.  414:  12  L.  R.  A. 
113;  12  S.  E.  954;  10  Ry.  &  Corp. 
L.  J.  35. 

32  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
390 


Lyon,  123  Pa.  St.  140;  2  L.  R.  A. 
489;  16  Atl.  607;  23  W.  N.  C.  69;  46 
Phila.  Leg.  Intel.  311;  39  Pitts.  L.  J. 
N.  S.  280. 

33 Scott  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co., 
43  W.  Va.  484;  27  S.  E.  211. 


Actions    i;v    PASSEK6EES. 

damages  is  allowed  on  the  ground  that  the  act  of  the  companj 
in  failing  or  refusing  to  transport  a  passenger  is  a  wilful,  wanton 
or  malicious  one.  The  failure  to  transport  may  be  due  to  mere 
negligence,  and  in  such  cases  it  is  decided  that  exemplary 
damages  are  not  recoverable,  the  damages  being  compensatory 
merely.34  So  where  the  failure  to  transport  a  passenger  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  engine  was  broken  down,  and  there  was  no 
personal  injury,  insult,  indignity  or  intentional  wrong  done  to 
him,  punitive  damages  were  refused.-'  And  where  an  intending 
passenger,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  ticket  agent  from  a  flag 
station,  was  unable  to  procure  a  ticket,  and  the  engineer  of  the 
train  failed  to  see  his  signal  to  stop,  it  was  held  that  he  was  en- 
titled to  recover  the  actual  damages  sustained  and  that  to  au- 
thorize the  recovery  of  punitive  damages  for  the  failure  of  the 
engineer  to  stop  at  such  station  so  that  he  might  board  the  train, 
the  engineer  must  have  seen  him,  it  not  being  sufficient  that  in 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  he  could  have  seen  him.30  And, 
again,  it  was  held  that  such  damages  could  not  be  recovered  for 
delay  in  transporting  a  passenger,  where  such  delay  was  due  to 
a  wreck,  though  the  company  failed  to  do  all  that  it  might  have 
done  to  insure  the  continuance  of  the  journey  and  though  there 
was  sufficient  negligence  to  justify  a  recovery  for  loss  of  time.17 
And  where,  owing  solely  to  the  negligence  of  the  company  in 
calling  out  the  name  of  a  station  before  it  was  time  for  passen- 
gers to  leave  the  car,  a  passenger  was  discharged  from  a  train  one 
and  a  half  miles  from  the  station,  it  was  decided  that  he  could 
not  recover  exemplary  damages,  and  this  though  there  was  a 
refusal  to  stop  the  train  after  discovering  that  the  passenger  had 
left  it.38     And  in  another  case  it  is  held  that  the  mere  wrongful 

84  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kendrick,  only   be   given    where    the   circnm- 

40  Miss.  374,  where  it  was  held  to  be  stances    of    the    case   were  found   to 

error  to  instruct,  the  jury  in  an  action  justify  or  require  them, 

to  recover  damages  for  failure  to  de-  K  Hansley  v.  Jamesville  A-   W.  R. 

liver  a  passenger  at  her  destination,  Co.,  117  N.  ('.  565;  115  X.  ('.  602;  :'.•-' 

that    not    only  damages    compensa-  L.  R.  A.  54:5:  •_*:;  S.  E.   II:'.. 


tory  for  the  private  injury  might  he 
recovered,  but  also  exemplary  dam- 
ages for  disregard  of  public  duty 
without  qualifying  that  part  of  the 
instruction  as  to  punitive  damages 
by  stating  that  such  damages  should 


Be  Thomas  v.  Southern  EL  Co.,  122 
N.  C.  1005;  SOS.  E.  S4:5. 

:)7  Alabama  &  V.  K.  {'<>.  v.  Purnell, 
iii»  Miss.  652;  13  So.  472. 

Gulf  C.  A-  s.  F.  K.  Co.  \.  McFad- 
den  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  26  S.  W.  451. 
391 


§§  336,  337 


ACTIONS   BY   PASSENGERS. 


refusal  of  a  carrier  to  permit  a  passenger  to  ride  on  a  certain  train 
is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  the  recovery  of  punitive  damages 
even  though  the  employees  were  informed  by  such  person  that 
he  desired  to  reach  the  deathbed  of  a  brother/39  In  an  action  by 
a  person  to  recover  exemplary  damages  against  a  carrier  for  the 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  conductor  to  hold  the  train  for  him, 
which  he  promised  to  do  while  the  former,  who  was  on  his  way 
to  attend  the  funeral  of  his  sister,  procured  his  ticket,  it  was 
held  that  testimony  by  the  plaintiff  as  to  what  he  did  after  he  had 
finally  reached  his  home,  was  admissible  though  it  tended  to  ag- 
gravate damages.40 

§  336.  Penalty  statute — Failure  to  transport  and  discharge 
passengers  at  destination — "  Legal  or  just  excuse." — Where 

there  is  a  statute  imposing  a  penalty  upon  railroad  corporations 
for  failure  to  transport  and  discharge  passengers  who  offer  them- 
selves for  transportation,  and  further  providing  that  the  penalty 
shall  be  recoverable  in  an  action  for  debt  and  that  the  only  de- 
fense thereto  shall  be  a  "just  or  legal  excuse,"  41  in  an  action  to 
recover  such  penalty  by  a  passenger  whom  the  company  had 
failed  to  discharge  at  his  destination,  it  is  no  defense  within  the 
wording  of  the  statute  that  the  train  was  not  stopped  at  the  pas- 
senger's destination,  because  in  the  opinion  of  the  conductor  it 
was  unsafe  to  stop  at  such  station  on  account  of  the  number  of 
persons  who  were  waiting  to  take  passage  on  the  train  which 
was  already  crowded.4- 

§  337.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train. — Where  a  passenger 
is  wrongfully  ejected  from  a  train,  he  majr  recover  either  in  an 
action  upon  the  contract  of  carriage,  or  in  an  action  of  tort. 
Where  his  action  is  for  a  breach  of  the  contract,  he  can  only  re- 
cover such  damages  as  are  the  direct  and  proximate  result  of 
the  breach.43     In  a  case  in  Ohio,  however,  where  a  person,  hav- 


39  Barnett  v.  Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  75 
Mo.  App.  446;  1  Mo.  App.  Kepr.  391. 

40  Gillman  v.  Florida,  C.  &  P.  K. 
Co.,  53  S.  C.  210;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  125;  31  E.  S.  224. 

41  See  How.  Ann.  Stat.  Mich, 
sec.  3324,  which  imposes  a  penalty 
of  $100  in  such  cases. 

392 


42  IToyt  v.  Cleveland,  Cincinnati  & 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  112  Mich.  638;  71 
N.  W.  172;  9  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  818;  29  Chic.  L.  N.  330;  4  Det.  L. 
N.  142;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  199. 

43  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Shook,  3 
Kan.  App.  710;  44  Pac.  785. 


ACTIONS    P,V    PASSENGERS. 


- 


ing  a  ticket  good  only  on  trains  stopping  at  a  specified  station, 
was  induced  to  board  ;i  certain  train  by  the  statement  of  the 
station  agent,  that  such  train  stopped  al  his  Btation,  but  which 
in  fact  did  ootand  he  was  ejected  by  the  conductor  before  reach- 
ing such  station,  it  was  held  that  the  measure  of  damages  was 
the  same  whether  the  injury  was  considered  as  resulting  from  a 
tort  or  from  a  breach  of  contract."  As  a  general  rule  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  in  such  an  action  is  such  as  may  fairly  he  con- 
sidered as  arising  naturally  in  the  usual  course  of  events  from 
the  breach  of  the  contract,  or  such  as  may  reasonably  be 
supposed  to  have  been  in  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  at  the 
time  they  executed  the  contract  as  the  probable  results  of  a 
breach  of  the  same.1*' 


§  338.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train— Continued.— In  an 

action  of  tort,  a  passenger  may  recover  damages  for  all  the  in- 
juries which  he  has  sustained,  either  directly  caused  by  or  flow- 
ing from  the  wrongful  act.46  And  it  is  declared  that  though  a 
passenger  in  such  a  case  may  have  suffered  no  pecuniary  loss 
or  actual  injury  to  his  person,  his  recovery  will  not  be  limited 
to  merely  nominal  damages.47    So  where  a  passenger  was  ejected 


**  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Reynolds,  55  Ohio  St.  370;  37 
Ohio  L.  J.  41;  45  N.  E.  712;  2  Chic. 
L.  J.  Wkly.  95. 

46  Chic.  H.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Spirit,  51 
Neb.  167;  70  N\  W.  926;  7  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  V  S.  205;  ^  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  201. 

*«  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Spirk.  51 
Neb.  1(J7;  70  X.  W.  926;  7  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  ("as.  N.  S.  205;  2  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  201.  See  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bine,  121  A  In.  234;  25  So. 
857;  1  l  Am.  A-  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
382. 

47  Chic,  etc.,  R.  R.  C«».  v.  Flagg, 
43  111.  3G4.  See  cast-s  following  as 
to  whether  verdicts  in  certain  crises 
were  excessive  in  actions  for  eject  ion 
of  passengers:  In  following  cases 
held  not  excessive:  Outlawing  all 
certain  class  of  tickets  of  which  pas- 


senger held  one,  considered  as 
reckless  disregard  of  passenger's 
rights  -$1,000.  Winters  v.  Cowen 
(C.  C.  X.  T).  Ohio),  90  Fed.  9'.':  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  40. 
though  large  not  excessive. 
Charleston  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Varnadore, 
94  <;a.  639;  21  S.  E.  581.  Wantonly 
and  wilfully  thrown  from  moving 
train  severe  injuries  external  and 
internal— $2,000.  Illinois,  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Davenport,  75  111.  App.  579.  atT'd 
177  111.  110;  52  X.  E.  266.  Force 
and  violence  resulting  in  illness — 
$2,000.  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R. 
C...  v.  Gohen,  15  End.  A.pp.  123;  42 
N.  E.  111(5,  reh'g  denied  43  N.  E. 
890.  Labor  and  inconvenience 
physical  ami  mental  pain  and  suffer- 
ing— humiliation  $296.34.  Atchi- 
son. T.  A-  s.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickerson, 
4  Kan.  App.  345;  45  Pac.  975.     Tas- 

393 


§  338 


ACTIONS    BY   PASSENGERS. 


from  a  street  car  on  the  unfounded  charge  that  he  had  not  paid 
his  fare,  it  was  held  that  his  recovery  was  not  limited  to  the 
amount  of  the  fare,  where  if  the  conductor  had  made  an  investi- 
gation which  he  refused  to  do,  the  fact  as  to  the  payment  of  the 
fare  would  have  been  disclosed,  and  the  payment  of  another 
fare  by  the  passenger  would,  in  the  eyes  of  the  other  passengers, 
have  amounted  to  an  admission  that  he  had  attempted  to  de- 
fraud the  company;18     But  where  it  appeared  that  a  passenger 


senger  afflicted  with  St.  Vitus  dance 
— forcible  ejection  in  belief  that,  he 
was  intoxicated — $400.  Requer  v. 
Glens  Falls,  S.  H.  &  F.  E.  St.  R.  Co., 
74  Hun  (N.  Y.),  202;  56  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  300;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  625.  Publicly 
charging  passenger  with  attempting 
to  pass  a  fraudulent  ticket,  but 
which  was  good  and  proper  and  con- 
ductor failed  to  examine  same — $450. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Teed 
(C.  C),  2  Ohio  Dec.  662.  Roughly 
spoken  to  by  conductor  in  presence 
of  other  passengers — great  mortifi- 
cation— compelled  to  walk  seven 
miles  to  his  home— $200.  Fordyce 
v.  Manuel,  82  Tex.  527;  18  S.  W.  657. 
Compelled  to  walk  three  and  a  half 
miles  home— $50.  Durfee  v. 
Union  P.  R.  Co.,  9  Utah,  213;  33 
Pac.  944.  Large  man — crippled — put 
off  five  miles  from  his  destination — 
walked  home  because  of  anxiety  on 
account  of  dangerous  illness  of  his 
daughter.  Sheets  v.  Ohio  River 
R.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  475;  20  S.  E. 
566.  In  following  cases  verdicts 
held  excessive:  Detained  two  days 
at  expense  of  $37 — punitive  damages 
not  proper — $1,700.  Zion  v.  Southern 
P.  Co.  (C.  C.  D.  Nev.),  67  Fed.  500. 
Obliged  to  walk  about  a  mile  caus- 
ing recurrence  of  insomnia  and 
nervous  paroxysms — $1,400.  Sloane 
v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Cal.  668; 
32  L.  R.  A.  193;  44  Pac.  320.  In 
belief  that  ticket  was  ,not  good — no 
insulting      language      or     improper 

394 


demonstrations — resumed  journey  on 
following  day — no  pecuniary  loss 
outside  of  amount  paid  for  fare — 
$1,300.  Comer  v.  Foley,  98  Ga.  678; 
25  S.  E.  671;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  250.  No  physical  personal 
injury  or  pecuniary  damages — $500. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Breckin- 
ridge, 17  Ky.  L.  R.  1303;  99  Ky.  1; 
34  S.  W.  702.  Suspicious  defects  in 
ticket  which  in  fact  valid — no  ma- 
licious or  wanton  disregard  of  pas- 
senger's rights — $225.  Eleven  v. 
Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  70  Minn.  79; 
72  N.  W.  828.  Ejected  by  collar  of 
person  carried  into  steamboat  ferry 
by  a  crowd  after  offer  to  pay  fare  or 
leave — $1,500.  Doran  v.  Brooklyn 
&  N.  Y.  Ferry  Co.,  46  N.  Y.  St.  R.  310; 
19  N.  Y.  Supp.  172.  Respectable 
man  of  mature  years — injuries  to 
feeling  and  reputation — put  off  for 
alleged  disorderly  conduct — account 
thereof  published  in  newspaper — 
pointed  out  as  man  put  off — $1,475 — 
should  be  set  aside  unless  $1,000 
remitted.  Cunningham  v.  Seattle 
Elec.  R.  &  P.  Co.,  8  Wash.  471;  28 
Pac.  745.  No  evidence  as  to  loss  of 
time — expenses — illness  or  unusual 
inconvenience  —  $1,500,  excessive 
though  one  half  has  been  remitted. 
Gillan  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S. 
M.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis.  633;  65  N.  W. 
373;  2  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  145. 
48  Sprenger  v.  Tacoma  Traction 
Co.,  15  Wash.  660;  47  Pac.  17;  43 
L.  R.  A.  706. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS.  §  339 

who  had  broughl  an  action  for  his  ejection  from  a  railroad  train 
had  purchased  a  bickel  consisting  of  four  coupons,  and  thai  the 
second  coupon  was  missing  when  he  offered  his  ticket  after 
having  used  his  first  coupon,  and  though  having  the  money  he 

refused  to  pay  his  fare,  in  consequence  of  which  he  was  ejected, 
though  he  informed  the  conductor  that  such  coupon  had  been 
taken  up  by  the  former  conductor  and  he  showed  the  return 
coupons,  it  was  held   that,  his    recovery  was   properly  limited  to 

the  amount  of  fare  necessary  to  complete  the  journey.* 

§  339.  Wrongful  ejection  from  train— Concluded.— For  a 

wrongful  ejection,  of  a  passengeT  for  a  refusal  to  pay  an  ex- 
cessive fare,  he  may  recover  for  all  the  consequences  of  the 
wrong, and  is  not  limited  to  the  difference  between  the  fare  de- 
manded and  that  tendered/'"  If  unnecessary  or  unreasonable 
force  is  not  used  in  the  ejection  of  a  passenger,  or  the  act  is  not 
accompanied  by  insult,  it  is  held  that  the  expulsion  is  not  tortious 
and  only  compensatory  damages  are  recoverable,  where  though 
the  passenger  was  entitled  by  reason  of  his  contract  with  the 
ticket  agent  to  passage,  yet  his  ticket  upon  its  face  did  not  so  en- 
title him/'1  And  it  has  been  decided  that  if  a  passenger  is  ejected 
in  good  faith,  no  unnecessary  force  being  used, and  the  ejection 
is  pursuant  to  rules  and  upon  due  notice  to  the  passenger,  he 
can  only  recover  compensatory  damages.52  So  if  he  is  law- 
fully ejected  but  with  more  force  than  is  necessary,  his  recovery 
is  confined  to  such  damages  as  were  due  to  the  excessive  force 
used.w  In  another  case  where  a  passenger  was  wrongfully 
ejected  in  the  erroneous  belief  that  he  was  not  the  owner  of  a 
nontransferable  ticket  presented  by  him.  it  was  held  that  the 
amount  of  his  compensatory  damages  did  not  depend  upon  the 
good  faith  or  intentions  of  the  conductor."'1  Inconvenience  suf- 
fered by  a  passenger  in  consequence  of  his  wrongful  ejection 
from  a  train  is  an  element  to  he  considered  in  estimating  the  dam- 


49  Van  Duaan  v.  (hand  Trunk  R. 
Co.,  97  Mich.  439;  56  X.  W.  sis. 

60  Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rogers,  28  End.  1. 

61  Lexington  A'  E.  R.  C<>.  v.  Lynns, 
20  Ky.  L.  R.  .".10:  11  Am.  A-  Eng.  R, 
Cas.  N.  S.  212:  40  S.  W.  209. 


ra  Pine   v.   si.    Paul    City    R.    I  >>. 
i.Minn.i.  10  L  R.  A.  347;  52  \"   W  392. 

«M;uy  v.   C.    C.   A  St.  L.  K.  Co.  (C. 
P.).  0  ohi.,  \.  P.  3. 

1  Pittsburg,  C  C.  A-  Si.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Russ  (C.  C.  A.pp.  Ttli  C.)i  07  Fed. 
062. 

395 


339 


ACTIONS   BY   PASSENGERS. 


ages.55  But  where  a  passenger  was  ejected  for  nonpayment  of 
fare  it  was  decided  that  damages  for  unnecessary  violence  could 
not  include  compensation  for  inconvenience  which  he  suffered 
in  making  his  way  back  to  a  station  or  for  his  suffering  or  sick- 
ness from  exposure.56  Loss  of  time  is  also  to  be  considered  in 
determining  the  measure  of  damages  for  the  wrongful  ejection 
of  a  passenger,57  but  in  the  absence  of  some  evidence  as  to  the 
value  of  such  time  it  cannot  be  included  in  the  damages 
awarded.58  Loss  of  a  job  of  work,  however,  due  to  the  ex- 
pulsion of  a  passenger  is  not  to  be  considered  in  the  estima- 
tion of  damages  for  such  expulsion.59  Nor  are  the  remarks  and 
comments  of  other  passengers  made  at  the  time  of  such  ejection 
to  be  considered.60  In  another  case  it  was  held  that  a  charge  to 
the  jury  that  they  were  not  confined  to  the  same  "amount  of 
damages  or  the  same  rules  as  if  the  suit  was  between  individuals, 
as  the  public  have  an  interest  in  such  cases  which  may  be  consid- 
ered and  looked  to  in  assessing  the  damages  "  was  erroneous.61 
Where  there  is  a  statutory  provision  that  in  all  actions  against 
railroad  companies  the  plaintiff  may,  if  he  recovers,  be  also  al- 
lowed a  reasonable  attorney's  fee  to  be  taxed  as  part  of  the  costs," 
it  is  decided  that  a  plaintiff  who  has  been  successful  in  an  action 
against  a  railroad  company  for  his  wrongful  ejection  from  a  train 
should  be  allowed  to  recover  an  attorney's  fee.63  But  though  a 
passenger  has  been  wrongfully  ejected,  yet  if  no  actual  damages 
have  been  sustained,  he  is  not  entitled  to  recover  counsel  fees.'11 
And  in  an  action  for  the  wrongful  ejection  of  a  passenger  from 


65  Central  R.  &  B'k'g  Co.  v.  Strick- 
land, 90  Ga.  562;  16  S.  E.  352;  52 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  216;  Laird  v. 
Pittsburgh  Traction  Co.,  166  Pa.  St. 
4;  31  Atl.  51;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
291;  2  Det.  L.  N.  339;  36  W.  N.  C. 
24;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cope- 
land,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  55;  42  S.  W. 
239;  Boelim  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  R. 
Co.,  91  Wis.  592;  65  N.  W.  506. 

56  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  James,  82 
Tex.  306;  15  L.  R.  A.  347;  18  S.  W. 
589. 

57  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cope- 
land,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  55;  42  S.  W. 

396 


239.    See  sec.  ante  herein,  as  recovery 
for  loss  of  time. 

58  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Daniels 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W.  426. 

59  Carston  v.    Northern  P.  R.  Co., 

44  Minn.  454. 

eo  Hoffman  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co., 

45  Minn.  53. 

6i  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nelson, 
59  111.  110. 

62 See  Sand.  &  H.  (Ark.)  Dig. 
sec.  6218. 

63  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Neal, 
66  Ark.  543;  51  S.  W.  1000. 

64  Dave  v.  Morgans  L.  &  T.  R.  & 


ACTIONS    I'.Y    PASSENGERS. 


;  340 


a  railroad  train,  interest  upon  unliquidated  damages  should  not 
be  allowed.1 


§  340.    Exemplary  damages  —  Ejection  of  passenger.— 

Where  a  passenger  has  been  wrongfully  ejected  from  a  train, 
street  ear,  or  other  public  conveyance,  the  recovery  is  not  in  all 
cases  limited  to  an  amount  which  may  be  compensatory  for  the 
loss  or  damage  sustained  as  a  result  thereof.  The  ejection  in 
addition  to  being  wrongful  may  be  done  in  a  malicious  or  wanton 
spirit,  may  be  accompanied  with  vilification,  insult  or  indignity, 
or  with  unusual  and  unnecessary  force,  or  there  may  be  other  ag- 
gravating circumstances,  which  warrant  the  imposition  of  some- 
thing more  than  compensatory  damages,  and  in  such  cases  the 
general  doctrine  seems  to  be  that  exemplary  damages  may  be 
awarded.'"'1  In  order,  however,  to  authorize  the  allowance  of  ex- 
emplary damages,  there  must  be  evidence  upon  which  to  base 
the  same.     Thus  it  was  held  to  be  reversible  error  to  instruct 


S.  S.  Co.,  47  La.  Ann.  576;  17  So. 
128. 

6i  Nichols  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co. 
(Utah),  27  Puc.  093. 

ee  Cowen  v.  Winters,  00  Fed.  929; 
Gorman  v.  Southern  Pao.  Co.,  97 
Cal.  1;  31  Pac.  1112;  Western  &  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ledbetter,  99  Ga.  318;  25  S. 
E.  003;  Atlanta  Consul.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hardage,  93  Ga.  457;  21  S.  E.  100; 
Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  olds,  77  Ga.  673; 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  Rea- 
gan, 52  111.  App.  48S;  Louisville,  N. 
A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Goben,  15  [nd.  App. 
123;  42  X.  E.  1116,  reh'g  denied  43 
N.  E.  890;  Callaway  v.  Mellett,  15 
Ind.  App. 360;  24  Wash.  L.  Rep.  014; 
44  N.  E.  198;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  77;  29 
Chic.  Lee;.  News,  43;  Ellsworth  v. 
Chicago,B.  &  <>r.  R.  Co.  (Iowa), 63  N. 
W.  584;  Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice, 
38  Kan.  398;  10  Pac.  817;  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  5  Kan. 
App.  044;  47  I'ac.  993;  Louisville* 
X.  R.  Co.  v.  Keller,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
957;  47  S.  W.  1072;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
348;  12  Am.   &   Eng.   R.   Cas.   N.  S. 


589;  Hanson  v.  European,  etc.,  Ry. 
Co.,  04  Me.  84;  10  Am.  Rep.  404; 
Philadelphia,  Wilmington  &  Bait. 
R.  Co.  v.  Larkin,  47  Md.  155;  Lucas 
v.  Michigan  C.  R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  1; 
56  X.  W.  1039;  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Maybin,  66  Miss.  83;  St.  Clair 
v.  Missouri  P.  K.  Co.,  29 Mo.  App.  76; 
Wigton  v.  Met.  Si.  R.  Co.,  38  App. 
Div.  (  X.  Y.)  207;  50  N.  Y.  Sup]).  047; 
Rose  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  K.  Co., 
106  N.  C.  168;  11  S.  E.  526;  Atlantic 
&  Greal  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunn.  19 
Ohio  St.  162;  Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cole,  29  Ohio  St.  126;  Fitts- 
burg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Fnsign. 
in  Ohio  C.  C.  21;  Hall  v.  South  Car- 
olina Ry.  Co..  28  S.  C.  201;  5  S.  E. 
623;  Palmer  v.  Railroad,  :'.  S.  C.  580; 
Internationa]  A-  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler. '.I  Tex.  Civ.  App.  104;  28  S.  W. 
■_':'.:'. :  writ  of  error  denied  in  87  Tex. 
430;  29  S.  W.  2:',:,;  Patsy  v.  Chic.  St. 
1'.  M.  A-  C.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  218;  46  N. 
W.  .".»;;  Hass  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  Ry.  Co., 
42  Wis.  654. 

397 


R  34]  ACTIONS   RV    PASSENGERS. 

the  jury  that  if  in  ejecting  the  plaintiff  the  agents  of  the  defend- 
ant were  rude  and  insulting  in  words,  tone,  or  gesture,  they  might 
award  punitive  damages,  there  being  no  evidence  upon  which  to 
base  such  a  verdict.67 

§341.  Exemplary  damages— Ejection  of  passenger— Un- 
necessary force  or  violence.— If  in  the  ejection  of  a  passenger 
more  force  than  is  necessary  is  used,  or  unnecessary  injury  is 
inflicted  upon  him  by  the  employees  of  the  company,  he  may  re- 
cover exemplary  damages.68  Ajid  though  a  passenger  may  make 
unnecessary  resistance  to  the  conductor  who  proposes  to  eject 
him,  yet  this  will  not  excuse  the  conductor  for  inflicting  wilful 
or  malicious  injuries  upon  him,  and  exemplary  damages  may  be 
recovered.69  So  it  was  held  proper  to  charge  the  jury  that  though 
a  passenger,  by  reason  of  his  disorderly  conduct,  rendered  himself 
liable  to  expulsion  therefor,  yet  if  in  ejecting  him  he  was  subjected 
to  unnecessary  and  reckless  violence  and  indignity,  and  the  em- 
ployees of  the  company  acted  in  a  wanton,  high-handed  and  out- 
rageous manner,  exemplary  damages  might  be  awarded.'0  And 
where  a  conductor  requested  a  passenger  to  assist  him  in  the 
expulsion  of  a  negress  from  a  car  set  apart  for  whites  and  they 
used  wilful  and  unnecessary  violence,  the  company  was  held  lia- 
ble in  exemplary  damages  therefor.71  Again,  where  a  conductor, 
preparatory  to  ejecting  a  passenger,  dragged  him  into  the  aisle 
of  the  car  in  the  presence  of  a  car  full  of  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
the  ejection  being  based  on  the  unfounded  pretense  that  he  was 
not  the  owner  of  a  mileage  book  presented  by  him,  it  was  decided 
that  the  passenger  might  be  awarded  punitive  damages.72     So, 


67  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  290;  4  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  437;  36  S.  W. 
173. 

68  Hanson  v.  European,  etc.,  Ry. 
Co.,  64  Me.  84;  Philadelphia,  Wil- 
mington &  Bait.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Md. 
155;  47  Fed.  155.  If,  however,  a  con- 
ductor starts  to  eject  a  passenger  in 
a  proper  manner  and  the  passenger 
makes  unnecessary  resistance  to  him, 
the  use  of  force  by  the  conductor  will, 
it  is  held,  be  excused  and  the  act  of 

398 


the  passenger  may  be  considered  in 
mitigation  of  damages.  Hall  v.  Mem- 
phis, etc.,  R.  Co.,  23  Fed.  637. 

69  Chic,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  68 
111.  499. 

70  Philadelphia,  Wilmington  & 
Bait.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Md.  155. 

71  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Miller,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  104;  writ  of 
error  denied  in  87  Tex.  430;  29  S.  W. 
235. 

72  Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ensign,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  21. 


ACTIONS    P.Y    PASSENGERS. 


also,  such  damages  are  held  to  be  properly  awarded  where  there 
is  a  disregard  of  the  life  and  Limbs  of  the  passenger  in  his  ejec- 
tion,r;  as  where  a  passenger  was  ejected  while  the  train  was  in 
motion.71 


§  342.  Exemplary  damages  Ejection  of  passenger— 
When  not.  recoverable.  Where  the  ejection  of  a  passenger  is  in 
good  faith  and  without  indignity,  abuse, unnecessary  force,  vio- 
lence, injury,  or  other  aggravating  circumstances,  only  compensa- 
tory damages  will  be  allowed.15  And  where  a  passenger  is  ejected 
from  a  train  by  mistake,  there  can  no  recovery  of  punitive  dam- 
ages in  the  absence  of  any  element  of  aggravation.'''  So  where 
a  conductor,  owing  to  a  mistake  in  reading  a  passenger's  ticket, 
wrongfully  ejected  him  from  the  train,  but  indulged  in  no 
abuse,  rudeness,  or  violence,  and  upon  being  convinced  of  his 
mistake,  used  every  effort  to  rectify  it,  there  was  held  to  be 
no  basis  for  the  recovery  of  exemplary  damages.77  And  such 
damages  cannot  be  recovered  for  his  ejection,  by  the  holder 
of  a  ticket  which  he  believes  will  not  be  accepted  by  the  con- 
ductor, where  he  enters  the  train  not  with  the  bona  tide  in- 
tention of  making  the  trip  called  for  by  the  ticket,  but  rather 
for  the  purpose  of  being  ejected.78  Again,  where  a  person  took 
passage  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  question  of  fares  and 
with  the  expectation  that  he  would  be  ejected  and  would  make 


73  St.  Clair  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co., 
29  Mo.  App.  70. 

w  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  II.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Reagan,  52  111.  App.  488. 

75  Lemon  v.  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co. 
(C.  C.  S.  D.  Miss.),  52  Fed.  262; 
Turner  v.  North  Beach,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  Oal.  594;  Fitzgerald  v.  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  50  Iowa, 
79;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown  (Kan.  1893),  31  Par.  79;  Atchi- 
son, T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Lamoreuz,  5 
Kan.  App.  813;  49  Pac.  152:  Smith  v. 
Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co..  87  [ml  48;  38 
Atl.  1072;  Ki  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  <  'as.  X.  S. 
264;  Logan  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  R. 
Co.,  77  Mo.  663;  Hamilton  v.  Third 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  N.   Y.  25,  rev"g  35 


X.  Y.  Supr.  118;  Muckle  v.  Roches- 
ter R.  Co.,  78  Hun  (N.  Y.  i.  32;  61  X. 
Y.  St.  R.  193;  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  732; 
Louisville,  Nashville  &  Great  South- 
ern 1!.  R.  Co.  v.  Guinan,  11  Lea 
(Penn.),98. 

70  Phila.  Traction  Co.  v.  Orbann, 
119  Pa.  St.  37;  12  Atl.  816;  21  W.  X. 
('.  70;  11  Cent.  631.  See  also  Denver 
Tramway  Co.  v.  Cloud  (Colo.  App.), 
40 Pac.  77'.'. 

77  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Nr.lv. 
<U  Va.  539;  22  S.  E.  367. 

T~  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Barlow,  L04 
Ga.  213;  30  S.  E.  732;  4  Am.  ffeg. 
Rep.  710.  Sec  Murphy  v.  Western  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  23  Fed.  037;  Holmes  v.  Car- 
olina C.  R.  Co.,  94  X.  C.  319. 

399 


§  343 


ACTIONS   BY    PASSENGERS. 


money  out  of  the  transaction,  and  he  tendered  not  the  fare  de- 
manded but  what  he  claimed  to  be  the  legal  fare,  and  what 
was  afterward  held  by  the  court  to  be  the  legal  fare,  it  was 
held  that  he  was  not  entitled  to  exemplary  damages.79  And 
the  fact  that  in  the  wrongful  ejection  of  a  passenger  a  colored 
train  hand  was  called  to  assist,  is  not  an  aggravating  circum- 
stance which  will  authorize  the  recovery  of  greater  damages 
than  if  the  train  hand  had  been  a  white  man.80 

§  343.  Exemplary  damages — Ejection  of  passenger — 
Cases. — Where  a  person  wishing  to  go  to  a  certain  destination 
is  given  by  the  ticket  agent  a  ticket  which  is  complicated  and 
not  easily  understood,  and  which  entitles  him  to  ride  only  in  the 
opposite  direction,  he  may  recover  exemplary  damages  of  the 
eompan}'  when  he  is  ejected  from  the  train  under  aggravating 
circumstances,  together  with  insult  and  vilification  by  the  con- 
ductor.81 And,  where  a  person  applied  for  a  ticket  between 
certain  points  and  accepted  from  the  ticket  agent  an  excursion 
ticket,  the  time  limit  for  which  had  expired,  and  which  he  did 
not  read  but  was  assured  by  the  ticket  agent  that  it  was  all 
right,  and  that  the  conductor  would  accept  it,  it  was  held  that 
he  might  recover  exemplary  damages  for  his  ejection  from  the 
train  by  the  conductor  to  whom  such  ticket  was  presented. ^ 
Punitive  damages  were  also  awarded  to  a  passenger  who,  after 
having  paid  his  fare  once,  was  asked  by  the  conductor  again  for  it 
about  five  minutes  afterwards,  and  the  conductor  when  informed 
of  such  fact  told  him  he  was  lying,  and  forcibly  ejected  him 
from  the  train,  such  acts  being  held  sufficient  to  justify  the  in- 
ference that  the  conductor  acted  in  a  spirit  of  malice  or  oppres- 
sion.83 So  again,  where  it  appeared  that  the  plaintiff,  after  hav- 
ing paid  his  fare,  was  asked  for  another  fare  by  the  conductor 


"9  Cincinnati,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole, 
29  Ohio  St.  126. 

80  Central  R.  &  B'k'g  Co.  v.  Strick- 
land, 90  Ga.  562;  16  S.  E.  352;  52  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  216. 

81  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Olds,  77  Ga. 
673. 

82  Callaway  v.  Mellett,  15  Ind. 
App.  366;  44  N.  E.  198;  24  Wash.  L. 

400 


Rep.  614;  43  Cent.  L.  J.  77;  29  Chic. 
L.  News,  43. 

83  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Goben,  15  Ind.  App.  123;  42  N.  E. 
1116,  reh'g  denied  43  N.  E.  890.  See 
also  Atchinson,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Long,  5  Kan.  App.  644;  47  Pac. 
993. 


A«   PIONS    KV     I" A      I  NGERS.  §  34  1 

in  a  violent  manner,  accompanied  with  profane  and  insulting 
language,  and  that  upon  his  refusal  so  to  pay,  the  conductor, 
without  making  any  request  for  him  to  Leave  the  car,  jerked  him 
from  his  scat  with  the  assistance  of  others  and  threw  him  from 
the  car  with  such  violence  as  to  dislocate  his  hip,  it  was  de- 
cided that  an  instruction  as  to  exemplary  damages  was  proper.* 
And  under  the  California  Civil  Code a  providing  that  in  >-.i>f 
of  a  breach  of  any  obligation  not  arising  from  contract,  where 
there  has  been  oppression,  fraud  or  malice  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant,  exemplary  damages  may  he  awarded,  it  has 
been  held  that  such  damages  may  he  recovered  by  a  pas- 
senger who,  after  having  paid  his  fare  once,  is  again  asked  for  it 
by  the  conductor,  and  upon  his  refusal  to  pay  again  is  ejected  by 
the  conductor,  his  ejection  being  accompanied  by  undue  violence 
or  by  insult  or  abuse.*  Again,  vindictive  damages  were  allowed 
where  a  passenger,  though  he  presented  the  proper  ticket,  was 
ejected  from  the  train  on  the  ground  that  the  ticket  had  expired, 
where  there  was  on  the  part  of  the  conductor  such  reckless 
disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  passenger  as  amounted  Co  wan- 
toness.*7  And  where  a  large  number  of  mileage  tickets  which 
had  been  issued  and  sold  by  the  authority  of  tln>  general  pas- 
senger agent  were  deliberately  repudiated  by  him  and  in  con- 
sequence of  his  orders  a  passenger  who  had  purchased  one  of 
such  tickets  was  ejected  from  a  train  of  the  company,  it  was 
held  that  the  act  of  the  passenger  agent  was  of  such  a  character 
and  so  far  equivalent  to  an  intentional  violation  of  the  company's 
duties  and  the  passenger's  rights  as  would  warrant  the  award- 
ing of  exemplary  damages. B 

§  344.  Passenger  left  at  wrong  station.  —As  a  general  rule 
a  passenger  who  by  the  negligent  conduct  of  the  conductor  is 

induced  to  alight,  at  the  wrong  station  is  entitled  to  recover 
compensatory  damages  therefor,  as  where  a  conductor  errone- 
ously informed  a  passenger   that    his  station  had    been  reached, 


84  St.  Louis,    I.  M.  &   s.   II.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  (Ark.)  ;  10  S.  W.  107. 

86  Sec.  3204. 

86  Gorman  v.  Southern  P.  Co.,  07 
Cal.  1:  31  Pac.  1112. 

26  401 


87  Southern  Kan.  11.  Co.  v.  Rice, 
38  Kan.  398;  16  Pac.  sit. 

88Co\ven  v.  Winters,  96  Fed.  929, 
aff '£  00  Fed.  00. 


§  845  ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 

thus  causing  him  to  alight  at  a  wrong  station.89  Compensa- 
tion in  such  cases  may  include  expenses  incurred  for  a  con- 
veyance or  lodging,  extra  fare  if  the  passenger  waits  for 
another  train,  loss  of  time,  and  for  any  other  injury  directly  re- 
sulting from  the  negligent  act  of  the  carrier.90  But  where  the 
passenger  was  unable  to  procure  a  conveyance  or  lodging  at  the 
point  at  which  he  was  left  and  he  walked  home,  it  was  held  that 
the  action  was  one  on  the  contract  of  carriage  and  that  damages 
for  exposure  and  fatigue,  incident  to  such  walk,  were  too  remote 
and  not  recoverable.91  This  element  of  damages  we  have,  how- 
ever, discussed  elsewhere,92  and  the  weight  of  authority  sup- 
ports the  conclusion  that  such  damages  are  recoverable,  espe- 
cially in  those  cases  where  it  appears  that  no  lodging  or  convey- 
ance can  be  obtained  at  the  place  at  which  the  passenger  is  left. 

§  345.  Duty  to  minimize  damages— Ejection  of  passen- 
ger.—Where  a  passenger,  in  violation  of  his  contract  of  carriage, 
is  ejected  from  a  train,  there  is  no  obligation  imposed  upon  him 
to  minimize  his  damages  by  paying  an  additional  fare  to  avoid 
his  removal  though  he  may  be  able  to  do  so.93  But  where  a 
passenger  who  had  been  ejected  from  a  train  sought  shelter  and 
protection  at  a  place  further  distant  from  the  place  of  his  eject- 
ment than  a  reasonably  prudent  person  would  have  done  under 
similar  circumstances,  it  was  held  that  for  an  excess  of  injuries 
caused  by  such  want  of  prudence  damages  could  not  be  re- 
covered.94 


«9  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Quillen,  22  Ind.  App.  496;  53  N.  E. 
1024;  1  Rep.  120G.  In  this  case  $150 
was  held  excessive  where  the  only 
expense  incurred  was  $5  for  a  con- 
veyance and  the  only  evidence  of 
inconvenience  or  other  damage  was 
the  fact  of  an  evening  ride  across 
country. 

90  See  in  this  connection  Paddock 
v.  Atchison,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed. 
841;  Alabama,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sellers,  93  Ala.  9;  Chic,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
v.  Brisbane,  24  111.  App.  463;  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr,  71  Md. 
135;  Schumaker  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R. 
402 


Co.,  46  Minn.  39;  12  L.  R.  A.  257;  48 
N.  W.  559;  Dorrah  v.  Illinois  C.  R. 
Co.,  65  Miss.  14;  Lake  Shore,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rosenzweig,  113  Pa.  St. 
519;  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry,  62 
Tex.  380. 

si  Hobbs  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  10  Q.   B.  111. 

92  See  sec.  349  herein  and  preced- 
ing sections  under  this  chapter. 

93  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  17  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  55;  42  S.  W.  239.  See  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Patter- 
son (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W.  848. 

sa  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Turner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23  S.  W.  83. 


ACTIONS    i;v    PASSENGERS. 


S  346 


§  340.  Passenger  carried  beyond  destination.  Where, 
owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  carrier,  .1  passenger  is  carried 
beyond  his  destination,  the  latter  may  recover  compensatory 
damages  fertile  Loss  or  injury  proximately  resulting  therefrom.88 
In  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  ;i  wilfulness  or  wantonness 
on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  or  acts  which  show  gross  negligence, 
the  damages  arc  Limited  in  such  cases  to  an  amount  which  is 
compensatory  for  the  injury  sustained.  So  where  a  conductor 
of  a  train  became  confused  by  an  altercation  with  some  of  the 
passengers  and  neglected  to  stop  his  train  at  a  station  to  which 
a  passenger  was  hound  and  carried  him  eighl  miles  beyond  the 
same,  for  which  neglect  the  conductor  courteously  apologized 


35  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, is  Ky.  L.  Rep,  296;  36S.  W.  IT:'.; 
4  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  437; 
Judice  v.  Southern  P.  Co.,  47  La. 
Ann.  255;  16  So.  816;  Cable  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  892;  29 
s.  E.  377.  See  following  oases  as  to  | 
different  amounts  which  have  been 
awarded  in  such  cases:  Carrying 
beyond  destination  and  refusal  to 
back  up  to  station,  accompanied  by 
profane  language  by  conductor  in 
presence  of  ladies — $1,000,  held  not 
excessive.  Fordyce  v.  Nix,  58  Ark. 
136;  23  S.  W.  967.  Arm  broken  in 
attempting  to  walk  back  to  station 
$1,000,  not  excessive.  New  York 
C.  &  St.  L.  K.  Co.  v.  Doane,  115 
Ind.  435;  1  L.  R.  A.  157;  17  N.  E. 
913.  Young  and  inexperienced  girl 
carried  past  one  station  to  point  at 
which   she    could    not    safely    alight 

and  thenhalf  mile  past  next  station, 
which  conductor  promised  to  stop 
.at — $400,  not  excessive.  Louisville, 
N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rinicker,  17 
Ind.  App.  619;  47  N.  E.  239;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  15:1.  Woman  in  delicate 
condition  compelled  to  have  train 
four  hundred  yards  beyond  station 
and  walk  back  over  a  rough  and 
rocky  road  —  §218,  not  excessive. 
Louisville  *   N.    R.   Co.    v.   tiny,   18 


Ky.  L.  Rep.  750;  37  S.  W.  1043. 
Verdict  for  84,500  considered  very 
large,  but  as  jury  bad  power  to  give 
punitive  damages,  court  refused  to 
set  it  aside.  New  <  )i  leans,  etc.,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hurst,  36  Miss.  660.  Young 
lady  carried  to  next  station  beyond — 
courteously  treated — only  annoyance 
was  being  obliged  to  wait  three 
hours  for  return  train  s'_'50,  held  ex- 
cessive. Southern  It.  Co.  v.  Bryant, 
lo:,  Ga.  316;  31  S.  E.  182;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  II.  Cas.  \.  S.  l;,!).  Young  lady 
carried  one  and  a  half  miles  beyond 
station — daytime — told  in  loud  tone 
to  get  off — necessary  to  walk  back 
over  track — 82,000,  excessive.  Chat- 
tanooga. R.  A-  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Lyon.  89 
Ga.  I''.:  15  L.  R.  A.  857:  15  S.  E.  24. 
Carried  two  miles  beyond  station — 
obliged  to  walk  hack  healthy,  able- 
bodied  man — no  ill  effects  except 
slight  fatigue — $50, excessive.  Gulf 
C.  &  s.  F.  R  (o.  v.  Ryan  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  i.  IS  S.  W.  silo.  Carried  one 
half  mile  beyond  station  —  night  inn- 
obliged  to  walk  and  to  crawl  over 
two  trestles  on  his  knees,  which  were 
Sure  for  several  days  cold  and  COUgb 
from  exposure  —  81,000,  excessive. 
Texas  A  I'.  K.  Co.  v.  Mansell  (Tex. 
civ.  App.),  23  S.  W.  549. 

403 


8  347 


ACTION'S    BY    PASSENGERS. 


and  gave  him  a  free  return  ticket  from  that  station,  it  was  held 
to  be  only  a  ease  lor  the  awarding  of  compensatory  damages.96 

§  347.  Passenger  carried  beyond  destination— Continued. 

— Where  a  passenger  is  wrongfully  carried  past  his  destination, 
the  jury  may,  in  awarding  damages  therefor,  properly  consider 
the  items,  incouvenience,  delay  and  expenses  resulting  from 
such  negligent  act.'1''  And  in  such  case  evidence  that  the  pass- 
enger was  compelled  to  walk  back  over  dusty  roads,  that  it  took 
her  about  three  hours,  that  she  was  frightened  by  being  chased  by 
dogs  and  by  other  causes,  that  she  got  wet  in  crossing  a  creek, 
and  that  by  reason  of  the  sultry  weather  she  was  made  sick, 
is  competent.'18  But  where  a  woman  passenger  with  a  sick 
child  was  carried  past  her  station,  it  was  held  that  the  jury,  in 
estimating  the  damages,  were  not  to  consider  an  arrangement 
which  had  been  made  with  the  father  of  such  passenger  to  meet 
her  and  her  child  at  the  station  and  take  them  to  her  sister's 
home,  where  the  child  was  to  receive  medical  treatment,  there 
being  no  evidence  showing  that  the  company  knew  of  any  such 
arrangement."  And  the  fact  that  a  tenant  failed  to  pay  a 
debt  during  the  absence  of  a  passenger  from  home  under  such 
circumstances,  is  held  not  to  be  a  proper  item  to  consider  in  the 
estimation  of  damages  where  there  is  no  evidence  showing  what 


96  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scurr,  59 
Miss.  456;  42  Am.  Rep.  373.  There 
being  no  evidence  iu  this  of  auy  in- 
convenience or  injury  except  that 
the  passenger  suffered  from  a  slight 
cold,  it  was  held  that  a  verdict  of 
$833.33  was  excessive  and  should  be 
set  aside. 

97Airey  v.  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co., 
50  La.  Ann.  648;  23  So.  512;  11  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  836.  But  see 
St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  McCulloush 
(Tex  Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  285, 
where  it  is  held  that  if  the  company 
used  ordinary  care  not  to  inflict  any 
unnecessary  inconvenience  in  such  a 
case,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  in- 
convenience in  such  an  action. 

^Cincinnati,   Hamilton  A   Indian- 

404 


npolis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eaton,  94  Ind. 
474;  48  Am.  Rep.  179.  But  see  Gulf 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleveland  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  33  S.  W.  687,  where  it 
was  held  that  a  passenger  carried 
past  his  destination  could  only  re- 
cover for  cost  of  lodging  or  of  a  con- 
veyance, and  not  for  damages  inci- 
dent to  his  walking  to  his  destination 
without  inquiry  as  to  lodgings  or  a 
conveyance.  See  also  for  a  consider- 
ation of  damages  in  such  cases,  sec. 
349  herein. 

»  Chic.  R.  I.  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyles, 
11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  522;  33  S.  W. 
247.  See  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
McKenzie  (Tex.  Civ.  App),  41  S.  W. 
831. 


ACTIONS    l:V    PASSENGERS.  §348 

she  might  have  done  to  compel  its  payment  if  she  had  been 
present.""  The  fact  thai  a  woman  who  had  been  carried  past 
her  station  owing  to  the  failure  to  call  her  as  requested,  did  not 
leave  the  train  at  a  point  some  distance  beyond  her  station  and 
accept  a  return  fare  and  an  opportunity  to  return  by  the  next 
train,  but  chose  to  continue  on  the  train  and  find  shelter  among 
her  relatives,  is  not,  it  has  been  held,  to  be  construed  as  a  fail- 
ure on  her  part  to  reduce  her  damages.1  Again,  an  action  to 
recover  damages  for  carrying  a  passenger  beyond  his  destina- 
tion is,  for  the  purpose  of  determining  costs  under  the  Indiana 
statute  where  the  verdict  is  lor  less   than  #50,  to  be  treated  as 

an  action  in  tort,  the  contract  of  carriage  in  such  a  case  being 
considered  only  as  an  incident  in  the  creatiou  of  the  relation 
from  which  the  company's  duty  arose.' 

§  348.  Exemplary  damages— Passenger  carried  beyond  des- 
tination.— It  is  the  duty  of  a  carrier  to  accept  and  transport 
a  passenger,  and  also  to  permit  him  to  alight  at  his  destina- 
tion and  to  allow  him  a  reasonable  time  so  to  do.  And  where, 
owing  to  the  gross  negligence  or  wanton  or  intentional  acts 
of  the  company,  a  passenger  is  carried  beyond  the  place  his 
ticket  calls  for,  he  may  recover  not  only  damages  to  compen- 
sate him  for  the  injury,  but  also  exemplary  damages  may  be  al- 
lowed.8 So  such  damages  were  held  to  be  properly  allowable 
where  the  employees  of  a  railroad  refused  to  put  a  passenger  off 
at  her  station  and  to  whom  they  were  "  insulting  either  in  words. 
tone  or  manner."4  But  exemplary  damages  cannot  be  recovered 
for  failure  to  announce  the  station  or  to  give  a  passenger  a  rea- 
sonable time  to  alight  from  ;i  train,  unless  such  failure  is  accom- 
panied by  wilfulness  or  other  aggravating  conduct."'      So  where 


1 "'  Airey  V.  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co., 
50  Ln.  Ann.  G4S;  23  So.  512;  11  Am. 
A-  Eng.  R.  <-:«s.  N.  S.  836. 

1  Airey  v.  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.,  50 
La.  Ann.  648;  23  So.  512;  11  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  S.  836. 

"Evansville  &  F.  II.  K.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
son, 20  I  ml.  A  pp.  5;  50  N.  E.  90; 
4  Am.  Neg.  Pep.  141. 

;i  Memphis,  etc.,  Packet  Co.  v. 
Nagel,  16  Ky.  L.  Rep.  748;  29  S.  W. 


743;  New  Orleans,  etc..  R.  P.  <  o.  v. 
Hurst.  36  Miss.  660. 

*  Louisville  &  V  P.  Co.  v.  Ballard, 
10  Ky.  L.  Rep.  7:'.5:  2  1..  P.  A.  694; 
10  S.  W.  429.  See  also  Memphis,  etc., 
Packet  Co.  v.  Nagel,  16  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
748;  29  S.  W.  743. 

BJudice  v.  Southern  1".  Co.,    IT  La. 

Ann.  255;  15  So.  816;  Dorrah  v.  Il- 
linois (  .  K.  Co.,  65  Miss.  14;  3  So. 
36;   Xorfork    &    W.   P.   Co.   v.    Lips- 

405 


§  348  ACTIONS   BY   PASSENGERS. 

a  conductor  negligently  omitted  to  have  his  train  stop  at  a  flag 
station  so  that  certain  lady  passengers  might  alight  therefrom, 
and  for  such  failure  he  expressed  his  regrets  to  them  and 
stopped  at  the  next  station  and  endeavored  to  procure  a  con- 
veyance to  take  them  back  to  such  flag  station,  it  was  held  that 
his  acts  did  not  evince  such  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  circum- 
stances as  to  authorize  the  recovery  of  punitive  damages.6  But 
where  a  carrier  passed  a  station  without  giving  a  passenger  op- 
portunity to  alight  and  refused  to  return  him  to  such  station, 
where  the  omission  was  discovered  within  a  reasonable  time  and 
there  was  no  controlling  agency  to  prevent  the  return,  aside  from 
mere  inconvenience,  it  was  held  that  exemplary  damages  might 
be  recovered.7  In  the  Georgia  Code8  it  is  provided  that  "in 
every  tort  there  may  be  aggravating  circumstances  either  in  the 
act  or  the  intention,  and  in  that  event  the  jury  may  give  addi- 
tional damages,  either  to  deter  the  wrongdoer  from  repeating 
the  trespass  or  as  compensation  for  the  wounded  feelings  of  the 
plaintiff."  In  a  case  where  this  provision  was  read  to  the  jury, 
it  was  held  that  the  mere  negligent  omission  of  a  carrier  to  stop 
its  train  at  a  given  point  to  which  it  has  undertaken  to  transport 
a  passenger  is  not  a  trespass  within  the  meaning  of  the  Code,  and 
that  the  reading  to  the  jury  of  the  concluding  clauses  of  that 
section,  namely,  as  to  the  giving  of  additional  damages  either  to 
deter  the  wrongdoer  from  repeating  the  trespass  or  as  compen- 
sation for  the  wounded  feelings  of  the  plaintiff  was  error.9  In 
another  case  in  the  same  state,  which  was  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  carrying  plaintiffs  beyond  their  destination,  where 
it  appeared  that  they  were  carried  to  the  next  station  beyond, 
where  they  had  to  wait  for  a  few  hours,  when  they  were  brought 
to  the  proper  station  by  a  train  from  the  opposite  direction,  it 
was  held  that  the  provisions  of  the  Code,10  that  in  some  torts  the 
injury  was  to  the  peace,  happiness  or  feelings  of  the  plaintiff  and 
that  the  worldly  circumstances  of  the  parties,  the  amount  of  bad 


comb,  90   Va.    137;  20  L.   R.   A.  817; 
17  S.  E.  809. 

e  Kentucky  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Biddle,  17 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1363;  34  S.  W.  904. 

7  Samuels   v.    Richmond  &   D.    R. 
Co.,  35  S.  C.  493;  14  S.  E.  943. 

s  Sec.  3906,  Civ.  Code. 
40G 


9 Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hardin,  101 
Ga.  263;  28  S.  E.  847;  10  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  250;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
783. 

i°  Ga.  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3907. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS.  §  349 

faith  in  the  transaction,  and  all  the  attendant  facts  should  l>e 
weighed,  should  not  be  read  to  the  jury." 

§349.  Passenger— Illness  duo  to  exposure— Walking  to 

destination. — In  the  estimation  of  the  damages  which  maybe 

allowed  therefor,  the  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  place 
of  the  ejection,  the  condition  of  the  weather,  and  tin-  sickness 
and  Buffering,  if  any,  resulting  from  exposure  thereto.18  So 
where  a  passenger  was  put  off  at  a  station  where  there  was 
no  station  house,  except  a  box  car,  of  which  use  as  a  station 
she  was  ignorant,  and  she  walked  hack  four  miles  to  the  sta- 
tion from  which  she  came,  it  was  held  that  she  might  recover 
for  damages  from  exposure  resulting  from  such  walk,  since  it 
was  the  natural  and  reasonable  thing  to  do.13  And  in  another 
case,  where  a  passenger  was  wrongfully  ejected  at  a  place  a  long 
distance  from  his  destination  where  his  duties  required  him  to 
be,  to  which  place  he  was  obliged  to  walk,  damages  were  al- 
lowed for  annoyances  and  exhaustion  caused  by  exposure." 
Again,  where  passengers  were  put  off  a  train  in  the  night  at 
a  considerable  distance  from  their  destination  and  at  a  place 
where  no  houses  could  be  seen  and  they  were  obliged  to  walk- 
to  their  destination,  and  in  consequence  of  the  exposure  caused 
by  such  walk  the  woman,  plaintiff  in  this  case,  who  was  preg- 
nant at  the  time,  suffered  a  miscarriage  and  consequent  illness, 
it  was  decided  that  the  acts  done  by  the  plaintiff  were  proper, 
that  the  negligence  of  the  company  was  the  proximate,  and  not 
the  remote,  cause  of  the  plaintiff's  injury,  that  the  plaintiff  acted 
with  ordinary  care  and  prudence  to  get  out  of  the  difficulty  in 
which  she  had  been  placed,  and  that  such  injury  could  be  traced 
directly  to  the  defendant's  negligence  as  its  cause.1"'  In  an  Eng- 
lish case,  however,  which  was  an  action  upon  the  contract  for 
carriage,  a  different  conclusion   was  reached.1"      In   this  case,  it 


"Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Bryant,  105 
Ga.  310;  31  S.  E.  182;  12  Am.  &  1  □  ■; 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  159. 

12  Cross  v.  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  50  Mo.  App.  664. 

"Malone  v.  Pittsburg  &  L.  E.  R. 
Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  390;  26  Atl.  638;  31 
W.  N.  C.  407;  23  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  467. 


14  Lake  Erie  A-  W.   K.  Co.  v.  Cloes, 
5  Ind.  App.  444;  32  N.  E.  588. 

15  Brown  v.  Chic.  M.    A-   St.  P.  Ry. 
Co..  54  Wis.  342:  41  Am.  Rep.  41. 

i6Hol>bs  v.   London  A  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  lu  Q.  1).  111. 


407 


§  349  ACTIONS   BY    PASSENGERS. 

appeared  that  a  passenger  with  his  wife  and  child  were,  owing  to 
the  negligence  of  the  company,  permitted  to  alight  at  the  wrong 
station  in  the  nighttime  where  they  could  neither  get  accommoda- 
tions for  the  night  nor  a  conveyance.  They  consequently  were 
obliged  to  walk  a  distance  of  about  five  miles  in  the  rain  in  order 
to  reach  their  destination,  and  as  a  result  of  the  exposure  the  wife 
caught  cold  and  was  taken  ill.  In  an  action  to  recover  therefor, 
it  was  held  that  the  action  was  based  on  the  contract,  and  that 
damages  for  the  illness  resulting  from  the  exposure  were  too 
remote  to  be  recoverable,  since  it  could  not  be  said  to  be  either 
the  necessary  or  probable  consequence  of  a  person  being  put  down 
at  an  improper  place  and  having  to  walk  home,  that  he  should 
sustain  either  a  personal  injury  or  catch  a  cold,  and  such  illness 
could  not  be  considered  as  having  been  in  the  contemplation  of 
the  parties  when  they  made  the  contract.  In  this  case,  how- 
ever, it  would  seem  that  the  plaintiff  should  have  been  permitted 
to  recover.  By  the  defendant's  negligence  the  woman,  accom- 
panied by  her  husband  and  child,  was  left  at  a  very  small  station, 
where  no  conveyances  or  accommodations  for  the  night  could  be 
obtained.  If  it  had  occurred  at  a  larger  place  where  vehicles 
by  reasonable  effort  could  have  been  found  or  accommodations  se- 
cured, which  would  have  prevented  any  necessity  for  the  long 
walk,  the  illness  due  to  the  exposure  might  then  have  properly 
been  found  to  be  due  to  the  passenger's  neglect  or  carelessness 
and  not  that  of  the  company.  But  such  was  not  the  condition 
of  affairs.  Owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  company  the  passen- 
ger was  obliged  to  walk  home  in  order  to  extricate  herself 
from  the  difficulty  in  which  the  company  had  negligently  placed 
her.  If  she  had  remained  at  the  place  she  was  left  at  for  the 
night,  with  no  accommodations  and  had  perhaps  subjected  herself 
to  and  in  fact  suffered  a  more  severe  illness,  would  the  company 
not  have  contended  that  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  prudence 
she  should  have  undertaken  to  walk  to  her  home,  and  would  not 
such  a  contention  have  been  upheld  as  a  reasonable  one  and  have 
been  considered  as  a  defense  to  a  recovery,  or  at  least  in  mitiga- 
tion of  damages  ?  Under  the  circumstances  of  this  case  it  seems 
a  very  reasonable  consequence  that  a  passenger  ejected  or  left 
at  such  a  station  might  be  compelled  to  walk  home,  and  we  fail 
to  see  how  the  consequent  illness,  due  to  the  exposure  occasioned 
408 


ACTIONS    i:Y    PASSENGERS.  §  360 

by  such  walking,  could  be  considered  as  one  not  in  the  reasonable 
contemplation  of  the  parties  when  the  contract  was  made.  It 
would  also  seem  that  such  illness  was  not  too  remote  even  though 
the  action  be  considered  as  in  contract.1' 

§  350.  Same  subject— Conclusion.— It  might  occur  in  souk 
cases  that  a  passenger  would  be  ejected  or  left  at  a  station  where 

conveyances  or  lodging  for  the  night  could  be  obtained,  and 
where  the  passenger  would  be  under  no  necessity  of  walking  to 
his  destination.  In  such  cases,  if  he  elects  to  walk  instead  of 
procuring  a  conveyance  or  lodging,  it  would  be  only  reasonable 
and  proper  that  for  any  damages  resulting  from  such  walk  the 
passenger  should  be  held  responsible  and  not  the  carrier.  But 
if  the  carrier  has  left  a  passenger  at  a  point  where  he  can  nei- 
ther procure  a  conveyance  or  lodging,  and  where  the  only  course 
left  open  to  him  to  extricate  himself  from  his  difficulty  is  to 
walk,  then  a  different  rule  should  prevail.  The  carrier's  obli- 
gation is  to  transport  the  passenger  to  a  certain  destination,  and 
if  he  wrongfully  ejects  him  or  negligently  puts  him  off  at  a 
point  beyond  or  short  of  his  destination  where  no  conveyance 
or  lodging  may  be  had,  and  where  if  he  would  get  out  of  his 
difficulty  he  must  walk,  then  the  carrier  should  be  held  respon- 
sible for  any  injuries  necessarily  resulting  from  such  walk,  in- 
cluding exposure  to  the  weather  and  illness  resulting  from  such 
exposure.  Though  it  has  in  some  instances  been  intimated  that 
the  fact  of  the  action  being  one  in  tort  or  on  the  contract  may 
be  a  determining  factor  in  the  consideration  of  this  question, 
yet  it  seems  to  us  that  the  true  rule  is,  as  we  have  just  stated. 
that  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  action,  whether  it  be 
in  contract  or  tort,  if  the  passenger  elects  to  walk  on  a  dark 
or  rainy  night,  exposing  himself  to  risks  of  injury  or  conse- 
quent sickness  when  he  might  procure  a  conveyance  or  Lodging 
and  thus  avoid  such  risk,  the  damages  incident  to  his  election 
must  be  borne  by  him.     On  the  other  hand,  whether  the  action 


"See  McMahon  v.  Field,  7  Q.  B. 
Div.  591;  Cincinnati,  II.  &  I.  K.  R, 
Co.  v.  Baton,  '.'4  Ind.  474;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry,  62 
Tex.  380;  Brown  v.  Chic.    M.  &    St. 


P.  B.  C>..  51  Wis.  342;  ii  \ in.  Rep. 
41.  But  Bee  Muiilcick  v.  Boston  & 
Albany  K.  R.  Co.,  133  Mass.  16;  St 
Louis  A  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Thorn  is  I  Tex. 
Civ.  A  pp.  i.  27  S.  W.  419. 

409 


§351 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 


be  considered  as  on  the  contract  or  in  tort,  this  should  not  affect 
the  determination  of  the  question  of  his  recovery  where  the  car- 
rier has  left  him  at  a  point  where  no  choice  is  left  to  him,  but 
his  only  way  to  extricate  himself  from  his  difficulty  is  to  walk, 
since  this  is  only  the  reasonable  act  of  an  ordinarily  prudent  man, 
an  act  which  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  will  follow  the  car- 
rier's act,  and  exposure  and  illness  therefrom  are  only  natural  re- 
sults from  such  act  directly  traceable  to  the  act  of  the  carrier,  and 
results  which  in  such  cases  are  reasonably  to  be  contemplated. 


§  351.  Passenger — Injury  to  health  by  exposure. — Where 
a  passenger  is  subjected  to  exposure  to  the  weather,  either  by 
wrongful  ejection  by  the  carrier  or  other  negligent  conduct  on 
its  part,  damages  for  injury  to  health,  caused  by  such  exposure, 
may  be  recovered  where  such  injury  is  the  natural  and  proxi- 
mate result  of  the  wrongful  or  negligent  act.18  And  where  a 
passenger  is  wrongfully  ejected  from  a  streetcar,  and  as  a  result 
of  exposure  to  the  cold  illness  ensues,  he  may  recover  damages 
therefor.19  But  where  a  passenger  was  ejected  from  a  train  at 
a  point  about  fifty  miles  from  his  destination,  and  he  started 
to  drive  thereto,  and  instead  of  starting  early  in  the  morning 
he  waited  until  the  first  part  of  the  afternoon,  it  was  held  that 
damages  were  not  recoverable  for  exposure  and  hardships 
caused  by  his  losing  his  way  upon  the  prairie  during  the  night.* 
In  another  case  where  a  passenger,  after  alighting  from  her 
train,  was  compelled  to  remain  in  a  hail  and  rain  storm  because 
the  way  to  the  depot  was  obstructed  by  a  freight  train,  it  was 
decided  that  damages  for  such  exposure  were  recoverable.21     So, 


18  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hed- 
dleston,  82  Ala.  218;  Baltimore  C.  P. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Kemp,  61  Md.  74;  Lerue 
v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  48  Minn.  78; 
50  N.  W.  1021;  Heim  v.  McCaughan, 
32  Miss.  17;  Williams  v.  Vander- 
bilt,  28  N.  Y.  217;  Malone  v.  Pitts- 
burg R.  R.  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  390;  25 
Atl.  638;  31  W.  N.  C.  407;  23  Pitts. 
L.  J.  N.  S.  467. 

19  Toronto  R.  Co.  v.  Grinsted,  24 
Can.  S.  C.  570;  Grinsted  v.  Toronto 
R.  Co.,  24  Ont.  Rep.  683. 

410 


20  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Spirk,  51 
Neb.  167;  70  N.  W.  926;  7  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  105. 

21  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v  Keller, 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  957;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
L.  Cas.  N.  S.  89;  47  S.  W.  1072;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  348.  In  this  case  it 
also  appeared  that  the  plaintiff  was 
subjected  to  the  jeers  of  the  railroad 
employees  while  so  exposed.  The 
court  held  that  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  gross  negligence  in  ob- 
structing the  way  to  the  depot,  and 


ACTIONS    i:\     PASSENGERS.  §  :'""'l 

also,  where  owing  to  the  negligence  of  a  railroad  company  a 
collision  ensues  al  the  crossing  of  two  roads,  damages  are  recov- 
erable from  such  company  for  exposure  to   the  weather,  where 

such  exposure  is  the  proximate  result  of  the  negligence.'-  But 
in  another  case,  where  owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  defendant, 

its  sleeping  car  caught  fire  and  plaintiff  was  compelled  to  leave 
the  car  half  clad  and  took  cold  which  resulted  in  the  suppression 
of  her  menses  and  a  long  illness,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant 
was  not   liable  in  damages  therefor,  since  it  appeared   from  the 
evidence  that  the  plaint  ill'  was  menstruating  at  such  time,  and 
that  such  condition  was  the  cause  of  her  illness.83     The  court 
declared  in  this  case  that  though    the  exposure  was  the  direct 
result  of  the  defendant's  negligence,  yet  the  illness  was  not  the 
result  of  the  exposure,  but  the  result  of  the  exposure  in  her  then 
condition  ;  that  such  condition  was  unknown  to  the  carrier  and 
the  increased  risk  arising  therefrom  must  rest  upon  the  should- 
ers of  the  plaintiff.     In   its  opinion  the  court  cited  the  case  of 
Hobbs   v.   London   &   S.    W.    lty.   Co.'4      But  in   the   principal 
case25  there  certainly  seems  no  just  reason  why  recovery  should 
have  been  denied   to  the   plaintiff.      If  a  carrier  has  negligently 
placed  a  passenger  in   a  position   where  injury   may  ensue,  it 
should   be  responsible   for  all  the   immediate   and  direct    conse- 
quences of  its  negligence.     Though  in  this  particular   case  the 
woman's  condition   was  the  nearest  cause   of  her    illness,   yet 
such  condition   is  not  unusual  to  every  normal  healthy   woman 
under  a  certain  age,  and  of   this   fact  all  persons  have  knowl- 
edge.    If  it  were  a  rare  and  exceptional  condition,  there  might 
be  a  basis  for  the  conclusion   reached  in   this  case,  but  to   hold 
that  especially  in  such  instances  the   company  must  have   per- 
sonal knowledge  of   this  particular  condition  of  its  female  pass- 
engers in  order    to    he   responsible    tor  any    illness  or  trouble 
possibly  arising    from    such    condition,    even    though    directly 
traceable  to  the  company's  negligence  would,  it  seems,  he  carry- 
ing a  rule,  that  the  company  should  have  knowledge  of  its  pas 


that  punitive  damages  might  prop- 
erly be  given.  A  verdict  fur  $260 
■was  held  not  excessive. 

-Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Settle,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  357;  47  S. 
W.  82a. 


•i-1  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Barker, 
4  Colo.  344;  3  t  Am.  Rep.  89. 

«  L.  R  to  Q.  B.  111. 

*  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Barker 
4  Colo.  :',44;    34  Am.  K.p.  sit. 

411 


§§  352,  353     actions  by  passengers. 

senger's  infirmities  in  order  to  render  it  liable  for  certain  results, 
to  an  absurdity. 

§  352.  Fright  in  connection  with  physical  injury— Expul- 
sion of  passenger. — Where  a  person  is  wrongfully  expelled 
from  a  train,  the  expulsion  maybe  at  a  place  where  the  sur- 
roundings are  such  as  to  cause  great  fright,  which  of  course,  be- 
ing a  species  of  mental  suffering,  is  an  element  of  damages* 
Thus,  where  a  woman  was  compelled  to  leave  a  train  at  a  point 
several  hundred  feet  from  a  depot  platform  and  was  injured  by 
falling  into  a  culvert,  it  was  held  that  recovery  was  not  limited 
to  damages  for  the  physical  injury,  but  that  there  might  also  be 
recovery  for  fright  suffered  by  her  in  endeavoring  to  extricate 
herself  from  the  culvert,  while  cars  were  approaching  on  the  side 
track.21  And  where  a  child  was  in  violation  of  the  statute  ex- 
pelled from  a  train  a  few  hundred  feet  from  a  depot  and  left  on 
the  track,  it  was  held  that  derangement  of  the  mind,  resulting 
from  fright  at  being  left  in  such  place,  was  an  element  of  dam- 
age.'^ In  a  case  in  California  where  an  action  was  brought  to 
recover  damages  for  the  ejection  of  a  passenger  from  a  train,  it 
was  decided  that  paroxysms  of  the  nervous  system,  resulting 
from  the  indignity  and  humiliation  suffered  by  the  passenger, 
constituted  a  bodily  injury  for  which  damages  might  be  re- 
covered.'^ 

§  353.  Mental  suffering,  etc.— Passenger  carried  beyond 
destination. — Where  a  passenger  is  carried  beyond  his  destina- 
tion no  damages  for  mental  suffering  or  fright  unaccompanied 
by  any  physical  injury  are  recoverable.30  So  where,  by  the  neg- 
ligence of  a  railway  company,  a  passenger  was  carried  beyond 
her  destination,  but  suffered  no  insult  or  personal  injury,  it  was 


20  See  preceding  section. 

27  Stutz  v.  Chieage  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
73  Wis.  147;  40  X.  W.  653. 

28  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Latimer, 
128  111.  163. 

29  Sloane  v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co., 
Ill  Cal.  668;  44  Pac.  320;  32  L.  R.  A. 
193.  See  sees.  219,  220.  352  herein, 
on  Fright — Physicial  injury  resulting 
from. 

412 


30  Judice  v.  Southern  P.  Co.,  47  La. 
Ann.  255;  16  So.  816;  Trigg  v.  St. 
Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Mo. 
147;  41  Am.  Rep.  305;  Strange  v.  Mo. 
P.  R.  Co.,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  209;  Pull- 
man Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Trimhle  (Tex. 
C.  A. )  28  S.  W.  96.  But  see  Texas 
&  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Gott,  20  Tex.  C.  A. 
335;  50S.W.  193. 


ACTIONS    I'.V    PASSENGERS. 


held  that  there  could  be  no  recovery  for  anxiety,  effects  on  bei 
health  nor  danger  by  reason  of  the  train  stopping  an  insufficient 
time  for  her  to  get  off.  And  where  by  the  negligence  of  a  rail- 
road company  a  passenger  was  afforded  no  opportunity  to  alight 
at  her  destination,  recovery  by  her  for  mental  anguish  which 
she  suffered  on  account  of  the  fright  and  distress  of  a  child  from 
whom  she  was  separated  was  denied.'"  In  a  later  decision  in  this 
same  state  it  is  determined,  however,  that  there  may  be  a  recov- 
ery for  fright,  worry  and  mental  anguish  where  a  passenger  IS 
carried  beyond  her  destination,  though  no  physical  injuries  are 
sustained.'53  In  another  case,  where  a  train  which  was  signalled 
to  stop  at  a  flag  station  failed  to  do  so,  it  was  held  that  mental 
suffering,  occasioned  as  a  result  of  the  the  failure  to  stop,  formed 
no  part  of  the  actual  injury  if  the  act  was  not  wilfully  done.51 

§354.  Mental  suffering    Injury  to  feelings,  etc — Ejec- 
tion of  passenger. — Where  a   passenger  is  wrongfully  ejected 

from  a  train  under  such  circumstances  as  to  cause  mental  suffer- 
ing, humiliation,  shame,  mortification,  wounded  pride,  disgrace, 
indignity  or  insult,  these  elements,  in  substance  the  same,  but 
thus  variously  designated  by  the  courts,  occurring  in  connection 
with  such  ejection  may,  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  therefor, 
be  considered  in  determining  the  amount  recoverable."     And 


81  Trigg  v.  St.  Louis,  Kansas  City 
&  N.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Mo.  147;  41  Am. 
Rep.  305. 

32  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Trim- 
ble (Tex.  C.  A.),  28  S.  W.  96. 

33  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Grott,  20 
Tex.  C.  A.  335;  50  S.  YV.  193. 

«  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Siddons,  53 
111.  App.  607. 

85  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hine, 
121  Ala.  234;  14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  382;  25  So.  857,  humiliation 
and  indignity.  Hot  Springs  R.  Co. 
v.  Deloncy,  65  Ark.  177;  45  S.  W. 
361,  humiliation.  Cooper  v.  Mullins, 
30  (J:i.  146,  mental  agony.  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  v.  Oonnell,  127  111.  419;  20 
N.  E.  89,  indignity.  Chicago  &  C.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Flagg,  43  111.  364;   Chicago 


&  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  A. lams,  69  111.  App. 
571,  wounded  pride  and  humiliation. 
Paleo  v.  Bray,  125  End.  229;  25  N.  E. 
439,  humiliation  and  indignity. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Goben,  15  Ind.  App.  123;  42  X.  E. 
1116,  shame  and  humiliation.  Shep- 
ard  v.  Chicago,  R.  1.  ft  P.  R.  Co.,  77 
Iowa,  54;  41  N.  W.  564,  indignity, 
humiliation,  wounded  pride  and 
mental  suffering.  Curtis  v.  Sioux 
City  £  II.  P.  R.  Co.  i  Iowa  i.  54  N.  \Y. 
339;  Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice, 
38Kan.  398;  16  Pac.  817,  injury  to 
feelings.  Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hinsdale,  38  Kan.  507;  16  Pac.  937; 
Serne  v.  Northern  I'.  I.'.  Co.  I  Minn.), 
50  N.  W.  1021,  indignity,  cherry  v. 
Kansas  City,  F.  I).  S.  ft  M.  K.  R.  Co., 

413 


§354 


ACTIONS    P.Y    PASSENGERS. 


though  the  conductor  of  a  train  may  not  be  personally  at  fault 
and  may  act  with  no  ill-will  or  malice  in  (lie  ejection  of  a  pas- 
senger, yet  if  the  ejection  be  wrongful,  mental  suffering  caused 
by  the  shame  and  disgrace  felt  by  such  passenger  will  be  an 
element  of  damages  for  which  recovery  may  be  had.36  So  where 
the  conductor  did  not  err  personally,  but  the  expulsion  was  due 
to  the  mistake  of  the  ticket  agent,  recovery  was  allowed  for  the 
humiliation  suffered.37  And  where  a  conductor  in  good  faith 
ejected  a  passenger,  owing  to  a  misconception  of  her  rights  un- 
der a  season  ticket,  and  the  conductor  acted  with  no  indication 
of  ill-will  or  malice,  but  did  only  what  was  necessary  to  carry 
out  his  instructions  and  in  as  gentlemanly  a  manner  as  was  con- 
sistent with  a  proper  discharge  of  his  duties,  recovery  was  al- 
lowed for  the  mental  suffering  caused  by  the  shame  and  dis- 
grace.38 So,  also,  where  a  young  lady  whose  ticket  was  wrongfully 
taken  up  was  ordered  to  vacate  the  car  or  pa}r  fare,  it  was  held 
that  she  might  recover  for  the  humiliation  and  mental  suffering 
due  to  having  the  attention  of  other  passengers  attracted  thereto 
and  to  being  put  under  obligations  to  a  stranger  who  advanced 
money  to  purchase  such  ticket.159  Again,  if  a  conductor  in 
ejecting  a  passenger  uses  insulting  and  abusive  language,  there 
may  be  a  recovery  by  the  passenger  on  account  of  the  words 
for  injury  to  his  feelings,  but  he  cannot  recover  damages  because 
the  words   tended  to  bring  him  into  ignominy  and  disgrace.*1 


1  Mo.  App.  Rep.,  injury  to  feelings 
including  humiliation,  insult  and 
indignity.  Ray  v.  Cortlaud  &  H. 
Traction  Co.,  19  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. ) 
530;  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  521,  indignity. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Teed, 

2  Ohio  Dec.  662,  injury  to  feelings. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  James,  82  Tex. 
306;  18  S.  W.  589;  15  L.  R.  A.  347, 
shame  aud  mortification.  Gulf  C.  & 
S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Copeland,  17  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  55;  42  S.  W.  239,  humiliation. 
Willson  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  5 
Wash.  621;  32  Pac.  468,  humiliation 
and  mental  suffering.  Schmitt  v. 
Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  195;  61 
X.  W.  834,  humiliation. 

36  Pittsburg,  etc.,   R.   Co.  v.    Russ, 
414 


67  Fed.  662;  14  C.  C.  A.  612;  Hot 
Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Deloney,  65  Ark. 
177;  45  S.  W.  351;  Atchison,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  v.  Dickerson,  4  Kan.  App.  345; 
45  Pac.  975. 

37  Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Deloney, 
65  Ark.  177;  45  S.  W.  351. 

38  Curtis  v.  Sioux  City  &  H.  P.  R. 
Co.  (Iowa),  54  N.  W.  339. 

39  Willson  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.,  5 
Wash.  621 ;  32  Pac.  468.  But  see  Mis- 
souri K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong 
(Tex.  C.  A.),  38  S.  W.  368. 

40  Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Hins- 
dale, 38  Kan.  507;  16  Pac.  937.  See 
Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Per- 
kins, 21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  508;  52  S.  W. 
124. 


A:   I  [QN8    BY    l'  \       i  M.I.I:  -. 


For  mental  distress  caused  1>\  apprehension  as  to  discharge 
from  employment,  it  is  held  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  by  a 
passenger  virrongfully  ejected,  unless  the  company  at  the  time 
of  the  contract  knew  thai  in  case  of  delay  he  was  Liable  to  suffer 
injury  or  loss."  And  mental  anguish  suffered  by  a  passenger 
by  reason  of  delay  in  reaching  a  sick  brother  is  col  recoverable 
though  the  situation  was  explained  to  the  conductor  who  ejected 
him.42  Nor  can  recovery  be  had  for  disappointment,  of  a  wrong- 
fully ejected  passenger,  in  regard  to  arrangements  for  bis  wed- 
ding or  for  ridicule  to  which  lie  may  have  been  subjected,  \\  here 
i  he  conductor,  after  he  had  ejected  him,  stopped  the  train  and 
invited  him  to  hoard  it  again,  but  he  refused  to  unless  it  was 
backed  down  to  where  he  was,  though  he  was  only  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  train.43 

§  355.  Mental  suffering— Passengers—  Cases  generally — 

In  an  action  by  a  husband  against  a  railroad  company,  damages 
may  be  recovered  by  him  for  the  mental  anguish  suffered  by  tin- 
wife  from  the  delay  and  vexation  consequent  upon  the  negli- 
gence of  an  agent  of  the  company  in  selling  her  a  ticket  to  a 
wrong  station."  But  where,  owing  to  the  lock  being  out  order, 
a  woman  passenger  was  confined  in  the  water-closet  of  a  car,  it 
was  held  that  the  company  was  not  liable  for  the  mental  suffer- 
ing and  mortification  occasioned  thereby  to  her,  where  it  was  not 
negligent  either  in  furnishing  a  suitable  lock  or  in  keeping  it  in 
repair,  and  all  reasonable  and  proper  efforts  were  used  to  effect 
her  release.45  A  passenger  who,  by  the  negligence  of  the  com- 
pany's employees,  is  injured  while  alighting  from  a  street  car 
may  recover  damages  for  mental  suffering.*  So.  also,  one  in- 
jured in  a  railroad  collision  may  recover  damages  for  the  shame 


41  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald (Tex.  C.  A.),  21  S.  W.  946. 

4-  Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Deloney, 
65  Ark.  177;  45  S.  W.  351.  See  also 
Turner  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  15 
Wash.  213;  4(1  Pac.  243;  ■>  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  23S. 

«  Louisville  &  X.  E.  Co.  v.  Hine, 
121  Ala.  234;  25  So.  857;  14  Am.  & 
Enjr.  U.  Cas.  N.  S.  382. 


44  Texas  &  V.  R.  <  !o.  v.  Armstrong, 
93  Tex.  31;  .">l  S.  W.  835;  6  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  721;  14  Am.  *   En<r.  E.  Cas.  N. 

s.  -_>56. 

«Gulf  C.  A-  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith 
(Tex.  C.  A.),  30  s.  W.  361. 

M  Omaha  Street  R.  <  <>.  v.  Emmin- 
ger,  57  Neb.  240;  77  V  \V.  675;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  (.'as.  N.  S.   188. 

415 


§  356  ACTIONS    I'.Y    PASSENGERS. 

and  mortification  of  being  compelled  to  use  crutches  or  a  crutch 
and  a  cane.47  In  an  action,  however,  against  a  carrier  by  a  pas- 
senger to  recover  damages  for  injuries  sustained  by  him,  it  is 
error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they  may  consider,  in  estimating 
damages,  pain  of  mind,  aside  and  distinct  from  bodily  suffering.48 

§  356.  Failure  to  give  passenger  proper  accommodations. — 

A  carrier  of  passengers  who  fails  to  give  to  a  passenger  the 
proper  and  suitable  accommodations  called  for  by  its  contract  of 
carriage,  and  which  could  have  been  furnished  by  the  exer- 
cise of  the  degree  of  care  required  of  such  carriers  is  liable  in 
damages  therefor.  So  where,  as  the  result  of  a  leakage  to 
which  the  attention  of  the  proper  officers  was  called  and 
which  could  have  been  easily  repaired,  the  berth  of  a  pass- 
enger upon  a  steamship  became  wet  and  the  passenger's  health 
was  thereby  impaired,  the  company  was  held  liable  for  such 
injury.49  And  where  a  sleeping  car  company  agreed  to  furnish 
accommodations  in  one  of  its  sleeping  cars,  to  a  woman  in  ill 
health  and  with  a  young  baby,  but  failed  to  fulfill  its  contract 
and  she  was  obliged,  with  her  child,  to  ride  in  a  common  car  with 
negroes,  it  was  decided  that  the  company  was  liable  for  the  dis- 
comfort and  illness  caused  thereby.50  Again,  where  a  passen- 
ger who  had  a  first-class  ticket  was  placed  in  a  filthy  car  which 
was  unsuitable  for  first-class  passengers,  and  in  which  the  occu- 
pants were  smoking,  drinking,  singing  indecent  songs,  and  firing 
off  pistols,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  damages 
and  that  a  verdict  for  $500  was  not  excessive.51  But  the  dam- 
ages recoverable  for  the  breach  of  a  contract  of  carriage  or  sleep- 
ing car  accommodations  are  generally  limited  to  those  which 
directly  and  naturally  flow  from  the  breach  and  were  in  the  con- 
templation of  the  parties,  and  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  men- 
tal suffering  or  anguish  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  harsh 


47  Beatti  v.  Rapid  R.  Co.,  119  Mich. 
512;  78  N.  W.  537;  15  Am.  &  Eug.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  793;  5  Det.  L.  N.  905. 

48  Johnson  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 
6  Nev.  224;  3  Am.  Rep.  245. 

49  Barker  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  91 
Him  (X.  Y. ),  495;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  858; 
36  N.  Y.  Supp.  256;  25  Civ.  Proc.  108. 

416 


50  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Booth 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  719.  A 
verdict  for  $1,000  was  held  not  exces- 
sive. 

51  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherbert 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  42  S.  W.  639. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS.  §§  357, 

or  unkind  treatment  or  some  insult  or  injury  inflicted  by  the 
company.32  And  in  an  action  by  a  negro  for  failure  to  furnish 
him  accommodations  on  the  train  equal  to  those  furnished  white 
passengers,  in  violation  of  a  statute,  it  was  held  that  he  could 
not  even  recover  nominal  damages  in  the  absence  of  evidence 
showing  that  he  had  sustained  some  damage  by  such  failure." 

§  357.  Injury  or  insult  by  third  persons  to  passenger — 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  exercise  a  high  degree  of  care  to 
protect  its  passengers  from  insult  or  injury  at  the  hands  of  third 
persons,  and  where  it  negligently  fails  to  exercise  the  degro-  of 
care  required,  it  will  be  liable  for  all  damages  sustained  from 
such  a  source."11  So  where  a  conductor,  without  any  interference, 
permitted  a  passenger  to  insult  or  abuse  a  fellow  passenger  and 
to  continue  such  conduct,  it  was  held  that  the  carrier  was  liable 
in  damages  therefor.55  And  where  drunken  passengers  made  a 
colored  man  dance  and  sing  and  subjected  him  to  many  other 
indignities  while  the  conductor  refused  to  interfere,  it  was  de- 
cided that  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  colored  man  for  tfl,000 
was  not  excessive.56 

§  358.  Wrongful  charge  of  fare — Taking  up  tickets,  etc. — 

If  a  passenger  is  wrongfully  charged  an  excessive  or  exorbitant 
rate  of  fare  or  his  ticket  is  wrongfully  taken  up  by  one  con- 
ductor, and  another  conductor  compels  him  to  pay  his  fare  a 
second  time  under  penalty  of  expulsion,  he  may  recover  therefor 
his  damages,  not  being  limited  in  all  cases  to  the  excess  of  fare 
paid,  but  under  certain  circumstances  he  may  recover  exemplary 
damages.57      But  where   a   passenger   who  had  been    refused   a 

m  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Fowler,    Minu.  7;  31    L.   EL    A.  551;  86  N.  W. 
6  Tex.  Civ.   App.  755;  27  S.  W.  268.    044. 
A  verdict  for  $1,500  \v:is  held  execs-        57  Richmond    &  D.  EL  Co.  v.  Jeffer- 


sive  to  amount  of  $1,150. 

63  Norwood  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A.  K.  Co.,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  561;  34 
S.  W.  180:  3   Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 


son,  8!»  Ga.  554;   17  L.  EL  A.  571:   16 

s.  EC.  69;  52  Am.  &  Eng.  EL  Cas.  138. 

67  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  <  ...  v. 

King    (Ga. ),    14    S.    E.    70S.   holding 


S.  305.  $500   not   excessive,   though    an    ex- 

54  4  Elliott  on  Railroads,  sec.  1591;  [  trerne  verdict  for  requiring  ;i  passen- 

Hutchinson    on   Carrier,    sees.    548-    ger  whose  ticket  had  been  taken  up 

552a.  by  a  former   conductor    to   pay   his 

66  Lucy  v.  Chic.    G.   W.    R.    Co.,  64  |  fare  a  second  time  under   penalty  of 


2H 


41' 


§  359  ACTIONS   BY    PASSENGERS. 

ticket  by  the  ticket  agent  because  the  train  which  he  wished  to 
board  did  not  stop  at  the  station  to  which  he  wished  to  be  car- 
ried, boarded  such  train  without  a  ticket  and  the  conductor 
charged  him  fare  in  excess  of  the  regular  rate,  it  was  held  that 
his  recovery  was  limited  to  the  excess  of  fare  which  he  had  paid, 
where  both  the  conductor  and  the  ticket  agent  acted  in  good 
faith  and  in  pursuance  of  what  they  believed  to  be  the  orders  of 
their  superior  officers,  though  they  were  mistaken.58  Damages 
are  also  recoverable  for  refusal  of  an  agent  of  the  company, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  sign  and  stamp  return  tickets  to  so  sign  and 
stamp  a  ticket  properly  presented  to  him  for  such  purpose.  But 
where  a  person  presented  the  return  part  of  an  excursion  ticket 
to  a  station  agent  to  be  signed  and  stamped  by  him  for  a  return 
passage,  which  he  refused  to  do,  a  verdict  for  $150  was  held  ex- 
cessive, where  the  owner  of  such  ticket  suffered  nothing  in  body 
or  mind,  and  a  friend  who  was  with  him,  without  any  request 
from  the  latter,  purchased  a  return  ticket  for  a  nominal  sum?1 

§  359.  Stipulations  exempting   carrier  from  liability. — 

As  a  general  rule  it  may  be  stated  that  a  carrier  of  passengers 
cannot  stipulate  for  exemption  from  liability  for  injuries  sus- 
tained by  a  passenger  due  to  the  negligence  of  the  carrier.60  So 
where  a  person  who  was  transporting  live  stock  was  given  a 
free  pass  on  the  back  of  which  was  a  stipulation  that  "  the  per- 
son accepting  this  free  ticket  assumes  all  risks  of  accidents  and 
expressly  agrees  that  the  company  shall  not  be  liable  under  any 


expulsion.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Patterson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
46  S.  W.  848.  In  this  case  an  extor- 
tionate charge  of  fifty  cents  had  been 
made  for  carrying  a  passenger  overa 
bridge,  one  mile  long,  forming  part  of 
the  right  of  way.  In  addition  such 
passenger  was  awakened  while  asleep 
at  night  and  shaken  by  the  shoulder. 
Five  hundred  dollars  actual  and 
.$1,500  exemplary  damages  was  held 
excessive.  Two  hundred  and  fifty 
dollars  actual  and  $500  exemplary 
damages  held  sufficient. . 
58  Courts  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
418 


99  Ky.  574;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  415;  36 
S.  W.  548;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  223. 

59  New  York,  T.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Leander  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W. 
843. 

60  Doyle  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  166 
Mass.  492;  44  N.  E.  611;  33  L.  R.  A. 
844;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  257; 
24  Wash.  L.  Rep.  663;  3  Det.  L.  N. 
Mo.  26;  29  Chic.  Leg.  News,  41;  Wil- 
liams v.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co., 
18  Utah,  210;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  61;  54  Pac.  991:  4  Elliott  on 
Railroads,  sees.  1497,  1498. 


ACTIONS    BY    PASSENGERS. 

circumstances,  whether  by  the  negligence  of  their  agents  or  other- 
wise for  any  injury  to  the  person  or  for  any  loss  or  injury  to  the 
personal  property  of  the  person  using  this  ticket,"  it  was  held 
that  such  stipulation  did  nol  excuse  the  carrier  for  any  injury 
occasioned  by  its  <>\vn  uegligence.0 

§360.  Statutory  exemption  from  liability —  Passengers 
riding  on  platforms  of  cars.  — Where  by  statute  railroad  com- 
panies are  exempted  from  liability  for  injuries  received  by  pas- 
sengers while  riding  on  the  platforms  of  cars  in  violation  of 
printed  regulations  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  ear,62  it 
is  held  that  the  question  of  a  railroad  company's  exemption  from 
liability  for  personal  injuries  under  such  a  statute  cannot  be 
raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal,  though  there  may  be  evidence 
bringing  the  case  within  the  statute.63 


61  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson, 
51  Pa.  St.  315.  See  also  Ohio  &  Miss. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Selby,  47  Incl.  171;  Cleve- 
land, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cnrran,  19  <  )hi<> 
St.  1.  But  seeBissell  v.  N.  Y.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  442:  Gallin  v. 
London,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 


212.     See  4  Elliott  on  Railroad,  sees. 
1495  et  seq. 

62  See  X.  Y.  Laws,  1892,  chap.  676, 
sec.  53. 

63  Schreiner  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  12  App.  Div.  (X  V.  i  551; 
42  X.  Y.  Supp.  163. 

419 


§361 


ASSAULT    AX!>    I5ATTERY. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


ASSAULT    AND   BATTERY. 


361.  Assault   and  battery — Gener- 

ally. 

362.  Elements  of  damages  recover- 

able. 

363.  Loss  of  time — Evidence. 

364.  Mental  suffering. 

365.  Assault  on  pregnant   woman. 

366.  Action  by  married  woman. 

367.  Assault  unintentionally  com- 

mitted. 

368.  Matters  in  aggravation. 

369.  Exemplary     damages — When 

recoverable. 

370.  Same  subject  continued. 

371.  Exemplary     damages — When 

not  recoverable. 


372. 


373. 
374. 

375. 

376. 
377. 
378. 
379. 
380. 


Exemplary  damages — Effect 
of  criminal  prosecution  on 
allowance  of. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Evidence  as  to  defendant's 
wealth. 

Mitigation  of  damages — Gen- 
erally. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Words  in  mitigation. 

Pleading. 

Evidence  generally. 

Whether  verdicts  excessive 
for  various  injuries. 


§  361.  Assault  and  battery — Generally. — In  determining  the 
measure  of  damages  in  an  action  for  an  assault  and  battery,  the 
jury  are  not  confined  to  any  precise  rule,  but  may  allow  in 
their  discretion  for  such  loss  and  damage  as  has  been  sustained, 
considering  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Although  there 
is  no  precise  rule  for  determining  the  amount  of  damages  to 
be  awarded,  yet  the  recovery  should  only  include  damages  for 
such  loss  or  injury  as  is  the  natural  consequence  of  the  assault.' 
As  a  general  rule  such  recovery  should  be  a  fair  compensation 
for  the  actual  loss  or  injury  sustained,  subject  to  certain  excep- 
tions which  we  shall  hereafter  consider.2     And  the  measure  of 


1  Slater  v.  Rink,  18  111.  527;  Cox  v. 
Vanderkleed,  21  Ind.  164;  Studgeon 
v.  Studgeon  (Ind.  App.),  30  X.  E. 
805;  Wadsworth  v.  Treat,  43  Me. 
163;  Commonwealth  v.  Norfolk,  5 
Mass.  435;  Coffin  v.  Coffin,  4  Mass. 
41;  Avery  v.  Ray,  1  Mass.   12;  Wliit- 

420 


ney  v.  Hitcbcock,  4  Den.  (N.  Y. ) 
461;  Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis.  67; 
Huxley  v.  Berg,  1  Stark.  98;  Gregory 
v.  Cotterel,  5  El.  &  Bl.  571;  Hodson 
v.  Stallebrass,  11  Ad.  &  E.  301 ;  Fetter 
v.  Beale,  1  Ld.  Raym.  339. 

2  Whitney   v.    Hitchcock,   4   Den. 


ASSAIL!     AM'    BATTERY. 


damages  is  to  be  determined  from  a  consideration  of  the  results 
which  actually  ensued  inconsequence  of  the  act  of  violence  and 
not  what  the  defend  ant  might  reasonably  suppose  to  have  contem- 
plated as  likely  to  result.3  So  the  plaintiff  is  not  confined  to 
nominal  damages  because  of  the  fact  that  he  alleges  no  special 
damages,  but  may  recover  such  general  damages  as  may  be  shown 
to  have  resulted  from  the  injury.1  And  a  verdicl  for  nominal 
damages  will  be  sel  aside  on  a  finding  by  the  jury  that  an  un- 
lawful assault  was  committed  by  defendant  on  the  plaintiff  and 
that  as  a  result  thereof,  the  Latter  has  suffered  much  pain,  and 
has  expended  a  considerable  amount  in  the  treatment  of  his 
injury. 

§  362.  Elements  of  damages  recoverable.— The  jury,  in 
determining  the  amount  recoverable  for  an  assault  and  battery, 
may  allow  for  physical  and  mental  pain  and  suffering,6  expenses 
incurred,7  loss  of  time,8  and  for  any  permanent  injury  which 
results   from  the  act  of  violence.9     So   the  actual  expenses   in- 


I  .V.    Y. )   461 ;     Ilarman    v.    Gross,  5 

Wash.  703;  32  Pac.  787;  Vosburg  v. 

Putney,  80  Wis.  5-23;  14  L.  R.  A.  226; 

50  N.  \V.  403. 

8Vosbnrg  v.  Putney,  80  Wis.    523; 

14  L.  K.  A.  226;  50  X.  W.  403. 
4  Andrews  v.  Stone,  10  Minn.  72. 
6  Dunbar  v.   Cowger,  68  Ark.  444; 

59  S.  W.  951. 

e  Smith  v.  Overly,  30  Ga.  241 ;  Cour- 

tenay  v.   Clinton,  18  Ind.  A.pp.  020; 

48  X.  E.  799;  Nipp  v.   Wisebeart,  7 

lud.  App.  226 ;  34  X.  E.  1006 ;  Caspar  v. 

Prosdame,   40   La.   Ann.  36;   14  So. 

317;  Wadsworth  v.  Treat,  43  Me. 
163;  Stockton  v.  Frey,  4  Gill  (Ind.), 

406;  Smith  v.  Holconib,  Oil  Mass.  552; 
Goucher    v.    Jamison    i  Mich.    1900), 

82  N.  W.  6G3;  Stuppy  v.  Hof,  82  Mo. 
App.  272;  Lyddon  V.  Dose,  2  Mo. 
App.  608;  Cooper  v.  Hopkins  (N.  II. 
1900),  48  Atl.  100:  Holyoke  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  4S  X.  II.  541;  Ran- 
som v.  X.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
X.  Y.  415;  Klein  v.  Thompson,  19 
Ohio   St.   569;    Penn.    Canal   Co.    v. 


Graham,  63  Pa.  St.  290:  Learh  v. 
Leach,  11  Tex."  Civ.  App.  099;  33  S. 
W.  703:  Iieek  v.  Thompson,  31  W. 
Va.  220;  7  S.  E.  447;  Haines  v. 
Martin,  15  Wis.  24U.  See  sees.  3(54, 
368  herein. 

7  Cox  v.  Vanderkleed,  21  ind.  164; 
Golder  v.  Lund.  50  Neb.  867;  70  X. 
W.  379;  Beck  v.  Thompson,  31  W. 
Va  220;  7  S.  E.  ^47.  The  expenses 
of  litigation  have  in  such  actions 
been  held  to  be  a  proper  element  for 
the  jury  to  consider  in  estimating 
the  damages.  Xoyes  v.  Ward,  19 
Conn.  250;  New  Orleans,  etc,  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Alibi  it  ton,  38  Miss.  242. 

8  Cox  v.  Vanderkleed,  21  Ind.  164; 
Wadsworth  v.  Treat,  43  Me.  163; 
Suffolk  v.  Woodward,  ."»  \.  .1.  Law  J. 
287;  Lagley  v.  Mason,  69  Vi.  17".; 
37  Atl.  287;  Beck  v.  Thompson,  31 
\V.  Va.  220;  7  S.  E.  447.  See  see>. 
363  herein. 

9  Barr  v.  Post,  56  Neb.  698;  77  N. 
W.  123. 

421 


§  383  ASSAULT    AND    I'.ATTERY. 

curred  by  the  plaintiff  may  be  proven  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  show  that  the  physician  rendering  the  services  was  licensed 
under  the  statute  to  practice  in  order  to  render  such  evidence 
competent.1"  And  a  physician  may  testify  as  to  the  "probabili- 
ties "  of  the  plaintiff's  recovery.11  So  an  instruction  that  the  jury 
ma}'  in  estimating  the  damages  recoverable  consider  the  plain- 
tiff's "loss  of  time  "  and  "diminished  capacity  for  labor  "  is  not 
objectionable  as  authorizing  a  double  recovery.12  In  order,  how- 
ever, to  justify  a  recovery  for  future  consequences,  they  must  be 
reasonably  certain,  and  for  those  which  are  purely  speculative 
there  can  be  no  recovery.13  And  where  the  plaintiff  sought  to 
recover  damages  for  a  fractured  skull  and  evidence  as  to  the 
damages  probably  resulting  therefrom  was  admitted,  it  was  held 
to  be  error  where  the  physician,  who  had  examined  plaintiff's 
skull,  had  given  no  testimony  showing  that  it  had  been  frac- 
tured.14 Again  the  plaintiff  should  not  be  allowed  to  show  that 
as  a  result  of  the  assault  and  battery,  he  has  lost  a  position  to 
which  he  was  about  to  be  appointed.15 

§  363.  Loss  of  time — Evidence. — As  a  general  rule  in  order 
to  authorize  a  recovery  for  loss  of  time,  there  must  be  some 
evidence  showing  what  the  time  was  worth.16  So  plaintiff 
may  prove  his  earnings  before  and  after  the  assault  and  his  loss 
of  time  therefrom.17  And  an  estimate  may  be  given  by  the  plain- 
tiff as  to  the  value  of  his  time,  together  with  a  statement  of  the 
facts  and  reasons  upon  which  it  is  based.18  Again,  under  an  alle- 
gation that  plaintiff  has  suffered  pain  and  has  been  prevented 
from  the  transaction  of  his  necessary  business  as  the  result  of  an 
assault  and  battery,  evidence  is  admissible  that  he  is  unable  to 
work  as  he  could  before  the  assault,  and  that  when  he  worked  in 


10  Golder  v.  Lund,  50  Neb.  867 ;  70 
X.  W.  379. 

11  Nichols   v.    Brabazon,    94    Wis. 
.-)49;  69  N.  W.  342. 

12  Knittel  v.  Schmidt,  16  Tex.  Civ. 


w  Givens  v.  Berkly  (Ky.),  56  S.  W. 
158. 

15  Brown    v.    Cummiugs,    7   Allen 
(Mass.),  507. 

16  Kane  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  3N. 


App.  7;  40  S.  W.  507.  Y.  St.  R.  145. 

13  Hooper  v.   Haskell,  56  Me.  251;  17  Bagley  v.  Mason,  69  Vt.  175;  37 

Barnes  v.  Martin,   15  Wis.  240.     See  Atl.  287. 

sees.  369-373,  379  herein.  18  Jackson  v.   Wells,   13  Tex.  Civ. 


App.  275;  35  S.  W.  528. 


422 


MI/1     AND    BATTERY. 


the  sun  he  could  not  work  as  he  could  before,  though  the  value 
of  his  time  be  not  specially  alleged.18 

§  364.  Mental  Buffering.— In  assessing  the  damages  which 

are  to  be  allowed  for  an  assault,  the  mental  Buffering  which  nec- 
essarily and  inevitably  results  therefrom  is  an  clement  to  be 
taken  into  consideration.31  And  damages  therefor  may  be  al- 
lowed, though  no  physical  harm  is  done  and  there  is  no  phys- 
ical contact."  Where  a  wrongful  assault  is  accompanied  with 
circumstance  of  insult  or  indignity,  injury  to  the  feelings,  caus- 
ing humiliation,  may  be  considered  in  assessing  the  damages.8 
And  there  may  be  a  recovery  for  mental  suffering  caused  by 
disfigurement  resulting  from  an  assault  and  battery.28  But  in 
an  action  by  the  father  in  behalf  of  a  son  to  recover  for  an  as- 
sault and  battery  committed  upon  him,  it  is  held  that  the  jury 
is  not  authorized  to  give  damages  for  the  injured  feelings  of  the 
parents/14 


§  )JG5.  Assault  on  pregnant  woman. — For  an  assault  on  a 
pregnant  woman  which  it  is  alleged  has  resulted  in  a  miscarriage, 
in  order  to  recover  substantial  damages  therefor,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary, it  has  been  decided,  to  show  that  and  she  has  suffered 
more  pain,  or  that  her  illness  has  been  more  severe,  or  her  health 
impaired  t<>  a  greater  extent  than  would  have  been  if  the  child 
had  been  delivered  at  the  proper  time  and  in  the  natural  way."' 


"•Knittel  v.  Schmidt,  16  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  7;  40  S.  W.  507. 

20  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Flatten 
(C.  C.  App.  5th  C.i,  0:;  Fed.  936;  36 
C.  C.  A.  46;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  521;  Maisenbacker  v. 
Society  Concordia,  71  Conn.  •"><>'.>;  42 
Atl.   67;  McKinley  v.  C.  A-  X.  W.  U. 

.Co.,  44  [owa,  :;i4;  24  Am.  Rep.  748; 
Morgan  v.  Curley,  142  Mass.  107; 
Stuppy  v.  II..!,  82  Mo.  App. 272 ;  Coo- 
per v.  Hopkins  |  V  II.  L900),  48  Atl. 
100;  Nichols  v.  Brahazon,  94  Wis.  549; 
69  N.  W.  342;  Schmitt  v.  Milwaukee 
St.  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  19:.;  61  X.  W.  834. 

21  Goddard   v.    Grand   Trunk    Ry. 


Co.,  57  Me.  202;  Handy  v.  Johnson, 

5  Md.  450;  Ford  v.  Jones,  62  Barb. 
(  X.  Y.)  4S4:  Alexander  v.  Blodgett, 
44  Vt.  476;  Mori  in  v.  Sboppee,  3  C. 

6  P.  373.  See  Papineau  v.  Taber, 
Mont.  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  107. 

22  Schmitt  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co., 
89  Wis.  195;  61  X.  W.  834. 

23  Nichols  v.  Brabazon,  94  Wis.  549; 
69  \.  W.  342. 

->  <  lowden  v.  Wright.  24  Wend.  |  X. 
Y.)  42!'. 

a&Plonty  V.  Murphy  (Minn.  1901), 
84  N.  W.  1005.  wherein  it  was  held 
that  three  hundred  dollars  as  dam- 
ages was  not  excessive. 

423 


§§  306-368  ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 

§  366.  Action  by  married  woman. — In  an  action  by  a  mar- 
ried woman  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  which  she  has  sus- 
tained as  the  result  of  an  assault,  loss  of  time  is  not  an  element 
to  be  considered  in  estimating  the  amount  recoverable,  where 
she  had  no  business  or  employment  apart  from  her  husband.20 
Nor  can  she  recover  moneys  which  her  husband  has  expended 
for  medical  treatment  and  expenses  in  endeavoring  to  cure  her.-'7 
And  the  right  given  by  the  Pennsylvania  Married  Woman's 
Property  Act  of  1887,2*  to  recover  for  an  assault  and  battery 
does  not  entitled  her  to  recover  for  loss  of  ability  to  do  house- 
hold work.29  And  in  an  action  by  a  husband  to  recover  for  an 
assault  committed  upon  his  wife  by  defendant's  agent,  it  is  not 
proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  an  assault  becomes  aggravated 
when  committed  by  an  adult  male  upon  a  female,  since  though 
true,  the  jury  might  be  misled  thereby  in  the  belief  that  they 
were  justified  in  assessing  more  than  actual  damages.130  Again, 
there  can  be  no  recovery  for  the  public  odium  incurred  by  ex- 
posure at  the  trial  of  the  domestic  quarrels  of  the  husband  and 
wife.31 

§  367.  Assault  unintentionally  committed. — Though  an 
assault  may  be  unintentional,  yet  if  it  is  recklessly  committed, 
the  party  guilty  will  be  liable  in  damages  therefor,  and  the  in- 
jured party  may  recover  such  damages  as  are  the  natural  and 
direct  result  of  the  act  of  violence,  including  mental  and  physical 
pain  and  suffering.32  But  one  who  in  the  exercise  of  his  rights 
of  self-defense  inflicts  an  unintentional  injury  upon  a  third 
party  is  not  responsible  in  damages  therefor,  as  where  when  a 
person  was  assaulted  by  another  he  struck  a  third  person,  mis- 
taking him  for  the  assailant.33 

§  368.  Matters  in  aggravation. — The  plaintiff  may  show 
that  injuries  which  he  had  sustained  prior  to  the  assault  have 


26  Denton  v.    Ordway,    108  Iowa, 
487;  79  N.  W.  271. 

27  Burnham  v.  Webster,  3  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  50;  25  Wkly.  Dig.  556. 

28  Act  of  1887,  sec.  2. 

29  Walter  v.  Kensinger,  ( Pa.  C.  P. ),  2 
Pa.  Dist.  R.  728;  10  Lane.  L.  Rev.  268. 

424 


30  Texas  Coal  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Aren- 
stein,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  441;  55  S.  W. 
127. 

si  Barnes  v.  Martin,  15  Wis.  240. 

82  West  v.  Forrest,  22  Mo.  344. 

MPaxton  v.  Boyer,  67  111.  132;  16 
Am.  Rep.  615. 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY.  §  369 

been  aggravated  thereby  and  also  the  extent  to  which  they 
have  been  aggravated.81  In  this  case  it  appeared  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  a  man  sixty  years  of  age  wli<>  had  been  injured  by  the 
explosion  of  a  shell  in  the  Civil  War,  for  which  injury  he  was 
receiving  a  pension.  His  counsel  attempted  to  show  as  a  part 
of  his  cast'  the  physical  condition  he  was  in  just  prior  to  the 

assault,  arising  fr this  injury  and  how  and   to   what  extent 

his  condition  had  been  affected  by  the  acts  of  the  defendant, 
but  the  court  refused  to  admit  such  evidence  and  the  question 
arose  on  appeal  as  to  its  admissibility,  when  it  was  said  by 
the  court:  "The  burden  was  upon  the  plaintiff  to  prove  such 
of  his  injuries  as  were  the  direct  and  proximate  result  of 
defendant's  acts,  and  in  doing  this  it  was  proper  to  show  in 
what  respect  and  to  what  extent  his  present  condition  could 
be  attributed  to  the  assault  and  battery  and  what  could 
more  properly  be  established  as  the  result  of  his  army  ex- 
perience. The  injury  for  which  the  plaintiff  was  receiving 
a  pension  affected  his  health  and  enfeebled  him  unquestion- 
ably, but  that  fact  would  not  deprive  him  of  the  right  to 
cover  the  direct  consequence  of  the  defendant's  tort,  to  recover 
such  damages  as  could  be  shown  to  be  the  direct  result  of  that 
wrong.  That  the  plaintiff  was  in  ill  health,  no  matter  the  cause, 
was  no  excuse  for  defendant's  acts  and  would  not  relieve  him 
from  resulting  consequences.  The  defendant  could  not  be  held 
to  respond  for  injuries  arising  out  of  other  causes,  but  as  to 
those  for  which  he  was  an  efficient  cause  an  action  would  lie. 
The  rule  is  that  a  perpetrator  of  a  tort  is  responsible  for  the 
direct  and  immediate  consequences  thereof  whether  they  may  be 
regarded  as  natural  or  probable,  or  whether  they  might  have 
been  contemplated,  foreseen,  or  expected  or  not.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary to  the  liability  of  a  wrongdoer  that  the  result  which 
actually  follows  should  have  been  anticipated  by  him." 

§  369.  Exemplary  damages— When  recoverable. — If  it  ap- 
pear that  the  defendant's  act  in  committing  the  assault  and 
battery  was  intentional  and  without  provocation,  and  was 
committed  in  a   spirit  of  wantonness  or  maliciousness   with  no 


84  Watson  v.  Kheinderknect  (Miun. 
1901),  84  X.  W.  798. 


85  Per  Collius,  J. 

425 


§  360 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTKKY. 


legal  excuse  or  justification,  the  plaintiff  is  not  confined  to  dam- 
ages which  are  merely  compensatory,  but  may  also  recover 
exemplary  or  punitive  damages.83  So  though  no  malice  is 
charged  in  the  complaint,  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
if  they  find  wilful  and  malicious  conduct  on  defendant's  part, 
they  may  award  exemplary  damages,  where  the  complaint  alleges 
that  defendant  violently  assaulted  plaintiff  and  against  her  will 
debauched  and  carnally  knew  her.37  And  punitive  damages 
may  be  recovered  by  one  who  has  been  violently  assaulted  and 
wounded  by  another  without  any  provocation.38  Again,  where 
a  newsboy  had  dropped  a  paper  upon  the  floor  of  a  saloon  and 
the  proprietor  of  the  saloon  struck  him  a  severe  blow  upon  the 
head  and  forced  him  to  go  back  into  the  saloon  and  place  the 
paper  upon  the  table,  exemplary  damages  were  allowed.39  So 
also  were  they  allowed  against  one  who  without  any  warning 


36Bundy  v.  Manginess,  76  Cal.  532; 
18  Pac.  (308;  Wilson  v.  Middleton,  2 
Cal.  54;  Maisenbacker  v.  Society 
Concordia,  71  Conn.  369;  42  Atl.  67; 
Dal  ton  v.  Beers,  38  Conn.  529;  Tat- 
nall  v.  Courtney,  6  Houst.  (Del.)  434; 
Watson  v.  Hastings,  1  Penn.  (Del.) 
47;  39  Atl.  587;  Alcorn  v.  Mitchell, 
63  111.  553;  Farwell  v.  Warren,  51 
111.  467;  McNamara  v.  King,  7  111. 
432;  Reizenstein  v.  Clark,  104  Iowa, 
287;  73  N.  W.  588;  Irwin  v.  Yeager, 
74  Iowa,  174;  Mai  one  v.  Murphy,  2 
Kan.  94;  Slater  v.  Sherman,  5  Bush 
(Ky. ),  206;  Gore  v.  Chadwick,  6 
Dana  (Ky.),  477;  Webb  v.  Gilman,  80 
Me.  177;  Pike  v.  Dilling,  48  Me.  539; 
Thillman  v.  Neal,  88  Md.  525;  42 
Atl.  242;  Crosby  v.  Humphreys,  59 
Minn.  92;  60  N.  W.  843;  Lochte  v. 
Mitchell  (Miss.  1900),  28  So.  877; 
Klingman  v.  Holmes,  54  Mo.  304; 
Lyddon  v.  Dore,  81  Mo.  App.  64; 
2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  668  ;  Berryman 
v.  Cox,  73  Mo.  App.  67;  1  Mo. 
App.  Rep.  29;  Sloan  v.  Speaker, 
63  Mo.  App.  321  ;  1  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  767;  Connors  v.  Walsh,  131 
N.  Y.  590;  42  N.  Y.  -St.  R,  868; 
30  N.  E.  859;  Clayton  v.  Keeler,  18 
426 


Misc.  (N.  Y.)  488;  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1051;  Lane  v.  Wilcox,  55  Barb.  (N. 
Y. )  615;  Cansee  v.  Anders,  4  Dev.  & 
B.  L.  (N.  C.)  246;  Hendricks  v. 
Fowler,  16  Ohio  C.  C.  597;  9  Ohio  C. 
D.  209;  Rhodes  v.  Rodgers,  151  Pa. 
St.  634;  Knittle  v.  Schmidt,  16  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  7;  40  S.  W.  507;  Sargent  v. 
Carnes,  84  Tex.  156;  19  S.  W.  378; 
Borland  v.  Barrett,  76  Va.  128;  44 
Am.  Rep.  152;  Roach  v.  Caldbeck,  64 
Vt.  593;  Goldsmith  v.  Joy,  61  Vt. 
488;  4  L.  R.  A.  500;  Edwards  v.  La- 
vitt,  43  Vt.  126;  Beck  v.  Thomson, 
31  W.  Va.  220;  7  S.  E.  447;  Lamb  v. 
Stone,  95  Wis.  254;  70  N.  W.  72; 
Spear  v.  Sweeney,  88  Wis.  545;  60  N. 
W.  1060;  Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis. 
67.  But  see  Atkins  v.  Glad  wish,  25 
Neb.  390;  Barr  v.  Barr,  8  Neb.  68;  30 
Am.  Rep.  814;  Fay  v.  Parker,  53  N. 
H.  342. 

37  List  v.  Miner,  74  Conn.  50 ;  49 
Atl.  856. 

38  Webb  v.  Rothchild,  49  La.  Ann. 
244;  21  So.  258;  Webb  v.  Gilman, 
80  Me.  177;  13  Atl.  688. 

39  Lyddon  v.  Dore,  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  668. 


A.88AULT    ami    i:.\  rn:i:\  . 


S  370 


threw  a  brickat  a  boy  who  was  running  across  his  yard  in  com- 
pany with  other  hoys  who  fearing  a  policeman  were  endeavoring 

to  reach  another  yard  and  the  boy  was  struck  in  the  eye  by  the 
brick  and  severely  injured.40 

§  370.  Same  subject  continued. — Where  the  defendant  en- 
deavored to  force  an  entrance  into  plaintiff 's  lmii.se  during  the  ab- 
sence of  the  husband,  alter  the  wile  had  refused  him  admission, 
and  he  struck  at  her  several  times  and  gave  her  a  violent  blow 
from  which  she  suffered  considerably,  an  instruction  directing 
punitive  damages  was  held  proper.43  And  consent  to  sexual  in- 
tercourse when  obtained  by  violence  may  constitute  part  oi  the 
assault  and  be  a  ground  for  the  award  of  exemplary  dam;:. 
Again,  such  damages  were  allowed  against  one  wh<>.  in  the  pre- 
sence of  a  large  number  of  people  in  a  court  room  after  the  ad- 
journment of  court,  spit  in  a  man's  face.*'  So  in  another  case 
where  an  action  was  bought  to  recover  for  an  assault  with  a  knife, 
it  was  held  proper  to  charge  the  jury  that  if  they  thought  tie-  at- 
tack was  wanton  and  unprovoked,  and  with  a  deadly  weapon,  ex- 
emplary damages  might  be  given."  In  actions  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  assault  and  battery,  it  is  proper  to  consider  the 
character  and  standing  of  the  parties.43  And  evidence  of  the 
wealth  of  the  defendant  is  held  to  be  admissible  as  bearing  upon 
the  amount  of  damages  recoverable,46  and  also  of  the  pecu- 
niary condition  of  both  parties.47  In  actions  of  this  kind  it  is 
held  that  exemplary  damages  may  be  given  where  the  assault 
and  battery  is  malicious,  even  though  there  has  been  ;i  criminal 
prosecution  and  conviction.48     Though   the  court   should  gene- 


«°Connors  v.  Walsh,  131  NT.  V.  590; 
42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  80S:  30  N.  E.  59. 
"Thillman  v.  Neal,  88  Mel.  525:  42 

Atl.   _Ml'. 

«  Dickey  v.  McDonnell,  41  111.  62. 

«  Alcorn  v.  Mitchell,  63  111.  553. 
In  this  ease  a  verdict  for  81,000  was 
held  not  excessive. 

« Porter  v.  Seiler,  23  Pa.  St. 
424. 

«s  Goldsmith  v.  Joy,  61  Vt.  488;  17 
Atl.  1010;  4  L.  R.  A.  500;  40  Alb.  L. 
J.  48. 


«  Pullman  Pal.  <"ar  Co.  v.  Law- 
rence, Tt  Miss.  782:  22  So.  53  15 
Nat.  Corp.  Rep.  124;  8  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  X.  S.  59;  2  Am.  NTeg.  Rep. 
586;  Rowe  v.  Mores,  9  Rich.  I..  S. 
0. )  123;  Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis.  67. 
See  sec.  374  herein. 

«7  Eltringham  v.  Earhart,  61  Miss. 
488;  7  So.  340. 

«» Roberts  v.  Mason,  10  Ohio  St. 
277.  See  sec.  372  herein  as  to  exem- 
plary damages  where  liable  to  crimi- 
nal prosecution. 

427 


§  371  ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 

rally  instruct  as  to  the  allowance  of  punitive  damages,  yet  a 
refusal  to  instruct  in  regard  to  such  damages  does  not  constitute 
a  reversible  error  where  the  verdict  clearly  shows  that  vindictive 
damages  were  not  allowed.19 

§  371.  Exemplary  damages— When  not  recoverable The 

defendant  may  in  committing  the  assault  have  acted  under  the 
honest  belief  that  he  was  in  immediate  danger  of  an  assault  by 
the  plaintiff,  and  where  such  is  shown  to  be  the  case,  exemplary 
damages  should  not  be  allowed.50  And  where  highly  provoking 
language  has  been  used  by  the  plaintiff  towards  the  defendant  im- 
mediately prior  to  the  assault,  such  malice  will  not  be  implied  in 
law  as  will  require  an  award  of  vindictive  damages  by  way  of 
punishment,  unless  the  act  of  violence  was  carried  to  an  excess, 
and  beyond  what  a  reasonable  man  would  do  under  such  circum- 
stances, the  question  of  the  award  of  such  damages  being  for  the 
jury,  and  not  for  the  court.51  Nor  is  it  proper  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  if  an  assault  was  committed  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
show  that  the  defendant  intended  to  injure,  annoy,  or  vex  plain- 
tiff, exemplary  damages  might  be  awarded,  since  such  inten- 
tion is  not  equivalent  to  malice.52  So  where  a  person  in  remov- 
ing a  trespasser  from  his  premises  uses  excessive  force,  exemplary 
damages  are  not  recoverable  on  the  ground  of  wantonness  and 
malice,53  unless  the  trespasser  was  not  previously  requested 
to  leave,  and  the  assault  was  without  qualification.54  And  one 
who  has  acquired  peaceful  possession  of  property  is  not  liable 
to  the  owner  of  the  same  in  exemplary  damages,  in  the  absence 
of  excessive  force  or  an}r  motive  of  malice,  where  he  resisted  the 
effort  of  the  owner  to  take  possession  of  the  property,  and  the 
latter  for  this  purpose  used  a  knife  with  which  he  threatened  and 
intended  bodily  harm.55  So  a  parent  or  master  cannot  re- 
cover punitive  damages  from  one  who  has  committed  an  assault 


49  Cross  v.  Carter,  100  Ga.  632;  28 
S.  E.  390. 

60Keyes  v.  Devlin,  3  E.  D.  Sun.  (N. 
T.)518. 

"Donnely  v.  Harris,  41  111.  126. 

^Badostain  v.  Grazide,  115  Cal. 
425;  47  Pac.  118. 

MKiff  v.  Youmans,  86  N.  Y.  324; 

428 


13  W.  D.  273,  rev'g  20  Hun,  123;  9 
W.  D.  461. 

«  Huston  v.  Gilbert,  40  Hun  (N. 
Y. ),  638;  24  W.  D.  54,  afE'd  113  N.  Y. 
622;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  992;  20  N.  E.  R. 
876. 

65  Barnes  v.  Martin,  15  Wis.  240. 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 


§  372 


upon  a  child  or  servant,  even  though  the  assault  be  of  an  in- 
decent character  upon  a  female  and  under  very  aggravating  cir- 
cumstances, since  such  damages  are  recoverable  in  a  suit  by  the 
child  or  servant  herself."''  And  where  plaintiff  was  shot  by  de- 
fendant while  making  a  riotous  disturbance  anmnd  the  hitter's 
house  at  night,  it  was  held  that  exemplary  damages  should  not 
be  allowed,  but  rather  that  the  fact  that  he  was  one  of  a  party 
creating  such  a  disturbance  should  go  to  mitigate  the  damages.57 
Again,  where  a  master  whips  a  seaman,  it  is  declared  that 
exemplary  damages  are  not  recoverable  by  the  latter  unless  it 
appear  that  the  master  acted  wantonly,  not  with  a  view  of  pun- 
ishment but  rather  for  the  purpose  of  disgrace  and  mortification.58 

§  372.  Exemplary  damages— Effect  of  criminal  prosecu- 
tion on  allowance  of.— The  defense  has  frequently  been  set 
up  in  actions  for  assault  and  battery  that  a  criminal  prose- 
cution and  fine  is  a  bar  to  the  recovery  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages in  the  civil  action,  on  the  ground  that  two  punishments 
cannot  be  inflicted  for  the  same  offense.  Such  a  defense  has 
not,  however,  as  a  general  rule,  been  sustained.  The  punish- 
ment inflicted  by  a  criminal  prosecution  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
penalty  for  the  wrong  which  has  been  done  to  the  public. 
Punitive  damages,  which  are  so  called  to  distinguish  them  from 
the  pecuniary  damage  or  loss  sustained,  are  inflicted  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  the  wrong  done  to  the  individual.  The  fact  that 
the  wrongdoer  has  been  punished  criminally  and  perhaps 
obliged  to  pay  a  tine  to  the  public  authorities,  should  not  affect 
the  individual's  right  to  exemplary  damages,  where  the  fact-  of 
the  case  justify  an  award   of  such    damages.     The   wrongdoer 

has  in  reality  been  guilty  of  two  wrongs,  though  the  act  be  < 

He  has  done  a  wrong  to  society  or  the  public  at  large,  for 
which  the  law  provides  a  punishment.  He  has  also  committed 
a  wrong  against  the  individual,  for  which  the  law  says  that  if 
accompanied  by  malice  or  wantonness  he  shall  be  responsible  to 
such  individual    in    punitive  damages,   and   the   award   of    such 


66  Whitney  v.  Hitchcock,  4  Dem. 
(N.  Y.)461.  The  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  such  an  action  is  the  actual 
loss  of  service  sustained. 


G'Robison  v.  Rupert,  '23  Pa.  St. 
523. 

68  Gould  v.  ChristianBoo,  Blatchl 
&  H.  Adm.  507. 

429 


§373 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 


damages  cannot  in  any  just  sense  be  considered  as  in  violation 
of  any  constitutional  provision  or  common-law  inhibition 
against  the  infliction  of  two  punishments  for  the  same  offense.59 

§  373.  Same  subject  continued. — Although  the  general 
rule  is  that  stated  under  the  preceding  section,  yet  there  are 
some  cases  which,  while  sustaining  such  rule,  declare  that  a 
conviction  and  fine  should  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  puni- 
tive damages.60  Again,  though  a  person  may  be  liable  to  a 
criminal  prosecution  for  an  assault  and  battery  committed  by 
him  upon  another  person,  yet  such  fact  of  itself  will  not  entitle 
the  latter  to  recover  exemplary  damages.61  Nor  will  the  dam- 
ages be  increased  in  such  an  action  by  the  fact  that  only  a  nomi- 
nal fine  has  been  imposed  in  a  criminal  action.62 


» Phillips  v.  Kelly,  29  Ala.  628; 
Bundy  v.  Maginess,  76  Cal.  532;  18 
Pac.  668;  Wilson  v.  Middleton,  2 
Cal.  54;  Jefferson  v.  Adams,  4  Harr. 
(Del.)  321;  Smith  v.  Bagwell,  19 
Fla.  117;  45  Am.  Rep.  12;  Butler  v. 
Mercer,  14  Ind.  479;  Hauser  v.  Grif- 
fith. 102  Iowa,  215;  71  N.  W.  223; 
Reddin  v.  Gates,  52  Iowa,  210;  Hen- 
drickson  v.  Kingsbury,  21  Iowa,  379; 
Johnson  v.  Smith,  64  Me.  553;  Elliott 
v.  Van  Buren,  33  Mich.  47;  Boetcher 
v.  Staples,  27  Minn.  308;  38  Am.  Rep. 
295;  Corwin  v.  Walton,  18  Mo.  71; 
Cook  v.  Ellis,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  466; 
Sowers  v.  Sowers,  87  N.  C.  303; 
Roberts  v.  Mason,  10  Ohio  St.  277; 
Rhodes  v.  Rodgers,  151  Pa.  St. 
634;  24  Atl.  1044;  23  Pitts.  L.  J.  N. 
S.  95 ;  Barr  v.  Moore,  87  Pa.  St.  385 ; 
Roach  v.  Caldbeck,  64  Vt.  593;  24 
Atl.  9S!>;  Edwards  v.  Leavitt,  46  Vt. 
126;  Hoadley  v.  Watson,  45  Vt.  289; 
12  Am.  Rep.  197;  Brown  v.  Swinne- 
ford,44  Wis.  282.  But  see  Howlett  v. 
Tuttle,  15  Colo.  454;  24  Pac.  921; 
Murphy  v.  Hobbs,  7  Colo.  541;  Hu- 
ber  v.  Teuber,  3  MacArthur  (D.  C), 
484;  336  Am.  Rep.  110;  Cheny  v. 
430 


McCall,  23  Ga.  193;  Farman  v. 
Lauman,  73  Ind.  568;  Humphreys  v. 
Johnson,  20  Ind.  190;  Butler  v  Mer- 
cer, 14  Ind.  479;  Austin  v.  Wilson. 
4  Cush.  (Mass.)  273;  Fay  v.  Parker, 
53  N.  H.  342;  16  Am.  Rep.  270. 

60  Coleman  v.  Hagerman,  5  City 
Hall  Rec.  (N.  Y.)  63;  Rhodes  v. 
Rodgers,  151  Pa.  St.  634;  24  Atl.  1044; 
23  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  95;  Flanagan  v. 
Womack,  54  Tex.  45;  Jackson  v. 
Wells,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  275;  35  S. 
W.  528.  But  see  Roach  v.  Caldbeck, 
64  Vt.  593;  24  Atl.  989;  Hoadley  v. 
Watson,  45  Vt.  289;  12  Am.  Rep.  197. 
In  both  of  these  last  cases  it  is  de- 
clared that  a  criminal  prosecution 
and  the  payment  of  a  fine  is  not  to 
be  considered  in  mitigation  even  of 
exemplary  damages.  See  also  Phil- 
lips v.  Kelly,  29  Ala.  628;  Wheatley 
v.  Thorn,  23  Miss.  62;  Cook  v.  Ellis, 
6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  466;  Brown  v.  Swine- 
ford,  44  Wis.  282. 

61Badostain  v.  Grazide,  115  Cal. 
425;  47  Pac.  118. 

62  Honaker  v.  Howe,  19  Gratt.  ( Va.) 
50. 


\s  3A1   l   l      LND  B  \TI  !  l.">  . 


§§  374,375 


§  374.  Evidence  as  to  defendant's  wealth.     Evidence  of 

the  wealth  of  the  defendant  is,  as  a  general  rule,  inadmissible 
in  these  actions,  except  it  he  a  case  for  the  award  of  exemplary 
damages,  when  it  is  generally  considered  admissible.0  So  in  an 
action  to  recover  for  a  wrongful  assault  by  an  employee  of  the 
defendant,  the  wealth  or  pecuniary  condition  of  the  latter  may 
be  shown  when'  the  facts  warrant  the  recovery  of  exemplary 
damages,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  jury  to  inflict  proper 
damages  by  way  of  punishment.01  But  where  no  evidence  has 
been  given  showing  that  the  defendant  in  an  action  for  an  assault 
and  battery  is  the  owner  of  any  property,  it  is  not  proper  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  in  assessing  punitive  damages  they  may 
consider  the  wealth  of  the  defendant.'" 


§  375.  Mitigation  of  damages — Generally.— The  defendant 
may  introduce  all  proper  facts  which  tend  to  mitigate  the  dam- 
ages for  the  assault  and  battery."'  So  where  it  is  alleged  by  the 
plaintiff  in  his  complaint  that  the  act  of  the  defendant  was 
wilfully  and  wrongfully  done,  the  latter  may  introduce  evi- 
dence for  the  purpose  of  disproving  any  improper  intent  in 
mitigation  of  damages/'  And  evidence  of  provocation  is  ad- 
missible and  it  is  not  necessarily  confined  to  the  immediate 
time  of  the  occurrence,  but  the  provocation  may  be  continuous, 
commencing  some  time  prior  to  the  date  of  the  assault  and 
continuing  day  by  day.68      But  as  a  general    rule  antecedent 


68  Brown  v.  Evans,  8  Sawy.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.)  488;  17  Fed.  912;  Jarvis  v. 
Manlove,  5  Har.  (Del.)  452;  Tatnal] 
v.  Courtney,  6IIoust.  (Del.)  434;  Gore 
v.  Chadwick,  6  Dan;i  (Ky.),  477; 
Sloan  v.  Edwards,  61  Md.  89;  Pull- 
man Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  71 
Miss.  782;  16  Nat.  Corp.  Rep.  124;  22 
So.  53;  8  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cis.  \.  S. 
59;  Morgan  v.  Dnrfee,  69  Wo.  469; 
:'.:'.  Am.  Rep.  50S;  Berryman  v.  Cox, 
1  Mo.  A.  Rep.  29;  73  Mo.  App.  07; 
Moody  v.  Osgood,  50  Barb.  (N.  V. ) 
628;  Hendricks  v.  Fowler,  10  Ohio 
C.  C.  597;  Spear  v.  Sweeney,  88  Wis. 
545;  CO  N.  W.  10G0;  Draper  v.  Baker, 
61  Wis.  450:  21   N.  W.  527.      Rut  see 


Givensv.  Berkley  (Ky.  1900),  56  S. 
W.  158.  See  in  this  connection 
sec.  370,  herein. 

64  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Lawrence, 
74  Miss.  782;  22  So.  58;  15  Nat  Corp. 
Rep.  124;  8  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  S. 
59. 

65  Lister  v.  McKee,  79  111.  App.  210. 
'■  Gilbert  v.   Rounds,  14  How.  Pr. 

i  X.  V.  i  46;  Saltus  v.  Kipp,  5  Duer 
(N.  Y.),  646:  2  Abh.  Pr.  382:  12  How. 
Pr.  342. 

67  Sherman  v.  Kortright,  52  Barb. 
i  N.  r.)  267. 

'-  Dolan  v.  Fagan,  68  Barb.  |  N.  Y.  i 
73.  See  Linde  v.  Elias.  4  Alb.  L.  J. 
76. 

431 


§375 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 


acts  which  cannot  be  considered  as  part  of  the  same  trans- 
action are  not  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages  though 
they  may  have  been  exceedingly  irritating  and  provoking.*9 
And  though  acts  of  the  plaintiff  in  provocation  of  an  assault 
may  be  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages,  yet  they  must  be 
so  connected  with  the  assault  as  to  raise  a  presumption  that  the 
act  of  the  defendant  was  committed  while  his  passions  were 
aroused  as  the  immediate  result  of  the  acts  of  the  plaintiff.70 
So  it  is  declared  that  though  there  may  be  provocation,  yet, 
if  it  does  not  amount  to  a  justification,  it  cannot  be  considered 
in  mitigation  of  actual  or  compensatory  damages.71  Where  a 
person  acts  in  the  belief  that  he  has  a  right  to  so  act,  such  fact 
may  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages,  as  where  a  person 
ejected  an  employer  from  his  house  under  such  a  belief,  and  ex- 
emplary damages  were  claimed.72  And  the  fact  that  the  plain- 
tiff immediately  before  the  assault  charged  the  defendant  with 
a  crime  may  be  shown.73  So  evidence  of  previous  threats 
made  by  the  plaintiff  has  been  held  admissible.'4  And  when  a 
servant  clearly  neglects  his  dut}r  and  the  master  in  a  fit  of  pas- 
sion assaults  him,  such  facts  may  be  considered.75  So  the 
action  of  the  defendant  in  preventing  a  third  party  from  joining 
in  the  assault  and  the  declaration  of  such  third  person  at  the 
time  that  he  was  about  to  join  in  the  fight,  are  facts  which  the 
jury  may  consider.76   Again,  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  advanced 


69  Lee  v.  Woolsey,  19  Johns.  (N. 
Y.i  319:  Stetlar  v.  Nellis,  60  Barb. 
<  V  Y.)524;  42  How.  Pr.  163;  Ells- 
worth v.  Thompson,  13  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)658.  But  see  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Randolph,  65  111.  App.  208, 
where  it  was  held  that  evidence  of  a 
prior  assault  was  admissible. 

70  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fleetwood,  90  Ga.  23;  15  S.  E.  778; 
Murphy  v.  McGrath,  79  111.  594; 
Groman  v.  Kukkuck,  59  Iowa,  18; 
Turner  v.  Footman,  71  Me.  218; 
Gaitherv.  Blowers,  11  Md.  536;  Ty- 
son v.  Booth,  100  Mass.  258;  Heiser 
v.  Loomis,  47  Mich.  16;  Castner  v. 
Sliker,  33  N.  J.  L.  95;  Dolan  v.  Fagan, 
63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  73;  Lee  v.  Woolsey, 

432 


19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Stetlar  v. 
Xellis,  60  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  524;  42  How. 
Pr.  163. 

n  Goldsmith  v.  Joy,  61  Vt.  488;  4 
L.  R.  A.  500;  17  Atl.  1010;  40  Alb.  L. 
J.  148;  Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis.  67. 

72  Redfield  v.  Redfield,  75  Iowa, 
435;  39  N.  W.  688. 

73  Bartram  v.  Stone,  31  Conn.  159. 
See  Bauman  v.  Bean,  57  Mich.  1. 

74  McKenzie  v.  Allen,  3  Strob.  ( S. 
C.)546;  Waters  v.  Brown,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  557;  Yeager  v.  Berry, 
82  Mo.  App.  534;  Fairbanks  v.  Wit- 
ler,  18  Wis.  287. 

75  Ward  v.  Blackwood,  41  Ark.  295; 
48  Am.  Rep.  41. 

76  Watkins  v.  Gaston,  17  Ala.  664. 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTEKY.  §  376 

upon  the  defendant  exhibiting  a  pistol  and  brass  knuckles  and  in 
a  threatening  manner,  whereupon  the  defendant  struck  him,  is 
sufficient  to  justify  a  finding  that  the  assault  was  justifiable.7' 

jj  37G.  Same  subject  continued.  -Where  a  woman  brings 
an  action  to  recover  lor  an  indecent  assault,  the  defendant  may 
show  in  mitigation  of  damages  specific  acts  of  lewdness  on  her 
part.18     But  evidence  of  defendant's  general  good  character  is 

declared  to  be  inadmissible  in  such  a  case.7"  Nor  is  evidence 
admissible  as  to  the  general  character  of  the  plaintiff  tor  tin- 
purpose  of  mitigating  the  damages.80  Nor  ran  the  defendant 
show  that  the  results  of  the  assault  and  battery  were  more  ag 
gravated  by  reason  of  the  intemperate  habits  of  the  plaintiff 
than  they  would  have  been  if  he  had  l>een  a  person  of  temperate 
habits. sl  Nor  is  the  fact  that  the  defendant  entered  the  plain- 
tiff's house  for  the  purpose  of  making  an  attachment  admissi- 
ble in  mitigation.83  And  in  an  action  by  the  husband  and  wife 
to  recover  for  injuries  inflicted  upon  the  wife  by  persons  who 
were  forcibly  preventing  her  from  entering  her  house,  the 
fact  that  her  husband  had  sometime  since  obtained  possession 
of  the  house  in  a  fraudulent  manner  from  one  of  the  defend- 
ants, is  not  admissible  to  reduce  the  damages.s:  .Again,  in  an 
action  by  a  passenger  to  recover  damages  for  an  assault  com- 
mitted upon  him  by  a  railroad  conductor,  the  failure  of  the  court 
to  charge  that  sneers  and  contemptuous  gestures  of  the  former 
may  be  considered  in  mitigation  is  not  sufficient  ground  lor 
a  new  trial  where  it  does  not  appear  that  any  request  for  such 
charge  was  made.'1  if  the  defendant  sets  up  a  mere  general 
denial  to  an  action  for  an  assault  and  battery,  he  cannot  estab- 
lish a  justification    under  such    plea.85     So  evidence    in    justifi- 


77  Strickland  v.  Atlanta  *  \V.  I". 
R.  Co.,  no  Ga.  124;  24  S.  E.  981. 

78  Gulerette  v.  McKinley,  -7  Hun 
(N.  V.i.  320;  Young  v.  Johnson,  46 
Hun  (N.  Y.  ),  1G4;  123  X.  V.  226; 
Ford  v.  Jones,  62  Barb.  I  X.  V.)  484. 

79  Redd  in  v.  Gates,  52  Iowa.  210; 
Sayen  v.  Ryan,  '.»  Ohio  C.  C.  631. 

80  Willis  v.  Forrest,  2  Duer  |  X.  V.  |, 
810;  Galbraith  v.  Fleming,  80  Mich. 
403:  Corning  v.  Corning,  6   X.  V.  97. 


«  Littleliale  v.  Dix,  11  Cush. 
(Mass.  |  364. 

82  Sampson  v.  Henry,  11  Tick. 
(  Mass.  i  379.  Hut  see  Paine  v.  Farr, 
118  Mass.  74. 

83  Jacobs  v.    Hoover.   '.'   Minn.  204. 
M  East   Tennessee.  V.  A   <;.  R.  Co. 

v.  Fleetwood,  90 Ga.  23. 

'    Hathaway  v.  Ilatchard.  160  Mass. 

296;  35  x    K.  857;  Ban    v.   Pi 
Xel).  CDS;  77  X.  W.  123. 


28  133 


§  377 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 


cation  of  an  assault  and  battery,  that  the  defendant  was  an 
officer  armed  with  a  process,  and  only  used  such  force  as  was 
necessary  to  attach  plaintiff's  property  under  the  writ,  is  not 
admissible  unless  such  facts  have  been  pleaded.86 


§  377.  Words  in  mitigation. — Although  opprobrious,  abu- 
sive or  insulting  language  by  the  plaintiff,  will  not  defeat 
an  action  for  an '  assault  and  battery,  yet  it  may  be  consid- 
ered in  mitigation.  In  this,  however,  as  in  other  cases  where 
provocation  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  may  tend  to  mit- 
igate the  damages,  the  words  must  not  be  wholly  disconnected 
from  the  assault.  Nor  on  the  other  hand  must  they  necessarily 
be  immediately  connected  with  the  act  and  confined  to  the  time 
of  its  commission,  but  may  consist  of  a  series  of  provoking 
words  extending  back  sometime  from  the  assault,  and  in  such 
cases  prior  words  or  language  may  be  shown,  and  only  in  such 
cases.87  So  in  an  action  against  ;i  railroad  company  for  an  as- 
sault by  a  conductor  upon  a  passenger,  the  fact  that  the  latter 
had  made  slanderous  and  indecent  remarks  about  the  sister-in- 
law  of  the  former  is  not  competent  to  reduce  the  damages  in 
the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  the  remarks  were  so  re- 
cently uttered  as  to  indicate  that  the  conductor  acted  under 
provocation  immediately  resulting  therefrom.88  And  though  it 
may  appear  that  the  plaintiff  may  have  made  remarks  or  de- 
clarations of  a  slanderous  or  provoking  nature  relative  to  the 
defendant,  yet  they  are  not  admissible  in  evidence  in  mitigation 


86  Smith  v.  Wilson,  21  R.  I.  327;  21 
R.  I.  (part  2)  120;  43  Atl.  634. 

87  Cuslimanv.  Ryau,  1  Story  (U.  S. 
C.  C),  91;  Bartram  v.  Stone,  31 
Conn.  159;  Burke  v.  Melvin,  45  Conn. 
243;  Matthews  v.  Teny,  10  Conn. 
455;  Donnelly  v.  Harris,  41  111.  126; 
Schlossen  v.  Fox,  14  Ind.  365;  Thrall 
v.  Knapp,  17  Iowa,  468;  Caspar  v. 
Prosdame,  46  La.  Ann.  36;  14  So. 
317;  Prentiss  v.  Shaw,  56  Me.  427; 
Tyson  v.  Booth,  100  Mass.  258;  Avery 
v.  Ray,  1  Mass.  12;  Stuppy  v.  Hof,  2 
Mo.  App.  Rep.  583;  Dolati  v.  Fagan, 
63  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  73;,Stetlar  v.  Nel- 
lis,  60   Barb.    (N.   Y. )   524;  42  How. 

434 


(N.  Y.)  163;  Maynard  v.  Berkeley, 
7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  560;  Robinson  v. 
Rupert,  23  Pa.  St.  523;  Hayes  v. 
Lease,  51  S.  C.  534;  29  S.  E.  259: 
Goldsmith  v.  Joy,  61  Vt,  488;  4.  L. 
R.  A.  500;  17  Atl.  1010;  40  Alb. 
L.  J.  148;  Wilson  v.  Young,  31  Wis. 
574;  Frazer  v.  Berkeley,  7  C.  &  P. 
789;  Sinford  v.  Lake,  3  H.  &N.  275. 
88  East  Tennessee,  V.  «fc  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Fleetwood,  90  Ga.  23;  15  S.  E.  778. 
See  Brooks  v.  Carter  (C.  C.  S.  D. 
Ga. )  34  Fed.  505,  where  remarks 
made  by  plaintiff  concerning  the 
sister  of  the  defendant  were  held 
not  to  justify  an  assault. 


ASSAULT    ANIi    BATTBBY.  §§   378,  379 

unless  it  also  appear  that  thej  were  communicated  to  the  d<  - 
fendant  immediately  prior  to  the  assault.89  Agaiu,  in  those 
where  the  defendant  seeks  to  reduce  damages  03  proof  of  abu- 
sive or  provoking  Language  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  the  defendant  has  had  tunc  Bince  the  words 
were  spoken  to  him  or  came  to  his  knowledge  to  cool  his  blood, 
and  not  the  number  of  hours  thev  were  spoken  prior  to  the  as- 
sault/" J11  an  action  by  a  husband  and  wife  to  recover  for  an 
assault  committed  upon  the  latter,  the  fact  that  the  husband  had 
used  provoking  words  to  the  defendant  is  not  admissible  in 
mitigation  of  damages,  unless  it  also  appear  that  the  wife  was 
privy  to  such  Language.91 

§  378.  Pleading.  —  In  an  action  to  recover  for  an  assault  and 
battery,  the  complaint  need  not  state  separately  the  grounds  for 
the  recovery  of  actual  and  punitive  damages.92  And  the  plain- 
tiff may  amend  his  complaint  so  as  to  ask  for  exemplary  dam- 
ages on  grounds  stated  in  the  original.93 

§  379.  Evidence  generally.  -Evidence  tending  to  show  mal- 
ice is  admissible  though  not  specially  alleged  in  the  complaint." 
And  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  is  a  laboring  man  has  been  ad- 
mitted." So  it  may  be  proper  to  admit  evidence  as  to  the  finan- 
cial condition  of  the  plaintiff,  the  extent  and  dependency  of  his 
family  upon  him  for  support  and  of  the  family's  source  of  support 
since  the  injury,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  extent  and  amount 
of  the  damages  received  by  him.""  Again,  statements  made  by 
the  plaint  iff  to  attending  physicians  as  to  pain  suffered  by  him  are 
admissible  in  evidence  though  made  after  he  had  decided  to  bring 
suit  and  for  the  purpose  of  using  such  physicians  as  witnesses.* 
So  also,  evidence  as  to  exclamations  tending  to  show  pain,  though 
made  to  one  not  a  physician,  are  admissible.98      And  where  an  as- 


89  Gaitlier  v.  Blowers,  11    M<l.  536; 
Castner  v.  Sliker,  33  N.  J.  L.  95. 
aoDolanv.  Pagan,  63  Barb.  1  \  V.  1  73. 

91  Everts  v.  Everts,  :'.  Mich.  580. 

92  Jackson  v.    Wells,    13   'IVx.    Civ. 
A  pp.  275;  35  S.  W.    528. 

98  Krenger  v.  Sylvester,   100  Iowa, 
047:  69  N.  \V.  1059. 


"  Kilns  v.  Woulley,  ll»".  N.  V.  204. 

'•'•'■< Jaithei  v.  Blowers,   1 1    lid.  536. 

'•"'■  II. Micky  v.  Smith,  10 Oregon,  :$4!»; 
45  Am.  Rep,   1  13 

j:  Baglej  \.  Mason,  69  Yi.  175;  37 
Atl.  287. 

w  Bagley  v.  Mason,  69  Vt  175;  37 
Atl.  287. 

435 


§  380  ASSAULT    AND    BATTERY. 

sault  is  made  upon  a  girl  for  the  purpose  of  having  illicit  inter- 
course with  her,  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor,  evidence  of  com- 
plaints as  to  her  treatment  made  to  her  parents  in  less  than  an 
hour  after  the  assault,  are  admissible,  since  in  the  absence  of  such 
evidence  there  would  be  good  reason  for  doubting  her  story." 
And  evidence  of  the  plaintiff's  condition  on  the  morning  following 
the  assault  is  admissible.100  And  the  defendant  in  an  action  for 
an  assault  may,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  full  version  of  the 
affair  and  of  showing  his  belief  in  his  danger,  show  that  he  was 
struck  by  others  than  the  plaintiff,  both  before  the  alleged  as- 
sault and  during  the  affray.1  But  evidence  that  at  the  time  of 
the  assault  the  defendant  charged  the  plaintiff  with  perjury  is 
not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  the  damages.2  And 
where  only  compensatory  damages  are  claimed,  evidence  as  to 
defendant's  motive  in  visiting  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  al- 
leged assault  is  not  admissible."  And  in  the  absence  of  a  demand 
in  the  petition  for  attorney's  fees,  evidence  as  to  what  the  plain- 
tiff agreed  to  pay  his  counsel  is  not  admissible.1  In  an  action 
by  a  passenger  against  a  carrier  for  an  assault  and  battery  com- 
mitted by  its  conductor,  if  the  carrier  claims  that  the  latter  acted 
in  self-defense  and  used  only  such  force  as  appeared  necessary 
to  him  as  a  reasonable  man  to  repel  the  assault  by  the  passenger, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  carrier  to  establish  such  facts.5 

§  380.  Whether  verdicts  excessive  for  various  injuries — 

As  in  other  cases  of  personal  injuries  so  in  actions  to  recover 
for  an  assault  and  battery,  if  the  verdict  is  so  grossly  excessive 
as  to  appear  to  have  been  the  result  of  ignorance,  prejudice  or 
corruption,   the   verdict  may  be  set  aside.*1     So  where  a  very 

9»Collins  v.  Wilson,  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  (34  Ark.  (313;  39  L.  R.  A.  784;  44  S.  W. 
1049;  39  S.  W.  33.  809. 

10l>Hantian  v.  Cross,  5  Wash.  703;  i  6  We  cite  a  few  eases  as  showing 
32  Pac.  787.  the    various  elements   considered  in 

1Hogan  v.  Ryan,5  N.  Y.St.  R.  110.    determining  whether  verdicts  were 

-  Pulver  v.  Harris,  61  Barb.  I  N.  Y. )  I  excessive:  Person  secretly  ap. 
78.  proached   and     struck   with     heavy 

3  Berryman  v.  Cox,  73  Mo.  App.  67;  '  chain  on  head  and  rendered  uncon- 
1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  29.  i  scious — $2,365  not  excessive.       Van 

4Irlbeck  v.  Bierl,  101  Iowa,  240; 67  Reeden  v.  Evans.  52  111.  App.  209. 
N.  W.  400,  reh'g  denied  70 N.  W.  200.    Kicked    in    face    while     down — jaw 

5  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.    Beiger,    broken     and    teeth    knocked     out — 

43b' 


ASSAULT    AND    BATTRR  S 


- 


large  verdict  is  awarded  and  the  evidence  is  not  sufficient  t" 
show  thai  the  injury  resulted  from  the  act  of  violence  of  the 
defendant,  a  new  trial  may  be  granted.1  And  where  ther< 
statutory  provision  which  authorizes  the  granting  of  a  new  trial 
in  those  cases  where  tin-  verdict  is  so  excessive  that  it  appears 
to  have  been  the  result  of  passion  or  prejudice,-  the  court  instead 
of  ordering  a  remittitur  should,  it  is  held,  order  a  new  trial.' 


§1,000  not  excessive.  Myers  v. 
Moore,  3  End.  App.  226;  28  N.  E.  724. 
Violent  beating  ami  wounding  with 

axe — $85  not  excessive  ami  a  much 
larger,  would,  it  was  declared,  be 
justified.  Gore  v.  Chadwick,  ti 
Dana  (  Ky. ),  477.  Suffered  pain  for 
several  weeks — confined  in  bed  and 
bad  a  miscarriage— Assault  appar- 
ently under  influence  of  passion — 
$2,000  not  excessive.  Barr  v.  Post, 
56  Neb.  698:  77  X.  W.  123.  Serious 
personal  injury — suffering  and  mis- 
carriage, $1,500  not  excessive. 
Pryor  v.  Chadwick,  86  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
75;  33  N.  V.  Supp.  1133.  Ejected 
from  hotel — when  outside  assaulted 
by  bartender  under  direction  of  de- 
fendant to  "Go  out  and  do  that 
man  up."  Smith  v.  Klannery.  G9 
Hun  i\.  Y.i,  615;  53  N.  V.  St.  R. 
L59.  Kicked  in  groin  by  gatem  in 
of  elevated  road — subsequent  swell- 
ing and  in  hospital  for  six  weeks.  $570 
not  excessive.  Niendorff  v.  Manhat- 
tan Ky.  Co.,  4  App.  Div.  (N.  V.)  46, 
appeal  dismissed  in  N.  Y.  270.  Severe 
pain  and  suffering — deprived  of  use 
of  arm  for  several  months  $750 
not  excessive.  Caldwell  v.  Central 
Park  N.  cV:  E.  K.  K.  Co.,  7  Misc.  |  N. 
Y.)  07;  57  N.  Y.  St.  R.  489;  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.    397.     Black     eye    only— $100 


not  excessive.  Dunlap  v.  Koss,  43 
V  JT.  St.  R.  509.  Malicious  assault- 
delirious — in  bed  Beveral  months 
intense  pain  resulting  in  insanity, 
$3,250  not  excessive.  Spear  v. 
Sweeney,  8*  Wis.  .".45;  60  N.  W.  1"  (0. 
Female  passenger  kissed  by  con- 
ductor whom  company  discharged 
on  learning  of  it  —  compensatory 
damages  against  company  held 
recoverable  —  -SI, 000  not  excessive. 
Croker  v.  Chic  &  Northwestern  Ky. 
Co.,  36  Wis.  i'>57:  17  Am.  Rep.  504. 
Assault  and  battery  with  intent  to 
produce  an  abortion — plaintiff  con 
sented — great  pain — unable  to  per- 
form domestic  duties — injuries  not 
permanent — no  punitive  damages 
recoverable  —  $3,500  excessive. 

Courtney  v.  Clinton,  18  End.  App. 
«20;  4S  N.  E.  799.  Defendant  in- 
toxicated and  provoked  by  plaintiff 
by  tatter's  language  —  verdict  not 
wari*anted  Oil  account  nf  actual  dam- 
ages— $5,000  excessive.  Roades  v. 
Larson.  50  N.  S.  St.  R.  551;  21  X.  Y. 
Sup]).  855;  66  Hun  (  \.  Y.  i.  635. 

T  Wright  v.  Southern    Exp.  Co.  (C. 
C.  W.  I).  Tenn.  |,  80  Fed.  85. 

'  S.    D.    <  lomp.     laws,    sec    5088, 
subd.  5. 

9  Murray  v.  Leonard,    11    S.  D.  22; 
75  N.  \V.  272. 

4:'>7 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 


LIBEL  AND    SLANDER. 


381.  Words  actionable  per  se. 

382.  Evidence  showing  malice. 

383.  Privileged      communications 

— Whole  communication  not 
privileged  because  parts 
are,  if  one  part  alone  action- 
able per  se. 

384.  Nominal  damages. 

385.  Measure     of   damages — Com- 

pensatory. 
38(3.  Measure  of  damages  generally 
— In  discretion  of  jury — Ex- 
cessive verdicts. 

387.  Injury    to     feelings — Mental 

suffering. 

388.  Expenses — Counsel  fees. 

389.  Libelous    article    concerning 

member  of  legislature- 
Official  investigation  of 
charges  —  Expenses  —  Loss 
of  time  and  labor — Case. 

390.  Injury  to  reputation. 

391.  Injury  to   business — Loss   of 

employment— Special  dam- 
ages. 

392.  Charge   of  incapacity  in  pro- 

fession— Allegation  of  spe- 
cial damage  not  necessary. 

393.  Special  damages— Pleading. 

394.  Special  damages— Pleading- 

Continued. 

395.  Special  damages— Action   by 

husband  for  slander  of 
wife. 

396.  Facts  tending  to  enlarge  the 

scope  of  a  libel  should  be 
pleaded. 

397.  Exemplary  damages — Malice. 

438 


398.  Exemplary  damages   may  be 

awarded      though      actual 
damages  nominal. 

399.  Exemplary       damages— Two 

defendants. 

400.  Plea  of  truth  as  justification 

— Wheii     damages     aggra- 
vated thereby. 

401.  Same  subject  continued. 

402.  Exemplary   damages — Malice 

— Reckless  or  wanton   con- 
duct. 

403.  Same        subject — Newspaper 

publications. 

404.  Evidence  of  prior  statements 

of  like  import— Reiteration. 

405.  Repetition  after  recovery. 

406.  Evidence — Social        standing 

and  wealth  of  defendant. 

407.  Exemplary  damages — Several 

defendants — Malice  of  one 
not  imputed  to  others. 

408.  Exemplary  damages— Slander 

by  wife. 

409.  Exemplary      damages — Tele- 

graph   company — Libelous 
message. 

410.  Exemplary    damages    as    af- 

fected by  statute. 

411.  Justification. 

412.  Mitigation  of  damages — Gen- 

erally. 

413.  Evidence    of    good    faith    in 

mitigation — Absence  of 

malice. 

414.  Same  subject  continued. 

415.  Evidence      that     defamatory 

matter  was  common  rumor. 


LIBKb    AND    SLANDER. 


§  381 


§  416. 


417. 
418. 
419. 

420. 
421. 


422. 


Source  of  information— Au 
thority    of     others— News 

agency — Copied  from  news- 
papers. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Provocation  in  mitigation. 

Same  subject— When  insuffi- 
cient. 

Retraction  in  mitigation. 

Exemplary  damages — How 
affected  by  rules  of  absent 
proprietor  of  newspaper  as 
to  investigation. 

Evidence  as  to  bad  character 
and  reputation  of  plain- 
tiff. 


423.   Evidence  as  to  bad  chat 

and  reputation  oJ    plaintiff 
I  'ontinued. 

421.  Allegation  of  two  libelous 
charges — Only  one  sub- 
mitted to  jury — Proof  of 
i  he  other  in  mil  igal  ion. 

125.  Evidence  in  behalf  of  plain- 
tiff as  to  his  social  posil  ion 

Reputation       Financial 

condition. 
420.   Evidence    to    show    sense     in 
which    words   were    spoken 
— To  whom  applicable. 

427.  Actions     against     mercantile 

agencies. 

428.  Slander  of  title. 


§  381.  Words  actionable  per  se. — Where  words  are  used  by 
one  person  in  reference  to  another  which  are  actionable  per  se, 
the  law  will  presume  damage  in  an  action  for  libel,  and  no  special 
evidence  showing  malice  or  damage  need  be  given  in  order  to 
entitle  a  person  to  recover.1  So  statements  are  actionable  per  se 
which  impute  to  a  physician  a  general  ignorance  of  medical 
science  and  want  of  professional  skill,  and  incompetency  to 
treat  diseases,  and  it  is  not  necessary  tor  him  to  give  proof  of 
special  damage  in  order  to  recover  damages   for   such  state- 


1  Republican  Pub.  Co.  v.  Conroy, 
5  Colo.  App.  202;  38  Pac.  423; 
Delaware  State  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Croasdale,  t;  Boust.  (Del.)  46;  Nolte 
v.  Herter,  65  111.  App.  430:  Tottleben 
v.  Blankenship,  58  111.  App.  47; 
Tracy  v.  Hackot,  19  [nd.  App.  133; 
4:t  N.  E.  185;  Ilaney  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Perkins,  78  Mich.  1:  43  N.  \V.  1073; 
Berzog  v.   Campbell,   47   Neb.   370; 

00  N.  W.  424;  Cruikshank  v.  Cordon, 
lis  N.  Y.  178;  28  N.  Y.  St.  P.  784; 
23  N.  E.  457,  aff'g  is  Bun  (  N.  V.), 
308;  15  N.  Y.  si.  K.  897;  Sanderson 
v.  Caldwell,  45  N.  Y.398;  6Am.  Pep. 
105;   Charwat   v.    Vopelak,  19  .Misc. 

1  \.  V.i  590;  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  20.  aff'g 
18  Misc.  601;  Root  v.   King,  7  Cow. 


(X.  Y.)  013;  Littlejohn  v.  Greeley, 
13  Abb.  Pr.  iN.  Y.)  41;  Fry  v.  Ben- 
nett, ")  Sand.  (N.  Y.)  54;  Moore  v. 
Leader  Pub.  Co.,  8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  152; 
42  \\\  N.  C.  57<»;  O'Brien  v.  Times 
Pub.  Co.,  21  R.  I.  250;  21  R.  I. 
I  part  2i  15;  1:'-  Ail.  101  ;  Mattson  v. 
Albert.  97  Tenn.  232;  36S.  W.  1090; 
Bouston  Printing  Co.  v.  Bfoulden, 
L5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  571;  41  S.  W.  881; 
Forke  v.  Homann,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App, 
670;  39  s.  w.  210;  Clemmons  \. 
Danforth,  67  Vt  417;  48  Am.  st. 
Rep.  S30;  32  Atl.  020:  Pellardis  v. 
Journal  Printing  Co.,  99  Wis.  156; 
71  V  W.  99;  Candrian  v.  Miller,  98 
Wis.  101;  7:;  N.  \V.  HHI4. 

439 


S  382 


LIBFX    AND    SLANDER. 


ments.2  Actual  malice  is  not  in  all  cases  necessary  to  a  recovery 
of  damages  in  an  action  for  libel  and  slander.  So  where  untrue 
statements  which  reflect  upon  the  character  of  a  candidate  for 
office  are  published,  he  may  recover  from  the  one  publishing  such 
statements  the  actual  damages,  regardless  of  malice.3  The 
question  of  malice  in  such  actions  only  affects  the  right  to  re- 
cover smart  money.' 

§  382.  Evidence  shewing  malice. — Where  words  are  slan- 
derous or  libelous  perse,  it  is  not  necessary  to  give  evidence  of 
express  malice  in  order  to  permit  the  plaintiff  to  recover  his 
actual  damages."'  But  evidence  of  express  malice  is  admissible 
in  aggravation  of  damages  whether  the  matter  complained  of  is 
within  the  class  of  privileged  communications  or  not."  So  the 
plaintiff  was  permitted  to  introduce  in  evidence  a  letter  written 
to  her  by  the  defendant  in  which  the  latter  stated  that  if  the 
plaintiff  kept  on  in  the  course  he  would  "  proceed  to  the  bitter 
end,'*  and  that  she  need  look  for  no  mercy  from  him  after  a 
specified  date.7  And  in  an  action  for  slander  for  charging  the 
plaintiff  with  theft,  the  latter  was  permitted  to  show  that  the 
defendant  had  declared,  twice  after  the  occurrence  of  the  alleged 
theft,  that  he  would  follow  the  thing  up  and  have  the  plaintiff 
discharged  if  it  cost  him  a  hundred  dollars.8  And  again,  in  an 
action  for  libel  against  a  newspaper,  evidence  is  admissible  of 
separate  and  independent  libels,  not  declared  on  by  the  plaintiff, 
published  by  the  same  paper  in  reference  to  the  plaintiff,  as 
tending  to  show  the  degree  of  malice.  Such  independent  libels, 
however,  can  only  affect  the  damages  by  establishing  the  degree 
of  malice  and  cannot  be  made  the  ground  for  the  recovery  of 
any  damages   the  plaintiff  may  have  sustained  from  their  publi- 


2  Cruikshank  v.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y. 
178;  28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  784;  23  X.  E. 
457,  aff'g  48  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  308;  15 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  897. 

3  Austin  v.  Hyndman,  119  Mich. 
615;  78  N.  W.  663;  6  Det.  L.  N.  8. 

*Remsen  v.  Bryant,  24  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  238;  52  N/.  Y.  Supp.  515. 

5  Charwat  v.  Vopelak,  19  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  500;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  26,  aff'g  18 
440 


Misc.  601;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  235.  See 
sec.  381,  herein. 

6  Fry  v.  Bennett,  28  N.  Y.  324;  3 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  200;  Krug  v.  Sassa- 
man  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  54  S.  W.  304. 

?Seip  v.  Deshler,  170  Pa.  St.  334; 
32  Atl.  1032. 

8  Wright  v.  Gregory,  9  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  85;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  139. 


LIBEL    ANI>    BLANDER.  §§  :''s:;.  :',SJ 

cation.''  So,  also,  where  a  Libel  is  published  bj  .1  newspaper 
charging  a  person  with  being  connected  with  an  illegal  or  crim- 
inal transaction,  such  as  bribery,  and  challenges  such  person  in 
explain  bis  connection  therewith,  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor 
the  fact  that  such  paper  refused  to  publish,  even  as  a  paid  ad- 
vertisement, an  explanation  submitted  In  him  which  was  for- 
tified by  an  affidavit,  is  admissible  as  showing  express  malice. 
But  it  is  held  thai  the  refusal  of  a  newspaper  to  publish  a  re- 
traction is  not  admissible  in  an  action  against  such  paper  for 
libel,  as  tending  to  show  malice  and  enhance  the  dainag 

§  383.  Privileged  communications— Whole  communication 

not  privileged  because  parts  are,  If  one  part  alone  actionable 
perse. — Where  a  person  having  an  interest  in  the  matter  pub- 
lished, or  a  duty,  whether  Legal,  social  or  moral,  and  there  is  a 
propriety  in  the  publication,  communicates  such  matter  in  goo. I 
faith  to  another  having  a  like  int. 'rest  or  duty  therein,  or  to 
whom  a  like  propriety  attaches  to  hear  or  read  the  utterances, 
such  a  communication  is  privileged  and  the  burden  is  on  the 
plaintiff  to  show  lack  of  good  faith  and  malice.1'  Of  such  a 
character  is  a  publication  concerning  the  general  condition  of 
municipal  affairs.  But  if  an  article,  the  greater  part  of  which  is 
devoted  to  such  a  subject,  is  published  which  contains  a  charge 
against  a  village  officer  of  incompetency  in  his  professional  ca- 
pacity and  criminality  in  office,  the  whole  of  such  publication  is 
not  privileged  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  balance  thereof  is 
privileged,  but  the  publisher  of  the  same  must,  when  brought 
into  court,  be  prepared  to  prove  the  truth  of  his  charge. 

§  384.  Nominal  damages. — Where  a  person  publishes  words 
concerning  another  which  are  actionahle  per  Be,  the  plaintiff, 
in  an  action  to  recover  therefor  is  not  obliged  to  prove  actual 


9  Van  Derveer  v.  Sutphin,  5  Ohio 
St.  293.  See  Doyle  v.  Levy,  Sit  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  350;  35   X.   Y.    Supp.    434. 

10  Wallace  v.  Jameson,  179  Pa.  St. 
98;  36  Atl.  142;  39  W.  N.  C.  387;  27 
Pitts.  L.  J.  X.  S.  251. 


"  Edsall  v.  Brooks,  •_'  Robt.  (N.  Y.i 
414. 

'-  Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  147  X.  V.  636; 
42  N.  E.  270. 

U  Mattice  v.  Wilcox.  147  X.  Y.  636; 
42  X.  E.  270. 

441 


$  385 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


damage  in  order  to  recover  more  than  nominal  damages.14  So 
plaintiff  was  held  to  be  entitled  to  more  than  nominal  damages, 
though  no  special  damages  were  shown,  where  it  appeared  that 
the  defendant  had  written  a  letter  to  a  creditor  of  the  plaintiff 
stating  that  he  was  dishonest  and  intended  to  evade  the  payment 
of  his  debts.15  '  As  a  general  rule,  whether  more  than  nominal 
damages  should  be  awarded  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  de- 
cide.1" But  they  will  not  be  justified  in  restricting  the  plaintiffs 
damages  to  a  nominal  sum  because  he  fails  to  take  the  stand  and 
disprove  the  truth  of  the  statements  for  the  publication  of  which 
he  seeks  to  recover,  since  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  defend- 
ant to  prove  the  truth  of  the  statements  published  by  him.17 
Nor  again,  will  the  fact  that  they  find  the  character  of  the  plain- 
tiff to  be  bad,  restrict  them  to  an  award  of  nominal  damages  un- 
less they  believe  that  the  plaintiff  will  be  compensated  by  an 
award  of  such  damages,  or  that  there  is  no  ground  for  an  award 
of  exemplary  damages. lh  So,  also,  the  fact  that  a  libel  or  slander 
may  not  be  believed  is  no  ground  for  restricting  the  damages  to 
a  merely  nominal  sum.19  But  where  there  is  no  evidence  of  ex- 
press malice  or  of  any  actual  loss  or  injury  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
it  appears  that  at  the  time  the  libel  was  published,  there  was  a 
common  report  or  rumor  in  circulation,  the  jury  should  then 
award  nominal  damages.50 


§  385.  Measure  of  damages— Compensatory.— Damages  in 

an  action  for  libel  or  slander  should,  in  the  absence  of  any  ele- 
ment which  would  justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damage,  be  a 
compensation  for  the  actual  injury  sustained  as  the  natural  or 
probable  consequence  of  the  slander  or  libel.21     And  the  plaintiff 


14  Nolte  v.  Herter,  65  111.  App.  430. 
See  sec.  381,  herein. 

15  Sanderson  v.  Hall,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  282;  55  S.  W.  594. 

11  Gray  v.  Times  Pub.  Co.,  74  Minn. 
452;  77  N.  W.  204. 

17  Remsen    v.     Bryant,    24     Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  238;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  515. 

18  Edwards  v.  San  Jose  Printing  & 
P.  Co.,  99  Cal.  431;  34  Pac.  128. 

19  Bishop    v.    Journal    Newspaper 
Co.,  168  Mass.  327;  47  N.  E.  119. 

442 


20  Delaware  State  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Croasdale,  6  Houst.  (Del.)  181.  See 
Scougale  v.  Sweet  (Mich.),  82  N.  W. 
1061. 

21  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  of  Newark  v. 
Buckner,  98  Fed.  222;  39  C.  C.  A. 
19;  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  0.)f  94  Fed.  7625  36 
C.  C.  A.  475;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  633;  Enquirer  Co.  v.  John- 
ston (C.  C.  App.  7th  C.),72  Fed.  443; 
Smith  v.  Sun   Printing  &   P.  Co.  (C. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


may  recover,  in  the  absence  of  Legal  excuse,  irrespective  oJ  the  in- 
tent of  the  defendant  in  publishing  the  statement,  or  his  belief 
in  the  truth  thereof,  or  that  he  was  actuated  by  an  honest  or  even 
commendable  motive.22  In  estimating  the  damages  the  jury 
should  consider  the  character  of  the  language  used,  and  the 
manner  of  the  publication,  and  where  the  action  is  for  a  libel 
published  in  a  newspaper,  the  extent  of  such  paper's  circulation, 
as  showing  the  publicity  given  to  the  alleged  Libel.28  The  dam- 
ages which  a  jury  may  award  may  include  not  only  compensa- 
tion for  the  past  injury  but  also  for  such  injury  as  may  subse- 
quently arise,  smee  ;in\  subsequent  injury  accruing  therefrom 
will  not  afford  a  new  ground  of  action.24  But  the  damages 
awarded  should  not  include  any  allowance  for  remote  or  specu- 
lative matters,  whether  pastor  prospective.5'  In  assessing  the 
damages  the  jury  may  consider  the  defendant's  conduct  in  con- 
nection with  the  libel  or  slander  from  the  time  the  same  was 
published  down  to  the  day  of  the  verdict.26  So  acts  and  declara 
linns  of  his  subsequent  to  the  time  when  the  libel  or  slander 
was  published  may  he  considered  as  showing  the  degree  of 
malice  which  actuated  him.'-'7  But  though  there  may  have  been 
no  express  malice,  and  the  defendant  may  have  acted  from  a 
good  or  laudable  motive,  yet  if  the  publication  is  not  justified, 


C.  App.  2d  C),  55  Fed.  240;  Hearne 
v.  De  Young,  132  Cal.  357;  64  Pac. 
57(1;  Edwards  v.  Kansas  City  Times 
Co.,  32  Fed.813;  Cioasdale  v.  Tan- 
tum,  6  Hems.  (Del.)  60;  Washington 
Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Lansden  (D.  C. 
App.  i,  24  Wash.  L.  Rep.  807;  Snyder 
v.  Fulton.  34  Md.  128;  6  Am.  Rep. 
314;  Evening  News  Assoc,  v.  Tryon, 
42  Mich.  54!);  36  Am.  Rep.  150; 
Sanderson  v.  Caldwell, 45  X.  V.  398; 
.6  Am.  Rep.  105;  Ullrich  v.  New  York 
Press  Co.,  23  Misc.  (N.  T.)  168;  50 
X.  Y.  Supp.  788;  Miller  v.  Donovan, 
16  Misc.  (X.  Y.  |  453;  39  V  V.  Supp. 
S20:  Houston  Printing  (V>.  v.  Moul- 
den,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  574;  41  S.  W. 
381;  Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune  Pub. 
Co.,  13  Utah,  532;  35  L.  R,  A.  61 P; 
45  Pac.  1097. 


™  Holmes  v.  Jones.  147  X.  Y.  67; 
69  X.  Y.  St.  R.  310;  41  N.  E.409,  per 
Andrews.  Ch.  J. 

-'Arnold  v.  Sayings  Co.,  76  Mo. 
App.  159.  See  Edwards  v.  Kansas 
City  limes  Co.,  32  Fed.  813;  Wash- 
ington <.as  Light  Co.  v.  Lansden 
(1).  C.   App.  i.  24  Wash.  L.  Rep.  807. 

M  Norfolk  &  W.  S.  B.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
12  App.  I).  C.  306;  ii''>  Wash.  L.  Rep. 
261;  57  Alh.  L.  .).  359;  Clark  v. 
Bohms  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W. 
347.  Sec  Weston  v.  Barnicoat 
(Mass.),  56  N.  E.  619. 

ssCortulla  v.  Kerr,  74  Tex.  SO;  11 
S.  W.   1058. 

*Praed  v.  Graham,  L.  K.  24  Q.  B. 
1).  53. 

•^Stitzell  v.  Reynolds.  67  Pa.  St. 
54;  ">   Am.  Hep.  396. 

148 


8  386 


LIBEL,    AND    SLANDER. 


such  fact  will  not   prevent   the  recovery  by  the  plaintiff  of  the 
actual  damage  sustained.28 

§  386.  Measure  of  damages  generally— In  discretion  of 
jury  Excessive  verdicts.— In  determining  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages which  may  be  awarded  in  an  action  for  slander  or  libel, 
the  jury  may  consider  the  character  of  the  language  used,  the 
various  circumstances  in  connection  with  its  use  as  showing 
malice,  or  in  provocation,  or  in  mitigation  generally,  the  pub- 
licity given  to  it,  as  in  the  case  of  a  newspaper,  the  extent  of 
the  paper's  circulation,  any  subsequent  facts  aggravating  the 
damages  as  repetition  or  mitigating  them  as  retraction,  that 
due  care  and  caution  was  used  by  the  defendant  to  determine 
the  truth  of  the  charge,  and  any  attempt  at  justification  not 
made  in  good  faith.  Evidence  bearing  upon  all  these  points  is 
admissible  to  enable  the  jury  to  determine  the  monetary  loss 
sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  and  also  in  arriving  at  the  amount 
which  they  may  award  as  exemplary  damages,  where  such  dam- 
ages are  claimed  and  may  be  justified.'*  The  amount  of  dam- 
ages which  may  be  awarded  in  an  action  for  slander  or  libel 
are  peculiarly  within  the  discretion  of  the  jury*     "  The  jury 


28  Ullrich  v.  New  York  Press  Co., 
2  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  168;  50  N.  Y.  Supp. 
788. 

29  Smith  v.  Sim  Pub.  Co.  (C.  C.  S. 
D.  N.  Y.),  50  Fed.  399;  Rutherford 
v.  Morning  .Journal  Assoc.  (C.  C.  S. 
D.  N.  Y.),  47  Fed.  487,  aft'd  51 
Fed.  513:  16  L.  R.  A.  803;  1  U.  S. 
App.  296;  2  C.  C.  A.  354;  Jones  v. 
Greeley,  25  Fla.  629;  6  So.  448;  Storey 
v.  Early,  m  111.  461;  Smith  v.  Chi- 
cago Herald  (111.  C.  C),  50  Alb.  L.  J. 
23;  Nally  v.  Burleigh,  91  Me.  22;  39 
Atl.  285;  John  Brenner  Brew.  Co. 
v.  McGill,  23  Ky.  Law  R.  212;  62  S. 
W.  722;  Frederickson  v.  Johnson 
(Minn.),  62  N.  W.  388;  Arnold  v. 
Sayings  Co.,  76  Mo.  App.  159;  Fry  v. 
Bennett,  28  N.  Y.  324;  Wright  v. 
Gregory,  9  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  85;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  139;  Neber  v.  Butler,  81 
Hun  (N.   Y.),  244;  62   N.   Y.    St.    R. 

444 


669;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  713;  Tobiu  v. 
Sykes,  71  Hun  (N.  Y.),  469;  54  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  399;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  943;  Cum- 
mings  v.  Line,  45  X.  Y.  St.  R.  56;  18 
N.  Y.  Supp.  469;  Rich  v.  Mayer,  26 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  107;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  69; 
Hilbraut  v.  Simmons,  18  Ohio  C.  C. 
123;  9  Ohio  C.  D.  566;  Kerr  v.  At- 
ticks,  20  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  233;  Luft  v. 
Lingane,  17  R.  I.—;  22  Atl.  942;  Pel- 
lardis  v.  Journal  Printing  Co.,  99 
Wis.  156;  74  N.  W.  99.  These  vari- 
ous points  are  fully  considered  in 
the  various  sections  of  this  chapter, 
so  Croasdale  v.  Bright,  6  Houst. 
(Del.)  52;  Manget  v.  O'Neill,  51  Mo. 
App.  35;  Jacquelin  v.  Morning  Jour- 
nal Assoc,  39  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  515; 
57  N.  Y.  Supp.  299;  Morrison  v.  Press 
Pub.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  131;  38  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  357;  Grace  v.  McArthur,  76 
Wis.  641 ;  45  N.  W.  518. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


may  give  nominal  damages  or  damages  to  a  greater  ur 
amount  as  they  shall  determine.  The  jury  may  accord  damages 
which  are  merely  compensatory,  or  damages  beyond  mere  com- 
pensation, called  punitive  or  vindictive  damages  by  way  of  ex- 
ample or  punishment,  when  in  their  judgment  defendant  was 
incited  by  actual  malice  or  acted  wantonly  or  recklessly  in  mak- 
ing the  defamatory  charge."31  And  the  verdict  which  the  jury 
may  award  in  such  a  case  will  not  ordinarily  be  interfered  with 
unless  it  appear  that  the  damages  awarded  by  them  are  so  grossly 
in  excess  of,  or  inadequate  to,  the  actual  injury  done,  or  what 
the  facts  of  the  case  would  justify,  as  to  clearly  indicate  that 
they  were  influenced  by  bias,  prejudice  or  some  other  improper 
motive,  in  which  case  it  will  be  set  aside.32  And  where,  in  an 
action  for  slander  or  libel,  a  misdirection  has  been  given  in  favor 
of  the  plaintiff  upon  a  material  part  of  the  libel  and  a  large  ver- 
dict has  been  awarded  by  the  jury,  who  may  have  been  influenced 
in  their  award  by  such   misdirection,  the  judgment  may  be  re- 


81  Holmes  v.  .Jones,  147  N.   Y.  59, 
per  Andrews,  C.  J. 

32  Croasdale  v.  Bright,  6  Eioust. 
(Del.)  52;  Jacksonville  Journal  Co. 
v.  Reyrner,  42  111.  App.  443;  Sanborn 
v.  Fickett,  91  Mi-.  364;  40  Atl.  66; 
Libby  v.  Towle,  90  Me.  262;  38  Atl. 
171:  Mangett  v.  O'Neill,  .~>1  Mo.  App. 
35;  Ilolmes  v.  Jones,  147  N.  Y.  ."J9; 
Jaequeliu  v.  Morning  Journal  Assoc, 
39  App.  Div.  (N.  r.)515;  :>7  X.  V. 
Supp.  299;  Nunnally  v.  Taliaferro, 
82  Tex.  286;  18  S.  W.  149;  Grace  v. 
McArthur,  7<i  Wis.  641;  43  X.  W. 
518;  Reed  v.  Keith,  99  Wis.  672;  7a 
N.  W.  392.  See  following  cases 
where  the  question  of  excessive  ver 
diets  was  considered.  Chiatovicb 
v.  Hanchett,  90  Fed.  681,  aff'd  101 
Fed.  742;  41  ('.  C.  A.  648.  Ac- 
tion for  libel — injury  to  reputation 
anil  business — $4,700  not  excessive. 
Jones  v.  Greeley,  25  Fla.  029:  0 
So.  448.  Action  for  libel— injury 
to  character,  standing  and  business 
of  plaintiff  by  publication  in  paper 
of  wide  circulation — $3,000  not  ex- 


cessive. Bee  Pub.  Co.  v.  World 
Pub.  Co.  ( Xeb. ),  82  N.  W.  28.  State- 
ment in  newspaper  that  a  rival  news- 
paper was  in  bankrupt  condition 
and  about  to  pass  out  of  existence 
— $4,000  not  excessive.  Turton  v. 
Xew  York  Recorder  Co.,  :'.  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  314;  52  X.  Y.  St.  It.  398:  22 
X.  Y.  Supp.  700.  Action  for  libel 
statement  that  business  man  had  left 
town  with  money  of  a  certain  bank 
through  which  he  had  drawn  a  draft 
on  a  bankrupt  firm — $5,000  exces- 
sive, and  ordered  set  aside  unless 
plaintiff  stipulates  to  reduce  to 
§3,000.  Sherwood  v.  Kyle.  125  Cal. 
652;  58  Pac.  270.  Action  for  slander 
— statements  concerning  plaintiff  as 
a  school-teacher — trial  two  years  af- 
ter— shown  not  to  have  affected  her 
ability  to  obtain  positions  as  school- 
teacher since — §1,000  excessive — 
new  trial  ordered  unless  plaint  it! 
remit  $700.  For  verdicts  in  action 
for  slander  or  libel  directly  affecting 
character  and  reputation,  see  sec. 
390  herein. 

lb". 


§  387 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


versed,  though  it  does  not  positively  appear  that  in  the  absence 
of  the  misdirection,  the  same  verdict  would  not  have  been  ren- 
dered.33  The  Federal  courts,  however,  in  an  action  for  libel, 
will  not  set  aside  a  verdict  as  excessive  upon  a  writ  of  error 
where  the  jury  has  been  properly  instructed  as  to  the  rule  for 
the  computation  of  damages.34 


§  387.  Injury  to  feelings — Mental  suffering.  -In  an  action 
for  libel  oi'  slander  the  jury  may  property  consider  in  estimating 
the  damages,  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  feelings,  his  mental 
suffering,  shame  and  wounded  honor  as  a  result  of  the  act  of 
the  defendant.35  And  it  is  not  necessary  that  these  elements 
be  especially  averred  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover  there- 
for, but  such  damages  are  recoverable  under  the  general  ad 
damnum  clause.*  In  determining  the  injury  to  the  feelings  of 
the  plaintiff  as  the  res'ult  of  a  libel  published  in  a  newspaper, 


33  Bray  v.  Ford  (H.  L.  E.)  [1896], 
A.  C.  44;  65  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  213;  73 
Law  Rep.  T.  609. 

34  Smith  v.  Sun  Printing  &  P. 
Assoc.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  2d  C),  55  Fed. 
240;  Morning  Journal  Assoc,  v. 
Rutherford  (U.  S.  C.  C.  2d  C),  51 
Fed.  513;  1  U.  S.  App.  296;  2  IT.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  354;  46  Alb.  L.  J.  305. 

36  Shattuck  v.  McArthur,  29  Fed. 
136;  Hearne  v.  De  Young,  132  Cal. 
357;  64  Pac.  576;  Cahill  v.  Murphy, 
94  Cal.  29;  30  Pac.  195;  Lehrer  v. 
Elmore,  100  Ky.  56;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
551;  37  S.  W.  292;  Windisch-Muhl- 
hauser  Brew.  Co.  v.  Bacon  (Ky. ),  53 
S.  W.  520;  Louisville  Press  Co.  v. 
Sennelly,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1231;  49  S. 
W.  15;  Blumhardt  v.  Rohr,  70  Md. 
328;  Hastings  v.  Stetson,  130  Mass. 
76;  Cribbs  v.  Yore,  119  Mich.  237; 
77  X.  W.  927;  5  Det.  L.  N.  794;  Long 
v.  Tribune  Printing  Co.,  107  Mich. 
207;  65  N.  W.  108;  2  Det.  L.  N.  635; 
Derham  v.  Derham  (Mich.),  82  N. 
W.  218;  Far-rand  v.  Aldrich,  85  Mich. 
593;  48  X.  W.  628;  Baldwin  v.  Boul- 
ware,  79  M<>.  App.  5;  2  Mo.  A.  Rep. 

446 


359;  Michael  v.  Matheis,  77  Mo. 
App.  556;  2  Mo.  A.  Rep.  175;  Brooks 
v.  Harrison,  91  N.  Y.  83;  Palmer  v. 
New  York  News  Pub.  Co.,  31  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  210;  52  N.  Y.  Supp. 
539;  Raines  v.  New  York  Press  Co., 
92  Hun  (N.  Y.),  515;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
197;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  45;  Ward  v. 
Deane,  32  N.  Y.  St.  R.  270;  10  N.  Y. 
Supp.  421;  Hamilton  v.  Eno,  16 
IIuu  (N.  Y.),  599;  81  N.  Y.  116; 
Houston  Printing  Co.  v.  Dement, 
18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  30;  44  S. 
W.  558;  Houston  Printing  Co.  v. 
Moulden,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  574;  41 
S.  W.  381;  Forke  v.  Homann,  14 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  670;  39  S.  W.  210; 
Hirshfield  v.  Ft.  Worth  Nat.  Bank, 
83  Tex.  452;  15  L.  R.  A.  639;  18  S. 
W.  743;  34  Cent.  L.  J.  350;  6  Bkg. 
L.  J.  345;  McCarthy  v.  Miller  (Tex. 
Civ.  App. ),  57  S.  W.  973.  Fenster- 
maker  v.  Tribune  Pub.  Co.,  13  Utah, 
532;  35  L.  R.  A.  611;  45  Pac.  1097; 
Rea  v.  Harrington,  58  Vt.  181. 

36  Cribbs  v.   Yore,    119  Mich.    237; 
77  N.  W.  927;  5  Det.  L.  N.  794. 


LIBEL    AM)    SLANDER. 

the  jury  may  consider  any  recklessness  or  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  employees  of  such  paper  in  respecl  to  the  publica- 
tion of  the  libel.8'  And  in  an  action  by  a  woman  for  slander, 
evidence  is  admissible  of  the  number  and  ages  of  her  children, 
as  li«'!-  mental  suffering  might  be  enhanced  by  the  fact  thai 
her  family  would  suffer  as  a  result  of  the  slander.88  Bui  in  a 
case  where  the  plaintiff  had,  as  a  result  of  a  report  made  to  a 
protective  association,  been  refused  credit  by  other  members  of 

tlic  association,  it  was  held  that  evidence  was  not  admissible 
that  the  plaintiff  had  a  large  family  dependent  on  him  for  sup- 
port by  reason  of  which  his  loss  of  business  had  caused  him 
trreat  mental  suffering.89  And  in  those  cases  where  a  libel  is  not 
actionable  per  se,  there  must  be  proof  of  some  other  injury  or 
damage  in  order  to  allow  a  recovery  for  mental  si  die  ring.'  In 
Texas  under  the  act  of  May  4,  1895,  which  provides  that  in 
case  of  the  death  of  the  original  plaintiff  while  an  action  for 
libel  is  pending,  the  action  survives  the  death,  the  substituted 
plaintiff  may  recover  for  the  mental  anguish  suffered  by  the 
original  plaintiff.41 

§  388.  Expenses — Counsel  fees. — It  is  error  to  instruct  the 
jury  in  an  action  for  libel  or  slander  that  they  may  allow  the 
plaintiff  for  the  expense  to  which  he  has  been  put  by  being  com- 
pelled to  vindicate  his  character,  since  under  such  an  instruction, 
the  jury  might  consider  an  allowance  proper  for  counsel  fees  for 
which  there  can  be  no  recovery.1-'  So  again,  to  instruct  the  jury 
that  they  may  allow  compensatory  damages  including  compensa- 
tion for  the  entire  expense  of  the  litigation  is  erroneous,  as  the 
instruction    should  specify   the  expenses   to  which  recovery  is 


37  Long  v.  Tribune  Printing  Co., 
107  Mich.  207;  65  N.  W.  L08;  2  Det 
L.  V  635. 


Miller  (Tex.   Civ.    A.pp.),   .".7    S.    W. 
973. 
41  Houston  Printing  Co.  v.  Dement, 


•    »Cahill  v.  Murphy,  94  Cal.  29;  30    Is  Tex.  Civ.  A.pp.  30;   H  S.  W.  558. 
Pac.  19").  **  Grotins  v.    Ross  (Ind.    App.),  57 


^Windisch-Muhlhauser  Brew.  Co. 
v.  Bacon  (Ky.),  53  S.  W.  520.     See 

in  this  connection  sec.  4lT>  herein 


N.  E.  4G  ;  Indianapolis  Journal 
Newspaper  Co.  v.  Pugh,  6  End.  A.pp. 
in  ;    33     N.     E.     991  :    [rlbeck 


»Hiischfield    v.    Fr.    Worth    Nat.    Hierle    (Iowa),  50    \.   W.  36;  Has- 


hed v.  Nelson.  24   Hun     X.    V. 

Rut    see    Thompson     v.     Powning, 


Bank,  83  Tex.  152;  15  L.  R.  A.  639; 
18  S.  W.  743;  34  Cent.  L.  J.  350;  6 
Bkg.    L.   .1.   345.     .See    McCarthy    v.    15  Nev.  L95. 

44 


§§  389,  390  LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

limited.43  And  in  order  to  permit  of  a  recovery  for  expenses  it 
must  appear  that  such  expenses  were  necessarily  incurred  as  the 
result  of  the  libel  or  slander.  So  where  in  an  action  for  libel,  af- 
fecting the  business  standing  of  the  plaintiff,  it  was  alleged  in 
the  complaint  that  as  a  result  of  the  libel  and  in  order  to  re- 
move the  effect  of  false  impressions  as  to  plaintiff's  credit,  which 
had  been  created  thereby  with  persons  with  whom  he  dealt,  he 
had  been  obliged  to  expend  a  certain  gross  amount  in  travelling 
expenses,  it  was  held  that  he  should  be  required  on  special  de- 
murrer to  give  a  fairly  accurate,  though  not  necessarily  minute, 
itemized  statement  showing  for  what  such  expenses  were  in- 
curred, and  that  he  should  allege  that  the  sums  stated  were  nec- 
essarily expended.41 

§  389.  Libelous  article  concerning  member  of  legislature- 
Official  investigation  of  charges— Expenses— Loss  of  time  and 
labor — Case. — In  a  case  in  New  York  which  was  an  action  to 
recover  for  a  libelous  article  published  concerning  a  member  of 
the  state  senate,  the  plaintiff  sought  to  recover  for  expenses,  loss 
of  time  and  labor  in  connection  with  an  investigation  which  was 
made  by  the  senate  as  to  the  charges  and  statements  which  were 
contained  in  such  publication,  and  it  was  decided  that  there 
could  be  no  recovery  therefor  unless  it  appeared  that  the  inves- 
tigation was  caused  by  the  publication  complained  of,  even 
though  the  publisher  thereof  intended  such  result/' 

§  390.  Injury  to  reputation.— As  a  result  of  a  libel  or  slander, 
a  person  may  be  injured  in  his  reputation  and  where  such  an  in- 
jury is  shown  to  have  been  sustained,  it  is  an  element  which  the 
jury  may  consider  in  estimating  the  damages  recoverable  by  the 
plaintiff.46     Injury  to  the  reputation  or  character  of  a  person  is 


43  Indianapolis  Journal  Newspaper 
Co.  v.  Pugh,  6  Ind.  App.  510;  33  N. 
E.  991.  See  Grotins  v.  Ross.  (Ind. 
App.),  57  N.  E.  40. 

44  Brad  street  Co.  v.  Oswald,  96  Ga. 
396;  23  S.  E.  423. 

45  Robertson  v.  New  York  Press 
Co..  2  App.  Div.  49;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
547;  :!7  N.  Y.  Snpp.  187. 

448 


46  Lehrer  v.  Elmore,  100  Ky.  56; 
37  S.  W.  292;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  551; 
Blumhardt  v.  Rohr,  70  Md.  328;  Far- 
rand  v.  Aldricli,  85  Mich.  593;  48 
N.  W.  628;  McGee  v.  Baumgartner 
(Mich.),  80  N.  W.  21;  Baldwin  v. 
Boulware,  79  Mo.  App.  5;  2  Mo. 
App.  Rep.  :'>59;  Houston  Printing 
Co.  v.    Moulden,   15  Tex.    Civ.    App. 


LIMKL    AND    SLANDER. 


one  of  the  natural  and  ordinary  results  of  a  slander  or  libel,  and 
in  most  of  the  cases  a  slander  or  libel  is  a  direct  imputation 
against  the  character  of  a  person,  though  not  always.  So  charg- 
ing a  person  with  dishonesty;47  with  bribery;48  with  being  a 
thief  or  robber ;  *  a  "damned  thief";30  a  counterfeiter ;  °  with 
having  passed  counterfeit  money  with  intent  to  defraud  ;  ■"'-'  with 
having  been  jailed  on  a  criminal  charge  ; :c  with  burning  his  house 
to  get  insurance  money, :>l  with  having  committed  rape;'"'  or 
with  bigamy,*  are  charges  directly  against  the  character  of  a 
person  and  for  which  damages  may  be  awarded.  So  also  re- 
covery may  be  had  where  libelous  or  slanderous  statements  are 
made  imputing  unchastity  or  immoral  conduct  to  a  woman  ;  " 


574  ;  41  S.  W.  381 ;  Fenstermaker  v. 
Tribune  Pub.  Co.,  13  Utah,  532;  35 
L.  R.  A.  611;  13  Utah,  532.  See  in 
this  connection  Derham  v.  Derham 
I  Mich.),  82  X.  W.  218. 

47  Payne  v.  Rouss,  46  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  315;  61  X.  Y.  Supp.  705, 
where  verdict  of  $5,000  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Hartman  v.  Morning  Jour- 
nal Assoc,  46  X.  Y.  St.  R.  181;  10 
X.  Y.  Supp.  308,  where  $5,000  held 
not  excessive  for  charging  connec- 
tion with  insurance  swindle  and  mis- 
appropriation of  money. 

«  Xally  v.  Burleigh,  01  Me.  22;  39 
Atl.  285.  Sheriff  charged  with  brib- 
ery and  permitting  prisoner  to  es- 
cape— $896. ;!7  not  excessive. 

» Clark  v.   Fox,  10  App.    Div.  (N. 

Y.  )  514;  41  X.  Y.  Sup]).  1091,  $2, 

not  excessive.  Wright  v.  Gregory, 
9  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  85;  41  X.  Y. 
Supp.  139,  $600  not  excessive.  Ken 
v.  Atticks,  20  Pa.  Co.  Ot.  233,  1200 
not  excessive.  Frederickson  v.  John- 
son  (Minn.),  62  X.  W.  388;  $5,000 
excessive — $3,000  held  sufficient. 

«>Shoaff  v.  Funk,  182  111.  224;  51 
N.  E.  069,  all's  73  111.  A.pp.  550, 
$400  not  excessive.  Southcombe  v. 
Armstrong,  28  X.  Y.  St.  R.  753;  8 
N.  Y.  Supp.  361. 

61Pellardis  v.  Journal  Printing  Co., 

29 


99  Wis.   156;  74  N.  W.  99,  $450   not 
excessive. 

62  Mequet  v.  Silverman,  52  La.  Ann. 
1369;  27  So.  885,  $1  held  inade- 
quate and  increased  to  8300  in  case 
of  boy  aged  eighteen  and  of  good 
character. 

63  Houston  Printing  Co.  v.  Dement, 
18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  30;  44  S.  W.  588. 
Person  of  unimpeachable  character 
— charged  with  having  been  jailed 
on  charge  of  horse  stealing— $1,000 
not  excessive. 

"Hilbrant  v.  Simmons,  18  Ohio  C. 
C.  123;  9  Ohio  C.  D.  566,  $800  held 
excessive  where  spoken  in  heal  of 
an  argument  in  which  plaintiff 
charged  defendant  with  cutting  his 
fence  and  no  malice  or  special  dam- 
age sbown. 

• ' . ilmaii  v.  McClatchy,  111  Cal. 
606;  44  Pac  211.  $500  as  compensa- 
tory damages  not  excessive. 

'•  Weber  v.  Butler,  81  Hun(X.  V.  |, 
2  11;  62  X.  Y.  St.  K.  669;  30  N  V. 
Supp.  713.  In  daily  paper  having 
circulation  of  over  fifty  thousand, 
$800  not  excessive. 

B7Wendt  v.  Craig.  17  X.  V.  Supp. 
748;  15  X.  Y.  St.  K.  23:  charging 
woman  with  keeping  disorderly 
house  and  with  being  morally  had 
and  unchaste-  $2,500  not  excessive. 
44!' 


§  391  LIBEL   AND    SLANDER. 

or  charging  a  married  woman  with  having  eloped,58  or  a  single 
woman  with  eloping  with  a  married  man,59  or  a  woman  with  be- 
ing a  drunken  brute  of  a  mother.60 

§  391.  Injury  to  business— Loss  of  employment— Special 
damages. — Where  language  used  is  slanderous  or  libelous  per 
se,  the  damage  which  the  law  presumes  such  language  will 
cause  to  a  person's  business,  profession  or  calling  being  general, 
a  recovery  therefor  may  be  had  under  a  general  allegation  of  dam- 
ages.61 and  if  in  an  action  for  a  slander  or  libel,  a  person  alleges 
a  loss  of  business  generally,  it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to  give 
proof  of  the  loss  of  particular  customers,  but  he  may  show  a 
general  loss  of  decline  of  patronage.62  But  if  he  has  in  his  allega- 
tions as  to  loss  of  business,  given  the  names  of  particular  cus- 


Luft  v.  Lingane,  17  R.  I.—  ;  22 
Atl.  942,  charging  woman  of  good 
character  with  keeping  company 
with  negro  and  being  assaulted  by 
hitter's  wife — $2,485.50  not  excessive. 
Heizog  v.  Campbell,  47  Neb.  370;  66 
N.  W.  424.  Girl  of  sixteen  with  be- 
ing pregnant  by  her  father — $1,000 
not  excessive.  Cummings  v.  Line, 
45  N.  Y.  St.  R.  56;  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
469.  Imputing  unchastity  while  in 
personal  altercation  with  plaintiff 
or  her  father— S3, 000  excessive. 

58  Rutherford  v.  Morning  Journal 
Assoc.  (C.  0.  S.  D.  N.  Y.),  47  Fed. 
487,  aff'd  51  Fed.  513;  16  L.  R.  A. 
803;  1  U.  S.  App.  296;  2  C.  C.  A. 
354.  Not  prompted  by  personal 
malice  and  injury  to  reputation  prob- 
ably insignificant — $4,000  not  exces- 
sive. Smith  v.  Sun  Pub.  Co.  (C.  C. 
S.  D.  N.  Y. ),  50  Fed.  399.  Conspicu- 
ous publication  in  a  paper  in  sen- 
sational and  somewhat  jeering  man- 
ner of  elopement  with  man  with 
whom  her  previous  intimacy  was  said 
to  have  been  freely  spoken  of — 
$7,500,  not  excessive.  See  Smith  v. 
Matthews,  21  Misc.  (N..  Y. )  150;  47  N. 
Y.  Supp.  96,  which  was  an  action  to 
450 


recover  damages  for  charging  a  mar- 
ried woman  with  having  eloped.  In 
this  case  a  large  verdict  was  awarded 
and  sustained  on  appeal  on  the 
ground  that  the  plaintiff  was  a  chaste 
and  refined  woman,  and  it  was  held 
that  a  new  trial  should  be  granted 
where  there  was  newly  discovered 
evidence  that  she  was  not  chaste  but 
was  living  in  adulterous  intercourse 
with  the  person  with  whom  the  de- 
fendant charged  she  had  eloped. 

59  Cooper  v.  Sun  Print  &  P.  Assoc. 
(C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.),  57  Fed.  566, 
.$2,500,  not  excessive. 

«>Tobin  v.  Sykes,  71  Hun,  469;  54 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  399;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  943. 
Unsuccessfull  attempt  at  justifica- 
tion— $400  not  excessive. 

61  Moore  v.  Francis,  121  N.  Y.  199; 
Smid  v.  Bernard,  31  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
35;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.    278. 

62  Bee  Pub.  Co.  v.  World  Pub.  Co. 
(Neb.),  82  N.  W.  28.  See  Weiss  v. 
Whittemore,  28  Mich.  373;  Ryan  v. 
Benger  &  H.  Brew.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  287;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  660;  Berg- 
mann  v.  Jones,  94  N.  Y.  51;  Evans  v. 
Harris,  1  H.  &  N.  254;  26  L.  J.  Ex. 
31. 


LIBEL    ANJ»    SLANDER. 


§391 


tomers,  he  will  be  confined  in  his  proof  to  those  named.8  Again, 
where  the  gist  of  the  action  is  loss  of  business,  the  plaintiff 
may  show  the  extent  and  character  of  the  business,  both  before 

and  after  the  alleged  slander  or  libel.*  And  the  jury  may 
consider  in  estimating  the  damages  for  loss  of  business,  the 
probable  future  as  well  as  the  past  Loss  sustained.''"'  And 
the  plaintiff  may  introduce  in  evidence  a  letter  received  by 
him  from  a  former  customer,  refusing  t<>  trade  with  him  be- 
cause of  the  alleged  libel  or  slander."  So  also  evidence  that 
a  person  has  been  refused  credit  is  admissible.61  And  where  the 
only  element  is  the  general  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  credit  as  a 
merchant  and  contractor,  the  fact  that  a  merchant  in  poor  credit 
is  ordinarily  compelled  to  pay  more  for  merchandise  than  one  in 
good  credit,  maybe  considered  by  the  jury,  as  may  also  the  further 
fact  that  parties  who  have  contracts  to  give  are  reluctant  to  give 
them  to  persons  of  doubtful  financial  reputation.**  lint  though 
a  person  may  allege  a  loss  in  business  or  of  employment,  he  can- 
not recover  therefor,  where  it  is  shown  that  such  loss  was  due 
to  other  causes.  So  where  plaintiff  alleged  loss  of  his  position, 
he  was  not  permitted  to  recover  therefor,  where  it  was  shown  that 
the  cause  of  his  dismissal  embraced  three  other  charges.1'9  And 
again  a  recovery  for  loss  of  employment  was  not  permitted  where 
it  appeared  that  the  cause  of  the  plaintiff's  discharge  was  that 
his  employers  had  decided  to  dispense  with  anyone  in  his  ca- 
pacity.™ And  where  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  publication 
of  a  libelous  article  concerning  plaintiff's  business  standing,  he 
alleges  that  in  order  to  raise  cash   to  meet  an  indebtedness  he 


63  Hallock  v.  Miller,  2  Barb.  (N.  V. ) 
630;  Kendall  v.  Stone,  5  N.  Y.  14; 
Keusch  v.  Koanoke  Cold  Storage  Co. 
|  Va.  |,  22  S.  K.  358. 

"Bee  Pub.  Co.  v.  World  Pub.  Co. 
(  NY1>.).  82  N.  W.  28. 

es  Bee  Pub.  Co.  v.  World  Pub.  Co. 
(Neb.),  82  \.  W.  28. 

66  Weston  v.  Baruicoat  (Mass.),  56 
N.  E.  619. 

07  Western  Union  Teleg.  Co.  v. 
Putchett,  108  Ga.  411;  34  S.  K.  216; 
Muetze  v.  Tuteur,  77  Wis.  236;  20 
Am.   St.  Rep.  115;  4ti  N.  W.  123.     In 


this  case  an  agency  for  the  collection 
of  bad  debts  had  published  plaintiff's 
name  on  a  list  of  delinquent  debtors. 
A.S  a  result  of  the  publication  it  was 
shown  that  plaintiff  had  been  re- 
fused credit  by  one  person,  and  a 
verdict  of  S">71  was  held  not  exces- 
sive. 

68I)aislev  v.  Dim,  107  Fed.  218. 

"Wallace  v.  Rodgers,  156  Pa,  St 
395;  27  Atl.  163;  :;.",  \v.  v  C.  538. 

7  Democrat  Pub.  Co.  v.  Jones 
(Tex.),  18  S.  W.  652. 

451 


§  392  U  BEL    AND    SLANDER. 

has  been  obliged  as  a  result  of  the  publication  to  pay  a  specified 
discount  on  notes  of  his  where  the  time  of  the  indebtedness 
would  otherwise  have  been  extended,  he  may  on  a  special  de- 
murrer to  such  allegation  be  required  to  give  an  itemized  state- 
ment of  the  amount  thus  expended.71 

§  392.  Charge  of  incapacity  in  profession— Allegation  of 
special  damage  not  necessary. — As  a  general  rule  where  a  slan- 
der or  libel  is  directed  against  one  in  his  general  professional 
capacity  and  ability,  he  may  recover  without  allegation  or  proof 
of  special  damage.72  So  it  is  actionable  per  se  to  impute  to  a 
physician  a  general  ignorance  of  medical  science.73  Or  to  im- 
pute to  a  lawyer  a  general  incapacity  in  his  profession.'1  But  a 
charge  against  a  professional  man  of  negligence  or  want  of  skill 
in  a  particular  instance  is  declared  not  actionable  per  se,  and  to 
render  it  actionable,  there  should  be  allegations  and  proof  of 
special  damage.75  To  render  the  words  actionable  per  se,  it  is  not 
necessary  in  all  cases,  however,  that  a  slander  or  libel  specifically 
allege  a  general  incapacity  in  all  branches  of  a  profession,  but  if 
a  physician  or  lawyer  has  chosen  some  particular  branch  or  sphere 
of  professional  labor,  a  charge  of  general  incapacity  to  properly 
perforin  the  professional  duties  involved  in  such  a  class  of  cases 
is  equivalent  to  a  charge  of  general  incapacity  in  his  profession 
for  which  recovery  may  be  had  without  allegation  or  proof  of 
special  damage.76  Thus  it  was  so  held  in  an  action  by  a  lawyer, 
who  had  been  employed  several  times  as  counsel  to  a  village,  to 
recover  for  a  libelous  publication  charging  him  with  incapacity 
to  properly  perform  the  duties  of  defending  negligence  cases.77 
The  court  said  :  "  The  plaintiff  in  this  case  had  been  frequently 
chosen  counsel  for  the  village  of  Oneonta.  In  such  an  employ- 
ment, it  would  almost  necessarily  (as  in  fact  it  did)  happen  that 


71  Bradstreet  Co.  v.  Oswald,  96  Ga. 
396;  23  S.  E.  423. 

72  Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  147  N.  Y.  629; 
42  N.  E.  270;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  244; 
Cruikskankv.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y.  178; 
Mclntyre  v.  Weinert,  195  Pa.  St.  52; 
45  Atl.  666. 

73  Cruikshank  v.  Gordon,  118  N. 
Y.  178. 

452 


74 Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  147  N.  Y.  629; 
42  N.  E.  270;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  244. 

75  Foot  v.  Brown,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
63. 

"■'  Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  147  N.  Y.  629; 
42  N.  E.  270;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  244. 

77  Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  147  N.  Y.  629; 
42  N.  E.  270;  71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  244. 


LIBEL    AND    si.ANDl.l:.  §  393 

among  others,  cases  of  negligence  would  arise,  and  it  would 
be  the  duty  of  the  counsel  employed  by  the  village  to  defend 
such  suits.  A  general  incapacity  to  properly  perform  the  duties 
of  defending  that  class  of  cases  seems  to  be  under  such  circum- 
stances equivalent  to  a  general  incapacity  to  properly  discharge 
the  duties  of  his  profession.  Those  duties  are  in  these  circum- 
stances to  try  such  eases  and  he  assumes  a  responsibility  in 
taking  such  a  general  elass  of  employment  to  discharge  such 
duties  with  ordinary  care  and  capacity.  A  charge  which  accuses 
him  of  incapacity  to  perform  the  ordinary  duties  appertaining  t.. 
the  practice  of  his  profession  in  such  eases,  is  of  so  general  a 
nature  as  to  come  within  the  reason,  if  not  the  very  letter  of  the 
rule  as  to  general  incapacity.  It  is  not  incapacity  as  to  a  single 
case  or  a  single  litigation.  It  is  incapacity  as  to  a  general  class 
of  actions  in  regard  to  which  he  lias  assumed  knowledge  and 
capacity  to  a  reasonable  extent  by  taking  such  cases  as  a  class, 
and  defending  them  as  part  of  his  professional  duties.  .  .  .  To 
confine  an  accusation  of  incapacity  to  a  particular  case.  the. 
courts  hold  does  not  tend  to  prejudice  a  man  in  his  profession 
without  proof  of  special  damage,  hut  it  surely  must  tend  to  so 
prejudice  him  in  a  case  where  the  accusation  is  a  want  of  capac- 
ity to  defend  a  class  of  cases  which  the  attorney  is  in  the  habit 
of  attempting  to  defend,  of  holding  himself  out  as  capable  of 
defending,  and  where  he  has  accepted  employment  from  a  client, 
many  of  whose  eases  are  of  that  description."  '8  Where  false 
and  defamatory  charges  an-  published  concerning  a  minister  and 
editor  of  a  religious  paper,  which  if  believed  would  bring  his 
character  as  minister  and  editor  into  disrepute,  and  would  there- 
fore imply  injury,  it  is  not  necessary  to  specially  allege  damages 
to  character  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor.™ 

$  393.  Special  damages  Pleading. — Where  words  which 
arc  libelous  or  slanderous  per  se  are  used  by  one  person  concern- 
ing another,  it  is  not  necessary  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor 
to  allege  special   damage.*     And    it    is   declared    that    though 


78  Per  Peekham,  J. 
79Craniill  v.   Hayden,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  656;  55  S.  W.  805. 


82  Fed.  160:  5"J  U.  S.  App.  881;  27  C. 
C.  A.  100;  Trimble  v.  Tautlinger, 
104  Iowa.  665;  69  N.  W.    1045;  Mor- 


»  Dun  v.  Maier(C.  C.  App.  5th  C.  i,    ris  v.  Curtis,  20  Ky.    L.  56;  45  S.  \V. 


393 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


words  are  not  in  themselves  libelous  or  slanderous,  yet  if  the 
complaint  states  extrinsic  circumstances  which  make  the  words 
defamatory  and  contains  innuendoes  appropriately  making  the 
applications  of  such  words  to  the  plaintiff,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
allege  special  damages."1  As  a  general  rule,  however,  where  words 
complained  of  in  an  action  for  slander  or  libel  are  not  action- 
able per  se,  since  the  right  to  recover  depends  upon  some  spe- 
cial loss  or  damage  which  the  plaintiff  has  sustained,  such  spe- 
cial loss  must  be  particularly  set  forth,  and  if  not  so  set  forth 
the  declaration  is  bad  in  substance.82  In  such  a  case  special 
damages  arising  from  the  use  of  such  words  must  be  averred 
and  proved.83  And  the  declaration  should  state  in  precisely 
what  way  the  special  damages  resulted  from  the  words  used.*4 
It  is  not  enough  for  the  plaintiff  to  generally  allege  that  he  has 
suffered  special  damage  or  has  been  put  to  great  costs  and  ex- 
penses, but  the  declaration  should  make  it  appear  how  such 
damages  were  caused  by  the  alleged  libelous  or  slanderous 
statements.*3  It  must  show  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  and 
the  special  injury  complained  of  must  be  the  natural  and  prox- 
imate result  of  such  statements.86  A  complaint  in  an  action 
for  slander  or  libel  if  insufficient  may  be  amended  by  inserting 
an  allegation  of  special  injury  and  damage.87 


86;  Smid  v.  Bernard,  63  X.  Y.  Supp. 
278;  31  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  35. 

81  Slayton  v.  Hemken,  91  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  582:  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.824;  36 
N.  Y.  Supp.  249. 

8*  Pollard  v.  Lyon,  91  U.  S.  225;  2 
Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus  Dig., 
U.  S.  Sup.  Co.  Rep.  3196;  Maiuire  v. 
Hubbard,  22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1753;  61 
S.  W.  466;  Dickens  v.  Shepherd,  22 
Md.  399;  Terwilliger  v.  Wands,  17 
N.  Y.  54;  Wilson  v.  Goit,  17  N.  Y. 
442;  Sumner  v.  Buel,  12  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  475;  Wallace  v.  Bennett,  1  Abb. 
N.  C.  478;  Bell  v.  Sun  Printing  & 
Rub.  Co.,  10  J.  &  S.  (N.  Y.)  267; 
Bassell  v.  Elmore,  48  N.  Y.  561; 
Havermeyer  v.  Fuller,  60  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y. )  316.     See   Folkard's  Starkie 

454 


on   Slander  and  Libel  (  Wood's  Am. 
ed.  1877),  chaps.  15,  23. 

83  Langdon  v.  Shearer,  43  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  607;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  193. 
Smid  v.  Bernard,  31  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
35;  63  N.  Y.  Supp.  278;  Hirshfield  v. 
Ft.  Worth  Nat.  Bank,  83  Tex.  452: 
15  L.  R.  A.  639:  18  S.  W.  743;  34 
Cent.  L.  J.  350;  6  Banking  L.  J.  345. 

84  Bush  v.  McMaun,  12  Colo.  App. 
504;  55  Pac.  956;  Cook  v.  Cook,  100 
Mass.  194. 

85  Cook  v.  Cook,  100  Mass.  194. 

86  Olmstead  v.  Brown,  12  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  652;  Beach  v.  Ranney,  2 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  309. 

"Fitzgerald  v.  Geils,  84  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  295;  65  N.  Y.  St.  R.  541;  32 
N.  Y.  Supp.  306. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


• 


§394.  Special  damages— Pleading— Continued.— A    com- 

plaint  which  alleges  that  the  plaintiff  has  been   injured  in  his 

business  but  does  not  state  wherein  and  how  he  has  been  in- 
jured is  not  a  sufficient  allegation  of  special  damage.88  And  in 
an  action  to  recover  for  the  publication  of  a  Libelous  communi- 
cation concerning  the   business  standing  of  a  person,  it  is  not 

sufficient  tor  a  complaint  to  allege  damage  in  a  gross  amount 
but  it  should  also  allege  wherein  the  damage  consisted.81  And 
again  in  an  action  to  recover  for  a  slanderous  statement  con- 
cerning the  chastity  of  the  plaintiff,  an  allegation  that  the 
slander  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  her  business  as  a 
school-teacher  and  that  she  is  damaged  in  a  specified  sum,  is  not 
sufficient  to  support  an  action  based  upon  special  damages.90  So 
also  where  a  complaint  in  an  action  for  slander  which  did  not 
relate  the  plaintiffs  business,  alleged  that  the  plaintiff  had  been 
injured  in  credit  ami  reputation  and  that  he  had  been  sued  for 
debts  which  he  would  not  have  been,  except  for  the  slander  com- 
plained of,  and  that  buyers  of  live  stock  and  produce  had  refused 
as  a  result  of  the  slander  to  deal  with  him,  it  was  held  not  to 
sufficiently  allege  such  damage.91  And  again,  a  complaint  al- 
leging that  by  reason  of  the  speaking  of  the  words  charged, 
''divers  persons  have  refused  to  associate  or  transact  business 
with  plaintiff  and  he  was  therefore  deprived  of  the  benefits  "  re- 
sulting to  him  from  -such  association  and  business  as  aforesaid 
to  his  damage  in  the  sum  of  $1,000,"  was  held  not  to  suffi- 
ciently allege  special  damages.*-  So  again,  in  an  action  to  recover 
for  the  publication  of  an  article  reflecting  upon  the  integrity  of 
the  plaintiff  as  manager  of  a  creamery,  it  was  decided  that  he 
could  not  recover  damages  accruing  from  inability  to  complete 
a  purchase  of  a  creamery  unless  such  special  damages  were 
pleaded.93     And    in    an   action    for   slander,    plaintiff    was  not 


88  Langdon  v.  Shearer,  43  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  GOT;  GO  X.  Y.Supp.  193; 
Smid  v.  Bernard,  31  Misc.  (X.  Y.) 
35;  63  X.  Y.  Supp.  278.  See  sec.  391 
herein. 

89  Bradstreet  Co.  v.  Oswald,  96  Ga. 
396;  23  S.  E.  423. 

,J°Ledlie  v.  Waller,  17  Mont.  150; 
42  Pac.  289. 


91Erwin  v.  Dezell,  84  Hun  i  X.  Y.\. 
391;  4G  X.  Y.  St.  K.  595;  19  N.  V. 
Supp.  7S4. 

9-  Flatow  v.  Von  Bremsen,  19  Civ. 
Proc.  125;   11  X.  Y.  Supp.  680. 

M  Roberts  v.  Breckon,  31  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  431;  52  X.  Y.  Supp.  G38. 


455 


§§   395,  396  LIBEL    AND    SLANDEK. 

permitted  to  show  that  in  consequence  of  the  slander  he  was 
ridiculed  by  his  associates  and  left  his  employment  temporarily 
when  not  alleged  as  special  damages.94 

§  395.  Special  damage— Action  by  husband  for  slander  of 
wife. — If  a  husband  brings  an  action  to  recover  damages  because 
of  a  slander  or  libel  of  his  wife,  he  must,  in  order  to  maintain 
such  action,  aver  special  damage.95 

§  396.  Facts  tending  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  a  libel  should 
be  pleaded. — Though  an  article  may  be  libelous  on  its  face,  }-et 
if  the  plaintiff  desire  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  such  article  and  ag- 
gravate its  meaning  by  the  proof  of  facts  tending  in  that  direc- 
tion, such  facts  should  be  alleged  in  the  complaint  "upon  the 
same  principle  which  compels  such  averment  when  the  article 
in  and  of  itself  is  not  libelous.  In  the  one  case  facts  are  to  be 
shown  which  render  the  publication  actionable,  while  in  the  other 
facts  are  offered  in  proof  for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  the  scope 
of  an  article  and  making  it  more  strong  than  it  appears  on  its 
face."  ^  In  the  case  cited  in  the  note,  the  defendant  had  pub- 
lished an  article  referring  to  the  plaintiff  as  being  "  as  big  a 
rascal  "  and  a  "  bigger  rascal  "  than  one  McDermott.  On  the 
trial  of  the  case  the  plaintiff  offered  in  evidence  several  articles 
published  years  before  concerning  McDermott,  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  in  what  estimation  the  defendant  held  him,  and  such 
articles  were  admitted,  though  their  admission  was  objected  to 
by  the  defendant.  On  appeal  it  was  held  that  such  proof  tended 
to  enlarge  the  character  of  the  libel  itself,  and  that  the  plaintiff 
should  have  apprised  the  defendant  of  such  intention  in  his 
pleading,  by  alleging  the  facts  upon  which  he  relied  to  show  the 
estimation  in  which  McDermott  was  held  by  the  defendant.  In 
this  connection  the  court  said  :  "  It  was  not  admissible  upon  the 
question  of  malice  or  damages  without  being  pleaded.  .  .  .  The 
prior  publications  contained  no  libel  upon  the  plaintiff  and  did 
not  refer  to  him  directly  or  indirectly.     To  allow  proof  of  them 

94  Hatt  v.  Evening  News  Assoc,  94  .      95  Harper  v.   Pinkston,     112  N.   C. 
Mich.   119;  54   N.   W.  766,  rev'g  on    293;  17  S.  E.  161. 
reh'g  94  Mich.  114;  53  N.  W.  952.  96  Cassidy  v.  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle, 

I  138  N.  Y.  239,  243,  per  Peckham,  J. 

456 


LIBEL    am»   3L  \NDKi:.  §  397 

by  way  of  showing  malice  would  as  I  have  said  be  no  more  than 
enlarging  by  proof  the  character  of  the  libel,  while  making  no 
averment  in  regard  to  it,  or  in  other  words  it  is  an  effort  to  en- 
hance damages  by  showing  other  publications  against  a  third 
person  in  order  to  show  how  big  a  rascal  McDermotl  w.is  in  the 
estimation  of  defendant.  I  think  that  to  admit  such  proof  un- 
der a  pleading  which  simply  sets  forth  the  libelous  article  coin- 
plained  of  would  be  unjust  to  the  defendant  because  it  would 
naturally  be  a  surprise  to  him.  It  would  be  trying  a  matter  of 
which  defendant  had  not  complained,  and  in  regard  to  which  the 
defendant  ought  not  to  be  called  upon  to  defend.  It  is  true 
the  plaintiff  by  this  evidence  only  seeks  to  prove  the  kind  of 
rascal  that  defendant  had  itself  charged  against  McDermott. 
But  the  charges  against  McDermott  were  separate  articles  which 
had  been  published  years  before  the  one  complained  of  and  at 
that  time  had  no  relation  to  it.  If  plaintiff  should  desire  to  ag- 
gravate his  damages  by  proof  which  in  effect  goes  to  enlarge 
the  character  of  the  libel  itself,  there  is  no  injustice  in  compel- 
ling him  to  apprise  defendant  of  such  intention  in  his  pleading. 
He  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  add  to  the  natural  and  legal  ef- 
fect of  the  libel  as  it  appears  on  its  face  by  this  kind  of  proof 
without  setting  up  the  facts  which  form  a  basis  for  such  addi- 
tion. I  do  not  see  that  this  rule  was  at  all  altered  by  the  fact 
that  the  article  as  published  was  libelous  per  se."97 

§397.  Exemplary  damages— )Ialiee.  —  Where  it  appears  in 
an  action  for  libel  or  slander  that  the  defendant  was  actuated 
by  express  malice,  the  jury  may  in  their  discretion  award 
exemplary    damages.98       But   express   malice    need  not  neces- 


»7  Per  Peckham,  J. 

98  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  Sth  C.)i  9-t  Fed.  762;  36 
C.  C.  A.  47.->;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  633;  Stallings  v.  Whiita- 
ker,  .-).')  Ark.  494;  L8  S.  W.  829; 
Cbilders  v.  Sao  .lose  Mercury  Print. 
&  P.  Co.,  10.')  Cal.  284;  38  Pac. 
903;  Kennedy  v.  Woodrow,  6  lions. 
(Del.)  4(5;  Jones  v.  Greeley,  25  Fla. 
i)2f);  6  So.  448;  Montgomery  v. 
Knox,  23  Fla.  595:  Prussing  v.  Jack- 


son, 85  111.  App.  324;  Colby  v.  Mc- 
Gee,  48  III.  App.  294;  Barker  v. 
Prizer,  150  [nd.  4;  4s  N.  E.  4;  Casey 
v.  Hulgan,  118  1ml.  590;  '-'1  N.  E. 
322;     Hess    v.   Sparks.   44   Kan.  4ti:>: 

24  Pac.  979,  reh'g denied  44  Kan.  470; 

25  Pac.  580;  Louisville  Press  Co.  v. 
Sennelly,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1281;  49  S. 
W.  15:  Fresh  v.  Cutter,  7:1  Md.  ^7;  l<i 
I..  R.  A.  67;  20  Ail.  774;  Snyder  v. 
Fulton.  34  Md.  128;  6  Am.  Rep. 
81  i;  Morgan  v. Andrews,  107  Mich.  33; 

4o7 


§  397  LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

sarily  exist  in  order  to  authorize  an  award  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages, for  they  may  be  allowed  in  the  case  of  implied  malice." 
The  implied  malice  which  will  authorize  the  recovery  of  such 
damages  must,  however,  be  coupled  with  a  wanton  or  reckless 
indifference  or  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  person  concerning 
whom  the  libel  or  slander  is  published.103  And  it  "must  be 
proved  not  mere  general  ill-will,  but  malice  in  the  special  case 
set  forth  in  the  pleadings  to  be  inferred  from  it  and  the  attend- 
ing circumstances."  '  So,  also,  in  an  action  for  libel  or  slander, 
exemplary  damages  may  be  given  in  the  discretion  of  the  jury 
upon  proof  of  the  falsity  of  the  statements  without  regard  to 
the  question  of  actual  malice,  proof  of  their  falsity  being  suffi- 
cient to  sustain  an  award  thereof.'  Such  damages  are  not  re- 
coverable as  a  matter  of  legal  right,  but  their  award  rests  in 
the  discretion  of  the  jury.  In  this  connection  it  was  said  in 
a  late  case:  "The  jury  were  practically  told  that  they  must 
give  exemplary  damages  and  were  absolutely  refused  the  dis- 
cretion to  withhold  them.     But  in  no  case  has  a  plaintiff  any 


64  N.  W.  869;  2  Det.  L.  N.  572;  Hatt 
v.  Evening  News  Assoc,  94  Mich. 
114;  53  N.  W.  952;  Callahan  v. 
Ingram,  122  Mo.  355;  26  S.  W.  1020; 
43  Am.  St.  Rep.  583;  King  v.  Pitass, 
162  N.  Y.  154;  Holmes  v.  Jones,  147 
N.  Y.  67;  69  N.  Y.  St.  R.  310;  41 
N.  E.  409;  Warner  v.  Press  Pub.  Co., 
132  N.  Y.  181 ;  43  N.  Y.  St.  R.  633, 
aff'g  15  Daly,  545;  Marx  v.  Press 
Pub.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  561;  47  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  775,  aff'g  34  N.  Y.  St.  R.  316; 
Brooks  v.  Harrison,  91  N.  Y.  83; 
McMahon  v.  New  York  News  Co., 
51  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  488;  64  N.  Y. 
Supp.  713;  Shanks  v.  Stumpf,  23 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  264;  51  N.  Y.  Supp. 
154;  Miller  v.  Donovan,  16  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  453;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  820; 
Van  Ingen  v.  Mail  &  E.  Pub.  Co.,  14 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  326;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
838;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  355;  Cotulla  v. 
Kerr,  74  Tex.  89;  11  S.  W.  1058; 
King  v.  Sassaman  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
54  S.  W.  304;  Harman  v.  Cundiff, 
458 


82  Va.  239;  Reed  v.  Keith,  99  Wis. 
672;  75  N.  W.  392;  Allen  v.  News 
Pub.  Co.,  81  Wis.  120;  50  N.  W. 
1093. 

99  Hess  v.  Sparks,  44  Kan.  465;  24 
Pac.  979;  Callahan  v.  Ingram,  122 
Mo.  355;  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  583;  26 
S.  W.  1020;  Krug  v.  Pitass,  162  N.  Y. 
160;  King  v.  Sassaman  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  54  S.  W.  304;  Reed  v.  Keith, 
99  Wis.  672;  75  N.  W.  392. 

wo  Times  Pub.  Co.  (C.  C.  App.  8th 
C),  94  Fed.  762;  36  C.  C.  A.  475;  10 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  633; 
Krug  v.  Pitass,  162  N.  Y.  162. 

!Krug  v.  Pitass,  162  N.  Y.  162. 
See  Prince  v.  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle, 
16  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  186;  37  N.  Y.  Supp. 
250;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  752. 

2  Bergmann  v.  Jones,  94  N.  Y.  51; 
Hamilton  v.  Eno,  81  N.  Y.  116;  16 
Hun,  599;  Samuels  v.  Evening  Mail 
Assoc,  75  N.  Y.  604,  rev'g  9  Hun, 
288. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER.  §§  398-400 

legal  right  to  exemplary  damages.  Such  damages  depend  upon 
the  case  and  the  evidence  and  finding  of  the  jury.3  Where  there 
is  evidence  of  circumstances  sufficient  to  uphold  a  verdict  for 
exemplary  damages,  the  question  whether  they  shall  be  given 
or  not  is  one  for  the  jury.  And  it  is  error  to  instruct  them  that 
the)'  must  give  exemplary  damages."  ' 

§  398.  Exemplary  damages  may  be  awarded  though  actual 
damages  nominal. — Though  the  actual  damages  in  an  action 
for  libel  or  slander  against  one  who  has  acted  with  malice  or 
in  a  wanton  or  reckless  manner  may  be  only  nominal,  yet  this 
will  not  prevent  an  award  of  punitive  damages."' 

§  399.  Exemplary  damages — Two  defendants. — Where  there 
are  two  defendants  in  an  action  for  libel,  their  respective  rights 
in  regard  to  the  allowance  of  exemplary  damages  are  sufficiently 
preserved  where  the  jury  are  instructed  that  though  there  may 
be  express  malice  on  the  part  of  one  of  them,  such  fact  does 
not  affect  the  other,  and  that  if  they  believe  such  damages  should 
be  awarded,  they  should  only  allow  such  sum  therefor  as  they 
believe  should  be  assessed  against  the  defendant  against  whom 
the  lowest  amount  of  exemplary  damages  should  be  given,  and 
that  if  they  believe  that  such  damages  should  be  allowed  only 
against  one  of  the  defendants,  then  nothing  should  be  allowed 
as  exemplary  damages.0 

£  400.  Plea  of  truth  as  justification — When  damages  ag- 
gravated thereby. — If  the  defendant  in  an  action  for  libel  or 
slander  pleads,  as  a  justification  of  the  same,  the  truth  of  the 
statements  he  has  made  concerning  the  plaintiff,  and  such  de- 
fense is  pleaded  in  bad  faith,  no  proper  investigation  having 
been  made  to  ascertain  the  truth,  and  no  effort  being  made  to 
establish  it  at  the  trial,  such  a  plea  may  be  considered   by  the 


a  Jerome  v.  Smith,  48  Vt.  230. 

4  Gambrill  v.  Schooley,  93  Md.  48; 
48  Atl.  730,  per  Pearce,  J. 

5  Ferguson  v.  Evening  Chronicle 
Pub.  Co.,  72  Mo.  App.  462;  Prince 
v.  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle,  10  Misc.  (  N. 
Y.)  186;  72  N.   Y.  St.  K.  752;  37  N. 


V.  Supp.  250.  See  Nailer  v.  Pon- 
den,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  408;  n  Ail.  88; 
O'Brien  v.    Semple,    Mont.   L.   Rep. 

0  Super.  Cl.   844;    Gomez   v.    Joyce, 

1  N.  Y.  Supp.  337. 

6  Hearne    v.    De    Young,  110   Cal. 
G70;  52  Pac.  150. 

459 


£  401  LIBEL   AND    SLANDER. 

jury  in  aggravation  of  damages.7  In  this  connection  it  is  de- 
clared in  a  late  case  that  "if  ...  .  when  the  party  is  brought 
into  court  to  answer  a  charge  of  libel,  he  undertakes  to  meet 
it  by  placing  on  the  public  records  the  allegation  that  what  he 
published  was  in  fact  true,  and  then  utterly  fails  to  establish  it, 
why  should  he  not  be  held  responsible  for  it?  If  he  made  an 
apology  for  the  publication,  it  is  generally  admissible  in  miti- 
gation, and  if  he  thus  still  stands  by  the  original  libel,  it  should 
aggravate  the  damages.  What  can  do  greater  injury  to  the 
character  of  a  man  than  to  have  it  known  that  a  responsible 
party  sued  for  libel  has  thus  asserted  the  truth  of  his  statement? 
The  public  may  believe  that  the  original  publication  was  the 
result  of  a  misunderstanding  or  false  information  ;  but  when 
the  publisher  has  asserted  his  readiness  to  prove  his  statement 
in  a  judicial  proceeding,  many  may  thereby  be  led  to  believe 
there  was  some  foundation  for  it.  This  court  has  therefore 
adopted  the  view  that  it  is  evidence  of  malice." 8 

§  401.  Same  subject  continued. — The  courts  are  not  in 
harmony  upon  the  question  whether  the  mere  failure  of  the 
defendant  to  establish  as  a  justification  the  truth  of  his  charges, 
is  of  itself  evidence  of  malice  which  will  authorize  a  recovery 
of  increased  damages.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said  that 
though  the  defendant  acted  in  good  faith  when  he  pleaded  the 
truth  as  a  justification,  yet  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  is  not 
diminished  thereby,  but  rather  a  new  injury  has  been  done  to 
the  plaintiff  by  the  reaffirming  of  the  slander  or  libel  and  plac- 
ing it  on  the  court  records  by  way  of  justification,  and  that 
though  the  plea  was  in  good  faith,  yet  the  new  injury  was  an 

7  Sun  Print.  &  Pub.  Assn.  v.lN.  Y.  St.  R.  897:  Disten  v.  Rose, 
Schenck,  98  Fed.  925;  40  C.  C.  A.  |  69  N.  Y.  122;  Tobin  v.  Sykes,  71 
163;  Westerfield  v.  Scripps,  119  Cal.  I  Him  (N.  Y. ),  469;  54  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
607;  51  Pac.  958;  Henderson  v.  Fox,  399;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  943;  Low  v. 
83  Ga.  233;  9  S.  E.  839;  80  Ga.  479;  j  Herald  Co.,  6  Utah,  176;  21  Pac. 
0  S.  E.  164;  Beasley  v.  Meigs,  16  111.  j  991.  See  Corridan  v.  Wilkinson,  20 
139;  Walker  v.   Wickens   (Kan.),  30    Ont.  App.  184. 

Pac.  181;  Holmes  v.  Jones,  121  N.  Y.  |      8  Coffin  v.    Brown  (Md.   1901),  50 
461;  31  N.  Y.St.  R.  379;  24  N.  E.  701;  |  Atl.  570,  citing  Blumhardt  v.  Rohr, 
Cruikshank  v.   Gordon,    118    N.    Y.    70  Md.  342;  17  Atl.  266;  Rigden  v. 
178;   28  N.  Y.  St.  Rl   784;  23  N.  E.    Walcott,  6  Gill.  &  J.  (Md.)  419. 
457,  aff'g   48  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  308;  15  j 
460 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


§  401 


aet  of  the  defendants  for  which  he  should  be  responsible,  and 
that  such  action  on  his  part  is  evidence  of  malice  which  may  be 
considered  by  the  jury  in  aggravation  of  damages.9  In  other 
states,  however,  where  this  question  has  been  considered,  it  has 
been  held  that  if  the  defendant  pleads  the  truth  as  a  justifica- 
tion of  a  libel  or  slander,  the  mere  failure  to  establish  such 
justification  is  not  of  itself  an  aggravation  of  the  damages,  but 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  defense  was  inter- 
posed in  bad  faith  or  on  the  other  hand  in  good  faith  and  with 
no  intention  to  injure  the  plaintiff,  and  where  the  evidence, 
though  not  sufficient  to  fully  sustain  the  pleas  of  justification, 
indicates  that  the  defendant  had  reasonable  grounds  for  believ- 
ing he  could  establish  such  plea,  it  may  in  some  jurisdictions 
be  considered  in  mitigation  of  the  damages.10  Under  the  New 
York  Code  "  which  authorizes  the  defendant  in  actions  for  per- 
sonal injuries  to  plead  and  prove  facts  in  mitigation  of  damages 
as  a  partial  defense,  and  also  in  actions  for  libel  or  slander  to 
prove  mitigating  circumstances  notwithstanding  he  has  pleaded 
or  attempted  to  prove  a  justification,  the  fact  that  the  defendant 
has  pleaded  the  truth  of  a  libelous  publication  and  fails  to  prove 
the  truth  of  the  same,  does  not  of  itself  warrant  an  inference 
of  malice  which  will  justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damages. 
To  authorize  an  allowance  of  such  damages  under  such  circum- 
stances, the  jury  must  first  find  that  the  defendant  interposed 
such  defense  either  carelessly,  recklessly,  wantonly,  or  in  bad 
faith,  and    for   the    purpose  of  further   injuring  the  plaintiff.12 


9  See  Robinson  v.  Drummond,  24 
Ala.  174;  Slieltrm  v.  Simmons,  12  Ala. 
4G6;  Downing  v.  Brown,  :>  Colo.  571; 
Jackson  v.  Stetson,  15  Mass.  48; 
Doss  v.  Jones.  .">  How.  (  Miss,  i  158; 
Shartle  v.  Hutchinson,  3  Oreg.  :;:'.7: 
LJpdegrove  v.  Zimmerman,  13  Pa. 
St.  G19;  Hurckhalter  v.  Coward,  16 
S.  C.  4o(>:  Cavanaugh  v.  Austin,  42 
Vt.  576;  Faucitt  v.  Booth,  31  Up. 
Can.  Q.  B.  263. 

10  See  Ward  v.  Dick,  47  Conn.  MOO; 
;56  Am.  Rep.  7~>;  Ransome  v.  chris- 
tian, 49  Ga.  491;  Corbley  v.  Wilson. 
71  111.  209;  Sloan  v.  Petrie,  15  111. 
425;    Byrket  v.   Monohon,  7  Blackf. 


(Ind.)  83;  Huson  v.  Dale,  19  Mich. 
17;  1'allett  v.  Sargent,  36  N.  II.  497; 
Raynorv.  Kinney,  14  Ohio  St.  283; 
Kennedy  v.  Holborn,  16  Wis.  457. 

11  Code  Civ.  Proc.  Bees.  508,  535,  536. 

l-  Willard  v.  Press  Pub.  <  <>..  52  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  448;  65  N.  Y.  Supp. 
73;  Klinck  v.  Colby.  46  N.  V.  427: 
Ainl  v.  Fireman's  Journal  Co.,  10 
Daly  (N.  Y.)254.  Formerly  in  this 
state  the  rule  prevailed  that  if  the  de- 
fendant reaffirmed  the  slander  or  libel 
in  his  pleadings,  alleging  the  truth 
thereof  as  a  justification,  and  he 
failed  to  establish  the  truth  of  his 
pleas,  such  facts  might  be  considered 

461 


§402 


LIBEL   AND    SLANDER. 


The  question  of  the  bad  faith  of  the  defendant  in  pleading  such 
a  defense  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  in  connection  with  the 
evidence  offered  to  sustain  such  plea  or  other  circumstances  of- 
the  case.13 

§  402.  Exemplary  damages— Malice— Reckless  or  wanton 
conduct. — As  we  have  stated  in  the  preceding  section,  express 
malice  is  not  necessary  to  authorize  a  recovery  of  exemplary 
damages,  but  malice  sufficient  for  that  purpose  may  be  inferred 
from  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  So  such  damages 
may  be  allowed  in  an  action  for  libel  or  slander  where  it  appears 
that  the  defendant  acted  with  such  gross  negligence,  reckless- 
ness or  wantonness  as  was  equivalent  to  an  intentional  violation 
or  utter  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff.14  So  where  a 
person  wilfully  and  with  a  reckless  indifference  of  the  conse- 


in  aggravation  of  damages,  though 
the  attempt  was  made  in  good  faith 
or  in  an  honest  helief  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  guilty  of  the  matter  laid  to 
his  charge.  Fero  v.  Roscoe,  4  N.  Y. 
165;  dimming  v.  Arrowsmith,  5  C. 
H.  Rec.  (N.  Y.)  52.  See  Root  v. 
King,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  613. 

«  Holmes  v.  Jones,  121  N.  Y.  461; 
31  N.  Y.  St.  R.  379;  24  N.  E.  701. 

"Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  C),  94  Fed.  762;  36 
C.  C.  A.  475:  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  633;  Bennett  v.  Salisbury 
(C.  C.  App.  2d  C.)  78  Fed.  769;  45 
U.  S.  App.  636;  Press  Pub.  Co.  v. 
McDonald  (C.  C.  App.  2d  C),  63 
Fed.  238;  26  L.  R.  A.  531;  11  C.  C. 
A.  155;  27  Chic.  Leg.  News,  53; 
Cooper  v.  Sun  Printing  &  P.  Assoc. 
(C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y.),  57  Fed.  566; 
Morning  Journal  Assoc,  v.  Ruther- 
ford (C.  C.  App.  2d  C),  51  Fed.  513; 
16  L.  R.  A.  803;  1  U.  S.  App.  296;  2 
C.  C.  A.  354;  46  Alb.  L.  J.  305; 
Courier-Journal  Co.  v.  Sallee,  20  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  634;  47  S.  W.  226;  Louisville 
Press  Co.  v.  Sennelly,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1231 ;  49  S.  W.  15 ;  FulkersOn  v.  Mur- 
462 


dock,  53  Mo.  App.  151;  Smith  v. 
Matthews,  152  N.  Y.  152;  46  N.  E. 
164;  55  Alb.  L.  J.  202:  Holmes  v. 
Jones,  147  N.  Y.  59;  69  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
310;  41  N.  E.  409;  Warner  v.  Press 
Pub.  Co.,  132  K  Y.  181;  43  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  633,  aff'g  15  Daly,. 545;  McMahon 
v.  New  York  News  Co.,  51  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  488;  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  713; 
Payne  v.  Rouss,  46  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. ) 
315;  61  N.  Y.  Supp.  705;  Grant  v. 
Herald  Co.,  42  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
354;  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  84;  Young  v. 
Fox,  26  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  261;  49  N. 
Y.  Supp.  634;  Schoepflin  v.  Coffey, 
25  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  438;  49  N.  Y. 
Supp.  627;  Karwowski  v.  Pitass,  20 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  118;  46  N.  Y.  Supp. 
691;  Van  Ingen  v.  Star  Co.,  1  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  429;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  114; 
72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  565;  Weber  v.  Butler, 
81  Hun  (N.  Y.),  244;  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 
713;  62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  669;  Waltenberg 
v.  Bernhard,  26  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  659, 
56  N.  Y.  Supp.  396;  Prince  v.  Social- 
istic Co-op.  Pub.  Assoc,  364  N.  Y. 
Supp.  285;  Ullrich  v.  New  York 
Press  Pub.  Co.,  23  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  168; 
60  N.  Y.   Supp.    788;  Alliger  v.  Mail 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDEB. 


quences  to  a  woman  charges  her  with  incontinency,  punitive 
damages  may  be  awarded  against  him.u 

§  403.  Same  subject — Newspaper  publications. — The  publi- 
cation of  a  libel  by  a  newspaper  without  any  effort  to  verify  the 
statements  made  therein  constitutes  such  a  reckless  and  wanton 
indifference  to  the  rights  of  others  as  to  justify  an  award  of 
punitive  damages.16  So  where  an  article  is  published  which 
names  a  certain  person  as  the  one  charged  by  a  woman  with 
being  the  father  of  her  illegitimate  child,  and  no  investigation 
is  made  to  determine  bhe  truthfulness  of  such  statement,  the 
facts  show  such  a  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  person  to  whom 
the  article  refers  as  will  justify  an  award  of  punitive  damages.17 
And  again,  a  statement  in  a  newspaper  article  upon  the  affidavit 
of  a  person  living  hundreds  of  miles  away,  that  a  person  of  good 
character  and  reputation  is  the  head  of  a  gang  of  thieves,  with- 
out any  inquiries  for  the  purpose  of  verifying  the  truth  of  the 
statement,  and  against  his  denial  and  protest,  will  render  the 
newspaper  liable  in  punitive  damages.18  So,  also,  the  publication 
of  stories  of  elopements  and  other  gossip  taken  from  the  col- 
umns of  another  paper  without  any  attempt  to  verify  the  truth 


Printing  Asso.,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  763; 
49  N.  Y.  St.  R.  495;  Bowden  v.  Bailes, 
101  N.  0.  012;  8  S.  E.  342;  Hayner 
v.  Cowden,  27  Ohio  St.  292;  l'2  Am. 
Rep.  303;  Becker  v.  Public  Ledger 
(C.  P.  Ta.),  6  Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  89. 

is  Bowden  v.  Bailes,  101  X.  C. 
612;  8S.  E.  342. 

is  Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  McDonald  (C. 
C.  App.  2d  C),  63  Fed.  238:  11  C.  C 
A.  155;  26  L.  R.  A.  531;  27  Chic. 
Leg.  News,  53;  Smith  v.  Sun  Printing 
A-  P.  Asso.  (C.  C.  App.  2d  0.)i  •">•"' 
Fed.  240;  Smith  v.  Matthews,  152 
N.  Y.  152;  46  \.  E.  164;  55  All..  1.. 
J.  202;  Van  Engen  v.  Star  Co.,  1 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  429;  72  \.  Y.  St. 
R.  565;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  114;  Turtou 
v.  New  York  Recorder,  3  Misc.  I  V 
T.)314;  52  X.  Y.  St.  R.  898;  22  X. 
Y.   Supp.    766.      See    Rutherford   v. 


Morning  Journal  Assoc.  (C.  C.  S.  D. 
N.  Y.),  47  Fed.  487,  aff'd  51  Fed. 
513;  16  L.  R.  A.  803;  1  U.  S.  App. 
296;  2  ('.  C.  A.  354,  where  a  verdict 
of  84,000,  was  held  not  excessive  for 
publication  of  a  false  statement, 
without  previous  investigation  that 
plaintiff  had  eloped.  In  Luft  v. 
Lingane,  17  R.  I.—;  22  Atl.  042,  a 
verdict  of  $2,485.50  was  held  not  ex- 
cessive  for  publication,  without  any 
attempt  at  verification,  of  the  charge 
the  female  plaintiff  had  been  Been  in 
the  company  of  a  negro  and  had 
been  assaulted  by  the  hitter's  wife. 

17  Grant  v.  Herald  Co..  42  App. 
Div.  |N.  V.i,  354,  59  N.  Y.  Supp.  84. 

ib  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
App.  8th  c.i.  91  Fed.  762;  36C.C.A. 
475;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S. 
633. 

•463 


§  404 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


of  such  statements  will  justify  an  award  of  such  damages.19 
But  where  a  newspaper  publishes  a  libelous  article  which  it  has 
received  from  a  reliable  and  correct  news  agency  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business,  under  such  circumstances  as  will  excuse  the 
duty  of  investigation,  inquiry  or  delay,  it  should  not  be  liable 
therefor  in  exemplary  damages.20  But  the  fact  that  an  article  is 
based  on  information  received  from  a  news  agency  will  not  re- 
lieve a  newspaper- from  liability  for  such  damages  where  it  is 
guilty  of  gross  negligence  in  not  attempting  to  verify  the 
truth  of  the  article  before  publication.21  So  a  finding  that  an 
article  received  from  such  a  source  was  wantonly  published,  and 
that  the  defendant  is  liable  in  exemplary  damages,  may  be  jus  ti- 
lled by  facts  showing  that  the  publication  was  false  and  that  the 
defendant  when  requested  to  retract  the  same  refused  to  do  so 
and  merely  stated  that  if  the  plaintiff  would  furnish  proof  that 
the  article  was  untrue,  he  would  be  glad  to  make  a  retraction.* 
If,  however,  a  libel  is  published  by  inadvertence  or  mistake  and 
no  malice  or  gross  negligence  prompted  such  publication,  and 
an  immediate  and  full  retraction  is  made,  exemplary  damages 
should  not  be  allowed.33 


§  404.  Evidence  of  prior  statements  of  like  import — Reit- 
eration.—Evidence  of  the  use  by  defendant  of  like  statements  in 
regard  to  the  plaintiff  or  of  the  substantial  reiteration  of  libel- 
ous or  slanderous  charges  is  admissible  as  showing  malice  and 
in  aggravation  of  damages.24     And  evidence  of  repetition  of  the 


19  Morning  Journal  Asso.  v.  Ruth- 
erford (C.  C.  App.  2dC),  51  Fed. 
f,13;  2  C.  C.  A.  354;  16  L.  R.  A.  803; 
1  U.  S.  App.  296;  46  Alb.  L.  J.  305. 

20  Smith  v.  Sun  Printing  &  P.  Assoc. 
(C.  C.  App.  2d  C),  55  Fed.  240. 

-1  Smith  v.  Sun  Printing  &  P. 
Assoc.  (C.  C.  App.  2d  C.),  55  Fed. 
240. 

22  Palmer  v.  New  York  News  Co., 
31  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  210;  52  N.  Y. 
Supp.  539. 

23  Becker  v.  Public  Ledger  (C.  P. 
Pa. ),  6  Pa.  Dist.  R.  89.  See  sec.  413, 
herein. 

24  Rausch  v.  Anderson,  75  111.  App. 

464 


526;  Barker  v.  Prizer,  150  Ind.  4;  48 
N.  E.  4;  Sharp  v.  Bowlar,  19  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  2018;  45  S.  W.  90;  Leonard  v. 
Pope,  27  Mich.  145;  Williams  v.  Har- 
rison, 3  Mo.  411;  Cruikshank  v.  Gor- 
don, 118  N.  Y.  178;  28  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
784;  23  N.  E.  457,  afTg  48  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  308;  15  N.  Y.  St.  R.  897;  1  N.  Y. 
Supp.  443;  Turton  v.  New  York  Re- 
corder Co.,  144  N.  Y.  144;  63  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  69;  38  N.  E.  1009,  aff'g  3  Misc. 
314;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  398;  22  N.  Y. 
Supp.  766;  Bassell  v.  Elmore,  48  N. 
Y.  561:  Titus  v.  Sumner,  44  N.  Y. 
266;  Wright  v.  Gregory,  9  App.  Div. 
(N.    Y.)    85;    41    N.    Y.  Supp.    139; 


LIBEL    AM)    SI.ANhl.K. 


§  W4 


charges  made  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit  is  admissible 
to  show  malice  but  not  as  an  independent  ground  of  dama 
In  this  connection  it  is  said  in  a  recent  New  York  case  :  -  It  is 
the  prevailing  doctrine  that  the  reiteration  of  a  libel  or  Blander 
after  suit,  brought  may  be  proved  on  the  question  of  malice  and 
damages,  probably  with  this  qualification,  however,  that  the 
cause  of  action  for  the  reiteration  has  been  haired  !,\  the  statute 
of  limitations,  or  that  the  language  subsequently  reiterated  is  for 
some  other  reason  not  actionable.  The  authorities  upon  this 
point  are  not  harmonious.26  No  case  holds  that  a  repetition  of  a 
libel  or  slander  after  suit  brought  is  in  its  nature  not  competent 
evidence  on  the  question  of  malice  and  damage,  and  whenever  it 
has  been  excluded  as  evidence,  it  has  always  been  upon  the 
ground  that  it  was  an  independent  cause  of  action,  and  thus  if 
such  evidence  were  received,  that  there  would  be  danger  of  a  dou- 
ble recovery." *  So  where  unchastity  is  imputed  to  an  unmarried 
woman  she  ma}*,  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor,  show  that  the 
defendant  substantially  reiterated  the  charges  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  action.28     And  where  an  action   is  brought 


Morrison  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  3S  N.  Y. 
St.  H.  357;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  131;  Ro- 
senwald  v.  Hammerstein,  12  Daly 
(N.  Y. ),  377;  Ionian  v.  Foster,  8 
Wend.  (X.Y.)G02;  Root  v.  Loundes, 
0  Hill  (X.  Y.),  518;  Distin  v.  Rose,  7 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  83;  Swolm  v.  Wal- 
bourn  (C.  P.  Pa.),  15  Lane  L.  Rev. 
118;  Bebee  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
71  Tex.  424;  9S.  W.  449.  See  Waul 
v.  Dick,  47  Conn.  300;  36  Am.  Rep. 
75.  In  Evening  Journal  Assoc,  v. 
McDermott,  15  Vroom  i  X.  J.),  430; 
43  Am.  Rep.  392,  it  was  held  that  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  malice,  evi- 
dence of  previous  publications  was 
admissible  though  an  action  lor  such 
publications  might  lie  barred  by  the 
statute  of  limitations.  In  Stitzell  v. 
Reynolds,  07  Pa.  St.  54,  it  has  been 
held  that  subsequent  declarations 
are  admissible  to  show  malice,  but 
that  damages  for  such  declarations 
should   uot  awarded. 

30 


»  Ward  v.  Dick,  47  Conn.  300;  36 
Am.  Rep.  75;  Van Cleef  v.  Lawrence; 
2  C   H.  Hec.  (N.  Y. )  41. 

^Citing  "Townshend  on  Slander 
and  Libel  (4th.  ed.),  653  et  seq.; 
St  unit  v.  Lovell,  2  Stark.  84:  Thomas 
v.  Cross  well,  7. Johns.  264;  Inman  v. 
Foster,  8  Wend.  602:  Keenholts  v. 
Pecker,  3  Den.  346;  Hoot  v.  Loundes, 
6  Hill,  518;  Johnson  v.  Brown,  57 
Barb.  118;  Thorn  v.  Knapp.  42  X.  Y. 
474;  Titus  v.  Sumner,  44  N.  Y.  266; 
Bassell  v.  Elmore,  48  X.  Y.  561;  Fra- 
zier  v.  McClosky,  60  V  Y.  337;  Daly 
v.  Byrne,  77  X.  Y.  L82;  Cruikshanh 
v.  Gordon,  118  X.  Y.  178." 

-;  Turton  v.  New  York  Recorder 
Co.,  1  H  X.  Y.  144;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
69;  38  X.  E.  1009,  aff'g  3  Misc.  314; 
52  \.  V.  St.  R.  398;  22  X.  Y.  Supp. 
766,  per  Karl.  .!.  But  see  Daly  v. 
Byrne.  77  X.  Y.  182. 

-■  Craven  v.  Walker,  101  Ga.  B45; 
29  S.  E.  152. 

165 


§§  405,  406  LIBEL   AND    SLANDER. 

against  a  newspaper  to  recover  for  the  publication  of  a  libelous 
article  charging  dishonest,  fraudulent  and  criminal  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  latter  may  show  that  when  a  demand 
for  retraction  was  made,  such  paper  published  a  second  article, 
which  might  be  construed  as  containing  an  evasive  and  covert 
reiteration  of  the  original  charges,  and  in  such  case  punitive  dam- 
ages may  be  recovered.3  But  where  the  manager  of  a  depart- 
ment store  had  made  a  charge  of  theft  against  a  former  employee 
of  the  store,  and  upon  a  demand  by  the  latter's  attorneys  for  a 
retraction  of  such  charge  had  made  to  a  law  clerk  of  such  at- 
tornej's,  in  reply  to  the  demand,  a  repetition  of  the  charge,  it 
was  held  that  his  reply  was  prima  facie  privileged,  and  express 
malice  must  be  shown  to  maintain  an  action  for  slander  thereon.'* 
And  the  repetition  by  others  of  the  charges  made  by  defendant 
concerning  the  plaintiff  are  held  to  be  too  remote  to  be  re- 
covered.31 

§  405.  Repetition  after  recovery. — The  fact  that  a  person 
has  recovered  damages  for  a  slander  or  libel  will  not  prevent  a 
subsequent  recovery  from  the  same  defendant  for  the  repetition 
of  the  slanderous  or  libelous  statements  subsequent  to  such  re- 
covery, since  such  repetition  constitutes  a  new  injury  for 
which  there  is  another  cause  of  action,  and  the  judgment  re- 
covered in  a  former  case  is  in  no  way  a  satisfaction  for  the  sub- 
sequent injury.32 

§  406.  Evidence— Social  standing  and  wealth  of  defend- 
ant.— In  an  action  for  libel  or  slander  evidence  is  admissible 
as  to  the  character,  social  standing  and  influence  of  the  de- 
fendant in  the  community.35  And  where  punitive  damages  may 
be  allowed,  evidence  as  to  the  financial  standing  of  the  defend- 


29Hoboken  Printing  &  Pub.  Co.  v. 
Kalin,  59  N.  J.  L.  218;  35  Atl.  1053; 
5  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  N.  S.  1. 

soMcCarty  v.  Lambley,  20  App. 
Div.  (K  Y.)  264;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  792. 

81  Prime  v.  Eastwood,  45  Iowa,  040; 
Shurtleff  v.  Parker,  130  Mass.  293; 
39  Am.  Rep.  454;  Hastings  v.  Stet- 
466 


son,  126  Mass.  329;  30  Am.  Rep.  683; 
Terwilliger  v.  Wands,  17  N.  Y.  57. 

32  Woods  v.  Pangburn,  75  N.  Y. 
495,  rev'g  14  Hun  (N.  Y.),  540. 

33  Broughton  v.  McGrew  (C.  C.  D. 
Ind.),39  Fed.  672;  5  L.  R.  A.  406; 
Xailor  v.  Pouder,  1  Marv.  (Del.)  408; 
41  Atl.  88. 


LIBEL    AN  It    SLANDER. 


§    K>7 


ant  is  also  admissible/1  And  evidence  thereof  is  also  admissible 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  effect  defendant's  words  would 
have  in  the  community.85  But  though  such  evidence  may  be 
admissible  in  the  case  of  an  individual  defendant,  yet  if  the  de- 
fendant is  a  corporation,  it  is  declared  that  evidence  is  not  ad- 
missible to  show  the  actual  or  reputed  wealth  of  the  corpora- 
tion.38 And  where  there  are  several  defendants,  evidence  is  not 
admissible  as  to  the  wealth  of  one  of  them  as  bearing  on  the  al- 
lowance of  punitive  damages,  since  the  verdict  must  be  against 
all  the  defendants  and  may  be  collected  from  anyone  of  them.37 
And  where  such  evidence  is  erroneously  admitted  and  not  spe- 
cifically withdrawn,  its  admission  cannot  be  cured  by  merely 
charging  the  jury  that  punitive  damages  cannot  be  recovered." 

^  407.  Exemplary  damages— Several  defendants  Malice 
of  one  not  imputed  to  others.— In  an  action  against  several  de- 
fendants for  libel  or  slander,  malice  of  one  defendant  cannot  be 
imputed  to  the  others  for  the  purpose  of  aggravating  the  dam- 
ages, without  connecting  proof.  Thus,  in  an  action  against  sev- 
eral defendants  for  the  publication  of  an  article  libelous  per  se.  it 
was  decided  that  a  judgment  against  all  must  be  reversed  where 
the  plaintiff,  in  order  to  establish  express  malice,  was  permitted 

M  Broughton  v.  McG-rew,  39  Fed. 
(572;  Barkly  v.  Copeland,  74  Cal.  1; 
:>  Am.  St.  Rep.  413;  15  Pac.  ::"7; 
Barber  v.  Barber, .  33  Conn.  335; 
Jones  v.  Greeley,  25  Fla.  629;  6  So. 
-448;  Wilson  v.  Simpler,  86  1ml.  275; 
Stan  wood  v.  Whitmore,  63  .Me.  2<>!i; 
Brown  v.  Lames.  3!)  Mich.  211;  :'.:'. 
Am.  Hep.  37">;  Taylor  v.  Pullen, 
!:>•-'  Mo.  4:54:  :,:',  s.  W.  1086;  Lewis 
v.  Chapman,  L9  Barb.  ( NT.  V.  i  252; 
Fry  v.  Bennett,  4  Duer  |  N.  V.i.  247; 
Reeves  v.  Winn,  '.'7  N.  C.  246;  1  S. 
E.  448;  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  287;  Baynor 
v.  Cowden,  27  Ohio  St.  292;  22 
Am.  Be  p.  303.  But  see  Ware  v. 
Cartledge,  21  Ala.  622;  Rosewater 
v.  Hoffman,  24  Neb.  222:  38  V 
W.  8.77:  Hues  \.  laios.  135  N.  V. 
COD;  48  X.  V.  St.  R.  392;  32  N.  E. 
123;  Palmer   v.    Ilaskius.    28    Barb. 


(X.  Y.  )  00;   Young  v.    Kuhn.  71  Tex. 
645;  9S.  W.  8(50. 

35  Botsford  v.  Chase,  108  Mich. 
432;  66  X.  W.  325;  2  Det  L.  N.  802. 

•  Story  v.  Early,  86  111.  161;  Ran- 
dall v.  Evening  News  Assoc.  97 
Mich.  L36;  56  X.  W.  361;  44  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  347;  Rosewater  v. 
Hoffman,  24  NY1».  222. 

■7  Washington  (Lis  Light  Co.  v. 
Lansden,  172  X.  s.  534;  43  L.  Ed. 
543;  19  Sup.  d.  Rep.  296;  9  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cms.  X.  S.  596,  rev'g  9 
App.  I).  C.  a0s:  24  Wash.  L.  Rep. 
807. 

"  Washington  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
Lansden,  172  D.  S.  534;  43  L.  Ed. 
.■.4:',;  lit  Sup.  Ct  Rep.  296;  9  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  X.  S.  596,  revV  y 
App.  D.  C.  508:  24  Wash.  I..  Rep. 
807. 


§  407  LIBEL   AND   SLANDER. 

to  show  as  against  all  the  defendants,  that  several  years  prior 
to  the  publication  in  question,  one  of  the  defendants  had  made 
remarks  concerning  the  plaintiff,  expressing  contempt  and  ill-will 
for  him.38  In  this  case  the  court  said:  "There  was  no  connec- 
tion between  these  remarks  and  the  other  defendants,  who  neither 
heard  them  nor  ever  heard  of  them  so  far  as  appears.  It  is  un- 
disputed that  Pitass  knew  nothing  about  the  article  until  some 
time  after  it  had  been  published.  He  did  not  directly  or  indi- 
rectly cause  or  consent  to  its  publication.  He  was  liable  only 
because  he  owned  the  newspaper  and  was  responsible  for  the  acts 
of  his  agents  in  publishing  it.  His  previous  statements  did  not 
cause  the  publication  nor  have  any  effect  upon  it.  Between 
those  statements  and  the  fact  of  publication,  there  was  no  con- 
nection and  no  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  They  did  not  enter 
into,  or  become  part  of,  or  have  any  bearing  upon  the  wrong  of 
which  the  plaintiff  complains.  As  the  article  would  have  been 
published  if  they  had  not  been  made,  they  were  immaterial  for 
they  did  not  touch  the  wrongful  act  and  could  not  aggravate  the 
damages.  Punitive  damages  which  are  in  excess  of  the  actual 
loss  are  allowed  where  the  wrong  is  aggravated  by  evil  motives 
in  order  to  punish  the  wrongdoer  for  his  misconduct  and  furnish 
a  wholesome  example.  ...  In  an  action  for  tort,  there  can  be 
no  recoveiy  of  punitive  damages  for  general  malice,  but  only 
for  such  particular  malice  as  existed  when  the  tortious  act  was 
done  and  which  had  some  influence  in  causing  it  to  be  done. 
.  .  .  Neither  the  author  nor  editor  was  a  party,  to  the  malice  of 
the  publisher  and  his  malice  did  no  harm,  because  it  had  no  effect 
upon  the  result.  While  he  was  responsible  for  their  acts,  they 
were  not  responsible  for  his  motives  of  which  they  had  no  knowl- 
edge. He  was  not  responsible  for  his  motives  in  connection 
with  their  acts  because  there  was  no  connection.  The  malice 
proved  in  this  case  did  not  cause  the  conduct  complained  of. 
The  one  guilty  of  the  malice  did  not  commit  the  wrong  except 
through  an  agent  who  knew  nothing  about  the  malicious  feel- 
ings of  his  principal.  The  principal  was  not  liable  for  general 
malice,  but  only  for  such  particular  malice  as  was  connected 
with  the  publication.  The  agent  was  not  liable  for  the  general 
malice  of  his  principal  of  which  he  knew  nothing  and  which  had 

:»  King  v.  Pitass,  162  N.  Y.  154. 
46b 


LIBEL    AM»    SLANDER.  §§  408     I  LO 

qo  connection  with  the  wrong  done.  The  writer  ol  the  article 
was  not  Liable  for  the  malice  of  another  of  which  he  had  n< 
heard  and  which  had  no  influence  upon  the  wrongful  act.  Yet 
the  general  malice  of  one  of  three  defendants,  although  it  had 
no  connection  with  the  wrong,  has,  as  it  must  be  presumed,  en- 
tered into  the  verdict  of  $6,250  against  all,  in  violation  of  the 
rights  of  each.  As  the  malice  proved  neither  caused  QOrprompted 
the  publication  of  the  Libel,  the  judgment  must  he  reversed  and 
a  new  trial  granted. "' "  In  a  ease  in  Massachusetts,  however, 
it  is  held  that  where  a  newspaper  is  conducted  by  a  partnership, 
the  malice  of  one  of  the  partners  in  the  publication  of  a  libel  in 
such  newspaper  will  he  imputed  to  his  copartners  although  proof 
of  actual  malice  is  required  by  statute." 

§  408.  Exemplary  damages— Slander  by  wife.— Where  a 
slander  has  been  uttered  by  a  married  woman  against  another, 
and  the  husband  is  made  a  party  defendant  because  of  his  marital 
relation,  and  not  because  of  any  active  participation  of  his  in 
the  slander,  and  he  is  in  fact  an  innocent  party,  a  narrower  limit  of 
exemplary  damages  exists.4-'  So  where  he  is  absent  at  the  time 
slanderous  words  are  spoken  by  his  wife,  and  they  are  uttered 
without  his  consent  or  knowledge,  the  exemplary  damages 
against  him  should  be  less  than  if  he  had  participated  therein.1-1 

$409.  Exemplary  damages— Telegraph  company  Libel- 
ous message.— A  telegraph  company  is  liable  for  the  acts  ol  its 
agents  within  the  scope  of  their  authority.  So  where  a  Libelous 
message  is  maliciously  transmitted  by  an  agent  of  the  company, 
within  the  scope  of  his  employment,  punitive  damages  therefor 
may  be  recovered  against  the  company." 

§410.  Exemplary  damages  as  affected  by  statute.— Under 

the  California  Civil  Code.'"'  if  the  publication  of  a  Libel  was  not 


*>  Per  Vann,  J. 

«  Lathrop  v.  Adams.  183  Mass.  471 ; 
4:1  Am.  Rep.  528. 

*■  Upton  v.  Upton,  51  Hun  (  N.  V.). 
184;  21  N.  Y.  St.  K.  559. 

"Webber  v.  Vincent,  29  N.  V.  St. 
R.  603;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  101. 


44  Peterson  v.  Western  Tin.  mi  Tel  eg. 
Co.,  75  Minu.  368;  43  L.  R.  \.  581; 
77  N.  W.  its:,:  5Am.  Neg.  Rep.  370. 
See  Joyce  on  Electric  L;iw  (ed.  1900). 
sec.  9S-J. 

«  Sec.  3294. 

469 


§  -411 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


made  with  ill-will  or  intention  to  injure  or  defame,  there  can  be 
no  recovery  of  exemplary  damages.46  And  under  the  Colorado 
laws,47  which  provide  that  there  shall  be  an  allowance  of  punitive 
damages  only  in  those  cases  where  wrongs  are  attended  by  cir- 
cumstances of  fraud,  malice  or  insult,  or  a  wanton  disregard  of 
the  injured  party's  rights  and  feelings,  there  can  be  no  recovery 
of  such  damages  in  an  action  for  libel,  where  it  was  published 
in  the  belief  of  its  truth  and  with  no  desire  or  intention  to  do 
injury.48  So  again,  under  the  Indiana  laws  if  a  person  who  has 
published  a  libel  is  subject  to  a  criminal  prosecution  therefor, 
exemplary  damages  cannot  be  awarded  in  a  civil  action  to  re- 
cover damages  for  such  libelous  publication.49  But  a  contrary 
rule  seems  to  prevail  in  Missouri.50  In  Nebraska  there  can  be 
no  recovery  of  exemplary  damages  against  a  newspaper  for  the 
publication  of  a  libelous  article  therein.51  In  an  action  in  a 
Federal  court  to  recover  damages  for  a  libelous  publication, 
such  court  is  not  bound  to  follow  the  statute  of  the  state  in 
which  it  is  sitting,  which  requires  that  when  actual  and  punitive 
damages  are  allowed  by  a  jury  in  a  libel  case,  they  shall  return 
such  damages  separately.52 

§411.  Justification. —The  defendant  in  an  action  for  libel 
or  slander  may  set  up  as  a  defense  to  the  action  the  truth  of  his 
statements,  and  where  the  truth  of  the  same  is  established,  it 
will  operate  as  a  justification,  and  no  recovery  can  be  had.53 
But  the  truth  of  such  a  publication  cannot  be  shown  either  as 


46  Taylor  v.  Hearst  (Cal.),  40  Pac. 
Rep.  394;  41  Cent.  L.  J.  54. 

47  Colo.  Sess.  Laws,  1889,  p.  64. 

48  Republican  Pub.  Co.  v.  Conroy, 

5  Colo.  App.  262;  38  Pac.  423. 

49  Tracy  v.  Hacket,  19  Ind.  App. 
133;  49  N.  E.   185;  Wabasb  Printing 

6  Pub.  Co.  v.  Crumrine  (Ind.),  21  N. 
E.  904. 

50  Baldwin  v.  Fries,  46  Mo.  App. 
288. 

51Rosewater  v.  Hoffman,  24  Neb. 
222;  38  N.  W.  857. 

52 Times  Pub.  Co.  v.' Carlisle  ( C.  C. 
App.  8th  C.  I,  94  Fed.  Rep.  762. 

470 


63Ratcliff  v.  Louisville  Courier- 
Journal  Co.,  99  Ky.  416;  18  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  291;  36  S.  W.  177;  Owen  v. 
Dewey,  107  Mich.  67;  65  N.  W.  8; 
2  Det.  L.  N.  573;  McCloskey  v.  Pu- 
litzer Pub.  Co.,  152  Mo.  339;  53  S.  W. 
1087;  Press  Co.  v.  Stewart,  119  Pa. 
St.  584;  14  Atl.  51;  21  W.  N.  C.  204: 
12  Cent.  275:  Mitchell  v.  Spradley,  23 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  43:  56  S.  W.  134: 
Tiudel  v.  La  Campagnie  D'lmprime- 
iie  et  de  Publication,  Montreal  L. 
Rep.  5  Sup.  Ct.  297,  aff'do  Q.  B.  510; 
Leduc  v.  Graham,  Montreal  L.  Rep. 
5  Q.  B.  511. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


§411 


a  justification  of  the  defendant's  act  or  in  mitigation  of  damages, 
unless  pleaded.51     And  an  answer  alleging  Buch  a  defense  must 

set  up  therein  with  some  particularity  the  facts  which  L,r<»  b 
tablish  the  truth  of  the  statement  made  and  for  which  the  action 
is  brought.*  Bui  where  the  purpose  of  proving  the  truth  of  a 
charge  for  which  an  action  is  Wrought  isnotasa  justification,  but 
to  rebut  malice  and  in  mitigation  of  damages,  evidence  tending 
to  prove  its  truth  is  admissible  under  a  plea  of  the  general  issue 
only.*3  If  the  trmh  is  set  upas  a  justification  it  is  not  necessary 
that  it  be  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  it  is  suf- 
ficient if  it  be  shown  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence."'  And 
where  an  action  is  brought  for  the  publication  of  a  statement 
that  the  plaintiff  had  been  discharged  from  the  employ  of  the 
defendants  upon  a  confession  by  him  that  he  had  misappro- 
priated money  belonging  to  them,  the  burden  of  proof  is  not 
upon  the  defendants  to  show  an  actual  conversion  of  the  money, 
but  they  merely  have  the  burden  of  proving  the  confession."* 
So,  also,  in  an  action  by  contractors  to  recover  for  defamation 
of  them  in  their  business,  where  it  is  alleged  in  defense  that  the 
article  complained  of  was  merely  a  comment  or  criticism  in  ref- 
erence to  a  public  work  made  by  citizens  and  taxpayers  who 
were  interested  therein,  it  must  appear  to  sustain  such  defense 
that  there  was  no  malice  on  the  part  of  the  defendants  towards 
the  contractors,  either  individually  or  in  a  business  way  in  the 
making  of  such  comment  or  criticism,  and  that  the  statements 
in  the  publication  were  fair  and  reasonable.90 


64  Atwater  v.  Morning  News  Co., 
67  Conn.  504;  84  Atl.  865. 

55  Brush  v.  Blot,  Hi  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  80:  44  \.  V.  Siipp.  1073.  In 
this  case  which  was  an  action  for  li- 
bel, the  defendant  in  his  answer  al- 
leged that  he  had  knowledge  of  the 
alleged  libelous  article,  and  at  the 
time  of  publication  believed  it  to  be 
true,  and  that  his  motive  in  publish- 
ing the  same  was  worthy  and  the 
ends  justifiable,  and  that  it  was  done 
in  the  discharge  of  a  duty  to  the  pub- 
lic, whom  he  believed  were  entitled 


to  be  informed  as  to  the  conduct  of 
the  plaintiff,  who  had  held  a  public 
office  in  the  city  prior  to  the  publi- 
cation. See  Funk  v.  Beverly,  112 
Ind.  100:  11  West.  220;  13  V  E.  573. 

»Huson  v.  Dale.  19  Mich.  17:  2 
Am.  Rep.  66;  Stanley  v.  Webb,  21 
Barb,  i  N.  V.i  148. 

67 Owen  v.  Dewey,  107  Mich.  67; 
65  \.  W.  8;  •-'  Det.  L.  V  573. 

■  Hall  v.  Elgin  Dairy  Co.,  15  Wash. 
542;  46  Pac.  1049. 

69Bearce  v.  Bass.  88  lie.  521;  34 
Atl.  411. 

471 


§  412 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


§  412.  Mitigation  of  damages— Generally. — Evidence  is  ad- 
missible in  mitigation  of  damages,  of  the  facts  and  circumstances 
which  induced  the  use  of  the  alleged  libelous  or  slanderous  state- 
ments by  the  defendant.'8  And  in  an  action  for  slander  in  im- 
puting unchastity  to  a  female,  the  defendant  may  show  that  the 
slander  was  repeated  many  years  after  it  first  started  and  after 
the  reputation  of  the  plaintiff  had  become  bad.61  Evidence,  how- 
ever, is  not  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages  of  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances which  did  not  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  defend- 
ant before  the  libelous  or  slanderous  statements  were  made  by 
him.62  So  where  the  defendant  had  charged  the  plaintiff  with 
having  charge  of  a  fund  for  the  corruption  of  voters  at  an  elec- 
tion, he  was  not  permitted  to  show  specific  acts  of  the  plaintiff 
as  to  the  use  of  money  at  prior  elections,  where  no  evidence 
was  given  showing  knowledge  of  such  acts  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant  prior  to  the  publication  in  question.63  And  in  an  ac- 
tion for  libel,  the  defendant  cannot  show  in  mitigation  of  dam- 
ages, that  actions  have  been  commenced  for  the  publication  of 
the  same  libel  against  other  newspapers.64  Nor  is  it  material  in 
such  a  case  that  a  judgment  has  been  recovered  ngainst  another 
newspaper,63  since  it  is  declared  that  a  person  who  has  com- 
mitted a  tortious  act  cannot  offset  against  the  damages  resulting 
therefrom,  damages  to  the  same  person  from  the  separate  tortious 
act  of  another.66  And  where  a  series  of  articles  have  been  pub- 
lished by  a  paper  or  magazine,  the  defendant  cannot  show  in 
mitigation  of  damages  that  the  same  plaintiff  has  previously  re- 
covered against  him  in  another  action  for  libel  based  on  a  former 
article  of  the  series,  though  such  article  contained  the  libelous 
words  charged  in  the  second  action.67  Again,  evidence  is  not 
admissible  for  the  purpose  of  excuse  or  defense,  that  the  libel 


60  Donnelly  v.  Swain,  3  Phil.  (Pa.) 
93. 

61  Nelson  v.  Wallace,  48  Mo.  App. 
193. 

62  Simons  v.  Burnham,  102  Mich. 
189;  60  N.  W.  476;  Morey  v.  Morning 
Journal  Assoc,  17  N.  Y.  St.  R.  266; 
Hatfield  v.  Lasher,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
23. 

63  Edwards  v.  San  Jose  Printing  & 
P.  Co.,  99  Cal.  431;  34  Pac.  128. 

472 


64  Palmer  v.  New  York  News  Pub. 
Co.,  31  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  210;  52  N. 
Y.  Supp.  539. 

^Bennett  v.  Salisbury  (C.  C.  App. 
2d  C),  78  Fed.  769;  45  U.  S.  App. 
636;  24  C.  C.  A.  329. 

6i  Arnold  v.  Sayings  Co.,  76  Mo. 
App.  159. 

67  Tillotson  v.  Cheetham,  3  Johns. 
(N.  Y. )  56. 


LII'.KL    ANI»    SLANDER 


§   H3 


may  not  be  believed/"  or  that  it  was  published  accidentally,  in- 
advertently or  by  mistake.*  Though  the  fact  that  the  publica- 
tion was  accidental  or  by  mistake  cannot  affect  the  question  of 
substantial  damages,  it  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  go  to 
the  question  of  exemplary  damages.™  Ami  as  bearing  upoD  tin- 
questions  of  malice  ami  such  damages,  evidence  is  admissible 
showing  that  the  language  was  rendered  libelous  by  a  mistake  in 
punctuation/1  or  by  reason  of  a  typographical  error. ,:  In  tin- 
case  of  the  accidental  or  inadvertent  publication  of  libelous  mat- 
ter, the  evidence  should,  it  would  seem,  tend  to  show  that  the 
publication  was  purely  by  accident  or  inadvertence,  for  in  such 
case  the  question  of  negligence  would  enter,  and  if  the  publica- 
tion was  due  to  gross  negligence  or  recklessness,  exemplary 
damages  should  be  allowed.  It  is  also  no  defense  to  an  action 
for  the  publication  of  an  article  reflecting  upon  the  integrity  of 
a  person,  that  such  article  was  intended  as  a  political  joke  or 
pleasant  gibe,  where  the  article  or  paper  contains  nothing  to  in- 
dicate that  it  was  so  intended.'"  And  in  those  cases  where  a  re- 
covery may  be  allowed  for  loss  of  time  and  fur  trouble  as  the 
result  of  a  slander,  the  amount  of  recovery  therefor  should  be 
reduced  by  the  fact  that  no  deduction  for  such  time  was  made 
by  plaintiff's  employer.74 

§  413.  Evidence  of  good  faith  in  mitigation— Absence  of 
malice. — For  the  purpose  of  rebutting  any  presumption  of  mal- 
ice which  may  arise  from  the  publication  of  libelous  words,  the 


68  Bishop  v.  Journal  Newspaper 
Co.,  108  Mass.  327;  IT  X.  E.  119; 
Hastings  v.  Stetson,  130  Mass.  76; 
Van  Ingeu  v.  Star  Co.,  1  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  429;  72  X.  Y.  St.  R.  565,  affd 
on  opinion  below,  157  X.  Y.  642.  See 
Richardson  v.  Barker,  7  Ind.  567. 

«9  Henderson  v.  Fox,  83  Ga.  233;  9 
S.  E.  839;  Morgan  v.  Rice,  35  Mo. 
App.  591;  Moore  v.  Francis,  l.'l  N. 
Y.  199;  8L.  R.  A.  214;  30  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  467;  31  Cent.  L.  J.  10;  23  \.  I.. 
1127;  Griebel  v.  Rochester  Printing 
Co.,  38  X.  Y.  St.  R.  788;  14  X.  Y. 
Supp.  848. 


7  McClean  v.  New  York  Press  Co., 
19  X.  Y.  Supp.  262 ;  40  V  Y.  St.  R. 
700. 

71  Arnott  v.  Standard  Assoc,  57 
Conn.  SO:  17  A 1 1 .  301;  3  L.  R.  A. 
69. 

7-  Median  v.  New  York  Press  Co., 
19  X.  Y.  Supp.  262;  46  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
700.  See  Sailings  v.  Shakespeare,  46 
Mich.  408:  41  Am.  Rep.  166. 

«  Truth  Pub.  Co.  v.  Reed,  13  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  323. 

74  Eimee  v.  Fessenden,  154  Mass. 
427;  2S  X.  E.  299. 

473 


$  413 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


defendant  may  show  the  circumstances  of  publication,  the  sources 
from  which  the  information  was  received  and  the  reliability  of 
the  same,  and  his  honesty  of  purpose,  good  faith  and  belief  in 
the  truth  of  the  allegations."'  So  evidence  is  admissible  in  be- 
half of  the  defendant  to  show  that  the  publication  was  made  in 
good  faith  and  in  an  honest  belief  of  its  truth,  and  where  such 
facts  are  established,  they  are  to  be  considered  by  the  jury  in 
mitigation  of  damages.76  But  the  good  faith  of  the  defendant 
in  the  publication  will  not  affect  the  recovery  of  the  actual  dam- 
ages sustained.  Such  facts,  when  established,  will  only  affect 
the  allowance  of  exemplary  damages."  So  in  the  case  of  an  ac- 
tion against  a  newspaper  for  the  publication  of  a  libelous  article, 
though  the  defendant's  motives  were  good  and  there  was  no 
intention  to  injure  the  reputation  or  character  of  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  publication  was  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business 
and  with  justifiable  ends,  the  plaintiff  may  still  recover  his  actual 
damages,  and  he  will  be  restricted  to  such  damages  where  such 
facts  appear.'8  In  some  cases  it  has  been  declared  that  if  the  de- 
fendant acted  in  good  faith  in  the  publication  of  such  an  article 
and  with  an  honest  belief  in  its  truth,  and  has  made  reasonable 
and  proper  investigation,  the  jury  will  be  warranted  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  in  reducing  the  damages  to  a  minimum.79     In 


75  Owen  v.  Dewey,  107  Mich.  67; 
65  BT.  W.  8;  2  Det.  L.  N.  573.  See 
Taylor  v.  Church,  8  N.  Y.  452. 

76  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  C),  94  Fed.  762; 
36  C.  C.  A.  475;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  633 ;  Hotchkiss  v.  Porter, 
30  Conn.  414;  Cox  v.  Strickland,  101 
Ga.  482;  28  S.  E.  655;  Nolte  v.  Her- 
ter,  65  111.  App.  430;  Tottleben  v. 
Blankenship,  58  111.  App.  47;  Louis- 
ville Press  Co.  v.  Tennelly,  20  Ky.  L. 
Kep.  1231;  49  S.  W.  15;  Blackwell  v. 
Johnston  (Ky.),  56  S.  W.  12;  Bron- 
son  v.  Bruce,  59  Mich.  467;  60  Am. 
Rep.  307;  26  N.  W.  671;  Evening 
News  Assoc,  v.  Tryon,  42  Mich.  549; 
36  Am.  Rep.  450;  Sharpe  v.  Larson, 
74  Minn.  323;  74  N.  W.  2:33;  McClos- 
key  v.  Pulitzer  Pub.   Co.,   152   Mo. 

474 


339;  53  S.  W.  1087;  Morgan  v.  Rice, 
35  Mo.  App.  591;  Lewis  v.  Hum- 
phreys, 64  Mo.  App.  466;  2  Mo.  App. 
Rep.  1011;  Bush  v.  Prosser,  11  N.  Y. 
347;  Erwin  v.  Sumrow,  1  Hawks 
(N.  C),  472;  Morrison-Jewell  Filtra- 
tion Co.  v.  Lingane,  19  R.  I. ;  33  Atl. 
452. 

77  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  C),  94  Fed.  762;  36 
C.  C.  A.  475;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  N.  S.  633;  Evening  News  Assoc, 
v.  Tryon,  42  Mich.  549;  36  Am.  Rep. 
450;  Lewis  v.  Humphreys,  64  Mo. 
App.  466;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  1011. 

7S  Fitzpatrick  v.  Daily  States  Pub. 
Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  1116;  20  So.  173. 
See  Hearne  v.  De  Young,  119  Cal. 
670;  52  Pac.  150. 

79  Bronson  v.  Bruce,  59  Mich.  467; 


LIBEL    AM>    SLANDER. 


5 :  n  i 


another  case,  however,  it  was  held  to  be  erroneo  tating  an 

incorrect  rule  of  damages  to  instruct  the  jury,  in  an  action  against 
a  newspaper  for  the  publication  of  a  Libelous  article,  that  though 
it  was  not  a  defense  to  the  action  that  the  defendant  published 
the  article  in  good  faith,  as  a  matter  of  news  and  without  malice, 
yet  such  fart  might  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages,  and 
with  other  mitigating  circumstances  might  be  sufficient  to  reduce 
the  damages  to  a  mere  minimum.80 

S  414.  Same  subject  continued.— In  an  action  for  the  al- 
leged libelous  publication  by  a  newspaper  of  a  sectarian  or  club 
meeting  at  which  it  stated  that  certain  speakers  insinuated  that 
funds  were  being  diverted  from  their  intended  purposes,  and  the 
report  further  insinuated  that  such  funds  had  been  embezzled 
by  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  may  show  for  t  he  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing good  faith  on  its  part  and  in  mitigation  of  damages  that 
the  article  complained  of  was  a  fair  and  true  report  of  the  meet- 
ing/1 And  as  tending  to  disprove  malice  and  to  show  the  good 
faith  of  the  defendant  in  an  action  for  libel,  evidence  is  admissi- 
ble showing  what  he  said  when  printing  the  article.88  But  the 
defendant  cannot  show  that  the  actions  and  conduct  of  the  plain- 
tiff were  such  as  to  excite  his  suspicions,  either  for  the  purpose 
of  proving  that  he  acted  in  good  faith  or  in  any  way  tending  to 
mitigate  damages/  and  only  facts  which  the  defendant  had 
knowledge  of  at  the  time  of  the  publication  and  which  might 
have  influenced  him  in  making  the  statements  contained  therein 
are  admissible.81  And  evidence  showing  the  insanity  of  the  de- 
fendant is  admissible  on  the  question  of  malice  and  in  mitigation 
of  damages/'  or  that  he  was  drunk  at  the  time  the  slanderous 
statements  were  made  by  him.86     If  the  publication  of  an  article 


60  Am.  Rep.  307;  26  N.  W.  071 ;   Mor- 
gan v.  Rice,  3">  Mo.  App.  591. 

bo  Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune  Pub. 
Co.,  12  Utah,  439;  13  Pao.  112:  35 
L.  R.  A.  till. 

81  Sarasohn  v.  Workingrnen's  Pub. 
Assn.,  44  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  302;  60 
N.  Y.  Supp.  640. 

82  Taylor  v.  Church,  8  N.  Y.  452. 
sasickra  v.  Small,  87   Me.  493;  33 


Atl.  9;  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  314.  But  see 
Coogler  v.  Rhodes,  38  Fla.  240;  21 
So.  109. 

84  Sun  Printing  &  Pub.  Assn.  v. 
Schenck,  98  Fed.  925;  40  C.  C.  A. 
163. 

85  Yeates  v.  Reed,  4  Blackf.  (lud.) 
463. 

86  Gates  v.  Meredith,  7  Ind.  440. 

475 


8  415 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


libelous  per  se  is  admitted  and  the  recovery  is  expressly  limited 
to  compensatory  damages,  evidence  is  irrelevant  either  as  to  the 
good  faith  or  the  negligence  of  the  publisher  of  such  article.87 

§  415.  Evidence  that  defamatory  matter  was  common 
rumor. — The  courts  do  not  seem  to  be  in  harmony  upon  the 
question  whether  in  an  action  for  slander  or  libel  the  defendant 
may  show  upon  the  question  of  malice  and  in  mitigation  of 
damages  that  the  defamatory  matter  which  he  has  spoken  or 
published  concerning  the  plaintiff  was  a  general  rumor  or  report. 
It  would  seem  that  such  evidence  should  be  admissible  for  such 
purpose,  for  if  there  was  in  fact  a  general  rumor  or  report  in 
substance  the  same  as  the  alleged  libelous  or  slanderous  state- 
ments, damages  in  such  a  case  should  certainly  not  be  awarded 
to  the  same  amount  as  where  no  rumor  or  report  had  previously 
been  in  circulation  affecting  the  plaintiff  in  the  manner  in  which 
the  alleged  libel  or  slander  affected  him,  and  such  seems  to  be 
the  rule  in  the  majority  of  the  jurisdictions  in  which  the  ques- 
tion has  arisen,  though  nearly  an  equal  number  hold  otherwise.88 
So  in  an  action  for  slander  for  charging  a  woman  with  being  an 
adulteress  and  prostitute,  evidence  is  admissible  of  general  ru- 
mors or  reports  of  guilt  of  adultery  on  her  part,89  and  the  defend- 
ant is  entitled  to  give  proof  that  the  defamatory  matters  which 
were  charged  against  the  plaintiff  were  current  rumor  and  re- 
port prior  to  the  publication,  and  that  the  publication  was  made 


87  Taylor  v.  Hearst,  118  Cal.  366; 
50  Pac.  541. 

88  See  Broughton  v.  McGrew,  39 
Fed.  672;  Fuller  v.  Dean,  31  Ala. 
654;  Swan  v.  Thompson,  124  Cal. 
193;  56  Pac.  878;  Republican  Pub. 
Co.  v.  Mosman,  15  Cob..  399;  24  Pac. 
1051;  Nailor  v.  Pouder,  1  Marv.  (Del.) 
408;  41  Atl.  88;  Gray  v.  Ellzroth,  10 
Ind.  App.  587;  37  N.  E.  551;  Barr  v. 
Hack,  46  Iowa,  308;  Nicholson  v. 
Rust  (Ky.),  52  S.  W.  933;  Brewer  v. 
Chase,  121  Mich.  526;  46  L.  R.  A. 
397;  Hoboken  Printing  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Kahn,  58  N.  J.  L.  359;  33  Atl.  382; 
Cook  v.  Barkley,  2  N.  J.  L.  169;  Mc- 
Curry   v.    McCurry,    82    N.    C.   296; 

476 


Lambert  v.  Pilaris,  3  Head  (Tenn.), 
622;  Richards  v.  Ricbards,  2  Mood. 
&  Rob.  557.  But  see  S trader  v.  Sny- 
der, 67  111.  404;  Eusor  v.  Bolgiano, 
67  Md.  190;  9  Atl.  529;  8  Cent.  296; 
Peterson  v.  Morgan,  116  Mass.  350; 
Baldwin  v.  Boulware,  79  Mo.  App. 
5;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  359;  Dame  v. 
Kenney,  25  N.  H.  318;  Gilman  v. 
Lowell,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  579;  Com. 
v.  Place,  153  Pa.  St.  314;  32  W.  N. 
C.  107;  26  Atl.  620;  Pease  v.  Sbippen, 
80  Pa.  St.  513;  21  Am.  Rep.  116; 
Black  well  v.  Land  re  th,  90  Va.  748;  19 
S.  E.  791;  Bowen  v.  Hall,  20  Vt.  232. 
89  Gray  v.  Ellzrotb,  10  Ind.  App. 
587;  37  N.  E.  551. 


LIBEL    AND    BLANDER. 


§  «6 


in  good  faith  in  reliance  in  such  rumor  though  the  plea  of  jus- 
tification fail  and  the  publication  be  false.'"  Bui  though  evi- 
dence of  a  general  rumor  «>r  report  is  admissible,  yel  writnesses 
should  not  be  permitted  to  detail  conversations  which  took  place 
in  reference  to  such  report  or  rumor;91  nor  .should  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  a  general  rumor  to  the  same  effect  as  the  all< 
slanderous  or  libelous  statements  be  admitted  unless  it  also  be 
shown  that  such  rumor  or  report  was  communicated  tn  the  de- 
fendant prior  to  the  statements  complained  of."  And  it  in  an  ac- 
tion for  slander  or  libel  it  appear  that  the  alleged  defamatory 
matter  was  positively  stated  with  no  reference  or  suggestion  of 
its  resting  on  rumor  merely,  it  is  declared  that  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  a  rumor  is  not  admissible."' 


§  416.  Source  of  information— Authority  of  others— News 
agency— Copied  from  newspapers. — It  is  not  a  justification  or 

excuse  in  an  action  for  libel  or  slander  that  the  defendant  was 
told  by  another  the  matter  which  he  stated."  But  the  defend- 
ant may  plead  in  mitigation  of  damages  that  the  words  were 
uttered  on  the  authority  and  information  of  others  whose  names 
he  gave  at  the  time  the  words  were  spoken  by  him,95 and  that 
he  also  stated  at  that  time  that  he  did  not  believe  the  statement 
to  be  true*  So,  also,  for  the  same  purpose,  evidence  is  admis- 
sible that  he  was  informed  that  the  statements  made  by  him 
were  true,97  and  the  defendant  may  testify  that  he  made  the 
statement  upon  information,  in  the  belief  of  its  truth,  and  with- 
out malice.98     But  where  a  libel  purports  to  be  based   upon  the 


90  Republican  Pub.  Co.  v.  M<>sm;in, 
15  Colo.  399;  24  Pac.  1051.  Hut  see 
Baldwin  v.  Bo ul ware,  79  Mo.  App. 
5;  2  Mo.  App.  Be  p.  3">9. 

91  Nicholson  v.  Bust  (Ky.),  52  S. 
W.  9;',:?. 

MWolfi  v.  Smith,  112  Mich.  359; 
4Det.  L.  X.  73;  70  X.  \V.  1010. 

93  Haskins  v.  Lumsden.  10  Wis. 
359. 

94  Edwards   v. 
(C.  C.  \V.  D.  Mo 
bish  v.   Hamilton 
16  So.  856. 


Kansas  City  Times 

,  82  Fed.  813;  Wim- 

47  La.    Ann.    246; 


96  Baldwin  v.  Boulware,  79  Mo. 
App.  5;  2  Mo.  App.  Bep.  359.  See 
Hinkle,  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa.  355. 
But  see  Inman  v.  Foster,  8  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  602. 

9iXicholson  v.  Bust  (Ky.),  52  S. 
W.  933. 

97  Fowler  v.  Fowler,  113  Mich.  575; 
71  \.  W.  1084;  4  Det.  L.  X.  412.  See 
Story  v.  Early.  86  111.  461. 

98Scullin  v.  Harper  (C.  C.  App. 
7th  C. ),  78  Fed  460;  46  U.  S.  App. 
673:  24  C.  C.  A.  169.  See  Mature  v. 
Wilcox.  147  X.  V.    024:  71  N.  Y.   St. 

477 


§417 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


writer's  own  knowledge,  evidence  is  not  admissible  in  mitiga- 
tion of  what  he  was  told  or  heard  before  publishing  the  same.93 

§  417.  Same  subject  continued. — If,  as  in  the  case  of  an 
action  against  a  newspaper  for  the  publication  of  a  libelous 
article,  such  article  appears  on  its  face  to  be  derived  from  sources 
other  than  the  publisher's  own  knowledge,  though  the  source  of 
information  may  not  be  stated,  evidence  is  admissible  to  show 
that  the  publisher  acted  on  apparently  reliable  information  and 
in  good  faith.100  And  for  the  purpose  of  showing  good  faith 
and  due  care  in  the  publication  of  an  article  by  a  newspaper, 
and  as  tending  to  mitigate  damages,  the  defendant  may  show 
that  the  article  was  received  from  a  news'  agency,  which  had 
theretofore  been  found  trustworthy.1  But  evidence  that  the 
information  upon  which  an  article  is  based  was  received  from 
a  reliable  source,  is  not  of  itself  admissible  in  mitigation  of 
damages,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  the  publisher 
had  reason  to  and  did  believe  that  the  information  was  true.2 
So  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  publication  of  a 
statement  by  a  newspaper,  that  the  plaintiff  was  to  have  charge 
of  a  fund  for  the  purpose  of  corrupting  voters  at  an  election,  it 
was  held  that  in  order  to  mitigate  the  damages,  the  defendant 
must  not  only  show  the  source  of  its  information,  but  it  must 
also  show  that  the  persons  who  informed  it  were  possessed  of 
such  a  character  and  standing  as  would  command  a  belief  in  their 
utterances.'  In  an  action  for  libel  the  defendant  may  also  prove 
that  the  publication  was  based  on  an  article  published  in  a  news- 
paper of  large  circulation,  which  he  had  seen,  read  and  be- 
lieved to  be  true,4  or  that  the   article   in   question  was  taken 


R.  244;  42  N.  E.  270;  Dolevin  v. 
Wilder,  7  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Witcher 
v.  Jones,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  491:  43  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  151. 

^Clifton  v.  Lange,  108  Iowa,  472; 
79  N.  W.  276;  Fenstermaker  v.  Trib- 
une Pub.  Co.,  12  Utah,  439;  35  L.  R. 
A.  fill;  43  Pac.  112. 

100  Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune  Pub. 
Co..  13  Utah,  532;  35  L.  R.  A.  611: 
45  Pac.  1097. 

478 


1  Folwell  v.  Providence  Journal 
Co.,  19  R.  I.  551:  37  Atl.  6. 

2  Robinson  v.  Evening  Post  Pub. 
Co.,  39  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  525;  57 
N.  Y.  Supp.  303,  rev'g  25  Misc.  243; 
28  Civ.  Proc.  239;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  62. 

3  Edwards  v.  San  Jose  Print.  &  P. 
Co.,  99  Cal.  431;  34  Pac.  128. 

4  Hoey  v.  Fletcher,  39  Fla.  325:  22 
So.  716.  See  Turner  v.  Hearst,  115 
Cal.    394:    47    Pac.    129;     Hewitt   v. 


LIBEL    AM)    BLANDER.  §  418 

therefrom  as  a  mere  matter  of  news.3  Although  where  an  in- 
struction h;is  been  given  that  no  exemplary  damages  can  be 
allowed,  hut  that  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  compensatory  dam 

it  is  improper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they  may  consider  in 
mitigation  of  damages  the  fact  that  oilier  similar  articles  were 
published  in  other  newspapers  immediately  prior  to  the  pub- 
lication of  the  article  in  question.6  Bui  in  order  to  render 
sueh  articles  admissible  in  evidence  in  mitigation  of  dam; 
they  must  be  pleaded  for  that  purpose  in  the  answer.1  The  de- 
fendant in  such  an  action  may  also  allege  in  mitigation  of  dam- 
ages that  the  article  in  question  was  published  as  a  matter  of 
news  in  accordance  with  its  regular  custom  upon  information 
furnished  by  the  police  authorities  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 
the  plaintiff —whom  the  article  said  had  mysteriously  disap- 
peared — to  her  friends,  and  was  published  in  a  friendly  spirit 
and  without  malice.8  But  where,  in  the  publication  of  an  article 
in  reference  to  a  seduction  case,  the  name  and  address  of  an 
innocent  party  was  given  as  the  complaining  witness,  and  the 
reporter,  who  wrote  the  article,  based  it  on  information  received 
over  the  telephone  and  a  note  left  by  the  justice  on  the  report- 
er's desk,  it  was  held  that  the  justice's  docket  was  not  admissi- 
ble in  evidence  in  mitigation  of  damages,  where  neither  the 
reporter  nor  the  publisher  saw  the  docket  prior  to  the  publica- 
tion.9 

§  418.  Provocation  in  mitigation. — In  an  action  for  slander 
or  libel  there  may  have  been  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
which  amounted  to  a  provocation  and  in  consequence  of  which 
the  statements  for  which  action  is  brought  were  made  by  the 
defendant  and  evidence  of  such  conduct  is  admissible  in  mitiga- 


Pioneer  Press  Co.,  25  Minn.  178;  23 
Am.  Rep.  680;  Wier  v.  Allen,  51  \. 
II.  177.  But  see  Reade  v.  Sweetzer, 
6  Abb.  Pr.  X.  S.  (N.  Y. )  9. 

6  Edwards  v.  Kansas  City  Times 
(C.  C.  W.  D.  Mo.),  32  Fed.  813. 

6  Van  Ingen  v.  Mail  *  Ex.  Pub. 
Co.,  14  Misc.  (N.  r.)326;  :'.">  X.  V. 
Supp.  838;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  355.  See 
Hoey  v.  Fletcher,  39  Fla.  325;  22  So. 
716;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Daily  States  Pub.  '  (Iowa),  82  N.  W.  928. 

IT!' 


Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  1116;  20  So.  173; 
Upton  v.  Hume,  24  Oreg.  420:  21 
L.  R.  A.  493;  33  Pac.  810. 

7  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C.  C. 
A]M>.  8th  C),  94  Fed.  762;  36  C.  C. 
A.  -17.".:  10  Am.  A-  Eng.  Corp.  (as. 
\.  s.  636. 

3  Evening  Post  Co.  v.  Hunter,  IS 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  726;  38  S.  W.  487. 

'  Hulbeit    v.    New    Nonpareil    Co. 


$418 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


tion  of  damages.10  So  in  an  action  for  libel,  previous  articles 
published  by  the  plaintiff  may,  in  certain  cases,  be  considered  in 
mitigation  of  damages.11  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  article  for 
which  an  action  in  libel  is  brought  is  professedly  an  answer 
to  a  publication  made  by  the  plaintiff,  and  which  is  referred  to 
in  such  article,  is  admissible  in  evidence  under  the  general  issue, 
in  mitigation  of  damages.1'  So  where  defendant  had  in  a  pub- 
lication charged  the  plaintiff  with  being  "  a  degraded  scoundrel, 
liar  and  blackguard, "  he  was,  in  an  action  to  recover  damages 
for  such  a  statement,  permitted  to  show  under  the  general  issue 
that  shortly  prior  to  the  publication  of  said  libel  he  had  been 
charged  by  the  defendant  with  false  swearing  in  an  action  in 
which  he  was  a  witness.13  But  to  render  a  previously  published 
libelous  article  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  plaintiff  caused  or  had  some  part  in  its  prepara- 
tion or  publication."  And  in  an  action  for  slander,  the  defend- 
ant may  show  that  in  consequence  of  the  plaintiff's  violent  con- 
duct or  language,  he  was  provoked  in  a  moment  of  anger  to  the 
use  of  the  words  charged.15 


10  Freeman  v.  Tinsley,  59  111.  497; 
Monsler  v.  Harding,  33  Ind.  176; 
Janch  v.  Janch,  50  Ind.  135;  19  Am. 
Rep.  699:  Simons  v.  Lewis,  51  La. 
Ann.  327:  25  So.  406;  Davis  v. 
Griffith,  4  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  342; 
Brewer  v.  Chase,  121  Mich.  526; 
46  L.  R.  A.  397;  80  N.  W.  575; 
Newman  v.  Stein,  75  Mich.  402;  42 
N.  W.  956;  Ritchie  v.  Stenins,  73 
Mich.  563;  41  N.  W.  687:  War- 
ner v.  Lockerby,  31  Minn.  421; 
Powers  v.  Presgrove,  38  Miss.  227; 
Richardson  v.  Northrop,  56  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)105;  Else  v.  Ferris  Auth.  N. 
P.  (N.  Y.),  36;  Massnere  v.  Dickens, 
70  Wis.  83. 

ii  Pugh  v.  McCarty,  40  Ga.  444; 
Brewer  v.  Chase,  121  Mich.  526;  46 
L.  R.  A.  397;  80  N.  W.  575;  May- 
nard  v.  Beardsley,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
560. 

i2  Hotchkiss  v.  Lothrop,  1  Johns. 
(N.    Y.)    286;    Gould     v.    Weed,    12 

480 


Wend.    (N.    Y.)    12;    Thompson   v. 
Boyd,  Mills.  Const.  (S.  C.)  80. 

13  Davis  v.  Griffith,  4  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  342. 

14  Dressel  v.  Shippman,  57  Minn. 
23;  58  N.  W.  684. 

15  Simons  v.  Lewis,  51  La.  Ann. 
327;  25  So.  406;  Newman  v.  Stein, 
75  Mich.  402;  42  N.  W.  956;  Pal- 
mer v.  Long,  7  Daly  (N.  Y.),  33; 
Else  v.  Ferris  Auth.  N.  P.  (N.  Y. ), 
36.  Hilbrant  v.  Simmons,  9  Ohio  C. 
D.  566;  18  Ohio  C.  C.  123,  where  a 
verdict  for  -S800  was  held  excessive 
for  charging  the  plaintiff  in  the 
course  of  a  quarrel  with  him,  with 
burning  his  house  to  get  insurance 
money.  In  Cnmmings  v.  Line,  45 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  56;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  469, 
a  verdict  for  $3,000  was  held  exces- 
sive for  imputing  unchastity  to  the 
plaintiff  in  the  course  of  a  quarrel 
which  was  heard  by  but  few  wit- 
nesses. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


419 


§419.  Same    subject— When    insufficient.     In  an    action 

against  an  employer  for  abusing  an  employee  and  culling  him 
a  thief  in  a  public  place  in  the  presence  of  others,  the  fact  that 
the  employer  was  at  the  moment  very  angry  with  the  employee 
because  of  reports  which  had  come  to  him  as  to  trouble  beta 

the  employee  and  the  manager,  does  not  excuse  the  employer 
for  uttering  such  statements. u;  And  the  fact  that  slanderous  words 
were  spoken  by  the  defendant  in  a  moment  of  anger  or  Budden 
resentment  will  not  preclude  the  plaintiff  from  the  recovery  of 
other  than  nominal  damages.17  Again,  a  previous  provoking  pub- 
lication  by  the  plaintiff  in  reference  to  the  defendant  can  neither 
be  considered  in  justification  or  in  mitigation  of  damages  in  an 
action  for  libel  or  slander,  where  such  previous  publication  is  en- 
tirely irrelevant  to  and  wholly  independent  of  the  publication 
for  which  the  action  is  brought,  and  where  the  publication  of  the 
plaintiff  was  not  so  connected  in  point  of  time  with  that  of  the 
defendant  as  to  justify  the  belief  that  the  latter's  statement  was 
made  in  a  moment  of  anger.13  And  in  an  action  for  slander  or 
libel,  the  defendant  cannot  plead  as  a  set-off,  damages  suffered 
by  him  as  a  result  of  a  previous  slanderous  or  libelous  attack, 
or  charges  made  concerning  him  by  the  plaintiff.1'1  In  New 
York  under  the  Code  provision  a  which  requires  that  a  counter- 
claim to  be  available  must  be  "a  cause  of  action  arising  out  of 
the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  or  connected  with  the  subject 
of  the  action,"  the  defendant  cannot  avail  himself,  as  a  counter- 
claim, in  an  action  for  slander,  of  a  slander  uttered  by  the  plain- 
tiff after  the  slander  of  which  he  complains  is  complete,  though 
uttered  in  the  same  conversation.'1 


16  Poissenet  v.  Heather,  51  La.  Ann. 
'.it-,:,;  -j;,  So.  937. 

17  Ledgerwood  v.  Elliott  (Tex.), 
:,1  S.  W.  ST-.'. 

iSRattell  v.  Wallace  (C.  C.  S.  D. 
V.  V.).  30  Fed.  JJO ;  Child  v.  Tloiner, 
13  Pick.  (Mass.)503;  Quinby  v.  Min- 
nesota Tribune  Co.,  38  Minn.  528; 
38  N.  W.  623;  Baldwin  v.  Bonlware 
1  Mo.  App.  Rep.  -466. 

19  Baldwin    v.     Boulware,     1     Mo. 

31 


App.  Rep.  466;  Trudel  v.  Vian. 
Montreal  L.  Rep.  5  Q.  B.  502.  But 
see  Trudel  v.  La  Campairnie  D'lm- 
primierie  et  de  Publication  da  Can- 
ada. Montreal  L.  Rep.  5  Q.  R.  510, 
affg  •".  Super.  Ct.  -JOT. 

2 "  X.  Y.  Code   Civ.   Proc.    sec.  520. 

21Sheehan  v.  Pierce,  70  Ilun  I N. 
Y.),  22:  53  N.  Y.  St.  R.  438;  23  NY. 
Supp.  1119. 

481 


§  420  LIBEL   AND   SLANDER. 

§  420.  Retraction  in  mitigation. — If  subsequent  to  the 
publication  of  a  libelous  article  or  slanderous  statement,  the 
publisher  makes  a  retraction  of  the  same,  such  fact  may  be 
considered  in  mitigation  of  damages."  A  retraction,  however, 
to  be  available  in  mitigation  should  be  full  and  fair,  and  not 
evasive.  So  where  the  defendant  had  published  a  libelous  article 
charging  the  plaintiff  with  fabricating  the  story  of  an  assault 
and  battery  for  the  purpose  of  concealing  the  fact  that  his 
wounds  were  received  in  a  row  over  a  woman,  it  was  held  that 
the  retraction  was  not  a  full  and  fair  one  where  the  publication 
of  the  original  article  was  not  referred  to  or  admitted  therein 
and  no  retraction  or  desire  to  retract  was  expressed,  but  it  was 
in  effect  a  criticism  upon  the  police  department  upon  whom  it 
attempted  to  place  the  responsibility  for  the  rumor.23  And 
though  a  retraction  may  be  made  after  the  commencement  of  an 
action  for  libel,  yet  if  such  action  is  commenced  without  any 
request  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  retract  and  the  defendant 
promptly  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit  publishes  a  full 
and  fair  retraction,  such  publication  may  be  proved  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  in  mitigation  of  damages.1*4  In  this  connec- 
tion it  was  said  by  the  court  in  this  case:  "  Under  such  circum- 
stances a  retraction  after  suit  brought  may  be  as  valuable  and 
effective  as  one  published  before  and  there  is  the  same  reason 
for  the  submission  to  the  jury  of  the  one  as  the  other.  .  .  .  No 
case  holds  that  a  repetition  of  a  libel  or  slander  after  suit  brought 
is  in  its  nature  not  competent  evidence  on  the  question  of  malice 
and  damages.  ...  If  the  plaintiff  can  give  in  evidence  the  lan- 
guage published  or  uttered  subsequently  to  the  commencement 
of  the  action  for  the  purpose  of  aggravating  damages,  it  seems 
quite  reasonable  that  the  defendant  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
give  in  evidence  a  fair  and  honest  retraction  of  the  charges 
promptly  made  subsequently  to  the  commencement  of  the  action 
in  mitigation  of  damages."23     In  California  a  similar  rule  pre- 


22  Storey  v.  Wallace,  60  111.  51; 
Davis  v.  Marxliauseu  (Mich.),  61  N. 
W.  504;  Hotchkiss  v.  Oliphant,  2 
Hill  (ST.  Y.),  510. 

23  Gray  v.  Times  Newspaper  Co., 
74  Minn.  452;  77  N.  W.  204.  See 
Alliger  v.   Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle,  2 

482 


Silv.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  5;  6  N.  Y.  Supp. 
110. 

24  Turton  v.  New  York  Recorder  Co.> 
144  N.  Y.  144;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  69;  38 
N.E.  1009,affg3Misc.  (N.Y.)314;52 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  39S;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  766. 

2»  Per  Earl,  J. 


LIBEL    AMi    SLANDER. 


§  421 


vails,*  but  in  Michigan  it  has  been  bel  1  that  a  retraction  of  a 
published  after  the  commencement  of  an  action  therefor  cannot 
be  considered  in  mitigation.2'  In  this  rase,  however,  it  appeared 
that  the  retraction  was  not  made  promptly  but  that  considerable 
time  elapsed  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit.  While  a  re- 
traction subsequently  to  the  commencement  of  the  action  may, 
under  certain  circumstances,  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  re- 
duction of  damages,  yet  a  mere  (titer  to  retract  at  such  time 
cannot/*  So  an  offer  made  under  stress  of  an  impending  suit  to 
publish  an  interview  with  a  person  libeled,  or  a  letter  from  him, 
is  not  a  retraction  which  will  operate  to  mitigate  the  damages.-"' 
Again,  it  is  no  justification  nor  a  fact  to  be  considered  in  mitiga- 
tion of  damages,  that  the  person  concerning  whom  a  libel  is  pub- 
lished did  not  go  to  the  publisher  and  ask  him  to  retract  the 
same.*'  The  Illinois  act  of  1895  ::1  which  provided  that  where  a 
libel  was  published  in  good  faith  and  retracted,  the  plaintiff 
should  be  limited  in  his  recovery  to  his  actual  damages,  is  con- 
strued as  applying  only  to  the  publishers  of  newspapers.32 

§  421.  Exemplary  damages — How  affected  by  rules  of  ab- 
sent proprietor  of  newspaper  as  to  investigation. — The  fat 

that  the  proprietor  of  a  newspaper,  who  is  himself  absent  from 
the  place  of  publication  and  who  has  placed  the  general  man- 
agement of  such  paper  in  the  hands  of  others,  has  made  a  rule 
that  no  article  reflecting  upon  any  person  or  corporation  shall  be 
published  until  after  strict  investigation  the  truth  of  the  matter 
shall  have  been  established,  does  not  of  itself  relieve  such  absent 
owner  from  liability  for  punitive  damages  for  the  publication  of 
a  libelous  article,  for  though  he  may  have  made  such  a  rule,  yet 
if  it  appear  that  the  article  was  carelessly  or  recklessly  published. 


*  Turner  v.  Hearst,  115  Cat.  304; 
47  Pac.  129. 

27  Evening  News  Assoc,  v.  Tryon, 
12  Midi.  549;  30  Am.  Rep.  450. 

28  Tuvton  v.  New  York  Recorder 
Co.,  144  N.  Y.  144;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
398;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  766,  aff'g8  Misc. 
314;  52  X.  V.  St.  R.  398;  22  X.  V. 
Supp.  766. 

29  Evening  Post  Pub.  Co.  v.  Voight 
(C.   C.    App.    2d    0.),    72   Fed.   885; 


38  U.  S.  App.  394;  Constitution  Pub. 
Co.  v.  Way,  Dl  Ga.  120;  21  S.  E. 
139. 

30  Times  Pub.  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (C. 
C.  App.  8th  C),  94  Fed.  762;  36  C. 
C.  A.  475;  10  Am.  &  Eug.  Corp.  Cas. 
N.  S.  033. 

«  Act  June  24,  1895;  Laws,  1895, 
p.  315. 

82  Prussing  v.  Jackson,  85  111.  App. 
324. 

483 


§  422  LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

such  damages  may  be  recovered."1  Rules  of  such  a  character 
will  not  relieve  the  publisher  from  liability  for  exemplary  dam- 
ages unless  it  be  shown  that  they  are  enforced.31  In  a  case  in  the 
Federal  courts,  where  this  question  arose,  it  was  claimed  that 
exemplary  damages  could  not  be  recovered  from  an  absent  owner 
where  he  had  made  a  rule  that  communications  of  a  personal 
nature  sent  by  unknown  correspondents  must  be  verified  by  an 
investigation  by  an  accredited  correspondent,  and  when  thus 
verified  might  be  published.  In  this  case  it  was  held  that  the 
existence  of  such  a  rule  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  free  the  pub- 
lisher from  liability,  but  that  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury 
whether  such  a  rule  showed  a  reckless  indifference  to  the  rights 
of  others,  and  that  if  they  found  it  did  so  show,  exemplary  dam- 
ages might  be  awarded,  and  a  verdict  for  plaintiff  was  sustained, 
the  court  declaring  that  the  jury  probably  found  the  rule  inade- 
quate to  meet  the  imperative  demands  of  prudence  and  caution 
which  investigation  demands.  And  it  was  also  said  that  if  such 
a  rule  could  protect  an  absent  publisher  from  the  recovery  of 
exemplary  damages  in  an  action  for  libel,  the  principle  of  law 
which  permits  of  the  recovery  of  such  damages  in  cases  of  careless 
or  reckless  indifference  to  injury  to  others,  could  be  easily 
evaded.*  In  this  case  it  was  also  held  that  the  testimony  of 
the  city  editor  of  the  paper  as  to  his  belief  in  the  thoroughness  of 
an  investigation  made  by  an  accredited  correspondent  to  whom 
the  article  in  question  was  referred,  was  properly  stricken  out  as 
the  o-ood  faith  or  malice  of  the  city  editor  was  not  in  issue  and  the 
question  of  punitive  damages  turned  entirely  on  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant/* 

§  422.  Evidence  as  to  bad  character  and  reputation  of 
plaintiff. — In  an  action  for  libel  and  slander,  evidence  is  not 
only  admissible  as  to  the  bad  character  of  the  plaintiff  in  the 


33  Morgan  v.  Bennett,  44  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  323;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  619;  Mc- 
Mahon  v.  Bennett,  31  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  16;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  390. 

84  Morgan  v.  Bennett,  44  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  323;  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  619;  Mc- 
Mahon  v.    Bennett,  31  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  16;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  390. 
484 


^Bennett  v.  Salisbury  (C.C  App. 
2dC),  78  Fed.  769;  45  U.  S.  App. 
636. 

se  Bennett  v.  Salisbury  (C.  C.  App. 
2d  C. ),  78  Fed.  769;  24  C.  C.  A.  329- 
45  U.  S.  App.  636. 


LIBEL    ANH    SLANDER. 


5  122 


trait  involved  in  the  alleged  slanderous  or  libelous  statements,*1 
hut  ;ilso  as  a  general  rule  evidence  as  to  the  general  bad  char- 
acter of  the  plaintiff  is  in  most  jurisdictions  admissible,  as  in  the 
majority  of  the  cases  libelous  <>r  slanderous  statements  affect 
the  character  of  the  person  against  whom  they  are  directed,  and 
where  the  general  character  of  a  person  concerning  whom  such 
charges  are  made  is  had,  the  damages  awarded  him  should  not 
be  the  same  as  if  the  charges  were  made  concerning  a  person 
against  whose  character  no  improper  charges  had  ever  been 
made.88  And  under  the  general  issue  or  general  denial  evidence 
is  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages  as  to  the  general  bad 
character  of  the  plaintiff  in  tliose  cases  where  the  plaintiff  claims 
damages  for  a  libel  or  slander  which  contain  charges  involving 
his  character.*  So  where  a  newspaper  published  an  article  stat- 
ing of  a  certain  person  that  he  had  ''made  his  name  notorious 
and  hated,"  defendant  was  permitted  to  show  in  an  action  for 
libel,  the  general  reputation  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  community  in 
which  he  lived.1"     And  in  such  cases  the  evidence  need  not  be 


87 Treaty.  Browning,  4  C<mn.  40S: 
Fletcher  v.  Burroughs,  10  Iowa. 
557;  Clark  v.  Brown,  116  Mass.  504: 
Warner  v.  Lockerly,  31  Miun.  421; 
Sowers  v.  Sowers,  87  N.  C.  303;  De- 
witt  v.  Greenfield,  5  Ohio  st.  225; 
Drown  v.  Allen,  91  Pa.  St.  394;  Con- 
roe  v.  Conroe,  47  Pa.  St.  198;  Bridg- 
man  v.  Hopkins,  34  Yt.  5:12. 

*Broughton  v.  McGrew  (C.  C.  1). 
Ind.),  39  Fed.  072;  Pope  v.  Welsh,  18 
Ala.  681;  Adams  v.  Smith,  58  111. 
417;  Tracy  V.  Hackett,  19  Ind.  App. 
133;  49  N.  E.  185;  Armstrong  v. 
Pierson,  8  Iowa,  29;  Sickra  v.  Small. 
87  Me.  493;  33  All.  9;  47  Am.  St.  Rep. 
344;  Shilling  v.  Carson,  27  Bid.  175; 
Peterson  v.  Morgan,  ll(i  Mass.  350; 
Stone  v.  Varney,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  86; 
Thibault  v.  Sessions.  101  Mich.  279; 
59  X.  W.  024;  Nelson  v.  Wallace.  57 
Mo.  App.  397:  Lamor  v.  Snell,  6  N. 
H.  413;  Sayre  v.  Sayre,  25  N.  J.  L. 
235:  Remsen  v.  Bryant,  47  App.  Div. 
(N.    Y.)  503;    62  N.     Y.   Supp.   434; 


Bernstein  v.  Singer,  1  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  63;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  1093;  72  \.  V. 
St.  R.  41;  Carpenter  v.  Matt.  00  Hun 
i  X.  Y.  I.  632;  50  X.  Y.  St.  R.  201 :  Foot 
v.  Tracy,  1  Johns.  (X.  Y. )  46;  May- 
nard  v.  Beardsley,  7  Wend.  (X.  V.i 
500;  Bnddock  v.  Salisbury.  2  Cow. 
(X.  Y.)  811;  Buford  v.  McLuny,  1 
Xott.  &  M.  (S.  C.)  268;  Campbell  v. 
Campbell,  54  Wis.  90. 

89 Commons  v.  Walters,  1  Port. 
(Ala.)  323:  Tracy  v.  Hackett.  19  Ind. 
App.  133;  49  X.  E.  185:  Stone  v. 
Varney,  7  Mete  i  Mass.  i  86;  Thibault 
v.  Sessions,  101  Mich.  279;  59  V  W. 
624;  Holmes  v.  Jones,  147  N.  Y.  59;  69 
\.  Y.  St.  R.310;  41  X.  F.409:  Boot  v. 
King,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.i  613;  Buford  v. 
McLuny,  1  Xott.  &  M.  (S.  C.l  268. 
See  Melton  v.  State,  :'■  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  389;  Can. Irian  v.  Miller,  98 
Wis.  164;  7:;  V  W.  1004. 

40  Remsen  v.  Bryant,  47  A ]>j>.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  503;  62  X.  Y.  Supp.  434. 

485 


§  4-J-")  LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 

restricted  to  the  particular  charges  contained  in  the  alleged  libel 
or  slander,  but  evidence  of  the  general  reputation  of  the  plaintiff 
either  as  a  man  of  moral  worth  or  in  the  particular  relation  is 
admissible.41  As  bearing  upon  the  actual  damages  recoverable, 
evidence  is  admissible  of  the  reputation  and  character  of  the 
plaintiff  prior  to  the  time  when  the  alleged  libel  or  slander  was 
published.42  So  the  plaintiff  in  such  an  action  may  be  cross- 
examined  as  to  his  reputation  and  character  prior  to  the  time 
when  the  alleged  libel  or  slander  was  published,  as  tending  to 
show  his  credibility  as  a  witness.*3  And  again  in  an  action  to 
recover  for  the  publication  of  a  charge  that  plaintiff  kept  a  dis- 
orderly house,  the  defendant  may  show  not  only  the  general 
reputation  of  inmates  and  frequenters  of  such  house,  but  evi- 
dence is  also  admissible  of  specific  acts  of  lewdness  and  immo- 
rality on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff.44  So  also  in  an  action  for  libel 
for  publishing  a  statement  of  the  plaintiff  that  he  had  "  run  "  the 
only  house  of  prostitution  in  the  place,  the  defendant  ma}r  show 
in  mitigation  of  damages  that  the  plaintiff  became  a  surety  on 
the  bond  of  the  inmates  of  such  house,  and  also  on  the  bond  of 
the  proprietress,  whom  the  evidence  tends  to  prove  was  his  kept 
mistress.*5  And  in  a  similar  action  for  the  publication  of  a  state- 
ment that  the  plaintiff  had  been  indicted  several  times  for  main- 
taining a  gambling  house,  evidence  is  admissible  showing  that 
the  plaintiff  is  a  gambler  and  permits  gambling  in  a  house  owned 
and  controlled  by  him.46 

§  423.  Evidence  as  to  bad  character  and  reputation  of 
plaintiff — Continued. — In  those  cases  where  the  action  is  to 
recover  for  an  attack  made  upon  the  chastity  of  a  female  plain- 
tiff, the  jury  may  properly  consider  in  mitigation  of  damages 
the  fact  that  her  reputation  in  this  respect  was  bad  prior  to  the 
statements  made  in  reference  thereto  by  the  defendant,  since  a 

«Sickra  v.   Small,  87  Me.  493;  33    (N.  Y.)  63;  72  N.  Y.  St.  R.  41;  36  N. 


Atl.  9;  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  344.  See  also 
cases  cited  in  first  two  notes  in  this 
section. 

^Bernstein  v.  Singer,  1  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  63;  72  N.  Y.'  St.  R.  41;  36  X. 
Y.  Supp.  1093. 

43  Bernstein  v.  Singer,  1  App.   Div. 

486 


Y.  Supp.  1093. 

"Lampher  v.  Clark,  149  N.  Y.  472; 
44  N.  E.  182. 

45Coogler  v.  Rhodes,  38  Fla.  240; 
21  So.  109;  2  Chic.   L.  J.  Wkly.  127. 

46  George  Kuapp  &  Co.  v.  Campbell, 
14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  199;  36  S.  W.  765. 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


i  123 


woman  whose  reputation  for  chastity  is  bad  cannot  suffer  the 
same  damages  fur  statements  reflecting  upon  her  chastity  as  a 
woman  of  good  reputation  would,  and  a  refusal  by  the  court  to 
so  instruct  the  jury  is  error."  So  where  an  action  is  brought  for 
calling  a  married  woman  a  whore,  the  defendant  may  show  thai 
she  has  been  guilty  of  acts  of  adultery,  both  before  and  subse- 
quent to  the  time  of  speaking  of  her  in  such  terms.1  So.  also. 
in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  publication  of  a  state- 
ment which  charged  the  plaintiff  with  political  perjury  and 
which  declared  that  lie  would  lie  to  defend  himself  against  such 
charges,  the  defendant  may  prove  the  general  reputation  of  the 
plaintiff  for  truth  and  veracity,  and  that  his  word  in  political 
matters  was  generally  regarded  by  the  community  as  unworthy 
of  belief.49  And  again,  in  an  action  for  libel,  the  defendant  may 
show  that  the  plaintiff  is  by  general  reputation  a  common  li- 
beler.50  While  as  a  general  rule  the  defendant  may,  in  mitigation 
of  damages,  prove  the  general  had  character  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
may  in  certain  cases  give  specific  instances  of  immorality  on  the 
plaintiff's  part,  yet  the  defendant  cannot  show  in  mitigation  of 
damages  for  a  specific  libel  other  and  disconnected  immoralities 
on  the  plaintiff's  part.51  So  evidence  is  not  admissible  that  the 
plaintiff  has  been  guilty  of  a  specific  crime  which  is  in  no  way 
connected  with  the  defamatory  words.5-  And  in  an  action  for 
slander  for  charging  the  plaintiff  with  drunkenness,  where  the 
answer  contains  a  plea  of  justification,  evidence  of  acts  of  drunk- 
enness which  did  not  occur  within  the  period  covered  by  the 
plea  are  not  admissible  in  support  thereof.53  So  in  an  action 
for  slander  for  charging  the  plaintiff  with  robbing  the  defend- 


"Nellisv.  Cramer,  86  Wis.  337;  56 
N.  W.  911.  In  this  case  an  error  in 
refusing  to  so  instinct  was  held  cot 
to  be  cured  by  an  instruction  that 
■  the  jury  should  consider  the  general 
reputation  of  the  plaintiff  tor  chas- 
tity, her  social  standing  among  her 
friends  and  acquaintances  and  the 
public  generally,  and  the  mental 
suffering  she  experienced  as  a  result 
of  the  publication  of  the  article  in 
question.  See  Smith  v.  Matthews,  21 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  150;  47  X.  Y.  Supp.  96. 


48  Claypool  v.  Claypool,  65  111. 
A  pp.  446. 

43Sanford  v.  Rowley,  93  Mich.  119; 
52  X.  W.  lllli. 

Mavnaid  v.  Beardsley,  7  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  560.  But  see  Gould  v. 
Weed,  12  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  12. 

i  Holmes  v.  Jones.  147  X.  V.  59; 
69  V.  V.  St.  K.  310;  -11  N.  E,  409. 

69  Fisher  v.  The,  ■_'(>  Iowa.  47'.'.  See 
Fisher  v.  Patterson.  14  Ohio,  418. 

63S\van  v.  Thompson,  124  Cal.  193; 
56  Pac.  878. 

487 


§  424 


LIREL    AND    SLANDER. 


ant  evidence  is  not  admissible  under  a  general  denial  that  the 
plaintiff  had  misappropriated  certain  money.51  And  where  the 
defendant  in  his  answer  has  pleaded  the  truth  of  the  charge  that 
the  plaintiff  was  a  liar,  he  cannot  testify  in  support  of  such  plea 
that  he  conversed  with  certain  neighbors  of  the  plaintiff,  and  that 
he  was  in  formed  by  them  that  plaintiff's  reputation  was  bad..55  So, 
also,  if  the  defendant  has  certain  evidence  of  plaintiff,  excluded 
on  the  ground  that  no  attack  was  made  by  him  upon  the  social 
standing  or  the  character  of  the  plaintiff,  he  is  thereby  estopped 
from  subsequently  introducing  any  evidence  as  to  the  social 
position,  standing  or  character  of  the  plaintiff,  for  the  purpose 
of  mitigating  the  damages.56 


§  424.  Allegation  of  two  libelous  charges— Only  one  sub- 
mitted to  jury— Proof  of  other  charge  in  mitigation — Where 
an  action  is  brought  to  recover  for  the  alleged  libelous  publica- 
tion of  two  charges  which  relate  to  the  same  transaction  and 
subject-matter,  and  are  not  disconnected  and  independent,  and 
the  plaintiff,  though  he  alleges  both  charges  in  his  complaint, 
only  submits  one  of  them  to  the  jury,  and  the  other  charge  was 
justified  in  the  answer,  the  defendant  may,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, give  evidence  in  substantiation  of  such  other  charge 
which  may  go  in  mitigation  of  damages  on  the  charge  submitted 
to  the  jury.57 


64  Clarke  v.  Fox,  10  App.  Div.  514; 
41  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091. 

«  Mitchell  v.  Spradley,  23  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  43;  56  S.  W.  134. 

66  Smith  v.  Sun  Pub.  Co.  (C.  C.  S. 
D.  N.  Y.),  50  Fed.  399. 

57  Holmes  v.  Jones,  147  N".  Y.  59; 
69  N.  Y.  St.  R.  310;  41  N.  E.  409.  In 
this  case  it  appeared  that  the  plain- 
tiff, who  had  rendered  services  as  an 
undertaker,  in  connection  with  the 
death  of  General  Grant,  had,  by  a 
letter  to  a  newspaper,  provoked  a 
public  discussion  as  to  the  non- 
payment of  his  bill  by  General 
Grant's  family,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant newspaper,  in  the  present  action, 
had  published  an  article  in  reference 

488 


thereto,  stating  that  the  bill  was  ex- 
tortionate, and  that  the  defendant 
was  intoxicated  at  the  time  the  ser- 
vices were  rendered.  The  charge  of 
extortion  w;is  justified  on  the  first 
trial.  On  the  second  trial,  though 
alleging  both  charges  in  his  com- 
plaint, only  submitted  the  charge  as 
to  intoxication  to  the  jury.  Evi- 
dence by  the  defendant  showing  that 
the  charge  of  extortion  was  offered 
for  the  purpose  of  mitigating  dam- 
ages on  the  charge  of  intoxication, 
but  was  excluded.  On  appeal,  the 
exclusion  of  this  evidence  was  held 
to  be  error.  The  court  said:  "The 
two  charges  were  made  in  respect  to 
the  same  subject-matter.     They  re- 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


§  125 


§  425.  Evidence  in  behalf  of  plaintiff  as  to  his  social  por- 
tion—Renntal  ion     Financial  condition. --  In  an  action  for  slan- 
der or  libel,  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  position  in  Hi 
the  plaintiff  and  his  social  standing  as  bearing  on  the  extent  of 

his  injury.*  But  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  introduce-  evi- 
dence of  his  character  or  reputation,  where  it  is  not  a  material 
issue  or  has  not  been  attached,  since  it  is  unnecessary  to  prove 
that  which  the  law  assumes,  and  the  character  of  the  plaintiff  in 
such  a  case  is  not  a  basis  for  the  recovery  of  general  damages.  ' 
If,  however,  the  libelous  or  slanderous  charge  directly  affects 
the  character  of  the  person,  as  in  the  case  of  a  charge  against 
his  integrity,  and  evidence  has  been  offered  to  sustain  such 
charge,  he  may  show  his  general  reputation  and  character  fol- 


iated to  the  same  transaction,  and 
the  plaintiff  makes  no  denial  of  the 
main  matter  in  which  the  calumny 
originated,  namely,  the  extortionate 
and  unjust  bill,  but  does  deny  the 
truth  of  one  of  the  incidents  of  his 
conduct  alleged  in  the  article.  He 
comes  claiming  damages  for  injury 
to  his  character.  It  is  well  settled 
that  defendant  cannot  show  in  miti- 
gation of  damages  for  a  specific  libel, 
other  and  disconnected  immorali- 
ties, but  can  attack  only  the  plain- 
tiff's general  character.  But  the 
charges  in  the  article  were  not  dis- 
connected and  independent  in  any 
proper  sense,  and  we  think  it  plain 
in  reason  that  the  plaintiff  ought  not 
in  justice  to  recover  punitive  dam- 
ages for  a  misstatement  in  the  arti- 
cle as  to  his  intoxication,  if  it  ap- 
peared that  his  conduct  in  other 
matters  in  the  transaction  to  which 
the  charge  related  had  been  repre- 
hensible, and  when  he  himself  had 
provoked  public  discussion.  The 
conduct  of  both  parties  in  the  whole 
matter  should  have  been  permitted 
to  be  shown  so  as  to  aid  the  jury  in 
determining  the  extent  of  the  dam- 


ages to  be  awarded."  Per  Andrews, 
Ch.  J. 

68  Klumph  v.  Dunn,  8G  Pa.  St.  141; 
5  Am.  Rep.  355.  See  also  Hosley  v. 
Brooks,  20  111.  115;  Wilson  v.  Shepler, 
S6  Ind.  275;  Larned  v.  Buffington,  3 
Mass.  54G;  Clements  v.  Maloney,  55 
Mo.  352;  Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune 
Pub.  Co.,  13  Utah,  532;  35  L.  R.  A. 
611;45Pac.  1097;  Harman  v.  Cundiff, 
S2  Va.  239.  In  Bnos  v.  Enos,  135  N. 
Y.  609;  48  N.  Y  St.  R.  392;  32  N.  E. 
123,  which  was  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  a  slanderous  statement 
imputing  unchastity  to  a  female, 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  had  :i 
family  of  young  children  was  de- 
clared  admissible  on  the  question  of 
damages.  But  see  Prescott  v. 
Toncey,  18  J.  &  S.  i  X.  Y.)  1. 

i9  Stafford  v.  Morning  Journal 
Assoc,  142  X.  V.  598;  37  N.  E.  625; 
60  X.  Y.  St.  R.  309;  Houghtaling  v. 
Kilderhouse.  1  X.  V.  530,  aff'd  2  Barb. 
149;  Blakeslee  v.  Hughes,  50 Ohio  St. 
490;  31  X.  E.  793;  30  Ohio  L.  J.  248: 
Chubb  v.  Grell,  34  Pa.  St.  115.  But 
see  Bennett  v.  Hyde,  6  Conn.  24; 
Nettles  v.  Somervell,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
627:  25  S.  W.  058. 

489 


§  426 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER. 


integrity."0  So  where  a  person  is  charged  with  stealing,  and 
under  a  plea  of  justification  defendant  has  attempted  to  show 
that  his  general  reputation  as  a  law-abiding  citizen  is  bad,  he 
may  introduce  evidence  showing  that  his  general  reputation  for 
honesty  and  integrity  is  good.61  And  where  a  slanderous  state- 
ment had  been  made  imputing  unchastity  to  a  woman,  and  in  an 
action  therefor  evidence  had  been  introduced  tending  to  show 
that  she  had  intercourse  with  her  husband  before  marriage,  that 
she  made  an  indecent  exposure  of  her  person,  and  that  she  other- 
wise conducted  herself  in  a  licentious  manner,  she  was  permitted 
to  show  that  her  general  reputation  for  chastity  was  good.63  And 
if  the  plaintiff  in  such  an  action  alleges  that  his  character  and 
reputation  are  good,  and  the  defendant  puts  such  allegation  in 
issue  by  his  answer,  the  plaintiff  will  thus  be  permitted  to  intro- 
duce evidence  to  sustain  his  allegations.613  While  evidence  is 
generally  held  to  be  admissible  as  to  the  wealth  of  the  defend- 
ant, yet  on  the  other  hand  evidence  is  not  admissible  as  to  the 
pecuniary  condition  of  the  plaintiff,  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing 
the  damages,64  although  it  is  declared  that  it  may  be  admis- 
sible to  show  actual  damage.65 

§  426.  Evidence  to  show  sense  in  which  words  were 
spoken — To  whom  applicable. — -In  an  action  for  slander  to 
recover  for  words  not  actionable  per  se  and  which  were  per- 
haps ambiguous,  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  understanding 
of  hearers  or  bystanders  as  to  the  sense  in  which  they  under- 
stood such  words  to  be  used.66  If,  however,  the  language  used 
is  plain  and  direct  such  evidence  is  not  admissible.67     Again,  in 


60  Post  Pub.  Co.  v.  Hallam  (C.  C. 
App.  6th  C),  59  Fed.  530;  8  C.  C.  A. 
201. 

61  Balcom  v.  Michels,  49  111.  App. 
379. 

62  Sheeny  v.  Cokley,  43  Iowa,  183; 
22  Am.  Rep.  239. 

63  Stafford  v.  Morning  Journal 
Assoc.,  142  N.  Y.  598;  37  N.  E.  625; 
60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  309. 

64  Reeves  v.  Winn,  97  N.  C.  246;  1 
S.  E.  448;  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  287.  See 
also  Case  v.  Marks,  20  Conn.  248. 

490 


65  Reeves  v.  Winn,  97  N.  C.  246;  1 
S.  E.  448;  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  287. 

66  Nolte  v.  Herter,  65  111.  App.  430; 
Lewis  v.  Humphreys,  64  Mo.  App. 
466;  2  Mo.  App.  Rep.  1011;  Knapp 
v.  Fuller,  55  Yt.  311;  45  Am.  Rep. 
618.  See  Fawsett  v.  Clark,  48  Md. 
494;  30  Am.  Rep.  481. 

67  Jarnigan  v.  Fleming,  43  Miss. 
710;  5  Am.  Rep.  514.  See  Beardsley 
v.  Maynard,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)336; 
Gould  v.  Weed,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
12. 


LIBEL    AMi    SLANDER.  §  427 

an  action  for  libel,  though  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  may  not  be 
mentioned  in  the  article  complained  of,  lie  may  show  by  wit- 
nesses who  were  familiar  with  the  relations  existing  between 
the  parties,  both  immediately  prior  to  and  at  the  time  of  the 
publication,  that  when  they  read  the  publication  they  understood 
the  plaintiff  to  be  the  person  referred  to  therein.1''  But  the  de- 
fendant in  an  action  for  slander  should  not  be  allowed  to  state 
what  the  party  to  whom  the  slander  is  alleged  to  be  uttered, 
understood  by  his  statements  to  him,  though  he  may  testify  that 
lie  told  such  party  the  source  of  his  information  and  what  it 
was.'"  In  an  action  to  recover  for  a  publication  libelous  per  se, 
the  plaintiff  may,  by  extrinsic  evidence,  show  that  the  libelous 
words  were  published  concerning  him.  So  in  an  action  1>\  a 
lawyer  to  recover  for  such  a  publication  he  may,  by  such  evi- 
dence, connect  the  libelous  words  with  his  professional  character, 
and  where  such  connection  is  shown,  the  natural  and  proximate 
damages  resulting  to  him  in  his  profession  may  be  recovered.'" 
And  in  such  an  action  a  witness  may  be  permitted  to  testify  as 
to  whom  he  understood  the  alleged  libelous  publication  applied.71 

§  427.  Actions  against  mercantile  agencies. — Where  in- 
formation is  furnished  by  a  mercantile  agency  to  a  subscriber  in 
response  to  an  inquiry  by  him,  and  such  information  is  given  in 
good  faith,  on  the  authority  of  one  apparently  well  qualified  to 
give  it,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  its  correctness,  the  fact 
that  such  information  is  false  will  not  render  the  agency  liable 
for  damages  in  an  action  for  libel.72  But  if  false  and  unfounded 
communications  are  negligently  circulated  by  a  commercial 
agency  concerning  the  business  standing  of  a  certain  person,  as 
a  natural  result  of  which  the  latter  sustains  special  damage, 
such  agency  will  be  liable  therefor  though  it  acted  innocently 


68  Russell  v.  Kelly,  44  Cal.  641; 
13  Am.  Rep.  169. 

«»Scullin  v.  Harper  (C.  C.  App. 
7th  ('.),  78  Fed.  460;  4(5  U.  S.  App. 
673;  24  C.  C.  A.  169. 

""  Sanderson  v.  Caldwell,  45  N.  V. 
398:  6  Am.  Rep.  105. 

71  Enquirer  Co.  v.  Johnston  (C.  C. 
App.  7th  ('.).  72  Fed.  443;  18  C.  C.  A. 
628;  34  U.  S.  App.  607. 


72  Robinson  v.  Dun,  24  Ont.  Rep. 
287.  See  Ormsby  v.  Douglass,  31  -V 
Y.  177:  Bradatreet  Co.  v.  Gill,  72 
Tex.  115;  2  L.  R.  A.  405.  As  to 
privilege  of  mercantile  agencies,  see 
notes  2  L.  R.  A.  405;  9  L.  R.  A.  86, 
103;  20  L.  R.  A.  138;  49  L.  R.  A. 
614. 


•491 


§  428  LIBEL   AND    SLANDER. 

and  no  malice  existed.'''  And  where  a  mercantile  agency  vol- 
untarily sends  out  a  false  statement  to  all  its  customers  whether 
creditors  of  a  certain  firm  or  not,  that  such  firm  has  assigned 
and  refuses  to  retract  such  statement  upon  request,  the  state- 
ment will  not  be  considered  a  privileged  one,  and  the  agency 
will  be  liable  for  the  damages  sustained  as  a  natural  result 
thereof.74  Though  the  person  concerning  whom  an  erroneous 
report  has  been  made  by  a  mercantile  agency  stating  that  an 
action  has  been  commenced  against  him  may  be  negligent  in 
not  taking  reasonable  steps  to  have  the  error  corrected,  yet  such 
negligence  will  not  prevent  the  recovery  by  him  of  such  dam- 
ages as  he  sustained  as  the  result  of  the  false  publication  prior 
to  his  own  negligence.75  But  the  publication  by  a  mercantile 
agency  that  an  action  has  been  commenced  against  a  certain 
person  though  it  may  be  false  is  not  actionable  per  se,  and  in 
order  to  support  an  action  for  libel  thereon  special  damages 
must  be  shown  76 

§  428.  Slander  of  title. — In  an  action  for  slander  of  title,  the 
plaintiff  must  show  both  the  falsity  of  the  words  and  that  they 
were  uttered  with  malicious  intent.77  Malice  may,  however,  in 
some  cases  be  inferred,  as  where  the  language  used  by  the  de- 
fendant was  known  by  him  to  be  false  and  was  uttered  with  in- 
tent to  injure.78  In  such  an  action  only  such  damages  as  are  the 
natural  and  direct  results  of  the  words  used  can  be  recovered.7* 
And  where  special  damages  are  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  they  must 
be  alleged  in  the  complaint,  and  the  proof  confined  to  the  losses 
alleged  therein.  So  where  the  plaintiff  alleges  special  damages 
from  the  loss  of  sale  of  property,  as  the  result  of  false  and  ma- 


73  Bradstreet  Co.  v.  Oswald,  96 
Ga.  39G ;  23  S.  E.  423.  See  Brown 
v.  Durham  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22  S. 
W.  868. 

74  Mitchell  v.  Bradstreet  Co.,  116 
Mo.  244;  20  L.  R.  A.  138;  22  S.  W. 
358. 

75  Giacona  v.  Bradstreet  Co.,  48 
La.  Ann.  1191;  20  So.  706. 

76  Giacona  v.  Bradstreet  Co.,  48 
La.  Ann.  1191;  20  So.  706. 

77  Hill  v.  Ward,  13  Ala.  310;  Mc-  \  N.  Y.  14 

492 


Daniel  v.  Baca,  2  Cal.  329;  Graham 
v.Reno  (Colo.  App.),  38  Pac.  835; 
May  v.  Anderson,  14  Ind.  App.  251; 
42  N.  E.  946;  Cardon  v.  McConnell, 
120  N.  C.  461;  27  S.  E.  109;  Pater  v. 
Baker,  3  C.  B.  869. 

78  Hopkins  v.  Drowne,  21  R.  I. 
(parti)  82;  41  Atl.  567. 

™  Burkett  v.  Griffith,  90  Cal.  532; 
13  L.  R.  A.  707;  27  Pac.  527;  25  Am. 
St.  Rep.  151.    See  Kendall  v.  Stone,  5 


LIBEL    AND    SLANDER.  §  42^ 

licious  statements  concerning  such  property  published  by  the 
defendant,  evidence  is  not  admissible  of  the  value  of  such  prop- 
erty for  exhibition  or  as  a  scientific  curiosity.* 

sooott  v.  Pulsifer,  122  Mass.  235;  2o  Am.  Kep.  322. 

493 


§429 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


MALICIOUS   PROSECUTION. 


§  429.  Malicious    prosecution — Gen- 
erally. 

430.  Malice  and  want  of  probable 

cause  must  both  exist. 

431.  Malice — Wbat  amounts    to — 

May  be  inferred. 

432.  Probable  cause — Wbat  is. 

433.  Conviction  in  criminal  prose- 

cution— Evidence  of  proba- 
ble cause. 

434.  Probable    cause — Burden    of 

proof — Evidence. 

435.  Acquittal   in  criminal  prose- 

cution— Evidence    of   want 
of  probable  cause. 

436.  Measure  of  damages — Gener- 

ally. 

437.  Measure  of  damages — Gener- 

ally—Continued. 


438.  Mental  suffering. 

439.  Evidence     in     mitigation    of 

damages. 

440.  Advice  of  attorney. 

441.  Advice  of  prosecuting  attor- 

ney, magistrate,  etc. 

442.  Exemplary  damages. 

443.  Wealtb     of     defendant— Evi- 

dence— Generally. 

444.  Malicious  prosecution  of  civil 

suit — Attachment. 

445.  Malicious  attachment— Where 

business    unlawful    no   re- 
covery for  injury  to. 

446.  Maliciously     causing    person 

to  lose  employment. 

447.  Pleading. 


§  429.  Malicious  prosecution — Generally. — Malicious  pros- 
ecution is  the  setting  in  motion  of  the  machinery  of  the  law 
against  a  person,  without  probable  cause  and  with  malice.  The 
nature  of  the  action  is  closely  allied  to  that  for  false  imprison- 
ment, since  arrest  and  false  imprisonment  is  frequently  a  result 
of  malicious  prosecution,  but  malicious  prosecution  does  not 
always  include  false  imprisonment.  The  elements  of  damage 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  are  declared  in  an  early 
case l  to  be  as  follows :  1 .  Damages  to  a  man's  fame,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  scandalous  accusation.  2.  Injuries  to  a  person  such  as 
danger  of  losing  life,  limb  or  liberty.  3.  Damages  to  a  man's 
property  as  where  he  is  accused  of  crime  and  is  obliged  to  expend 
monev  in  order  to  acquit  himself.  This  classification  has  gen- 
erally been  accepted  as  the  basis  for  the  award  of  damages  in 
an  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  and  the  various  items  which 


1  Saville  v.  Roberts,  1  Ld.    Raym.  374. 


494 


MALICIOUS    PR(  'Si. i  i    l  [ON. 


§  430 


the  jury  may  properly  consider  in  estimating  the  damages  recov- 
erable are  included  therein. 


§430.  Malice  and  want  of  probable  cause  must  both  exist. 

— In  an  action  to  recover  for  a  malicious  prosecution,  it  is  nec- 
essary in  order  to  maintain  the  action  that  both  malice  and  want 
of  probable  cause  exist. J  So  a  mere  arrest,  though  without  legal 
authority,  Is  not  a  sufficient  ground  to  support  such  an  a 
in  the  absence  of  want  of  probable  cause  or  malice.1  Nor  in  the 
absence  of  such  elements  is  the  bringing  of  a  multiplicity  of 
suits  sufficient  to  authorize  the  recovery  of  damages.1  So  one 
who  in  good  faith  procures  the  arrest  of  another  is  not  liable  to 
damages  for  malicious  prosecution/'  But  where  a  person  exe- 
cutes a  dispossess  warrant  against  another  who  has  entered  as 
the  tenant  of  a  prior  owner,  and  both  malice  and  want  of  prob- 
able cause  exist,  he  is  responsible  for  the  damages  caused  by 
such  act.'1     Since  it  is  essential  to  the  support  of  an  action  that 


2  Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Co.  v. 
Butchers  Union,  etc.,  Co.,  120  I'.  S. 
141;  1  Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus 
Dig.  U.  S.  Rep.  1001;  .Jones  v.  Jones, 
71  Cal.  89;  11  Pac.  817;  Spitzer  v. 
Friedlander,  14  App.  D.  C.  550;  Sea- 
mans  v.  Hoge,  105  Ga.  159;  31  S.  E. 
156;  Smith  v.  Michigan  Buggy  Co., 
66  111.  App.  516;   Wright  v.   Ilayter. 

5  Kan.  App.  638;  47  Pac.  540:  An- 
derson v.  Columbia  Finance  &  T.  Co., 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  790;  50  S.  W.  740; 
Moore  v.  Large,  20  Ky.  Law  Rep.  409; 
46  S.  W.  508;  McCorniick  v.  Con- 
way, 12  La.  Ann.  53;  McXulty  v. 
Walker,  64  Miss.  19S;  1  So.  55;  Tal- 
bott  v.  Great  Western  Plaster  Co., 
86  Mo.  App.  558;  Strieker  v.  Penn. 
K.  R.  Co.,  60  X.  J.  L.  230;  37  Atl. 
776:  7  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  (as.  N.  S. 
758;  McGowan  v.  McGowan,  122  N. 
C.  145;  29  S.  E.  97:  Kolka  v.  Jones, 

6  N.  D.  401;   71   \.   W.  558;   Schon 
dorf  v.  Griffith,    13   Pa.    Super.    Ct. 
580;  Auer   v.  Mauser.   6    l'a.  Super. 
Ct.     61S;    42     Wkly.     V    &     C.     40; 
Fry     v.     Wolf,     8     Pa.    Super.     Ct. 


468:  43  Wkly.  N.  &  C.  124;  29 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  200;  Rutfner  v. 
Hooks,  2  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  278;  38 
Wkly.  N.  C.  516;  27  Pitts.  L.  J. 
N.  S.  86:  Baker  v.  Hornik,  57  S.  C. 
213;  35  N.  E.  524;  Graham  v.  Fi- 
delity Mut.  L.  Asso.,  98  Tenn.  48; 
37  S.  W.  995;  Tavenner  v.  More- 
head,  41  W.  Va.  116;  23  S.  E.  673. 
See  Magowan  v.  Rickey  ( N.  J.),  45 
Atl.  804.  In  an  action  to  recover 
for  the  malicious  prosecution  of  a 
civil  suit,  it  has  been  held  that  such 
action  will  lie  though  such  suit,  was 
prosecuted  without  probable  cause, 
but  it  is  also  declared  that  such 
suits  are  not  encouraged.  Clements 
\.  Odorless  Excavating  Co.,  07  Md. 
461;  10  Atl.  412;  8  Cent.  900. 

3  Tavenner    v.     Morehead.    41    W. 
Ya.  110;  23  S.  E.  673. 

4  Otis   v.    Sweeney,    48     La.    Ann. 
940:  20  So.  229. 

Crimes    v.    Miller,    23  Ont.   App. 
704. 

■  Porter  v.  Johnson,  99  Ga.  275;  25 
S.  E.  631. 

495 


§431 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


both  malice  and  want  of  probable  cause  must  exist,  the  burden 
of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  in  this  class  of  cases  to  establish 
the  existence  of  such  elements.'  So  in  an  action  to  recover  for 
the  malicious  suing  out  of  a  writ  of  attachment,  the  existence  of 
malice  and  want  of  probable  cause  must  be  affirmatively  shown 
by  the  plaintiff.8  But  in  an  action  to  recover  for  malicious 
prosecution,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  defendant  acted 
maliciously  and  without  probable  cause,  both  in  the  commence- 
ment and  continuance  of  the  prosecution,  but  the  existence  of  such 
elements  either  in  the  commencement  or  the  continuance  of  the 
action  is  sufficient.9  In  the  absence,  however,  of  evidence  show- 
ing malice,  though  want  of  probable  cause  may  be  proved,  a 
verdict  may  properly  be  directed  for  the  defendant.10 


§431.  Malice  —  What  amounts  to — May  be  inferred. — 

Where  a  person  seeks  to  recover  for  malicious  prosecution  the 
malice  which  is  necessary  to  support  the  action  is  declared  to 
mean  the  evil  mind,  which  is  regardless  of  social  duty  and  the 
rights  of  others.11  Malice  of  this  character  may  be  inferred  by 
the  jury  from  want  of  probable  cause,  though  such  inference  does 
not  necessarily  arise  therefrom.12  And  the  inference  of  malice 
arising  from  want  of  probable  cause  is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury  to 


7  Scheldrup  v.  Farwell  Co.,  67  111. 
App.  630;  Taylor  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 
S.  W.  K.  Co.,  18  Ind.  App.  692;  48 
N.  E.  1044:  Wright  v.  Hayter,  5 
Kan.  App.  638;  47  Pac.  546;  Ander- 
son v.  Columbia  Finance  &  T.  Co., 
20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1790;  50  S.  .W.  40; 
Warren  v.  Dennett,  17  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
86;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  830;  Hilbrant 
v.  Donaldson,  69  Mo.  App.  92. 

8  Anderson  v.  Columbia  Finance  & 
T.  Co.,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1790;  50  S.  W. 
40. 

9  Hilbrant  v.  Donaldson,  69  Mo. 
App.  92. 

10Hatjie  v.  Hare,  68  Vt.  247;  35 
Atl.  54. 

11  Graham  v.  Fidelity  Mut.  L. 
Assoc,  98  Tenn.  48;  37  S.  W.  995. 
See  Noble  v.  White,,  103  Iowa,  352; 
72  N.  W.  556. 

496 


12  Foster  v.  Pitts,  63  Ark.  387;  38 
S.  W.  1114;  Harpham  v.  Whitney,  77 
111.  32;  Paddock  v.  Watts,  116  Ind. 
146;  Parker  v.  Parker,  102  Iowa,  500; 
71  N.  W.  421;  Markly  v.  Kirby,  6 
Kan.  App.  494;  50  Pac.  953;  Wright 
v.  Hayter,  5  Kan.  App.  638;  47 
Pac.  546;  Anderson  v.  Columbia 
Finance  &  T.  Co.,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
1790;  50  S.  W.  40;  Decoux  v.  Lieux, 
33  La.  Ann.  392;  Straus  v.  Young,  36 
Md.  246;  Carson  v.  Edgworth,  43 
Mich.  241;  Limbeck  v.  Gerry,  15 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  663;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
95;  Kolka  v.  Jones,  6  N.  D.  461; 
71  N.  W.  558;  Fry  v.  Wolf,  8  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  4G8;  29  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
200;  43  W.  N.  C.  124;  Auer  v. 
Mauser,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  618;  42  W. 
N.  C.  40;  Richardson  v.  Dybedahl 
(S.    D.    1900),   84   N.    W.    486;    Gra- 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


|   t32 


determine  and  is  not  one  of  law."  Malice  may,  however,  in 
some  cases,  exist  as  a  matter  of  law.  So  where  the  defendant, 
after  the  dismissal  of  an  action  by  his  immediate  vendors  against 
the  plaintiff,  which  involved  the  hitter's  right  to  land  and  the 
timber  thereon,  caused  the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  on  the  charge 
of  feloneously  cutting  and  removing  timber  from  such  land,  it 
was  held  that  the  malice  essential  to  support  an  action  for  mali- 
cious prosecution  existed  as  a  matter  of  law."  Again,  malice 
may  exist  though  the  defendant  believe  the  charge  he  makes  to 
be  true,  and  a  failure  to  so  instruct  the  jury,  though  no  request 
for  such  instruction  is  made,  is  error.1 ' 


§  432.  Probable  cause— What  is. — Probable  cause,  in  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution  which  will  constitute  a  defense 
to  such  action,  is  such  a  state  of  facts  and  circumstances  as 
would  lead  an  ordinarily  prudent  and  cautious  man.  acting 
reasonably,  conscientiously  and  without  prejudice  upon  the  same 
facts  to  believe  that  the  person  accused  is  guilty."'     While  from 


ham  v.  Fidelity  Mut.  L.  Asso.,  98 
Tenn.  48;  37  S.  W.  993;  Jacobs  v. 
Crura,  62  Tex.  401;  San  Antonio  & 
A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  20  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  91 ;  48  S.  W.  542;  Viual  v.  Core, 
18  W.  Va.  1. 

w  Thompson  v.  Bell,  11  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1;  32  S.  W.  142.  See  cases  in 
preceding  note. 

m  Proctor  Coal  Co.  v.  Moses,  19 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  419;  40  S.  W.  681.  See 
Clement  v.  Major,  8  Colo.  App.  86; 
44  Pac.  776. 

15  Hawkins  v.  Snow,  28  N.  S.  259. 

16  Wheeler  v.  Nesbitt,  24  How.  (U. 
S.)  544:  Ilitson  v.  Sims  (Ark.  1901), 
64  S.  W.  219;  Clement  v.  Major,  8 
Colo.  App.  86;  It  Pac.  766;  Knicker- 
bocker Ice  Co.  v.  Scott.  7t;  111.  App. 
645;  Chic  Forge  &  B.  Co.  v.  Rose, 
69  111.  App.  123;  29  Chic.  Leg.  News, 
239;  2  Chic.  L.  .1.  Wkly.  207;  Ford 
v.  Buckley,  68  111.  App.  447;  Lacey 
v.  Mitchell,  23  lud.  67:  Moore  v. 
Large,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  409;  46  S.  W. 
508:  Decoux  v.  Lieux,  33  La.  Ann.  392; 

32 


Fitzgibbon  v.  Brown,  43  Me.  169; 
Wilson  v.  liowen,  64  Mich.  133;  Ellis 
v.  Simonds,  168  Mass.  316;  47  X.  E. 
116;  Smith  v.  .Munch,  65  Minn.  256; 
68  X.  W.  19;  Xoleu  v.  Kaufman,  70 
Mo.  App.  651;  Wist'  v.  McNichols,  63 
Mo.  App.  141;  Hagelund  v.  Murphy, 
54  Neb.  545;  74  X.  W.  956;  Fry  v. 
Kaessuer,  48  Neb.  133;  66  X.  W.  1126; 
Strieker  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  60  X.  J.  L. 
230;  37  Atl.  776;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  X.  S.  758;   Hodges  v.  Richards, 

30  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  158;  51  X.  Y. 
Supp.  869;  Carl  v.  Ayers,  53  X.  Y. 
17;  Root  \.  Rose,  6  N.  D.  575; 
72  X.  W.  10-2:  2  chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
664;  Milesv.  Salisbury.  21  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  R.  333;  12  C.  C.  D.  7;  Ash  v.  Mar- 
low,  20  Ohio  St.  119;  Hess  v.  Ore- 
gon German  Bkg.  Co.,  31  Oreg.  503; 
49  Pac.  803;  Ritter  v.  Ewing,  174 
Pa.  St.  341;  34  Atl.  584;  Graham 
v.  Fidelity  Mut.  L.  Assoc.  98  Tenn. 
18;  37  S.  W.   995;   Ban-on    v.  Mason, 

31  Vt.  197:  Billingsley  v.  Maas,  93 
Wis.  17C:  67  N.  W.  49;Spearv.  Riles, 

497 


§433 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


want  of  probable  cause  an  inference  of  malice  may  in  some  cases 
arise,  yet  want  of  probable  cause  cannot  be  implied  from  malice.17 

§  433.  Conviction  in  criminal  prosecution — Evidence  of 
probable  cause. — While  an  acquittal  is  prima  facie  evidence  of 
want  of  probable  cause,  a  conviction  on  the  other  hand  is  conclu- 
sive evidence  that  there  was  probable  cause  for  commencing  and 
continuing  the  prosecution  and  will  relieve  the  defendant  in  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution  from  liability  therefor.18  And 
this  is  declared  to  be  the  effect  of  evidence  showing  a  convic- 
tion in  the  criminal  action,  even  though  such  conviction  may  be 
reversed  on  writ  of  error.19  And  it  is  said  that  where  a  decision 
of  a  court  is  interposed  as  conclusive  evidence  of  probable  cause, 
no  inquiry  can  be  made  into  the  honesty  of  such  decision.20  But 
in  another  case  it  is  held  that  a  conviction  in  a  criminal  action 
raises  a  presumption  of  probable  cause  in  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution,  which  may  be  rebutted  by  proof  of  facts  depriving 
the  conviction  of  any  probative  effect.^1     Again,  an  indictment 


67  Wis.  330;  Hicks  v.  Faulkner, 
8  Q.  B.  Div.  167.  In  the  foregoing 
case,  facts  have  been  considered  as 
showing  probable  cause.  See  fol- 
lowing cases  where  on  various  facts 
the  question  of  whether  probable 
cause  existed  or  not  is  considered : 
Carl  Corper  Brew.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Min- 
wegen  &  W.  Mfg.  Co.,  77  111.  App. 
213;  Lancaster  v.  Langston,  18  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  299;  36  S.  W.  521;  Call  v. 
Hays,  169  Mass.  586;  48  X.  E.  777; 
Eagleton  v.  Kabrich,  66  Mo.  App. 
231 ;  Hamilton  v.  Davey,  28  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  457;  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  88;  Fran- 
cis v.  Tilyon,  26  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
340;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  799;  Siefke  v. 
Siefke,  6  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  472;  39 
N.  Y.  Supp.  601;  Durham  v.  Jones, 
119  N.  C.  262;  25  S.  E.  873;  Kolka  v. 
Jones,  6  N.  D.  461;  71  N.  W.  558; 
Britton  v.  Granger,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  281; 
7  Ohio  Dec.  182;  Ruffner  v.  Hooks, 
2  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  278;  27  Pitts.  L.  J. 
N.  S.  86;  38  W.  N.  C.  516;  Wuestv. 
498 


American  Tobacco  Co.,  10  S.  D.  394; 
73  N.  W.  903;  Johnston  v.  Meaghr, 
14  Utah,  426;  47  Pac.  861;  Strehlow 
v.  Pettit,  96  Wis.  22;  71  N.  W.  102; 
Charlebois  v.  Surveyor,  27  Can.  S.  C. 
556. 

"Brown  v.  Smith,  83  111.  291; 
Auer  v.  Mauser,  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  618; 
42  Wkly.  N.  C.  40;  Graham  v. 
Fidelity  Mut.  L.  Assoc,  98  Tenn.  48; 
37  S.  W.  995. 

18  Morrow  v.  Wheeler  &  W. 
Mfg.  Co.,  165  Mass.  349;  43  N.  E.  105. 

"Hartshorne  v.  Smith,  104  Ga. 
235;  30  S.  E.  666.  SeeNeherv.  Dobbs, 
47  Neb.  863;  66  N.  W.  864. 

20  Root  v.  Rose,  6  N.  D.  575; 
72  N.  W.  1022;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
664. 

2i  Neher  v.  Dobbs,  47  Neb.  863;  66 
N.  W.  864,  where  it  was  held  that 
evidence  was  admissible  showing 
that  the  convicting  court  acted  under 
a  misapprehension  of  the  law  appli- 
cable to  the  facts  of  the  case. 


MALICIOUS    PROSE4  I'TION. 


§  t:;i 


or  the  commitment  of  the  accused  by  an  examining  magistrate 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  probable  cause.- 

§  434.  Probable  cause— Burden  of  proof  -Evidence. — As  we 

have  stated  elsewhere  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  can- 
not be  maintained  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  want  of  probable 

cause.  And  want  of  probable  cause  cannot  be  implied.'-'1  Il 
must  be  expressly  and  substantially  proved  and  the  burden  of 
proof  to  establish  it  is  upon  the  plaintiff.8  The  question  of 
probable  cause  in  an  action  of  this  character,  where  the  facts 
are  not  in  dispute,  is  for  the  court  to  decide  as  one  of  law. " 
And  a  judgment  of  the  court  upon  this  point  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff  is  generally  considered  as  conclusive  proof  of  prob- 
able cause  unless  it  appear  that  such  judgment  was  obtained  by 
means  of  fraud,2*  though  it  may  subsequently  be  reversed  by  an 
appellate  court.  Again,  facts  tending  to  show  that  the  plaintiff 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  was  guilty  of  the  crime 
charged  in  the  criminal  prosecution  are  declared  to  be  admis- 


-  Sharpe  v.  Johnston,  76  Mo.  660. 

•"Vinson  v.  Flynn,  64  Ark.  453;  39 
L.  K.  A.  415;  43  S.  W.  146;  4ti  S.  W. 
186;  Petry  v.  Schillo,  61  111.  App.  236. 

24  Graham  v.  Fidelity  Mut.  L. 
Assoc.  9S  Tom.  48;  37  S.  W.  995. 

^Spitzer  v.  Friedlander,  14  App. 
D.  C.  556;  27  Wash.  L.  Rep.  368:  Ep- 
stein v.  Berkowski,  64  111.  App.  498; 
1  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  309;  Skala  v. 
Bus,  60  111.  App.  479;  Paddock  v. 
Watts,  116  hid.  146;  Lancaster  v. 
Langston,  IS  Ky.  L.  Rep.  299;  36  S. 
W.  521 ; Girot  v. Graham, 41  La.  Ann. 
511;  Black  v.  Buckingham,  174  Mass. 
102;  54  X.  E.  494;  Keating  v.  litis. 
13  App.  Div.  (N.  V.)  1;  43  X.  V. 
Supp.  124;  Welch  v.  Cheek.  115  N. 
C.  310;  20  S.  E.  460;  Mitchell  v. 
Logan,  172  Pa.  St.  349;  3:',  At  1.  554; 
26  Pitts.  L.  J.  X.S.  392;  37  Wkly.  N. 
C.  398;  Graham  v.  Fidelity  Mut. 
L.  Assoc,  98  Tenn.  48;  37 S.  W.  995; 
Hicks  v.  Faulkner.  8Q.  B.  Div.  167. 
But  see  Mann  v.  Cowan  8  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  30.     In  this  case  it  appeared  that 


the  defendant  had  without  process 
or  warrant  and  without  the  advice  of 
counsel  placed  plaintiff  in  the  cus- 
tody of  an  officer,  and  that  he  was 
subsequently  regularly  arrested  and 
discharged,  and  it  was  held  that  the 
burden  of  proof  was  on  the  defend- 
ant to  show  probable  cause. 

26  Roisterer  v.  Lee  Sum  (C. C.  App. 
2d  C. ).  94  Fed.  343;  36  C.  C.  A.  285; 
Clement  v.  Major,  s  Colo.  App.  86;  44 
Pac.  776;  At.hison,  T.  &  s.  V.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Smith.  44  Kan.  I:  55  Pac.  272; 
Matlick  v.  Crump,  62  Mo.  App.  21:  1 
Mo.  App.Rep.  712;  Neher  v.  Dobbs, 
47  Neb.  863;  66  X.  W.  86 1 :  Bell  v.  At- 
lantic City  R.  K.  Co.  (N.  .1.1,  33  Atl. 
211;  Sliipiuan  v.  Learn.  92  Hun  (N. 
Y.i.  568;  72  X.Y.  St.  K.  73;  36  N.  Y. 
Supp.  969;  Mitchell  v.  Logan.  172 
Pa.  St.  349;  33  Ail.  554;  26  Pitts.  L. 
J.  X.  S.  392;  37  Wkly.  X.  C.  - 
Gyles  v.  Jefferis,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Pep.  129. 
But  see  Johnson  v.  HcDaniel,  t  Ohio 

Leg.  News,  .">:>:  Billingsley  v.  Maas, 
93  Wis.  176;  67  X.  W.  49. 

499 


§§  435,  436 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


sible,  though  unknown  by  the  defendant  at  the  time  he  insti- 
tuted such  prosecution.28 

§435.  Acquittal  in  criminal  prosecution  —  Evidence  of 
want  of  probable  cause. — Where  a  criminal  prosecution  is  vol- 
untarily dismissed  or  the  defendant  is  acquitted,  such  dismissal 
or  acquittal  is  not  conclusive,  but  merely  prima  facie  evidence 
of  a  want  of  probable  cause,-"9  which  throws  upon  the  defendant 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  the  burden  of  showing 
that  probable  cause  existed  for  his  making  the  charge.3"  So 
where  the  grand  jury  returns  an  indictment  as  "  not  a  true  bill," 
such  action  will  cast  upon  the  defendant  the  burden  of  proving 
that  he  had  probable  cause  for  the  prosecution.31  But  where 
the  complaint  in  a  criminal  prosecution  is  defective  and  the 
action  is  dismissed  on  that  account,  such  dismissal  is  not  an 
acquittal  for  the  purpose  of  commencing  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution.32  The  general  rule  that  the  acquittal  of  the  de- 
fendant in  a  criminal  action  throws  upon  the  defendant  in  a  civil 
action  for  malicious  prosecution  the  burden  of  showing  probable 
cause,  is  not  applicable  where  the  plaintiff's  own  testimony 
shows  its  existence.33 

§  436.  Measure  of  damages — Generally. — In  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution,  the  plaintiff  may  recover  damages  for  such 
injury  as  is  the  natural  and  direct  result  of  the  wrongful  act, 
and  he  is  not  confined  in  his  recovery  to  the  loss  which  he  has 
sustained  up  to  the  time  of  the  trial,  but  evidence  is  also  admis- 
sible as  to  any  loss  which  it  is  reasonably  certain  will  ensue  in 


27  Crescent  City  Live  Stock  Co.  v. 
Butchers  Union,  etc..  Co.,  120  U.  S. 
141;  1  Russell  &  Winslow's  Syllabus 
Dig.  U.  S.  Rep.  1001. 

26  Thurber  v.  Eastern  Bldg.  &  L. 
Assoc,  118  N.  C.  129;  24  S.  E.  730. 

,29Eagletou  v.  Kabrich,  60  Mo.  App. 
231;  Christian  v.  Hanna,  58  Mo.  App. 
37;  Britton  v.  Granger,  13  Ohio  C. 
C.  281;  7  Ohio  Dec.  182;  Auer  v. 
Mauser.  6  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  618;  42 
Wkly.  X.  C.  40.  But  see  Philpot 
v.  Lucas.  101  Iowa,  478;  70 N.  W.  625, 
500 


30  Hidy  v.  Murray,  101  Iowa,  65;  69 
N.  W.  1138;  Ritterv.  Ewing,  174  Pa. 
St.  341;  34  Atl.  584. 

31  Gaertner  v.  Heyl,  179  Pa.  St.  391; 
36  Atl.  146;  39  Wkly.  N.  C.  393;  27 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  358. 

32  Wakely  v.  Johnson,  115  Mich. 
285;  73  N.  W.  238;  4  Det.  L.  X. 
859. 

33  Ruffner  v.  Hooks,  2  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  278;  27  Pitts.  L.  J.  X.  S.  86;  38 
Wkly.  N.  C.  516. 


ma Liciora  i'i;< iseci'  noK. 


5  137 


the  future.*1  So  the  jury  in  estimating  the  damages  may  con- 
sider such  injury  to  his  reputation  as  the  plaintiff  may  have  sus- 
tained.88  But  a  person  who  though  morally  guilty  has  escaped 
in  a  criminal  action  cannot  recover  damages  for  injury  to  his 
reputation  resulting  from  the  unsuccessful  prosecution.21  So, 
also,  the  plaintiff  may  recover  for  injury  to  Ins  business  or  loss 
of  employment8'  and  injury  to  his  credit."  So  where  a  person 
was  arrested  on  the  charge  of  embezzlement,  in  an  action  for 
the  malicious  prosecution  of  such  charge,  evidence  was  admitted 
of  the  nature  of  the  plaintiff's  business,  of  the  amount  of  his 
earnings,  as  to  the  difficulty  he  had  in  getting  employment,  as  to 
the  tools  necessary  for  him  to  use  therein,  and  as  to  the  trouble 
which  the  taking  away  of  his  property,  on  which  he  relied  to  ob- 
tain other  tools,  subjected  him  to."  And  where  the  complaint  al- 
leges that  as  a  result  of  the  malicious  prosecution  of  the  plain- 
tiff he  was  obliged  to  surrender  a  contract  with  an  insurance 
company,  evidence  is  admissible  not  only  to  show  the  surrender 
of  the  contract,  hut  also  of  conversations  between  the  plaintiff 
and  the  company's  agent  at  the  time  of  the  surrender  as  part  of 
the  res  gestte  of  the  surrender.10  But  under  a  general  allega 
tion  that  plaintiff  was  "greatly  injured  in  his  business,"  evidence 
to  show  the  forfeiture  of  earnings  under  a  special  contract  is  not 
admissible." 

§  437.  Measure  of  damages— Generally-  Continued.— The 

jury  may  also  consider   the   indignity,  shame   and   humiliation 


34  Wheeler  v.  Hanson,  161  Mass. 
370;  37  N.  E.  382. 

35  Clark  v.  American  Dock  &  Imp. 
Co.,  3.")  Fed.  47S;  Lunsford  v.  Dietrich, 
80  Ala.  250;  Spencer  v.  Cramblett, 
56  Kan.  794;  14  Pac.  985;  Wheeler  v. 
Hanson,  161  Mass.  370;  37  X.  K.  382; 
Minneapolis  Threshing-Mach.  Co.  v. 
Regier,  51  Neb.  402;  70  \.  W.  93 1; 
Sheldon  v.  Carpenter,  1  NT.  V.  (4 
Comst. )  57S;  Willaid  v.  Holmes,  2 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)303;  21  N.  Y.  Snpp. 
998;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R.  569;  Johnson 
v.  McDaniell,  5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  1'.  Dec. 
717;    Zantzinger    v.    Weightnian.     2 


Cranch  C.  Ct.  478;  Saville  v.  Rob- 
erts, 1  Ld.  Raym.  374. 

36  Sears  v.  Hathaway,  12  Cal.  277. 

87  Spencer  v.  Cramblett,  56  Kan. 
794;  44  Pac.  985;  Willaid  v.  11. .lines. 
2  Misc.  (N.  V.l  303;  21  N.  V.  Snpp. 
998;  51  \.  Y.  St.   R.  569. 

38 . Johnson  v.  McDaniell,  5  Ohio  S. 
&  C.  P.  Dec.  717. 

89  Wheeler  v.  Hanson,  161  Mass. 
370;  37  N.  E.  382. 

»  Oldfather  v.  Zent,  21  End.  App. 
307;  52  \.  E.  286. 

«  Oldfather  v.  Zent,  14  Ind.  App. 
89;  41  X.  K.  555. 

501 


§437 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


directly  resulting  from  the  charge  made  against  a  person.42 
And  where  a  person  was  arrested  he  may  show,  in  a  civil  action 
for  malicious  prosecution,  the  had  condition  of  the  place  in  which 
he  was  confined  and  any  discomfort  or  deprivation  which  he 
may  have  suffered.43  But  the  jury  should  not,  in  estimating 
the  damages,  consider  an  aggravation  of  injuries  which  existed 
prior  to  his  arrest,  where  the  evidence  tends  to  show  negligence 
or  other  conduct  on  his  part  which  may  have  caused  the  aggra- 
vation.44 Expenses  of  the  defense  of  a  person  in  a  criminal 
prosecution  is  also  an  element  to  be  considered  in  an  action  by 
him  for  malicious  prosecution.45  And  this  includes  attorneys' 
fees  which  have  been  paid,  unless  they  are  obviously  excessive, 
in  which  case  a  reasonable  sum  should  be  allowed.46  The  amount 
of  damages  to  be  awarded  in  such  actions  is  a  proper  subject 
for  the  jury  to  determine,  and  whether  a  verdict  is  excessive  or 
not  is  to  be  determined  by  the  same  general  principles  as  in  the 
case  of  awards  in  other  actions  for  damages.47 


42 McWilliams  v.  Hoban,  42  Md. 
56;  Wheeler  v.  Hauson,  161  Mass. 
370;  37  N.  E.  382;  Willard  v.  Holmes, 
2  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  303;  21  N.  Y.  Supp. 
998;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R.  569;  Johnson  v. 
MeDaniell,  5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  717. 

43  Drumm  v.  Cessnum,  61  Kan.  467; 
59  Pac.  1078;  Zebley  v.  Storey,  117 
Pa.  St.  478;  12  Atl.  569;  10  Cent. 
823;  21  W.  N.  C.  68. 

«  Fletcher  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
109  Mich.  363;  67  N.  W.  330;  3  Det. 
L.  N.  100. 

45  Easton  v.  Bank  of  Stockton,  66 
Cal.  123;  Lawrence  v.  Hagerman,  56 
111.  68;  8  Am.  Rep.  674;  Ziegler  v. 
Powell,  54  Ind.  173;  Walker  v.  Pitt- 
man,  108  Ind.  341 ;  Sheldon  v.  Carpen- 
ter, 4  N.  Y.  578;  Willard  v.  Holmes,  2 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)303;  21  N.  Y.  Supp. 
998;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R.  569;  Closson  v. 
Staples,  42  Vt.  209;  1  Am.  Rep.  316; 
Magmer  v.  Renk,  65  Wis.  364.  See 
Wilmertou  v.  Sample,  39  111.  A  pp. 
60. 

46  Drumm  v.  Cessnum,  61  Kan. 
467;  :>(.)  Pac.    1078;  Wheeler  v.  Hau- 

502 


son,  161  Mass.  370;  37  N.  E.  382;  42 
Am.  St.  Rep.  408;  Johnson  v.  Me- 
Daniell, 5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  717. 
47  Chapman  v.  Dodd,  10  Minn.  350. 
See  following  cases  as  to  amounts 
awarded  under  various  circum- 
stances: Attempt  by  landlord  to 
seize  property  of  tenant  under  dis- 
tress warrant,  though  no  rent  due, 
and  subsequent  arrest  of  latter — 
$212.50  not  excessive.  Gruel  v.  Men- 
gler,  74  111.  App.  36.  Charges  in- 
volving integrity  of  man  high  in 
financial  circles  and  holding  several 
important  fiduciary  positions  — 
$31,700  not  excessive.  Willard  v. 
Holmes,  2  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  303;  51  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  569;  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  998. 
Arrest  of  person  without  probable 
cause — $1,000  not  excesssive,  though 
greatly  in  excess  of  expense  incurred 
and  plaintiff  was  treated  with  proper 
care  and  consideration.  Neys  v. 
Taylor  (S.  D. ),  81  N.  W.  901.  Ma- 
licious prosecution  on  charge  of 
assault  with  intent  to  murder — wil- 
ful   perjury — $3,000    not   excessive. 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION.  §§438-440 

§  438.  Mental  Buffering. — In  an  action  to  recover  dania 

for  malicious  prosecution,  mental  suffering  is  one  of  the  ele- 
ments for  which  damages  may  he  assessed,  and  it  may  he  con- 
sidered though  there  he  no  physical  injury  or  pain  in  connec- 
tion therewith.1"1 

§  439.  Evidence  in  mitigation  of  damages. — Defendant  in 

an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  may  show  in  mitigation  of 
damages  the  general  had  reputation  of  the  plaintiff.  '  And  evi- 
dence  in  such  an  action  that  the  plaintiff  voluntarily  surrendered 
himself  for  arrest,  hut  was  in  fact  never  really  arrested,  is  ad- 
missible in  mitigation  of  damages.50  But  evidence  is  not  ad- 
missible, that  the  period  of  the  plaintiff's  imprisonment  might 
have  been  shortened  if  he  had  availed  himself  of  his  right  to  a 
preliminary  examination,  unless  it  be  shown  that  his  object  in 
waiving  such  examination  was  to  enhance  the  damages."'1  And 
the  defendant  cannot  for  such  purpose  show  that  the  plaintiff 
had  instituted  a  similar  suit  against  him.88 

§  440.  Advice  of  attorney. — As  a  general  rule  it  is  a  defense 
to  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  that  the  defendant  acted 
upon  the  advice  of  an  attorney.  But  such  advice  must  have 
been  sought  of  a  reputable  attorney  and  not  a  co-conspirator  and 
must  have  been  asked  for  in  good  faith,  and  the  defendant  must 
have  disclosed  to  such  attorney  all  the  facts  within  his  knowl- 
edge, and  must  have  acted  in  good  faith  upon  such  advice.:ki     So 


Jonec  v.  Jenkins,  3  Wash.  17;  27 
Pao.  10:22.  Arrest  and  confinement 
in  hotel  for  fifteen  hours — no  injury 
to  business  or  reputation  —  $2,500 
excessive.  O1  Boyle  v.  Shivley,  65 
111.  App.  278.  In  jail  fifteen  hours — 
money  damages  nominal — s750  ex- 
cessive— should  remit  §250.  Myers 
v.  Litts  (C.  P.  Pa. ),  3  Lack.  L.  News, 
363. 

48  Lunsford  v.  Dietrich,  86  Ala. 
250;  Shatto  v.  Crocker,  87  Cal.  629; 
Tisdale  v.  Major.  100  Iowa,  1;  75 
N.  W.  663;  Parkhurst  v.  Mastellar, 
57  Iowa,  474:  Fisher  v.  Hamilton, 
49  Ind.  341;  Friel  v.  Plumer  (N.  H.), 


43  Atl.  618;  Johnson  v.  McDaniell, 
5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  717;  Vina]  v. 
Core,  18  W.  Va.  1;  Rowland  v.  Sam- 
uel. 1 1  Q.  B.  39. 

49  Rosenkrantz  v.  Barker,  115  111. 
333;  Fitzgibbon  v.  Brown,  -t:;  Me. 
169;  Bostwick  v.  Rutherford,  4 
Hawks  L.  (X.  C.)  8:?;  Britton  v. 
Granger,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  281;  7  Ohio 
Dec.  182. 

60  Chatfield  v.  Bunnell,  69  Conn. 
511;  37  Atl.  1074. 

si  Kin?  v.  Colvin.  11  R.  I.  582. 

52  Bliss  v.  Franklin,  13  Allen 
l  Mass.  I,  214. 

"O'Neal  v.  McKinna,  116  Ala.  GOO; 
OUo 


§   "i40 


MALICIOI'S    i  ROSECUTION. 


advice  of  an  attorney  is  no  defense  to  such  an  action,  where  it 
appears  that  defendant  had  the  plaintiff  rearrested  on  same  day 
after  his  discharge  in  habeas  corpus  proceedings,  and  did  not 
communicate  the  fact  of  such  discharge  to  the  attorney.54  The 
defendant,  however,  in  such  cases  is  not  necessarily  relieved  from 
liability  by  stating  to  his  attorney  all  the  facts  which  he  actually 
knew,  but  the  rule  extends  to  those  facts  which  he  should  have 
known  by  reasonable  diligence.55  But  where  the  question  of 
probable  cause  is  for  the  jury,  advice  of  counsel  that  plaintiff  is 
guilty,  is  declared  not  to  be  a  complete  defense  to  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution,  but  it  is  to  be  considered  by  the  jury  in 
determining  whether  or  not  probable  cause  existed,  and  also  upon 
the  question  of  malice,  for  which  smart  money  may  be  given.56 
The  good  or  bad  faith  of  the  counsel,  however,  in  giving  the  ad- 
vice is  not  an  element  to  be  considered  in  determining  the  merits 
of  such  a  defense,57  unless  it  appear  that  such  attorney  was  a 


22  So.  905;  Holliday  v.  Holliday,  122 
Gal.  26;  55  Pac.  703,  aff'g  in  banc 
53  Pac.  42;  Seabridge  v.  McAdam, 
119  Cal.  460;  51  Pac.  691;  Struby- 
Estabrook  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Keyes, 
9  Colo.  App.  190;  48  Pac.  663;  Clem- 
ent v.  Major,  8  Colo.  App.  86;  44 
Pac.  776;  Gruel  v.  Mengler,  74  111. 
App.  36;  Chicago  Forge  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Rose,  69  111.  App.  123;  29  Chic.  Leg. 
News,  239;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  207; 
Paddock  v.  Watts,  116  Ind.  146; 
Bowman  v.  Western  Fur  Mfg.  Co., 
96  Iowa,  188;  64  N.  W.775;  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  57  Kan. 
785;  48  Pac.  31;  Meskerv.  McCourt, 

19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1897;  44  S.  W.  975;  An- 
derson v.  Columbia  Finance  &  T.  Co., 

20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1790;  50  S.  W.  40; 
Womack  v.  Fudiake-r,  47  La.  Ann.  33; 
16  So.  645;  Pullen  v.  Glidden,  68  Me. 
566;  Stone  v.  Swift,  4  Pick.  (Mass.) 
389;  Pawlowski  v.  Jenks,  115  Mich. 
275;  73  N.  W.  238;  4  Det.  L.  N.  874; 
Alexander  v.  Harrison,  38  Mo.  258; 
Brown  v.  McBride,  24  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
235;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  620;  Johnson  v. 
McDaniell,  5  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  717: 

504 


Johnson  v.  McDaniel  (C.  P.),  4  Ohio 
Leg.  News,  53;  Hess  v.  Oregon  Ger- 
man Bkg.  Co.,  31  Oreg.  503;  49  Pac. 
803;  Keplogle  v.  Frothingham,  16  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  374;  Myers  v.  Litts  (C.  P. 
Pa. ),  3  Lack.  L.  News,  363;  Goldstein 
v.  Foulkes,  19  R.  I.  — ;  Ravenga 
v.  Mackintosh,  2  B.  &  C.  693. 

54  Replogle  y.  Frothingham,  16  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  374. 

55  Seabridge  v.  McAdam,  119  Cal. 
460;  51  Pac.  691;  Chic.  Forge  &  B. 
Co.  v.  Rose,  69  111.  App.  123;  29 
Chic.  L.  News,  239;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  207;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Brown,  57  Kan.  785 ;  48  Pac. 
31;  Anderson  v.  Columbia  Finance 
&  T.  Co.,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1790;  50  S. 
W.  40;  St.  Denis  v.  Shoultz,  25  Ont. 
App.  131.  But  see  Holliday  v.  Hol- 
liday, 122  Cal.  26;  55  Pac.  703;  Hess 
v.  Oregon  German  Bkg.  Co.,  31 
Oreg.  503;  49  Pac.  803. 

66  Brown  v.  McBride,  24  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  235;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  620. 

"Seabridge  v.  McAdam,  119  Cal. 
460;  51  Pac.  691;  Sandell  v.  Sherman, 
107  Cal.  391. 


MALICIOUS    PBOSECtJTION.  §§4tl-    *  l- 

co-conspirator  aiding  others  to  extort  money  for  personal  gain." 
Again,  where  after  a  statement  of  facts  made  by  a  client  to  his 
attorney,  which  do  not  constitute  probable  cause  for  an  arrest, 
the  latter  personally  swears  to  the  information  upon  which  a 
warrant  of  arrest  is  issued,  he  will  be  personally  liable  to  the  per- 
son arrested,  and  his  professional  privilege  will  not  shield  him. " 

§  441.  Advice  of  prosecuting  attorney,  magistrate,  etc.— 

The  fact  that  a  criminal  prosecution  was  instituted  upon  the 
advice  of  the  prosecuting  attorney  is  admissible  in  evidence 
for  the  purpose  of  exoneration  in  an  action  for  malicious  prose- 
cution/0 But  in  order  that  the  defendant  may  be  exonerated 
by  such  advice,  he  is  bound  to  state  the  tacts  in  connection 
therewith  to  the  same  extent  as  if  he  were  seeking  the  advice 
of  his  personal  attorney,  and  to  have  acted  upon  such  advice  in 
good  faith.'11  And  the  facts  that  the  defendant  stated  all  the 
facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  to  a  magistrate,  that  the 
latter  declared  that  the  accused  was  guilty  if  the  statement  was 
true,  and  that  the  prosecution  was  instituted  upon  such  assur- 
ance, are  admissible  in  evidence  on  the  question  of  malice  and 
in  mitigation  of  damages.^ 

§  442.  Exemplary  damages. — The  plaintiff  in  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution  is  not  limited  in  the  damages  which  he 
may  recover  to  those  which  are  compensatory  for  the  injury  sus- 
tained, but  may,  in  those  cases  where  the  defendant  acted  wan- 
tonly, recklessly  or  with  actual  malice,  recover  exemplary  dam- 
ages.63    So   evidence  is   admissible   in   such   an   action   for   the 


58  Clement  v.  Major,  8  Colo.  App. 
86;  44  Pac.  77ti. 

59  Whitney  v.  New  York  Casualty 
Ins.  Assoc.,  27  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
320;  50  X.  Y.  Supp.  227. 

lojlaffit  v.  Chic.  R.  I.  &  P.  K.  Co., 
57  Kan.  912;  48  Pac.  lllii;  Wakely 
v.  Johnson,  115  Mich.  liS5 ;  73  X.  W. 
238;  4  Det.  L.  X.  859;  Rogers  v. 
Mullen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  63  S. 
W.  897;  Peterson  v.  Reisdorph,  49 
Neb.  529;  68  X.  W.  943. 


Estabrook  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Keys,  0 
Colo.  App.  190;  48  Pac.  663;  Rogers 
v.  Mullen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1000),  03 
S.  W.  S97. 

'-llhseh  v.  Feeney.  83  111.  550; 
White  v.  Tucker,  16  Ohio  St.  168; 
Sisk  v.  Hurst,  1  W.  V;i.  53. 

MBrownv.  Master,  111  Ala.  3'.»7; 
20  So.  344;  Stewart  v.  Cole.  46 
Ala.  646;  Foster  v.  Pitts,  63  Ark. 
387;  38 S.  W.  1114;  Coleman  v.  Allen, 
79  Ga.  637;  Lawrence  v.  Ilaperman, 


«i  See  sec.440  herein.     See  Struby-  I  50  111.  68;  8  Am.  Rep.  874;  Wauzer  v. 

505 


§  443 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 


purpose  of  showing  the  motive  of  the  defendant  in  causing  the 
arrest  of  the  plaintiff.64  And  evidence  of  a  subsequent  arrest  is 
admissible  as  showing  a  vindictive  spirit  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant/" In  determining  the  amount  of  exemplary  damages 
which  may  be  awarded,  the  jury  may  consider  the  respective 
social  positions  of  the  parties  to  the  action.66  And  evidence  of 
the  wealth  or  financial  ability  of  the  defendant  in  such  an  action 
is  admissible.6'  But  though  the  plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to 
exemplary  damages,  it  is  improper  to  instruct  the  jury  that  they 
are  to  assess  such  damages  in  such  sum  as  in  their  judgment 
plaintiffs  are  entitled  to.(W 

§  443.  Wealth  of  defendant — Evidence— Generally— In  an 

action  to  recover  for  a  malicious  prosecution  where  the  facts  of 
the  case  may  justify  an  award  of  punitive  damages,  evidence  of 
the  wealth  of  the  defendant  is  admissible.69  And  where  a  per- 
son has  been  arrested  for  a  wilful  wrong,  he  may  in  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution  give  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  negativ- 
ing wilfulness  on  his  part.70  But  statements  of  a  local  attorney 
of  a  railroad  company,  are  not  admissible  in  an  action  against 
the  company  for  malicious  prosecution,  as  tending  to  show  mal- 
ice on  the  part  of  the  company,  where  such  attorney  was  not  au- 
thorized to  speak  or  act  for  the  company.71     And  where  a  village 


Bright,  52  111.  35;  Parkhurst  v.  Mas- 
teller,  57  Iowa,  474;  Schippel  v.  Nor- 
ton, 38  Kan.  567;  McWiliams  v.  Ho- 
ban,  42  Md.  56;  Frank  v.  Curtis,  58 
Mo.  App.  349;  McGarry  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  App.  340;  Brown  v. 
McBride,  24  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  235;  52 
N.  Y.  Supp.  620;  Fuller  v.  Redding, 
16  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  634;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
109;  Johnson  v.  McDauiell,  5  Ohio 
S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  717;  Orr  v.  Seiler,  1 
Penny.  (Penn.)445;  Jacobs  v.  Cram, 
62  Tex.  401;  Shear  v.  Hiles,  67  Wis. 
3.";0;  Winn  v.  Peckham,  42  Wis.  493. 
See  Hawkins  v.  Snow,  29  N.  S.  444. 

6*Fuller  v.  Redding,  10  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  634;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  109. 

66  Miller  v.  Potter,  59  111.  App.  125. 

66 Johnson  v.  McDariiel  (C.  P.),  4 
Ohio  Leg.  News,  53. 

506 


67  Eagleton  v.  Kabrich,  66  Mo.  App. 
231. 

es  Foster  v.  Pitts,  63  Ark.  387;  38 
S.  W.  1114. 

69  Atkinson  v.  Vancleave  (Ind. 
App.  1900),  57  N.  E.  731;  Whitfield 
v.  Westbrook,  40  Miss.  311.  See  Eg- 
gett  v.  Allen,  106  Wis.  633;  82  N.  W. 
556.     See  sec.  442  herein. 

70  Parker  v.  Parker,  102  Iowa,  500; 
71  N.  W.  421.  In  this  case  plaintiff 
had  been  arrested  for  a  wilful  tres- 
pass in  cutting  down  and  removing 
timber,  and  he  was  permitted  to  show 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecu- 
tion that  his  object  was  to  make  the 
land  available  as  pasture  land. 

"  Fletcher  v.  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
109  Mich.  363;  67  N.  W.  330;  3  Det. 
L.  N.  100. 


MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION.  §  444 

trustee  procured  the  arrest  of  .1  person  for  the  violation  of  an 
ordinance  forbidding  the  riding  of  a  bicycle  on  a  sidewalk,  it  was 

declared  in  an  action  against  such  trustee  {>»■  false  imprison- 
ment and  malicious  prosecution  that  evidence  showing  that  the 
road  was  obstructed  where  plaintiff  turned  on  to  the  sidewalk 
was  inadmissible  as  showing  defendant's  motive.75  Again,  in  an 
action  based  on  the  arrest  of  .1  woman  for  purchasing  goods  on 
the  credit  of  her  husband,  pending  her  appeal  from  a  decree  ot 
divorce  against  her,  evidence  Bhowing  that  goods  were  purchased 
by  her  from  other  dealers  is  not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  probable  cause.151  And  where  the  arrest  of  a  person  is 
procured  on  the  charge  of  wilful  trespass  on  the  land  of  another, 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution  based  on  such  arrest,  the 
defendant  should  not  he  permitted  to  show  that  certain  persons 
had  said  that  plaintiff  was  damaging  his  property  to  a  certain 
specified  amount.'1 

§  444.  Malicious  prosecution  of  civil  suit— Attachment — 

Damages  may  also  be  recovered  for  the  malicious  prosecution 
of  a  civil  suit,  and  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor  the  jury  may 
compensate  the  plaintiff  for  such  mental,  physical  and  financial 
loss  as  has  directly  and  naturally  resulted.75  And  as  a  ground 
for  special  damage  he  may  show  his  peculiar  situation  and  cir- 
cumstances at  the  time  the  suit  was  brought.76  And  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  malice,  evidence  is  admissible  that  the  de- 
fendant has  brought  several  suits  against  the  plaintiff  upon  the 
same  groundless  claim.77  So  for  the  prosecution  of  a  civil  suit, 
maliciously  and  without  reasonable  or  probable  cause,  which 
is  terminated  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  the  latter  may  recover 
from  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  the  damages  sustained  in  the 
defense  of  the  original  suit,  in  excess  of  the  taxable  costs  ob- 
tained by  him.78     And  where  a  person  was  indebted   to  another 

w  Fuller  v.  Bedding,  13  App.  Div.  ■  48  Atl.   618;    Thomas    v.    Rouse,   2 


(N.  Y.i  til:  43  \.  V.  Supp.  90. 

'3  Rosenfeld  v.  Stix,  07  Mo.  App. 
582. 

»  Noble  v.  White,  103  Iowa,  352; 
72  N.  W.  556. 

7»  Nichols  v.  Bronson,  2  Day, 
(Conn.)  211;  Friel  v.  Plumer  (N.  H.), 


Biev.  (S.    C.)   7;");  Churchill    v.    Sig- 
ners, 3  El.  &  BL  929. 

76  Nichols     v.     Bronson,     2      Day. 
(Conn.)  211. 

77  Magner  v.  Renk,  65   Wis.   104. 

78  Closson  v.  Staples,  42    Vt.    209; 
1  Am.  Rep.  316. 

507 


§  444  MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 

in  the  sum  of  fifteen  dollars  and  the  latter  maliciously  and 
without  probable  cause  brought  an  attachment  suit  for  $2,030 
against  him,  it  was  held  that  he  could  recover  for  the  injury 
resulting  from  the  bringing  of  such  suit.70  And  in  such  an  ac- 
tion evidence  .showing  injury  to  the  credit  of  the  plaintiff  is 
admissible.8"  And  there  may  be  a  recovery  for  injury  to  the 
business  of  a  person  against  whom  an  attachment  is  maliciously 
procured,  and  for  this  purpose  a  witness  may  testify  as  to  what, 
from  his  own  knowledge,  was  the  effect  upon  the  business  and 
credit  of  the  plaintiff.*1  But  evidence  is  not  admissible  as  to 
the  profits  usually  made  in  the  same  kind  of  business  in  the 
plaintiff's  neighborhood.*2  And  where  the  plaintiff  claims  that 
he  has  been  injured  in  his  business  as  the  result  of  a  malicious 
attachment,  in  order  to  authorize  a  recovery  therefor  the  evi- 
dence must  not  only  show  a  loss  in  his  business,  but  must  also 
show  that  it  was  attributable  to  the  attachment,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  such  evidence  it  is  not  proper  for  the  plaintiff  to  show 
the  course  of  his  business  from  the  time  of  its  inception  down 
to  the  time  he  disposed  of  it,  covering  a  period  of  several  years 
before  and  several  months  subsequent  to  the  attachment.83  And 
where  the  delay  of  a  firm  to  forward  goods  purchased  is  not 
shown  to  have  been  the  result  of  an  attachment,  evidence  of 
such  fact  is  not  admissible.81  But  where  as  the  result  of  an 
action  maliciously  instituted  by  the  lessor  of  property,  the  lessee 
is  ejected  therefrom,  the  latter  in  an  action  to  recover  therefor 
is  entitled  to  damages  for  the  value  of  the  use  of  the  premises 
to  him  during  the  time  he  was  out  of  possession  and  also  for 
any  permanent  injury  to  the  leasehold  due  to  the  lack  of  ordi- 
nary care  by  the  lessor  while  he  was  in  possession  of  the  same.'" 
And  again,  in  an  action  for  maliciously  issuing  a  writ  of  attach- 
ment on  a  crop  of  potatoes  which  were  not  dug  until  after  the 
release  of  the  levy,  it  was  held  that  damages  were  recoverable, 

79  Clark  v.  Nordholt,   121    Cal.   26;  I      81  O'Grady  v.  Julian,  34  Ala.  88. 
53  Pac.  400.     See    Weaver   v.    Page,        82  O' Grady  v.  Julian,  34  Ala.  88. 

6  Cal.  681.  83  Zinn  v.  Rice,  154   Mass.  1 ;  12  L. 

80  Brewer  v.  Jacobs,    22    Fed.  217;    R.  A.  288;  37  N.  E.  747. 

Tynberg  v.  Cohen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),        84  Tynberg   v.   Cohen     (Tex.    Civ. 
24  S.  W.  314.     See   Fine  v.    Navarre    App. ),  24  S.  W.  314. 
(Mich.),  62  N.  W.  142;  Sonneborn  v.  |      85  Moffatt     v.     Fisher,     47     Iowa, 
Stewart,  2  Woods,  599.  473. 

508 


MALICIOUS    PE08ECU1  [ON. 


§§    \\'<    1  17 


the  measure  of  such  damages  being  the  difference  between  the 
value  of  the  potatoes  in  the  ground  at  the  time  of  the  levy,  and 
its  value  at  the  time  of  release  thereof/ 

§  445.  Malicious  attachment — Where  business  unlawful  no 

recovery  for  injury  to. — Though  there  may  be  a  recovery  for 
any  loss  which  a  person  has  sustained  in  his  credit,  business  or 
reputation,  owing  to  the  wrongful  suing  out  of  an  attachment, 
yet  if  the  business  in  which  a  person,  against  whom  such  an 
attachment  is  issued,  is  engaged,  is  carried  on  in  violation  of 
the  law,  such  as  the  business  of  keeping  a  gambling  house,  there 
can  be  no  recovery  for  injury  thereto/' 

§  446.  Maliciously  causing  person  to  lose  employment. — 

Where  a  person  maliciously  procures  the  discharge  of  another 
from  his  position  or  employment,  he  will  be  liable  to  such  person 
for  the  damages  sustained  as  a  direct  result  of  such  malicious 
act,  and  such  damages  will  include  the  time  lost  by  the  person 
discharged,  and  it  is  declared  that  he  need  not  look  for  employ- 
ment in  other  localities.88 

§  447.  Pleading. — A  complaint  in  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution  should  allege  that  the  prosecution  was  malicious  and 
without  probable  cause."0  And  it  should  set  forth  the  alleged 
malicious  conduct  of  the  defendant,  it  not  being  sufficient  to 
merely  allege  that  the  defendant  acted  maliciously."  And  like- 
wise facts  showing  want  of  probable  cause  should  be  alleged. 
And  want  of  probable  cause  was  held  to  be  sufficiently  set 
out  in  the  complaint  where  it  alleged  that  under  a  misap- 
prehension of  the  law  applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case, 
which  were  known  to  the  complainant  and  which  established 
the  innocence  of  the  defendant,  the  latter  was  convicted,  and 


.  86  Pratt  v.  Hampe  (Iowa.  1901), 
86  N.  W.  292. 

87  Kauffman  v.  Babcock,  67  Tex. 
241;  2  S.  W.  878. 

»8  Connell  v.  Stalker,  20  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)423;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  104S,  afTd 
21  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  609;  48  X.  Y.  Supp. 
77. 

"H  Hilbrant   v.   Donaldsou,   69   Mo. 


App.  92;  Ely  v.  Davis,  111  N.  C.  -'4; 
15  S.  E.  878;  Cousins  v.  Swords,  14 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  338;  48  X.  Y. 
Supp.  907;  Palmer  v.  Palmer,  8  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  331;  40  X.  Y.  Supp. 
829. 

90  Tavenner    v.    Morekead,    41    W. 
Va.  116;  23  S.  E.  673. 

509 


§  447  MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION. 

that  such  conviction  was  reversed  on  appeal.91  Again,  in  an  ac- 
tion to  recover  damages  based  on  an  alleged  conspiracy  to  in- 
jure and  oppress  the  plaintiff,  he  may  in  his  complaint  properlv 
allege  injury  and  suffering  of  his  wife,  and  injury  to  his  own 
feelings,  resulting  from  acts  done  in  pursuance  of  the  conspiracy JM 

91  Neber  v.  Dobbs,  47  Neb.  863;  66  I  4tb  C),  76  Fed.   699;  42  U.  S.   App. 
N.  W.  864.  133;  22  C.  C.  A.  493. 

92  Gaillard  v.  Cantini  ( C.  C.  App.  ' 

510 


FALSE   AJSRE8T   AND    QdTPBISOXMENT. 


§448 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


FALSE    ARKKST    AND    l.M  PKISONM  KNT. 


448.  False    arrest    and     imprison- 

menl — Measure  of  damages. 

449.  Same  subject  continued. 
4f)0.  Measure  of  damages — Gener- 
ally —  Excessive  damages. 

451.  Mental  suffering. 


452.  Punitive  damages. 

453.  Same  subject  continued. 

454.  Mitigation  of  damages. 

455.  Evideuce — Generally. 

456.  Pleading. 


§  448.  False  arrest  and  imprisonment— Measure  of  dam- 
ages.— In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  false  arrest  and  im- 
prisonment, the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  for  such  injury  as 
he  has  sustained  as  the  result  of  the  wrongful  act.  The  ques- 
tion of  motive  does  not  affect  his  recovery  of  compensatory 
damages,  but  the  plaintiff  upon  proof  of  the  false  arrest  and 
imprisonment  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  injury  ensuing 
therefrom,  and  his  recovery  may  include  damages  for  deprivation 
of  liberty,  physical  pain  and  suffering,  mental  suffering,  humilia- 
tion and  indignity  of  the  act,  loss  of  time  from  labor  or  in  busi- 
ness, expenses  of  procuring  release,  for  any  physical  injury  due 
to  imprisonment  in  an  unhealthy  or  unwholesome  place,  and  for 
any  permanent  injury.1     So  it  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury  that 


1  Bryan  v.  Congdon  (C.  C.  App. 
8th  0.)i  57  U.  S.  App.  505;  86  Fed. 
221;  29  C.  C.  A.  670;  Clarke  v.  Amer- 
ican Dock  &  I.  Co.,  35  Fed.  478; 
Lavender  v.  Iludgens,  32  Ark.  7(3:1; 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Williams, 
09  Ga.  251;  Blanchard  v.  Burbank, 
.16  111.  App.  375;  Stewart  v.  Maddox, 
63  Ind.  51;  Lytton  v.  Baird,  95  Ind. 
349;  Yount  v.  Carney,  91  Iowa,  559; 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  II.  Co.  v.  Rice, 
30  Kan.  593  j  Wheeler*  W.  Manufg. 
Co.  v.  Boyce,  36  Kan.  350;  Miller  v. 
Ashcraft,  98  Ky.  314;  32  S.  W.  10S5; 
17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  894;  Wentz  v.  Bern- 
hardt. 37  La.   Ann.  636;    Slilphen  v. 


Ulmer,  83  Me.  211;  33  Atl.  980;  Ross  v. 
Leggett,  61  Mich.  445;  Josselyn  v.  Mc- 
Allister, 22  Mich.  300;  Page  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 13  Mich.  63;  Bacon  v.  Bacon,  76 
Miss.  458;  24  So.  90S;  Hewlett  v. 
George,  68  Miss.  703;  13  L.  R.  A. 
682  ;  9  So.  S85  ;  Cone  v.  Central  R. 
Co.,  62  NT.  J.  L.  99;  40  Atl.  780;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  278;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.659;Toomeyv.  Del.  L.&  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  4  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  392;  53  \. 
Y.  St.  R.  907;  24  X.  Y.  Supp.  1'-: 
Ball  v.  Borrigan,  47  N\  Y.  St  R.384; 
Limbeck  v.  deny,  15  Misc.  (X.  Y. ) 
663;  39  N.  Y.  supp.  995;  Duggan  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R,  R,  Co.,  159  Pa.  St 
511 


§  449 


FALSE    AIIREST    AND    IMPRISONMENT. 


defendant's  motives  in  making  an  arrest  cannot  affect  the  plain- 
tiff's right  to  recover  for  physical  inconvenience,  loss  of  time, 
physical  and  mental  suffering,  humiliation  of  mind  and  expenses 
incurred.2  And  the  jury  in  estimating  the  damages  should  con- 
sider the  jeopardy  of  the  person  arrested,  his  age  and  physical 
condition  when  arrested,  and  the  distance  he  was  obliged  to 
walk,  together  with  his  physical  and  mental  pain  and  suffering.' 
And  the  taking  of  a  man  through  a  crowded  thoroughfare  caus- 
ing him  humiliation  may  be  considered.4  So  for  humiliation 
and  insult  and  subjection  to  great  indignity,  the  jury  may  prop- 
erly give  compensation-5 

§449.  Same  subject  continued.— In  estimating  the  dam- 
ages in  such  an  action,  the  jury  may  also  properly  consider  the 
discomforts  experienced  while  confined  in  jail,  due  to  the  un- 
clean or  unhealthy  condition  of  the  same,  or  to  other  causes,6 
and  suffering  due  to  the  absence  of  the  proper  necessities  and 
comforts  of  life,  such  as  food,  bed,  or  sufficient  heat  may  be  con- 
sidered.7 So  in  an  action  for  false  imprisonment  by  confine- 
ment in  an  industrial  school,  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the 
restraints  imposed,  the  treatment  received  and  the  sleeping  facil- 
ities afforded.8     Again,  in  the  case  of  the  wrongful  imprisonment 


248;  28  Atl.  182;  33  W.  N.  C.  381;  25 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  13;  Buchanan  v. 
Goettman  (C.  P.),  29  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
302;  Abrahams  v.  Cooper,  81  Pa.  St. 
232;  Miller  v.  Grice,  2  Rich.  (S.  C.) 
27  ;  McQueeu  v.  Heck,  1  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  212;  Cabell  v.  Arnold,  86 
Tex.  102;  22  L.  R.  A.  87;  Karner  v. 
Stump,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  461  ;  34 
S.  W.  656;  Coffin  v.  Varilla,  8  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  417;  Vanderberg  v.  Con- 
noly,  18  Utah,  112;  54  Pac.  1097;  Bol- 
ton v.  Vellines,  94  Va.  393;  26  S.  E. 
847;  3  Va.  L.  Reg.  120;  Parsons  v 
Harper,  16  Gratt.  (Va.)  64;  Ogg  v. 
Murdock,  25  W.  Va.  139;  Fenelon  v. 
Butts,  53  Wis.  344;  Plath  v.  Branns- 
dorff,  40  Wis.  107;  Bonesteel  v.  Bone- 
steel,  30  Wis.  511  ;  Jay  v.  Almy,  1 
Woodb.  &  M.  262.  See  sec.  451  herein 
as  to  mental  suffering. 

512 


2  Karner  v.  Stump,  12  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  461;  34  S.  W.  656;  Miller  v. 
Grice,  2  Rich.  (S.  C.)  27;  McQueen 
v.  Hale,  1  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  212;  Par- 
son v.  Harper,  16  Gratt.  (Va. )  64. 

3  Ahem  v.  Collins,  39  Mo.  145. 

4  Toomey  v.  Del.  L.  &  VV.  R.  Co., 
4  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  392;  53  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
567;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  108. 

5  Ball  v.  Horrigan,  47  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
384;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  913;  Limbeck  v. 
Gerry,  15  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  663;  39  N.  Y. 
Supp.  95. 

6  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Griffin,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  91;  48  S. 
W.  542;  Fenelon  v.  Butts,  53  Wis. 
344. 

7  Abrahams  v.  Cooper,  81  Pa.  St. 
232. 

8  Scott  v.  Flowers,  60  Neb.  676; 
80  N.  W.  81. 


FALSI:    ARBEST    AND    I  M  PRISi  >N  MKNT. 


5  450 


of  a  passenger,  he  may  recover  from  the  railroad  company  re- 
sponsible therefor,  for  his  physical  and  mental  Buffering,  injury 
to  feelings,  loss  of  time,  interruption  in  business  and  actual  ex- 
penses incurred.9  So,  also,  may  a  similar  recovery  be  had  for 
wrongful  confinement  in  an  insane  asylum.1"  But  the  loss  of  a 
job  of  work  or  employment  because  of  being  detained  beyond  a 
certain  hour  is  not  an  element  to  be  considered  by  the  jury.11 
And  where  plaintiff  alleged  that  he  was  hindered  from  transact- 
ing his  business  and  from  engaging  in  business  which  he  other- 
wise could  and  would  have  engaged  in,  it  was  held  that  he  could 
not,  under  such  allegations,  give  evidence  that  while  under  bonds 
not  to  go  out  of  the  county  he  could  twice  have  done  so  in  his 
business  as  claim  collector.1'-  And  if  at  the  time  of  the  arrest 
or  during  the  imprisonment  of  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  took, 
injured  or  destroyed  property  of  the  plaintiff,  the  latter  may 
recover  for  such  loss,  where  he  alleges  it  in  his  complaint." 
Again,  where  a  person  has  been  arrested,  it  is  the  duty  of  who- 
ever makes  the  arrest  to  bring  such  person  within  a  reasonable 
time  and  without  unnecessary  delay  before  a  magistrate,  who 
shall  deal  with  the  case  as  the  facts  may  require,  and  though  an 
arrest  may  be  lawful,  yet  for  any  undue  and  unnecessary  delay 
in  so  acting,  the  persons  responsible  therefor  may  be  liable  in 
damages.14 

§  450.  Measure  of  damages— Generally — Excessive  dam- 
ages.—  In  estimating  the  damages  recoverable  in  an  action  for 
a  wrongful  arrest  and  imprisonment,  the  malice  or  bad  motive 
of  the  person  responsible  therefor  is  an  element  to  be  considered. 
So,  also,  the  jury  may  consider  circumstances  of  aggravation  in 
making  the  arrest,  or  in  the  inprisonment,  the  place  and  dura* 


'  Duggan  v.  Baltimore  &  <).  R.  Co., 
159  Pa.  St.  248;  28  Atl.  182;  33  W. 
N.  C.  381;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  \.  S.  13. 

w  Hewlett  v.  George,  68  Miss.  703; 
9  So.  885. 

"Carpenter  v.  Perm.  R.  Co.,  13 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  328;  43  X.  V. 
Supp.  203;  Hoey  v.  Felton,  11  C.  B. 
(N.  S.)  142.  See  Thompson  v.  Ella- 
worth,  39  Mich.  7 

i-  Fuller  v.  Bowker,  11  Mich.  204. 
33 


18Blanchard     v.    Burbauk,    16    111. 
App.  375. 

u  Kirk  v.  Garrett,  84  Md.  383:  38 
Atl.  1089.  See  in  this  connection 
Potter  v.  Swindle.  77  Ga.  419;  Diers 
v.  Malkm,4G  Neb.  121;  04  N.  W.  722; 
Gibbs  v.  Randlett,  58  X.  II.  407; 
Pastor  v.  Regan,  9  Misc.  tX.  Y.  |  547; 
Burk  v.  Howley,  179  I'm.  St 
36  Atl.  327 j  39  W.  N.  C.  473;  27 
Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  266. 

513 


§  450  FALSE   ARREST    AND    IMPRISONMENT. 

tion  of  imprisonment,  and  the  standing,  financially  or  socially,  of 
the  person  arrested.  The  length  of  the  imprisonment  may  be 
brief,  hut  the  circumstances  accompanying  the  arrest  as  of  insult 
or  false  and  malicious  accusation  .of  a  criminal  offense  or  mali- 
cious imprisonment,  either  with  criminals  or  in  a  foul  or  loath- 
some place,  may  be  circumstances  which  justify  an  award  of 
more  than  actual  damages.lj 


^See   the   following  cases   where 
these    various    elements   have  heen 
considered:     Woman — arrested      on 
faise   charge    of  forcible  entry   into 
house   of  one    of    defendants — con- 
fined  with     disorderly  women — re- 
quired to   give    surety  of   the   peace 
without  trial — arrest  without  proba- 
ble cause  and  to  keep  plaintiff  away 
from  house  until  defendant  could  re- 
move plaintiff's  things  therefrom  and 
tear  house  down — $4,000  not  exces- 
sive.    Clarke   v.   American  Dock  &  j 
Improvement     Co.,    35     Fed.     478.  i 
Arrest   and  detention   from    Friday  j 
until  Monday— $3,500  not  excessive,  j 
Cuthbert  v.  Galloway,  35  Fed.  466. 
Evidence  of   passion  or  prejudice — 
prosecution   conducted    with   much 
bitterness — some  of  property  recov- 
ered,  but  fact  withheld   from  court 
and     jury — $2,000     not     excessive. 
Williams   v.  Casebeer,    126   Cal.  77; 
58   Pac.    380.     Woman— illegally  ar- 
rested and  detained  three  days  and 
nights  in  detective  agency — chained 
to  bed  one  night — $1,271  not  exces- 
sive.    Pinkerton   v.    Snyder,   87  111. 
App.  76.     Arrest   by  private   person 
on  charge  of  shoplifting — not  guilty 
— allowed  to  go  only  after   she  had 
paid  five   times  the  price   of  goods 
she  was  accused  of   stealing — $2,500 
not    excessive.      Siegel-C.  &  Co.   v. 
Connor,  70  111.  App.  116;  2  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  271.     Young  man  of  high  per- 
sonal character,  excellent  family  and 
social       connections — imprison  ment 
rigorous  and   loathsome  and  health 

514 


seriously  and  permanently  impaired 
— imprisoned  eight  weeks — $40,000 
not  excessive.  Mexican  C.  R.  Co., 
v.  Gehr,  66  111.  App.  173;  12  Nat. 
Corp.  Rep.  651;  1  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
419.  In  custody  eight  days — forty 
dollars  expended  to  secure  release — 
$100  not  excessive.  Johnson  v.  Kou- 
ton,  35  Neb.  898;  53  N.  W.  995. 
Elderly  gentleman  charged  with  at- 
temping  to  steal  ride  on  train — $500 
not  excessive.  Toomey  v.  Del.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  St.  R.  507;  24 
N.  Y.  Supp.  108.  Unlawful  arrest- 
only  lucked  up  an  hour  and  a  half- — 
$1,000  not  excessive.  Thorp  v.  Car- 
valho,  14  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  554;  70  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  760;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  1.  Arrest 
on  charge  of  horse  stealing — con- 
fined in  jail  twelve  hours — $400  not 
excessive.  Karner  v.  Stump,  12 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  461;  34  S.  W.  056. 
Arrest  of  police  captain  for  wearing 
uniform  and  badge  which  he  did  un- 
der belief  that  he  had  right  to  do  so 
until  his  successor  qualified — carried 
through  streets  in  van — searched — 
and  confined  in  prison  until  released 
by  habeas  corpus — $1,000  not  exces- 
sive. Bolton  v.  Velliues,  94  Va.  393; 
26  S.  E.  847;  3  Va.  L.  Reg.  120. 
Woman  accused  of  shoplifting — re- 
quired to  go  to  office,  where  she  vol- 
untarily remained  some  time— mis- 
take— innocent — $1,000  excessive. 
The  Fair  v.  Himmel,  50  111.  App.  215. 
No  humiliation,  expense  or  incon- 
venience— restrained  of  liberty  only 
a     few     minutes — $500     excessive. 


FALSF.    ARBEST    AM)    IMPRISONMENT.      §§  451,     \~>- 

§  451.  Mental  suffering. — In  case  of  wrongful  arrest  or  false 
imprisonment,  damages  for  mental  suffering,  wounded  pride, 
indignity  and  humiliation  are  recoverable.18  So  where  a  wrong- 
ful arrest  is  made  in  a  public  place  and  in  the  presence  of  a 
large  number  of  persons,  damages  for  mental  suffering  may  be 
properly  allowed."  And  the  fact  that  the  jail  in  which  the 
plaintiff  was  confined  was  in  a  filthy  condition,  is  admissible  in 
evidence  upon  the  question  of  his  mental  suffering,  as  is  also 
any  fact  showing  the  circumstances  of  his  family,  or  that  he  was 
deprived  of  certain  comforts  or  necessities.18  Butinan  action  for 
false  imprisonment  it  is  decided  that  evidence  is  not  admissible 
as  to  the  amount  of  plaintiff's  damages  per  day  as  a  result  of 
mental  suffering;  all  the  facts  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury 
and  it  is  for  them  to  determine  the  damages  recoverable.19 


§  452.  Punitive  damages. — The  motive  of  the  defendant 
is  properly  considered  in  determining  whether  punitive  dam- 
ages shall  be  awarded.  If  there  appears  no  evidence  of  bad 
motive,  malice,  or  wanton,  or  oppressive  conduct,  such  damages 
should  not  be  given,  and  the  plaintiff  is  properly  confined  to  the 
actual  damages  sustained,  but  if  it  appear  that  the  false  arrest 


Miller  v.  Ashcraft,  98  Kv.  314;  32  S. 
W.  1085;  17  Ky.  L.  Rep.  894.  Ar- 
rested for  making  threats — ordered 
to  give  bonds  for  $500 — but  refused 
to  though  he  could  have  easily 
done  so,  and  went  to  jail — damage 
from  loss  of  time  merely  nominal — 
■$288  excessive.  Yost  v.  Tracy,  13 
Utah,  431;  45  Pac.  346.  Xo  actual 
confinement — after  being  in  custody 
only  an  hour  released  upon  making 
a  small  deposit  and  promising  to  ap- 
pear in  court  when  no  examination 
was  made  and  there  was  no  objec- 
tion to  discharge — $3,500  grossly  ex- 
cessive and  reduced  to  $1,000.  Bill- 
ingsley  v.  Maus,  93  Wis.  176;  67  X. 
W.  49. 

"Gibney  v.  Lewis,  68  Conn.  392; 
36  Atl.  799;  Stewart  v.  Maddox,  63 
End.  51;  Yount  v.  Carney  (Iowa),  60 
N.   W.   114;  Morgan    v.    Cm-lev,    142 


Mass.  107;  Ross  v.  Leggett.  61  Midi. 
445;  Lamlrum  v.  Wells  (Tex.  C.  A.), 
26  S.  W.  1001;  Hays  v.  Creary,  60 
Tex.  445;  Parsons  v.  Harper,  16 
Gratt.  (Va. )  64;  Fenelon  v.  Butts,  53 
Wis.  344. 

17  Yount  v.  Carney  (Iowa),  60  X.  W. 
114. 

18Feuelou  v.  Butts.  :>;;  Wis.  344; 
Clark  v.  American  Dock,  etc.,  Co..  35 
Fed.  478;  McCall  v.  McDowell,  Deady. 
233;  Abraham  v.  Cooper,  si  Pa.  St. 
232.  It  is  held,  however,  that  if  the 
plaintiff  is  subjected  to  annoyances, 
inconveniences,  discomforts  or  any 
other  wrongful  act  which  the  defend- 
ant did  not  in  any  way  authorize,  evi- 
dence thereof  is  not  admissible. 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Williams,  69 
Ga.  251. 

laLandrum  v.  Wells  (Tex.  C.  A.), 
26  S.  W.  1001. 

515 


§  453 


FALSE    AKREST    AND    IMPRISONMENT. 


and  imprisonment  was  actuated  by  malice  or  oppression,  or 
wantonness  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  then  such  facts  may 
properly  be  considered  by  the  jury  and  will  justify  an  award  of 
exemplary  or  punitive  damages.30  But  the  allowance  of  such 
damages  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  jury.21  So  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  malice  and  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  exem- 
plary damages,  the  jury  may  properly  consider  the  damage  done 
by  defendant  to  household  furniture  of  the  plaintiff  shortly 
after  his  arrest.22  And  where  an  arrest  is  made  under  circum- 
stances indicating  a  wanton  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  person 
arrested,  punitive  damages  may  be  awarded,  though  there  be  no 
actual  malice.23  And  gross  negligence  or  insult  may  be  suffi- 
ciently aggravating  to  justify  the  award  of  such  damages.24 

§  453.  Same  subject  continued. — It  is  not  necessary  to  show 
malice  in  the  ordinary  sense  to  entitle  one  to  recover  punitive 
damages  in  an  action  for  false  imprisonment,  but  legal  malice 
is  sufficient.25  Though  an  arrest  may  not  be  prompted  by  anger, 
bad  motive  or  vindictiveness,  yet  an  improper  motive  may  be  in- 
ferred from  a  wrongful  act,  as  in  the  case  of  an  arrest  based  on 
no  reasonable  ground,  and  such  a  motive  will  constitute  malice  in 


20McCall  v.  McDowell,  1  Abb.  (N. 
S.)  212;  Roza  v.  Smith  (D.  C.  N.  D. 
Cal.),  65  Fed.  592;  Thorpe  v.  Wray, 
68  Ga.  359;  Little  v.  Munson,  54  111. 
App.  437;  Pearce  v.  Needhara,  37 
111.  App.  90;  Ross  v.  Leggett,  61 
Mich.  445;  28  N.  W.  695;  1  Am.  St. 
Rep.  608;  Fellows  v.  Goodman,  49  Mo. 
62;  Craven  v.  Bloom ingdale,  64  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  262;  30  Misc.  650,  afTd  54 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  266;  66  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  525;  Kolzen  v.  Broadway  &  S. 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  656;  1 
Misc.  148;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  700;  Lim- 
beck v.  Gerry,  15  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  663; 
39  N.  Y.  Supp.  95;  Lewis  v.  Clegg, 
120  N.  C.  292;  26  S.  E.  772;  Bucha- 
nan v.  Goettmann  (C.  P.  Pa.),  29 
Pitts,  L.  J.  N.  S.  302;  Balton  v.  Vel- 
lines,  94  Va.  393;  26  S.  E.  847;  3  Va. 
Law  Reg.  120;  Parsons  v.  Harper,  16 

516 


Gratt.  (Va. )  64;  Grace  v.  Dempsey, 
75  Wis.  313;  Coddington  v.  Lloyd,  8 
A.  &  El.  449;  Warwick  v.  Frouke, 
12  M.  &  W.  507. 

21  Craven  v.  Bloomingdale,  54  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  266;  66  N.  Y.  Supp. 
525,  aff'g  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  262. 

22  Hendricks  v.  Haskins,  114  Mich. 
291;  72  N.  W.  152;  4  Det.  L.  N.  511; 
30  Chic.  Leg.  News,  81. 

23 Kolzen  v.  Broadway  &  S.  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  656;  1  Misc. 
148;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  700;  Pearce  v. 
Needham,  37  111.  App.  90. 

2*  Lewis  v.  Clegg,  120  N.  C.  292;  26 
S.  E.  772. 

25  Craven  v.  Bloomingdale,  64 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  262;  30  Misc.  650,  afFd 
54  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  266;  66  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  525. 


KALSK    ARREST    AND    I  M  i'l:is<  >\  M  BNT.  §    158 

law  which  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence.'-*  But  where  an  arrest 
is  madron  suspicion  and  is  deemed  to  be  warranted  by  the  circum- 
stances, and  is  made  in  good  faith,  and  there  is  no  evidence  show- 
ing any  malice,  ill-will  or  wanton  disregard  of  rights,  there  is  do 
ground  for  an  award  of  punitive  damages.''  So  an  arrest  of  a 
passenger  at  the  instance  of  a  railroad  conductor,  though  with- 
out probable  cause,  will  not  render  the  company  liable  for  ex- 
emplary damages  where  it  appears  that  the  conductor  acted  in 
good  faith,  being  honestly  mistaken,  and  there  is  no  evidence  of 
any  malice  on  his  part  or  that  he  acted  with  an  intention  to  injure 
or  oppress  such  passenger.*  But  where  the  plaintiff  who  was  ex- 
amining watches  in  defendant's  store  was  detained  and  searched 
in  the  presence  of  and  surrounded  by  defendant's  employees,  on 
the  suspicion  of  having  taken  a  watch  which  the  salesgirl  said 
was  missing,  punitive  damages  were  awarded  to  the  plaintiff  in 
an  action  for  false  imprisonment.21  And  where  a  person  accused 
an  industrious  young  man  of  sober  habits  of  stealing  his  bicycle, 
and  refused  to  go  with  him  to  prominent  citizens,  by  whom  he 
could  establish  his  movements  on  the  evening  in  question,  but 
summarily  arrested  him  and  then  turned  him  over  to  a  night 
watchman  with  instructions  to  hold  him  until  the  wheel  was 
found,  and  such  acts  were  done  in  the  presence  of  a  number  of  peo- 
ple, and  the  watchman  also  kept  him  exposed  to  the  gaze  of  people 
passing  by  and  refused  to  give  him  the  opportunity  of  establish- 
ing his  innocence  by  the  people  whom  he  wished  to  see,  punitive 
damages  were  declared  to  be  properly  allowed.*  So,  also,  where 
a  tenant  who  had  been  given  notice  to  vacate  the  premises  oc- 
cupied by  him  was  engaged  in  removing  his  furniture  when  the 
landlord  appeared,  and  against  the  tenant's  objection  entered  the 
house  and  used  abusive  and  violent  language  and  became  so 
threatening  in  his  actions  that  the  tenant  drew  a  pistol,  where- 
upon  the  landlord    procured  his  arrest  on   the   charge   of  as- 

2*  Bolton  v.   Vcllines,  94   V:i.  393;    217.     See  Cone  v.  Central   R.  Co.,  82 


26  S.  E.  S  IT ;  3  Va.  Law  Keg.  120. 

27  Newman  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  (N.  Y.),  835;  27 
N.  Y.  St.  R.   135;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  5G0. 

28  Claiborne  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio 
R.  R.  Co.,  46  W.  Va.  863;  33  S.  E. 
262;  14  Am.   &   Eng.   R.   Cas.   N.   S. 


N.  J.  L.  99;  40  Atl.  780;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  278;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  6:>9. 

'-'■'  Stevens  v.  O'Neill,  51  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  304;  64   N'.  Y.  St.  R.  603. 

80  Hight  v.  Naylor,  86  111.  App.  508. 

oil 


§  454 


FALSE    ARREST    AND    IMPRISONMENT. 


sault  with  a  dangerous  weapon,  compensatory  and  punitive 
damages  were  given.-1*1  But  where  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover 
exemplary  damages  in  an  action  for  false  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment, alleging  in  his  complaint  that  the  defendant  acted  mali- 
ciously and  without  probable  cause,  the  latter  may,  under  a  gen- 
eral denial,  show  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  connected  with 
the  arrest,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  an  award  of  such  dam- 
ages.32 

§  ±54.  Mitigation  of  damages. — If  the  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment of  a  person  is  in  good  faith  and  under  such  circumstances 
and  facts  as  would  warrant  a  reasonable  man  in  the  belief  that 
there  was  probable  cause  for  making  the  arrest,  such  facts  may 
be  considered  by  the  jury  in  mitigation  of  exemplary  damages 
but  not  of  actual  damages.33  But  though  there  may  exist  prob- 
able cause  for  the  arrest  of  a  person  on  a  specific  charge,  yet 
this  will  not  justify  the  detention  of  the  arrested  person  on  a 
substituted  charge.34  Where,  however,  there  is  information 
which  points  to  a  person's  guilt  upon  which  information  another 
acts,  but  before  procuring  the  arrest  of  such  person  he  lays  the 
whole  matter  before  a  magistrate  who  advises  the  issuance  of  a 
warrant,  and  the  arrested  person  simply  repudiates  the  charge 
but  does  not  attempt  to  explain  the  suspicious  circumstances, 


31  Parker  v.  McGlifl,  52  La.  Ann. 
1514;  27  So.  946. 

32  Richardson  v.  Huston,  10  S.  D. 
484;  74  N.  W.  234. 

33  Mitchell  v.  Malone,  77  Ga.  301; 
Newton  v.  Locklin,  77  111.  103;  Carey 
v.  Sheets,  60  Ind.  17;  Painte-  v. 
Ives,  4  Neb.  122;  Gamier  v.  Squires 
(Kan.  1900),  62  Pac.  1005;  Comer  v. 
Knowles,  17  Kan.  441;  Roberts  v. 
Hackney  (Ky.  1900),  59  S.  W.  328, 
mod'g  order  22  Ky.  Law  R.  975 ;  58  S. 
W.  810;  Strieker  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  60 
N.  J.  L.  230;  37  Atl.  776;  7  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  758;  Renck  v.  Mc- 
Gregor, 32  N.  J.  L.  70;  Bradner  v. 
Faulkner,  93  N.  Y.  515;  Kutner  v. 
Fargo,  34  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  317;  54 
N.    Y.  Supp.  332;  Newman  v.  New 

518 


York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  335;  27  N.  Y.  St.  R.  135;  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  560;  Brown  v.  Chadsey, 
39  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  253;  Grace  v.  Demp- 
sey,  75  Wis.  313:  Landrum  v.  Wells 
(Tex.  C.  A.),  26  S.  W.  1001;  43  N. 
W.  1127.  The  question  of  the  ex- 
istence of  probable  cause  which 
would  authorize  the  arrest  of  a  per- 
son without  a  warrant  is  held  to  be 
one  of  law  for  the  court.  Diers  v. 
Mallon,  46  Neb.  121;  64  N.  W.  722. 
34  Francis  v.  Tilyon,  26  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  340;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  799.  In 
this  case  a  person  was  arrested  on 
the  charge  of  grand  larceny  and  sub- 
sequently detained  on  the  charge  of 
vagrancy. 


FALSE    FREEST    AM»    [MPEISONMENT. 


§  155 


such  facts  are  sufficient  to  show  probable  cause. '  But  instruc- 
tions given  to  the  defendant  by  his  employer  to  procure  the 
arrest  of  the  plaintiff  are  not  admissible  in  mitigation  of  dam- 
ages.93 In  such  actions  the  defendant  may,  as  bearing  upon  the 
question  of  malice  and  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  an  award 
of  exemplary  damages,  introduce  in  evidence  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury,  the  affidavit,  warrant  and  proof  of  arrest  under 
the  assumed  authority  of  a  void  warrant.'  And.  where  a  per- 
son is  arrested  on  suspicion  of  disloyally  and  an  act  of  assas- 
sination, the  officer  responsible  for  the  arrest  may  show  a  mili- 
tary order,  in  mitigation  of  damages  for  false  imprisonment, 
though  it  may  not  justify  him  in  his  act.:s  Again,  where  an  offi- 
cer arrested  a  person  on  the  charge  of  aiding  and  abetting  de- 
serters from  the  army  and  the  arrest  was  without  a  warrant, 
but  made  under  the  orders  of  his  commanding  officer,  he  was,  in 
an  action  against  him  for  false  imprisonment,  allowed  to  show 
in  support  of  his  belief  for  making  the  arrest  and  in  mitiga- 
tion of  damages,  that  the  arrested  person  had  been  engaged 
in  procuring  men  to  enlist  and  then  to  desert  after  they  had 
obtained  their  bounty,  though  such  facts  were  not  known  to 
him  at  the  time  of  the  arrested  person's  release  from  imprison- 
ment.39 

§  455.  Evidence — Generally. — In  an  action  to  recover  for 
false  arrest  and  imprisonment,  the  fact  that  an  account  of  the  ar- 
rest was  published  in  the  newspapers  is  admissible  in  evidence  as 
bearing  on  the  question  of  damages.40  And  the  plaintiff  in  such 
an  action  may  testify  to  the  fact  that  tie-  person  making  the  ar- 
rest under  the  direction  of  the  defendant  promised  him  in  re- 
sponse to  a  request  by  the  plaintiff  that  he  would  notify  his  wife 
of  his  arrest,  hut  that  she  failed  to  come  and  see  him.  and  that 
none  of  his  friends  came  until  the  following  morning.41     But  the 


35  Kutnor  v.  Fargo,  34  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  317;  :>4  X.  Y.  Supp.  332. 

88  Josselyn  v.  McAllister,  22  Mich. 
300. 

87  Woodall  v.  McMillan,  3S  Ala. 
622. 

88  Carpenter  v.  Parker,  23  Iowa, 
4:.0. 

as  Beck  with  v.  Bean,  98  U.  S.  266; 


1  Russell  &  Winslow's  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court  Reports,  Syllabus  Uigesl 

11  Filer  v.  Smith.  96  Midi.  :',17;  55 
X.  W.  999;  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  603;  37 
('cut.  L.  J.  237;  Scott  v.  Flowers,  60 
Neb.  07:.;  St  X.  W.  SI. 

41  San  Antonio  &  A.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Griffin,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  91;  48  S. 
\Y.  542. 

519 


8  456 


FALSE   ARREST   AND    IMPRISONMENT. 


fact  that  a  village  trustee  against  whom  an  action  for  false  im- 
prisonment and  malicious  prosecution  had  been  brought  for  pro- 
curing the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  for  riding  upon  the  sidewalk, 
in  violation  of  an  ordinance,  had  on  a  previous  occasion  told  an 
officer  to  watch  the  plaintiff  and  two  other  women,  and  in  case 
he  found  them  riding  upon  the  sidewalk  to  arrest  them,  is  not 
admissible  as  showing  malice  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that 
such  order  was  given  for  any  other  purpose  than  to  procure  the 
enforcement  of  the  ordinance.42  Evidence  as  to  the  plaintiff's 
previous  good  character  is  not  admissible  in  an  action  for  false 
imprisonment  where  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  assail  it,4* 
but  otherwise  where  the  defendant  in  mitigation  of  damages 
has  introduced  evidence  to  show  that  the  public  strongly  sus- 
pected him  of  the  crime  for  which  he  was  arrested.44  Nor 
can  the  defendant,  where  no  justification  is  pleaded,  in  such  an 
action  introduce  in  evidence  an  unsigned  commitment  under 
which  the  plaintiff  was  imprisoned.45  Again,  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing that  an  arrest  was  procured  by  the  defendant  and  that  there  was 
want  of  probable  cause  rests  upon  the  plaintiff.46  But  evidence 
of  facts  and  circumstances  which  raise  a  reasonable  presumption 
that  the  defendant  ordered  or  directed  the  false  arrest  and  im- 
prisonment of  the  plaintiff  establishes  a  prima  facie  case  for  him.47 
And  where  it  has  been  shown  that  defendant  acting  through 
his  agent  procured  the  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  the  plaintiff 
and  that  he  was  subsequently  discharged,  the  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  defendant  to  show  a  justification  for  his  act.48 

§  456.  Pleading. — In  an  action  to  recover  for  false  imprison- 
ment, the  plaintiff  must  allege  in  his  complaint  that  the  impris- 
onment was  illegal  or  was  procured  without  a  warrant.49     Un- 


42  Fuller  v.  Reddingr,  13  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  61;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  96. 

43  Diers  v.  Mallon,  46  Neb.  121;  64 
N.  W.  722. 

44  American  Express  Co.  v.  Patter- 
son, 73  Ind.  430. 

45  Yost  v.  Tracy,  13  Utah,  431;  45 
Pac.  346.  See  Russell  v.  Shuster,  8 
W.  &  S.  308. 

46  Limbeck  v.  Gerry,  15  Misc.  (N. 

520 


Y.)  663;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  95;  Warren 
v.  Dennett,  17  Misc.  (N.  Y)  86;  39 
N.  Y.  Supp.  830. 

47  Limbeck  v.  Gerry,  15  Misc.  (N. 
Y.)  663;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  95. 

48  Mexican  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gehr,  66 
111.  App.  173;  12  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
651;  1  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  419. 

49  Cousius  v.  Swords,  14  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  338;  43  N.  Y  Supp.  907. 


FALSK    A.RREST    AM"     IMPRISONMENT. 


§  \. ".t; 


der  the  New  York  Code," which  provides  that  in  an  action  tore- 
cover  for  persona]  injuries  two  or  more  causes  of  action  may  be 
joined,  there  may  be  a  joinder  of  a  cause  of  action  for  false  im- 
prisonment with  one  for  malicious  prosecution.51  But  though 
such  causes  of  action  may  he  joined  in  the  same  complaint,  they 
cannot  be  maintained  on  the  same  state  of  facts.68 


60  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.    Proc.  sec.  484, 
subd.  2. 
"  Thorp  v.  Carvalho,  14  Misc.  (N. 


Y.)  5o4;  70  N.  Y.  St.   R.  760;  36  N. 
Y.  Supp.   1. 

52  Warren     v.    Dennett,     17     Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  86;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  830. 

521 


§  467  ALIENATION    OF   AFFECTIONS. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

ALIENATION  OP  AFFECTIONS — CRIMINAL  CONVERSATION. 

$  457.   Alienation      of      affections —  I      45'.).   Exemplary  damages. 

Criminal        conversation —  '      460.  Evidence  in  mitigation. 
Measure  of  damages  for.  461.   Advice    by   parent  to   son  to 


158.  Right  of  wife  to  recover  for 
alienation  of  affections  of 
husband. 


leave  wife. 
4Gi'.  Evidence — Generally. 
403.  Pleading. 


§  457.  Alienation  of  affections — Criminal  conversation — 
Measure  of  damages  for. — One  who  by  his  intentional  con- 
duct prejudices  a  wife  against  her  husband,  and  alienates  her 
affections  from  him,  is  liable  to  the  husband  for  the  damages 
which  he  suffers  as  the  result  of  such  act.1  And  where  the 
wife  is  seduced  in  such  a  case,  the  husband  has  a  right  of  action 
based  on  his  loss  of  consortium.2  While  loss  of  consortium  is 
the  main  ground  for  the  assessment  of  damages,  it  is,  however, 
not  the  only  ground.3  So  the  alienation  of  her  affections  while 
not  the  gist  of  the  action,  may  be  considered  in  aggravation  of 
the  damages.4  So  in  an  action  for  alienation  of  affections  and 
criminal  conversation,  the  husband  may  recover  for  the  loss 
which  he  has  sustained  of  the  services  of  his  wife,  including  her 
conjugal  society,  aid,  assistance,  comfort  and  affection,  and  the 
mortification,  mental  anguish  and  disgrace  resulting  from  de- 
fendant's act,  the  damages  being  dependent  in  each  case  upon 
the  extent  of  the  injury  sustained  by  the  husband,  to  be  de- 
termined in  the  discretion  of  the  jury,  whose  verdict  will  not 
be  disturbed  unless  the  amount  awarded  appear  to  have  been 
the  result  of  passion,  prejudice  or  corruption.5     And  though 


1  Halfpence  v.  Rodgers,  143  Mo. 
623;  45  S.  W.  650;  Metcalf  v.  Rob- 
erts, 23  Ont.  Rep.  130. 

2  Evans  v.  O'Connor,  174  Mass. 
287;  54  N.  E.  557.  See  Evans  v. 
Evans,  68  Law  J.  Prob.  70.(1899); 
Prob.  195;  81  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  60. 

522 


3  Evans  v.  Evans,  68  Law  J.  Prob. 
70  (1899);  Prob.  195;  81  Law  T. 
(N.  S.)60. 

4  Evans  v.  O'Connor,  174  Mass. 
287;  54  N.  E.  557. 

6  Long  v.  Booe  (Ala.),  17  So.  716; 
Prettymau   v.   Williamson,   1   Penn. 


CRIMINAL    CONVERSATION. 


8  t51 


no  damages  in  a  specific  amount  are  proved,  the  plaintifl  in 

such  an  action  is  entitled  to  recover  substantial  damages.'1  So 
it  is  proper  for  the  judge  in  instructing  the  jury  to  call  their 

attention  to  the  several  ways  in  which  plaintiff  may  suffer 
damages  as  a  result  of  his  wife's  Seduction,  leaving  it  to  them 
to  determine  whether  from  all  the  evidence  he  did  suffer  in 
any  of  the  ways  specified,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent.'  But  an 
instruction  to  the  jury  in  an  action  by  a  husband  for  the  seduc- 
tion of  his  wile,  that  the  real  and  substantial  damages  are 
for  the  loss  of  the  society  of  the  wife,  and  the  alienation  of  her 
affections,  together  with  "al]  other  proper  considerations,"  which 
are  applicable  to  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  was  held  to  he 
error  where  the  amount  awarded  was  large."  Although  the  jury 
in  estimating  the  damages  in  this  class  of  actions  may  consider 
the  elements  above  mentioned,  they  are  also  to  consider  that  the 
husband's  right  to  the  services,  conjugal  society,  affection,  aid 
and  assistance  of  his  wife,  is  burdened  with  the  obligation  on 
his  part  to  support,  clothe,  cherish  and  care  for  her.'1  Again,  in 
an  action  to  recover  lor  a  wife's  seduction,  evidence  is  admissi- 


(Del.)   224;    39   Atl.    731;    Yundt   v.  i 
Bartrunft,  41  111.  0;  Puth  v.  Zimble- 
inaii,    9!)   Iowa.    641;  (iS  \.   W.   895;! 
Johnston   v.  Disbrow,  47   Mich.   59;  ■ 
Hartpence  v.  Kodgers,    143  Mo.  623; 
45   S.    W.   650;   Smith   v.   Myers,   52 
Neb.   70;    71   N.    W.    1006;   Smith   v. 
Masten,  15  Wend.  ( N.   Y. )  270;  Wil- 
ton  v.    Webster,    7    C.    &    P.     198; 
Duberly  v.  Gunning,  4  Term  R.  657. 
See   following  cases   as  to  amounts  , 
awarded  for  alienation  of  affections 
and   criminal    conversation:     $1,500 
held   not  excessive,  Path  v.  Zi noble- 
man,   99    Iowa,    641;  6S  N.  W.   895;  | 
$4,375     not    excessive,    Dorman    v. 
Sebree  (Ky.),    52  S.  W.   809;  $5,250 
not  excessive    where    husband    and 
wife    had   previously   lived  happily, 
and  her  reputation  had  always  been 
good  prior  to  the  time  she  came  un- 
der    defendant's     influence,      Hart- 
pence   v.    Rogers,    143   Mo.   623;    45 
S.    W.    650;    $3,000    not    excessive, 


Smith  v.  Myers,  52  Neb.  70:  71  Neb. 
1006;  $15,000  not  excessive,  rela- 
tions prior  to  acquaintance  with  de- 
fendant, cordial,  friendly  and  af- 
fectionate— plaintiff  a  lawyer  and 
prosecuting  attorney,  and  his  wife 
a  school-teacher  receiving  good 
wages.  Speck  v.  Gray,  14  Wash. 
589;  45  l'ac.  143:  $5,000  held  ex- 
cessive where  plaintiff  consented  to 
sexual  intercourse  between  plaintiff 
and  his  wife.  Peek  v.  Traylor,  17 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  L312;  34  S.  W.  705. 

''■  Hart  v.  Shorey,  Rep.  Jud.  Queb. 
12  C.  S.  84. 

7  Matheis  v.  Mazet,  164  Pa.  St. 
580;  30  Atl.  434:  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
169. 

8  Hoggins  v.  Coad.  58  111.  App.  58. 
'•'  Prettyman      v.     Williamson.     1 

Penn.  (Del.)  224:  89  Atl.  731:  l'uth 
v.  Zimbleman,  99  Iowa.  641:  6S  N. 
W.  895;  Rudd  v.  Rounds.  64  Vt. 
432;  25  Atl.  438. 

523 


§  458  ALIENATION    OF    AFFECTIONS. 

ble  of  facts  which  aggravate  the  injury,  and  consequently  go 
to  enhance  the  damages.  So  the  happiness  which  existed  in 
the  domestic  relations  of  the  husband  and  wife  prior  to  her  se- 
duction, and  her  previous  virtuous  behavior  and  unblemished 
reputation  and  character,  together  with  any  special  advantages 
accruing  to  the  husband  by  reason  of  the  relations  of  husband 
and  wife,  are  facts  which  the  jury  may  consider.10  But  where 
the  plaintiff  claims  damages  for  a  venereal  disease,  which  he  has 
contracted  as  a  result  of  defendant's  intercourse  with  his  wife, 
he  must  specially  allege  damages  from  such  cause.11 

§  458.  Right  of  wife  to  recover  for  alienation  of  affections 
of  husband. — The  common-law  disability  which  prevented  a 
wife  from  maintaining  an  action  in  her  own  name  and  con- 
sequently from  suing  any  one  for  alienating  the  affections  of 
her  husband,  has  as  a  general  rule  been  removed  by  statute,  so 
that  to-day  under  the  enabling  acts,  which  permit  her  in 
most  of  the  states  to  sue  as  a  feme  sole,  she  may  recover  dam- 
ages against  a  third  person  for  the  alienation  of  her  husband's 
affections  and  consequent  loss  of  society,  aid,  and  support.1-' 


10  See  Milford  v.  Berkely,  1  Burr. 
609;  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Germain, 
12  How.  St.  Tr.  927. 

"  Dowdell  v.  King,  97  Ala.  635;  12 
So.  405. 

12  Betser  v.  Betser,  87  111.  App.  399; 
Dietzraan  v.  Mullin  (Ky.  1900),  57. S. 
W.  247;  Lockwood  v.  Lockwood,  67 
Minn.  476;  70  N.  W.  784;  Nichols  v. 
Nichols,  134  Mo.  187;  35  S.  W.  577; 
Clark  v.  Hill,  69  Mo.  App.  541;  Ro- 
maine  v.  Decker,  11  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  20;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  79;  Gernerd 
v.  Gernerd,  185  Pa.  St.  233;  39  Atl. 
884;  40  L.  R.  A.  549;  42  W.  N.  C.  49; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  121  N.  C.  8;  38  L. 
R.  A.  242;  27  S.  E.  998;  Beach  v. 
Brown,  20  Wash.  266;  43  L.  R.  A. 
114;  55  Pac.  46.  But  see  Crocker  v. 
Crocker,  98  Fed.  702,  construing  the 
Massachusetts  statute.  Smith  v. 
Smith,  98  Tenn.  101;  38  S.  W.  439; 
Lellis  v.  Lambert,  24  Ont.  App.  653. 
524 


See  in  this  connection  also,  Mehrott' 
v.  Mehroff,  26  Fed.  13;  Foot  v.  Card, 
58  Conn.  4;  6  L.  R.  A.  829;  Haynes 
v.  Nowlin,  129  Ind.  581;  14  L.  R.  A. 
787;  Price  v.  Price,  91  Iowa,  693;  29 
L.  R.  A.  150;  Warren  v.  Warren,  89 
Mich.  123;  14  L.  R.  A.  545;  Seaver  v. 
Adams,  66  N.  H.  142;  19  Atl.  776; 
Bennett  v.  Bennett,  116  N.  Y.  584;  6 
L.  R.  A.  553;  Westlake  v.  Westlake, 
34  Ohio  St.  621;  32  Am.  Rep.  397. 
See  following  cases  as  to  amount 
awarded  in  actions  by  wife  for  aliena- 
tion of  husband's  affections:  Action 
against  parents  of  husband — conduct 
wilful  and  malicious — health  of  wife 
impaired  by  the  separation — $15,000 
not  excessive.  Lockwood  v.  Lock- 
wood,  67  Minn.  476;  70  N.  W.  784, 
— $5,000  not  excessive.  Nichols  v. 
Nichols,  147  Mo.  387;  48  S.  W.  947. 
Action  agninst  brother  of  wife — no 
evidence     showing    he    advised   or 


CRIMINAL    CONVERSATION. 


§  158 


Id  mi  action  against  another  woman  for  alienating  the  affections 
of  the  plaintiff's  husband,  there  must  have  been  on  the  part  of 

the  defendant  some  wrongful  or  wilful  intent  to  engage  his 
affections  and  thereby  seduce  him  from  his  duty  and  fidelity  to 
the  plaintiff,  and  there  will  be  no  faull  imputed  to  the  defendant 

in  law  because  she  may  have  been  attractive,  or  pleased  with 
his  admiration.1"  And  where  owing  to  the  wilful  and  malicious 
conduct  of  another,  a  husband  is  induced  to  abandon  his  wife, 
she  mav  recover  damages  as  a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  his 
society,  protection  and  aid,  such  damages  not  being  merely 
Limited  to  the  injury  she  has  sustained  up  to  the  time  of  the 
suit."  And  her  recovery  of  such  damages  should  not  be  affected 
by  the  fact  that  she  procured  a  separation  from  him  after  he  had 
deserted  her,  where  the  action  for  the  separation  was  not  prose- 
cuted by  her  because  she  desired  to  live  apart  from  him,  but 
rather  because  she  could  not  learn  of  his  whereabouts  and  hoped 
to  induce  him  to  return.1"'  But  where  by  an  agreement  of  separa- 
tion in  consideration  of  a  certain  sum  paid  by  the  husband  and 
accepted  by  the  wife,  she  relinquishes  her  claim  against  him  for 
support,  she  cannot  in  an  action  for  alienation  of  affections  re- 
cover for  the  loss  of  support  and  maintenance."1  The  gist  of  the 
action  is  said  to  be  the  loss  of  consortium  and  not  the  loss  of  assist- 
ance, and  it  is  held  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  relations  of  the 
husband  with  the  defendant  were  improper  and  that  he  remained 
away  from  his  family,  but  there  must  also  have  been  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  some  active  interference.17  But  in  another 
case  where  the  evidence  showed  that  there  had  been  illicit  inter- 
course between  the  husband  and  the  defendant,  though  there 
was  no  proof  showing  that  such  relations  were  the  result  of  the 
seduction  of  the  husband  by  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that  such 


Bought  to  iudnce  plaintiffs  wife  to 
leave  him — $5,000 excessive.  Bathke 
v.  Krassin  (Minn.),  80  N.  YV.  950. 
Husband   <li<l    not   provide  for  his 

family  and  wife  had  stated  she  would 
support  him  no  longer — $2,000  ex- 
cessive. Van  Olinda  v.  Hall.  88  Hun 
(N.  Y.l,  4:>2;  34  N.  V.  Supp.  777. 

13  Whitman  v.  Egbert,  27  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y. )  374.     See  Buchanan  v.  Foster, 


23  App.   Div.  (X.    Y.i  542;  48  X.    V. 
Supp.  732. 
"Nichols  v.  Nichols,  147  Mo.  387; 

IS  s.  W.  017;  Wilson  v.  Coulter,  29 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  85;  51  \.  Y.  Supp.   804. 

'Wilson  v.  Coulter.  29  App.  Div. 
i\.  Y. )  8;>:  ol  X.  Y.  Supp.  n.>4. 

"Metcalf  v.  Tiffany,  106  Mich.  504: 
04  X.  W.  470;  2  Det.  L.  N.  •*-:'.•>. 

17  Buchanan  v.  Foster.  2:1  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  042;  48  X.  V.  Supp.  732. 

525 


§  459,  460  ALIENATION    OF    AFFECTIONS. 

evidence  would  sustain  a  finding  that  the  defendant  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  desertion  and  nonsupport  of  the  plaintiff  by 
her  husband  and  liable  in  damages  therefor.18 

§459.  Exemplary  damages — Exemplary  damages  may  be 
given  against  one  who  wilfully  and  maliciously  alienates  the  affec- 
tions of  another's  wife,  or  who  seduces  her.19  Or  for  the  alienation 
of  a  husband's  affections,  where  done  wantonly  and  maliciously?1 
But  in  an  action  for  the  alienation  of  a  wife's  affections,  it  was 
decided  that  an  instruction  to  the  jury  was  not  erroneous  because 
it  failed  to  state,  in  connection  with  an  instruction  as  to  exem- 
plary damages,  that  the  jury  must  find  that  the  act  of  the  de- 
fendant was  wanton,  malicious  or  from  an  improper  motive,  in 
order  to  authorize  the  recovery  of  such. damages,  where  the  only 
evidence  bearing  upon  this  was  the  statement  of  the  defendant 
that  his  motive  was  to  take  the  plaintiff's  wife  for  himself,  and 
that  the  sooner  he  could  get  rid  of  the  husband  the  sooner  he 
could  get  the  wife,  and  the  jury  found  that  the  act  of  the  de- 
fendant in  persuading  plaintiff's  wife  to  abandon  him  was  in- 
tentional."1 Alienating  the  affections  of  a  husband  or  wife  is 
declared  to  be  a  wrong  done  to  the  person  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Colorado  act,  which  permits  of  the  recovery  of  exemplary 
damages  in  such  cases.22 

§  460.  Evidence  in  mitigation. —Evidence  of  misconduct  on 
the  part  of  the  husband  in  his  relations  and  duties  towards  his 
wife  is  admissible  in  mitigation  of  damages.23  So  the  jury  may 
consider  evidence  showing  that  their  relations  were  unhappy, 
that  his  treatment  of  her  was  cruel  and  unkind,  or  that  there 
was  a  lack  of  affection  between  them.21     So  where  statements 


18Romaine  v.  Decker,  llApp.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  20;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  79. 

19Prettymanv.  Williamson,  1  Penn. 
(Del. )  224;  39  Atl.  731;  Johnson  v. 
Disbrow,  47  Mich.  59;  Hartpence  v. 
Rogers,  143  Mo.  623;  45  S.  W.  650; 
Johnson  v.  Allen,  100  N.  C.  131;  Cor- 
nelius v.  Hambay,  150  Pa.  St.  359;  24 
Atl.  515;  22  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  476. 

^Waldron  v.  Waldron  (C.  C.-N.  D 


21  Hartpence  v.  Rogers,  143  Mo. 
623;  45  S.  W.  650. 

22  Williams  v.  Williams,  20  Colo. 
51;  37  Pac.  614. 

23  Cross  v.  Grant,  32  N.  H.  675;  13 
Am.  St.  Rep.  607.  See  Schorn  v. 
Berry,  63  Hun  (N.Y.),  110:  43  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  508. 

M  Prettyman  v.  Williamson,  1  Penn- 
(Del.)  224;  39  Atl.   731;  Coleman  v. 


111.),  45  Fed.    314.  I  White,  43  Ind.  429;  Hadley  v.  Hey- 

'  526 


( ' R I M I NAL   CON  V ERSATION. 


§  460 


have  been  made  by  the  wife,  prior  to  the  alleged  seduction, 
afi  to  cruel  treatment  of  her  by  her  husband,  evidence  of  such 
statements  is  admissible  fur  the  purpose  of  mitigating  the  dam- 
ages.25 But  evidence  of  domestic  trouble  occurring  years  before 
the  time  of  the  alleged  seduction  is  not  admissible,  being  too 
remote.*  Again,  evidence  is  admissible  that  the  husband  is 
living  apart  from  his  wife,27  for  if  they  were  separated  before 
the  wife  committed  adultery  with  the  defendant,  such  fact  would 
be  a  good  reason  why  damages  against  the  defendant  should  be 
assessed  at  a  lower  rate.28  But  such  facts,  however,  only  go  in 
mitigation  of  damages.  So  though  there  may  be  a  written  agree- 
ment between  the  husband  and  wife,  in  which  she  agrees  to  re- 
lease her  marital  rights  with  her  husband,  in  consideration  of  a 
certain  amount,  sueh  agreement  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for 
the  alienation  of  the  husband's  affections.-'  Again,  the  defend- 
ant may  show  in  mitigation  of  damages  that  the  relations  of  the 
plaintiff  with  other  women  at  times  subsequent  to  the  marriage, 
and  before  the  trial,  have  been  of  a  criminal  character.*  So 
where  a  husband  has  brought  an  action  against  his  wife's  father 
for  the  alienation  of  the  wife's  affections,  evidence  is  admissible 
that  the  husband  was  a  frequenter  of  brothels  and  boasted  of  his 
criminal  connection  with  lewd  women,  and  that  he  was  an  ha- 
bitual drunkard.31  The  jury  may  also  consider  in  mitigation  of 
damages,  the  bad  character  of  the  wife  or  any  specific  acts  of 
unchastity  which  she  has  been  shown  to  have  committed.32    But 


wood,  121  Mass.  236;  Palmer  v.  Cook, 
7  Grya  (Mass),  418;  Ilarter  v.  Crill,33 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  283;  Jones  v.  Thomp- 
son, 6  C.  &  1".  41.") ;  Calcroft  v.  Har- 
borougli,  4  C.  &  P.  499;  Trelawney 
v.  Coleman,  2  Stark.  191;  Bromley 
v.  Wallace,  4  Esp.  237. 

^  Palmer  v.  Crook,  7  Gray  (  Mass. ), 
418;  Rudd  v.  Rounds,  64  Vt.  432;  25 
Atl.  438. 

*  Dorman  v.  Sebree  |  K  v.  i.  52  S.  W. 
809,  where  evidence  of  domestic 
trouble  which  occurred  eighteen 
years  before  the  time  of  the  injury 
was  held  inadmissible. 

27  Prettyman  v.  Williamson,  1  Penn. 
I  Del.)  224:  :;;»  Atl.  731. 


23  Evans  v.  Evans,  68  Law  J.  Prob. 
70;  (1899)  Prob.  195;  81  Law  T. 
(U.  S.)  60. 

-^Betser  v.  Betser,  87  ill.  App.  399, 
aff'd  58  X.  E.  249.  But  see  Buckel 
v.  Suss,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  21;  44  X.  V. 
St.  R.  571. 

;,Sh;ittuck  v.  Hammond,  46  Vt. 
466;  II  Am.  Rep.  631.  See  Norton 
v.  Warner,  9  Conn.  172;  Smith  v. 
Masten,  15  Wend.  (X.  V.)  270. 

31  Bennett  v.  Smith,  21  Barb.  (  X.  Y. ) 
139. 

a  Xorton  v.  Warner,  9  Conn.  172; 
Harrison  v.  Price,  22  I  ml.  165;  Con- 
way v.  Xichol,  34  Iowa.  .".:'.:'.;  Winter 
v.  Henn,  4  C.  &  P.  494. 


§  461 


ALIENATION    OF    AFFECTIONS. 


where  such  evidence  has  been  given  in  behalf  of  the  defendant, 
the  plaintiff  may  show  in  rebuttal  the  general  reputation  for 
chastity  of  his  wife.33  And  though  immoral  conduct  on  the  part 
of  the  wife  of  the  plaintiff  may  mitigate  the  damages  recover- 
able by  him  for  her  seduction,  yet  if  it  appears  that  her  immoral 
conduct  took  place  before  marriage  and  was  confined  exclusively 
to  her  intimacy  with  the  defendant,  who  induced  the  plaintiff  to 
marry  her  on  his  recommendation  that  she  was  a  good  girl,  and 
the  plaintiff  married  her,  believing  her  to  be  pure  and  virtuous, 
such  conduct  should  not  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  dam- 
ages.34 And  if  there  has  been,  in  respect  to  the  wrongful  act  of 
the  wife  with  the  defendant,  any  loose  or  negligent  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  husband,  not  amounting  to  consent,  such  con- 
duct may  be  considered  by  the  jury.33  But  though  a  husband 
may,  after  knowledge  of  the  infidelity  of  his  wife  cohabit  with 
her,  such  fact  is  not  a  bar  to  an  action  against  the  one  who 
seduced  her.36  And  the  fact  that  the  wife  consented  to  an  illicit 
intercourse  with  the  defendant  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for 
her  seduction,31  but  otherwise  if  the  intercourse  with  the  de- 
fendant was  the  result  of  her  own  licentiousness.38  And  the 
defendant  may  show  by  letters  from  the  wife  to  him,  or  by  other 
evidence,  that  the  first  advances  were  made  by  the  wife,  such 
evidence  tending  to  mitigate  the  damages.39 


§  461.  Advice  by  parent  to  son  to  leave  wife. — In  an  action 
against  a  parent  for  advising  his  son  to  separate  from  his  wife, 
it  is  decided  that  though  the  advice  was  wilful,  yet  it  is  not  thereby 
necessarily  malicious  so  as  to  render  the  parent  liable  in  dam- 
ages for  the  abandonment  if  the  parent  was  moved  by  proper 
motives  for  his  son's  welfare  and  happiness,40  but  otherwise  if 


33  Browning  v.  Jones,  52  111.  App. 
597. 

•^Stumm  v.  Hummell,  39  Iowa, 
478.  See  Conway  v.  Nichol,  34  Iowa, 
533. 

^Prettyman  v.  Williamson,  1  Penn. 
(Del.)  224;  30  Atl.  731. 

36  Smith  v.  Meyers,  51  Neb.  857;  71 
N.  W.  1006.  See  Sikes  v.  Tippins,  85 
Ga.  231;  Stumm  v,  Hummell,  39 
Iowa,  483. 

528 


37  Moore  v.  Hammons  (Ind. ),  21 
N.  E.  1111. 

38  Hoggins  v.  Coad,  58  111.  App. 
58. 

39  Elsam  v.  Fawcett,  2  Esp.  562. 

*»  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  74  Miss.  93; 
32  L.  R.  A.  623;  19  So.  955;  43  Cent. 
L.  J.  118;  Brown  v.  Brown,  124  N. 
C.  19;  32  S.  E.  320;  Gernerd  v.  Ger- 
nerd,  185  Pa.  St.  233;  40  L.  R.  A. 
549;  39  Atl.  884;  42  W.  N.  C.  49. 


CRIMINAL   CONVERSATION. 


§  162 


the  act  of  the  parent  was  unjustifiable,4'  as  where  the  parent 
had  not  properly  investigated  the  farts  or  acted  recklessly  or 
from  dishonest  purposes,  since  in  such  cases  the  law  will  presume 
malice.'-  In  an  action  of  this  character  it  is  proper  to  show  in 
mitigation  of  damages  that  the  son  was  married  while  he  was 
intoxicated  and  that  no  affection  everexisted  on  his  part  towards 
her.15 


§  462.  Evidence — Generally.— In  an  action  for  alienation  of 
affections,  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  wealth  of  the  defend- 
ants.44 And  a  female  plaintiff  in  an  action  fur  alienating  the 
affections  of  her  husband  may  give  evidence  of  the  cost  to  her 
of  living.48  And  she  may  also  show  that  by  reason  of  the  con- 
veyance of  his  property  to  the  defendant,  she  has  not  been  able 
to  recover  anything  on  account  of  alimony  and  costs  due  to  her 
by  reason  of  a  judgment  of  separation  in  her  favor."'  And  as 
bearing  on  the  question  of  damages,  letters  written  by  the  plain- 
tiff's wife  to  the  husband  prior  to  the  time  of  the  alleged  aliena- 
tion of  her  affections  are  admissible  in  evidence.47  So  also  in 
an  action  by  the.  wife  for  alienation  of  her  husband's  affections 
letters  written  by  him  to  her  before  and  after  he  became  ac- 
quainted with  the  defendant  are  admissible  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  his  feelings  towards  her  before  defendant  intervened 
and  subsequent  thereto.48  As  are  expressions  of  remorse  by  him 
in  interviews  with  her  after  the  intimacy.1''     And  for  the  purpose 


41<;ernerd  v.  Gernenl,  185  Pa.  St. 
233;  40  L.  R.  A.  549;  39  Atl.  884;  42 
W.  X.  C.  49. 

«  Brown  v.  Brown,  124  N.  C.  19; 
32  S.  E.  320. 

*3Bassett  v.  Bassett,  20  III.  App. 
54:;. 

"  Peters  v.  Lake,  CO  111.  206;  Nich- 
ols v.  Nichols,  1  17  M<».  :;s7:  is  s.  \V. 
<»47:  \V;il. Iron  v.  Waldron,  )•">  Fed. 
31G.  Hut,  sec  Bailej  v.  Bailey,  '.»l 
Iowa,  598;  03  N.  W.  341;  Derham  \. 
Derham  (Mich.),  83  N.  W.  1005;  7 
Det.  L.  N.  430.  In  these  lav,  two 
cases  which  were  actions  by  wife 
for  alienation  of  husband's  affections 
such  evidence  was  held  inadmissible. 

34 


**  Bowersox  v.  Bowersox.  115 
Mich.  21;  72  N.  W.  980;  4  Det.  L.  X. 
742. 

"Wilson  v.  Coulter,  20  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  85;  51  \.   V.  Supp.  Sill. 

4,;  Homer  v.  Vance,  93  Wis.  352; 
07  N.  W.  72H.  Such  letters  were 
held  admissible  notwithstanding  thai 
the  Wis.  Rev.  Stat. sec. 4072, provided 
that  confidential  communications 
between  r  husband  and  wife  during 
their  marriage  Bhould  not  l>o  dis- 
closed. 

4-\sh  v.  Prunier,  in:,  Fed.  72l\  44 
('.  C.  A.  675. 

»  Ash  \.  Prunier,  105  Fed.  722;  44 
C.  C.  A.  075. 

529 


§  463  ALIENATION    OF    AFFECTIONS. 

of  showing  loss  of  affection,  a  husband  who  has  discovered  his 
wife  in  the  company  of  the  defendant  may  give  proof  of  state- 
ments made  by  her  at  such  time  as  to  the  state  of  her  affection 
for  her  husband  and  for  the  defendant.50     But  evidence  of  state- 
ments made  by  the  wife  of  the  plaintiff  subsequent  to  the   im- 
proper relations  between  her  and  the  defendant,  which  the  latter 
admits  and  which  tend  to  show  that  her  mind  was  the  dominat- 
ing one,  are  inadmissible  for  any  purpose.51     Where,  however,  a 
wife  sues  the  parents  of    her  husband  for  the   alienation  of  his 
affections,  evidence  that  he  had  stated  that  he  had  decided  to 
leave  his  wife  is  admissible  as  part  of  the  res  gestae  to  show  an 
accomplished  fact  resulting  from  defendant's  influence  over  him.52 
Again,  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  damages  in  an  action  by 
a  woman  for  alienation  of  affections,  it  is  proper  to  show  that 
prior  to  the  husband  leaving  home   she  had  improper  relations 
with  another  of  which  her  husband  had  knowledge,  though  it 
does  not  appear  that  he  left  because  of  such  relations.53     In  an 
action  by  a  husband  or  wife  for  alienation  of  affections,  the  bur- 
den of  proving  the  allegations  in  reference  thereto  is  upon  the 
plaintiff.54     And  where  she  seeks  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  his 
society,  affections  and  companionship,  she  must  show   that  the 
defendants  have,  by  means  of  their  tortious  acts,  enticed  him  away 
from  her  and  thus  caused  the  loss   for  which  she  claims  a  re- 
cover}-.55 

§  463.  Pleading. — The  declaration  in  an  action  for  the 
alienation  of  the  affections  of  a  husband  or  wife  should  allege 
the  loss  of  consortium  ;  the  alienation  of  the  affections  is  merely 
to  be  considered  in  aggravation  of  damages  and  is  not  a  sub- 
stantive cause  of  action,56  and  the  declaration  should  allege 
the  facts  which  constitute   the   wrong  and  not  conclusions.57 


60  Rose  v.  Mitchell,  21  R.  I.  270;  21 
R.  I.  (part  2)  60;  43  Atl.  67;  As  to 
evidence  of  affection,  see  also  Ea- 
gon  v.  Eagon,  60  Kan.  597;  57  Pac. 
942;  49  Cent.  L.  J.  288. 

51  Vaughn  v.  Clarkson,  19  R.  I. 
497;  36  Atl.  1135;  34  Atl.  989. 

52Lockwood  v.  Lockwood,  67  MinD. 
476;  70  N.  W.  784. 

530 


53  Wolf  v.  Frank,  92  Md.  138;  48 
Atl.  132;  52  L.  R.  A.  102. 

i4  Myers  v.  Raynolds,,  3  Ohio  Leg. 
News,'  127;  3  Ohio  N.  P.  186. 

55  Eklredge  v.  Eldredge,  79  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  511;  61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  540. 

56  Neville  v.  Gile  (Mass.),  54  N.  E. 
841. 

"  Mead  v.  Hoskins,  6  Ohio  N.  P. 
522;  8  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  342. 


CRIMINAL   CONVERSATION.  §    1'    I 

But  it  is  decided  that  it  is  a  sufficient  allegation  of  lact  to  sustain 
an  action  for  alienation  of  affections  where  the  complaint  alii 
that  the  defendants  wrongfully  enticed,  influenced  and  induced 
plaintiff's  husband  to  leave  her.98  Hut  in  another  case  a  petition 
which  stated  that  the  defendants  conspired  with  the  malicious 
intent  of  injuring  plaintiff  and  of  destroying  his  peace  and  happi- 
ness and  to  injure  and  deprive  him  of  the  comfort,  society  and 
services  of  his  wife,  and  that  they  induced  her  to  leave  and 
separate  from  him,  was  held  to  be  demurrable  as  stating  conclu- 
sions.7'1 And  where  a  complaint  alleged  that  the  defendant  lived 
in  immoral  relations  with  the  plaintiff's  husband,  having  knowl- 
edge of  the  marriage  between  plaintiff  and  her  husband,  and 
that  the  defendant  had  assumed  the  husband's  surname,  and  that 
such  assumption  and  false  impersonation  of  the  plaintiff  preju- 
diced her  in  the  community  and  scandalized  and  injured  her  in 
name  and  fame  as  a  lawful  wife,  by  reason  of  which  she  was 
damaged  in  a  specified  amount,  was  held  not  to  set  forth  a  cause 
of  action.* 

M  Nichols  V.  Nichols,  1:34  Mo.  187;    P.    522;    8  Ohio   S.    &    C.      P.    Dec. 
35  S.  W.  577.  342. 

M  Mead   v.      Hoskius.     t>  Ohio    N.  .      ""  Hodecker   v.   Strieker,   39   N.  Y. 

I  Suop.  515. 

531 


§  464 


SEDUCTION. 


CHAPTER  XXL 


SEDUCTION. 


§  464.  Seduction — Action  by  woman 
to  recover  for. 

465.  Seduction— Abortion  by  phy- 

sician—  Liable     for     entire 
damages — Case. 

466.  Action  by  womau — Mitigation 

of  damages. 


467.  Action  by  parent. 

468.  Action  by  parent — Mitigation 

of  damages. 

469.  Action  by  parent — Barred  by 

marriage  subsequent  to  se- 
duction and  before  confine- 
ment. 


§  464.  Seduction— Action  by  woman  to  recover  for. — In 

those  jurisdictions  where  a  female  is  entitled  to  recover  damages 
for  her  own  seduction,  it  is  not  necessary  to  a  recovery  that 
there  should  have  been  a  promise  of  marriage,1  but  where  such 
a  promise  lias  been  made,  it  is  said  that  the  breach  thereof  may 
be  proved  in  aggravation  of  damages.'  Nor  is  it  necessary  that 
the  woman  should  at  all  times  in  the  past  have  lead  a  virtuous 
life.  It  might  occur  that  at  some  time  in  the  past  she  ma}'  have 
led  an  unchaste  life  but  that  she  had  reformed  and  that  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  seduction  her  conduct  was  that  of  a  virtuous 
and  moral  woman,  and  where  such  facts  appear  in  evidence  her 
seduction  should  be  visited  with  damages  to  such  an  amount  as 
the  jury  believe  the  defendant  ought  to  pay.3  But  to  entitle  her 
to  recovery  in  such  a  case,  it  must  appear  that  there  was  a  ref- 
ormation.1 In  estimating  the  damages  in  an  action  for  seduc- 
tion, the  jury  may  consider  the  consequences  naturally  resulting 
from  the  defendant's  wrongful  act.  So  upon  the  question  as  to 
whether  a  verdict  for  $5,000  was  excessive,  it  was  held  that  it 


1  Milliken  v.  Long,  188  Pa.  St.  411;   238;  3   L.    R.    A.    529;  21   Pac.    129; 


41  Atl.  540;  Franklin  v.  McCorkle,  10 
Lea  (Tenn.),  609. 

-  Franklin  v.  McCorkle,  16  Lea 
(Tenn.),  609. 

3  Patterson    v.    Hayden,    IT    Oreg. 

532 


Gemmill  v.  Brown  (Ind.  App. ),  56  N. 
E.  691. 

4  Patterson    v.    Hayden,    17   Oreg. 
238;  3  L.  R..A.  529;  21  Pac.  129. 


SEDUCTION. 


6   [&4 


was  not  excessive  where  it  appeared  that  the  defendant    • 
married  man  fifty-two  years  of  age,  and  the  plaintiff  an  orphan 
aged  seventeen  at  the  time  of  the  seduction,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant hud  procured  two  abortions  to  be  performed  upon  her,  as  a 

result  of  which  her  health  had  hern  greatly  injured  and  she  was 
prevented  from  Labor,  and  had  suffered  much  pain  and  anguish 
and  injury  to  her  reputation.9  So  where  pregnancy  ensues,  re- 
sulting in  childbirth  and  sickness,  such  elements  may  be  consid- 
ered," and  the  suffering  and  anguish  of  mind  in  connection  with 
childbirth  are  also  elements  for  which  recovery  may  be  had. 
So,  also,  the  jury  may  consider  the  effect  the  seduction  has  had 
upon  her  standing  in  the  community,  and  that  she  has  lost  her 
social  standing,  and  evidence  is  admissible  of  the  treatment  ac- 
corded her  by  her  individual  acquaintances  before  and  after  the 
seduction.''  Again,  the  motive  of  the  defendant  may  be  an  ele- 
ment to  he  considered  in  estimating  the  damages  in  an  action  for 
seduction,  as  an  aggravation  of  the  wrongful  act,  and  in  this 
connection  and  as  bearing  on  his  motive,  evidence  of  his  arts, 
persuasions  and  promises  is  admissible,'1  and  if  the  defendant  has 
given  publicity  to  the  seduction,  such  fact  may  be  a  ground  for 
additional  damages."  In  an  action  of  this  nature  exemplary 
damages  may  be  recovered,11  and  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the 
financial  standing  of  the  defendant.1- 


6  Guilder   v.  Tibbits,  153   1ml.  59  1 : 

55  N.  E.  762. 

,j  McCoy  v.  Trucks,  121  Ind.  292; 
23  X.  E.  1)3.  See  Egan  v.  Murray,  80 
Iowa,  180;  45  X.  \V.  563,  where  it 
was  held  thai  a  verdict  in  au  action 
for  seduction  for  SI, 500,  was  not  ex- 
cessive where  ii  appeared  that  the 
plaintiff  had  given  hirth  to  au  ille- 
gitimate child. 

7  Gemmill    v.  Brown   (Ind.    App.), 

56  N.   E.  691;  Simons   v.  Bushy.  119 
End.  13. 

8  Havvn  v.  Banghart,  76  Iowa,  688; 
3'.)  N.W.251.  See  (,  under  v.  TiU.its. 
153  Ind.  591;  55  N.  E.  762. 

9  Stevenson  v.  Belknap,  0  Iowa,  97. 

10  Simons  v.  Busby  (Ind.),  21  N.  E. 
451. 


11  Ball  v.  Bruce.  21  111.  161;  Steven- 
son v.  Belknap,  *'*  Iowa.  97;  Stout  v. 
I'rall,  1  X.  .1.  L.  7:<;  Lawyer  v. 
Eritcher,  130  X.  V.  239;  14  L.  R.  A. 
700;  41  X.  Y.  sr.  K.  268;  29  X.  E.  267; 
45  Alb.  L.  J".  72:  Kerns  v.  Bagen- 
buckle,  28  J.  &  S.  (  X.  Y.)  228:  42  N. 
V.  St.   It.  669. 

'-  shewalter  v.  Bergman,  123  Ind. 
155:  2:'.  \.  E.  686;  Gemmill  v.  Brown 
(Ind.  App.  (,56  \.  E.I  91.  See  Dehler 
v.  state,  Bierck,  22  [nd.  App  383;  53 
X.  E.  850.  This  case  was  a  bastardy 
proceeding, and  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  proper  amount  to 
assess  against  the  defendant,  evi- 
dence of  his  financial  condition  and 
prospects  ia  life  was  admitted. 

533 


§§  465-467  seduction. 

§  4G5.  Seduction — Abortion  by  physician — Liable  for  en- 
tire damages — Case. — Where  in  an  action  by  a  woman  for  se- 
duction, it  appears  that  a  physician,  acting  in  conspiracy  with  her 
seducer,  performed  abortions  upon  the  plaintiff  for  the  purpose 
of  concealing  the  illicit  intercourse,  and  that  the  physician  repre- 
sented that  in  order  to  save  her  life  the  abortions  were  necessary, 
the  latter  will  be  liable  for  the  entire  damages  of  the  plaintiff, 
since  the  continued  course  of  conduct  of  the  seducer  consti- 
tuted an  entire  wrong  which  will  not  be  apportioned  among 
the  wrongdoers,  and  the  fact  that  the  physician  did  not  know 
that  the  illicit  intercourse  was  the  result  of  plaintiff's  seduction 
will  not  relieve  him  from  liability.13 

§  466.  Action  by  woman — Mitigation  of  damages. — The 

character  of  a  woman  prior  to  the  time  of  her  seduction  and 
specific  acts  of  lewdness  on  her  part  may  be  shown  in  mitigation 
of  damages  in  an  action  by  her  for  seduction.11  But  the  defend- 
ant in  such  an  action  cannot  show  that  the  plaintiff's  reputation 
was  bad  after  the  seduction,15  nor  can  his  damages  be  lessened 
by  the  fact  that  subsequent  to  the  seduction  the  plaintiff  con- 
tinued to  meet  his  advances.16 

§  467.  Action  by  parent.— The  parent's  right  to  recover  for 
the  seduction  of  a  minor  daughter  is  technically  based  at  com- 
mon law  upon  the  loss  of  services,  and  where  no  such  law  exists 
the  action  cannot  be  maintained.17  In  Tennessee,  however,  it 
is  not  necessary  for  either  the  pleading  or  the  proof  to  show 
that  there  has  been  a  loss  of  her  services  to  entitle  a  father  to 
recover  damages.18  And  in  Michigan  also  a  similar  rule  pre- 
vails, it  being  only  necessary  in  this  state  to  show  the  parental 


»  Guilder  v.  Tibbits  (Ind. ),  55  N.  E. 
762. 

14  Gemmill  v.  Brown  (Ind.  App. ), 
56  N.  E.  691. 

15  She  waiter  v.  Bergman,   123  Ind 


Md.  369;  Kennedy  v.  Shea,  110  Mass. 
147;  Mulvehall  v.  Mill  ward,  11  N.  Y. 
343;  Martin  v.  Payne,  9  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  387;  Grinnell  v.  Wells,  7  M.  & 
G.  1033,  and  other  cases  cited  in  tliis 


155;  23  N.  E.  686.  See  sec.  464,  herein.  I  section.     But  see  Franklin  v.  McCor- 

16  Stoudt  v.   Shepherd  (Mich.),  41    kle,  16  Lea.  (Tenn.)  609. 

N.  W.  696.  is  Franklin    v.    McCorkle,    16  Lea. 

17  Humble  v.  Shoemaker.  70  Iowa,  |  (Tenn.)  609. 
223;  Greenwood   v.     Greenwood,   28  i 


SEDUCTION. 


§  167 


or  other  relation  by  nature  or  wardship  to  permit  a  recovery.19 
But  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  parent's  action  is  based  on 
l,»ss  of  services,it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  relation  of  master 
and  servant  exists  between  the  parent  and  daughter  to  authorize 
a  recovery,*  and  if  it  appears  that  such  relation  dors  not 
exist,  as  in  the  ease  <»f  a  child  being  bound  outas  an  apprentice, 
there  can  be  no  recovery  of  damages  by  the  father  for  the 
daughter's  seduction .a  But  slight  evidence,  however,  is  suffi- 
cient to  establish  such  relation,22  and  though  the  action  may  be 
founded  on  loss  of  services,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  ser- 
vices rendered  by  her  for  him  were  paid  for  or  not.2  So,  also, 
though  tie'  daughter  is  temporarily  employed  elsewhere,  a  loss 
of  services  will  be  presumed  in  l'avor  of  the  father,  who  has  not 
parted  with  his  right  to  the  services  of  a  minor  daughter.-1  And 
the  fact  that  the  daughter  was  not  in  the  father's  actual  service, 
at  the  time  of  her  illness  and  death,  but  was  at  the  defendant's, 
will  not  prevent  the  father  from  recovering  for  loss  of  her  ser- 
vices on  account  of  the  seduction.3"'  But  it  has  been  decided  that 
the  defendant  may  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  legally  entitled 
to  the  services  of  the  girl  for  whose  seduction  he  is  suing  to 
recover  damages,  by  proof  of  the  fact  that  his  marriage  with  the 
woman  who  is  the  mother  of  the  seduced  girl  was  void.26     To 


19Stoudt  v.  Shepherd  (Mich.),  61 
N.  W.  696. 

20  Barbour  v.  Stephenson  (C.  C.  D. 
Ky.),  32  Fed.  06. 

2i  Dain  v.  WyculT,  7  X.  Y.  191;  Pos- 
tlewaite  v.  Parkes,  3  Burr.  1879. 

-Lamb  v.  Taylor,  07  Bid.  85;  8 
Atl.  760;  7  Cent.  377;  Davidson  v. 
Goodall,  18  X.  II.  427;  Gray  v.  Dur- 
land,  51  N.  Y.  424;  Hewitt  v.  Prime, 
21  Wend.  (N.  Y. )  79. 

2»  Lamb  v.  Taylor,  67  Md.  85;  8 
Atl.  760;  7  Cent.  377. 

"Gilley  v.  Gilley,  79  Me.  292;  9 
Atl.  623;  4  N.  Eng.  Rep.  495; 
Greenwood  v.  Greenwood,  28  Md. 
369;  Mulvehall  v.  Millward,  11  N. 
Y.  343;  Clarke  v.  Fitch,  2 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  459;  Lamb  v. 
Taylor,    67     Md.   85;    8  Atl.    760;  7 


Cent.  377.  Under  tlie  Minnesota  Gen. 
Stat.  1894,  sec.  5163,  providing  that 
an  action  for  the  seduction  of  a 
daughter  may  be  prosecuted  by  the 
father,  though  the  daughter  is  not 
living  with  t  lie  father  at  the  time  she 
is  seduced,  and  there  is  no  loss  of 
services,  the  plaintiff,  in  such  an  ac- 
tion, is  not  obliged  to  slmw  that  his 
daughter's  ruin  was  accomplished 
by  seductive  nets  to  enable  him 
to  recover  other  than  his  actual 
money  loss.  Hein  v.  Holdridge 
(Minn.),  81  N.  W.  522. 

25  Lawyer  v.  Kriteher.  54  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  586;  28  N.  Y.  St.  R.  221;  7  X. 
V.  Supp.  WO. 

■■»Howland  v.  Howland,  114  Mass. 
517;  19  Am.  Rep.  381. 

535 


§  467 


SEDUCTION. 


entitle  a  parent  to  recover  damages  for  the  seduction  of  a  minor 
daughter,  there  must  be  some  proof  of  actual  damage,  but  the 
slightest  proof  of  damage  will  be  sufficient.27  And  the  damages 
which  a  father  may  recover  incase  of  the  seduction  of  a  minor 
daughter  are  not  limited  to  a  recovery  for  the  loss  of  her  ser- 
vices, and  for  expenses  incurred,  but  may  include  compensation 
for  what  he  as  a  father  has  felt  and  suffered  for  the  wrong  and 
injury  received  for  his  daughter's  ruin.*  So  the  disgrace  sus- 
tained by  the  plaintiff  and  his  family,  as  a  result  of  her  seduc- 
tion, is  an  element  to  be  considered.2'  So,  also,  there  may  be  a 
recovery  for  expense  necessarily  incurred  as  the  natural  and 
direct  result  of  the  seduction.30  So  again,  the  jury  may  consider 
in  aggravation  of  the  damages  that  the  defendant  procured  an 
abortion  to  be  performed  upon  the  seduced  girl.31  And  in  certain 
cases  exemplary  damages  may  be  given  in  the  discretion  of  the 
jury.32  Mere  proof  of  criminal  intercourse  is  not,  however,  suffi- 
cient to  justify  an  allowance  of  such  damages.33    And  they  should 


27  Lawyer  v.  Fritcher,  54  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  586;  28  N.  Y.  St.  221;  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  909.  See  in  this  connec- 
tion as  to  what  is  sufficient  to  show 
a  loss  or  damage  necessary  to  sus- 
tain the  action,  Lencker  v.  Steilen, 
89  111.  545;  Blagge  v.  Ilsley,  127 
Mass.  191;  Abraham  v.  Kidney,  104 
Mass.  222;  Hewitt  v.  Prime,  21  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  79;  White  v.  Nellis,  31  Barb. 
(N.  Y.).  279. 

28  Barbour  v.  Stevenson  (C.  C.  D. 
Ky.),  32  Fed.  66;  Herring  v.  Jester, 
2  Houst,  (Del.)  66;  Pruitt  v.  Cox,  21 
Ind.  15;  Hatch  v.  Fuller,  131  Mass. 
574;  Fox  v.  Stevens.  13  Minn.  272; 
Morgan  v.  Ross,  74  Mo.  318;  Coon  v. 
Moffitt,  3  NT.  J.  L.  436;  Lunt  v.  Phil- 
brick,  59  N.  H.  59;  Lipe  v.  Eiseu- 
leid,  32  N.  Y.  229;  Phelin  v.  Klender- 
dine,  20  Pa.  St.  354;  Rolling  v. 
Chambers,  51  Vt.  592:  Riddle  v. 
McGinnis,  22  W.  Va,  253;  Lavery  v. 
Orooke,  52  Wis.  612;  38  Am.  Rep. 
768;  Irwin   v.  Dearman,  11  East.  23. 

29  Herring  v.  Jester,  2  Houst. 
(Del.)  66;  Mighell   v.  Stone,  74  111. 

536 


App.  129,  affd  175  111.  261;  51  N. 
E.  906;  Felkner  v.  Scarlet,  29  Ind. 
154,  Smith  v.  Young,  26  Mo.  App. 
575;  Lunt  v.  Philbrick,  59  N.  H.  59; 
Coon  v.  Moffitt,  3  N.  J.  L.  436;  Par- 
ker v.  Monteith,  7  Oreg.  277. 

30  Simpson  v.  Grayson,  54  Ark.  404; 
16  S.  W.  4;  Humble  v.  Shoemaker, 
70  Iowa,  223;  Hogan  v.  Cregan,  6 
.Robt.  (N.  Y.)  138. 

31  White  v.  Murtland,  71  111.  250; 
Klopfer  v.  Bromme,  26  Wis.  372. 
See  Gunder  v.  Tibbits,  153  Ind.  591; 
55  N.  E.  762. 

32  Mighell  v.  Stone,  74  111.  App. 
129,  aff'd  175  111.  261;  51  N.  E. 
906;  Russell  v.  Chambers,  31  Minn. 
54;  Kerns  v.  Hagenbuckle,  28  J.  & 
S.  (N.  Y.)  228;  42  N.  Y.  St.  R.  669; 
Lawyer  v.  Fritcher,  130  N.  Y.  239; 
Knight  v.  Wilcox,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
212;  Badgely  v.  Decker,  44  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  577;  Lavery  v.  Crooke,  52  Wis. 
612;  Irwin  v.  Dearman,  11  East. 
23. 

33  Hogan  v.  Cregan,  6  Robt.  (N. 
Y.)  138. 


SEDUCTION.  §  468 

not  be  awarded  in  an  action  for  Beduction  except  the  action  be 
brouglit  by  the  parent  of  the  seduced  girl  or  by  the  girl  her- 
self.8* 

§  408.  Action  by  parent   -Mitigation  of  damages. — In  an 

action  to  recover  for  the  seduction  of  a.  minor  daughter,  the  facl 
that  she  has  been  guilty  of  youthful  indiscretions  in  the  past 
will  not  prevent  a  recovery  of  the  damages  sustained,  where  il 
appears  that  she  had  reformed,  and  at  the  time  of  the  all 
seduction  was  living  a  virtuous  life  and  enjoyed  the  esteem  and 
regard  of  her  acquaintances/"3  And  a  parent's  damages  will  not 
be  limited  to  a  recovery  for  loss  of  expenses  because  of  previous 
acts  of  unchastity  on  her  part.86  But  the  defendant  may,  for  the 
purpose  of  mitigating  the  damages,  show  that  the  daughter's 
unchaste  conduct  in  the  past  has  been  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge,  and  may  introduce  evidence  showing  specific  acts  of 
illicit  intercourse  between  her  and  others.37  And  where  her  un- 
chaste conduct  has  been  so  notorious  that  nothing  coidd  be  added 
to  the  sufferings  of  the  parent,  or  to  the  danger  of  corrupting 
the  family's  morals  by  the  seduction,  no  recovery  can  be  had 
for  such  elements.38  And  the  defendant  may  show,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  mitigating  damages,  acts  and  conduct  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff  which  amount  to  negligence  or  a  careless  indifference.*1 
In  a  case  in  Rhode  Island,  the  defendant  endeavored  to  show 
by  various  facts  a  reckless  or  careless  indifference  on  the  part 
of  a  father  in  respect  to  his  daughters,  which  could  be  considered 
in  mitigation  of  damages  in  an  action  for  seduction.  The  evi- 
dence  which  the  court  held  was  inadmissible,  as  not  tending  to 
show  such  indifference,  was  that  the   father,  who  was  a  farm 

M  Lipe  v.  Eizenlerd,  32  N.  Y.  229.  Reed  V.Williams,  5  Sneed   (Tenn.), 

^Millikenv.  Long,  188  Pa.  St.  411; !  580;  Parker  v.    Coture,   63   Vt.  155; 

41  Atl.  540.  Carpenter  v.  Wall,   11   Ad.  a   I 

86  Simpson    v.    Grayson,   54    Ark.  Verry  v.  Watkins,  7  C.  &  P.  308. 

404;  10  S.  W.  4.  '-Simpson    v.    Grayson,     54     Ark. 

87Simpson  v.  Grayson,  54  Ark.  404;  404;  165  S.  W.  4. 

10  S.   W.  4;  White  v.   Murtland,  71  M  Richardson  v.  Pouts,  11  Ind.  466; 

111.  250;  22  Am.   Rep.   100;  Smith  v.  Zerflng  v.    Mourer,    2  Greene     l 

Milburn,  17  Iowa,  SO;  Dalman  v.  Ko-  520;  Graham  v.  Smith,   1   Edm.  Sel. 

ning,  54  Mich.  320;  Stoudt  v.  Shep-  Cas.  (N.   Y.)  267;  Travis  v.    Barger, 

herd  (Mich.),  41  N.  W.  696;  Fletcher  24  Barb.    (N.    Y.J  614;   Sherwood   v. 

v.  Randall,  Anth.  N.  P.  (N.  Y.)  267;  Tetman,  55  Pa.  St.  77. 


53 


§  469  SEDUCTION. 

laborer,  was  absent  from  home  all  day,  while  his  wife  was  also 
away,  as  a  result  of  which  his  daughters  were  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  receive  male  visitors,  and  that  under  such  circumstances 
an  elder  daughter  had  been  seduced  three  years  before  and  had 
given  birth  to  a  child  two  months  after  her  marriage.41  So  again, 
where  the  misconduct  of  the  daughter  was  as  much  the  cause  of 
the  seduction  as  the  acts  of  her  seducer,  such  fact  may  be  con- 
sidered in  mitigation"  of  damages  and  will  prevent  a  recovery  on 
account  of  the  injured  feelings  of  the  family  and  also  of  exem- 
plary damages.41  But  the  defendant  cannot  show  for  the  pur- 
pose of  mitigating  damages  an  offer  on  his  part  to  marry  the 
girl  whom  he  has  seduced.42  Nor  should  the  jury  consider  the 
fact  in  estimating  the  damages  recoverable  by  a  father  for  a 
daughter's  seduction  that  she  may  recover,  or  has  recovered 
damages,  for  her  seduction.43  Nor  is  evidence  admissible  to  show 
that  the  plaintiff's  character  is  bad  for  the  purpose  of  reducing 
the  damages.44 

§  469.  Action  by  parent— Barred  by  marriage  subsequent 
to  seduction  and  before  confinement.— If  a  father's  recovery 
is  limited  to  loss  of  services  and  expenses  in  an  action  for 
seduction,45  and  after  the  daughter's  seduction  she  is  married  to 
another  than  her  seducer,  and  she  is  not  confined  until  after  her 
marriage,  and  there  has  been  no  loss  of  services  or  expenses  in- 
curred by  the  father  as  a  result  of  the  daughter's  seduction  prior 
to  her  marriage  and  confinement,  there  can  be  no  recovery  by 
the  father,  since  he  was  neither  entitled  to  her  services  nor  bound 
to  incur  expense  in  her  behalf  after  her  marriage.46 


40Tourgee  v.  Rose,  19  R.  I.  432;  37 
Atl.  9. 

«  Comer  v.  Taylor,  82  Mo.  341. 

42  White  v.  Murtland,  71  111.  250; 
22  Am.  Rep.  100;  Ingersoll  v.  Jones, 
5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  661. 

538 


43  Pruitt  v.  Cox,  21  Ind.  15. 

44  Dain  v.  Wyckoff,  18  N.  Y.  47. 

45  See  Iowa  Code,  sec.  2,556. 

46  Humble  v.  Shoemaker,  70  Iowa, 
223. 


TITLE  IV. 

CIVIL  DAMAGE  ACTS. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


§  470    Civil  damage  acts     Who  may 
sue. 

471.  Measure  and  elements  of  dam- 

ages— Generally. 

472.  Death. 

47:1   Loss  of  support. 

474.  Injury    to    feelings  —  Mental 

Buffering. 

475.  Exemplary    damages — Gener- 

ally. 

470.  Exemplary  damages— General 
rule. 

477.  Sale  by  employee  without  de- 
fendant's knowledge  no  de- 
fense—Exemplary damages 
— Mitigation  of. 


178.   Evidence    affecting    damages 

— Generally. 
47'.'.    Evidence    showing    unlawful 

sale. 

480.  Sales  by  two  or  more  persons 

— Recovery  in  case  of. 

481.  Plaintiffs  knowledge  and  con- 

sent   to   sale    may    be    de- 
feuse. 

482.  Release  of   damages   by   wife 

no    defense    to    action    by 
children. 

483.  Pleading. 

484.  Civil    rights    acts  —  Damages 

and  penalties. 


§  470.  Civil  damage  acts — Who  may  sue. — In  most  of  the 
states  statutes  have  been  passed,  generally  known  as  civil  dam- 
age acts,  which  in  substance  provide  that  any  person  who  shall 
supply  liquor  to  one  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated,  after 
he  has  been  given  notice  of  such  habit,  shall  be  liable  in  dam- 
ages for  any  injury  or  damage  to  the  person,  property  or  means 
of  support  of  another  as  a  result  of  liquor  so  supplied.  L'nder 
such  a  statute  conferring  the  right  to  recover  such  damages  upon 
every  wife,  child,  parent,  guardian  or  employer,  or  other  person, 
a  husband  is  included  in  the  general  classification  ••other  per- 
sons."1 Such  a  statute  is  declared  not  to  be  a  penal  statute  but 
merely  one  giving  a  remedy  for  damages.'     And  a  widow   who 


1Landrum  v.  Flannigan,  GO  Kan. 
436;  56  Pac.  753;  Kan.  Gen.  Stat. 
1897,  chap.  101,  sec.  41. 


-Keiuhardt  v.  Fritzsche,  69  Hun 
(N.  V.  i.  565;  53  N".  Y.  St.  R.  261;  23 
N.  V.  Supp.  958. 


§  470 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


is  without  other  means  of  support  than  that  furnished  by  her 
son,  and  who  by  his  death  is  injured  in  her  means  of  support,  may 
recover  under  such  a  statute,  giving  a  right  in  such  cases  to  a 
parent;5  So  where  a  statute  provides  that  in  case  a  liquor 
dealer  violates  his  bond  by  selling  liquors  to  a  minor,  "  any  per- 
son or  persons  aggrieved  "  may  sue  on  his  bond,  a  mother  may 
maintain  an  action.1  And  under  a  statute  giving  a  right  of  ac- 
tion to  a  parent  against  a  liquor  dealer  and  his  bondsmen  for 
loss  of  services  of  a  minor  son  due  to  his  death  as  the  result  of 
the  sale  to  him  of  intoxicating  liquors,  the  action  may  be  prose- 
cuted in  the  name  of  the  party  entitled  to  damages,  the  inter- 
vention of  an  administrator  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  not 
being  necessary ,5  Again,  a  married  woman  injured  in  any  of 
the  ways  stated  in  the  statute  by  the  sale  of  liquors  to  her  son  may 
recover  in  her  own  name,  though  her  husband,  the  father  of  the 
son,  is  living,  where  the  statutes  of  the  state  permit  her  to  sue 
as  a  feme  sole.'5  And  where  the  liquor  dealer's  bond  is  required 
by  statute  to  be  conditioned  that  he  will  not  sell  liquors  to  any 
person  after  having  received  notice  in  writing  from  the  wife  of 
such  person  not  to  sell  to  him,  and  in  case  subsequent  sales  are 
made,  the  right  is  conferred  upon  the  person  "  aggrieved  "  by  the 
violation  of  the  bond  to  sue  thereon,  a  married  woman  who  has 
given  the  notice  required  may  recover  on  the  bond  where  a  sub- 
sequent sale  is  made,  though  she  has  not  been  injured  thereby 
in  person  or  property.'  And  again,  where  the  statute  in  such  a 
case  gives  a  married  woman  the  right  to  maintain  an  action  in 
her  own  name,  such  right  is  not  lost  by  her  subsequently  obtain- 
ing a  divorce.8     And  the  fact  that  a  widow  who  sues  under  such 


3Depuy  v.  Cook,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
43;  N.  Y.  Lans.  1873,  chap.  64G. 

*Peavy  v.  Goss,  90  Tex.  89;  37  S. 
W.  317;  Tex.  Act.  23d  Leg.  chap. 
121,  p.  177. 

5  Fitzgerald  v.  Donoher,  48  Neb. 
852;  67  N.  W.  880;  Neb.  Comp.  Stat, 
chap.  50. 

6  McMaster  v.  Dyer,  44  W.  Va.  644; 
29  S.  E.  1016. 

'  Fay  v.  Williams  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
41  S.  W.  497;  Tex.  Gen.   Laws,  1893, 
pp.  177-181. 
540 


8Nordin  v.  Kjos,  13  S.  D.  497; 
83  N.  W.  573;  S.  D.  Laws,  1897, 
chap.  72,  which  requires  liquor 
dealers  to  give  bonds  and  provides 
that  "  it  shall  be  lawful  for  any  mar- 
ried woman  or  any  other  person  at 
her  request  to  institute  and  maintain 
a  suit  on  any  such  bond  mentioned 
in  this  act  for  all  damages  sustained 
by  her  or  by  her  children  on  account 
of  such  traffic  and  the  money  when 
collected  shall  be  paid  over  for  the 
use  of  herself  and  her  children.1 ' 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS.  §    171 

an  act  procured  liquor  for  her  husband  and  drank  with  him  on 
some  occasions  does  not  bar  her  from  the  right  to  maintain  the 
action.''  In  Nebraska  in  such  an  action  on  a  bond,  a  married 
woman  may  sue  in  her  own  name,  or  she  may  join  her  children, 
and  the  damages  when  collected  are  to  be  paid  over  to  her  for 
the  maintenance  of  herself  and  children.10  So,  also,  in  Illinois  a 
widow  and  minor  children,  who  were  wholly  dependent  on  de- 
ceased for  support,  may  sue  jointly.1'  But  in  an  action  to  recover 
for  the  breach  of  liquor  dealer's  bond  by  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  to  a  minor  son.  the  wife  cannot  maintain  the  action  by 
joining  her  husband  as  plaintiff  pro  forma,  as  the  recovery  in  such 
an  action  is  community  property.12  In  New  York  it  is  declared 
that  a  posthumous  child  is  within  the  provisions  of  the  law  giv- 
ing a  right  of  action  to  every  husband,  wife,  child  or  other  per- 
son." And  in  Nebraska  a  poor  person  dependent  for  support 
upon  a  relative  whose  death  was  due  to  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  to  him,  may  maintain  an  action  against  the  vendors  of 
such  liquors  in  his  own  name  and  for  his  own  benefit."  Again, 
in  Pennsylvania  the  intoxicated  person  himself  may  recover  under 
a  statute  which  provides  that  "  any  one  aggrieved  may  recover 
full  damages."1"'  In  Illinois  though  a  father  may  be  legally  en- 
titled to  his  son's  wages,  yet  such  fact  gives  him  no  right  to  re- 
covery under  the  act  of  that  state  for  the  intoxication  of  a  son 
if  he  is  not  living  with  his  family  and  his  means  of  support  are 
not  affected.16 

§  471.  Measure  and  elements  of  damages     Generally.— The 

amount  of  damages  recoverable  under  the  civil  damage  acts 
for  the  unlawful  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  is  a  question 
to    be  determined  by   the  jury   under    the    instruction   of   the 

9Kliment   v.     Corcoran.    51    Neb.  Y.    Supp.    968;  N.    Y.      Laws.    1st:?. 

142;  70  N.  W.  910.  chap.  646. 

10  Warden  v.  McConnell  (Neb.),  36  M  Fitzgerald    v.  Donoher,   48   Neb. 
N.  W.  278.  852;  67  N.  W.  8S0.     Sec  Neb.  Comp. 

11  Ilelmuth  v.   Bell  (111.),  37  N.    E.  Stat.  1895,  chap.  (17. 

230.  15Littol  v.  Young,  ">  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

12  Wartelsky  v.  McGee  (Tex.  Civ.    205;  41  W.  N.  C.  100;   Pa.  act.  May8, 
App. ),  30  S.  \V.  69.  1S54. 

13Quinlen    v.    Welch,    69  Hun  i.N.        16  Lossman  v.  Knigbts,  77  111.  App. 
Y.).  584;  ■">:;  N.  Y.  St.   R.  250 ;  23  N.    670. 

541 


§ 471 


CIVIL   DAMAGE   ACTS. 


court.1'  And  the  verdict  of  the  jury  in  such  an  action  will  not  be 
set  aside  as  excessive,  unless  so  erroneous  as  to  indicate  that 
it  was  the  result  of  passion,  prejudice,  ignorance  or  corruption.18 
Under  the  statutes  in  some  of  the  states,  money  paid  for  in- 
toxicating liquors  sold  in  violation  of  the  law  may  he  recovered 
from  the  person  selling  such  liquors.19  And  recovery  may  be 
had  for  expenses  of  medical  attendance  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  under  such  a  statute.20  So,  also,  where  a  husband  abuses 
his  wife  so  as  to  cause  illness,  while  he  is  intoxicated  as  a  result 
of  liquors  sold  to  him  in  violation  of  the  law,  recovery  may 
be  had  by  the  wife  for  the  illness  so  caused.-1  And,  where, 
owing  to  the  negligence  of  a  minor  while  intoxicated,  a  horse 


17  Miller  v.  Gleason,  18  Ohio  C.  C. 
374;  10  OhioC.  D.  20. 

18  Pegram  v.  Stortz,  31  W.  Va.  220; 
6  S.  E.  485.  See  the  following  cases 
where  amount  of  verdicts  in  various 
cases  has  been  considered:  Intoxica- 
tion of  plaintiff's  husband  resulting 
in  death,  whose  support  during  life 
was  worth  from  $200  to  $300  per 
year — $1,000  not  excessive.  Brown 
v.  Butler,  66  111.  App.  86.  As  result 
of  drink  reduced  from  prosperous 
business  man  to  a  sot — property  ex- 
hausted and  business  ruined — wife 
abused  and  loss  of  support  because 
husband's  means  therefor  squan- 
dered—sales not  made  by  defendant 
alone  but  by  several — $1,000  not  ex- 
cessive. Bunyan  v.  Loftus,  90  Iowa, 
122;  57  N.  W.  685.  Husband  killed 
while  intoxicated— age  thirty-five— 
good  wages  as  a  mechanic  which  had 
been  devoted  to  support  of  wife  and 
four  children— wife  and  children  left 
destitute — $850  not  excessive.  Schiek 
v.  Sanders,  53  Neb.  664;  74  N.  W. 
39.  Causing  intemperance  of  hus- 
band— wife  deprived  of  husband's 
former  earning  capacity  of  four  dol- 
lars per  day — loss  will  continue  for 
some  time— $1,000,  not  excessive. 
Bennett  v.  Levi,  46  N'.  Y.  St.  R.  754; 
19  N.    Y.   Supp.  226.     Loss  of  good 

542 


and  comfortable  support  by  death  of 
son  while  intoxicated — mother  in 
poor  health,  age  sixty-three,  and 
having  no  other  means  of  support— 
$1,325,  not  excessive.  Du  Puy  v. 
Cook,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.),  43;  70  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  397;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  632. 
Death  of  husband  while  intoxicated 
— aged  thirty-eight — strong  and  ro- 
bust, earning  one  dollar  and  a  half 
to  three  dollars  per  day — paying  for 
a  home — family  comfortably  sup- 
ported— verdict  to  wife  for  $275, in- 
adequate. Johnson  v.  Gram,  72  111. 
App.  676. 

19  Sellers  v.  Arie,  99  Iowa,  515;  68 
N.  W.  814;  Barrett  v.  Delano  (Me.), 
14  Atl.  288;  Kilburn  v.  Coe,  48 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  144.  In  Kohn  v. 
Melcher  (C.  C.  S.  D.  Iowa),  43  Fed. 
641;  10  L.  R.  A.  439,  however,  it 
is  held  that  money  paid  by  a  phar- 
macist for  intoxicating  liquors  can- 
not be  recovered  under  the  Iowa 
Code,  §  1550,  which  gives  a  right  of 
action  for  the  recovery  of  money 
paid  for  liquors  sold  in  violation  of 
the  prohibitory  liquor  law. 

20  Thomas  v.  Dansby,  74  Mich.  389; 
Aldrich  v.  Sager,  9  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
537. 

-1  Kear  v.  Garrison,  13  Ohio  C.  C. 
447;  7  Ohio  Dec.  515. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS.  §   471 

was  killed  and  the  carriage  injured,  the  owner  of  such  horse  and 
carriage  was  permitted  to  recover  for  such  Loss  from  the  person  un- 
lawfully selling  the  liquor  to  the  minor.28  Again,  where  a  horse 
belonging  to  plaintiff  was  killed  by  her  husband  while  intoxi- 
cated, it  was  decided  that  in  an  action  under  the  civil  damage  act 
sin- could  recover  the  value  of  the  horse.28  So,  also,  where  as 
the  result  of  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  a  person,  he  per- 
mitted the  garden  to  go  to  waste,  it  was  held  that  the  person 
selling  such  Liquors  could  nut  escape  Liability  in  an  action  by 
the  wife,  because  she;  might  have  employed  some  one  else  to 
market  such  produce.'-'1  Recovery,  however,  cannot  be  had  in 
an  action  under  such  a  statute  for  money  which  was  taken  from 
the  owner's  pockets  while  intoxicated,  since  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  loss  is  not  the  sale  of  liquor  but  the  intervening  wrong- 
ful act  of  a  third  person.'"'  So,  also,  damages  for  an  assault 
committed  by  a  person  while  intoxicated  are  too  remote  to  be 
recovered,  where  the  assault  is  voluntary  and  incited  by  the 
persons  assaulted.-1'  And  the  contingent  liability  of  a  father 
for  his  son's  support  under  the  poor  laws  of  a  state  because  "i 
injuries  sustained,  due  to  the  unlawful  sales  of  liquor  to  such 
minor,  is  too  remote  to  permit  a  recovery  for  the  unlawful  sale. ■'■ 
But  where  the  support  of  an  adult  son  as  a  poor  person  under 
the  statute  was  voluntarily  assumed  by  the  father,  it  was  decided 
that  the  latter,  in  an  action  under  the  civil  damage  act,  might 
recover  the  sum  which  it  would  be  reasonably  necessary  for  him 
to  expend  in  the  support  of  such  son  based  on  his  own  and  his 
son's  expectation  of  life.*  And  in  an  action  against  a  saloon 
keeper  to  recover  for  damages  sustained  as  a  result  of  the  dis 
posal  of  property  by  the  plaintiff  while  intoxicated  from  liquors 
furnished  by  defendant,  there  can  be  no  recovery  in  the  absence 


22  Flower  v.  Witkousky  (Mich.),  14 
West.  44;  37  X.  YV.  364;  Bertholf 
v.  O'Reilly,  8  Hun  (X.  Y.),  10,  aff'd 


B'Swiufm  v.  Lowry,  37  Minn.  345; 
:'.t  \.  W.  i'-'. 

-7  Veon  v.  Creaton,  138  Pa.  St.   48; 


74  N.  Y.  516.  9   L.    R.    A.   814;  27  \V.   X.  C.   57;  48 


-;i  Morenus  v.  Crawford,  51  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  89. 

'2i  Maloney  v.  Dailey,  07  111.  App. 
427. 

25 Gage  v.  Harvey,  00  Ark.  68;  43 
L.  R.  A.  143;  48  S.  W.  898. 


Phila.   Leg.  Int.  35;  21    l'itts.    L.  J. 
X.  S.  i:.  I. 

-*  Clinton     v.    Laning,     01     Mich. 
355. 


543 


8  472 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


of  any  evidence  as  to  the  value  of  such  property  or  an  admis- 
sion in  reference  thereto.29 

§  472.  Death. — The  general  rule  is  that  where  a  statute  gives 
a  person  who  has  been  injured  in  his  or  her  means  of  support  by 
reason  of  the  intoxication  of  another,  a  right  to  recover  damages 
therefor  against  the  person  who  by  giving  or  selling  the  intoxi- 
cating liquors  has  caused  the  intoxication  in  whole  or  in  part, 
the  person  so  injured  may  also  recover  where  the  intoxication 
causes  the  death  of  such  person.80  So  under  such  a  statute  a 
wife  may  recover  for  the  death  of  her  husband  under  such  cir- 
cumstances,31 and  a  woman  for  the  death  of  her  son,32  and  a  minor 
for  the  death  of  his  father.33  But  in  order  to  authorize  a  recov- 
ery it  must  appear  that  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  in  his  or  her 
means  of  support,  and  that  the  death  was  caused  by  the  sales  of 
liquor  shown.14     But  though  necessary  to  show  a  loss  of  support, 

29  Roberts  v.  Hopper,  55  Neb.  599;  1813,  04  N.  W.  245;  Mead  v.  Stratton. 


76  N.  W.  21. 

30  Cruse  v.  Aden,  127  111.  231;  3  L. 
K.  A.  327;  20  N.  E.  73;  Flynn  v. 
Fogarty,  106  111.  263;  Emory  v.  Ad- 
dis, 71  111.  273;  Johnson  v.  Gram,  72 
111.  App.  676;  Brown  v.  Butler,  66  111. 
App.  86;  Marschall  v.  Langhran,  47 
111.  App.  29;  Westphal  v.  Austin,  39 
111.  App.  230;  Reath  v.  State,  John- 
son, 16  Ind.  App.  146;  44  N.  E.  808; 
Rafferty  v.  Buckman,  46  Iowa,  195; 
Doty  v.  Postal,  87  Mich.  143;  49  N. 
W.  534;  Lafler  v.  Fisher  (Midi.),  79 


87  N.  Y.  493;  Davis  v.  Standish,  26 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  608. 

3-=  Du  Puy  v.  Cook,  90  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
43;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  397;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
632. 

33  Westphal  v.  Austin,  39  111.  App. 
230. 

34  Meyer  v.  Butterbrodt,.146  111.  131 ; 
34  N.  E.  152,  affg43  111.  App.  312; 
Westphal  v.  Austin,  39  111.  App. 
230 ;  Davis  v.  Standish,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
608.  Where  the  evidence  showed 
that  a  person  became  intoxicated  by 


X.  W.  934;  6  Det.  L.  N.  358,  Grau  v.  |  reason  of  liquors  sold  to  him,  and 
Houston,  45  Neb.  813;  64  N.  W.  245;  |  that  when  in  such  condition  he  fell  a 
Mead  v.  Stratton,  87  N.  Y.  493;  Quain  ;  distance  of  about  thirteen  feet  to  the 


v.  Russell,  8  Hun  (N.  Y.),  319;  Lan- 
son  v.  Eggleston,  28  App.  Div.  ( N.  Y. ) 
52;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  181;  Du  Puy  v. 
Cook,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.),  43;  70  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  397;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  632.     But 


frozen  ground,  while  going  up  an  out- 
side stairway  to  his  home,  that  he 
was  taken  up  in  an  unconscious  con- 
dition and  lived  for  five  days  after  the 
injury,  which  was  pronounced  by  the 


see  Brookiuire  v.  Monaghan,  15  Hun  \  medical  attendants  as  concussion  of 
(N.  Y.),  16;  Barrett  v.  Dolan,  130  j  the  brain  or  a  clot  of  blood  on  the 
Mass.  366;  Davis  v.  Justice,  31  Ohio  |  brain,  it  was  held  that  such  evidence 
st   359  was   sufficient   to   sustain  a  finding 

:Ji  Johnson  v.  Gram.  72  111.  App.  j  that  the  proximate  cause  of  his  death 
676;  Doty  v.  Postal,  87.  Mich.  143;  49  was  the  fall.  Marschall  v.  Langhran, 
N.  \V.  534;  Grau  v.  Houston,  45  Neb.  !  47  111.  App.  29. 

544 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS.  §  472 

it  is  not  necessary  to  give  an  accurate  detailed  statement  of  the 
amount  contributed  by  the  deceased  to  the  support  of  the  plain- 
tiff, it  being  sufficient  to  show  that  some  contribution  was  made 
by  the  deceased.85    So,  though  the  plaintiff  in  such  an  action 

may  have  an  income,  yet  if  the  deceased  contributed  to  am  ex- 
tent to  his  support,  there  may  be  a  recovery,36  and  the  fact  tint 

the  person  for  whose  death  the  action  is  brought,  received  liquor 
elsewhere  will  not  relieve  one  who,  by  his  sales  of  Liquor  to  the 
deceased,  contributed  to  his  death.1"  Again,  though  a  person  may 
in  certain  cases  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  a  person  as  a  re- 
sult of  intoxicating  liquors  furnished  to  him  by  another,  yet  the 
jury  in  estimating  the  damages  therefor  should  only  consider  the 
loss  which  the  plaintiff  has  sustained  as  a  direct  and  necessary 
result  of  the  death,  and  no  recovery  should  be  allowed  for  any 
loss  which  is  not  directly  traceable  thereto  as  the  proximate 
result  thereof.  So  in  such  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  hus- 
band, evidence  should  not  be  admitted  of  the  loss  of  the  home- 
stead as  a  result  of  the  husband's  death,  because  of  the  foreclosure 
of  a  mortgage  upon  it  which  existed  during  the  life  of  the  hus- 
band, and  which  the  widow  had  no  means  to  pay,  since  it  is  a 
mere  conjecture  whether  the  husband  would  have  redeemed  the 
homestead  had  he  lived,  and  its  loss  cannot  be  traced  as  the  prox- 
imate result  of  the  death.38  The  recovery  of  damages  for  the 
death  of  a  person,  under  these  acts  is  not  confined  to  those  cases 
where  the  intoxicated  person  himself  dies,  but  extends  to  those 
cases  where  one  is  injured  in  his  or  her  means  of  support  by  the 
death  of  a  person  due  to  the  act  of  another  while  intoxicated 
from  liquors  unlawfully  furnished  him.'59 


85  Latter  v.  Fisher  (Mich.),  79  N. 
W.  934;  6  Det.  L.  N.  358.  Action  to 
recover  under  ;'.  How.  (Mich.)  Ann. 
Stat.  sec.  2283e  3. 

36  Reath  v.  State.  Johnson,  16  Ind. 
A.pp.  146;  44  N.  K.  808.  This  rust- 
was  an  action  brought  by  a  father  to 
recover  for  his  son's  death  under  a 
statute  giving  a  right  of  action  to  one 
injured  in  his  "  means  of  support  *' 


vented  because  of  the  fact  that  the 
father  bad  an  income  of  855  per 
month  independent  of  the  sun's  earn- 
ings. 

37  Lawson  v.  Eggleston,  28  A  pp. 
Div.  (X.  Y.i  52;  52  X.  Y.  Supp.  L81. 

88  Karan  v.  Pease,  45  111.  App.  3S2. 

39  Broekway  v.  Patterson,  72  Mich. 
122;  1  L.  R.  A.  70S;  40  N.  W.  192 j 
Fortier  v.  Moore,  67   N.   II.  460;  86 


by  reason  of  intoxication  due  to  AH.  869;  New  v.  McKechnie,  95 N".  T. 
liquors  furnished  by  another,  and  it  I  632.  See  Belding  v.  Johnson  (Grft.), 
was  held  that  recovery  was  not  pre- 1  11  L.  K.  A.  53;  12  S.  E,  304. 

35  545 


§   473  CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 

§  473.  Loss  of  support. — Where  as  the  result  of  the  intoxi- 
cation of  a  woman's  husband  she  is  injured  in  her  means  of  sup- 
port she  may  recover  either  jointly  or  severally  against  the  per- 
sons, who  by  the  sale  of  the  liquor  to  the  husband,  caused  the 
intoxication.40  .  And  the  damages  recoverable  are  not  limited  to 
the  mere  sum  which  was  paid  for  the  liquors  and  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  devoted  to  the  support  of  the  wife,  but  they 
include  such  damages  as  proximately  result  from  the  sale  of  the 
liquors,  such  as  the  loss  of  the  husband's  position  which  thus 
injures  the  wife  in  her  means  of  support.41  So  in  this  connec- 
tion evidence  is  admissible  in  behalf  of  the  plaintiff  that  her 
husband  has,  as  the  result  of  the  sale  to  him  by  the  defendant 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  been  reduced  from  a  prosperous  business 
man  to  financial  insolvency  and  that  his  mental  condition  borders 
upon  a  state  of  imbecility.42  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  to  en- 
title a  wife  to  recover,  that  she  has  been  deprived  of  the  bare 
necessities  of  life,  but  she  may  be  injured  in  her  means  of  sup- 
port where  the  ability  of  the  husband  to  furnish  her  with  the 
comforts  of  life  has  been  lessened  or  destroyed,  and  in  such  a 
case  may  recover.43  And  though  a  husband  has  become  a  drunk- 
ard and  as  a  result  has  ceased  to  support  his  wife,  yet  this  will 
not  prevent  a  recovery  from  one,  who  by  subsequent  sales  of 
liquor  to  the  husband,  causes  the  loss  to  continue.44  And  again, 
though  all  the  damages  sustained  by  a  wife  are  not  traceable  to 
the  sales  made  to  the  husband  by  the  defendant,  yet  where  such 
sales  produced  the  intoxication  which  was  the  beginning  of  a 
continuous  debauch,  lasting  several  da}^s  or  weeks,  damages  may 
be  recovered  from  the  defendant  for  all  the  injuries  which  she 
has  sustained  during  the  entire  period.45  But  loss  of  support 
due  to  the  imprisonment  of  the  husband  because  of  a  crime  com- 
mitted by  him  while  under  the  influence  of  liquor  and  his  con- 


40  Stanley  v.  Leahy,  87  111.  App. 
465. 

41  Kolling  v.  Bennett,  18  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  K.  425;  10  Ohio  C.  D.  81.  See 
Loseman  v.  Knights,  77  111.  App.  670, 
an  action  by  parent  for  sales  of  liquor 
to  minor  son. 

42  Kliment  v.  Corcoran,  51  Neb. 
142;  70  N.  W.  910. 

546 


43  Maloney  v.  Dailey,  67  111.  App. 
427.  See  De  Puy  v.  Cook,  90  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  43;  Mulford  v.  Clewell,  21 
Ohio  St.  191. 

44  Lloyd  v.  Kelly,  48  111.  App.  554; 
Rouse  v.  Melsheimer,  82  Mich.  172; 
46  N.  W.  372. 

45  Johnson  v.  Johnson  (Mich.),  58 
N.  W.  1115. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


§  it:; 


sequent  inability  to  work  are  declared  Dot  to  be  a  proximate 
result  of  the  sale  of  liquor  to  him  for  which  recovery  may  be 
had.46  In  New  York,  however,  where  a  man  while  intoxicated 
shot  and  killed  another  Eor  which  crime  he  was  convicted  and 
sent  to  state  prison  Eor  life,  thus  depriving  the  wife  of  her  means 
of  support,  it  was  held  that  the  wife  was  entitled  to  maintain  an  ac- 
tion for  loss  of  support.*  Again,  if  the  husband  is  injured  while 
intoxicated,  the  wife  may  recover  for  Loss  of  support  due  to  such 
injuries,  though  the  intoxication  was  merely  a  contributory  cause 
and  not  the  sole  or  principal  cause  of  the  injury.1.  So  where 
the  defendant  sold  liquor  to  the  plaintiffs  husband  while  he 
was  intoxicated  and  the  latter  while  returning  with  his  wife  in 
a  sleigh  was  so  injured  as  to  be  paralyzed  and  unable  to  work,  and 
the  wife  was  also  injured,  it  was  decided  that  damages  therefor 
were  recoverable  by  the  wife  from  the  liquor  dealer.*  And  in 
such  a  case  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  evidence  show  that  the 
husband  was,  at.  the  time  he  was  injured,  so  intoxicated  that  his 
reasoning,  judgment  and  memory  were  in  such  an  impaired  con- 
dition that  he  was  not  aware  of  the  natural  and  reasonable  con- 
sequences of  his  acts.90  Again,  in  an  action  by  a  mother  to  recover 
damages  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  her  son.  as  a  re- 
sult of  which  she  has  been  injured  in  her  means  of  support,  she 
may  show  her  situation  in  life,  her  dependence  on  him  for  sup- 
port, the  amount  which  he  earned  prior  to  the  time  he  became 
addicted  to  the  use  of  liquor,  and  any  decrease  in  his  earnings 
subsequent  to  such  time  or  loss  of  employment,  traceable  to  such 
habits.51  And  in  an  action  by  a  parent  to  recover  for  loss  of  sup- 
port as  the  result  of  the  intoxication  of  an  adult  son,  it  is  neees- 
sarv  to  show  that  the  parent  is  poor  and  has  no  other  adequate 
means  of  support.52 


«  Bradford  v.  Boley,  167  Pa.  St. 
506;  31  Atl.  751;  25  Pitts.  L.  J.  N.  S. 
396;  36  W.  N.  C.  238. 

47  Beers  v.  Walhizer,  4:;  Hun  (N. 
V.),  254;  4  X.  Y.  St.  R.  377;  26  Wkly. 
Dig.  29. 

48  MoClellan  v.  Hein,  56  Neb.  600; 
77  N.  W.  120. 

49  Mulcahey  v.  Givens,  115  Ind. 
286;  17  N.  E.  798;  15  West.  309. 


^Tipton  v.  Schuler.  ST  111.  A  pp. 
:.17. 

H  VNYis.T  v.  Welch.  112  .Mich.  134; 
70  x.  \V.  4:18;  3  Det.  L.  X.  880.  See 
Weitz  v.  ESwen,  50  Iowa.  570:  Dun- 
lavey  v.  Watson.  3S  Iowa,  :)'.»:  .lock- 
ers v.  Borgman,  29  Kan.  109;  Wright- 
man  v.  Devere,  .'!:'.  Wis.  570. 

Stevens  v.  Cheney,  36  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  1.  See  Volans  v.  Owen,  7t  N.  Y. 
526. 

547 


§§  474,  475  CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 

§  474.  Injury  to  feelings— Mental  suffering.— In  an  act  in 
Michigan,88  it  was  provided  that  where,  as  a  result  of  liquor  fur- 
nished by  one  person  to  another,  certain  persons  were  injured 
in  person,  property,  means  of  support  "  or  otherwise,"  a  recovery 
might  be  had  for  such  injury  from  the  one  furnishing  the  liquor 
by  means  of  which  the  injury  occurred.  Under  such  an  act  it  is 
decided  in  this  state,  that  a  wife  may  recover  for  the  shame  and 
mortification  which  she  suffers  as  a  result  of  the  publication  in 
a  newspaper  of  her  husband's  connection  with  and  participation 
in  a  saloon  row.54  So,  also,  for  the  mental  suffering  which  she 
experiences  resulting  from  the  disgrace  and  discomfort  at 
tendant  upon  her  husband's  besotted  condition.55  And  where 
the  husband  is  convicted  of  drunkenness  resulting  proximately 
from  the  sale,  she  may  recover  for  the  disgrace  and  mortification 
resulting  from  such  conviction.56  But  mental  anguish  suffered 
by  an  intoxicated  person  as  a  result  of  any  injury  sustained  by 
him  cannot  be  recovered.57  And  where  a  father  has  been  an 
habitual  drunkard  for  years,  before  the  particular  sale  com- 
plained of,  a  daughter  cannot  recover  for  mental  suffering  result- 
ing from  her  father's  intoxication.58  Outside  of  those  states 
where  recovery  for  mental  suffering  or  anguish  is  allowed  by 
the  wording  of  the  statute,  either  expressly  or  by  a  general  term, 
such  as  in  the  Michigan  act,  and  the  recovery  is  expressly  al- 
lowed for  injury  to  person,  means  of  support  or  property, 
the  general  rule  seems  to  be  that  mental  suffering  alone  is 
not  sufficient  to  authorize  a  recovery  of  damages  under  the 
statute.59 

§475.  Exemplary  damages  — Generally.— In  one  of  the 

earlier  cases  in  Illinois  in  which  the  right  of  a  person,  suing  un- 
der the  civil  damage  act,  to  recover  exemplary  damages  was  con- 
sidered, it  was  decided  that  the  mere  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
and  resulting  damages  would  justify  an  award  of  exemplary 


53  Mich.  Act,  1887. 

5*  Lucker  v.  Liske,  111  Mich.  683; 
70  N.  W.  421;  3  Det.  L.  N.  850. 

55  Radley  v.  Seider  (Mich.),  58 
N.  W.  366. 

50  Lucker  v.  Liske,  111  Mich.  083; 
70  N.  W.  421:  3  Det,  L.  N.  850. 

548 


57  Sissing  v.  Beach  (Mich.),  58  N. 
W.  364. 

58  Sissing  v.  Beach  (Mich.),  58  N. 
W.  364. 

59  Freese  v.  Tripp,  70  111.  497;  Callo- 
way v.  Laydon,  47  Iowa,  456;  Mul- 
ford  v.  Clewell,  21  Ohio  St.  191. 


civil.    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


3  it:. 


damages.60     In  a  Later  case  in  this  state,  however,  it  was  held 

that  a  wife  suing  a  saloon  keeper  for  personal  injury  and  loss  of 
support,  as  a  result  of  the  sale  or  gift  of  intoxicating  liquors  to 
her  husband,  eould  only  recover  such  damages  where  the  con- 
duct of  the  defendant  was  wanton,  and  in  wilful  disregard  of 
her  rights.  lint  it  was  also  declared  that  the  selling  of  liquor 
to  a  person  who  was  an  habitual  drunkard  by  one  who  had  knowl- 
edge of  such  fact  was  such  a  wilful  violation  of  the  statute  as 
would  justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damages/'1  And  the  sale 
of  liquor  to  a  man  after  requests  and  warnings  of  the  wife  to 
the  defendant  not  to  do  so  will  render  the  latter  liable  for  such 
damages,  where  the  plaintiff  has  sustained  actual  injury  in  con- 
sequence thereof.1'-'  So.  again,  in  this  state  it  is  declared  that 
the  sale  of  liquors  to  one  who  is  plainly  intoxicated  and  who  is 
subsequently  killed  by  a  railroad  train,  while  in  such  condition. 
will  justify  an  award  of  exemplary  damages.*'  In  Iowa  they 
may  be  recovered  from  one  who  has  wilfully  violated  the  stat- 
ute.61 In  Kansas  the  sale  of  liquors  to  a  husband  after  notice 
from  the  wife  not  to  sell  her  husband  any  intoxicating  liquors 
will  authorize  the  recovery  of  such  damages.'"  And  in  Michi- 
gan, where  actual  damages  have  been  sustained,  exemplary 
damages  may  be  recovered,  they  being  given  as  a  punishment 
of  the  wrongdoer."1  Under  the  Michigan  act  of  1883,'"  how- 
ever, such  damages  can  only  be  recovered  in  cases  of  wilful 
wrong.'8  And  the  sale  of  liquors  to  a  husband  by  the  defendant 
after  notice  to  him  from  the  wife  not  to  furnish  any  more  liquoi-s 
to  the  husband  is  such  a  wilful  act  as  will  justify  an  award  of 
punitive  damages/"     So,  also,  the  sale  of    liquors  to  a  man   by 


App. 
Johnson,  45   111.   App. 


60  Murphy   v.  Cunan,   24  I 
475. 

"»  Wolfe  v. 
122. 

w  Wolfe  v. 
38  N.  E.  886 
133  111.  636: 


Johnson,  152  111.  280; 
Mr. Main >n  v.  Sankey, 
24   N.    E.    1027;  Hane- 
waeker  v.  Perman,  47  111.  App.  17. 

68  Buck  v.  Maddock,  07  111.  App. 
466,  affd  107  111.  219;  47  X.  E.  20S. 

64  Fox  v.  Wunderlick,  04  Iowa,  187. 
See  Miller  v.  Hammers  (Iowa,  1895), 
61  N.  W.  1087. 


65  .lockers  v.  Rorgman,  29  Kan. 
100. 

66  Peacock  v.  Oaks,  85  Mich.  578; 
48  N.  W.  L082.  See  Weiser  v.  Welch, 
112  Mich.  134;  70  N.  W.  438;  3  Del. 
L.  N.  880;  Larzelere  v.  Kirchgessner, 
7:1  Mich.  276;  41   X.  W.  88. 

81  Mich.  Stat.  1883,  p.  215. 

'-  Kosecrants  v.  Shoemaker.  60 
Mich.  4:  26  X.  W.  791:  Gaussly  v. 
Perkins,  30  Mich.  492;  Kreitei  \. 
Nichols,  28  Mich.  490. 

89  Rouse    v.   Melsheimer,  82   Mich. 

549 


8  476 


CIVIL   DAMAGE   ACTS. 


one  with  knowledge  that  he  was  intoxicated,  and  who  met  his 
death  while  intoxicated,  will  authorize  the  recovery  thereof  in 
an  action  by  the  wife.70  In  New  York  the  mere  sale  of  liquor  is 
not  of  itself  sufficient  to  justify  a  recovery  of  exemplary  dam- 
ages by  one  who  has  been  injured  as  the  result  of  intoxication 
caused  by  such  sale,71  but  there  must  be  some  proof  of  aggra- 
vating circumstances  with  which  the  defendant  was  connected.72 
So  they  are  not  recoverable  against  the  lessor  in  such  an  action, 
in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  participation  in,  or  know- 
ledge of,  the  aggravating  circumstances.73  But  they  may  be  re- 
covered of  one  who  sells  liquor  to  another  after  he  has  become 
intoxicated,  the  sale  to  him  while  in  such  condition,  being  such 
an  aggravating  circumstance  as  will  permit  of  their  recovery.74 
In  Ohio  a  wife  may  recover  punitive  damages  from  a  saloon 
keeper  who  sells  liquor  to  her  husband  after  his  name  has  been 
placed  on  the  blacklist.75  And  in  such  an  action,  evidence  is 
admissible  in  aggravation  of  damages  of  the  continuance  of  the 
sale  of  liquor  to  the  plaintiff's  husband  by  defendant  after  no- 
tice of  the  action  against  him.76  In  West  Virginia,  in  an  action 
under  such  a  statute,  exemplary  damages  are  not  recoverable 
merely  because  of  an  illegal  sale,  unless  it  appear  that  the  de- 
fendant acted  maliciously  or  in  wanton,  deliberate  and  wilful 
disregard  of  the  rights  and  known  wishes  of  the  plaintiff.77 

§  476.  Exemplary  damages— General  rule.— From  a  con- 
sideration of  the  cases  noted  in  the  preceding  section  it  will  be 


172;  46  N.  W.  372;  Larzelere  v.  Kirch- 
gessuer,  73  Mich.   276;  41  N.  W.  88. 

70  Lafler  v.  Fisher  (Mich.),  79  N. 
W.  934;  6  Det.  L.  N.  358. 

"'  Wilberv.  Dwyer,  69  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
507;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  625;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  395. 

72  Reid  v.  Terwilliger,  116  N.  Y. 
530;  27  N.  Y.  St.  R.  563;  22  N.  E. 
1091,  rev'g  42  Hun  (N.  Y),  310; 
Ketcham  v.  Fox,  52  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
284;  5  N.  Y.  Supp-  272;  Wilber  v. 
Dwyer,  69  Hun  (N.  Y.),  507;  52  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  625. 

73  Ketcham  v.  Fox,  52  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
284;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  272. 


■*  Wilber  v.  Dwyer,  69  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
507;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  625;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  395. 

75  Kear  v.  Garrison,  13  Ohio  C.  C. 
447;  7  Ohio  Dec.  515. 

™  Miller  v.  Gleason,  18  Ohio  C.  C. 
374;  10  Ohio  C.  D.  20. 

77  Pegram  v.  Stoitz,  31  W.  Va.  220; 
6  S.  E.  485.  In  this  case  it  is  declared 
that  exemplary  damages  are  not 
given  as  a  punishment  in  an  action 
by  a  wife,  but  as  a  compensation  for 
injury  to  her  means  of  support  and 
under  certain  circumstances  for  men- 
tal anguish. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


177.478 


seen  that  exemplary  damages  are  recoverable  under  the  civil  dam- 
age arts,  but  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  .sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  and  resulting  damage  to  another  will  not  of  itself  author- 
ize a  recovery  of  such  damages.  To  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  such 
an  award,  there  must  have  been  some  circumstances  of  aggrava- 
tion in  connection  with  the  defendant's  conduct  in  making  the 
sale,  such  as  malice  or  a  wanton,  deliberate  and  wilful  disregard 
of  the  plaintiff's  rights.  And  a  sale  to  one  who  is  in  an  intoxi- 
cated condition,  or  after  notice  has  been  given  to  make  no  further 
sales,  or  after  notice  of  the  commencement  of  the  action  are  acts 
showing  su.-h  a  wilful  disregard  of  the  rights  of  others  as  will 
justify  an  award  of  such  damages.78 

§  477.  Sale  by  employee  without  defendant's  knowledge 
no   defense  — Exemplary    damages— Mitigation    of.— In    an 

action  to  recover  damages  for  the  unlawful  sale  of  liquors,  the 
defendant  cannot  escape  liability  because  the  sale  was  made  by 
his  bartender  without  his  knowledge  or  authority  and  in  viola- 
tion of  his  express  orders  and  instructions.79  And  in  certain 
cases,  though  the  sale  may  be  made  under  such  circumstances, 
exemplary  damages  may  be  recovered.80  But  though  such  dam- 
ages are  recoverable,  yet  it  has  been  decided  in  Illinois  that  the 
defendant  may  show  in  mitigation  thereof  that  the  sale  was 
made  by  a  servant  in  violation  of  orders  given  by  the  defend- 
ant.81 

§  478.  Evidence   affecting    damages— Generally.— In    an 

action  by  a  wife  to  recover  damages  under  the  civil  damage  act,  evi- 
dence is  admissible  of  the  conviction  of  the  plaintiffs  husband 
for  drunkenness,  such  evidence  being  admissible  to  show  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  injury  but  not  to  establish 
drunkenness.82     And    evidence  is   admissible   in  an  action  by  a 


"8  See  cases  cited  in  preceding  sec- 
tion. 

79  Smith  v.  Reynolds,  8  Bun  (N. 
Y.),  128. 

so  Kear  v.  Garrison,  13  Ohio  C.  C. 
447;  7  Ohio  Dec.  515.  See  Krieter 
v.  Nichols,  28  Mich.  496. 

81  Fentz  v.  Meadows,  72  111.  540; 
Freeze  v.  Tripp,  70  111.  496. 


82  Lucker  v.  Liske,  111  Mich.  (583; 
70  N.  W.  421;  3  Del.  L.  X.  850.  See 
Beers  v.  Walhizer,  4:;  Qua  (N.  Y.  i. 
254;  4  N.  Y.  St.  EL  377:  26  Wkly. 
Dig.  29,  as  to  evidence  of  conviction 
for  crime.  But  Bee  Bradford  v. 
Boley,  1G7  Pa.  St.  506;  31  At  1.  751; 
25  l'itts.  L.  J.  N.  S.  3%;  30  W.  N.  C. 
238. 

551 


§  478  CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 

wife  that  her  husband  had,  on  previous  occasions,  drank  at 
defendant's  place,  and  had  been  on  protracted  sprees  to  de- 
fendant's knowledge.*3  And  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  sale 
of  intoxicating  liquors  to  a  person  which  resulted  in  his  death, 
evidence  is  admissible  of  his  industrious  habits  when  sober,  and 
of  acts  performed  by  him  for  the  support  of  his  wife,  such  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  his  ability  and  disposition  to  provide  for 
his  family.81  So,  also,  as  bearing  on  the  question  of  the  damages 
to  be  awarded  in  an  action  by  a  widow  for  loss  of  support,  evi- 
dence may  be  given  of  her  subsequent  remarriage.85  So  again, 
in  such  an  action  the  intemparate  habits  of  deceased  may  be 
shown.86  In  Iowa,  however,  it  is  declared  that  the  defend- 
ant cannot  show,  in  mitigation  of  damages,  that  the  deceased 
had  been  an  habitual  drunkard  for  years  before  his  death,  but 
rather  that  such  evidence  is  admissible  in  behalf  of  the  plain- 
tiff for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  sale  of  liquor  by  de- 
fendant to  deceased  was  unlawful.87  But  where  in  an  action  by 
a  wife  to  recover  damages  for  the  unlawful  sale  of  liquor  to  her 
husband,  she  seeks  to  recover  for  money  lost  by  her  husband  in 
gambling  while  intoxicated,  evidence  is  admissible  in  behalf  of 
the  defendant  that  the  husband  was  in  the  habit  of  gambling.* 
And  in  an  action  by  a  widow  to  recover  for  the  damages  sus- 
tained by  the  death  of  her  husband  as  the  result  of  his  intoxica- 
tion from  sales  by  defendant,  evidence  is  admissible  of  injuries 
sustained  by  the  deceased  previous  to  such  sale,  which  impaired 
his  ability  to  labor  and  which  would  probably  shorten  his  life.811 
But  the  fact  that  property  accumulated  by  the  deceased  during 
his  lifetime,  went  to  to  the  plaintiffs  upon  his  death,  should  not 
be  considered  by  the  jury  in  mitigation  of  damages,  but  it  is  de- 
clared that  the  fact  of  the  deceased's  ability  to  accumulate  such 


88  Lawson  v.  Eggleston,  28  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  52;  52  N.  Y.  Supp. 
181. 

8*  Buck  v.  Maddock,  167  111.  219; 
47  N.  E.  208,  aff'g  67  111.  App.  466. 

85  Sharpley  v.  Brown,  43  Hun  (N. 
Y. ),  374. 

86  Brockway  v.  Patterson  (Mich.), 
40  N.  W.  192;  Uldrich  v.  Gilmore,  35 
Neb.  288;   53  N.   W.   135.     See  also 

552 


Smith  v.  People,  Williamson,  31  N. 
E.  425,  afFg  38  111.  App.  638;  Gran 
v.  Houston,  45  Neb.  813;  64  N.  W. 
245. 

87  Huff  v.  Aultman,  69  Iowa,  71. 

88  Gintz  v.  Bradley,  53  111.  App. 
597. 

89  Slaven  v.  Germain,  64  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  506;  46  N.  Y.  St.  R.  514;  19  N. 
Y.  Supp.  492. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 


S   IT'.' 


property  should  rather  go  to  enhance  damages.90  Again,  in  an  ac- 
tion by  a  wife  to  recover  for  her  husband's  death  while  intoxicated 
from  liquors  sold  by  defendant,  evidence  is  not  admissible  as  to 
the  number  and  ages  of  the  surviving  children,  where  the  law 
gives  them  separate  rights  of  action  there  for."  And  where  no 
claim  is  made  for  exemplary  damages  in  an  action  by  a  minor 
brought  by  bis  mother  as  guardian,  evidence  that  a  judgment 
has  already  been  recovered  by  the  mother  againsl  the  defendant 
for  the  same  act  is  not  admissible/12  In  actions,  however,  to  re- 
cover under  a  civil  damage  act  for  the  death  of  a  person  and  loss 
of  support,  mortality  tables  are  generally  admissible  to  show 
the  expectation  of  life.93 

§  479.  Evidence  showing  unlawful  sale. — In  an  action  to 
recover  damages  for  injuries  sustained  as  the  result  of  an  all 
unlawful  sale  of  liquors  a  preponderance  of  evidence  showing 
the  sale  to  be  unlawful  is  sufficient.'"  So  in  an  action  by  a  wife 
who  sues  to  recover  for  injury  to  her  means  of  support  as  tin- 
result  of  her  husband's  intoxication  from  sales  by  defendant,  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  made  numerous  sales  of  intoxicating 
liquors  to  her  husband  is  sufficient  where  the  evidence  also 
shows  that  liquor  was  sold  by  the  defendant  a  sufficient  number 
of  times  to  have  materially  aided  in  producing  a  condition  of 
habitual  intoxication  on  the  part  of  the  husband.'"'  And  under 
a  complaint  alleging  unlawful  sales  by  the  defendant,  evidence 
is  admissible  of  sales  made  by  employees  of  the  defendant.'*' 
But  in  an  action  against  a  saloon  keeper  under  such  a  statute. 
evidence  is  not  admissible  as  part  of  the  res  gesta?  of  statements 
made  by  the  intoxicated  person  after  an  injury  as  to  where  he 
obtained  the  liquor.'1' 


90  Houston  v.  Gran,    38   Neb.  687; 
57  N.  W.  403. 

.  91  Larzelere  v.  Kiirbgessner,  73 
Mich.  270:  41  X.  W.  88;  Johnson  v. 
Schultz  (Midi.).  41  V  W.  865.  But 
see  Tetherow  v.  St.  Joseph  it  I).  M. 
R.  Co.,  98  M<».  74:  11  S.  W.  310. 

92  Secor  v.  Taylor,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.  |, 
123. 

98  Sellars  v.  Foster,    27   Neb.    118. 


See  Betting  v.  Hobbet  (111. ),  30  N. 
E.  104- . 

94  Kolliiiiz  v.  Bennett.  18  Ohio  C. 
C.  42:>;   10  Ohio  C.  I).  81. 

95Siegle  v.  Bush.  17::  111.  559;  50 
V  E.  1008,  aff'g  72  111.  A.pp.  485. 

96  Carrier  v.  Bernstein,  104  Iowa, 
572;  7:;  V  W.  1076. 

'-':  Van  Alstine  v.  Kaniecki.  109 
Mich.  318;  67  \.  W.  502;  3  Det.  L. 
N.  103. 

553 


§§  480,  481  CIV1I,    DAM  ACE    ACTS. 

§  480.  Sales  by  two  or  more  persons-  Recovery  in  case  of. 

— In  actions  under  the  civil  damage  acts  it  frequently  appears 
that  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff  was  the  result  of  the  sales  by  two 
or  more  persons.  In  such  cases  the  rule,  so  far  as  it  may  be 
possible  to  deduce  one  from  the  few  decisions  upon  this  point, 
is  that  in  order  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  against  one  of 
such  persons,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  sale  by  the  defendant 
was  a  contributing  cause  of  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff,  one  which 
tended  to  produce  the  injury  sustained,  and  where  such  fact  has 
been  shown,  the  defendant  will  be  liable  for  all  damages  sustained 
as  the  result  of  the  several  sales.33  And  in  an  action  for  loss  of 
support,  by  death,  an  instruction  to  the  jury  that  if  defendants 
furnished  "any  quantity"  whatever  of  liquor,  to  the  deceased, 
they  would  be  liable,  was  held  not  erroneous  though  it  was 
declared  that  the  idea  of  contribution  was  more  finely  drawn  by 
such  instruction  than  was  proper."  For  any  injury  which  oc- 
curred prior  to  the  time  when  defendant  began  selling  liquor 
to  the  plaintiff's  husband,  there  cannot,  however,  be  any 
recovery.100 

§  481.  Plaintiff's  knowledge  and  consent  to  sale  may  be 
defense. — It  may  be  shown,  in  defense  to  an  action  under  the 
statute,  that  the  plaintiff  consented  to  or  acquiesced  in  the  sale 
of  the  intoxicating  liquor,  as  a  result  of  which  he  has  been 
injured  in  the  manner  designated  in  the  statute.1  So,  in  an 
action  by  a  wife,  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  if  she  consented  to,  or  contributed  to  the  use 
of  the  intoxicating  liquors  by  her  husband,  there  can  be  no  re- 
covery by  her.-  And  where  the  statute  provides  for  the  recov- 
ery of  a  penalty  as  liquidated  damages,  by  any  person  aggrieved, 
a  father  cannot   recover  such  penalty  for  a  sale  of  liquor  to  his 


98Woolheather  v.  Risley,  38  Iowa, 
486;  Bryant  v.  Tidgewell,  133  Mass. 
86;  Ford  v.  Cheever  (Mich.),  2  Det. 
L.  N.  215;  63  N.  W.  975;  27  Chic. 
Leg.  News,  408;  Ulrich  v.  Gilmore, 
35  Neb.  288;  53  N.  W.  135;  Hutch- 
inson v.  Hubbard,  21  Neb. 83;  Boyd 
v.  Watt,  27  Ohio  St.  259. 

554 


"Gran  v.  Houston,  45  Neb.  813;  64 
N.  W.  245. 

i^Ford  v.  Cheever  (Mich.),  2  Det. 
L.  N.  215;  03  N.  W.  975;  27  Chic. 
Leg.  News,  108. 

i  Reget  v.  Bell,  77  111.  593. 

2  Elliott  v.  Barry,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
129.  See  Engelken  v.  Hilger,  43 
Iowa,  563. 


CIVIL    DAMAGE    A.CT8.  §§    182,    183 

minor  son,  where  he  consented  to  the  sale.  In  a  case  in  Ne- 
braska, however,  it  is  declared  that  though  ;i  wife  may  coi 

to,  or  acquiesce  in  the  sale  of  liquor  to  her  husband,  yet  this 
will  be  no  defense  to  an  action  under  the  statute  of  that  state 
brought  by  her  in  behalf  of  herself  and  children  for  Loss  of 
support.4 

§  4N2.  Release  of  damages  by  wife  no  defense  to  action 
by  children.  —  Where  minor  children  are  by  statute  given  a 
right  of  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
Liquors  to  their  father  independent  of  any  similar  right  con- 
ferred upon  the  wife,  a  release  by  the  latter  of  all  damages  from 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  her  husband  will  be  no  de- 
fense to  an  action  by  the  children.5 

$  483.  Pleading. — To  enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  injury  to  her  means  of  support  sustained  as  the  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  intoxication  of  her  husband,  such  as 
would  result  from  his  inability  to  labor  while  intoxicated,  it  is 
sufficient  to  allege  generally  that  she  was  injured  in  her  means 
of  support  in  consequence  of  the  intoxication  of  her  husband, 
but  if  she  wishes  to  recover  damages  for  any  injury  to  her  means 
of  support  which  is  not  the  necessary  result,  hut  the  natural 
result  of  his  intoxication,  such  as  the  reckless  expenditure  of 
his  money  when  drunk,  she  must  allege  this  in  her  declaration.1' 
In  Michigan  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  under  the  statute 
of  that  state,  the  plaintiff  may  properly  allege  the  cause  of 
action  as  a  continuing  one.7  In  Iowa  a  cause  of  action  arising 
under  a  statute  giving  a  right  of  action  to  a  wife,  injured  in  her 
means  of  support  as  the  result  of  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor 
to  her  husband,  cannot  be  joined  in  a  single  pleading  with  a 
cause  of  action  under  a  separate  statutory  provision  which  pro- 
vides for  the  recovery  of  a  penalty  by  any  citizen  in  the  county, 


3Ed£ettv.  Finn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
30  S.  W.  8:'.0. 

Miran  v.  Houston,  4."»  Neb.  si;;-.  84 
X.  W.  24:,. 

5  Johnson  v.  McCauu,  01  111.  App. 
110. 


"  Pegram  v.  Stortz,  31  W.  Va.  220; 

t;  S.  E.  485. 

7  Wood  v.  Leutz,  110  Mich.  l'7.~; 
74  V  W.  462;  SO  chic.  Leg.  News, 
258;  4  Det  L.  N.  l's.">.  action  brought 
under  Mich.  Pub.  Acts.  l>*-7.  act  No 
313. 

55o 


§  484  CIVIL    DAMAGE    ACTS. 

who  shall  be  entitled  to  one  half  the  amount  collected  in  those 
cases,  where  a  person  has  sold  intoxicating  liquor  to  one  already 
intoxicated  or  in  the  habit  of  becoming  so.s 

§  484.  Civil  rights  acts — Damages  and  penalties. — Where 
the  plaintiff,  a  colored  female,  was  refused  passage  on  a  street 
car  of  defendant,  the  conductor  refusing  to  stop,  saying,  "  We 
don't  take  colored  people  in  this  car,"  and  it  was  also  proved 
that  there  was  ample  room  for  the  plaintiff,  and  that  she  was 
provided  with  the  usual  passage  tickets  and  was  ready  and  will- 
ing to  pay  her  fare,  it  was  decided  the  case  was  not  one  for  ex- 
emplary damages  since  there  was  no  proof  of  special  damage  or 
of  wanton  or  violent  conduct  on  the  part  of  defendant,  and  that 
if  the  plaintiff  was  wrongfully  excluded  from  the  car,  such  a 
violation  of  her  rights  entitled  her  to  nominal  damages  which 
the  law  would  presume  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  actual  dam- 
ages.9 But  the  denial  of  such  privilege  when  not  on  the  ground 
of  race  or  color  does  not  subject  the  defendant  to  the  statutory 
penalty.10 

8  Carrier  v.  Bernstein,  104  Iowa,  I  reason  of  race,  color  and  condition, 
572;  73  N.  W.  1076.  see  10   Century  Dig.  columns  2133- 


9  Pleasants  v.  North  Beach  &  M, 
K.  Co.,  34  Cal.  586. 

w  Cully  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
1  Hughes,  536;  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3,466. 
As  to  allegations  for  denial  of  priv- 
ileges of  inn,  see  Fruchey  v.  Eagle- 
son,  15  lnd.  App.  88;  43  N.  E.  146. 
As  to  allegation  of  wrongful  dis- 
crimination on  account  of  color  and 
race,  see  Redding  v.  South  Caro- 
lina R.  Co.,  5  S.  C.  (5  Rich.)  67,  de- 
cided 1873.     As  to  discrimination  by 

556 


2143,  covering  the  following  subjects: 
Sec.  714.  "  In  general  ;  "  sec.  715. 
"  Public  conveyances;  "  sec.  716. 
"  Marriage  ;  "  sec.  717.  "  Occupa- 
tion and  employment  ;  "  sec.  718. 
Inns  and  Theatres ;  "  sec.  719.  "Resi- 
dence;" sec.  720.  "Competency  as 
witness;1'  sec.  721.  "Homestead;" 
sec.  722.  "Punishment  of  crime;'' 
sec.  723.  "  Public  schools;  "  sec.  724. 
"  Constitution  of  juries."  See  also 
10  Century  Dig.  cols.  51-52,  sec.  12. 


TITLE  V. 

DAMAGES  FOR  CAUSING  DEATH. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


DAMAGES    FOE   CAUSING    DEATH — GEN EB ALLY. 


§48o.   Deatli  l>v  wrongful  act,  etc. — 
Pi  eliiuinary  remarks. 
48J.  Actio  personalis  moritur  cum 
persona. 

487.  Actio  personalis — Continued — 

Tort  or  contract — Election 
of  remedies. 

488.  Actio       personalis — Tort     or 

contract — Election  of  rem- 
edies— Continued. 

489.  Same  subject  continued. 

490.  Death — Abatement   or   survi- 

val—  Rights     of    action  — 
Statutes — Generally. 

491.  Death — Effect   of  subsequent 

statute — Survival. 

492.  Death    before   or  after  judg- 

ment, verdict,  etc. 

493.  Death    of    wrongdoer — Com- 

mon law  and  statutes. 

494.  Death    of     wrongdoer — Con- 

tinued —  Abatement       and 
survival  of  actions. 
49o.   Death — Civil  action — Remedy 
purely  statutory. 

496.  Nature   of   statutory    remedy 

for  losses  by  death  or  where 
death  ensues — Generally. 

497.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — 

Continued — Decisions,    etc. 

498.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — 

Continued — Whether    rem- 
edy new   and    independent. 

§485.    Death    by    wrongful 
marks. — Prior  to    the  enactmei 


499.  Nature  oi  statutory  remedy — 

Whether  Bame  is  new  and 
independent — Continued. 

500.  Same     subject  —  Conclusion. 

501.  Construction      of     statutes — 

General  principles. 

502.  Construction  of  statutes,  etc. — 

Survival  and  death  loss. 
50o.   Construction  of  survival  and 
death    loss   statutes,    etc. — 
Continued. 

504.  Death — Conflict  of  laws— Ex- 

traterritorial jurisdiction 
— Foreign  administrator — 
Federal  jurisdiction. 

505.  Same  subject  continued. 

506.  Death  —  Coullict    of    laws  — 

Lex  loci — Lex  fori. 

507.  Death  —  Conflict    of    laws  — 

Foreign  administrator  — 
Party  in  interest — Federal 
jurisdiction  —  Opinions  in 
recent  decisions. 

508.  Death  —  Conflict    of    laws  — 

Foreign  administrator — Ex- 
traterritorial jurisdicl  ion 
Where  action  does  not  lie — 
Federal  jurisdiction. 

509.  Death— Conflict  of  laws— Ex- 

traterritorial jurisdiction — 
Federal  jurisdiction — Mexi- 
can laws. 

act,    etc. — Preliminary    re- 

lt  of  what   may    he    generally 
•357 


§  486  DEATH— ACTIO    PERSONALIS. 

designated  as  the  death  loss  statutes,  there  were  certain  rules 
of  law  whereby  personal  rights  of  actions  died  with  the  person 
injured.  We  shall  therefore  briefly  notice  these  legal  principles 
or  rules,  the  distinction  between  torts  and  contracts  in  connec- 
tion therewith,  the  election  of  remedies,  the  common  law,  the 
death  loss  statutes  generally,  and  the  nature  and  construction 
thereof.  It  may  also  be  stated  here,  that  while  these  legislative 
enactments  are  perhaps  an  attempt  to  accomplish  the  same 
general  purpose  of  affording  a  remedy  against  the  person  respon- 
sible for  the  wrongful  or  negligent  killing  of  another,  neverthe- 
less they  differ  widely  in  their  terms,  many  of  them  having 
evidently  been  enacted  to  meet  certain  conditions  peculiar  to 
the  especial  jurisdiction,  or  to  remedy  what  may  have  been 
considered  defects  in  pre-existing  statutes,  either  of  the  same  or 
other  jurisdictions.  Thus  there  exist  statutes  relating  to  death 
caused  by  the  use  of  deadly  weapons  ;  by  wilful  or  grossly 
negligent  acts ;  by  killing  in  a  duel  :  death  occasioned  by  rail- 
road corporations,  by  defective  highways,  by  negligence  in 
operating  mines,  by  negligence,  etc..  of  certain  common  carriers  ; 
a  remedy  by  indictment,  an  action  in  the  name  of  the  state  to 
the  use  of  specified  persons  and  the  general  action  for  damages 
by  designated  legal  representatives  or  beneficiaries.  Again, 
certain  of  the  statutes  use  specific  terms  as  to  the  measure  of  re- 
covery which  are  similar  in  a  few  states,  while  in  the  other  juris- 
dictions no  measure  of  damages  is  specified,  and  in  still  others 
some  of  the  elements  of  damages  are  mentioned.  A  difficulty 
therefore  exists  in  formulating  or  applying  any  general  govern- 
ing rule.  We  shall,  however,  classify  as  far  as  we  deem  war- 
ranted and  possible,  the  statutes  having  similar  provisions  and 
those  of  a  general  and  special  or  peculiar  character,  stating  the 
rules  applicable  under  each  subdivision. 

§  486.  Actio  personalis  moiitnr  cum  persona.— The  rule 
that  a  personal  right  of  action  dies  with  the  person '  was  applied 
by  Blackstone  to  actions  arising  ex  delicto  for  wrongs  actually 
done  or  committed  by  the  defendant  as  trespass,  battery  and 
slander,  and  he  declares  that  such  actions  "  never  shall  be  re- 
vived either  by  or  against  the    executors  or  other   representa- 

1  Noy  Max.  14;  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  Ed.)  *909. 

558 


DEATH       ACTIO    I  \  LIS. 


§48' 


tives."2  At  common  law  the  rule  actio  personalis  was  held  to 
be  peculiarly  applicable  to  actions  in  form  ex  delicto.  "  It  being 
a  general  rule  that  an  action  founded  in  tort  and  in  form  e\  de- 
licto was  considered  as  actio  personalis  and  within  "  the  maxim 
above  given.3 


§  487.  Actio  personalis — Continued— Tort  or  contract — 
Election  Of  remedies. — Actions  on  tort  abate  and  those  on  con- 
tract survive  as  a  general  rule,  on  the  death  of  the  injured  party 
unless  there  is  a  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary.  In  apply- 
ing this  ride,  however,  regard  should  be  had  rather  to  the  sub- 
stance than  to  the  form  of  the  action.  And  it  is  declared  that 
if  the  damages  are  merely  incident  to  the  injur}',  that  being  per- 
sonal and  the  proximate  cause  of  the  damages,  the  action  dies, 
otherwise  where  the  breach  of  the  contract  itself  is  the  primary 
cause  of  the  damage  and  the  personal  injuries  are  mere  inci- 
dents of  the  breach.'     And  even  though  a  contractual   relation 


2  3  Black.  Comra.  (Cooley's  ed. 
1899)    302. 

3  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.)  *909,  citing  Wlieatley  v.  Lane, 
1  Wins.  Saund.  216  n  (1). 

*  Webber  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co., 
97  Fed.  140,  case  of  passenger  on 
street  railroad  holding  that  a  per- 
sonal representative  of  one  whose 
death  was  caused  by  an  injury  re- 
ceived as  such  passenger  could  not 
maintain  an  action  under  Gen.  Stat. 
Minn.  1894,  sec.  5912,  which  applied 
alike  to  contract  and  tort,  said  suit 
not  being  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  sec.  5913.  As  to  the 
rule  actio  personalis  "  it  has  been 
observed  that  this  maxim  is  not  ap- 
plied in  the  old  authorities  to  causes 
of  actions  on  contracts,  but  to  those 
in  tort  which  are  founded  on  mal- 
feasance or  misfeasance  to  the  per- 
son or  property  of  another;  which 
latter  are  annexed  to  the  person  and 
die  with  the  person,  except  where 
the  remedy  is  given  to  the  personal 
representative   by  the  statute   law." 


Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  ed.) 
*909.  Although  there  be  an  ex- 
press contract  to  furnish  a  skillful, 
trained,  competent  nurse  to  a  pa- 
tient, and  an  action  for  tort  for 
breach  of  duty  might  lie,  yet  an  ac- 
tion can  be  maintained  for  the  breach 
of  contract.  Ward  v.  St.  Vincent's 
Hospital,  39App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)624; 
57  N.  Y.  Supp.  784;  6  Am.  Neg.  Kep. 
164,  rev'g  50  N.  Y.  Supp.  466;  23 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)91;  30  Chic.  Leg.  News, 
258;  •")  Det.  L.  N.  (No.  4).  Action 
for  breach  of  contract  for  carriage 
and  injury  to  passenger  for  damages 
prior  to  death  survives  to  personal 
representatives.  Kelley  v.  Union 
Pac.  K.  Co.,  16  Colo.  455;  27  Pac, 
1058;  11  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  10.  False 
representations  as  to  real  estate  sold; 
action  survives  death  of  plaintiff 
under  I  !al.  Civ.  Code,  sec.  954,  provid- 
ing for  such  survival  to  the  personal 
representatives  upon  the  owner's 
death  of  a  thing  in  action  arising 
out  of  the  violation  of  a  right  to 
property.      Henderson    v.     Henshall 

559 


488 


DEATH — ACTIO    PERSONALIS. 


exists,  yet  if  the  plaintiff's  case  depends  as  to  a  considerable  por- 
tion thereof  upon  a  breach  of  duty  outside  of  and  not  a  part  of 
the  contract,  an  action  lies  in  tort,  although  said  duty  is  de- 
pendent upon  and  connected  with  the  contract.5 

§  488.  Actio  personalis — Tort  or  contract — Election  of 
remedies — Continued. — It  has  been  held  in  New  York  that  an 
action  against  a  common  carrier  may  be  brought  in  contract  for 
an  injury  resulting  in  death,  for  the  benefit  of  decedent's  per- 
sonal representatives.6  And  a  cause  of  action  is  held  to  survive 
to  personal  representatives  of  a  husband,  who  has  brought  suit 
for  a  personal  injury  to  his  wife,  per  quod  servitium  amisit,  the 
defendant  being  a  carrier  of  passengers.  It  was  said,  however, 
that  the  action  would  have  abated  at  common  law  on  plaintiff's 
death,  the  action  being  grounded  in  tort.'     So,  also,  a  cause  of 


(U.  S.  C.  C.  App.  9th  Cir.),  54  Fed. 
320.  Action  for  damages  for  tres- 
pass on  land  survives  to  personal 
representatives  of  deceased  owner. 
Musick  v.  Kansas  City  S.  &  M.  R. 
Co.,  114  Mo.  309;  21 S.  W.  491.  That 
actions  ex  contractu  do  not  survive, 
see  Vittum  v.  Oilman,  48  N.  H.  416. 
6  Church  v.  Ante-Kalsomine  Co., 
118  Mich.  219;  76  N.  W.  383;  5  Det. 
L.  N.  486.  "  Ordinarily  the  es- 
sence of  a  tort  consists  in  the  viola- 
tion of  some  duty  to  an  individual, 
which  duty  is  a  thing  different  from 
the  mere  contract  obligation,  and 
omission  to  perform  a  contract  ob- 
ligation is  never  a  tort  unless  that 
omission  is  also  an  omission  of  a 
legal  duty.  That  legal  duty  may 
arise  from  circumstances  not  con- 
stituting elements  of  the  contract 
as  such,  although  connected  with 
and  dependent  upon  it,  and  born  of 
that  wider  range  of  legal  duty  which 
is  due  from  every  man  to  his  fellow 
to  respect  his  rights  of  property  and 
person  and  to  refrain  from  invading 
them  by  force  or  fraud."  Ander- 
son's Law  Diet,  title  "  Tort," 
p.  1040,  citing  Rich  v,  N.  Y.  Cent. 
560 


&  H.  R.  Rd.    Co.,  87  N.  Y.  382,    390, 
398,  per  Finch,  J. 

6  Doedt  v.  Wiswall,  15  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  125,  aff'd  15  How.  (N.  Y.) 
145;  Yertore  v.  Wiswall,  16  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  8.  But  see  Hegerich  v. 
Keddie,  99  N.  Y.  258,  rev'g  32  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  141;  5  Civ.  Pro.  (N.  Y.) 
228.  As  to  survival  and  acts  of  1847 
and  1849,  see  Baker  v.  Bailey,  16 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  54;  Dickens  v.  N.  Y. 
Cent.  Rd.,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41; 
Safford  v.  Drew,  3  Duer  (N.  Y.), 
627;  12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  150. 

7  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Cross  Town 
Rd.  Co.,  56  How.  Pr.  ( N.  Y. )  32,  aff'd 
75  N.  Y.  192;  56  How.  (N.  Y.)  465, 
aff'g  case  cited  in  numerous  cases. 
Action  survived,  however,  under 
Xew  York  statutes  as  to  survival  of 
actions  in  case  of  wrongs  to  property 
rights,  or  interest  of  another.  Ex- 
amine Sweet  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  355;  41  N.  Y. 
Supp.  549.  That  executrix  might 
sue  in  contract  for  death  consequent 
upon  injury  to  her  husband,  who 
was  a  passenger  on  a  railroad  train. 
See  Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  &  T. 
R.  Co.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  148;  L.  R.  10 


I'l: A  I'll        \<   I  In    PERSONALIS. 


§    188 


action  may  be  brought  upon  contract  though  sounding  in  tort. 
the  tort  being  waived,  and  such  action  survives  against  personal 
representatives.8  It  is  further  held  that  the  right  to  waive  a 
tort,  and  sue  on  an  implied  contract   is   well  settled.'     Again, 


C.  P.  189.  See  also  Winnegar  v. 
Cent.  Passgr.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Ky.  547; 
Potter  v.  Metropolitan  Dist.  Ky.  Co., 
30  L.  T.  N.  S.  7t3:> ;  Leggott  v.  (ireal 
North.  Ry.  Co.,  45  L.  J.  Q.  B.  557;  24 
Wkly.  H.  784;  Q.  B.  I).  599;  City  of 
Brussels,  0  Ben.  (TJ.  S.  Dist.  X.  Y.) 
371.  An  action  by  a  passenger  on 
board  a  vessel  for  negligence,  death 
or  injury,  is  either  in  rem  or  in  per- 
sonam. Desty's  Shipp.  &  Admlty. 
(Pony.  ed.  1879),  sec.  273,  citing 
The  Highland  Light,  Chase  Dec. 
150;  The  New  World  v.  King,  16 
How.  (U.  S. )  469.  That  the  recovery, 
however,  should  be  under  a  statute, 
see  The  Job  T.  Wilson  (U.  S.  I).  C. 

D.  Md. ),  84  Fed.  204;  The  Jane  Grey 
(U.  S.  D.  C.  D.  Wash.),  95  Fed.  693; 
The  Williamette  (IT.  S.  C.  C.  App. 
9th  Cir.),  18  C.  C.  A.  366;  46  U.  S. 
App.  26;  31  L.  R.  A.  715;  70  Fed. 
874,  modified  18  C.  C.  A.  373;  44 
U.  S.  App.  96;  31  L.  R.  A.  720;  The 
Glendale  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.), 
42  U.  S.  App.  546;  81  Fed.  633,  rev'g 
77  Fed.  906;  The  Transfer,  No.  4,  & 
The  Car  Float,  No.  16  (IT.  S.  C.  C. 
2d  Cir.),  61  Fed.  364;  Barton  v. 
Brown.  145  U.  S.  335;  12  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  949;  36  L.  R.  A.  727;  46  Alb. 
L.  J.  66;  Rundell  v.  La  Compagnie 
Gen.  Trans.  (IT.  S.  D.  C.  X.  I),  ill.  i. 
94  Fed.  366.  This  point,  however, 
will  be  more  fully  considered  in  an- 
other part  of  this  work. 

8  People  v.  Starkweather.  3  J.  &  Sp. 
( N.  Y. )  453. 

9  Central  Gas  &  Elec.  Fix.  Co.  v. 
Sheridan,  49  X.  Y.  St.  R.  639;  1 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  386,  ease  of  contract 
to  furnish  house  with  g:>s  fixtures, 
and    failure    to    complete    purchase. 

36 


Demand  for  goods  and  refusal  to  re- 
turn or  pay  for  them  and  allegation 
for  conversion  of  goods.  Rothschild 
v.  Mark.  115  N.  V.  1;  42  Hun  (  X.  Y.), 
72;  23  X.  V.  St  K.  992;  21  X.  E. 
726,  ease  of  money  obtained  by 
fraud  and  tort  waived.  Berly  v. 
Taylor,  5  Hill  (N.  Y. ),  577,  case 
where  goods  deposited  and  wrong- 
fully sold,  tort  waived.  Boyle  v. 
Stat  en  Island  &  S.  B.  L.  Co.,  17  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.  I  621;  45  V  Y.  Supp.  496, 
case  where  agent  received  securities 
to  pay  for  property,  lmt  used  se- 
curities of  his  own  of  less  value  for 
payment,  tort  waived.  Terry  v. 
Munger,  121  X.  Y.  161  :  30  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  746:  24  X.  E.  272,  aff'g  49  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  560;  18  X.  V.  St.  EL  506;  2 
N\  Y.  Supp.  :;4S,  case  of  wrongful 
conversion  of  personal  property. 
Doherty  v.  Shields.  86  Hun  |  X.  Y.  ). 
303;  67  X.  Y.  St.  EL  211,  case  of 
tortious  conversion.  Abbott  v. 
Blossom,  66  Barb.  353,  use  of  an- 
other's materials  in  repair  of  build- 
ing. Starr  Cash-Car.  Co.  v.  Kein 
hart,  4'.i  X.  Y.  St.  R.  228;  2  Mise. 
(N.  Y. )  116,  case  of  conversion  of 
cash;  carriers.  But  tort  cannot  be 
waived  by  a  real  estate  owner,  and 
suit  be  brought  against  a  trespasser 
on  a  contract  for  the  value  of  the 
use  of  the  premises.  Me  Lane  v. 
Kelly,  72  Minn.  395;  75  X.  W.  601 
Examine  also  People  v.  Gibbs,  9 
Wend.  (X.  Y.  I  29.  So  an  action 
againsi    a   telegraph    company    for 

breach  of  contract   n I   not   he  ex 

delicto.  Carland  v.  West,  Uu.  Tel. 
Co.,  118  Mich.  369;  76  X.  W.  762; 
4:;  L.  EL  A.  280;  5  Det.  I..  X. 
539.     As  to  character  or  form  of  ac- 

561 


§  -189 


DEATH  — ACTIO    PERSONALIS. 


the  wrongful  ejection  of  a  passenger  who  is  rightfully  on  a 
train  under  a  contract  for  his  carriage  to  a  certain  point,  con- 
stitutes a  ground  for  an  action  for  breach  of  the  contract,  or  for 
an  action  ex  delicto  for  tort  or  negligence  of  the  carrier.10 

§  489.  Same  subject  continued. — In  a  comparatively  re- 
cent California  case  the  plaintiff  was  employed  by  the  board  of 
state  harbor  commissioners  as  a  night  deck  hand  upon  a  tug- 


tion  for  failure  to  transmit  a  tele- 
gram, etc.,  ex  delicto  or  ex  con- 
tractu, see  Joyce  on  Electric  Law 
(ed.  1900),  sec.  1013.  See  Florida 
C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Scarlett  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  5th  Cir.),  33  C.  C.  A.  554;  63 
U.  S.  App.  377;  91  Fed.  349,  case  of 
conversion  of  ties.  Statute  gave 
right  where  transaction  was  of  the 
nature  of  tort  and  contract  to  waive 
the  one  and  rely  upon  the  other. 

10  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  K.  Co.  v.  Spirk, 
51  Neb.  167;  70  N.  W.  926;  7  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  205;  Boster  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va. 
318;  15  S.  E.  158.  So  also  where  a 
passenger  has  been  furnished  an  im- 
proper ticket,  he  may  sue  in  tort  for 
damages  for  ejection  from  train 
on  refusal  to  pay  fare  demanded, 
his  means  being  exhausted. 
Pouiliu  v.  Canadian  P.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  E.  D.  Mich.),  47 
Fed.  858;  11  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  39, 
and  passenger  wrongfully  expelled 
may  sue  in  tort  or  for  breach  of  con- 
tract. Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  Russ  (U.  S.  C.  C.  App.  7th 
Cir.),  6  C.  C.  A.  597;  57  Fed.  322. 
So  also  for  injury  caused  by  a  breach 
of  the  carrier's  duty  owed  to  a  pas- 
senger, action  lies  in  tort  or  con- 
tract. Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hine  (Ala.),  25  So.  857.  "The  re- 
fusal of  a  common  carrier  to  accept 
a  passenger  must  be  (citing  Lake 
Erie,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Acres,  108  Ind. 
548;  9  N.  E.  453),  and  his  wrongful 
562 


ejection  of  a  passenger  with  or  with- 
out unnecessary  force  may  be  (citing 
Central  R.,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Roberts,  91 
Ga.  513;  18  S.  E.  315,  and  other 
cases),  the  subject  of  an  action  in 
tort  rather  than  in  contract,  and  the 
right  of  election  exists  in  any  case 
of  positive  misfeasance  to  a  pas- 
senger," (citing  several  cases)  2 
Shearman  &  Redf.  on  Neg.  (5th  ed.). 
sec.  486.  At  common  law  the  passen- 
ger's right  of  action  for  injury  was 
confined  solely  to  him,  and  the  maxim 
actio  personalis  applied  except,  it  is 
said,  where  the  plaintiff  sustained  a 
direct  loss  himself  as  in  case  of  a,  loss 
of  service  from  injury  to  his  servant. 
Hutchinson  on  Carriers  (ed.  1891), 
sec.  777,  citing  Carey  v.  Railroad, 
1  Cush.  (Mass.)  475;  Kearney  v. 
Railroad,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  109;  Whit- 
ford  v.  Railroad,  23  N.  Y.  465; 
Eden  v.  Railroad,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
204;  Soule  v.  Railroad,  24  Conn. 
575;  Holland  v.  Railroad,  144  Mass. 
425;  Matthews  v.  Railroad,  26  Mo. 
App.  75;  Hall  v.  Hollander,  4  B.  & 
C.  660,  and  other  cases.  Passenger's 
remedy  is  in  contract  or  tort  at  his 
election.  2  Harris  on  Dam.  by 
Corp.  (ed.  1892)  sees.  544,  545;  4 
Elliott  on  Railroads  (ed.  1897), 
sees.  1693,  1694,  1696;  Black's  Law 
&  Pract.  in  Accdt.  Cas.  (ed.  1900) 
sees.  90;  Thomas  on  Neg.  (ed.  1895) 
p.  129,  V;  Booth  on  Street  Rys. 
(ed.  1892)  sec.  375. 


DEATH       A.CTIO    PERSONALIS. 


§489 


boat  belonging  to  the  state  and  used  by  said  board,  and  was 
injured,  as  ulk-ged,  by  a  fall,  while   in   the  performance  of  bis 

duties  as  .said  employee.  It  was  urged  that  the  relation  of 
master  and  servant  was  a  contract  relation,  and  that  the  action 
was  to  recover  damages  for  a  breach  of  duty  under  the  con- 
tract. The  court,  however,  declared  the  action  to  he  one  in 
tort  and  not  upon  contract.  "The  contract  of  employment  has 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  liability,  except  to  create  a 
duly  on  the  part  of  the  employer — a  duty  not  expressed  in  the 
contract,  and  for  the  violation  of  which  the  contract  of  employ- 
ment furnishes  no  rule  or  standard  lor  the  estimation  of  dam- 
ages. Nor  is  the  action  grounded  upon  the  contract  hut  upon 
the  duty  springing  from  the  relation  created  by  it,  viz  :  that  of 
employer  and  employee,  and  under  the  old  system  of  pleading 
was  always  classed  as  an  action  ex  delicto."11  And  if  a  tort 
exists  independently  of  the  contract  even  though  one  of  the 
consequences  is  a  breach  thereof,  action  may  be  brought  in 
tort.1'  There  are,  it  is  said,  three  classes  of  cases  in  which  ac- 
tions for  tort  are  founded  :  (1)  an  invasion  of  some  legal  right 
of  person  or  property;  (2)  the  violation  of  some  duty  toward 
the  public  which  has  resulted  in  some  damage  to  the  plaintiff, 
or,  (3)  an  infraction  of  some  private  duty  or  obligation  which 
has  been  productive  of  damage  to  the  complaining  party.11  So 
the  election  as  to  contract  or  tort  applies  not  only  to  mis- 
feasance or  nonfeasance  but  tort  also  frequently  lies  where  there 
is  simply  a  nonperformance  of  contract.14 


11  Denning  v.  State,  123  Cal.  316; 
5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  289,  297.  See  also  1 
Waiis  Act.  &  Def.  (ed.  1S7T)  i>.  L35. 

12  Stock  v.  Boston,  NO  Mass.  410; 
21  N.  E.  871.  A  claim  for  a  conver- 
sion of  securities  by  a  member  of 
a  linn  of  stockbrokers  wbo  has  died, 
may  be  sued  on  as  a  claim  in  lort 
against  the  estate  of  tbe  deceased 
partner  or  as  an  action  on  implied 
contract  against  the  survivor  if  the 
linn.  Matter  of  1'ierson,  19  A.pp. 
Div.  (N.  Y.i  478;  46  N.  Y.  Supp. 
557. 

is  1  Wait's  Acts  &  Def.    fed.    18771 


p.  132,  from  which  the  above  is  sub- 
stantially taken. 

u  Broom's  Leg.  .Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.)  *202.  See  also  Black's  Law  & 
Pract  in  Accdt.  Cases  (ed.  1900), 
sec.  90;  1  Shear.  &  Redf.  on  Neg. 
(5th  ed.i  sec.  220,  eases  cited,  1 
Stover's  X.  Y.  Ann.  Code  (5th  cd.), 
p.  329a  et  seq. :  Blin  v.  Campbell, 
14  Johns.  (N.  Y.i  432;  McAllister  v. 
Hammond,  6  Cow.  i  \.  V.  i  342;  Per- 
eival  v.  Hickey,  Is  Johns.  i\.  Y.) 
432.  But  it  is  held  that  for  the  neg- 
ligent performance  of  a  duty  arising 
out  of    contract,  tort   does   not  lie. 

563 


§§  -190,491  DEATH— SURVIVAL. 

§  490.  Death — Abatement  and  survival — Rights  of  action 
— Statutes — Generally. — Seven  distinct  propositions  may  be 
deduced  from  the  decisions  :  (1)  The  maxim  actio  personalis  ap- 
plied to  torts  and  not  to  actions  on  contract.  Actions  of  tort 
which  were  annexed  to  the  person  died  with  the  person  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary.  (2)  Actions  of  tort  for 
injury  to  a  man's  person,  reputation  or  feelings  within  the  maxim 
actio  personalis  are  distinct  from  those  causes  of  action,  whereby 
it  is  sought  to  recover  for  loss  by  the  death  itself,  occasioned  by 
a  statutory  wrong  or  omission  as  the  proximate  cause.  (3)  An 
action  for  a  tort  annexed  to  the  person  who  is  a  party  to  a  per- 
sonal action  and  which  dies  with  such  party,  has  been  distin- 
guished from  a  case  wherein  the  party  alleged  to  be  injured  and 
the  wrongdoer  are  still  in  existence  and  the  injury  arises  to  the 
plaintiff  outside  of  and  independent  of  that  to  the  deceased,  as 
where  there  is  an  injury  to  some  relative  right,  such  as  a  loss 
of  service  to  a  master,  husband  or  parent.  (4)  Excluding  from 
consideration  any  reference  to  death  statutes,  it  may  be  stated 
generally  that  personal  representatives  stand  not  so  much  for 
the  person  as  for  the  estate  and  assets  of  the  deceased.  (5)  The 
statutes  giving  a  cause  of  action  in  the  civil  courts  for  loss  by 
death  for  and  to  designated  parties,  occasioned  by  specified 
wrongs  are,  in  so  far  as  the  decisions  are  of  any  weight,  limited 
in  their  construction  and  application  to  the  terms  of  each  par- 
ticular statute.  (6)  An  exception  to  the  last  proposition  should 
exist  in  those  cases  where  there  are  like  or  similarily  worded 
statutes.  (7)  Within  such  an  exception  the  weight  of  any 
extraterritorial  decision  would  evidently  be  limited  by  the  rule 
stare  decisis.15 

§  491.  Death— Effect  of  subsequent  statute— Survival.- 


Masters  v.  Stratton,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
101.  See  note  41  L.  R.  A.  807,  under 
the  following  heads  :  Death;  com- 
mon-law right  of  action  of  parent 
for  loss  of  services  of  child   killed: 


damages;  (d)  effect  when  death  is 
not  instantaneous;  (2)  the  contrary- 
rule  ;  (3)  the  true  rule  ;  (4)  rule 
when  injury  consists  of  a  breach  of 
contract. 


(1)  Rule  that  no  action  will  lie;  i>  The  various  decisions  from  which 
(a)  different  theories  as  to:  (6)  doc-  i  the  above  propositions  are  deduced 
trine  that  private  injury  is  merged  !  appear  throughout  the  sections  here- 
in public  wrong;  (c)<  doctrine  that  in,  in  which  the  subject  of  death 
human  life  is  not  a  subject  of  civil  !  losses  are  considered. 

564 


DEATH       8URVIV  W.. 


S  492 


In  Texas  it  is  decided  thai  the  Legislature  was  empowered  to 
make  a  statute,  providing  for  the  aonabatemenl  of  rights  of  ac- 
tion 1>\  death  of  a  person  injured  in  health  or  reputation,  appli- 
cable to  existing  causes  ofaction  and  to  provide  that  they  should 
not  abate  thereafter  by  such  death.10  So  that  an  action  for  per- 
sonal injuries  received  before  the  passage  of  said  act  survives 
the  injured  plaintiff's  death,17  but  a  right  of  action  which  abated 
by  death  of  the  injured  plaintiff  prior  to  said  enactment  is  not 
within  its  provisions.18 

§  492.  Deatb  before  or  after  judgment,  verdict,  etc.— In 
a  case  in  the  United  States  supreme  court  the  original  plaintiff 
brought  suit  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  received  while  a 
passenger  on  a  railroad  train.  Upon  petition  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany, the  suit  was  removed  from  the  Ohio  court  into  the  United 
States  circuit  court.  After  removal  the  plaintiff  died.  At  the 
time  of  his  death  the  common-law  rule  as  to  the  abatement  of 
causes  of  action  for  personal  injuries  prevailed  in  Ohio.  The 
injury  resulting  in  such  death  was  received  in  Indiana,  and  it 
was  held  that  the  action  did  not  finally  abate  by  reason  of  the 
death  of  the  plaintiff  before  trial  and  judgment,  but  that  it  ought 
be  revived  and  prosecuted  by  his  executor  or  administrator, 
duly  appointed  in  Ohio  by  the  proper  court,  and  that  the  point 
whether  the  action  could  be  revived  in  a  Federal  court  was  not 


16  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  K.  Co.  v.  Settle, 
19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  :ir>7;  1  Jour,  of 
App.  37;  47  S.  YV.  825;  Act,  Tex. 
May  4,  1895;  Tex.  Rev.  Stat.  1 395, 
art.  3353a.  See  also  City  of  Marshall 
v.  McAllister,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  15!); 
43  S.  W.  1043;  3  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  743. 
"It  appears  that  after  the  injuries 
were  alleged  to  have  heen  received 
and  before  said  L.  <;.  McAllister's 
death,  the  legislature  <>f  Texas  passed 
an  act  (art,  3353a,  Rev.  St.  1895),  pro- 
viding that  actions  pending  or  there- 
after brought  for  personal  injuries 
not  resulting  in  death  should  survive 
to  and  in  favor  of  the  heirs  and 
legal  representatives  <>f  the  party  in- 
jured upon  his  death.      It  is  insisted 


by  counsel  for  the  city  that  the 
said  act  is  retroactive  and  uncon- 
stitutional and  that  its  provisions 
should  not  govern  in  this  ease. 
This  precise  point  was  raised  in  the 
case  of  Railway  Co.  v.  Rogers  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  39  S.  W.  1112,  and  we 
there  held  that  the  action  would  sur- 
vive. Thequestion  was  fully  consid- 
ered when  that  case  was  under  con- 
sideration and  we  now  see  no  reason 
for  changing  the  views  tbere  ex- 
pressed/1    Id..  74."),  per   Rainey,   J. 

i"  Houston  it  T.  ('.  R  Co.  v.  R 
15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  680;  39 S.  W.  1112. 

u  Fitzgerald  v.  Western  On.  T. 
Co.,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  143:  40  S.  W. 
421. 

565 


§493 


DEATH    OF    Wi:<>N<;i)OER. 


affected  in  this  case,  by  the  fact  that  the  deceased  received  his 
injuries  in  Indiana.19  So  in  Minnesota  an  action  for  personal  in- 
juries caused  b}r  negligence  does  not  abate  by  death  of  one  of 
the  parties  after  verdict  rendered,  but  may  be  continued  by  or 
against  personal  representatives.20  Nor  does  an  action  for  dam- 
ages through  negligence  of  defendant's  servants  abate  by  death 
of  the  plaintiff  after  verdict.21  But  it  is  also  held  that  the  com- 
mon-law rule  that  a  right  of  action  for  damages  for  personal 
injuries  abates  on  plaintiff's  death  is  not  changed  by  the  Code 
unless  a  verdict,  report  or  decision  has  been  rendered.22  Again, 
in  Ohio,  death  of  the  plaintiff  after  judgment  in  his  favor  in  an 
action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  does  not  abate  the  suit 
where  a  new  trial  has  been  granted,  but  none  is  had.23 

§  493.  Death  of  wrongdoer — Common  law   and   statutes. 

— In  its  application  the  maxim  actio  personalis  relates  not  only 
to  the  person  injured,  but  also  to  the  death  of  the  wrongdoer, 
and  with  some  exceptions  the  statutes  which  give  a  remedy  for 
loss  by  death  to  certain  representatives  or  beneficiaries  of  dece- 
dent have  not  changed  the   common-law  rule  as  to  defendants 


19  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rd.  Co.  v. 
Joy,  173  U.  S.  226;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
387;  43  L.  Ed.  677;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  760.  The  court  considers  Rev. 
Stat.  Ohio,  sec.  5144  ;  1  Rev.  Stat. 
Ohio,  1890,  p.  1491;  Rev.  Stat.  Intl. 
sees.  282,  283;  sec.  955,  Rev.  Stat. 
U.  S.  (Judiciary  Act,  U.  S.  Sept.  24, 
1789,  1  Stat.  90,  c.  20,  sec.  21 ) ;  Rev. 
Stat.  U.  S.  sec.  721  (Judiciary  Act 
U.  S.  1789,  1  Stat.  92,  ch.  20,  sec.  34). 

20  Cooper  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co. 
(Minn),  56  N.  W.  588,  under  Minn. 
Genl.  Stat.  1878,  ch.  66,  sec.  41. 

21  Lyons  v.  Third  Ave.  Rd.  Co.,  7 
Rob.  (N.  Y.)  605,  under  Code  Proc. 
sec.  121  (Stov.  Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
sec.  755). 

22  Corbett  v.  Twenty-third  St.  R. 
Co.,  114  X.  Y.  579;  24  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
538;  21  N.  E.  1033,  under  Stov. 
Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc.  (1898)  sec.  764. 
As  to  meaning   of   "decision."   see 

566 


same  case.  Also  Adams  v.  Nellis, 
59  How.  (N.  Y.)  385,  rev'd  24  Hun 
(N.  Y. ),  605.  Parties  may  stipu- 
late for  nonabatement  by  plaintiff's 
death  before  final  judgment.  Cox 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  Rd.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  414, 
rev'g  4  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  176;  6  T.  &  C. 
405.  Stov.  1ST.  Y.  Ann.  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  (1888)  sec.  763,  is  not  applica- 
ble where  final  judgment  has  been 
entered.  Carr  v.  Risher,  28  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  260.  See  further  as  to  cases 
under  sees.  763-765,  Smith  v.  Lynch, 
12  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  348;  8  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  341;  Kelsey  v.  Jewett,  34  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  11;  Pessini  v.  Wilkins,  8 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  89;  54  N.  Y.  Snpr.  146. 
See  also  cases  noted  Stover's  Ann. 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  (1888)  pp.  765-767, 
sees.  763-765. 

23  Ohio  &  P.  Coal  Co.  v.  Smith,  52 
Ohio  St.—:  34  Ohio  L.  J.  94;  2  Ohio 
Leg.  N'ows,  718. 


DEATH    OP    WRONGDOER. 


§494 


or  the  wrongdoer.  To  be  more  specific,  it  is  clear  that  prior  to 
"  Lord  Campbell's  act, "' -''  if  a  person  by  his  wrongful  act  caused 
another's  death,  no  action  could  be  maintained  against  him,  nor 
did  that  act  prescribe  any  remedy  against  the  personal  n 
sentativcs  of  the  wrongdoer  or  tort-feasor.  A  distinction,  how- 
ever, existed  and  generally  exists  bel  ween  a  tort  to  tin'  person, 
and  a  tort  in  respect  to  real  or  personal  property.  ' 

§  494.  Death  of  wrongdoer-  Continued — Abatement  and 
survival  of  actions. — If  death  alone  constitutes  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion, there  being  no  injury  to  the  estate  or  to  the  property  of  the 
deceased,  such  right  of  action  abates  by  the  wrongdoer's  death.'4" 
So  it  is  held  in  a  Texas  case  that  if  no  action  is  commenced 
during  the  lifetime  of  one  killing  another,  the  right  of  action 
does  not  survive  the  death  of  the  one  at  fault.'-'7     It  is  also  de- 


»*  ( 1846)  9  and  10  Vict.  cb.  93. 

25  "  By  the  Statute  3  and  4,  Will  4, 
ch.  42,  sec.  2,  .  .  .  trespass  and 
case  will  also  lie  against  personal  rep- 
resentatives for  any  wrong  commit- 
ted by  any  person  deceased  in  his 
lifetime  to  another  in  respect  of  his 
property,  real  or  personal,"  subject 
to  a  specified  time  limit,  both  as  to 
the  commission  of  the  act  and  the 
bringing  of  an  action.  "  Prior  to 
this  act,  the  remedy  for  a  tort  to  the 
property  of  another,  real  or  personal, 
by  an  action  in  form  ex  delicto, 
such  as  trespass,  trover  or  case  for 
waste  .  .  .  could  not  have  been  en- 
forced against  representatives  of  the 
tort-feasor  .  .  .  For  a  tort  commit- 
ted to  the  person  it  is  clear  then  that 
at  common  law  no  action  can  be 
maintained  against  the  personal  rep- 
resentatives of  the  tort-feasor,  nor 
does  the  Stat.  9  and  10  Vict,  ch.  93, 
as  amended  27  and  28  Vict.  ch.  95, 
supply  any  remedy  against  the  exec- 
utors or  administrators  of  the  party, 
who  by  his  '  wrongful  act,  neglect, 
or  default,'  has  caused  the  death  of 
another,  for  the  first  section  of  this 
act  renders  that  person  liable  to  an 


action  for  damages  '  who  would  have 
been  liable  if  death  had  not  ensued,' 
in  which  case,  as  already  stated,  the 
personal  representatives  of  the  tort- 
feasor would  not  have  been  liable" 
Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am.  ed. ) 
*914,  *915.  Action  for  continuance 
of  obstruction  to  ancient  lights  may 
be  maintained  against  executors  or 
administrators  under  3  and  4  Win. 
IV,  chap.  42,  sec  2,  providing  for 
trespass  on  the  case,  etc.  Jenks  v. 
Viscount  Clifden  (1897),  1  Ch.  694; 
76  Law  .lour.  Hep.  382;  66  L.  J.  Ch. 
X.  S.  338. 

-■<  llegericli  v.  Keddie,  99  N.  Y. 
258;  1  X.  E.  787,  rev'g  32  Bun  i .  X. 
F.),  141;  5  Civ.  Pro.  (  X.  Y. )  228.  See 
1'ri.c  v.  Price,  11  linn  (N.  Y.  , 
299,  afE'd  75  X.  V.  244;  Pessini  v. 
Wilkins.  8  X.  V.  St.  R.  89;  54 
Super.  Ct.  (N.    V.i  146;   Fertore   v. 

WlSWall,  L6  How.  Pr.  I  \.  V.i  8,  and 
Doedl  v.  Wiswall,  15  How.  i  X.  V.) 
128,  held  that  the  action  could  be 
continued  against  defendant's  repre- 
sentatives, but  the  later  decisions 
must  be  considered  as  the  law. 

"Johnson  v.  Farmer,  89  Tex.  610; 
35  S.  W.  1062,  under  Tex.  Rev.  Stats. 
5GT 


§  495 


DEATH  -STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


cided  iii  Pennsylvania  that  an  action  by  a  widow  for  causing 
her  husband's  violent  death  abates  upon  the  death  of  the 
defendant  before  judgment.25  So  in  Ohio  if  the  death  be 
caused  by  another,  and  he  die,  the  action  abates.3  In  Colorado, 
an  action  for  negligently  or  wilfully  inflicted  injury  dies  with 
the  wrongdoer,  and  the  words  "trespass for  injuries  done  to  the 
person  "  in  the  statute  of  1868,  are  held  not  to  imply  of  necessity 
a  trespass  vi  et  armis.30  Again,  an  action  for  personal  injuries 
abates  on  defendant's  death  in  Indiana,  even  though  the  in- 
jury is  alleged  to  have  arisen  out  of  a  breach  of  contract  and 
recovery  is  also  incidentally  sought  for  injury  to  property.31  And 
the  act  of  negligently  running  over  a  person  by  a  driver  is 
neither  a  trespass  nor  an  assault  so  as  to  come  within  a  statute 
excepting  assault  and  battery  with  other  actions  from  its  pro- 
visions as  to  survival,  but  providing  that  actions  for  personal 
injury  survive.32 

§495.  Death — Civil  action — Remedy  purely  statutory — 

Although  one  sustaining  a  personal  injury  might  sue  in  tort  to 
recover  damages  therefor,  or  might  have  his  election  as  to  an 


arts.  3024,  3026,  providing  for  sur- 
vival in  such  cases  only  when  action 
is  commenced  during  life  of  per- 
son at  fault.  Action  may  be  con- 
tinued if  defendant  die  pending  suit 
and  does  not  abate  by  death  of  either 
party  to  record,  if  any  beneficiary 
survives.  See  Sayles1  Civ.  Stat.  Tex. 
sees.  2900—2908;  Tex.  Rev.  Stats. 
1885,  sec.  3353a. 

28  Weiss  v.  Hunsicker,  14  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  398;  3  Pa.  Dist.  K.  445.  As  to 
death  after  judgment  or  verdict,  see 
section  492  herein. 

29  Russell  v.  Sunbury,  37  Ohio  St. 
372;  41  Am.  Rep.  523.  See  Bates' 
Ann.  Stat.  Ohio,  1897,  sec.  4975. 
As  to  killing,  see  Moreliead  v.  Bitt- 
ner,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1986;  50  S.  W. 
857,  under  Ky.  Stat.  1894,  p.  176,  sec. 
10,  which  provides  that  on  death  of 
person  injuring,  actions  for  "as- 
sault" cease  or  die. 

568 


30  Letson  v.  Brown,  11  Colo.  App. 
11;  52  Pac.  287,  under  Colo.  Rev. 
Stats.  1868,  p.  632,  which  provides 
for  survival  to  and  against  executors 
and  administrators  of  all  actions  at 
law  except  actions  on  the  case  for 
slander  or  libel  or  trespass  for  injuries 
to  the  person,  and  actions  to  recover 
real  estate.  See  Colo.  Civ.  Code,  sec. 
15.  See  also  Munal  v.  Brown  (  U.  S. 
C.  C.  D.  Colo. ),  70  Fed.  967. 

3*Feary  v.  Hamilton,  140  Ind.  45; 
39  N.  E.  516,  under  Ind.  Rev.  Stat. 
1894,  sec.  283,  which  provides  for 
abatement  by  death  of  either  party 
in  actions  arising  out  of  injury  to  the 
person.  See  also  Hamilton  v.  Brown, 
125  Ind.  176;  Hess  v.  Lowery,  122 
Ind.  225;  7  L.  R.  A.  900. 

32  Perkins  v.  Stein,  15  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
203;  22  S.  W.  049. 


l>l.  \  i  ii      -  I  \  I  l    r< » 1 : N     REMEDY. 


:    195 


action  for  tort  or  contract  in  certain  ''uses,  nevertheless,  what- 
ever remedy  exists  by  way  <>f  a  civil  action,  for  tin-  benefit  of 
the  relatives,  beneficiaries  or  estate  of  decedent,  for  Loss  by  death 
of  a  human  being,  Is  purely  statutory,  it  being  well  settled  that 

under  tin'  '-0111111011  law,  no  civil  right  of  action  existed  in  such 
case.33 


33  Higgins  v.  Butcher,  Yelvcrton,  j 
89;  1  Browne  &  C  206,  husband  for  | 
wife.  Baker  v.  Bolton,  1  Campb. 
493,  husband  for  wife.  "  In  a  civil 
court  t lie  death  of  a  human  being 
could  not  be  complained  of  as  an  in- 
jury." Id.,  per  Lord  Ellenborough. 
Osborn  v.  Gillett,  L.  R.  8  Exch.  88, 
per  Pigott,  J.,  master  for  servant. 
See  Canadian,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son, 14  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  10.").  Preamble 
to  Lord  Campbell's  act  (1840),  9  and  10 
Vict.  ch.  93,  reads,  "  Whereas  no  ac- 
tion at  law  is  now  maintainable 
against  a  person  who  by  his  wrong- 
ful act,  neglect  or  default  may  have 
caused  the  death  of  any  person.'' 
Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  33  Ark.  350,  parent  for 
minor.  Davis  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Ark.  117;  13  S.  W. 
801,  parent  for  minor.  Kramer  v. 
Market  St.  Kd.  Co.,  25  Cal.  234, 
parent  for  minor.  Hindry  v.  Holt, 
24  Colo.  464,  orphan  child  for  uncle. 
Conn.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  X.  Y.  & 
X.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  265,  rule 
applied  to  indirect  loss  as  insurer 
for  insured's  death.  Womack  v. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Ca.  L32;  5  S.  E. 
(!3,  husband  for  wife.  Bell  v. 
Wooten,  53  Ca.  (384,  father  for  death 
of  son  from  negligence  of  surgeon. 
Selma  R.  Co.  v.  Lacey,  49  Ca.  106; 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tindall,  1:'. 
Ind.  366;  Long  v.  Morrison,  14  Ind. 
595;  Indiana,  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Keely,  23  Ind.  133;  Burns  v.  Grand 
Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  (Ind.),  15  \.  E. 
230,    actio    personalis;     Jackson    v. 


Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co., 
(Ind);    :;'.»    N.     K.    663,     parent    for 

child.  Pittsburgh,  c.  c.  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.  v.  llosca.  152  Ind.  412:  1  Repr. 
896;  M  Am.  A-  Eng.  R,  Cas.  N.  S. 
G'J2;  Malott  v.  Shinier,  10:;  Ind.  35; 
1  Repr.  1234;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  263; 
IT)  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  774; 
54  N.  E.  101;  Eureka  v.  Merrilield 
(Kan.),  37  Pac.  113;  Covington  St. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Packer,  '.»  Bush  (Ky.  |,  455, 
parent  for  minor.  Eden  v.  Lexing- 
ton, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  14  B.  Man.  (Ky.) 
204,  husband  for  wife.  Judd  v. 
Chesapeake  *  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Ky.  Ct. 
App.  1897),  1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  254,  2.',.".. 
statutory  action  for  death  of  em- 
ployee. "  The  case  at  bar  is  purely  a 
statutory  right  not  existing  under 
the  common  law,"  per  the  court. 
Louisville  A  X.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwain, 
98  Ky.  700;  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  379;  34 
S.  W.  236;  34  L.  R,  A.  788;  3  Am.  A- 
Eng.  K.  cas.  X.  S.  309,  statutory  ac- 
tion for  loss  of  wife's  society  on  ac- 
count of  injuries  resulting  in  death 
is  more  advantageous  than  common- 
law  action  for  loss  of  her  society. 
Hermann  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  R. 

( !o.,  1 1  I. a.  Ann.  51,  widow  for  minor. 
Ilubgh  v.  Xew  Orleans  &  C.  R.  1!. 
Co.,  6  La.  Ann.  4'X>,  wife  for  hus- 
band. Nickerson  v.  Harriman,  38 
Me.  277,  parent  for  minor.     Lyons  v. 

Woodward.  49  Me.  29,  wife  for  hus- 
band. Carey  \.  Berkshire  R.  1.'.  *  >o. 
I  wife  for  husband  |,  and  Skinner  v. 
Housatonic  R.  <  •>..  1  Cush.  |  M  iss  | 
47-">,  parent  for  child.  Kearney  v. 
Boston,   etc.,     R.    R.    Co.,    9    Cush. 

569 


§  496  DEATH— STATUTORY    REMEDY. 

§  496.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy  for  losses  by  death  or 
where  death  ensues — Generally. — The  discussion  of  the  nature 
of  the  remedies  given  by  the  various  statutes  for  loss  b}r  death 
of  a  human  being  involves  also  the  construction  of  such  statutes. 


(Mass.)  10S,  by  executor  or  adminis- 
trator. Mass.  Act  ( Mass.  Colonial 
Laws  [ed.  1660]  Boston,  18S9,  p.  120), 
however  gave  a  remedy  as  early  as 
1648  for  loss  of  life  from  defective 
ways  and  bridges.  Hyatt  v.  Adams, 
10  Mich.  180,  husband  for  wife. 
Scheffler  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.,  Ry. 
Co.,  32  Minn.  125,  parent  for  minor. 
Natchez,  J.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook,  63 
Miss.  38,  parent  for  minor.  Wyatt 
v.  Williams,  43  N.  H.  102,  wife  for 
husband.  Myers  v.  Holborn,  58  N. 
J.  L.  (29  Vr.)  193;  Grosso  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  J.  L. 
(21  Vr.)  317,  husband  for  wife.  Cor- 
bett  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  R.  Co.,  114 
N.  Y.  579;  24  N.  Y.  St.  R.  538;  21  N. 
E.  1033,  holding  that  the  rule  of  com- 
mon law  that  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  personal  injury  abates  on 
death  of  plaintiff  is  not  changed  by 
sec.  764,  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  un- 
less a  verdict,  report  or  decision  has 
been  rendered  upon  the  issues,  and 
explaining  "decision"  in  that  sec- 
tion. Hegerich  v.  Keddie,  99  N.  Y. 
258;  52  Am.  Rep.  25,  rev'g  32  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  141;  8.  C  5  Civ.  Pro.  (N.  Y.) 
228,  actio  personalis.  Debevoise  v. 
N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y. 
377,  purely  statutory  and  does  not 
exist  at  common  law.  Whitford  v. 
Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  23  X.  Y.  465;  3 
Bos.  (N.  Y. )  67,  statutes  create  a  new 
cause  of  action  in  favor  of  represen- 
tatives of  deceased.  Dickens  v.  N. 
Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  158;  Za- 
briskie  v.  Smith,  13  N.  Y.  322;  Crow- 
ley v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  99;  Green  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  R.  Co.,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  9,  aff'd 
31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  260,  aff'd  2  Keyes, 
570 


294;  2  Abb.  App.  277,  husband  for 
wife's  immediate  death.  People  v. 
Gibbs,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  29,  cause  of 
action  ex  delicto  does  not  survive 
though  by  statute  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit be  given  against  the  wrong- 
doer. Wellman  v.  Sun  Print.  &  Pub. 
Assn.,  66  Hun  (N.  Y.),  331;  50  1ST.  Y. 
St.  R.  254,  case  of  libel  of  wife,  that 
miscarriage  produced  her  death 
— held  a  personal  wrong  which  died 
with  her.  Worley  v.  Cin.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Handy  (Cin.  Sup.  Ct. ),  481,  hus- 
band for  wife.  Russell  v.  Sunbury, 
37  Ohio  St.  372;  41  Am.  Rep.  523, 
actio  personalis  applies.  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Orvis  (C.  C),  1 
Ohio  Dec.  492,  father  for  son,  no  ac- 
tion at  common  law.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Adams,  55  Pa.  St.  499;  Mexi- 
can C.  R.  Co.  v.  Goodman,  20  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  109;  48  S.  W.  778,  wife  for 
husband,  does  not  survive  unless 
statute  in  states  where  death  occa- 
sioned, as  well  as  in  state  where 
brought.  Fitzgerald  v.  West.  U.  T. 
Co.,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  143;  40  S.  W. 
421,  holding  that  action  against  tele- 
graph company  for  failure  to  deliver 
message  is  personal  and  abated  with 
death  of  plaintiff  prior  to  act.  Tex. 
May  4,  1895.  Sherman  v.  Johnson, 
58  Vt.  40,  parent  for  son.  Needham 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Vt. 
294,  actio  personalis  rule.  Brown  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Wis. 
137;  77  N.  W.  748;  44  L.  R.  A.  579; 
13  Am.  &  Ehg.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  603;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  255,  257,  per  Mar- 
shall, J.  See  further  Mobile  L.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Brame,  95  TJ.  S.  754,  756,  "  no 
deliberate  well-considered  decision  to 
the   contrary  is   to   be  found,"   per 


I»K  \Tir      STATUTORY    KEMEDY. 


S  19' 


There  is  certainly  a  distinction  between  the  following  c 
<  1  i  Where  a  right  of  action  survives  the  death,  such  rights  hav- 
ing existed  before  such  death,  but  no  action  having  1 □  com- 
menced prior  thereto.  (2)  Where  an  action  for  the  injury  to 
the  person  has  been  commenced  during  the  Lifetime  of  the  in- 
jured and  it  survives  his  death.  (3)  Where  the  action  is  com- 
menced after  death  to  recover  for  Loss  thereby,  the  injury  having 
been  instantaneous  therewith  or  at  Least  instantaneous  in  tin- 
sense  of  there  being  no  appreciable  period  of  time  between  the 
two.  (4)  Where  the  action  is  penal  or  l>v  way  of  indictment 
for  the  benefit  of  designated  persons.  (5)  Where  the  action  is 
special.  (6)  Where  employer's  liability,  miners1  acts,  dueling 
acts  and  other  particular  statutes  are  involved.  (7  |  Where  the 
construction  of  enactments  relating  to  recovery  for  death  losses 
are  involved  in  the  same  case  with  that  of  other  statutes,  and 
finally.  (8)  where  the  nature  of  the  remedy  is  dependent  upon 
the  express  wording  of  the  particular  statute,  with  its  amend- 
ments. 


$  V.)7.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy— Continued— Decisions, 


Hunt.  J.:  The  Ilarrisburg,  119  U.  S. 
rii;  Denuick  v.  Central  K.  R.  Co., 
L03  I".  S.  11;  Webber  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ky.  <'o.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  Minn.), 
'.'7  Fed.  140,  a  general  proposition 
that  actions  on  torts  abate  on  death 
of  injured  party  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  giving  a  right  of  action. 
Matz  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  (C.  C. 
W.  D.  Mo.),  85  Fed.  lso.  decides  that 
where  a  statute  gives  a  right  of  ac- 
tion in  case  of  instant  death,  the  right 
is  not  defeated  because  there  was  no 
suffering  or  injury  for  which  a  per- 
sonal action  could  have  been  brought 
at  common  law.  Gerling  v.  Halt.  & 
O.  R.  C,  151  U.  s.  i;:.".:  11  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  533;  38  L.  Ed.  311,  holds 
thai  death  of  the  plaintiff  abates  a 
cause  of  action  in  West  Virginia 
brought  for  personal  injuries  and 
notwithstanding  the  statute  giving 
after  death  a  right  of  action  to  per- 
sonal   representatives.     Sullivau    v. 


Union  I*.  K.  Co.,  1  Mc<  Vary  (U.  S. 
C.  C).  301,  parent  for  child.  Hut  ex- 
amine contra.  Cross  v.  Guthrey,  2 
Root  (Conn.),  90.  .See  Augusta  Fac- 
tory v.  Davis,  87  Ga.  04S;  Perry  v. 
Ga.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  S5  Ga.  193;  11  S.  K 
605,  loss  of  services  of  minor.  Mc- 
Dowell v.  Ga.  K.  Co.,  <io  Ga.  320, 
father  for  daughter.  Chick  v.  South- 
western U.  Co.,  57  Ga.  357,  loss  of 
minor.  In  Shields  v.  Vouge,  15  Ga. 
349,  suit  was  sustained  by  a  father 
for  loss  of  service  of  minor  through 
his  death.  Examine  Stanley  v.  Hir- 
cher,  78  Mo.  245;  .lames  v.  Christy, 
is  Mo.  162,  loss  of  services  of  minor 
son.  Ford  v.  .Monroe.  L'd  Wend.  210, 
loss  of  services  of  minor  until  t  sventy- 
one  years  old  and  for  wife's  sickness 
consequent  upon  negligent  killing  of 
son.  See  notes  :'.7  Am.  Rep.  716,  719; 
3  Chic.  Law  Jour.  X.  S.  149.  Ex- 
amine 11  L.  K.  A.  >07. 

571 


^  498  DEATH       STATUTORY    REMEDY. 

etc.— Iii  New  York  it  is  declared  that  the  light  to  damages  for 
injuries  causing  death  does  not  depend  upon  the  right  to  sup- 
port from  the  deceased.''1  In  Louisiana  the  statutory  right  of 
action  is  attached  to  the  person,  and  is  not  transmissible  as  a 
property  right.:r>  In  Massachusetts  the  act  is  penal,36  although 
a  civil  action  may  also  be  maintained.37  In  Maryland  under  the 
survival  statute  relating  to  actions  for  personal  injuries,  the 
rio-ht  to  recover  is  held  to  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  action 
and  not  upon  the  character  of  the  damages  claimed.33  In  a  Fed- 
eral court  case  it  is  decided  that  the  right  of  action  for  recovery 
for  loss  of  life  by  negligence  of  a  railroad  company,  etc.,  is  not 
property  upon  which  administration  can  be  obtained  by  a  for- 
eign administrator  in  Kentucky.3'  In  New  York  it  is  held  that 
in  an  action  for  death,  the  cause  of  action  is  the  death  and  not 
the  injury,  and  that  the  action  is  governed  by  the  law  in  force 
at  the  time  of  death.40  And  under  the  Ohio  statute  it  is  decided 
that  the  right  to  revive  an  action  is  a  right  inhering  in  the  ac- 
tion which  accompanies  it  into  the  Federal  court  in  removal.41 

§  498.  Nature  of  statutory  remedy— Continued— Whether 
remedy  new  and  independent.— In  England,  "  Lord  Campbell's 
act "  permitting  the  recovery  for  the  benefit  of  the  family  of 
damages  for  death  of  a  human  being  caused  by  wrongful  act, 
neglect  or  default  of  another  in  cases  where,  if  death  had  not  en- 
sued, the  injured  party  would  have  been  entitled  to  maintain  an 
action  for  damages  in  respect  thereof,  and  the  preamble  to  which 
specifies  that  no  claim  at  law  was  then  maintainable  in  such 
cases  has  evidently  been  considered  as  conferring  a  totally  new 
cause  of  action  resting  on  a  new  and  different  principle  and  not 
operating  merely  as  a  transfer  of  an  old  right  of  action.^'     Un- 

3*  Palmer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Marvin  v.  Maysville  St.  R.  &  T. 
5  X.  Y.  St.  R.  436;  26  Wkly.  Dig.  26.    Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Ky.),  49  Fed.  436. 

36  Huberwald  v.  Orleans  R.  Co.,  50  j  *°  Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry. 
La.  Ann.  477;  23  So.  474.  Co.,  15  Misc.   (X.   Y.)  158;  35  N.  Y. 

36  Adams    v.     Fitchburg  R.   Co.  67    Supp.  1062. 

Vt.  76;  30Atl.  687.  41  Baltimore  &   O.    R.   Co.   v.  Joy, 

37  See  Mass.  Pub.  St.  c.  112  (af-  173  U.  S.  226;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  387; 
fected  1894,  67).  43   L.    Ed.    677;   5    Am.    Neg.    Rep. 

38Ott  v.  Kaufman  (Md.),  11  Atl.  760,  under  Ohio  Rev.  Stat.  sec.  5144. 
-g0  42  Seward   v.  The  Vera  Cruz,   10 

572 


DEATH      STATUTORY     REMEDY.  \    198 

der  this  statute  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  deceased 
was  entitled  to  sue  for  the  benefit  of  hia  surviving  family,  but 

only  us  above  noted  in  casus  where  the  injured  party  could  b 
maintained  the  action.  Now,  while  the  enactment  gave  a  rem- 
edy which  did  not  exist  prior  to  Its  passage,  yel  the  courts  might 
well  consider  that  the  right  of  the  executor  or  administrator  to 
bring  suit  rested  alone  upon  the  injured  party's  right  to  recover 
and  did  not  exist  as  an  independent  right  Ln  the  named  repre- 
sentatives. In  this  sense  it  was  perhaps  Dot  unduly  extending 
legal  argument  to  hold  that  the  injured  party's  cause  of  action 
was  transmitted  upon  his  decease  to  his  representatives  for  the 
benefit  of  his  family  under  the  terms  of  the  statute.  This  reason- 
ing would  assume  tone  in  determining  to  what  extent  the  acts  of 
the  injured  partyin  releasing  his  right  of  action  or  in  obtaining 
damages  through  a  civil  action  would  affect  the  right  oi  his 
executor  or  administrator  to  recover  damages  for  the  benefit  of 
the  family  of  the  deceased,  and  so  it  has  been  asserted  that  the 
right  of  the  representative  of  the  deceased  to  maintain  an  ac- 
tion is  not  absolute  in  the  former,  and  independent  of  the  fact 
whether  or  not  the  injured  party  has  received  compensation  in 
his  lifetime,  and  therefore  that  the  representative  is  merely  sub- 
stituted  as  to  the  right  of  action  in  that  place  which  the  injured 
party  would  have  had,  had  he  survived,  and  that  only  a  new 
principle  as  to  the  assessment  of  damages  is  conferred  and  no 
new  right  of  action  created.43  From  this  standpoint  statutes 
which  are  worded  the  same,  or  substantially  the  same  as  the 
English  act,  might  come  within  the  same  reasoning,  and  if  the 
argument  is  sound,  then  it  may  fairly  be  extended  as  involving 
logically  the  following  points:  (1)  Can  damages  be  recovered 
for  pain  and  suffering  of  the  deceased  from  the  injury  causing 
death,  and  if  the  statute  does  not  create  a  new  cause  of  action 
for  the  loss  by  death  but  operates  to  continue  the  action  began 
.  by  the  injured  party,  ought  it  not  to  include  in  the  recovery  all 
that  the  injured  party  would  have  been  entitled  to  recover  had 


App.  Cas.  59,  per  Lord  Blackburn  ; 
Blake  v.  Midland  liy.  Co.,  18Q.  B.  98; 
16  Jur.  562;  21  L.  J.  Q.  B.  233,  per 
Coleridge,  J. 


"See  Read  v.  Great  Eastern  Ky. 
Co.,  L.  R.,  3  Q.  B.  J-s,  per  Black- 
burn, J.  Sjr<-  Griffiths  v  Karl  of 
Dudley,  9  Q.   B.  D.  57. 

573 


§  -499 


DEATH — STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


he  lived?44  (2)  What  is  the  meaning  of  pecuniary  loss?45 
(3)  What  right  have  the  named  representatives  to  sue  for  loss 
by  death  for  the  benefit  of  the  designated  beneficiaries  in  addi- 
tion to  the  personal  representative's  right  to  continue,  under 
survival  statutes,  the  action  brought  by  the  injured  party  dur- 
ing his  lifetime  ?  (4)  What  is  the  effect  of  instantaneous  death 
so  far  as  the  right  of  action  is  concerned?  (5)  From  what 
time  does  the  limitation  of  the  right  of  action  commence?46 

§  499,  Nature  of  statutory  remedy — Whether  same  is  new 
and  independent  -Continued. — It  is  held  in  Indiana  that  the 
statute  of  that  state  creates  a  new  and  independent  cause  of  ac- 


44  That  damages  are  confined  to 
loss  by  the  death,  and  are  not  allow- 
able for  pain  and  suffering  of  the  in- 
jured person  prior  to  his  death,  see 
Blake  v.  Midlaud  Ry.  Co.,  18  Q.  B.  93, 
per  Coleridge..!.;  Dwyer  v.  Chicago 
St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  51  N. 
W.  244,  under  Iowa  Code,  sec.  2525; 
Cheatham  v.  Red  River  Line  (U.  S. 
D.  C.  E.  D.  La.),  5(5  Fed.  248.  under 
La.  Civ.  Code.  art.  2315;  Holland 
v.  Brown,  35  Fed.  23.  under  Comp. 
Laws,  Oregon,  1887,  sec.  371 ;  Wilcox 
v.  Wilmington  City  Ry.  Co.  (Del. 
Super.  1899),  44  Atl.  686,  under  Rev. 
Code,  p.  676;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Sander,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1941;  44  S. 
W.  644;  Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  465,  469,  contra,  as  to 
survival  of  suit,  Missouri,  K.  &.  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Settle,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  357; 
47  S.  W.  825,  contra,  as  to  pain  and 
suffering  prior  to  death,  Murphy  v. 
Railroad,  29  Conn.  496.  Examine 
Bowler  v.  Lane,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  311; 
Railroad  v.  Prince,  2  Heisk.  (Tenn. ) 
580.  See  Ky.  Genl.  Stat.  ch.  57,  sec. 
1 ;  La.  Civ.  Code.  art.  2315  and  chap- 
ters on  measure  of  damages  herein. 
See  Murphy  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 
88  N.  Y.  445;  14  Wkly.  Dig.  150; 
Givens  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R..  Co.,  89 
Ky.  231 :  12  S.  W.  257.  This  ques- 
574 


tion  is   fully   considered   elsewhere 
herein. 

45  That  the  recovery  is  confined  to 
the  pecuniary  loss,  see  Morgan  v. 
Southern  P.  Co.,  95  Cal.  510;  17  L.  R. 
A.  71;  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  143;  30  Pac. 
603;  54  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  101;  Lap- 
sley  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
X.  D.  Iowa),  50  Fed.  172,  affd  51 
Fed.  174;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spencer,  25  Colo.  9;  52  Pac.  211;  10 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  536,  under 
Colo.  Gen.  Stat.  sec.  1032;  Lazelle  v. 
Newfane,  70  Vt.  440;  41  Atl.  511. 
under  Vt.  Stat.  sec.  2452;  Graham 
v.  Consolidated  Traction  Co.  (N.  J. 
Sup.  1899),  44  Atl.  964,  under  act 
March  3,  1848;  1  Gen.  Stat.  p.  1188; 
McKay  v.  New  England  Dredging 
Co.,  92  Me.  454;  43  Atl.  29,  under  Me. 
Act,  1891,  ch.  124;  Hughey  v.  Sul- 
livan (U.  S.  C.  C.  S.  D.  Ohio),  36 
Ohio  L.  J.  247.  The  question,  how- 
ever, of  pecuniary  loss  is  more  fully 
considered  elsewhere  herein. 

46  This  last  point  would  apply 
where  it  is  held  or  declared  that  the 
statute  presenting  the  time  limit  for 
suing  is  independent  of  the  statute 
of  limitations  and  confined  to  the 
statutory  remedy  in  cases  of  loss  by 
death.  See  The  Harrisburg,  119  U. 
S.  199,  per  Waite,  C.  J. 


DKATII       STATl  TORY    REMEDY. 


§  m 


tion  to  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  for  tin'  benefit  <>(  I 
designated  therein.47  So  in  New  York  it  is  declared  thai  the  Code 
docs  not  simply  provide  a  new  remedy  but  creates  .1  new  right 
and  a  new  liability,  and  that  the  statutory  provisions  are  part 
of  the  substantn  e  law  of  the  state.48  And  substantially  the  same 
language  is  used  in  a  Wisconsin  caself)  where  tin'  court  considers 
at  some  length  the  distinction  between  tin' survival  enactment 
and  the  death  loss  statute,  declaring  that  they  refer  to  entirely 
distinct  losses  recoverable  in  different  rights  and  that  the  former 
creates  no  new  liability  but  prevents  the  lapsing  by  death  of  an 
old  one,  while  the  latter  creates  a  new  right  in  the  surviving 
relatives  to  compensation  for  their  loss  arising  from  the  death. 


*7  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hosea,  152   End.  412;  1  Repr.  896; 

14  Am.  A-  Eng.  <'as.  \.  S.  692,  un- 
der Horner's  Rev.  Stat.  1897,  sec.  284. 

<»  O'Reilly  v.  Utah,  Xev.  A-  I  al. 
Stage  Co.,  87  Hun,  457;  34  X.  Y. 
Supp.  358;  68  N.  Y.  St.  R.  1:!l'.  See 
Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y. 
465;  3  Bos.  (X.  Y. )  67,  where  it  is 
said  that  the  statute  creates  a  new- 
cause  of  action  in  favor  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  deceased.  Quiun 
v.  Moore,  15  X.  Y.  435,  per  Comstock, 
J.,  Littlewood  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  8!'  \.  V. 
24,  per  Rappaljo,  J.;  8.  C,  14  Wkly. 
Dig.  400,  aff'g  47  Super.  Ct.  547. 

49  "The  death  loss  act  of  the  Eng- 
lish statute,  !>  and  10  Vict.  ch.  03, 
commonly  called  'Lord  Campbell's 
Act,'  and  the  various  law  sot'  a  similar 
kind  that  have  been  modeled  after 
it,  gave  a  new  cause  of  action  un- 
known to  the  common  law  for  the 
benefit  of  a  certain  designated  class 

of  surviving  relatives.  Such  relatives 
do  not  take  the  cause  of  action  Eoi 
damages  to  the  deceased  bj  transfer 
to  them  by  operation  of  law  or  other- 
wise, but  ate  enabled  by  statute  to 
recover  the  pecuniary  loss  i,,  them- 
selves caused  by  the  wrongful  taking 
off  of  the  decedent  the  continuation 
of  whose  life  would  have  been  hen.- 


ficial   to   them.   .    .    .    The  action  a. 
ernes   to   the    surviving    beneficiary 
mentioned  in  the  Btatute  by  reason 

<>f   tlie  deal  h   of  the   injured    pers    u 
caused   by  the   wrongful   act   of  an- 
other.    It    is  strictly  not   proper  to 
say  that  it  is  ;i  cause  of  action  which 
survives,    hut    it  is   rather  a  new    ac 
tion  by    sees.  4255,    -1250    (Rev.    Stat. 
Wis.    1898),  which    can    lie    brought 
not   for  the  benefit    of  the    estate  hut. 
solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  benefici 
aries  named  in  the  statute.'-       Brown 
v.    Chicago    &    X.    \V.    Ry.    Co.,  102 
Wis.  137;  77  X.  W.  748;  44  L.  R.  A. 
579;  13  Am.  A  Eng.  R.  <  as.  \.s.  603; 
5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  255,    257.    per    Mar 
shall,  J.,  rehearing  denied 44  L.  R.  A. 

585;  78  N.  \\\  771.  See  also  Topping 
v.  Town  of  St.  Lawrence,  86  Wis. 
526;  57  \.  V.  ;',h5,  per  Ort.ou,  J. 

60  The  value  of  the  following  justi- 
fies  its  insertion  at  length:  "The  law 
of  this  state  conferring  upon  surviv- 
ing relatives  the  right  to  n 
their  pecuniary  loss  caused  by  the 
wrongful  taking  off  by  death  of  a 
husband,  wile,  child,  father  or 
mother  has  existed  for  forty  years, 
while  the  law-  reviving  the  right 
in  favor  of  the  personal  representa- 
tives   of    a    deceased    person    to    his 

claim  tor  damages  t"  his  person  was 


§  499 


DEATH— STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


So  it  is  also  held  that  the  remedy  is  purely  statutory  under  the 
Illinois  act  and  not  a  survival  of  decedent's  cause  of  action.51     In 


not  enacted  till  1887.  But  independ- 
ent of  that  circumstance,  as  before 
observed,  the  language  of  the  two 
provisions  is  plain.  They  refer  to  en- 
tirely distinct  losses  recoverable  in 
different  rights;  the  oiie  in  the  right 
of  the  deceased  for  the  loss  occa- 
sioned to  him;  the  other  is  the  right 
of  the  surviving  relatives  for  the  loss 
to  them.  Both  are  dependent  on  the 
injury  but  only  one  dependent  on 
the  death  with  surviving  relatives 
to  take  under  the  statute.  The 
language  of  one  provision  is  that 
'actions  for  personal  injuries  shall 
survive'  and  of  the  other  '  in  case  of 
the  death  of  a  person  by  the  wrong- 
ful act  of  another.1  Under  certain 
circumstances  named  the  wrongdoer 
•  shall  be  liable  to  an  action  for 
damages  notwithstanding  the  death 
of  the  person  injured,  if  the  death 
be  caused  in  this  state.'  The  only 
condition  of  the  right  of  action  in 
the  former  case  is  the  existence  of 
the  actionable  claim  for  damages  at 
the  time  of  the  death  of  the  injured 
party.  The  statute  creates  no  new 
liability,  but  prevents  the  lapsing  by 
death  of  an  old  one.  The  only  con- 
dition of  liability  under  the  other 
provision  is  the  existence  of  an  ac- 
tionable claim  in  the  right  of  the  in- 
jured party  at  the  time  of  his  death 
and  the  existence  of  the  beneficiaries 
mentioned  in  the  statute.  The  lia- 
bility of  the  wrongdoer  while  de- 
pendent on  the  condition  named  is 
not  on  the  actionable  claim  called 
for  to  satisfy  such  condition,  but  on 
a  new  right  created  by  the  statute, 


— the  right  of  the  surviving  relatives 
to  compensation  for  the  loss  which 
falls  upon  them."  And  criticising 
Holton  v.  Daly,  106111.  131,  the  court 
continues:  "  That  learned  court  rea- 
sons that  there  is  but  one  ground  of 
liability, — the  wrongful  act;  and  as 
all  claims  for  damages  grow  out  of 
the  one  wrong,  it  is  unreasonable  to 
say  the  legislature  intended  there 
shall  be  two  causes  of  action  based 
upon  it;  that  the  more  reasonable 
view  is  that  the  act  making  causes 
of  action  for  personal  injuries  sur- 
vive should  be  considered  as  refer- 
ring to  a  special  class  of  actions 
not  included  in  those  named  in  the 
general  provision  giving  a  right  of 
action  to  surviving  relatives;  that 
without  that  construction  there 
would  be  a  repugnance  between  the 
two  provisions.  The  fallacy  of  that 
reasoning  is  easily  apparent.  Thus 
in  the  circumstances  named,  there 
is  but  one  wrongful  act,  but  that  is 
not  the  sole  ground  of  action  in  the 
right  of  the  deceased,  or  the  sur- 
vivor. It  takes  the  wrongful  act 
and  the  loss  to  make  the  complete 
cause  of  action,  and  as  the  loss  to 
the  person  upon  whom  the  injury  is 
inflicted  must  be  recovered  by  or  in 
his  right,  and  the  loss  to  the  sur- 
viving relatives  by  or  in  their  right, 
the  causes  of  action  are  clearly  dis- 
tinct. .  .  .  The  views  of  the  Illinois 
court  accord  with  the  judgment  of 
the  supreme  court  of  Kansas.  Mc- 
Carthy v.  Railroad  Co.,  18  Kan.  46; 
City  of  Eureka  v.  Merrifield,  53  Kan. 
794;  37  Pac.  113;  Martin  v.  Railway 


Shimer,  153  Ind.  35;  Rep.  263.  See  Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111. 
131;  Quincy  Coal  Co.  v.  Hood,  77  111. 
68;  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  349. 


51Malott   v. 
1  Repr.  1234  ;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  774;  54  N.  E.  101;  6  Am.   Neg. 

576 


IM'.A  III       STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


199 


Pennsylvania  it  is  declared  that  one   section  of   the  statute  of 
1851  gives  to  a  common-law  action  the  quality  of  survivorship, 

the  estate  of  the  decedent  and  tin- 
other  for  tin-  benefit  of  bis  surviv- 
ing relatives   are   entirely   distinct, 

the  former  beit)'r   b;ise<l   on  survivor- 


Co.,  4(.t  Pac.  605.  It  is  significant 
that  the  former  treats  the  act  for  the 
survivorship  of  the  right  to  recover 
damages  to  the  deceased  for  the 
benefit  of  his  estate  as  a  special  pro- 
vision, and  that  for  the  benefit  of  the 
surviving  relatives  as  a  general  act, 
and  that  giving  them  a  literal  inter- 
pretation they  are  repugnant  to  each 
other  in  part;  while  the  latter  re- 
verses the  situation,  treating  the  act 
of  the  claim  for  damages  to  the  de- 
ceased.as  general,  and  that  for  the 
benefit  of  surviving  relatives  as  spe- 
cial, the  latter  being  intended  to 
take  away  the  right  of  survivorship 
for  the  benefit  of  the  estate  which 
would  otherwise  be  given  by  a  literal 
reading  of  the  former  provision. 
The  fallacy  of  both  processes  of 
reasoning  grows  out  of  a  failure  to 
observe  the  distinction  between  the 
wrong   and   the    resulting  loss;  that 


ship  uf  the  claim  of  the  deceased, 
taking  no  note  of  the  pecuniary  lose 

to  relatives,  and  the  other  on  the 
survivorship  of  relatives  mentioned 
in  the  statute,  taking  no  note  of  dam- 
ages to  the  decedent;  that  the  latter 
proceed,  regardless  of  whether  the 
death  was  instantaneous  or  followed 
after  months  of  pain  and  suffering, 
being  damages  to  relatives  by  death 
to  be  measured  by  their  pecuniary 
loss  caused  thereby,  while  the  former 
is  for  loss  that  would  otherwise  be  a 
permanent  injury  to  the  estate  itself. 
For  further  illustration  of  the  dis- 
tinction, the  following  in  Mr.  Justice 
Wilson's  opinion  in  Xeedham  v.  Kail- 
way  Co.,  38  Vt.  294,  is  quoted  by 
Justice   Brewer:  '  The  principles  on 


though   there  be   but  one  wrongful  which  the  intestate's  cause  of  action 

act  and   one    physical    injury,   there  rested  at  common  law  are  the  same 

may  be  several    persons    that    sutler  irrespective     of     the     cause     of    his 

distinct   losses,    some    of  which   are  death.'     It    'died    with    his    person 

actionable  at  common  law,  and  some  but  is  revived  by  the  statute  in  favor 


actionable,  dependent  on  the  statute. 
Justice  Brewer,  who  was  a  member 


of    his   administrator.'     It    includes 
'  nothing  more    than    his   intestate's 


of   the  Kansas  court  at  the  time  tin'  cause  of  action.     The  statute  simply 

first   decision   there    was    rendered,  ;  revives    but   does    not    enlarge    the 

and  concurred  in  it,  referred  to  the  common  law  right  of  the  intestate.' 

subject    when   he   was   later  called  The  provision  for  surviving  relatives 

upon  to   consider    the    matter   as  a  '  introduced     principles    wholly    un- 

member  of  the  Federal  bench  in  the  known  to  the  common   law.  namely, 

case  of  Hulbert  v.  City    of  Topeka,  that  the  value   of  a  man's  life  to  hi- 


reported  in  34  Fed.    BIO,  said,  sub- 
stantially,    that     he     doubted     the 


wife   and    next  of  kin    constitutes  a 
part  of  his  estate.'     'Such  damages 


correctness   of   his   former   opinion,  to  the  widow  and  next  of   kin  begin 

and  followed  it  only  in  deference  to  where  the  damages  of  the  intestate 

the  settled  judicial  policy  of  Kansas,  ended,  viz:  with  his  death.1  "    Brown 

the  cause  being  one  that  arose  there ;  v.  Chicago   &  \*.    W.    By.   Co.,   102 

that  the  basis  of  recovery  under  the  Wis.   187;  77   N.  W.  74s;  44  L.  R.  A. 

two   provisions   of   law    under   con-  579;  13  Am.  &  Fng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  603; 

sideration,  the  one  for  the  benefit  of  5  Am.    Neg.    Rep.   255,  258     '■!.  per 

37  577 


§  499  DEATH  — STATUTORY   REMEDY. 

while  the  act  of  1855  creates  a  new  cause  of  action.32  But  in 
Tennessee  it  is  said  that  the  Code  sections  create  no  new  cause 
of  action  but  merely  allow  the  survival  of  the  actions  of  dece- 
dents.53 This  is  also  substantially  true  in  Missouri.51  And  in 
Kansas  the  law  of  1889,  authorizing  an  action  by  the  widow  for 
the  death  of  her  husband,  where  no  personal  representative  has 
been  appointed,  is  held  to  merely  change  the  remedy  and  to  create 
no  new  cause  of  action  nor  impose  any  limitation  on  an  existing 
one  being  merely  supplementary  to  the  Civil  Code,  section  422.5"' 
So  the  Dakota  statute  is  held  to  be  a  survival  statute  which  pre- 
supposes the  party  deceased  to  have  been  once  entitled  to  main- 
tain the  action.56  In  an  Iowa  case  the  statute  has  been  held  not 
to  create  a  new  cause  of  action,  but  simply  to  remove  the  bar 
which  death  created  at  the  common  law.57  In  a  Connecticut  case 
the  court  considers  the  survivial  act  of  1848  and  the  death  stat- 
ute of  1853,  relating  to  death  caused  by  the  negligence,  etc.,  of 


Marshall,  J.,  rehearing  denied  44 
L.  K.  A.  585;  78  N.  W.  771;  13  Am. 
&  Eng.  K.  Cas.  N.  S.  603.  The  court, 
Marshall,  J.,  also  considers  Read  v. 
Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  1;  Blake  v. 
Railway  Co.,  10  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  443; 
Leg  v.  Britton,  64  Vt.  652;  24  Atl. 
1016;  Lubrano  v.  Atlantic  Mills  (R. 
I.),  32  Atl.  205,  and  says  of  the 
latter  case,  "  Here  again  there  is  a 
confusion  between  rights  and  reme- 
dies. To  say  that  section  4255  of  our 
(Wis.)  statutes  gives  a  remedy  for 
the  one  that  at  common  law  lapsed 
with  the  death  of  the  decedent,  is  to 
say  that  it  gives  a  new  remedy  for  a 
pre-existing  right.  But  there  was  no 
such  pre-existing  right  of  the  sur- 
viving relatives  to  recover  their  loss 
caused  by  the  wrongful  death.  The 
right  or  cause  of  action  itself  is  new 
and  the  remedy  to  enforce  it  as 
well."  The  court  also  cites  as  in 
harmony  with  its  opinion,  Hurst  v. 
Railway  Co.,  84  Mich.  539;  48  N.  W. 
44.  See  Mulcahey  v.  Wheel  Co.,  145 
Mass.  281;  Kennedy  v.  Sugar  Re- 
finery, 125  Mass.  90. 

578 


52  McCafferty  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  (Pa.),  44  Atl.  435,  under  Act 
April  15,  1851,  sec.  18  and  act  April 
26,  1855. 

53Whaley  v.  Catlett  (TeHn.),  53 
S.  W.  131,  under  Shannon's  Code, 
sees.  4025-4027,  the  case  was  brought 
by  an  infant  for  procuring  the  mur- 
der of  her  father  and  mother— death 
being  instantaneous. 

^ Gray  v.  McDonald  (Mo.),  16  S. 
W.  398. 

^  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Napole  (Kan.),  40  Pac.  669,  under 
Laws,  1889,  ch.  131;  Kan.  Civ.  Code, 
sec.  422. 

se  Belding  v.  Black  Hills  &  Ft.  P. 
R.  Co.  (Wis.),  53  N.  W.  750;  52  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  624,  under  Dak.  Comp. 
Laws,  sec.  5498,  case  where  death  was 
instantaneous.  See  Belding  v.  Black 
Hills,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  3  S.  D.  369; 
53  N.  W.  750. 

57  Sherman  v.  Stage  Co.,  24  Iowa, 
515.  Examine  Connors  v.  Railway 
Co.,  71  Iowa,  490. 


DEATH — STAT  IT< )  B  Y     B  KMEDY. 


§499 


railroad  corporations,  states  that  they  are  embodied  in  the  stat- 
utes of  1888,  including  all  injuries  resulting  in  death  and  says, 
"From  these  statutes  it  is  evident  that  tlncc  things  have  been 
effected  :  first,  the  cause  of  action  which  existed  in  the  deceased 
person  is  kept  alive.  The  rule  of  law  that  all  personal  actions 
died  with  the  person  has  been  set  aside  as  to  these  cases."  The 
other  two  things  effected  relate  to  the  limitation  of  damages  and 
distribution  of  the  sum  recovered/* 


<*Budd  v.  Meriden  Elect.  Rd.  Co., 
69  Conn.  272;  37  Atl.  683;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  335,  341  per  Andrews, 
Ch.  J. 

Opinions  of  text  writers.  Mr.  Black 
says,  "  Some  of  the  cases  hold  and 
the  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be 
on  the  side,  viz:  that  the  statute 
gives  a  new  right  of  action  and 
not  a  substituted  right  of  action." 
Blacks1  Law  &  Pract.  in  Accdt. 
Cases  (ed.  1900),  sec.  10:3,  citing 
Littlewood  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  N.  Y., 
89  N.  V.  24,  27  (14  Wkly.  Dig.  400); 
Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  40.-)  (this  case,  aff'd  3  Bosw. 
[N.  Y.]  67);  Smith  v.  Louisville,  etc., 
R.  R.  Co.,  75  Ala.  449  ;  Munro  v. 
Pac.  Coast,  etc.,  Co.,  84  Cal.  515  ; 
Adams  v.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  95  Fed. 
938,  and  other  cases.  Mr.  Harris 
considers  the  action  arising  from 
death  as  "  wholly  a  statutory  rem- 
edy," differing  from  that  where  a 
right  of  action  accrues  to  the  injured 
party  and  which  is  commenced  dur- 
ing his  lifetime,  dependent  upon  stat- 
ute for  survival  in  case  of  his  death, 
the  former  remedy  being  "afforded 
by  another  and  different  statute,1' re- 
quiring a  different  state  of  the  case 
and  different  procedure.  1  Harris 
on  Dam.  by  Corp.  (ed.  1892)  sec.  336, 
p.  397.  Mr.  Hutchinson  reviews  the 
question  at  length,  considering  the 
various  elements  involved,  but  states 
no  definite  conclusion.  Hutchinson 
on  Carriers  (2d  ed.),   sec.  789.     Mr. 


Sedgwick  quoting  from  a  New  York 
and  an  English  case,  says  the  statute 
contemplates  the  damages  resulting 
from  the  death  to  the  statutory  ben 
cticiaries  not  for  injuries  to  the  de- 
ceased from  the  wrongful  act.  etc., 
and  also  that  life  by  the  common 
law  was  not  property.  2  Sedg.  on 
Dam.  (8th  ed.)  see.  572,  p.  201, 
sec.  573,  quoting  as  to  the  first  prop- 
osition from  Mulford  v.  Panama  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  N.  V.  465.  469:  Blake  v. 
Midland  Ry.  Co.,  18  Q.  B.  93,  per  Cole- 
ridge, J.  Mr.  Sutherland  declares 
that  "a  personal  injury  by  the  de- 
fendant's wrongful  act,  neglect  or  de- 
fault is  the  basis  of  his  liability,  but 
only  because  it  produces  death,  and 
the  liability  is  only  for  the  damages 
which  result  from  the  death  to  those 
for  whose  use  and  benefit,  the  stat- 
utory action  is  giveu.  It  is  a  new 
cause  of  action  because  there  is  an 
element  in  it  additional  to  that  which 
constituted  the  cause  of  action  in 
favor  of  the  person  injured,  viz:  death 
must  ensue  in  consequence  of  an  in- 
jury to  him.  It  is  a  different  cause 
of  action  also,  because  only  the  dam- 
ages which  ensue  from  the  death  are 
recoverable.11  3  Sutherland  on  Dam- 
ages (2d  ed.),  sec.  1260,  p.  2707,  cit- 
ing Read  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co., 
L.  R.3Q.  B.  555;  Pym  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  2  B.  &  S.  759;  Leggott 
v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  1  Q.  B.  D. 
599;  Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131;  An- 
drews v.  Hartford,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  34 
57^ 


§§  500,  501  DEATH — STATUTORY    REMEDY. 

§  500.  Same  subject — Conclusion. — It  is  clearly  evident 
from  an  examination  and  comparison  not  only  of  what  is  said 
by  the  text- writers,  but  also  of  the  decisions  and  of  the  several 
statutes  upon  which  those  decisions  are  based,  that  there  can  be 
no  determining  rule  applicable  to  all  cases,  for  the  reason  that 
the  binding  weight  of  any  decision  based  upon  a  statutory  en- 
actment must  be  limited  to  the  state  where  rendered,  except  to 
the  extent  that  such  extraterritorial  determinations  may  be  of 
value  where  statutes  with  their  amendments  are  at  least  sub- 
stantially alike,  and  provided  no  contrary  binding  decision 
exists  in  the  state  where  such  extraterritorial  rulings  or  decla- 
rations of  courts  are  urged  as  of  determining  force.  Again,  the 
decisions  upon  this  point  must  rest  upon  the  wording  of  partic- 
ular statutes  and  also  upon  the  fact  whether  the  statutory  en- 
actment stands  alone,  as  one  which  may  be  denominated  purely 
a  death  statute,  or  embodies,  as  it  seems  to  do  in  Connecticut, 
both  a  survival  enactment  and  a  statutory  remedy  for  loss  by 
death.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  better  opinion  favors 
the  view  that  statutes  of  the  character  of  Lord  Campbell's  act 
create  a  new  right  of  action,  a  new  and  independent  legal  lia- 
bility. As  to  other  statutory  enactments  which  have  combined  or 
merged  either  originally  or  by  amendments  both  what  may  be 
denominated  as  death  loss  acts,  and  also  what  are  strictly  known 
as  survival  or  nonabatement  statutes,  a  different  rule  would 
probably  govern  so  far  as  the  question  of  a  transfer  or  survival 
of  the  cause  of  action  is  concerned. 

§501.   Construction  of  statutes  —  General  principles. — 

Inasmuch  as  the  right  to  recover  damages  under  both  survival 
and  death  loss  statutes  frequently  depends  upon  the  construction 

Conn.  57,  and  other  cases.     Mr.  Tif-  I  J. ;  Seward  v.  The  Vera  Cruz,  10  App. 


fany  asserts  that  Lord  Campbell's  act 
creates  a  new  cause  of  action  and 
that  expressions  in  opinions  to  the 
effect  that  the  statute  gives  a  sub- 
stituted and  not  a  new  right  of  action 
present  an  untenable  position.  Tif- 
fany on  Death  by  Wrongful  Act  (ed. 
1893),  sees.  23,  124,  citing  Blake  v. 
Midland  Ry.  Co.,  18  Q.  B.  93;  21  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  233;  16  Jur.  ",62.  per  Coleridge. 

580 


Cas.  59,  per  Lord  Blackburn;  Ham- 
ilton v.  Jones,  125  Ind.  176;  25  N.  E. 
192;  Hurlburt  v.  City  of  Topeka,  34 
Fed.  510;  Mason  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  (Utah),  24  Pac.  796;  Hecht  v. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Ind.),  32  N.  E. 
302,  per  Olds,  J.;  Griffiths  v.  Earl 
of  Dudley,  9  Q.  B.  D.  357,  per  Field,  J., 
and  other  cases. 


DEATH      STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


§  501 


of  such  statutes,  the  following  general  principles  are  impor- 
tant, although  an  extended  consideration  of  the  questions  relat- 
ing to  statutory  construction  is  not  strictly  within  the  purpose 
or  scope  of  this  treatise.  It  may  be  generally  stated  as  to  stat- 
utes ••against  an  injury,  mischief  or  grievance"  that  they  im- 
pliedly give  "  a  remedy  ;  for  the  party  injured  may,  if  no  remedy 
he  expressly  given,  have  an  action  upon  the  statute."71  Ami 
it  is  also  held  that  if  a  statute  or  ordinance  create  both  the  right 
and  remedy,  such  remedy  is  exclusive,  but  thai  where  a  common- 
law  right  exists,  the  remedy  under  the  statute  or  ordinance  i- 
cumulative.'"  Again,  if  a  statute  gives  a  remedy,  a  remedy  un- 
der a  former  statute  is  held  not  to  be  abridged  or  changed 
thereby  where  no  such  intention  is  indicated  by  the  later  act, 
upon  the  same  principle  that  the  common-law  remedy  is  held 
not  to  be  superseded  by  a  statute  giving  a  remedy  in  a  like 
case.61  If  a  statute  purports  to  modify  or  abrogate  a  well  es- 
tablished rule  of  common  law,  it  should  not,  if  reasonable  effect 
can  be  otherwise  given  to  the  words  used,  be  extended  beyond 
their  plain  import/''  It  is  held  in  New  York  that  there  should 
be  a  strict  construction  of  statutes  changing  the  common  law  and 
this  is  the  general  rule.83     And  penal  statutes  or  those  imposing 


59  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  (7th  Am. 
ed.)*194. 

60  Summit  Co.  v.  Gustavesou,  18 
Utah,  351;  54  Pac.  '.'77.  Sec  Mon- 
terey Co.  v.  Abbott,  77   Cal.  541. 

«  Colorado  Milling  &  El.  Co.  v. 
Mitchell,  26  Colo.  284;  58  Pac.  28, 
aff'g  12  Colo.  App.  277;  55  Pac.  736. 
See  Ryalls  v.  Mechanics  Mills,  150 
Mass.  100;  5  L.  R.  A.  6(17. 

«2  Felix  v.  (irimths,  56  Ohio  St.  39; 
37  Ohio  L.  J.  139;  45  X.  E.  1092. 
Examine  Brooke  v.  Turner,  95  Va. 
696;  2  Va.  L.  Reg.  85;  30  S.  E.  55; 
Hardy  v.  Brooklyn,  7  Abb.  X.  C. 
(N.  Y.)  403.  See  cases  under  next 
note. 

68  Fitzgerald  v.  Quann,  109  N.  V. 
441;  15  Civ.  Proc.  139;  16  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  395;  17  N.  E.  354,  aff'g  33  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  652,  which  rev'd  Gerald 
(Fitzgerald)  v.  Quaun,  10  Abb.  X.  < '. 


31;  1  Civ.  Proc.  273:  62  How.  I  X.  Y.l 
331.  See  Souter  v.  Sea  Witch,  1 
Cal.  162;  Kolm  v.  Collison  (Del.),  27 
Atl.  834:  Williams  v.  Vanderbilt.  145 
111.  238;  34  N.  E.  476;  (but  contra  to 
last  case,  see  Pinkerton  v.  Le  Beau 
[S.  D.].  54  V  W.  97);  Gibson  v. 
Jenney,  15  Mass.  205;  Wilbur  v. 
Crane,  13  Pick.  <  Mass.  i  290:  Sibley 
v.  Smith.  2  Mich.  486;  People  v. 
Palmer,  109  X.  Y.  110;  28  Wkly.  Dig. 
432;  15  V  Y.  St.  R.  78;  16  X.  E.  529, 
rev'g  46  Hun  (X.  Y.),  479;  11  \.  V 
St.  R.  817:  27  Wkly.  Dig.  401:  Rue 
v.  Alter.  5  Denio,  119;  McQueen  v. 
Middletown  Mfg.  Co.,  16  Johns.  I  X. 
Y.)  7;  McCluske>  v.  Cromwell,  11 
X\  Y.  593;  Esterly's  Appeal.  54  Pa. 
St.  192;  Hearn  v.  Erwin,  3  Cold. 
(Tenn.)  599;  Shaw  v.  K.  R.  Co.,  101 
U.  s.  557;  Browu  v.  Barry.  3  Dall. 
(U.  S.)365. 

581 


§  501 


DEATH — STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


a  penalty  must  not  be  strictly  construed.'14  But  it  is  also  de- 
cided that  remedial  statutes  should  receive  a  liberal  rather  than 
a  strict  construction,"  with  a  view  to.  the  intended  beneficial 
purpose.*  A  statute  should,  however,  be  given  some  effect 
differing  from  the  status  of  the  law  as  it  existed  without  it.6; 
So  the  object,  spirit  and  purpose  of  a  statute  should  be  con- 
sidered,68  and  its  purpose  is  determined  by  its  natural  and  rea- 
sonable effect.1'9  Again,  statutes  are  to  be  construed  together 
and  are  in  pari  materia,  when  they  relate  to  the  same  general 
subject-matter,  or  to  the  same  thing.70     And  statutes  in  pari  ma- 


64  Thurn  v.  Alta  Teleg.  Co.,  15  Cal. 
472;  Allen's  Teleg.  Cas.  146,  148  per 
Baldwin,  J.;  Daggett  v.  State,  4  Conn. 
61;  Rawson  v.  State,  19  Conn.  292; 
United  States  v.  Athens,  35  Ga.  344; 
Cushing  v.  Dill,  2  Scam.  (111.)  461; 
State  v.  Indiana  &  I.  S.  R.  Co.  (Ind.), 
18  L.  R.  A.  502;  32  N.  E.  817,  hold- 
ing also  that  the  rule  is  not  violated 
where  a  common  sense  view  of  the 
statute  as  a  whole  is  taken  so  as  to 
effect  the  legislative  purpose  if  per- 
mitted by  a  reasonable  construction, 
State  v.  Hogriever,  152  Ind.  652;  53 
N.  E.  921;  45  L.  R.  A.  504,  holding 
also  that  the  rule  should  not  be  un- 
reasonably applied  so  as  to  defeat 
the  sovereign  will  when  that  is  ex- 
pressed with  ordinary  certainty. 
Western  Un.  Teleg.  v.  Harding,  103 
Ind.  505;  1  Am.  Elec.  Cas.  814,  818, 
per  Mitchell,  C.  J.;  State  v.  Lowell, 
23  Iowa,  304;  Melody  v.  Reab,  4  Mass. 
473:  Pike  v.  Jenkins,  12  X.  H.  255; 
Chase  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co..  26 
N.  Y.  523;  Sprague  v.  Birdsall,  2 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  419;  Jones  v.  Estes,  2 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  379;  Hall  v.  State,  20 
Ohio,  7;  Kirby  v.  West.  Uu.  Teleg. 
Co.  (S.  D.),  37  N.  W.  202;  United 
States  v.  Ellis  (U.  S.  D.  C.  W.  D.  Ark. ), 
51  Fed.  808,  holding  also  that  con- 
struction must  be  fair  and  reason- 
able and  not  forced.  United  States 
v.  Wiltberger,  5  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  76; 
United   States  v.   Hartwell,  6  Wall. 

582 


(U.  Si)  385;  Joyce  on  Elec.  Law  (ed. 
1900),  sec.  179. 

65  Mcintosh  v.  Johnson,  51  Neb.  33; 
70  N.  W.  522;  Kohnv.  Collison  (Del.), 
27  Atl.  834. 

66  Hudler  v.  Golden,  36  N.  Y.  446, 
and  a  liberal  construction  should  be 
given  to  statutes  intended  for  the 
public  good.  Tallman  v.  Syracuse  & 
N.  Y.  Rd.  Co.,  Keyes,  128;  4  Abb. 
Dec.  351. 

67  Quackenbush  v.  United  States. 
33  Ct.  CI.  355. 

68  People,  Wood  v.  Lacombe,  99 
N.  Y.  43;  1  N.  E.  599,  aff'g  34  Hun 
( X.  Y. ),  401 ;  Pearson  v.  Elmer,  5  Redf . 
(N.  Y.)181. 

69  Collins  v.  New  Hampshire,  171 
U.  S.  30;  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  768. 

70  State  v.  Gerhart,  145  Ind.  439:  44 
N.  E.  409;  33  L.  R.  A.  313.  See 
Micbenor  v.  Harrison,  116  Ind.  300; 
State  v.  Sloss,  83  Ala.  93;  People  v. 
Raymond,  18  Colo.  242;  19  L.  R.  A. 
649 ;  Ex  parte  O'Donovan.  24  Fla.  281 ; 
Hunt  v.  Chicago,  H.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  121 
111.  644;  Re  Hall,  38  Kan.  670;  Rich- 
ardson v.  Richardson,  La.  Ann.  641; 
Merrill  v.  Grossman,  08  Me.  412: 
Simpkins  v.  Ward,  45  Mich.  559; 
State,  Brown  v.  Klein,  116  Mo.  259: 
Gartner  v.  Cohen,  51  N.  J.  L.  125: 
Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Syra- 
cuse, 116  N.  Y.  167;  26  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
364;  22  N.  E.  381;  5  L.  R.  A.  546; 
Wortham  v.  Basket,   99   N.    C.    70; 


DEATH    -STATUTORY    lMlMEDY. 


§501 


i.i  i;i  are  to  be  construed  together  as  if  parts  of  the  same  act.71 
The  intention  governs  in  the  construction  of  a  statute  and  this  in- 
tention must  be  gathered  from  the  whole  statute  and  sometimes 
from  statutes  in  pari  materia.78  So  every  word  of  a  legislative 
enactment  is  presumed  to  have  some  force  and  effect.78  And 
the  act  must  also  be  construed  in  its  entirety  so  as  to  give  effect 
to  every  part  without  violating  the  intention  of  the  legislature/' 
And  it  is  held  that  the  intention  governs  though  contrary  to 
the  letter  of  the  statute/"'  Again,  that  one  of  two  constructions 
will  he  presumed  to  have  been  intended  which  is  within  the 
power  of  the  legislature.76  And  if  tin-  meaning  of  a  statute  is 
too  plain  to  admit  of  construction,  the  maxim  noscitur  a  sociis 
has  no  application,"  for  tin-  Language  of  an  unambiguous  statute 
should  not  be  departed  from  in  construing  it.78     It  may  also  be 


Cooper  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  113 
U.  S.  727:  2s  L.  Ed.  1137;  Ryan  v. 
Carter,  93  U.  S.  78;  23  L.  Ed.  807. 

71  People  v.  Asten,  (5  Daly,  18;  49 
Mow.  (X.  V.)  40:,,  aff'd  02  X.  Y.  623. 
See  Powers  v.  Shepard,  48  X.  Y.  540, 
aff'g  49  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  418;  35  How. 
I  N.  Y.  J  53;  McCarter  v.  Orphan  Asy- 
lum of  X.  Y..  9  Cow.  437. 

72  People,  Ouondaga  Co.  Sav.  Bk. 
v.  Butler,  147  X.  Y.  164;  69  X.  Y.  St. 
K.  410;  41  X.  E.  416,  rev'g  85  Hun 
(N.  Y. ),  616;  State,  Jones  v.  Mack. 
23  Xev.  359;  47  Pac.  763;  Barnard  v. 
Gall,  43  La.  Ann.  959;   10  So.  5. 

78  Brown  v.  Turner,  174  Mass.  150: 
54 N.  E.  510.  See  Cincinnati  v.  Guck- 
enberger,  60  Ohio  St.  353;  42  Ohio  L. 
J.  79;  54  X.  E.  376;  Cincinnati  v.  Con- 
ner, 55  Ohio  St.  82;  36  <  >hio  L.  J.  25: 
14  X.  E.  582. 

74  Johnson  v.  Schlosser,  146  Ind. 
509;  45  X.  E.  702;  :;■;  L.  K.  A.  59. 
Every  clause  will  if  possible  be  given 
effect.  Mcintosh  v.  Johnson,  51  Xeb. 
33;  70  X.  W.  552.  must  be  construed 
so  as  to  give  force  and  effect  to  legis- 
lative intent.  Shonwiler  v.  Stewart, 
104  Iowa,  67;  73  N.  W.  179,  must  be 
so  construed  that  one  section  will  not 
destroy  but  support  and  explain  the 


other.  Bernier  v.  Bernier,  147  U.  S. 
242:  13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  214;  37  L. 
Ed.  752.  See  further  Washington 
Twp.  v.  Coler  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C. ), 
2  C..C.  A.  272;  4  U.  S.  App.  622;  51 
Fed.  362. 

'■'  Hooper  v.  Creager,  84  Md.  195; 
35  Atl.  967,  1103;  35  L.  II.  A.  202,  re- 
hearing denied  84  Md.  258;  30  Atl. 
359;  35  L.  R.  A.  210. 

76  Martin  v.  North  Salem  L.  Co.,  97 
Ya.  ;!49;  1  Va.  S.  C.  442;  :':.,  S.  E.  600; 
Martin  v.  South  Salem  L.  Co.,  94  Va. 
28;  2   Va.  L.  Keg.  743;  26  S.   E.  591; 

6  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  X.  S.  312; 
S.  < '.,  97  Va.  349;  33  S.  E.  600;  1  Va. 
S.  C.  Rep.  442. 

77  Brown  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co., 
102  Wis.  137;  78  X.  W.  771:  44  L.  R. 
A.  585,  denying  rehearing  77  X.  W. 
74S;  44  L.  R.  A.  579;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Pep. 
255;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  603. 
See  also  McGowan  v.  Metropolitan 
L.  Ins.  Co.,  60  X.  J.  L.  198;  38  Ail. 
671;  Choctaw,  <  >.  it  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Alex- 
ander, 7  Okla.  591:  :.i  Pac.  121,  aff'g 

7  Okla.  579:  52  Pac.  944. 

-  Matter  Of   Miller.  110  X.  Y.  216, 

222;  IS   X.    Y.  St.    R.   226;  18   N.  E. 

139,  aff'g  47  Bun  (X.  Y.  |,  394;  14  X. 

Y.  St.  R.  529;  2S  Wkly.  Dig.  47.     See 

583 


501 


DEATH       STATUTORY    REMEDY. 


stated  that  a  statute  is  constitutional  unless  clearly  otherwise,™ 
and  every  intendment  and  presumption  favors  its  constitutional- 
ity even  to  the  exclusion  of  a  reasonable  doubt,*0  so  that  one  of 
two  constructions  which  will  bring  a  statute  in  harmony  with 
the  constitution  should  be  adopted.81  Again,  a  statute  may  be 
valid  in  part  and  unconstitutional  in  part  if  the  parts  are  sepa- 
rable, and  sufficiently  operative  provisions  remain,82  and  the  in- 


People  v.  Supervisors  of  Green  Co., 
13  Abb.  N.  C.  421;  66  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)330;  Johusonv.  Hudson  R.  Rd. 
Co.,  49  N.  Y.  455,  rev'g  2  Sweeny 
(N.  Y.),  298. 

79  Cummings  v.  Hyatt,  54  Neb. 
635;  74  N.  W.  411;  Malloy  v.  Fay- 
etteville,  122  N.  C.  480;  29  S.  E.  880. 
See  Perkius  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa. 
554;  33  Wkly.  N.  Cas.  41;  24  Pitts. 
L.  J.  N.  S.  85;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  325;  27  Atl.  356. 

80  Com.  Armstrong  v.  E.  H.  Taylor 
Jr.  Co.,  101  Ky.  325;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
552;  41  S.  W.  11,  rev'g  38  S.  W.  10; 
Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  554; 
33  Wkly.  N.  Cas.  41;  24  Pitts.  L. 
J.  N.  S.  85;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
325;  27  Atl.  356;  De  Walt  v.  Bartley, 
146  Pa.  529;  30  Wkly.  N.  C  121; 
24  Atl.  185;  15  L.  R.  A.  771,  aff'g  1 
Pa.  Dist.  Rep.  199,  202,  220;  People, 
Woodyatt  v.  Thompson,  155  111.  451; 
40  N.  E.  307;  Kerrigan  v.  Force,  68 
N.  Y.  381,  aff'g  9  Hun  (N.  Y.),  185; 
Cole  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Falls,  90  Tenn.  466; 

16  S.  W.  1045;  Holton  v.  State,  28 
Fla.  303;  9  So.  716.  And  its  uncon- 
stitutionality must  be  shown  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt.  Denver  v. 
Knowles,  17  Colo.  204;  30  Pac.  1041; 

17  L.  R.  A.  135.  In  case  of  reasonable 
doubt  courts  will  hold  a  statute  con- 
stitutional. People,  Woodyatt  v. 
Thompson,  155  111.  451;  40  N.  E.  307. 
The  rule,  however,  is  held  to  be  one 
of  comity  only  with  regard  to  rea- 
sonable intendment  favoring  consti- 
tutionality, and  does  not  apply  where 

584 


statute  is  contrary  to  manifest  inten- 
tion of  the  constitution.  Perkins  v. 
Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  554;  24  Pitts. 
L.  J.  N.  S.  85;  33  Wkly.  N.  C.  41; 
27  Atl.  356;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  325. 

81  New  York  &  L.  I.  B.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  148  N.  Y.  540;  42  N.  E.  1088, 
aff'g  90  Hun  (N.  Y.),  312;  People  v. 
Rosenberg,  136  N.  Y.  410;  53  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  1;  34  N.  E.  285,  rev'g  67  Hun 
(N.  Y.),52;  51  N.  Y.  St.  R.  189;  22 
N.  Y.  Supp.  56. 

82  State  v.  Street,  117  Ala,  203;  23 
So.  807;  Leep  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  &  M. 
S.  R.  Co.,  58  Ark.  407;  23  L.  R.  A. 
264;  57  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  1;  25  S. 
W.  75;  Anderson  v.  Byrnes,  122  Cal. 
272;  54  Pac.  821;  Jacksonville,  T.  & 
K.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  33  Fla.  608: 
15  So.  257;  24  L.  R.  A.  272;  English 
v.  State,  31  Fla.  340,  356;  12  So.  689; 
State,  Lamar  v.  Dillon,  32  Fla.  545; 
14  So.  383;  22  L.  R.  A.  124;  44  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  134;  People,  De- 
neen  v.  Simmons,  176  111.  165;  31 
Chic.  L.  News,  75;  3  Chic.  L.  J. 
Wkly.  506;  State  v.  Gerhardt  145 
Ind.  439;  44  N.  E.  469;  33  L.  R.  A. 
313;  Manistee  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Commrs.  of  Rds.,  118  Mich.  349;  5 
Det.  L.  News,  507;  76  N.  W.  633; 
State,  Crow  v.  Fireman's  Fund  Ins. 
Co.,  152  Mo.  1;  52  S.  W.  395;  45  L.  R. 
A.  363;  State  v.  Bockstruck,  136  Mo. 
335;  38  S.  W.  317;  State,  Aull  v. 
Field,  119  Mo.  593;  24  S.  W.  752; 
State,  Wilmot  v.  Buckley,  60  Ohio 
St.  273;  42  Ohio    L.    J.  35;  54   N.  E. 


DEATH       STATUTES    GBNKRALUS 


502 


valid  part  may  be  rejected/1  But  the  invalid  section  may  sus- 
tain such  a  material  relation  i"  the  other  sections  or  be  so 
dependent  thereon  as  bo  invalidate  all/1  and  it  is  held  that  an 
unconstitutional  provision  in  an  act.  while  nol  constituting  the 
basis  of  a  right,  is  of  effect  in  ascertaining  the  meaning  ..1'  that 
part  which  is  valid/' 

§502.  Construction  of  statutes,  etc.— Survival  and  death 
1088.— The  Texas  survival  act  relating  to  personal  injuries  not 
resulting  in  death  is  held  not  unconstitutional  as  applied  to  one 
who  was  injured  before  its  passage  but  died  thereafter."  Nor 
is  the  Georgia  act  of  1889  unconstitutional  as  applicable  to  ac- 
tions pending  at  the  time  of  its  passage.87  As  to  the  effect  of 
constitutional  provisions,  it  is  held  in  Kentucky  that  the  right 
granted  by  the  statute  to  designated  persons  to  bring  an  action 
where  a  husband  or  father  is  killed  by  the  wanton  or  malicious 
use  of  firearms,  or  by  any  weapon,  is  not  taken  away  by  the  con- 
stitution, which  provides  that  the  personal  representatives  shall 
bring  suit  where  death  results  from  an  injury  inflicted  by  neg- 
ligence or  wrongful  act.88    And  the  general  statute  of  that  state 


272;  Re  Assessment  &  C.  of  Taxes 
(S.  D.),  54  N.  W.  818;  Trimble  v. 
Com.,  96  Va.  818;  1  Va.  S.  C.  Rep. 
29;  5  Va.  L.  Reg.  92;  31  Chic.  L. 
News,  361;  Field  v.  Clark,  143  U. 
S.  649:  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  495;  36  L. 
Eil.  294:  Cantini  v.  Tillman  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  D.  S.  C. ),  54  Fed.  969;  47  All). 
L.  J.  430. 

83  People,  Akin  v.  Kipley,  171  111. 
44;  49  N.  E.  229;  State  v.  Newell,  140 
Mo.  282;  41  S.  W.  751;  State,  Corn- 
stock  v.  Stewart.  52  Neb.  243;  71  X. 
W.  998;  State,  Wheeler  v.  Stuht,  52 
Neb.  209;  71  X.  W.  941;  Eureka  v. 
Wilson,  15  Utah,  67;  48  Pac.  150. 

84  Cheyenne  v.  Swan  (  Wy.  i.  51 
Pac.  209;  40  I..  R.  A.  195.  See  Dur- 
yee  v.  Mayor,  New  York,  76  N.  V. 
477;  State,  Scott,  v.  Bowen,  54  Neb. 
211:  74  N.  W.  615:  People.  Deneen 
v.  Martin,  178  111.611;  53  X.  E.  309; 
state,  Gray  v.  Dover,  62  X.  J.  L.  40; 


49  Atl.  640,  aff'd  42  Atl.  674;  West- 
ern U.  T.  Co.  v.  Poe  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D. 
Ohio),  61  Fed.  449;  State  v.  Godwin, 
123  N.  C.  697;  31  S.  E.  221. 

ssSipev.  People,  Milliken.  20  Colo. 
127:  56  Pac.  571. 

86  Marshall  v.  McAllister,  18  Tex. 
Civ.  A  pp.  159;  43  S.  W.  104:1:  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  743,  under  Tex.  Rev.  Stat. 
1895,  art  3353a,  followiug  Houston 
&  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  39  S.  W.  1112.  See  also  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  P.  Co.  v.  Settle,  19  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  357;  1  Jour.  App.  ')7:  47 
S.  W.  825. 

87  Pritchard  v.  Savannah  St  a  R. 
R.  R.  Co..  87  Ga.  294;  13  S.  E.  493;  I  I 
L.  R.  A.  721:  <;a.  Ait  <>f  Novem- 
ber 12,  1889,  amdg.  Ga,  Code,  sec. 
20H7. 

"Mii'lme  v.  Alexander.  15  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  732;  2  1  s.    W.  619:    Ky.  Gen. 
Stat.  ch.  1,  sec.  6;  Kv.  Const,  sec.  241. 
585 


§  502 


DEATH — STATUTES   GENERALLY. 


permitting  the  widow  to  recover  for  the  wrongful  death  of  her 
husband,  where  there  are  no  children,  is  not  repealed  as  incon- 
sistent therewith,  by  the  constitutional  provision  giving  the 
personal  representative  a  right  of  action.®  Nor  does  the  con- 
stitutional provision  of  that  state  allowing  the  recovery  of  dam- 
ages for  death  negligently  caused,  deprive  any  person  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law  in  violation  of  the  Federal  constitution, 
although  the  relative  entitled  to  recover  has  no  legal  pecuniary 
claim  on  the  deceased.90  Again,  the  New  York  constitution  pro- 
viding against  legislative  limitation  of  the  amount  recoverable 
for  injuries  resulting  in  death,  and  that  the  right  of  action  shall 
never  be  abrogated,  is  not  retroactive  but  is  prospective  and  does 
not  apply  to  causes  of  action  theretofore  accruing,  although  if 
the  injury  occurred  before,  and  the  death  after,  the  constitution 
went  into  effect,  the  provision  applies.91  So  in  North  Carolina 
the  act  of  1897,  providing  that  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  ser- 
vant shall  not  be  a  defense  in  actions  against  a  railroad  company 
for  death  or  injury  of  an  employee,  is  held  not  to  apply  where  the 
employee  was  injured  before  its  enactment.92  As  to  the  effect 
of  an  amended  or  repealing  statute,  it  is  held  that  the  Alabama 
Code  of  1886  embodies  the  act  of  1872,  "to  prevent  homicides;' 
and  although  it  drops  the  title  and  provides  for  the  recovery  of 
such  damages  as  the  jury  may  assess,  it  is  unchanged  in  purpose 

C.)i  24  U.  S.  C.    C.  A.  280;  47  U.  S. 

App.  339;  78  Fed.  693. 
si  Weber   v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 

15  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  512;  42  X.  Y. 

Supp.   789;    76    X.    Y.    St.    R.    789; 

art.   1,  sec.    18,    Const.    X.    Y.  1895; 


s9  Edmonson  v.  Kentucky  C.  R.  Co., 
16  Ky.  L.  Rep.  459;  28  S.  W.  789;  Ky. 
Gen.  Stat.  ch.  57,  sec.  3;  Const.  Ky. 
sec.  241. 

90  Owensboro  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
clay, 19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  997;  43  S.  W. 
177;  Ky.  Const,  sec.  241;  U.  S.  Const. 
14th  Amdt.  See  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barron,  5  Wall.  (72  U.  S. )  90;  18 
L.  Ed.  591.  And  the  Ohio  Act, 
April  2.  1890,  governing  railroad's 
liability  for  injury  to  employees  and 
which  applies  to  all  railroad  corpora- 
tions within  the  state  and  to  all  of  a 
common  class  of  their  employees, 
does  not  violate  a  constitutional  re- 
quirement that  all  laws  of  a  general 
nature  shall  have  a  uniform  oper- 
ation throughout  the  state.  Pierce 
v.  Van  Dusen  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  6th. 
586 


Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co., 
15  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  158;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1062;  Isola  v.  Webber,  147  N.  Y.  329; 
69  X.  Y.  St.  R.  691;  41  N.  E.  704, 
rev'g  13  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  97;  68  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  32;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  77,  rearg. 
denied  148  N.  Y.  736:  art.  1,  sec.  18, 
Const.  X.  Y.  1895;  O'Reilly  v.  Utah, 
Xev.  &  Cal.  Stage  Co.,  87  Hun  (X. 
Y.),  406;  68  X.  Y.  St.  R.  432;  34  X. 
Y.  Supp.  358;  art.  1,  sec.  18,  Const, 
as  am'd  1874. 

92  Rittenhouse  v.    Wilmington   St. 
R.  Co.,  120  X.  C.  544;  26  S.  E.  922. 


DEATH      STATUTES    GENERALLY. 


§  503 


although  the  prior  act  provided  for  the  assessment  of  such  sum 
as  the  jury  deem  just.93  Again,  it  is  decided  in  Pennsylvania 
that  the  survival  act  in  case  of  actions  for  injuries  to  the  person 
has  not  been  expressly  or  impliedly  repealed  or  modified  by  sub- 
sequent legislation."  Ami  in  Washington  it  is  held  that  the 
statutory  right  of  action  in  the  heirs  or  personal  representatives 
is  not  inconsistent  with  and  does  not  repeal  another  section  of 
the  same  Code  which  gives  a  parent  a  remedy  for  the  death  or 
injury  of  a  child.86  Again,  as  we  have  elsewhere  stated,  the 
nonabatement  or  survival  statute  of  Connecticut  as  to  personal 
injuries  and  death,  and  the  enactment  giving  a  remedy  for  loss 
of  life  by  a  railroad  company's  negligence,  etc.,  are  brought  to- 
gether in  the  statutes  of  1888  of  that  state  which  includes  all 
injuries  resulting  in  death.*'' 

§  503.  Construction  of  survival  and  death  loss  statutes, 
etc.— Continued. — Another  question  which  has  necessitated  the 
construction  of  these  statutes  relates  to  the  effect  of  enactments 
where  the  death  loss  act  provides  a  remedy  and  other  statutes 
are  of  necessity  involved.  To  illustrate  :  It  is  held  in  South 
Carolina  that  the  death  loss  act  of  1859  does  not  apply  to  a 
case  under  the  act  of  1874,  which  gives  a  right  of  action  against 
the  county  where  one  is  injured  by  a  defective  highway  or 
bridge.97  And  in  another  case  it  is  decided  that  an  administra- 
trix  continuing  an  action  under  a  survival  statute  cannot  re- 


6)1  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Free- 
man (Ala.),  11  So.  800;  Ala.  Act 
February  5,  1872,  embodied  in  Code, 
1886,  sec.  2580. 

91  Maherv.  Philadelphia  Trac.  Co., 
181  Pa.  391;  40  Wkly.  X.  C.  477; 
87Atl.  571;  3  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  85;  Pa. 
act,  April  15,  1851,  sec.  18;  art.  3, 
sec.  21,  Const.  Pa.;  case  was  decided 
May,  1897.  citing  Birch  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  339;  30  Atl.  82(5. 

95Hedrick  v.  Ilwaco  R.  &  Nav.  Co., 
4  Wash.  400;  30  Par.  714:  54  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  45;  Wash.  Code,  1881, 
sees.  8,  9.  Sec.  8  was  later  in  pas- 
sage. 

»*  Budd  v.   Meridan  Elec.  Rd.  Co., 


69  Conn.  272:  37  Atl.  683;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  335.  341,  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J.; 
Acts  1848,  ch.  5,  sei'S.  1,  2;  Acts  1853, 
ch.  74,  sec.  8;  Genl.  Stats.  1888,  sec. 
1008. 

9' All  v.  Burnwell  Co.  (S.  C.I.  7 
S.  E.  58;  Gen.  Stat.  S.  C.  sec.  2183, 
enacted  1859;  Gen.  Stat.  S.  C.  sec. 
1087,  enacted  1S74.  See  also  Radio 
v.  Detroit  (Mich.).  51  X.  W.  360, 
under  Flow.  Mich.  Stat.  sees.  8313, 
8314,  and  Mich.  Pub.  acts  1887. 
No.  264.  Examine  Bowes  v.  City  of 
Boston  (Mass.).  29  N.  E.  633,  under 
Mass.  Pub.  St.  ch.  52,  sec.  17,  and 
Pub.  St.  ch.  165,  sec.  1. 

587 


§  503 


DEATH     -STATUTES    GENERALLY. 


cover  damages  under  an  act  creating  a  new  right  of  action 
limited  to  cases  of  death  caused  by  violence  or  negligence  and 
also  limiting  the  exercise  of  the  right  to.  persons  other  than  the 
one  acting  as  administratrix.*  So  in  an  Illinois  decision  an 
action  under  the  death  loss  act  is  held  not  within  the  statute 
relating  to  damages  for  injuries  to  the  person,"  and  it  is  decided 
in  a  Federal  case  that  the  state  of  West  Virginia,  which  gives  a 
right  of  action  after  death  to  the  personal  representatives,  does 
not  impliedly  save  an  action  for  damages  for  personal  injuries 
which  abates  by  death  of  the  plaintiff.100  Again,  where  a  statute 
provided  that  a  cause  of  action  for  negligent  injuries  should 
survive,  and  the  death  loss  act  provided  for  an  action  for  the 
benefit  of  the  heirs  to  the  extent  of  the  pecuniary  injury  re- 
sulting from  the  death,  it  was  held  that  an  action  for  the  benefit 
of  the  estate  for  death  from  the  injuries  and  also  an  action  for 
the  pecuniar}-  loss  to  the  heirs  was  not  given.1  This  question 
of  the  effect  upon  the  remedy  or  right  of  action  of  death  loss 
enactments  and  survival,  and  other  personal  injury  statutes,  has 
also  been  passed  upon  in  other  states  and  is  involved  as  to  the 
construction  of  such  legislative  acts  with  other  matters  which  are 
elsewhere  considered  fully  herein,  in  so  far  as  they  are  germane 
to  the   subject  of  damages,  and  the  rights  of  action  therefor.3 


98  McCaffei  ty  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  (Pa.  1899).  44  Atl.  435. 

99  Lake  Shore  v.  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dylinski,  67  111.  App.  114:  2  Chic. 
L.  J.  Wkly.  77,  under  death  loss  act, 
111.  Rev.  Stat.  ch.  70,  and  personal 
injury  act,  ch.  83,  sec.  14.  Examine 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Connor, 
119  111.  586;  9  N.  E.  263;  6  West.  673; 
Hoi  ton  v.  Daly.  106  111.  131;  19  111. 
App.  591. 

110  Ceiling  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  151  U.  S.  673;  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep- 
533;  38  L.  Ed.  311.  Examine 
Hurlburt  v.  City  of  Topeka,  34  Fed. 
510;  Martin  v.  Missouri  P.  Ry.  Co., 
58  Kan.  475;  49  Pac.  605;  7  Am. 
&Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  576;  3  Ana.  Xeg. 
Rep.  165,  under  Kan.  Civ.  Code,  sees. 
420,  425 ;  McCarthy  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.    R.    Co.,    18   Kan.    46;  City   of 

588 


Eureka  v.  Merrifield,  53  Kan.  794; 
37  Pac.  113. 

1  Sweetland  v.  Chicago  &  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  117  Mich.  329;  43  L. 
R.  A.  568. 

'-  See  Brown  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  102  Wis.  137;  77  N.  W.  748; 
44  L.  R.  A.  579;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  603;  rehearing  denied  44 
L.  R.  A.  585;  78  N.  W.  771;  13 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  603;  Davis 
v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  53 
Ark.  117;  13  S.  W.  801;  Hartigan  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Cal.  142; 
24  Pac.  851;  Mayhew  v.  Burns,  103 
Ind.  328;  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
McElwain,  98  Ky.  700;  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders,  86  Ky.  259;  55 
S.  W.  563;  Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Phillips,  64  Miss.  693;  2  So.  537; 
Little  wood  v.   Mayer,  89  N.    Y.  24; 


DEATH — 8TATUTES    GENERALLY. 


Upon  the  point  whether  the  statutes  of  the  character  under 
consideration  should  receive  a  liberal  or  strict  construction,  the 
authorities  are  not  in  harmony.  As  we  have  slated  elsewhere, 
statutes  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,  and  likewise  penal 
statutes,  should  be  strictly  construed,  while  it  is  also  held  that 
remedial  statutes  should  be  liberally  construed.  The  construction 
therefore,  of  any  enactment  must  depend  upon  the  view  which 
the  courts  of  that  state  take  of  its  character.  Thus  while  the 
Massachusetts  statute  has  been  held  penal  in  form,  it  has  also 
been  declared  to  be  remedial  in  its  nature,8  and  that  the  act  is 
penal  while  the  action  also  given  the  administrator  is  merely  a 
substitute  for  the  indictment.1  In  the  New  Hampshire  cases, 
those  arising-  under  the  statutes  of  1867  "'  and  of  1878 ''  should 
lie  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  remedy  given  by  way  of  fine  under 
those  acts,  and  the  change  effected  by  the  subsequent  enact- 
ment.7 Again  the  Maine  statute  of  1857  s  likewise  provided  a  for- 
feiture to  be  recovered  by  way  of  indictment.  So  also  does  the 
statute  of  1883, '•'  and  decisions  under  the  earlier  acts  should  be 
considered  in  comparison  with  those  involving  the  survival 
enactments  of  that  state  as  well  as  those  rendered  under  the 
acts  providing  for  a  civil  action.10  In  Louisiana  the  statute  of 
1857  was  in  effect  a  survival  act,"  which  so  remained  in  the 
("ode  of  1889  with  a  slight  change  as  to  the  parties  whose 
death  gave  a  right  of  action.1-'  And  in  this  connection  it  is  held 
in  Illinois  that  the  abatement  or  survival  acts  of  1874  are  re- 
medial and  will  be  liberally  construed  to  embrace  a  case  not 
within  its  terms.18     So  the  Colorado  statutes  providing  for  the 


14  Wkly.  Dig.  400,  aff'g  47  Sup.  Ct. 
547;  Putman  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  Or.  230;  Legg  v.  Britton,  04 
Vt.  652:  24  Ail.  1016;  The  Harris- 
burg,  119  U.  S.  199;  7  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
140,  per  Waite,  Ch.  J. 

3  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  &  A. 
R.  Co.,  121  Mass.  36. 

4  Littlejohn  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co., 
148  Mass.  478;  20  N.  E.  103,  per 
Holmes,  J. 

s  Gen.  Stat.  N.  H.  1867,  ch.  264, 
sec.  14,  p.  259. 

6  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  ch.  282,  sec. 
14. 


7  N.  II.  Laws,  1879,  ch.  35, 
sec.  1;  N.  H.  Laws,  1885,  ch.  11;  N. 
II.  Laws,  1887,  ch.  71;  N.  H.  Pub. 
Stat.  1891,  ch.  191,  sees.  8-13.  See 
French  v.  Masenna  F.  Co.  (  X.  H. ), 
20  Atl.  363. 

8  Rev.  Stat.  Me.  1857,  ch.  51,  sec. 
42  p.  370:  ch.  52,  p.  376. 

9  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  ch.  51. 

10  See  Acts  Me.  1891,  ch.  7l'4;  Rev. 
Stat.  Me.  1888,  ch.  18. 

U  Rev.  Stat.  La.  1857,  sec.  18,  p. 
79. 

J-  La.  Civ.  Code,  1889,  art.  2315. 

11  Xortheru  Trust  Co.  v.   Palmer, 

589 


§  503 


DEATH  — STATUTES    GENERALLY. 


recovery  of  damages  for  death  by  wrongful  acts,  etc.,  are  held 
to  be  remedial  and  not  penal  statutes.14  Again  in  a  Wisconsin 
case  it  is  said  of  the  death  loss  act  of  that  state  :  "  To  be  sure  the 
rule  of  strict  construction  should  apply  as  the  act  is  in  deroga- 
tion of  the  common  law  15  if  the  language  is  open  to  construc- 
tion;  but  in  our  judgment  it  is  not."16  It  is  decided  in  an 
Illinois  case  that  a  liberal  construction  will  be  given  to  effectu- 
ate the  purpose  of  an  act  for  the  health  and  safety  of  coal  miners,17 
while  in  Kentucky  the  statute  is  held  to  have  a  double  char- 
acter, remedial  in  part  and  penal  in  part,  to  be  construed  accord- 
ingly.1" It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  value  of  any  decision 
depends  upon  so  many  factors  that  except  in  the  case  of,  at 
least,  substantially  similar  statutes,  the  extraterritorial  force  of 
any  decision  or  declaration  of  the  courts  must  necessarily  be 
limited  in  determining  its  weight  on  the  question  of  liberal  or 
strict  construction  of  these  various  statutes.19 


171  111.  383;  49  N.  E.  553,  affg  70 
111.  App.  93;  111.  Rev.  Stat.  1874,  ch. 
3,  sec.  123,  p.  97,  sees.  10,  11.  See 
Henderson  v.  Alexander,  2  Ga.  81; 
Greene  v.  Martine,  21  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
136. 

14  Hayes  v.  Williams,  17  Colo.  465; 
30  Pac.  352;  Mill's  Ann.  Stat.  Colo. 
sees.  1509,  1510. 

15  Citing  Eilers  v.  Wood,  64  Wis. 
422;  25  N.  W.  440. 

16  Eau  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  95  Wis.  69;  69  N.  W.  997;  1  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  537,  538,  per  Marshall,  J. 
The  court  adds,  ''There  is  nothing 
either  in  the  terms  or  spirit  of  the 
act  from  which  the  court  can  say 
the  legislative  idea  was  to  confine 
its  effect  to  rights  of  action  in  favor 
of  injured  persons  as  the  law  existed 
on  the  subject  at  the  time  section 
4255  was  passed."  Wis.  Rev.  Stat, 
sec.  4245.  The  court  also  considered 
the  effect  of  this  statute  as  covering 
the  death  of  a  railroad  employee  not- 
withstanding Laws,  Wis.  1893,  ch. 
220,  relating  to  liability  of  railroad 
companies  to  employees. 

590 


17  Carterville  Coal  Co.  v.  Abbott, 
81  111.  App.  279;  3  Starr  &  C.  A'nn. 
Code  of  111.  ch.  93,  sec.  14.  The 
Miuers'  Act  provides  a  remedy  in 
case  of  loss  of  life,  etc.  So  also 
Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1889,  sec.  7074. 

18  Board  of  Shelby  Co.  v.  Scearce, 
2  Duv.  (Ky.)    576. 

19  Courts  favoring  a  strict  construc- 
tion are,  in  addition  to  cases  con- 
sidered in  the  text,  Smith  v.  Louis- 
ville, etc.,  R.  Co.,  75  Ala.  449,  450; 
Daly  v.  Stoddard,  66  Ga.  145; 
Hamilton  v.  Jones,  125  Ind.  176;  25 
N.  E.  192;  Stewart  v.  Terre  Haute, 
etc.,  R.  Co.,  103  Ind.  44:  Jackson  v. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Mo. 
422;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hine,  25  Ohio  St.  629.  Cases  favor- 
ing liberal  construction  in  addition 
to  these  noted  in  text  are,  Lam- 
phear  v.  Buckingham,  33  Conn.  237; 
Soule  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  24 
Conn.  575;  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Shacklett,  10  111.  App.  404; 
Merkle  v.  Bennington  Twp.,  58 
Mich.  156;  24  N".  W.  776;  Bolinger 
v.  St.    Paul   &  D.   R.    Co.,  36  Minn. 


DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 


§504 


§  504.    Death— Conflict   of   laws— Extraterritorial   juris- 
diction-Foreign administrator— Federal  jurisdiction.— It  is 

decided  in  several  cases  that  the  test  whether  an  action  for  the 
loss  occasioned  by  a  negligent  killing  can  be  maintained  in  an- 
other jurisdiction  than  that  in  which  the  death  occurred,  depends 
upon  whether  the  action  is  contrary  to  the  public  policy  of  the 
state  whose  jurisdiction  is  invoked  or  inconsistent  with  its  laws; 
if  not,  the  action  lies.  But  the  complaint  must  aver  the  ex- 
istence in  such  other  state  of  a  statute  similar  to  that  of  the 


418,  421;  31  N.  W.  856;  Haggerty  v. 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  L.  (2  Vr.) 
349,  350;  Murphy  v.  Board  of  Cb. 
F.  28  Vr.  (N.  J.  L.)  244,  250;  Lang  v. 
Houston  St.,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  151;  58  N.  Y.  St.  R.  504;  27 
N.  Y.  Supp.  90,  case  aff'd  144  N.  Y. 
717;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  8G8;  39  N.  E. 
858;  Beach  v.  Bay  State  Steamboat 
Co.,  6  Abb.  (X.  Y.)  415;  27  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)248;  10  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  1, 
case  rev'd  10  Abb.  (X.  Y.)  71;  30 
Barb.  (N.  V. )  433;  18  How.  (N.  Y.)  335. 
Examine  further  Eustace  v.  Jahns, 
38  Cal.  3;  Burns  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  I. 
R.  Co.,  113  Ind.  169;  15  N.  E.  230. 
See  further  upon  the  general  con- 
struction of  statutes  the  following 
cases:  Sees.  420  and  422  of  the  Kan- 
sas Civ.  Code  must  be  construed 
in  pari  materia,  and  sec.  422  is 
exclusive.  Martin  v.  Missouri,  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Kan.  475;  49  Pac.  005;  7 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  576;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  105,  107,  citing  McCarthy 
v.  Rd.  Co.,  18  Kan.  40.  The  La.  Civ. 
Code,  art.  2315,  relating  to  survival 
of  the  right  of  action  in  case  of  death 
in  favor  of  the  minor  children,  etc., 
for  the  space  of  one  year  from  the 
death,  applies  to  acts  of  commission 
as  well  as  omission:  American  Sug. 
Ref.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (U.  S.  C  C.  A. 
5th  C),  60  Fed.  503.  As  to  the  ap- 
plication of  the  Ark.  statutes  to 
Indian  Territory  under  act  of  con- 
gress, May    2,   1890,    Anlmore    Coal 


Co.   v.  Bevil  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C), 

61  Fed.  757. 

20  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 

62  Ark.  254;  35  S.  W.  225;  Weaver  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (D.  C),  21 
Wash.  L.  Rep.  179;  Law  v.  Western 
R.  of  Ala.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  Ga.),  91  Fed. 
817;  Burns  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R. 
Co.,  (Ind.);  15  X.  E.  230;  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Snivell,  13  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
902;  18  S.  W.  944:  Higgins  v.  Cen- 
tral N.  Eng.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Mass.)  ; 
48  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  212;  29  N.  E. 
534;  Nicholas  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  & 
N.  R.  Co.,  (Minn.)  ;  80  X.  W.  776; 
Van  Doren  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  3d  C.  N.  J.),  35  C. 
C.  A.  282;  93  Fed.  200;  13  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  577;  Davidow 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
I).  X.  Y.),  85  Fed.  943;  Kiefer  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  12  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  28,  aff'd  153  X.  Y.  688;  Nel- 
son v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.;  88 
Va.  971;  14  S.  E.  838;  16  Va.  L.  J. 
255;  15  L.  R.  A.  583;  11  Ry.  A-  Corp. 
L.  J.  245.  See  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rouse,  78  111.  App.  280,  aff'd 
178  111.  132;  52  X.  E.  '.'51;  44  L.  R.  A. 
410;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  706; 
5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  549,  citing  numer- 
ous cases;  Stewart  v.  Baltimore  & 
<>.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  Sup.  C.  D.  C.i,  L68 
U.  S.  445;  42  L.  Ed  537;  L8  Sup.  Ct. 
in:,:  25  Wash.  L.  Rep.  81  t;  3  Va.  L. 
Reg.  045,  rev'g  6  App.  I).  C.  56.  It 
is  held   in  this  decision  that  while, 

591 


§504 


DEATH — CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 


state  where  the  suit  is  brought.21  But  the  fact  that  the  statutes 
of  the  two  states  differ  in  some  particulars,22  or  that  a  different 
law  of  distribution  may  prevail  in  other  jurisdictions,  does  not 
preclude  the  right  to  sue.23  The  Ohio  statute24  authorizes  a 
suit  in  its  courts  by  an  administrator  appointed  in  another 
state,  subject  to  the  same  restriction  as  applies  to  a  nonresident, 


under  the  Maryland-  statute  author- 
izing the  survival  of  the  right  of  ac- 
tion, the  state  is  the  proper  plaintiff 
and  the  jury  trying  the  cause  is  to 
apportion  the  damages  recovered, 
and  under  the  act  of  congress  in 
force  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
the  proper  plaintiff  is  the  personal 
representative  of  the  deceased,  and 
the  damages  recovered  are  distrib- 
uted by  law,  these  differences  are 
not  sufficient  to  render  the  statutes 
of  Maryland  inconsistent  with  the 
act  of  congress,  or  the  public  policy 
of  the  District  of  Columbia.  It  is 
also  decided  in  the  same  case  that 
the  purpose  of  the  several  statutes 
passed  in  the  states  in  more  or  less 
conformity  to  what  is  known  as  Lord 
Campbell's  act,  is  to  provide  the 
means  for  recovering  the  damages 
caused  by  that  which  is  in  its  nature 
a  tort,  and  where  such  a  statute 
simply  takes  away  a  common-law 
obstacle  to  a  recovery  for  the  tort, 
an  action  for  that  tort  can  be  main- 
tained in  any  state  in  which  that 
common-law  obstacle  has  been  re- 
moved when  the  statute  of  the  state 
in  which  the  cause  of  action  arose  is 
not,  in  substance,  inconsistent  with 
the  statutes  or  public  policy  of  the 
state  in  which  the  right  of  action  is 
Bought  to  be  enforced.  The  same 
coui't  also  holds  that  the  supreme 
court  of  the  District  of  Columbia 
has  jurisdiction  of  an  action,  sound- 
ing in  tort,  brought  by  the  adminis- 
trator of  a  deceased  person  against 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
Company,    to   recover   damages   for 

592 


the  benefit  of  the  widow  of  the  de- 
ceased by  reason  of  his  being  killed 
by  a  collision  which  took  place  while 
he  was  travelling  on  that  railroad  in 
the  State  of  Maryland.  In  Texas  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox  (Tex.),  145  U.S. 
593;  36  L.  Ed.  829;  12  Sup.  Ct.  905, 
it  is  held  that  a  cause  of  action 
founded  upon  a  statute  of  one  state, 
conferring  the  right  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  injury  resulting  in  death, 
may  be  enforced  in  a  court  of  the 
United  States  sitting  in  another  state 
if  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  stat- 
utes or  public  policy  of  the  state  in 
which  the  right  of  action  is  sought 
to  be  enforced.  This  cause  of  action 
founded  upon  the  statute  of  Louisi- 
ana, conferring  such  right,  is  en- 
forceable in  Texas,  notwithstanding 
the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  that 
state,  referred  to  in  the  opinion  of 
this  case,  those  cases  being  in  con- 
struction of  the  statute  of  Texas  on 
that  subject,  and  not  applicable  to 
the  Louisiana  statute.  See  also  ci- 
tations of  this  case  in  3  Russell  & 
Winslow's  Syl.  Dig.  U.  S.  p.  3922. 

-1Kahl  v.  Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
(Ala.),  10  So.  661.  But  see  Jackson 
v.  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
(Ind.),  39  N.  E.  663;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  14  Ohio 
C.  C.  564. 

22  Nelson  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  88  Va.  971,  14  S.  E.  838;  16  Va. 
L.  J.  255;  15  L.  R.  A.  583;  11  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.  J.  245. 

2:5  Weaver  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  (D.  C),  21  Wash.  L.  Rep.  174. 

2*Rev.   Stat.  sees.   6133,  6134a. 


DEATH       CONFLICT    <•!•"    LAWS. 


and  also  gives  a  right  of  action  in  that  state  even  though  accru- 
ing under  the  laws  of  another  state,  upon  the  general  principle 
of  comity,  that  is,  in  cases  where  such  other  state  would  permit 
the  enforcement  in  its  courts  of  a  statute  of  Ohio  of  like  char- 
acter. Therefore  an  administrator  appointed  in  Indiana  may  sue 
in  Ohio  for  the  intestate's  death  occasioned  in  Indiana."'  But 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  merely  show  that  the  courts  of  such  other 
state  entertain  actions  for  death.36  In  Georgia  a  dependent 
mother's  right  of  action  is  not  confined  to  resident  mothers." 
And  the  Illinois  courts  will  not  refuse  to  enforce  another  state's 
statute  abolishing  the  fellow-servant  rule  in  a  suit  for  the  death 
of  one  of  its  own  citizens  occurring  in  such  foreign  state,  where 
such  action  is  brought  by  one  of  its  own  citizens  against  a  cor- 
poration in  its  own  state.*  So  in  Indiana  a  foreign  administra- 
tor may  sue  for  wrongful  death  occasioned  in  Indiana  even 
though  in  the  state  where  the  intestate  resided  there  is  no  stat- 
ute  giving  a  right  of  action  in  similar  cases.'8  Again,  the  rem- 
edy under  the  Kentucky  statute  ;o  is  not  restricted  to  personal 
representatives  appointed  in  said  state,  nor  to  deceased  persons 
who  were  citizens  or  residents  thereof.11  And  an  administrator 
appointed  in  that  state  may  sue  for  killing  the  intestate  in  Ten- 
nessee, although  the  statutes  differ  in  some  respects."2  But  the 
damages  recovered  in  Kentucky  will  go  to  the  widow  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Illinois  statute  where  the  death  was  occasioned.*5 
In  Louisiana'54  an  action  for  an  employee's  death  may  be  brought 


25  Cincinnati  H.  &  D.  K.  Co.  v.  Thie- 
band  (U.  S.  C.  C.  App.  6th  C),  114 
Fed.  918. 

•^Wabash  K.  Co.  v.  Fox,  04  Ohio 
St.  133;  59  X.  E.  888: 9  Am.  Nog.  Rep. 
593. 

27  Augusta  K.  Co.  v.  Glover  (Ga.), 
18  S.  E.  400. 

^Chicago  v.  E.  I.  K.  v.  Rouse,  178 
111.  V.V2:  52  N.  E.  951;44  I,.  R.  A.  HO; 
12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  <  as.  \.  s.  706;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  549,  aff'g  78  111.  A.pp. 
286.  The  court  said  in  this  caBe: 
"  Actions  not.  penal  lint  lor  pecuniary 
damages  for  torts  in  civil  injuries  to 
the  person  or  property  are  transitory 
and  if  actionable   when   committed. 

38 


in  general  may  he  maintained  in  any 
jurisdiction  in  which  the  defendant 
can  be  legally  served  with  process." 

29 Memphis  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v. 
Pikey,  (Ind.)  :  40  N.  E.  527,  under 
Ind.  Rev.  Stat.   1881,  sec.  284. 

31  Ch.  57,  p.  550. 

!l  Marvin  v.  Marysville  St.  R.  <fe 
Tr.  Co.  (IT.  S.  C.  C.  Ky.),  49  Fed. 
436. 

82Wintnska  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.,  14  Ky.  L.  Rep.  579:  20  S.  W. 
819. 

^McDonald  v.  McDonald,  16  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  412;  28  S.  W.  482. 

M  Under  Code  Prac.  art.  105.  par.  9. 

593 


§  505  DEATH — CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 

in  any  parish  where  the  damage  is  done.35  So  in  Missouri  a 
citizen  thereof  may  be  sued  by  a  foreign  administrator  for  caus- 
insr  a  wrongful  death  of  another  in  the  state  of  the  latter' s  domi- 
cile  without  joining  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the  suit  is 
prosecuted.36 

§505.  Same  subject  continued.  —  An  administrator  ap- 
pointed in  New  Jersey  and  a  citizen  thereof  may  sue  a  citizen 
of  another  state  in  a  Federal  court  in  the  latter  state.37  So  unless 
the  statute  restricts  the  right  of  action  to  causes  of  death  occa- 
sioned within  the  state,  the  place  of  death  cannot  affect  the  right 
to  sue.38  And  where  injuries  causing  the  death  were  sustained 
without  the  state,  an  administrator  appointed  in  New  York  may 
sue  a  foreign  corporation  under  a  complaint  showing  such  for- 
eign statute  to  be  of  similar  import  even  though  not  exactly  the 
same  in  character;  bat  it  need  not  be  shown  that  letters  were 
taken  out  in  the  state  of  the  death,  nor  need  it  be  alleged  that  the 
intestate  could  have  maintained  the  action  except  for  the  death.3" 
But  although  the  administrator  of  a  person  killed  on  a  British 
ship  on  the  high  seas  may  bring  his  action  in  New  York,  yet  it 
is  subject  to  the  time  limit  of  the  British  statute  barring  the 
right  to  sue.40  Again,  an  action  for  a  personal  injury  sustained 
in  Indiana,  pending  in  the  United  States  circuit  court  for  Ohio, 
does  not  abate  upon  such  part)T's  death,  but  may  be  prosecuted 
by  his  administrator  appointed  in  Ohio.41  And  it  is  decided  that 
the  right  of  action  arises  out  of  the  death  and  in  the  state  of  its 


35  Castillo  v.  Caffery  Cent.  R.  &  R. 
Co.,  48  La.  Am.  322;  19  So.  332.  See 
Campbell  v.  Rio  Grande  W.  R.  Co., 
16  Utah,  346;  52  Pac.  594,  under  Utah 
Const,  art.  8,  sec.  5. 

se  Wilson  v.  Tootle  ( U.  S.  C.  C.  W. 
D.  Mo. ),  55  Fed.  211,  under  Mo.  Code 
Civ.  Proc.  sec.  1991.  See  Riley  v. 
Grand  Island  Receivers,  72  Mo.  App. 
280. 

37McCarty  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 
R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  X.  Y.),  62  Fed. 
437;  Rev.  Stat.  N.  J.  p.  294,  sec.  2. 
See  as  to  averment  of  the  right  to  sue 
Davidow  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  S.  D.  N.  Y. ),  85  Fed.  943. 

594 


38  Van  Doren  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  3d  C.  N.  J.),  35  C.  C. 
282;  93  Fed.  200;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  577,  and  cases  cited. 

39  Gurney  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
37  N.  Y.  St.  R.  557;  59  Hun  (N.  Y.). 
625;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  645.  See  as  to 
allegation  of  statute  and  of  place  of 
death,  Debevoise  v.  New  York,  L.  E. 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  377. 

40  Cavanagh  v.  Ocean  Steam  Nav. 
Co.,  19  Civ.  Proc.  (X.  Y.)  391;  13  N. 
Y.  Supp.  540. 

41  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Joy, 
173  U.  S.  226;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  387; 
43  L.  Ed  .  677;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  760. 


DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS.  §506 

occurrence  and  not  from  the  appointment  of  the  administrator.42 
In  Tennessee  it  is  decided  that  although  the  husband  was  a  non- 
resident and  entered  into  his  contract  of  employment  in  a  for- 
eign state,  nevertheless,  the  widow  may  sue  in  said  state  for 
personal  injuries  occurring  in  Tennessee  and  occasioning  his 
death.43  So  although  the  persons  entitled  to  sue  are  different 
in  Canada  and  Vermont  and  the  death  occurs  in  Canada,  never- 
theless suit  may  be  maintained  in  Vermont."  Again,  the  stat- 
ute dots  not  restrict  the  action  to  the  administrator  of  the  state 
where  the  statute  exists.4"'  Nor  is  a  right  of  action  precluded 
where  death  occurs  within  the  state,  although  the  injury  oc- 
casioning the  same  occurred  outside  of  said  state,  where  the 
statute  so  provides.* 

§  506.  Death — Conflict  of  Laws — Lex  loci — Lex  fori.— In 

an  action  by  the  representatives  of  a  railroad  employee  against 
the  company  to  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  the  employee, 
caused  by  an  accident  while  in  its  employ,  which  is  tried  in  a 
different  state  from  that  in  which  the  contract  of  employment 
was  made  and  in  which  the  accident  took  place,  the  right  to 
recover  and  the  limit  of  the  amount  of  the  judgment  are  gov- 
erned by  the  lex  loci,  and  not  by  the  lex  fori.i:  But  where  a 
suit  is  brought  in  one  state  for  death  by  negligence,  etc..  under 
the  statute  of  another  state,  and  the  law  of  the  latter  fails  to 
prescribe  the  time  limitation  for  suing,  then  the  statute  of  the 
former  state  governs  in  this  respect. 4S  Again,  the  law  of  the 
province  of  Ontario  determines  the  right  of  recovery  in  a  fed- 
eral court  of  admiralty  in  case  of  death    from  collision   upon  a 

*»Lung  Chung   \.    Northern  P.   R.  O.  R.  Co.,  94  Wis.  L91;  68N.W.  661; 

Co.  <lT.  S.  I).  ('.  Or.  |,  1!)  Fed.  254.  6  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  50,  under 

4;  Chesapeake.  C.  &  S.  W.  R.  <  '<>.  v.  Sanb.  &   B.    Wis.    An  not.    Stat.    sec. 

Higgius,   85   Tenn.    620;  4  S.  W.  47.  4255. 

Sec  Mexican  C.  R.  Co.   v.  Goodman,       "Northern    Pac.     K.    Co.   v.   Hah 

20Tex.  Civ.  App.  104:  48  S.  W.  778.  cock,  154  V .  S.   190;  38    I-   Ed.  958; 

"  Boston*  M.   K.  Co.  v.  McDuffey  44  Sup.  Ct.  Hep.  978.     See  2  RusBell 

(U.  S.  C  C.  A.  Vt.),  25  C.  C.  A.  -.'IT:  &  Winslow's  Syl.  Dig.  V.  S.  p.  2920, 

Tit  Fed.  934.  for  citations  of  this  case. 


« Hodges  v.  Kind. all  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
A.  Va.),  34  C.  C.  A.  10:',;  01  Fed.  845, 
rev'g  Lusk's  Ad  mis.  v.  Kimball,  87 


48  Munus  v.  Southern  P.  R.  <o. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C.i.  •_'  C.  s.  App. 
222;    :,1    Vod.    188.      See  Theronx   v. 


Fed.  545.  Northern   P.    R.  <",.    (U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 

*«Rudiger  v.  Chicago.  St.  1'.    M.  &    srh  C.  |,  12  C.  C.  A.  52;  64  Fed.  84. 

:,9.-» 


§506  DEATH —CONFLICT    OF  LAWS. 

vessel  in  Canadian  waters  on  the  Detroit  river.49  And  the  ques- 
tion of  revival  of  an  action  in  case  of  death  of  the  injured  party 
in  a  pending  suit  depends  upon  the  laws  of  the  jurisdiction 
where  the  action  was  commenced,  even  though  the  injury  oc- 
casioning the  death  occurred  in  another  state.50  So  where  a 
railroad  employee  was  killed  in  Canada,  the  law  of  that  country 
allowing  recovery  in  case  of  death  occasioned  by  the  negligence 
of  a  fellow  servant  governs,  rather  than  the  law  of  Vermont, 
which  precludes  liability  in  such  case,  and  the  Canadian  law, 
as  to  the  beneficiaries  entitled,  governs  instead  of  the  Vermont 
law  under  which  the  action  was  brought/'1  But  the  burden  of 
proof  and  the  amount  of  evidence  requisite  is  controlled  by  the 
law  of  the  forum.52  Again,  while  the  lex  loci  governs  the  right 
of  recovery,  and  lex  fori  the  mode  of  procedure,  yet  the  New 
York  Code, a  under  which  interest  is  allowed,  relates  to  the  right 
of  recovery,  so  that  the  lex  fori  does  not  apply  to  an  action  for 
death  occurring  without  the  state,54  although  the  limitation 
of  the  amount  recoverable  under  the  statute  of  the  state  wherein 
the  suit  is  brought  operates  to  limit  the  damages  even  though  the 
death  occurred  in  another  state,  having  no  such  limitation.51' 
And  where  one  was  killed  from  falling  overboard  from  a  British 
steamer,  within  two  miles  from  the  shore  of  the  United  States  of 
Columbia,  the  laws  of  the  latter  and  not  those  of  the  former 
country,  govern.56  It  is  decided,  however,  that  although  a  person 
is  a  citizen  of  another  state,  yet  the  laws  of  the  state  where  the 
negligence  and  consequent  death  occurred,  governs,  and  this, 
notwithstanding  those  entitled  to  the  damages  are  also  citizens 
of  the  foreign  state.57     So  where  a  railway  employee  received 


49  Robinson  v.  Detroit  &  C.  S.  Xav. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  6th  C),  43  U.  S. 
App.  191;  73  Fed.  883. 

50  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Joy, 
173  U.  S.  226;  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  387; 
43  L.  Ed.  677:  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  760. 

5i  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  McDuf- 
fey  (LT.  S.  C.  C.  A.  2d  C.),51  U.  S. 
App.  Ill;  25  C.  C.  A.  247:  79  Fed.  934. 

m  Geohegan  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  3 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  224;  51  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
868:  22  X.  Y.  Supp.  749.  See  note 
56  post. 

596 


53  Civ.  Proc.  sees.  1902,  1904. 

64  Kiefer  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
12  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  28;  42  X.  Y. 
Supp.  171 ;  26  Civ.  Proc.  147. 

65  Wooden  v.  Western  X.  Y.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  126  X.  Y.  10;  36  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
387,  aff'g  35  X.  Y.  St.  R.  686. 

5j  Geohegan  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  3 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  224;  51  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
868;  22  X.  Y.  Supp.  749.  6  Misc.  127. 
case  aff'd  146  X.  Y.  636,  40  X.  E. 
507. 

57  Davidow  v,  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 


DEATH       <  l  >N  !  I.l<  "i    I  IF    LAWS.  §  507 

his  injury  in   Iowa,  the  laws  of  that  state,  as  construed  therein, 

are  to  be  followed  and  construed  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the 
courts  of  said  state,  even  though  suit  is  brought  in  .1  Minnesota 
court."  lint  it  is  determined  that  the  laws  of  Indiana  where 
the  action  is  brought  controls  where  the  wrong  was  committed, 
on  the  Ohio  river  between  Indiana  and  Kentucky,""  although 
where  the  cause  of  action  arose  in  a  foreign  state,  by  the  laws 
of  which  it  is  barred,  it  cannot  be  amended  alter  such  limita- 
tion under  the  Michigan  statute  as  to  death."  Again,  the  laws 
of  the  Island  of  Trinidad  do  not  govern  an  action  for  the  death 
of  an  employee  upon  a  British  ship  registered  in  England  and 
owned  and  navigated  by  a  Canadian  corporation,  since  such 
vessel  is  English  territory.'11 

§  507.  Death— Conflict  of  laws— Foreign  administrator 
Party  in  interest— Federal  jurisdiction  -Opinions  in  recent 
decisions. — It  is  decided  in  a  Federal  case  in  the  circuit  court 
of  Ohio*''  that  a  foreign  administrator  may  in  that  state  main- 
tain an  action  under  its  statute  m  for  death  by  wrongful  act,  and 
that  the  administrator  is  not  merely  a  nominal  party,  but  the 
real  party,  and  may  bring  an  action  in  the  Federal  courts  not- 
withstanding the  beneficiaries  reside  in  another  state,  namely 
that  of  the  death.  In  this  decision,  Thompson.  Dist.  J.,  said: 
''This  cause  is  submitted  to  the  court  upon  a  demurrer  to  the 
petition  upon  the  ground  that  it  does  not  appear  therefrom  that 
the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  action.  1.  It  is  said  that,  for 
aught  that  appears  in  the  petition,  the  plaintiff  may  have  been 
appointed  administratrix  in  a  foreign  country,  or  in  some  state 
of  the  Union  other  than  Ohio,  and  that  under  section  6133  of 
the  Revised  Statutes  of  Ohio,  a  foreign  administrator  cannot 
maintain  an  'action  for  death  caused  by  wrongful  act '  under  sec- 
tions 6134,   6134a,   and  613")    of  said   statutes.      This   claim  is 


(U,  S.    C.   C.    S.    D.    N.    Y.  1.  85    Fed. 
943. 
68  Njus  v.  Chicago,  st.  P.  &   M.  R. 


•J  Dupont  v.  Quebec  S.  s.  Co.,  Rap. 
.1  ihI.  Quebec,  11  S.  C.  188.  See  Wil- 
son v.  The  John  Ritson,  •">■">  Fed.  6(53. 


Co.,  47  Minn.  22;  49  N.  VV.  527.  G-  Popp  v.  Cincinnati.   II.  &  D.    K. 


69  Memphis  &  C.  P.  C.  v.  Pikey 
(lnd.),  40  N.  E.  527. 

w  How.  Mich.  Stat.  sees.  8313, 
8314;  Wingert  v.  Carpenter  (Midi.), 
59  S.  W.  662. 


Co.  (U.  s-  C.  C.  S.  D.  Ohio),  9(1  Fed 
465. 

«•  Kev.  Stat.  sec.  6133-6134.1,  6135. 


597 


§  507  DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 

based  upon  a  construction  of  section  6133,  which  would  exclude 
actions  for  wrongful  death  as  not  being  brought  by  the  foreign 
executor  or  administrator '  in  his  capacity,'  of  executor  or  adminis- 
trator because  any  damages  recovered  in  such  action  would  not 
become  assets,  of  the  estate,  but  would  be  apportioned  among  the 
wife,  husband,  children  or  next  of  kin  of  the  deceased.  I  do  not 
think  this  construction  sound.  I  think  the  manifest  intention  of 
the  legislature  was  to  allow  foreign  executors  and  administrators 
to  prosecute  any  action  which  might  be  prosecuted  by  an  executor 
or  administrator  appointed  in  this  state,  '  in  like  manner  and 
under  like  restrictions  as  a  nonresident  may  be  permitted  to 
sue.'6'  2.  It  is  said  that  the  beneficiaries  under  the  statute  are 
the  real  parties  in  interest,  and  that  Federal  jurisdiction,  based 
upon  diverse  citizenship,  has  relation  to  the  citizenship  of  the 
real  parties  in  interest,  and  not  to  that  of  mere  nominal  parties  ; 
that  the  plaintiff  is  a  mere  nominal  party,  and  for  aught  that  ap- 
pears in  the  petition,  the  other  beneficiary  may  be  a  citizen  of 
Ohio  and,  therefore,  jurisdiction  not  appearing  upon  the  faee  of 
the  petition,  the  action  must  be  dismissed.  The  plaintiff,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  is  not  a  mere  nominal  party.  She  is  a  real 
party  so  far  as  the  prosecution  of  the  suit  is  concerned.  It  is 
not  a  case  where  the  suit  is  being  prosecuted  in  the  name  of 
somebody  else,  where  the  party  actively  conducting  the  litiga- 
tion is  doing  it  in  the  name  of  the  state,  in  the  name  of  a  next 
friend  or  the  like,  but  it  is  a  case  where  the  administratrix  is 
the  active  party  in  the  prosecution  of  the  suit,  who  institutes 
it,  carries  it  on,  and,  with  the  sanction  of  the  court,  may  com- 
promise or  dismiss  it.  She  has  absolute  control  of,  and  is  re- 
sponsible for,  the  conduct  of  the  case.65     In  the  Stewart  case™  the 


64  Duchesse  D'Auxy  v.  Porter,  41 
Fed.  68;  Noonan  v.  Bradley,  9  Wall. 
394,  403. 

65  Harper  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Fed. 
102;  Coal  Co.  v.  Blatchford,  11  Wall. 


(U.  S.)  164:  Bonnafee  v.  Williams, 
3  How.  574;  Osborn  v.  Bank,  9 
Wheat.  (U.  S.)  738;  Irvine  v.  Lowrey, 
14  Pet.  298;  Ptice  v.  Houston,  13 
Wall.   (U.  S.)66;  Davis  v.  Gray,  16 


172;  Knapp  v.  Railroad  Co.,  20  Wall.  (U.  S. )  220:  Florida  v.  Ander- 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  117;  Chappedelaine  v.  j  son,  91  U.  S.  67(5;  Walden  v.  Skinner, 
Dechmaux,  4  Cranch  (U.  S.),  306:  101  U.  S.  589;  Davies  v.  Lathrop,  12 
Childress  v.  Emory,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  Fed.  353;  Shirk  v.  City  of  La  Fay- 
642;  Clarke    v.    Mathewson,   12   Pet.  '  ette,  52  Fed.  857;  Reinach  v.  Railroad 


66  168  U.  S.  445;  IS  Sup.  Ct.  105. 


598 


DEATH      CONFLICT    OF    LAWS.  £  507 

question  was  whether  a  cause  of  action  arising  in  Maryland 
could  be  sued  upon  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  owing  to  the 
peculiarities  of  the  Maryland  statute  requiring  suits  to  be  broughl 
in  the  name  of  the  state.  It  was  not  a  question  of  Federal  juris- 
diction, and  the  court  held  that,  the  state  of  Maryland  not  being 
the  beneficiary  of  the  fruits  of  the  litigation,  the  Buit  might  be 
brought  in  the  District  of  Columbia  by  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  the  deceased.  The  case  is  thus  stated  in  the  Digest : 
•  An  action  for  death  caused  by  negligence  in  Maryland,  where 
the  statute  provides  for  an  action  in  the  name  of  the  state  as 
nominal  plaintiff,  but  for  the  benefit  of  certain  prescribed  heirs, 
is  not  such  a  special  remedy  for  a  purely  statutory  right  of  ac- 
tion as  will  prevent  the  maintenance  of  an  action  by  the  ad- 
ministrator in  the  District  of  Columbia,  where  the  statutes  pro- 
vide for  actions  by  personal  representatives  in  such  cases  for  the 
benefit  of  certain  prescribed  heirs,  although  the  beneficiaries  may 
not  be  exactly  the  same  under  the  two  statutes.' (i7  In  suits  by 
the  state  on  relation  of  A.  B.  or  by  a  next  friend,  the  state  and 
the  next  friend  are  not  real  parties,  in  the  sense  that  they  con- 
trol the  litigation ;  but  executors,  administrators,  trustees,  etc., 
although  they  have  no  personal  interest  in  the  fruits  of  the  liti- 
gation, yet  are  real  parties  in  the  sense  that  they  control,  and 
are  responsible  for  the  litigation.  The  demurrer  will  be  over- 
ruled." In  another  decision  in  the  United  States  circuit  court 
in  Washington  the  opinion  is  as  follows  :  "  The  demurrer  to  the 
complaint  in  this  case  raises  the  question  whether  the  adminis- 
trator of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  in  the  state  of  Washing- 
ton can  maintain  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  a  personal 
injury  to  his  decedent  causing  death,  the  injury  being  committed 
in  Alaska,  and  there  being  no  widow  or  children  of  the  deceased 
to  benefit  by  the  recovery.  The  complaint  in  this  case  contains 
no  allegation  that  the  deceased  person,  of  whose  estate  the  plain- 
tiff is  administrator,  left  surviving  him  any  widow  or  children, 
and  presumably  there  are  no  such  relatives.  As  the  laws  of 
this  state  do  not  authorize  an  action  by  an  administrator  to  re- 
cover damages  for  the  infliction  of  an  injury  causing  death,  ex- 
Co.,  58  Fed.  33;  Morris  v.  Lindauer,  i  v.  Smith.  24  C.  C.  A.  145:  78  Fed. 
4  C.  C.  A.  1G2;  54  Fed.  2:5;  Bangs  v.  399. 
Loveridge,  60  Fed.  963;  Pennington  '      67  4  l.  Co-op.  U.  S.  Dig.  p.  59. 

599 


§508  DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 

cept  for  the  benefit  of  the  immediate  family,  that  is,  wife  and 
children  of  the  deceased,"8  it  is  insisted  that  the  plaintiff  has  no 
right  to  maintain  the  action.  If  the  injury  complained  of  had 
been  inflicted  in  this  state,  the  defendant  would  be  certainly 
right  in  the  position  it  has  taken,  but  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  wrong  was  committed  must  determine  the  rights  of 
the  parties.69  The  laws  of  the  state  of  Oregon,  which  by  an  act 
of  congress  have  been  adopted  as  laws  of  Alaska,  confer  upon 
the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  person  a  right  of  ac- 
tion to  recover  damages  for  the  wrongful  act  or  omission  of  an- 
other, causing  death,  in  cases  in  which  the  deceased,  if  he  had 
lived,  might  have  maintained  an  action  for  the  injury  to  him- 
self, by  the  same  act  or  omission.  The  serious  question  in  the 
case  is  whether  this  statute  creates  any  right  in  favor  of  per- 
sonal representatives  residing  and  acting  beyond  the  limits 
within  which  the  laws  of  Alaska  have  force,  and  whose  authority 
to  represent  the  deceased  does  not  spring  from  the  laws-  of 
Alaska.  I  consider,  however,  that  the  question  is  practically  set- 
tled in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  decisions  of  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  in  cases  of  Dennick  v.  Railroad 
Co.,7n  and  Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.,'1  and  upon  the  authority  of 
these  decisions  I  will  overrule  the  demurrer.7- 

§  508.  Death — Conflict  of  laws — Foreign  administrator — 
Extraterritorial  jurisdiction —Where  action  does  not  lie — 
Federal  jurisdiction. — In  Alabama  the  law  has  no  extraterritorial 
force  and  although  the  death  occurred  and  the  action  is  brought  in 
the  state  having  the  statute,  such  law  does  not  apply  where  the 
wrongful  act  causing  the  death  was  committed  in  another  state.73 
So  where,  by  the  law  of  Maryland,  an  action  must  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  state  for  the  use  of  the  beneficiaries,  no  re- 
covery can  be  had  in  another  jurisdiction,  and  the  United  States 
statutes 74  do  not  include  death  in  Maryland,  so  as  to  permit  a 


68  Noble    v.     City   of    Seattle,    19 
Wash.  133;  52  Pac.  1013. 

69  Railroad     Co.    v.    Babcock,    154 
U.  S.  190,  203;  14  Sup.  Ct.  978. 

*>  103  U.  S.  11-21. 
™  168   U.   S.   445-450;  18  Sup.   Ct. 
105. 

600 


72  Erickson  v.  Pacific  Coast  Steam- 
ship Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Wash.  W. 
D. ),  96  Fed.  80,  per  Hanford,  Dist.  J. 

73  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 113  Ala.  402;  21  So.  938. 

7*  23  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  p.  307,  ch.  126; 
Acts  Cong.  February  17,  1885. 


DEATH      CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 


§  508 


recovery  by  the  administrator  of  a  resident  <>f  the  District  of 
Columbia,  to  which  the  said  statute  only  applies  as  bo  casualties 
within  its  borders. r'  Again,  an  administrator  of  Missouri  has 
no  standing  in  the  Federal  courts  of  Kansas,"'1  and  the  theory  of 
the  law  in  Kansas  differs  from  that  in  New  Mexico  in  relation 
to  the  recovery  for  death  losses,  m  that  ld  the  former  state  it 
is  compensatory,  while  in  the  latter  it  is  strictly  penal,  so  that 
the  law  that  penal  statutes  have  no  extraterritorial  force  applied 
to  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  New  Mexico  enactment  in  Kansas.7' 
So  if  the  statute  is  a  penal  one,  the  Federal  courts  of  another 
state  will  not  entertain  jurisdiction,78  and  it  is  decided  in  Mary- 
land that  the  courts  of  a  state  other  than  that  where  the  acci- 
dent occurred,  causing  the  death,  cannot  entertain  jurisdiction.7,1 
Again,  where  a  cause  of  action  accrues  in  Minnesota,  a  Missouri 
appointee  cannot  sue  in  the  former  state,  but  the  administrator 
of  Minnesota  can  in  such  case  sue  in  Missouri.80  And  where  a 
declaration  under  the  Pennsylvania  statute  shows  the  widow  to 
be  entitled,  and  such  enactment  requires  her  to  bring  the  action 
instead  of  the  personal  representative,  the  complaint  is  demur- 
rable,81 for  an  administratrix  appointed  under  the  New  Jersey 
statute  cannot  sue  for  death  by  negligence  in  the  former  state/-' 
So  under  a  Federal  decision  an  administrator  cannot  maintain  an 
action  under  the  statute  of  and  in  another  state,*'  and  the  statute 


75  Stewart  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  (D.  C.  App.),  23  Wash.  L.  Rep. 
247.  See  Stone  v.  Grotore  Bridge 
&  Mfg.  Co.,  77  Hun  (N.  Y.),  99;  59 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  53;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  445. 

76  Hurlburt  v.  City  of  Topeka  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  Kan.),  34  Fed.  510;  Lime- 
killer  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  .1.  R.  Co., 
33  Kan.  83;  5  Pac.  401,  under  1  Rev. 
Stat.  Mo.  1S70,  sees.  2121,  96,  and 
Comp.  L.  Kau.  1879,  sec.  422. 

77  Dale  v.  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.,  57  Kan.  601;  47  Pac.  521;  14 
Nat.  Corp.  Cas.  34;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
46,  and  note,  p.  47.  See  Adams  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.  (Vt.),  30  Atl.  687; 
Matheson  v.  Kansas  City,  Fr.  S.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  61  Kan.  667;  60  Pac.  747,  un- 
der Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1889,  sec.  4425; 


St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
62  Ark.  254;  35  S.  W.  225;  Russell  v. 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  113  Cal.  258;  45  Pac 
323;  34  L.  R.  A.  747;  12  Nat.  Corp. 
R.  650;  Lew.r  v.  Segal,  59  N.  .1.  L. 
(30  Vr.)  66;  34  Atl.  945. 

-  Marshall  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  Ohio),  46  Fed.  269. 

"'  Ash  v.  Bait.  &  O.  K.  Co.,  72  Md. 
144;  lit  Atl.  64:5;  7  Rd.  &  Corp.  L.  J. 
50!);  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  461. 

»  Wilson  v.  Tootle  (TJ.  S.  C.  C.  W. 
I).  Mo. ).  55  Fed.  I'll:  Mo.  Act, 
April  20,  1891. 

81  Lower  v.  Segal,  60  N.  Y.  I,.  99; 
36  Atl.  777. 

"-  Lower  v.  Segal,  59  X.  J.  L.  (80 
Yr.)    66;  34  Atl.  945. 

m  Mackay  v.  Central  R.  Co.    (U.  S. 

601 


§508 


DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 


has  no  extraterritorial  force  as  to  an  injury  occurring  in  another 
state  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  a  similar  statute  in  such  for- 
eign jurisdiction.81  So  although  the  statute  ffi  gives  a  right  of 
action,  though  the  death  occurred  in  another  state,  neverthe- 
less, suit  cannot  be  maintained  for  the  death  of  an  employee 
where  he  could  not,  upon  the  proven  facts,  have  recovered  in 
such  foreign  jurisdiction.86  Nor  can  a  nonresident  alien  sue 
under  the  act  of  1855  of  Pennsylvania,87  and  a  recovery  can  be 
had  in  that  state  for  death  occurring  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction 
only  where  some  negligent  act  or  omission  in  the  former  state 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.83  Nor  will  the  statute 
of  a  foreign  jurisdiction  be  enforced,  in  Texas,  where  the  provi- 
sions of  the  enactment  are  dissimilar  ;ai  and  so,  even  though  the 
injury  occurred  in  another  state  and  the  death  within  Texas,  and 
the  defendant  railroad  company's  line  extends  into  another  coun- 
try or  state.90  Again,  in  an  action  under  9  and  10  Vict.  ch.  93, 
and.  27  and  28  Vict.  ch.  95,  where  the  death  of  a  person  occurred 
in  the  course  of  his  employment  on  board  a  steamer  belonging 
to  a  railway  company  during  the  passage  from  Milford  to  Water- 
ford,  it  was  alleged  that  the  boiler  explosion,  which  occasioned 
the  accident,  was  caused  by  the  corrosion  of  part  of  the  machin- 


C.  C.  N.  Y. ),  4  Fed.  617,  under  the 
acts  of  1847  and  1849.  If  the  injuries 
occasioning  death  are  inflicted  in 
another  state  even  though  done  by  a 
New  York  corporation,  an  action 
cannot  be  there  maintained.  Whit- 
ford  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  23  X.  Y. 
465,  aff'g  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  67;  Mahler 
v.  Norwich  &  N.  Y.  Trans.  Co.,  45 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  226;  30  How.  (N.  Y. ) 
237,  case  rev'd  35  N.  Y.  352;  Van 
Deventer  v.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R. 
Co.  See  Van  Derwerker  v.  Same,  27 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  244;  6  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  239. 

8*Debevoise  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W. 
R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  377. 

85  Rev.  Stats.  Ohio,  sec.  6134a. 

860ttv.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 
18  Ohio  Civ.  Ct.  R.  395;  10  O.  C.  D. 
85.  See  Campbell  v.  Rogers,  2  Handy 
(Ohio),  110. 

"Act  April  26,  1855  (F.  L.  309); 
602 


Deni  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  181  Pa. 
525 ;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  01 ;  contra  Veta- 
loro  v.  Perkins  (U.  S.  C.  C.  E.  D. 
Mass.),  101  Fed.  393,  per  Colt,  Cir.  J.; 
Mulhall  v.  Fallon,  176  Mass.  266;  57 
N.  E.  386. 

88  Derr  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co., 
158  Pa.  365;  33  W.  N.  C.  295;  27  Atl. 
1002. 

89  Belt  v.  Gulf  C.  &.  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22  S.  W.  1062,  under 
Mansfield's  Ark.  Dig.  sees.  5225,  5226, 
adopted  as  the  law  of  Indian  territory 
by  act  of  Congress,  May  2,  1890;  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  McCor- 
mick  (Tex.),  9  S.  W.  540. 

90  De  Ham  v.  Mexican  N.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22  S.  W.  249,  under 
Tex.  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2899;  S.  C,  86 
Tex.  68;  23  S.  W.  381;  7  Nat.  Corp. 
Rep.  350;  Belt  v.  Gulf  C.  <&  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22    S.  W.  1062. 


DEATH       CONFLICT    <  >!■'    LAW'--.  §  509 

ery,  and  that  the  process  of  corrosion  extended  overa  period  dur- 
inor  which  the  steamer  had  been  several  times  in  Ireland,  it  was 
decided  that  no  part  of  the  cause  of  action  was  shown  to  have 
arisen  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Irish  court.' 

§  509.  Death  Conflict  of  laws— Extraterritorial  juris- 
diction— Federal  jurisdiction— Mexican  laws.— The  statin. 
of  Mexico  giving  a  civil  right  of  action  to  recover  damages  for 
wrongful  death  through  negligence,  although  it  bases  such 
right  of  action  on  the  fact  that  defendant's  negligent  acts  or 
omissions  constitute  crimes,  does  not  for  that  reason  hehmg  to 
the  class  of  criminal  laws  which  can  he  enforced  only  in  the 
courts  of  the  country  where  the  offense  was  committed.  So 
that  said  laws  in  so  giving  a  light  of  action  to  recover  damages 
for  a  wrongful  death  occurring  in  that  country  are  not  contrary 
to  the  public  policy  of  Texas,  nor  to  natural  justice  or  good 
morals,  nor  is  their  enforcement  in  that  state  calculated  to  in- 
jure the  state  or  its  citizens,  and  an  action  to  enforce  the  right 
so  given  may  be  maintained  therein  in  a  state  or  Federal  court 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  parties,  in  which  the  established  tonus 
of  procedure  are  such  that  substantial  justice  can  he  done  between 
the  parties.  Again,  under  the  Rev.  St.  Tex.  1895,  art.  3027,  in 
an  action  for  wrongful  death,  "the  jury  may  give  such  damages 
as  they  may  think  proportionate  to  the  injury  resulting  from 
such  death,  and  the  amount  so  recovered  shall  be  divided  among 
the  persons  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  action  ...  in  such 
shares  as  the  jury  shall  find  by  their  verdict."  As  construed  by 
the  courts  of  the  state,  while  such  damages  are  limited  to  com- 
pensation for  pecuniary  loss,  they  are  not  confined  to  such  sum 
as  can  be  exactly  proved,  but  may  include  a  further  element  of 
damages  where  the  person  killed  stood  in  the  relation  of  husband, 
wife,  or  parent  to  the  beneficiaries  ;  also  to  be  fixed  by  the  jury 
in  the  exercise  of  "their  own  knowledge,  experience,  and  sense 
of  justice,"  and  the  right  to  such  damages  is  not  affected  by  the 
remarriage  of  the  surviving  wife  or  husband.     The  statute  also 


91  Walsh  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Ir. 
R.  6  C.  L.  532;  10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig. 
(1898)  p.  114.  See  Dupontv.  Quebec 
S.  S.  Co.,  Rep.  Jud.  Quebec,  11  S.  C. 


188;  Wilson  v.  The  John  Ritson,  3o 
Fed.  663;  The  Olga,  32  Fed.  229;  The 
Branford  City,  29  Fed.  373. 

G03 


$509 


DEATH       CONFLICT    OF    LAWS. 


requires  that  the  rights  of  all  entitled  to  damages  shall  be  de- 
termined and  settled  in  one  action.  Under  the  laws  of  Mexico 
the  liability  of  the  defendant  in  such  case  is  limited  to  the  fur- 
nishing of  a  continuing  support  to  the  legal  dependents  of  the 
deceased  during  the  periods  of  time  that  such  support  would 
have  been  due  from  him,  and  in  the  amounts  that  it  would  have 
been  due,  proportioned  to  his  ability  to  give  it  and  the  necessities 
of  those  entitled  to  receive  it,  which  questions  are  required  to 
be  determined  by  the  judge.  The  recovery  in  such  case  is  in 
the  nature  of  alimony  or  pension  awarded  by  the  court  to  each 
beneficiary,  payable  in  monthly  installments,  which  cease  in  the 
case  of  a  widow  or  daughters  on  their  marriage,  and  in  case  of 
sons  on  their  attaining  majority.  Held,  that  the  right  of  recov- 
ery given  by  such  laws,  at  least  in  a  case  where  the  wife  and 
daughters  of  the  deceased  are  beneficiaries,  is  so  dissimilar  to 
that  given  by  the  laws  of  Texas,  and  so  incapable  of- enforce- 
ment through  any  procedure  provided  for  trials  at  law  by  the 
statutes  of  Texas  or  by  the  common  law,  with  due  regard  to 
the  rights  of  the  defendant,  that  a  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States  in  that  state  should  decline  jurisdiction  of  an  action  at 
law  for  its  enforcement.92  But  in  Texas  a  suit  may  be  brought 
in  its  courts  where  the  defendant's  railroad  extends  into  that 
state  and  said  defendant  is  incorporated  in  the  United  States, 
nor  is  the  suit  precluded  by  the  fact  that  the  road  is  also  owned 
and  operated  in  Mexico  nor  by  the  facts  that  the  injuries  were 
there  received  and  the  action  could  have  been  instituted  in  that 
countrv.93 


92  The  above  text  is  the  syllabus 
to  Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  0.),  H5  Fed.  593. 
There  was  also  evidence  of  a  learned 
professional  man  as  to  the  law  of 
Mexico  in  addition  to  the  laws  of- 
fered in  evidence.  This  case  also 
fully  sets  forth  the  laws  of  Mexico. 

98Evey  v.  Mexican  C.  R.  Co.  (U. 

604 


S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C),  52  U.  S.  App. 
118;  81  Fed.  294;  38  L.  R.  A.  387. 
See  De  Ham  v.  Mexican  N.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22  S.  W.  249,  un- 
der Tex.  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2899;  8.  C, 
86  Tex.  68;  23  8.  W.  381;  7  Nat.  Corp. 
Rep.  350;  Belt  v.  Gulf,  C.  <fe.  S.  F.  R. 
Co.   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  22  S.  W.  1062. 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§  510 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


DEATH — RECOVERY 


AND     DAMAGES 

AND   RULES. 


GENERAL     1*I:IN<TPLES 


§  510.   Death— Measure  of  damages — 
Generally. 

511.  Same  subject  continued. 

512.  Death — Measure   of   damages 

— Age  as  a  factor — Gener- 
ally. 

513.  Death— Measure  of    damages 

—Mental  and  physical  abil- 
ity, health,  strength,  etc., 
as  factors — Generally. 

514.  Death  of  children— Damages 

— Age,  sex,  mental  and 
physical  ability.  health, 
strength,  etc.  —Generally. 

515.  Beneficiaries — Widow — Loss 

of  support. 

516.  Beneficiaries  —  Widow  —  Fi- 

nancial    condition     of    de- 


ceased husband — Increase 
of  his  property — Dower — 
Settlement  on  widow. 

517.  Beneficiaries  —  Widow       and 

children  —  Number,  ages, 
sex,  dependency  and  sup- 
port— Financial  and  physi- 
cal condition  —  Expendi- 
tures and  financial  condition 
of  deceased — Generally. 

518.  Death — Pecuniary  loss  or  in- 

jury— The  statutes — Gener- 
ally. 

519.  Death  —  Pecuniary     loss     as 

measure  of  damages. 

520.  Death  —  Pecuniary     loss     or 

damage — Construed. 

521.  Same  subject  continued. 


§510.  Death— Measure  of  damages  —  Generally. — There 
are,  as  will  be  apparent  from  the  following  sections,  numerous 
factors  which  enter  into  the  determination  of  the  measure  of 
damages  in  cases  where  recovery  is  sought  for  negligently  caus- 
ing death.  Any  attempt  to  logically  arrange  these  various  ele- 
ments of  damages  upon  any  basis  of  underlying  principle,  is 
made  most  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  obvious  reasons,  princi- 
pally because  of  the  different  express  statutory  provisions,  and 
also  by  reason  of  the  conflicting  decisions  as  to  the  construction 
of  these  statutes.  Still  another  element  is  the  nature  or  char- 
acter of  the  statute  under  which  damages  for  injuries  resulting 
in  death,  or  for  death  losses  are  sought  to  be  recovered.  Thus 
it  has  been  declared  in  a  case  under  the  Massachusetts  enact- 
ment, that  the  penalty  when  recovered  is  conferred  on  the  widow 
and  heirs  not  as  damages  for  their  loss  but  as  a  gratuity  from 

605 


§511 


DEATH— DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


the  commonwealth,1  while  in  Louisiana  it  is  said  that  the  ob- 
ject of  the  statute  is  not  benefit  but  compensation.2  Again, 
the  question  whether  survival,  death  loss  statutes  and  emploj'er's 
liability  acts  are  penal  laws  or  penal  in  the  international  sense, 
is  important  .in  connection  with  the  right  to  enforce  such  enact- 
ments in  foreign  states  or  in  Federal  courts.8 

§  511.  Same  subject  continued. — It  has  been  declared  in 
New  York  that  the  action  to  recover  damages  for  loss  by  death 
is  given  upon  different  principles  and  for  different  causes,  al- 
though it  can  be  maintained  only  in  those  cases  in  which  it 
could  have  been  brought  by  the  deceased  if  he  had  survived.1 
So  it  is  declared  in  a  Georgia  case  that  in  an  action  against  a 
railroad  company,  the  liability  rests  on  other  grounds  than  the 
criminal  negligence,  then  evidently  necessary  under  certain  other 
decisions  based  on  the  statute.5  Again,  in  Massachusetts,  the 
action  which  is  given  the  administrator  is  declared  to  be  merely 
a  substitute  for  the  indictment,6  and  in  Nevada  the  statute 7  is 
said  to  give  two  causes  of  action,  one  requiring  proof  of  the  ex- 
istence of  kindred,  the  other  not.-  So  it  may  be  generally  stated 
that  the  measure  of  damages  depends  frequently  upon  whether  the 
action  is  based  upon  a  survival  statute  or  exists  solely  by  virtue 
of  a  statutory  right  to  damages  for  the  death  itself,  irrespective 
of  the  damages  which  the  injured  party  might  have  recovered 


1  Carey  v.  Berkshire  Ry.  Co.,  1 
Cush.  (Mass.)  475,  480,  per  Met- 
calf,  J. 

2McFee  v.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  790;  7  So.  720,  per 
Breaux,  J. 

3  See  Huntington  v.  Attrill,  140 
U.  S.  657,  673,  per  Mr.  Justice  Gray. 
See  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurd 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  1st.  C.  Dist.  N.  H. ), 
108  Fed.  116,  per  Putnam,  J. 

*Whitford  v.  The  Panama  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  465,  409. 

5  McDonald  v.  Eagle  &  P.  Mfg. 
Co.,  67  Ga.  761;  68  Ga.  839,  but  Ga. 
Code  of  1882,  sec.  2971,  was  amended, 
Laws.  1887,  and  as  amended  includes 

606 


all  cases  where  death  of  a  human 
being  results  from  a  crime  or  from 
criminal  or  other  negligence.  See 
Daly  v.  Stoddard,  66  Ga.  145;  Cen- 
tral R.  A  B.  Co.  v.  Roach,  70  Ga.  434; 
Augusta  Factory  v.  Hill,  83  Ga.  709; 
10  S.  E.  450. 

6Littlejohn  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co., 
14S  Mass.  478;  20  N.  E.  103,  per 
Holmes,  J.  See  Pub.  Stat.  Mass.  ch. 
112,  sees.  212,  213;  Stat.  1886,  ch.  140. 

7  Gen.  Stat.  sec.  3898,  3899. 

8  Roach  v.  Consolidated  I.  M.  Co., 
7  Fed.  698;  7Sawy.  (U.  S.)224.  See 
also  Davis  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
53  Ark.  117:  7  L.  R.  A.  283;  44  Am. 
&  Eug.  R.  R.  Cas.  690, 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§  511 


had  he  lived.9  The  above  points  merely  suggest  the  Impossibility 
of  formulating  positive  rules  of  other  than  general  applicability. 
The  difficulty  in  determining  the  value  of  a  human  life  needs  no 
demonstration,  but  it  may  be  briefly  stated  in  conclusion  that 
the  law  can  furnish  no  definite  measure  of  damages;  they  are 
and  must  be  essentially  indefinite.  Human  life  is  not  property 
capable  of  an  exact  market  valuation.  Whatever  compensatory 
value  the  statutes  give  by  way  of  damages  to  beneficiaries  for 
loss  of  life  must  depend  upon  the  varying  circumstances  of  each 
particular  case,  excluding  any  certain  rule  of  admeasurement. 
Much  must  therefore  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  discretion  of 
the  jury,  aided  as  far  as  possible  by  the  instructions  of  the  court 
as  to  the  law  under  the  statute,  upon  which  recovery  depends.1" 


9  See  Malier  v.  Philadelphia  Tract. 
Co.,  181  Pa.  391;  37  Atl.  571;  40 
Wkly.  N.  C.  477;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  S3. 

io  "It  is  for  the  jury  to  say  under 
all  the  circumstances,  taking  into  ac- 
count all  the  uncertainties  and  con- 
tingencies of  the  particular  case, 
whether  there  was  such  a  reasonable 
and  well  founded  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary bent-lit  as  can  be  estimated 
in  money."  Pym  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.,  2  Best  &  S.  759;  4  Best  &  S. 
396,  per  Cockburn,  C.  J.  That  mother 
of  deceased  adult  should  be  placed 
pecuniarily  in  same  condition  that 
she  would  probably  have  occupied 
except  for  the  death,  there  having 
been  an  annuity  allowance  during 
their  joint  lives,  see  Rowley  v. 
London  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Exch. 
221.  "Such  sum  will  depend  on  a 
variety  of  circumstances  and  future 
contingencies  and  will,  therefore,  be 
difficult  of  exact  ascertainment,'' 
but  may  be  appropriated.  Pierce  v. 
Conners,  20  Colo.  182;  37  Pac.  722, 
That  no  measure  of  damages  was 
provided  prior  to  act  of  December 
16,  1878,  in  Georgia,  see  Macon  &  \V. 
K.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  38  Ga.  409.  That 
the  amount  of  the  verdict  is  partic- 
ularly within  the  province  of  the  jury. 


see  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Judd. 
20  Ky.  L.    Rep.   1978;  50  S.   W.  539. 

"Almost  impossible  systematically  to 
figure  out  by  items  what  may  amount, 
to  an  adequate  relief."  Myhau  v. 
Louisiana  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  41  La. 
Ann.  964;  6  So.  799,  per  Bermudez, 
C.  J.  There  seems  to  have  been 
a  "  natural  and  almost  universal  re- 
pugnance among  enlightened  na- 
tions to  setting  a  price  upon  human 
life  or  any  attempt  to  estimate  its 
value  by  a  pecuniary  standard,  a  re- 
pugnance which  seems  to  have  been 
strong  and  prevalent  among  nations 
in  proportion  as  they  have  been  or  be- 
come more  enlightened  or  refined." 
Hyatt  v.  Adams,  16  Mich.  191,  per 
Christianey.  J.  As  to  jury's  discre- 
tion, see  Stbher  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  91  Mo.  "'til).  ■■  Such  damages  are 
not  merely  nominal.  Wha1  they 
should  be  depends  upon  the  varying 
facts  of  each  particular  case  and  arc 
for  the  jury  to  assess,  guided  by  the  in- 
structions of  the  court  as  to  the  law." 
Corliss  v.  Worcester  X.  A-  R.  K.  Co., 
t;3  X.  11.  404,  per  Bingham,  .1.  "  In 
but  few  eases  arising  under  this  act 
is  the  plaintiff  able  to  show  direct 
specific  pecuniary  loss  .  .  .  the 
proof  may  be  unsatisfactory  and  the 

607 


§511 


DEATH    - DAMAGES    GEN  ERA ELY. 


It  may  be  stated,  however,  in  conclusion,  that  there  are  certain 
elements  of  damages,  some  of  which  enter  into  nearly,  if  not  all 
the  cases,  while  the  terms  of  some  of  the  statutes  permit  the  ad- 
mission of  evidence  upon  the  question  of  damages  which  is  ex- 


damages  be  quite  uncertain  and  con- 
tingent, yet  the  jurors  in  each  case 
must  take  the  elements  thus  fur- 
nished and  make  the  best  estimate 
of  damages  they  can."  Lockwood 
v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  98  X.  Y. 
523,  per  Earl,  J.  This  case  affirms 
20  Week  Dig.  (N.  Y. )  341.  "  There 
is  no  way  to  ascertain  mathematically 
what  that  damage  would  be;  it  nec- 
essarily must  be  to  a  great  extent 
speculative  and  the  only  thing  the 
legislature  has  done  to  help  out  the 
jury  is  to  limit  the  amount."  Ether- 
ington  v.  Prospect  Park  &  C.  I.  R. 
R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641.  This  case  af- 
firms 24  Hun  (N.  Y.),  2:35.  So  in 
case  of  a  child  of  tender  years  it 
would  be  impracticable  except  in 
very  rare  instances  to  furnish  direct 
evidence  of  the  loss  by  death,  and 
the  question  would  be  for  the  jury  in 
view  of  the  circumstances.  Ihl  v. 
Forty-second  St.  &  G.  St.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  47  N".  Y.  317.  That  the  measure 
of  damages  "must  be  somewhat  in- 
definite "  and  dependent  upon  the 
judgment  of  the  jury,  see  Green  v. 
Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
25,  32,  per  Allen,  J.  As  to  the  suf- 
ficiency of  a  general  allegation  of 
damages  without  pleading  particular 
facts  showing  damages,  see  Haug 
v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  8  N.  D. 
23;  42  L.  R.  A.  664;  77  X.  W.  97;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  25,  citing 
and  criticising  numerous  cases.  "It 
is  not  human  possessions  that  are 
destroyed,  but  humanity  itself,  and 
as  this  has  no  market  value  it  must 
be  very  much  a  matter  of  human 
feeling.  Hard  then  as  the  task  may 
be  and  however  uncertain  its  results, 

608 


it  is  to  be  performed  by  the  jury, 
aided  by  the  cautions  and  counsels 
of  the  judge  .  .  .  the  law  can  fur- 
nish no  definite  measure  of  damages 
which  are  essentially  indefinite." 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McCloskey, 
23  Pa.  526,  per  Lovvrie,  J.  "  While 
the  law  does  not  .  .  .  intend  to  give 
compensation  for  anything  but  pe- 
cuniary loss  by  estimating  the  money 
value  of  the  life  of  the  relative,  and 
while  it  necessarily  results  that  re- 
gard must  in  each  instance  be  paid 
to  such  facts  and  conditions  as  cast 
light  upon  the  subject,  yet  it  must  be 
admitted  the  inquiry  is  not  intended 
to  be  narrowed  down  by  the  law  to  a 
result  that  can  be  exactly  accounted 
for  by  the  facts  in  evidence  .  .  .  the 
difficulties  of  proof  are  known  to  the 
lawmaker  .  .  .  When  no  amount  is 
fixed  by  law  and  no  rule  is  prescribed 
.  .  .  we  think  that  the  lawmaker  in- 
tended that,  having  reference  as  far 
as  practicable  to  conditions  existing 
at  the  time  of  the  death,  juries  from 
their  own  knowledge,  experience 
and  sense  of  justice  should  fix  and 
assess  the  proper  sum."  Missouri 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  61. 
That  matter  should  largely  be  left  to 
the  jury's  discretion.  See  Whitton  v. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Biss.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.)  282.  Examine  St.  Louis  I. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Xeedham,  3  U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  129;  52  Fed.  371.  That 
"jury  have  no  arbitrary  discretion 
to  give  as  damages  what  they  may 
see  proper  without  reference  to  a 
proper  basis  from  which  to  estimate 
them,"  see  Louisville,  etc.,  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Orr,  91  Ala.  548,  553,  per  Cole- 
man, J. 


DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 

eluded  under  other  enactments.     These  various  factors  will  be 
fully  considered  under  the  different  statutes  under  this  title. 

§  512.  Death— Measure  of  damages— Age  as  a  factor- 
Generally. — Age  of  the  deceased  constitutes  one  of  the  most 
important  factors  to  be  considered  in  the  determination  of  the 
amount  to  be  awarded  as  damages  in  cases  of  death  Losses;  and 
this  is  so  whether  the  action  be  brought  under  a  survival,  death 
loss,  or  employer's  Liability  statute.  It  is  important  not  only  as 
an  independent  factor,  but  also  because  it  is  one  of  many  other 
constituent  parts  dependent  upon  it  in  the  ascertainment  of 
damages.  Thus  upon  age  depend  in  a  greater  or  less  degree 
(1)  mental  or  physical  ability,  health,  strength,  endurance  or 
weakness,  intelligence  and  education  ;  (2)  permanency  or  other- 
wise of  habits  affecting  mental  and  physical  ability,  etc.,  such 
as  those  of  temperance  or  intemperance  and  the  like ;  (3)  per- 
haps, though  not  necessarily  so,  disposition  to  labor,  habits  of 
industry,  frugality,  power  to  accumulate,  and  their  opposites  : 
(4)  an  increasing  or  diminishing  earning  power  or  capacity  for 
labor,  or  for  accumulating  property;  (5)  expectancy  of  life: 
(6)  to  some  extent  at  least,  the  need  of  support  or  the  extent 
of  capability  of  supporting  dependents;  and  (7)  in  certain 
cases  the  power  to  render  service  or  the  necessity  of  exacting. 
or  right  to  require  service."  In  conclusion  it  may  be  stated 
as  a  rule  that  evidence  of  the  intestate's  age  is  admissible  as 
relevant  and  material  upon  the  trial  of  actions  of  the  character 
under  consideration,  and  it  is  also  constantly  relied  upon  in  de- 
termining whether  the  damages  awarded  in  this  class  of  cases 
are  excessive  or  not,  or  inadequate.  But  while  age  constitutes 
an  important  factor,  the  necessity  of  proof  of  age  is  subject  to 
whatever  qualification  exists  in  those  states  where  nominal  dam- 
ages are  awarded  without  proof  of  other  than  the  express  statu- 
tory requisites.1' 

§  513.  Death— Measure  of  damages— Mental  and  physical 
ability,  health,  strength,  etc.,  as  factors— Generally — Depen- 
dent  upon   the  age  of  the  deceased  are   mental   and    physical 

"These    various    factors  will    be  i      u  For  citations  see  the  sections  un- 

fully  considered  under  the  sections    der  this  title  as  to  general  elements 
•within  this  title.  j  of  damages. 

39  tiOi) 


§  514  DEATH  —DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 

ability,  health,  strength,  and  their  adjuncts,  essential  and  other- 
wise. A  person's  endurance  or  weakness,  the  fact  whether  he 
is  robust  and  strong  or  not,  his  intellectual  and  physical  condi- 
tion, his  education  or  want  thereof,  enter  partly  or  as  a  whole 
into  questions  affecting  his  ability  to  labor  or  follow  his  profes- 
sion, business  or  occupation,  his  earning  capacity,  his  increasing 
or  diminishing  power  in  these  respects,  his  probable  accumula- 
tions, his  expectancy  of  life,  his  ability  to  attend  to  the  proper 
care,  education  and  training  of  children,  where  there  are  any 
children,  to  support  dependents  in  certain  cases}  etc.  It  is 
therefore  apparent  that  the  factors  mentioned  at  the  beginning 
of  this  section  constitute,  as  applied  to  the  intestate,  especially 
when  an  adult,  important,  relevant  and  material  evidence  in 
determining  what  damages  shall  be  awarded  for  losses  occasioned 
by  death.  This  rule  is  subject  to  whatever  qualification  exists 
in  these  cases  where  proof  of  other  than  the  express  statutory 
requisites  is  not  necessary  to  entitle  the  beneficiaries  to  some 
recovery,  or  to  nominal  damages.  Where  such  evidence  is  relied 
on,  its  weight  and  value  must  depend  largely  upon  the  nature  of 
the  statutory  action  and  also  upon  the  character  of  the  recovery 
sought,  in  whose  behalf,  the  relation  which  the  surviving  ben- 
eficiaries sustained  to  the  deceased  by  way  of  dependency  and 
the  like  in  certain  cases,  and  other  matters  apparent  throughout 
this  chapter.13 

§  514.  Death  of  children — Damages— Age,  sex,  mental 
and  physical  ability,  health,  strength,  etc. — Generally. — In 

actions  brought  to  recover  damages  for  loss  occasioned  by  the 
death  of  a  child  its  age,  sex,  talents,  mental  and  physical  condi- 
tion, ability,  health,  strength,  state  of  development  and  the  like, 
are  very  important  factors  in  the  estimation  of  the  amount  to  be 
awarded.  So  the  fact  is  material  that  a  child  is  of  veiy  tender 
years.  This  rule  is  well  supported  by  the  decisions  and  also  by 
the  declarations  of  courts.  It  is  not  intended,  however,  that  this 
rule  should  exclude  the  right  to  recover  at  all  unless  such  proof 
be  given.14     The  general  basis  of  recovery  for  loss  by  death  of 

13  The  above  principles  are  fully  j  u  See  in  addition  to  cases  below, 
supported  by  the  decisions  through-  j  citations  under  the  next  preceding 
out  this  title.  j  section    herein.      A    complaint    al- 

610 


DEATH— DAMAGES    < ;  KNEUALLY. 


§5U 


a  minor  child,  where  the  action  for  damages  is  brought  by  the 
father,  is  held  to  be  loss  of  service  and  it  is  held  that  such  par- 
ents' right  thereto  is  to  be  determined  primarily  by  the  laws 
applicable  to  the  relation  of  master  and  servant,  and  that  this 
applies  to  a  ease  of  negligent  homicide  of  a  minor  son,15  al- 
though in  Alabama  it  is  decided  in  a  Like  action  that  the  dam- 
ages sought  are  purely  punitive  and  do  not  depend  upon  loss  of 
services.1"  And  it  is  also  determined  that  there  can  be  no  recov- 
ery by  a  father  for  the  loss  of  the  services  of  a  minor  son,  from 
the  date  of  his  death  until  he  would  have  attained  his  majority, 
in  an  action  against  one  for  having  negligently  caused  such 
death,  since  the  statute  expressly  provides  that  the  action  must 


though  not  alleging  special  damages 
which  sets  forth  the  age,  occupation, 
relationship,  etc.,  is  sufficient  in  case 
of  death  of  minor  son.  Ormau  v. 
Mannix,  17  Colo.  504;  30  Pac.  1037. 
Evidence  of  relationship  of  plaintiff 
and  deceased  son  and  of  their  rela- 
tive ages  and  habits  may  authorize  a 
recovery  of  damages.  Mollie  Gibson 
Consol.  Min.  Co.  v.  Sharp  (Colo.  App.), 

38  Pac.  850.  See  also  Colorado  Coal 
&  I.  Co.  v.  Lamb  (Colo.  App.),  40 
Pac.  251.  Age,  health,  habits,  etc.,  of 
deceased  son  may  be  considered. 
Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ky.  Co., 

39  Fed.  18.  As  to  health,  age,  tal- 
ents, habits  of  industry,  etc.,  past 
success  in  life  where  child  is  an 
adult,  see  Hutchins  v.  St.  Paul,  M. 
&  M.  Ky.  Co.,  44  Minn.  5;  46  X.  W. 
79.  That  proof  of  age  of  son  and 
condition  in  life  of  father  is  sufficient, 
see  Grogan  v.  Broadway,  etc.,  Co., 
ST  Mo.  321,  As  to  to  reaching  ma- 
jority and  noncontinuance  of  family 
relations  and  as  to  the  effect  of  age 
under  the  statute  as  affecting  the 
action,  see  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Adams,  55  Pa.  St.  409.  Examine  Le- 
high Iron  Co.  v.  Rupp,  100  Pa.  St. 
95.  Incase  of  the  death  of  an  infant 
daughter,  the  court  charged  that 
the   jury    should    consider   the   age 


and  sex  of  the  deceased,  etc.,  and 
the  probability  of  the  next  of  kin 
sustaining  any  pecuniary  damage  by 
her  death.  Etherington  v.  Prospect 
Park  &  C.  1.  K.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641, 
case  aff'd  24  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  235. 

13  Frazier  v.  Georgia,  R.  &  B.  Co., 
101  Ga.  70;  28  S.  E.  684;  46  Cent.  L.  J. 
133.  But  in  New  York,  see  as  to 
the  relation  of  parent  and  child, 
Cuming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  109 
N.  V.  95;  14  X.  r.  St.  Rep.  788:  16 
X.  E.  65.  This  was  a  personal  injury 
case.  That  jury  may  allow  for  value 
of  services  though  no  proof  thereof 
be  made,  see  Callaway  v.  Spurgeon, 
63  111.  App.  571.  See  further  as  to 
loss  of  services,  Covington  St.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Packer,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  455;  15 
Am.  Rep.  725  ;  McGovern  v.  New 
York  Cent.  R,  Co.,  67  X.  Y.  417; 
Pressman  v.  Mooney,  ■">  App.  Div. 
(  X.  Y.  )  121;  39  N.  V.  Supp.  44;  Cogh- 
lan  v.  Third  Ave.  P.  R.  Co.,  7  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  124:  39  X.  Y.  Supp. 
11098,  aff'g  16  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  C77;  25 
Civ.  Pro.  (X.  V)  249.  Damages  for 
loss  of  services  is  fully  considered 
elsewhere  herein. 

"'■  Alabama,  G.  A-  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
gess, llii  Ala.  509;  22  So.  913,  under 
Ala.  Code,  sec.  2589. 

611 


§514 


DEATH  —DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


be  brought  by  the  personal  representative  of  the  deceased.17  So 
in  other  jurisdictions  the  right  of  action  is  held  to  lie  only  for 
the  pecuniary  loss  resulting  from  the  death.ls  While  in  other 
states  the  pecuniary  loss  is  not  confined  to  the  minority  of  the 
child,  but  includes  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  bene- 
fits thereafter,  to  those  entitled  as  beneficiaries.19  Again,  the 
age  of  a  minor  is  deemed  of  importance  in  determining  whether 
he  is  capable  or  incapable  of  rendering  services  for  which  the 
parent  could  recover,  as  in  case  of  children  of  very  tender  years.*' 
So,  age,  sex  and  health  affect  the  right  to  support  or  the  par- 
ents' liability  therefor,  and  consequently  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages.21    And  the  age,  sex,  intelligence,  strength,  etc.,  of  minor 


17  Harris  v.  Kentucky  Timber  &  L. 
Co.,  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1731,  1732;  45  S. 
W.  94,  denying  rehearing  43  S.  W.  462, 
under  Ky.  Stat.  sec.  6.  See  also  Illi- 
nois C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  TO  Miss. 
471;  12  So.  482,  under  Miss.  Const. 
1890,  sec.  193;  Fitzhenry  v.  Consoli- 
dated Tract.  Co.  (N.  J.),  42  Atl. 
416,  under  1  N.  J.  Gen.  Stat.  p.  1188. 
The  question  of  the  majority  of  a 
child  as  a  limit  in  determining  dam- 
ages is  considered  elsewhere  herein. 

18  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  67;  42  Atl.  165;  13  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  517;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  417,  under  1  Gen.  Stat.  N.  J. 
p.  1188;  ActsN.  J.  approved  March  3, 
1848.  Myers  v.  Holborn,  58  N.  J.  L. 
(29  Vr.)  193;  33  Atl.  389;  30  L.  R.  A. 
345,  under  N.  J.  Rev.  Stat.  p.  294, 
This  question  of  pecuniary  loss  is 
fully  considered  elsewhere  herein. 

19  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C),  35  C.  C.  A.  105; 
92  Fed.  953;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas. 
N.  S.  520;  McLean  Co.  Coal  Co.  v. 
McVey,  38  111.  App.  158;  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cross,  58  Kan. 
424;  49  Pac.  599;  Thompson  v.  Johns- 
ton Bros.  Co.,  86  Wis.  576;  57  N.  W. 
298.  Loss  of  services  is  fully  con- 
sidered elsewhere  herein. 

20  Atlanta  Consol.  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Ar- 

G12 


nold,  100  Ga.  566;  28  S.  E.  224;  Al- 
len v.  Atlantic  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Ga. 
503;  Crawford  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  106 
Ga.  870;  33  So.  826 ;  4  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
436;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  459.  See  Con- 
solidated Traction  Co.  v.  Graham 
(N.  J.),  40  Atl.  773;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
660;  Graham  v.  Consolidated  Trac- 
tion Co.  (N.  J.  1899),  44  Atl.  964;  Ihl 
v.  Forty-second  St.  Ry.  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 
317;  Lehman  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  29 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)334. 

21  It  is  held  that  a  father's  liability 
for  his  daughter's  support  ceases  at 
her  attaining  her  majority  if  she  is 
then  able  to  support  herself,  and  that 
even  though  she  thereafter  becomes 
mentally  incompetent,  the  liability  is 
not  revived.  Mt.  Pleasant  Overseers 
v.  Wilcox,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  447;  2  Pa. 
Dist.  R.  628.  Before  the  act  of  187o 
in  Arkansas  a  female  was  a  minor  un- 
til 21  years  of  age.  Rowland  v.  Mc- 
Guire,  64  Ark.  412;  42  S.  W.  1068. 
It  is  held  that  a  parent's  obligation 
to  support  a  daughter  is  not  deter- 
mined by  her  marriage  and  removal 
from  her  parent's  domicile,  where 
her  husband  cannot  provide  for  her 
wants,  and  she  is  in  actual  need. 
Pratt  v.  Pratt,  Rapports'  Judic. 
Quebec,  10  C.  S.  134.  A  father  may 
emancipate     his     minor      daughter. 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENKRALLY. 


.14 


children  also  affect  the  question  of  contributory  negligence  by 
parentsand  infants,  and  necessarily  the  determination  of  the  point 

whether  a  right  exists  to  recover  any  damages  whatsoever.*  So 
the  same  factors  are  considered  as  of  weight  in  determining 
whether  the  damages  assessed  are  excessive,  inadequate  or  other- 


Kain  v.  Larkin,  131  N.  V.  300;  43 
X.  V.  St.  R.  1U7:  30  N.  E.  It)".,  rev'g42 
N.  Y.  St.  K.  571;  IT  N.  V.  Supp.  223. 
And  a  sun  is  also  held  emancipated 
by  marriage,  notwithstanding  con- 
tinued residence  with  his  father's 
family.  Craftsbury  v.  Greensboro, 
66  Vt.  585;  29  Atl.  1024.  As  to  re- 
covery of  damages  where  deceased 
son  was  emancipated,  etc.,  see 
Franklin  v.  South  Eastern  l!y.  Co.,  3 
Hurl,  &  N.  211.  Examine  Dalton  v. 
South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  (U.  S.) 
290.  An  infant  husband  who  mar- 
ried without  his  father's  consent,  and 
needs  his  wages  for  the  support  of 
himself,  his  wife  and  children,  is 
entitled  to  them.  Commonwealth  v. 
Graham  (Mass.),  31  X.  E.  706;  16  L. 
li.  A.  578.  The  father's  liability  for 
board,  care  and  medicine  furnished 
a  minor  sou  ceases  where  the  cir- 
cumstances show  an  emancipation. 
Kubic  v.  Zemke,  105  Iowa,  269;  74 
X.  W.  748.  A  father  may  also  be 
liable  for  necessaries  furnished  a 
minor  son  who  is  sick  and  in  a  desti- 
tute condition,  where  he  had  aban- 
doned the  sou  and  had  been  notified 
of  his  condition.  Manning  v.  Wells, 
61  N.  Y.  St.  R.  59;  29  X.  Y.  Supp. 
1044;  8  Misc.  (N.  V.)  040,  aff'd  83 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  27;  66  X.  V.  St.  It.  109; 
.32  X.  Y.  Supp.  601.  The  question 
of  expenses  for  medical  attendance, 
care,  nursing,  etc.,  of  minors  as  an 
element  of  damages,  and  also  the 
deduction  for  support  and  mainte- 
nance, will  be  considered  elsewhere 
herein. 

"Age,    intelligence   and   ability  to 
understand  the  character  of   the   act 


and  its  consequences  may  be  consul 
ered  by  the  jury  in  determining  the 
contributory  negligence  of  a  boy  14 
years  old.  Texas  \.  P.  Ii.  Co.  \. 
Phillips,  '.U  IVx.  278;  42  s.  \V.  852, 
vev'a  40  S.  \V.  :J,44.  It  is  held  that 
an  old  person  is  not  required  to  ex- 
ercise  greater  care  than  a  young  and 
vigorous  one.  Culbertson  v.  Holli- 
day,  50  Neb.  229;  69  X.  W.  853. 
Precisely  the  same  degree  of  care 
and  prudence  is  not  required  in  an 
infant  of  about  twelve  years  of  age 
as  in  case  of  an  adult.  Baltimore 
*  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cumberland,  12  A.pp. 
ill.c.i  598;  26  Wash.  L.  Rep.  306. 
Age  of  infant  and  all  the  other  cir- 
cumstances are  to  be  considered  and 
what  might  be  contributory  negli- 
gence in  the  case  of  an  adult  may 
constitute  a  question  of  fait  for  the 
jury  in  case  of  an  infant  of  tender 
age.  Brown  v.  Syracuse,  77  Hun 
lX  Y.),  411:  CO  X.  Y.  St.  R.  16. 
See  also  Ginchard  v.  Xew.  84  Hun 
(X.  Y.I,  54;  65  X.  Y.  St.  R.  20:  31 
X.  Y.  Supp.  1080:  Masser  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co..  68  Iowa.  002: 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Gladmon, 
15  Wall.  ill.  S.)  401;  21  L.  Ed.  114; 
Goff  v.  Ockers,  40  X.  Y.  St.  R.  615; 
21  X.  Y.  St.  K.  454;  1  Misc.  (X.  Y.  | 
408,  aff'd  139  X.  V.  653;  54  V  V. 
St.  R.  934;  355  V  E.  207:  Messenger 
v.  Dennie,  V.)l  Mass.  197:  50  Am. 
Rep.  205:  Springfield  Consol.  R. 
Co.  v.  Welsh,  155  111.  511;  40  V  K. 
10:^4,  aff'g  50  111.  A  pp.  190.  That 
age,  sex.  health,  strength,  capacity, 
experience,  intelligence,  ability,  ex- 
tent of  information,  activity,  etc., 
go  to  the    question    of   contributory 

613 


§514 


DEATH   DAMAGES  GEM  EH  ALLY. 


wise.3  Again,  it  is  held  that  damages  will  not  be  restricted  to 
a  merely  nominal  sum  for  the  negligent  killing  of  a  child  five 
years  old,  although  the  only  evidence  furnishing  a  basis  for  the 
determination  of  the  amount  of  damages  is  as  to  the  age,  sex  and 
general  intelligence  of  the  child.'4    So  the  habits  and  energy  of  a 


negligence  of  minors,  see  Cleveland, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  K.  Co.  .v.  Tartt  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  7th  C),  12  C.  C.  A.  625;  64 
Fed.  830;  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cook.  42  Neb.  577;  60  N.  W.  899, 
rehearing  denied  42  Neb.  905:  62 
N.  W.  235;  Carson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.  R.  Co.,  96  Iowa,  583;  65  N.  W. 
831;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald, 
152  U.  S.  262;  14  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  619; 
38  L.  Ed.  434;  Collis  v.  N.  Y. 
Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  504;  55  N.  Y.  St.  R.  82;  24 
N.  Y.  Supp.  82;  Robertson  v.  Mayor 
of  N.  Y.,  7  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  645:  58  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  391;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  13, 
aff'd  144  N.  Y.  609;  44  N.  E.  1128; 
East  Tennessee,  V.  <fc  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hughes  (Ga. ),  58  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  373;  17  S.  E.  949:  Turner  v. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  (W.  Va. ), 
22  S.  E.  83;  Butz  v.  Cavanagh,  137 
Mo.  503;  38  S.  W.  1104.  As  to  dis- 
tinction in  this  respect  between 
children  of  tender  years  and  minors 
of  years  of  discretion,  see  E.  S.  Hig- 
gins  Carpet  Co.  v.  O'Keefe  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  2d  C),  51  U.  S.  App.  74;  25  C. 
C.  A.  220;  79  Fed.  900.  As  to  im- 
puted negligence  in  case  of  children, 
see  Dudley  v.  Westcott,  44  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  882;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  130,  rev'g 
40  N.  Y.St.  R,  506;  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
952;  Foley  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  78  Hun  (N.  Y.),  248;  60  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  6;  Jeft'ersonville  v.  McHenry, 
22  Ind.  App.  10;  53  N.  E.  183,  and 
numerous  cases  cited.  See  further 
on  the  above  points,  Joyce  on  Elect. 
Law  (ed.  1900),  sees.  585,  586;  1 
Shearman  &  Redf .  on  Neg.  (ed.  1898 ) 
sees.  73-83. 

614 


23  See  note  at  end  of  this  chapter 
entitled  "  Age,  etc.,  of  cbildren — Ex- 
cessive and  inadequate  damages — 
Decisions." 

24  Howell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  24 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  502;  49  N.  Y. 
Supp.  17.  That  proof  of  son's  age 
and  father's  condition  in  life  suffi- 
cient, see  Grogan  v.  Broadway,  etc., 
Co.,  87  Mo.  321.  As  to  proof  of  age 
(daughter  6  years  old)  health  and 
intelligence  being  sufficient,  see 
Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.  C.  Co., 
92  N.  Y.  219,  rev'g  28  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
407;  15  Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  aff'd 
11  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  72;  63  How. 
(N.  Y.)  328;  4  Month.  Law  Bull.  65. 
See  also  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater, 
129  111.  91;  Nagle  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  75  Mo.  653.  Examine  Silber- 
stein  v.  Wiche  Co.,  29  Abb.  N.  C. 
(N.  Y.)  291;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  170. 

•'  Where  the  testimony  shows  the 
bodily  health  and  strength,  the 
sprightliness  or  want  of  it  of  mind, 
the  aptitude  and  willingness  to  be 
useful  in  performing  services,  the 
mode  in  which  such  faculties  are  ex- 
ercised as  in  useful  labor  or  other- 
wise, and  when  from  the  age  and 
undeveloped  state  of  the  child,  any 
estimate  of  the  value  of  the  services 
until  majority  would  be  matter  of 
opinion  in  which  no  particular  or 
special  knowledge  could  be  procured 
better  than  the  judgment  and  com- 
mon sense  of  the  ordinary  person 
called  to  the  duty  of  determining 
such  value  then  upon  such  testimony 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  jury  can 
be  relied  on  to  determine  the  value 
without  any  witness  naming  a  sum 


IM.  \  l  II       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§  515 


deceased  minor  son,  his  tender  age  and  expectancy  of  life  until 
majority,  his  ability  to  learn  well,  his  obedience,  tin-  help  rendered 
to  his  parents  and  the  character  thereof  and  willingness  to  work 
art-  properly  considered.23     So  it  is  decided  in  Texas  that  it  is 

sufficient  proof  of  damages  to  warrant  an  award  by  the  jury,  for 
the  negligent  killing  of  a  child,  to  show  that  he  was  twenty-five 
months  old,  could  understand  what  was  said,  obeyed  his  mother, 
was  just  beginning  to  talk  and  was  stout  and  healthy.26  And  in 
an  Illinois  ease  it  is  determined  that  the  value  of  services  of  a 
deceased  minor  may  be  estimated  from  the  child's  age  and  the 
knowledge  and  experience  of  the  jurors  in  matters  of  common 
observation.-'  So  where  from  the  undeveloped  state  of  a  daughter 
six  years  old,  an  estimate  of  her  services  would  be  a  matter  of 
opinion,  the  jury  may  use  their  own  judgment,  common  sense 
and  sound  discretion  upon  the  evidence,  as  no  expert  opinion 
would  be  better.*  And  in  Arkansas  it  is  decided  that  a  child's 
age  may  be  such  as  to  make  his  loss  a  matter  of  conjecture  as  in 
case  of  an  infant  of  tender  years  where  the  question  may  be  left 
to  the  jury  without  evidence.^ 

§  515.  Beneficiaries— Widow  —Loss  of  support. — In  an  ac- 
tion by  a  widow  to  recover  damages  for  the  wrongful  or  negli- 
gent death  of  her  husband,  she  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  com- 
pensation for  the  loss  of  support  which  he  was  legally  bound  to 
provide  for  her.*     And  evidence  is  admissible  that  the  husband 


...  As  the  age  of  the  child  in- 
creases and  his  faculties  develop  tes- 
timony to  actual  service,  can  and 
should  be  produced."  Brunswig  v. 
White,  70  Tex.  504;  8  S.  W.  85. 

2-  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Gil- 
more  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  53  S.  W. 
61.  Examine  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Lee,  70  Tex.  490;  7  S.  W.  857;  In- 
ternational &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Knight 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  52 S.  W.640,  where 
the  sou  was  strong,  sober,  indus- 
trious, etc. 

26  Austin  v.  Rapid  Trans.  K.  Co.  v. 
Cullen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W. 
256,  rehearing  denied,  30  S.  W.  578. 

27  Callaway  v.  Spurgeon,  63  111. 
App.  571. 


Brunswig  v.  White 

55,  Annot  case,     bee 

Uunden,  37  Kan.  1, 


Co.    v.   Fox- 
338;  13  Am. 


28  So  held  in 
(Tex.),  8S.  W. 
Pacific  R.  Co.  \ 
14  Pac.  501. 

29  Little  Rock   &   Ft.    S.   R.   Co.  v. 
Barker,  39  Ark.  491. 

30  Florida  C.  &  P.  R. 
worth,  41  Fla. ;  25  So. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  S.  469;  Chesapeake 
&  ().  R.  Co.  v.  Dixon,  20  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
792(1883);  47S.  W.  615;  50  S.  W.  252; 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  827? 
Hayes  v.  Williams,  17  Colo.  405  :  Bal- 
timore, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  State,  71  Md. 
57:'.;  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  24  Md.  271 :  Nichols  v.  Winfrey, 
90  Mo.  40:5;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hines  (Tex.    Civ.  App.).  40  S.  W. 

615 


$  515 


DEATH        DAMAGES    GENERALLY 


was  at  his  decease  the  wife's  sole  support.31  So  it  is  held  that 
the  measure  of  damages  in  such  case  would  be  the  probable 
amount  which  the  husband  would  have  contributed  to  her  main- 
tenance and  support  had  he  lived.32  But  in  case  of  a  wife  who 
was  openly  adulterous  and  living  apart  from  her  husband  at  his 
decease  no  damages  can  be  recovered.33    Again,  where  a  deceased 


152;  Dallas  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Spieker, 
61  Tex.  427;  Kaspari  v.  Marsh,  74 
Wis.  563;  Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  67  Wis.  48;  Lanson  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.,  R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  448;  Cas- 
tello  v.  Landwehr,  28  Wis.  522.  In 
this  connection  as  hearing  upon  the 
principle  involved,  examine  the  fol- 
lowiug  cases:  That  husband  is  ob- 
liged to  support  wife  as  long  as  legal 
relation  exists,  see  State  v.  Tierney, 
1  Penn.  (Del.),  116;  39  Atl.  774; 
Duty  of  husband  to  support  wife  to 
extent  of  ability  and  reasonable  and 
necessary  comforts  according  to  cir- 
cumstances and  to  society  in  which 
they  live,  Thill  v.  Polman,  76  Iowa, 
638;  41  N.  W.  385.  Examine  also 
Baker  v.  Carter,  83  Me.  132;  21  Atl. 
834;  McGrath  v.  Donnelly,  131  Pa. 
549;  20  Atl.  382;  Leuppie  v.  Osborn, 
N.  J.  Ch.  29  Atl.  433;  39  Cent.  L.  J. 
187;  Roll  v.  Davison,  165  Pa.  392; 
35  Wkly.  N.  C.  562;  25  Pitts.  L.  J. 
N.  S.  450;  30  Atl.  987. 

81  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Keene,  143 
111.  172;  32  N.  E.  260;  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  May,  108  111.  2S8.  See  also 
Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  X.  R.  R.  Co., 
67  Wis.  46.  That  it  need  not  be  al- 
leged that  widow  was  depend- 
ent on  her  deceased  husband  for  sup- 
port, see  Salem  Bedford  Stove  Co. 
v.  Hobbs  (Ind.  App.),   38  N.   E.  538. 

S2  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W.  152. 

^Stimpson  v.  Wood,  57  L.  J.  L. 
B.  484;  36  W.  734;  59  L.  T.  218. 
See  Brash  v.  Steele,  7  D.  B.  M. 
(Scotch)  539;  Fort  Worth,  etc,  R. 
Co.  v.  Floyd  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  21  S. 
616 


W.  544.  In  this  connection  as  bear- 
ing upon  the  principle  involved,  ex- 
amine the  following  cases:  Where 
a  husband  had  separated  from  his 
wife  because  of  her  adultery,  it  was 
held  that  he  was  not  liable  for  her 
board  to  one  whom  he  had  notified 
of  the  facts  although  he  had  specially 
agreed  to  pay  her  board  while  she 
lived  with  him.  Ford  v.  Hoover  (C. 
P.),  13  Lane.  L.  Rev.  81.  That 
|  husband  is  not  liable  for  support  of 
■  wife  guilty  of  adultery,  see  Mitchell 
v.  Torrington  Union,  Q.  B.  76  Law 
T.  Rep.  724.  That  adultery,  a  suffi- 
cient defense  for  refusing  to  support 
wife,  see  State  v.  Schweitzer,  57  Conn. 
532;  18  Atl.  787;  li  L.  R.  A.  125;  12 
Crirn.  L.  Mag.  273,  under  Conn.  Gen. 
Stat.  sec.  3402.  See  McCutchen  v. 
McGahan,  11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  281. 
That  husband's  abandonment  ex- 
cused by  wife's  infidelity,  see  Carney 
v.  State,  84  Ala.  7;  4  So.  285.  That  a 
husband  is  legally  obliged  to  support 
his  wife  who  is  living  apart  from  him, 
though  she  is  not  entirely  without 
fault,  and  to  pay  her  an  amount  suit- 
able to  his  financial  condition,  see 
Euslin  v.  Euslin  (N.  J.  Ch.),  37  Atl. 
442.  If  a  wife  voluntarily  leaves 
her  husband  without  sufficient  legal 
grounds,  as  in  case  of  his  utter  in- 
difference and  neglect,  there  being 
no  physical  violence,  etc.,  she  cannot 
pledge  his  credit  for  her  support. 
Bostick  v.  Brower,  49  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1046;  22  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  700.  That 
husband  not  bound  to  provide  a 
dwelling  for  his  wife  apart  from  the 
family,   see   Rodenbaugh,  Young,  v. 


DEATH      DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


S  51i 


employee  leaves  a  widow  only,  the  measure  of  damages    is  the 

pecuniary  value  of  his  life  resulting  from  the  relation  of  depend- 
ency or  from  expectation  of  benefit  from  the  distribution  of  such 
estate  as  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  evidence  he  would  have 
earned  and  saved  but  for  his  death."'  The  faet  however  thai 
the  husband  did  not  intend  to  contribute  to  his  wife's  support 
cannot  affect  her  right    to  damages. ^     But  damages    tor    the 


Rodenbaugh  (C.  P.),  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
477.  See  People  v.  Petti t,  74  X.  Y. 
320;  3  Hun  (N.  Y.),  410.  That  hus- 
baud  liable  when  lie  forces  wife  to 
live  apart,  see  Scott  v.  Caiothers,  17 
Ind.  App.  673;  47  X.  E.  389.  Tbat 
husband  liable  for  wife's  support 
■when  she  is  boarding  with  another, 
her  husband  having  failed  or  refused 
support,  see  McClary  v.  Warner,  60 
111.  App.  223.  In  California  under 
sec.  137  of  Cal.  Civ.  Code,  wife  is  en- 
titled to  maintain  an  action  for  per- 
manent support  where  her  husbaud 
deserts  her.  Benton  v.  Benton,  122 
Cal.  395;  55  Pac.  152.  When  not 
relieved  from  liability  for  lodgings 
for  wife  living  apart,  see  Old  man  v. 
Yost,  62  Minn.  261;  64  N.  W.  564. 
Where  a  husband  who  is  the  wrong- 
doer has  abandoned  his  family  and 
they  are  living  apart  from  him,  lie  is 
liable  for  medical  attendance  fur- 
nished his  wife  and  minor  B< >n.  Hardy 
v.  Eagle  (N.  Y.  City  Ct.),  23  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  441;  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  501. 
But  examine  Morgan  v.  Bartels,  Rap- 
ports Jud.  Quebec,  12  C.  S.  125. 
That  husband  is  liable  for  mainte- 
nance or  necessaries,  etc.,  of  wife 
when  she  is  separated  or  living  apart 
from  him,  see  Llewellyn  v.  Levy,  163 
Pa.  647;  30  Atl.  292;  Davis  v.  St.  Yin- 
cents  Inst.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  9th  C), 
61  Fed.  277;  Seybold  v.  Morgan.  43 
111.  App.  39;  Mclvinney  v.  Juliman, 
38  Mo.  App.  344;  Le  Boutilier  \. 
Fiske,  47  Hun  (N.  Y.),  323;  Anony- 
mous, 21  Misc.  (X.   Y. )  656;  Lord  v. 


Thompson,  9  J.  &  S.  (X.  Y.)  115; 
Hartjen  v.  Keubsamen,  19  Misc.  (N. 
V.I  149;  77  X.  Y.  St.  K.  446;  43  N. 
V.  Supp.  466;  Lockwood  v.  Thomas, 
12  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  248;  Kent  v. 
Brinckerhoff,  8  N.  Y.  St.  R.  794;  26 
Wkly.  Dig.  (X.  Y. )  438;  Blooming- 
dale  v.  Brinckerhoff,  2  Misc.  (X.  Y.  i 
49;49X.  Y.  St.  R.  142;20N.  V.  Supp. 
858;  Minck  v.  Martin,  22  J.  &  S.  iN. 
Y.)  136;  6  X.  Y.  St.  K.  803;  Com. 
v.  Tragic,  4  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  159;  40 
Wkly.  X".  C.  350.  Contra  see  Sawyer 
v.  Richards,  65  X.  H.  185;  2:',  Ail. 
150;  Raymond  v.  Cowdrey,  42  X.  V. 
Supp.  557:  19  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  34;  Cat- 
lin  v.  Martin,  69  X.  Y.  393;  Anderson 
v.  Cullen,  29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  494;  16 
Daly  (X.  Y. ),  15:  8  X.  Y.  Supp.  64:;. 
Blowers  v.  Sturtevant,  4  Den.  (  X. 
Y. )  46;  Guthrie  v.  Gorrecht  (Pa.  C. 
P.),  8  Lane.  L.  Rev.  25;  Hentze  v 
Marjenhoff,  42  S.  C.  427:  20  S.  E. 
278.  Examine  Raymond  v.  Hay 
mond,  74  Tex.  414;  12  S.  W.  90. 
See  Morse  v.  Morse.  65  Yt.  112;  26 
Atl.  528;  Hunt  v.  Hayes,  64  Vt.  89; 
15  L.  R.  A.  661;  23  All.  '.i20; 
34  Cent.  L.  J.  473;  45  Alb.  L.  J.  414; 
Mott  v.  Comstock,  8  Wend,  i  N.  V.) 
5  14;  Belknap  v.  Stewart  (Neb. ),  56; 
X.  W.  881. 

a4  Louisville,  etc.,  I!.  Co.  v.  Tram- 
well,  93  Ala.  350,  354,  per  McClel- 
lan,  .1. 

*  Dallas  A-  W.   l;.    Co.   v.  Spieker, 

61  To;.  427.      That    $6,250  not  exces- 

sive   damages   where    husband    had 
always    supported    his    wife,    was    a 

617 


§  516 


DEATH       DA. MACKS    GENERALLY. 


negligent  killing  of  a  husband  are  not  limited  to  the   simple 
value  of  his  support  and  protection  to  the  widow.36 


§  516.  Beneficiaries —Widow — Financial  condition  of  de- 
ceased husband — Increase  of  his  property — Dower — Settle- 
ment on  widow. — In  a  New  York  case  the  administratrix  of  the 
deceased  was  permitted  to  testify  in  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  his  negligent  death  that  he  left  no  property  .;?7  And  the 
widow  may  recover  for  the  negligent  killing  of  her  husband  not 
only  the  value  of  his  support,  but  the  damages  ma}r  include  com- 
pensation for  the  share  which  she  might  reasonably  be  expected 
to  have  received  from  an  increase  to  his  property  or  accumula- 
tions to  his  estate  had  he  not  been  thus  wrongfully  killed.33  So 
in  an  action  by  a  widow  under  the  Florida  statute  for  her  hus- 
band's death,  the  damages  may  include  compensation  for  her 
loss  of  whatever  she  reasonably  could  have  expected  to  receive 
by  way  of  dower  or  legacies  from  his  estate,  where  her  life  ex- 
pectancy would  exceed  his.39  Again,  it  is  held  not  error  to  re- 
fuse to  charge  the  jury  that  in  case  the  deceased  was  largely 
indebted  at  the  time  of  his  death,  the  plaintiff  would  have 
no  pecuniary  interest  in  his  life  until  his  debts  were  paid,  and 
the  jury  in  estimating  the  pecuniary  value  of  the  loss  of  the 
plaintiff's  husband,  must,  if  they  can,  fix  a  period  in  his  life  if 
he  had  lived  when  he  would  have  acquired  property  beyond  his 
debts. w  And  in  an  English  case  it  is  declared  that  financial  pro- 
visions made  by  a  husband  for  the  maintenance  of  his  widow 
might  be  considered  in  estimating  her  loss,  but  that  the  nature 
of  the  provision  and  the  position  and  means  of  the  deceased  ought 
to  govern  the  extent  to  which  reduction  should  be  made  in  the 
damages,  as  where  deceased  did  not  earn  his  living,  and  had  set- 


healthy  man,  earning  from  .$500  to 
$1,200  a  year  and  of  the  age  of  55, 
see  Paschall  v.  Owen  (Tex.),  14 
S.  W.  203. 

36  Bauer  v.  Richter,  103  Wis.  412; 
79  N.  W.  404. 

37Koosorouska  v.  Glasser,  8  N.  Y. 
Supp.  197. 

88  So  held  in  Bauer  v.  Richter,  103 
Wis.  412  ;  79  N.  W.  404.  See  Kas- 
pari  v.  Marsh,  74  Wis.  563  ;  Annas  v. 
618 


Milwaukee,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  67  Wis.  48; 
Lawson  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  64 
Wis.  448. 

39  Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox- 
worth,  41  Fla.— ;  25  So.  338;  13  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  469,  under  Fla. 
Acts,  1883,  chap.  3439,  sec.  2.  See 
chap.  27,  herein,  as  to  dower. 

40  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Hender- 
son, 51  Pa.  315. 


DEATH       DAMAGES   GENERALLY. 


6  51' 


tied  one  half  of  his  income  on  his  wife,  his  death  would  not  oc- 
casion the  loss  of  that  half,  although,  to  the  extent  of  her  inter- 
est in  the  other  half,  the  jury  might  estimate  her  loss." 

§  517.  Beneficiaries— Widow  and  children— Number,  ages, 
sex,  dependency  and  support— Financial  and  physical  condi- 
tion Expenditures  and  financial  condition  of  deceased— 
Generally.— The  courts  in  determining  whether  or  not  the  dam- 
ages awarded  are  excessive,  have  in  numerous  cases  considered 
not  only  the  number,  ages  and  sex  of  the  surviving  children, 
but  also  the  fact  of  the  dependency  of  the  widow  and  children 
upon  the  deceased  for  support,  his  contribution  in  whole  or  in 
part  thereto,  and  in  some  case  their  physical  condition  and  the 
financial  as  well  as  physical  condition  of  the  deceased.42 


41  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  of  Canada 
v.  Jennings,  13  App.  Cas.  800;  58  L. 
J.  P.  C.  1;  59  L.  T.  N.  S.  079;  37 
Week.  R.  403,  per  Lord  Watson  who 
also  considers  Hicks  v.  Newport,  A. 
&  H.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Best  &  S.  403.  See 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Trammell, 
93  Ala.  350,  354,  per  McClellan,  J., 
noted  in  next  preceding  section 
herein. 

42  Deceased  whose  expectancy  of 
life  was  25  years  contributed  $800  to 
$900  a  year  to  his  wife  and  children 
for  their  support— $10,000  held  not  ex- 
cessive. St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Sweet,  60  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571. 
Deceased  contributed  from  his  earn- 
ings of  $00  per  month,  from  $40  to 
$55  per  month  to  his  family,  consist- 
ing of  a  widow  and  children.  He 
had  no  other  means  of  revenue— 
$7,500  held  excessive.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Robbins,  57  Ark. 
377;  21  S.  W.  5GG.  Deceased  had  de- 
pendent upon  him  a  wife  and  adult 
unmarried  daughter  and  his  expect- 
ancy of  life  was  about  nine  and  one 
half  years  aud  his  utmost  >„M'oss  earn- 
ings would  have  only  amounted  to 
$12,000.     Held  that  $8,000  wa6  exces- 


sive. Harrison  v.  Sutter  St.  Ry.  Co., 
116  Cal.  156;  47  Pac.  1019;  1  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  403.  Invalid  wife  and 
daughter  survived — $8,000  held  not 
excessive.  Cook  v.  Ry.  Co.,  60  Cal. 
604.  Widow  and  minor  children  sur- 
vived; deceased  was  a  laborer — $5,000 
held  excessive.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Welden,  52  111.  2!)0.  Husband  left  a 
wife  and  three  children  aud  he  owned 
two  teams  at  his  decease — $5,000  held 
not  excessive.  Louisville,  X.  A.  & 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Patchen,  66  111.  App.  206. 
Widow  and  two  minor  children 
were  left — $5,000  held  not  excessive. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  54 
111.  App.  215.  Labor  of  deceased 
furnished  only  means  of  support  for 
his  wife  and  three  children — $5,000 
held  not  excessive.  Chicago  &  E.  I. 
R.  Co.  v.  Eneinin,  4s  ill.  App.  243. 
Widow  aud  two  sons  19  and  14 
years  old;  deceased  was  in  good 
health  and  a  postal  employee — $5,000 
held  not  excessive.  Malott  v.  Shinier, 
153  Iud.  35:  5  1  \.  E.  101:  1  Repr. 
1234;  6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  263;  15'  Am. 
&  Kim.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  774.  Widow 
and  six  young  children  survived. 
Deceased  provided  for  bis  family  to 
619 


§  518 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§  518.  Death— Pecuniary  loss  or  injury — The  statutes — 
Generally. — Some  of  the  statutes  expressly  provide  for  compen- 
sation based  upon  the  pecuniary  injury,  while  in  others  the  word 
pecuniary  does  not  appear,  and  in  several  states  there  are  ex- 


the  best  of  his  ability ;  $5,000  held  not 
excessive.  Board  of  Commrs.  How- 
ard Co.  v.  Legg,  110  Ind.  479;  11  X. 
E.  612.  Employee  50  years  old  left 
widow  and  four  children.  His  wages 
were  50  cents  an  hour  while  he 
worked,  and  the  amount  of  his  earn- 
ings were  left  indefinite  by  the  evi- 
dence; $1,500  was  awarded.  Boden 
v.  Demwolf  (U.  S.  D.  C.  E.  D.  La.), 
56  Fed.  846.  Widow  two  minors  and 
another  child  left— $5,000  held  not 
excessive.  Bolinger  v.  St.  Paul  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  36  Minn.  418;  31  N.  W. 
856.  Intestate  was  a  bricklayer,  57 
years  old.  He  left  a  widow  and  three 
children,  aged  respectively  17,  14  and 
11.  Deceased  was  prosperous  in  busi- 
ness and  had  accumulated  property. 
He  was  suffering  from  a  disease 
which  might  soon  have  terminated 
his  life;  $3,800  held  not  excessive. 
Williams  v.  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co. 
(N.  J.),  37  Atl.  1107;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  569.  Deceased,  a  railroad  fire- 
man, left  a  wife,  son  and  daughter. 
He  never  earned  more  than  two  dol- 
lars a  day — $15,000  held  excessive. 
Cooper  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  25 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  383;  49  N.  Y. 
Supp.  481.  Widow  and  three  chil- 
dren were  left.  Deceased  was  in 
good  health  and  sole  support  of  his 
family  and  earned  $1.25  per  day — 
$5,000  held  not  excessive.  Felice  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  345;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  922;  1 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  637.  Deceased,  an 
expert  railroad  man,  30  years  old,  in 
good  health,  contributed  at  least  $45 
out  of  his  earnings  of  $75  per  month 
to  the  support  of  his  wife  and  two 
small  children.  He  was  thrifty  and 
620 


provided  a  comfortable  home  for  his 
family.  There  was  no  evidence  of 
what  sum  would  purchase  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  pecuniary  benefit  which 
the  widow  and  children  had  a  right 
to  reasonably  expect  from  his  life 
continuance — $15,000  held  not  exces- 
sive. Ft.  Worth  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kime,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  271;  51  S. 
W.  558,  affd  54  S.  W.  240.  Deceased 
devoted  most  of  his  earnings  of  $60 
per  month  to  the  support  of  his  wife 
and  five  children.  He  was  about 
40  years  old,  industrious,  frugal  and 
economical,  and  a  railroad  brake- 
man,  but  was  affected  with  asthma — 
$10,000  held  not  excessive.  Missouri, 
K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  15  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  689;  41  S.  W.  826.  De- 
ceased contributed  his  entire  wages 
of  $60  per  month  to. the  support  of 
his  wife  and  children.  He  was  in 
good  health,  47  years  old— $11,000 
held  not  excessive.  Tyler  v.  S.  E.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W.  796. 
Widow  and  seven  year  old  daughter 
survived,  average  wages  of  deceased 
were  $125  per  month ;  $5,000  to  eacli 
survivor  held  not  excessive.  St. 
Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 
78  Tex.  536;  15  S.  W.  104.  Widow 
and  two  young  children  left.  De- 
ceased was  stout  and  healthy,  35 
years  old  and  earned  $1.25  per  day — 
$10,000  held  not  excessive,  although 
the  court  declared  that  the  law  did 
not  intend  to  give  compensation  for 
anything  but  pecuniary  loss  by  esti- 
mating the  money  value  of  the  life  of 
the  relative,  but  that  the  inquiry  was 
not  intended  to  be  narrowed  down  by 
the  law  to  a  result  that  could  be  ex- 
actly accounted  for  by  the  facts  in 


DAMAGES    M.NERALLY.  §§  519,  520 

press  provisions  for  the  recovery  of  exemplary  or  punitive  dam- 
ages, while  in  a  few  states  such  damages  are  recoverable  even 
though  not  expressly  so  provided,  although  in  some  of  these 
latter  states  there  are  later  decisions  which  substantially  over- 
rule the  earlier  ones  allowing  such  damages.  These  differences 
in  the  statutes,  in  so  far  as  they  affect  the  measure  of  damages 
under  the  decisions,  will  appear  under  the  several  sections  within 
this  title. 

§  519.  Death— Pecuniary  loss  as  measure  of  damages.— In 

determining  whether  or  not  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained,  or  a 
loss  susceptible  of  a  pecuniary  estimate,  is  the  sole  standard  for 
the  admeasurement  of  damages  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  human 
being,  reference  must  be  had  (1)  to  the  meaning  of  the  word 
pecuniary  ;  (2)  to  the  terms  and  intent  of  the  statute  under 
which  recovery  is  sought ;  (3)  to  the  statutory  allowance  in 
certain  states,  of  exemplary  or  punitive  damages  and  the  limita- 
tions thereto ;  (4)  to  the  factor  of  solatium  or  the  inclusion  or 
exclusion  of  injuries  not  susceptible  of  being  estimated  on  any 
pecuniary  basis  ;  (5)  to  the  nature  of  the  action,  viz  :  (a)  whether 
the  recovery  rests  upon  a  survival  of  the  original  action,  or 
(16)  whether  it  is  an  action  for  compensation  to  the  beneficiaries 
for  the  loss  to  them  by  the  death  itself:  and  (6)  to  the  class  of 
beneficiaries  seeking  a  recovery  having  in  view  their  relation  to 
deceased.*5 

§  520.    Death     Pecuniary  loss  or  damage— Construed.— 

In  so  far  as  the  statutes  authorize  a  recovery  only  of  pecuniary 
loss  or  damage  occasioned  by  the  death  of  a  human  being,  the 
meaning  of  •'pecuniary"  becomes  important.  The  word  ought 
not  to  be  construed  in  this  connection  as  covering  a  loss  of  ac- 
tual money  alone.  Thus  what  dependents  may  have  received 
from  deceased  in  "money"  may  have  been  the  very  least  of  the 
benefits  conferred,"  and,  therefore,  not  of  itself  the  measure  of 


evidence  and  that  every  parent  and 
husband  has  for  his  wife  and  chil- 
dren a  pecuniary  value  beyond  the 
amount  of  his  earnings.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmbeig,  75  Tex.  61 ; 
12  8.  W.  838. 


4:!  See  citations  throughout  this 
title. 

**  Chicago,  Hock  1.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Porterfleld,  19  Tex.  Civ.  A.pp.  225; 
46  s.  \V.  919,  aff'd  49  S.  U\  :;u7:  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  It.  Cas.  N.  S.  383. 

1321 


§521 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


damages  or  of  the  pecuniary  loss.  The  word  pecuniary  may, 
however,  include  something  of  money  value,  or  the  means  of 
acquiring  either  money  itself  or  that  which  is  of  money  value.15 
Again,  pecuniary  loss  is  evidenced  in  this  class  of  cases  in  num- 
erous instances  by  facts  covering  not  only  that  which  is  capable 
of  being  definitely  estimated  in  money,  but  also  the  capacity  to 
create  something  tangible,  having  approximately  at  least  a  money 
equivalent  or  actual  commercial  value,  or  on  the?  contrary  it  may 
include  some  benefit  or  advantage  absolutely  incapable  of  being 
estimated  on  any  certain  money  basis,  and  as  has  been  clearly 
stated  '•  there  is  no  way  to  ascertain  mathematically  what  that 
damage  would  be,  it  necessarily  must  be  to  a  great  extent  specu- 
lative." « 

§  521.  Same  subject  continued. — An  instruction  may  prop- 
erly be  refused  which  fixes  the  pecuniary  loss  at  the  actual 
amount  in  money  which  a  widow  has  lost  by  reason  of  being 
deprived  of  her  husband's  support,4'  although  an  instruction 
may  direct  the  jury  to  fix  the  damages  at  a  fair  equivalent  in 
money  for  the  earning  power  of  the  deceased,  lost  by  the  de- 
struction of  his  life,  taking  into  consideration  his  age,  etc.48 
It  is  declared  in  a  New  Jersey  case  that.  "  our  statute  con- 
fines the  amount  of  the  recovery  in  such  cases  to  the  pecuniary 
injury  sustained  by  the  next  of  kin,  by  reason  of  the  death  of 
the  decedent  and  that  injury  as  was  said  by  Beaslev,  Ch.  J.,49 


45  Green  v.  Hudson  K.  R.  Co.,  32 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  25,  33,  per  Allen,  J. 
See  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
N.  Y.  274. 

46  Etherington  v.  Prospect  Park  & 
C.  I.  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641,  afTg  24 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  235;  Lockwood  v.  N. 
Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  523, 
case  affirms  20  Wkly.  Dig.  341;  Ohio 
&  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin,  152  111.  138; 
38  N.  E.  760;  Andrews  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  86  Iowa,  677;  53 
N.  W.  399;  12  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  296; 
52  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  252;  Tennes- 
see Coal  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Herndon,  100 
Ala.  451;  14  So.  287.  "When  the 
suit  is  brought  by  the  representative 
the  pecuniary  injury  resulting  to  the 

622 


next  of  kin  is  equally  uncertain  and 
indefinite.11  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barron,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)90;  Kane  v. 
Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  90  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
65;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35  N.  Y. 
Supp.  581,  case  aff'd  153  N.  Y. 
680. 

47  Barth  v.  Kansas  City  El.  Ry.  Co., 
142  Mo.  535;  44  S.  W.  778;  10  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  281 ;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  682. 

48  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Lang, 
100  Ky.  221;  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  67;  40  S. 
W.  451,  modifying  19  Ky.  L.  Rep.  65; 
38  S.  W.  503,  modification  denied  19 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  68;  41  S.  W.  271. 

49  In  Paulrnier  v.  Railroad  Co.,  34 
N.  J.  L.  158. 


DEATH     -DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§521 


'is  nothing  more  than  a  deprivation  of  a  reasonable  expectation 
of  a  pecuniary  advantage  which  would  have  resulted  by  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  life  of  the  deceased.'"7'  And  to  much  the 
same  effect  is  a  .Mississippi  case  which  holds  that  the  word. 
" pecuniary "  comprehends  such  prospective  advantage  and  is 
not  confined  in  its  meaning  to  present  money  losses."'1  But  it  is 
held  under  the  Michigan  statute  that  all  injuries  not  susceptible 
of  being  compensated  for  by  a  money  consideration  to  the 
beneficiaries  should  be  excluded  in  admeasuring  damages."'-'  In 
conclusion  we  may  add  that  the  recovery  is  the  money  estimate 
of  the  loss  sustained,  based  on  as  certain  elements  of  damages, 
as  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case  may  permit  of, 
reference  being  had  to  the  intent,  express  or  implied,  of  the 
statute  under  which  recovery  is  sought,  and  also  to  the  class  of 
beneficiaries  seeking  recovery.*1 


60  Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v. 
Graham,  G2  N.  J.  L.  00:  58  Alb.  L.  J. 
93;  40  Atl.  773;  17  Natl.  Corp.  Rep. 
213;  31  Chic.  L.  News,  35;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  060,  per  Gummere,  J. 

51  City  of  Vicksburg  v.  McLain,  67 
Miss.  4.  See  Dalton  v.  Southeastern 
Ry.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  N.  S.  206;  Boyden  v. 
FitchburgR.  Co.,  70  Vt.  125;  Pym  v. 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  4  B.  &  S. 
406. 

52Mynning  v.  Detroit  L.  &  N.  R. 
Co.,  59  Mich.  257;  26  N.  W.  514,  un- 
der How.  Mich.  Stat.  sec.  8314. 

68  Opinions  of  text  writers. — The 
principle  on  which  damages  are 
awarded  in  this  class  of  cases  is  com- 
pensation for  the  pecuniary  loss  or 
injury.  There  must  be  evidence  of 
pecuniary  loss  to  the  survivors  or 
beneficiaries  to  enable  them  to  re- 
cover substantial  damages.  .  .  .  The 
loss  must  be  such  as  can  be  com- 
puted or  estimated  by  a  money  con- 
sideration." Black's  Law  it  l'ract. 
in  Accdt.  Cas.  (ed.  1000),  sec.  254, 
citing  Demarest  v.  Little.  Is  \'i. 
(X.  V.  i  28;  Huntingdon,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  v.  Decker,  84  Pa.  St.  419;  Myn- 


ning  v.  Detroit,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.-,  59 
Mich.  257;  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Berry,  96  Ky.  604,  and  other  cases. 
"  The  pecuniary  damage  which  alone 
can  be  recovered  in  most  of  the 
states  for  the  death  of  any  person 
must  be  something  of  definite  and 
almost  of  commercial  value.  It  is 
not  necessary,  however,  to  show  that 
the  deceased  was  under  any  legal 
obligation  to  the  next  of  kin.  If 
they  had  a  reasonable  expectation 
from  the  continuance  of  his  life,  they 
may  recover  for  it."  2  Shearman 
&  Redfield  on  Neg.  (5th  ed.)  sec. 
769.  "  The  rule  confining  recoveries 
to  pecuniary  losses  is  not  applied  in 
a  strict  sense.  '  When  we  consider' 
says  Fullerton,  '  the  defect  which  the 
statute  was  designed  to  remedy,  it 
is  taking  too  narrow  a  view  of  the 
matter  to  say  that  the  word  pecu- 
niary was  used  in  so  limited  a  sense 
as  to  embrace  only  losses  of  money.1 " 
3  Sutherland  on  Dam.  (2d  ed.) 
sec.  1263,  citing  Mclntyre  v.  New 
York  C.  R.  Co..  37  X.  Y.  287  I  35  How. 
[N.  Y.]  36;  4  Trans.  App.  1.  case 
affirms  47  Barb.  [N.  Y.]  515  i:  Tilley 
623 


§521 


DEATH      DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  471 
(23  How.  [N.  Y.]  363);  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.  v.  Keller,  67  Pa.  St.  300. 
"The  use  of  'pecuniary'  to  desig- 
nate the  kind  of  loss  for  which  re- 
covery can  be  had  is  misleading  for 
the  damages  are  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  the  loss  of  money  or  of  what 
can  be  estimated  in  money.  .  .  . 
The  meaning  would  be  better  ex- 
pressed by  '  material '  as  was  sug- 
gested by  Patterson,  J.,  as  in  an  opin- 
ion in  which  he  carefully  reviews  all 
English  decisions''  (citing  Lett  v. 
Lawrence  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  11  Out.  App. 
1;  Patterson's  Railway  Accident 
Law);  Tiffany's  Death  by  Wrong- 
ful Act  (ed.  1893),  sec.  158. 

Age,  etc.,  of  children  —  Excessive 
and  inadequate  damages- -Decisions. 
Boy  10  months  old,  healthy,  etc., — 
$1,000  held  not  excessive.  Hoppe  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  61 
Wis.  359;  21  N.  W.  227.  Child  18 
months  old — $2,000  held  not  exces- 
sive. Scarier  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  65  Wis.  457;  27  N.W.  167. 
Son  25  months  old,  a  stout,  healthy 
sensible  boy — $6,000  held  not  exces- 
sive. Austin  Rap.  Trans.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cullen  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W. 
256,  rehearing  denied  30  S.  W.  578. 
Child  3  years  old — $12,500  in  favor 
of  the  parents  held  excessive  and 
reduced  to  $4,000.  Rice  v.  Crescent 
City  R.  Co.,  51  La.  Ann.  108;  24  So.  791. 
Deceased  was  under  4  years  of  age — 
$10,500  held  excessive  where  com- 
pensation only  is  allowed.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Creighton,  20 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  1691,  1698;  50  S.  W.  227; 
15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  713. 
Deceased  was  not  4  years  old  and 
no  special  pecuniary  injury  was 
shown — $4,000  held  excessive.  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mabie,  77  111. 
App.  176.  Girl  4  years  old,  $3,500 
held  excessive — $2,000  declared  suf- 
ficient.    West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 

624 


Scanlan,  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  113, 
aff'd  168  111.  34;  44  N.  E.  148.     Roy 

4  years  old — $5,000  held  excessive. 
Graham  v.  Consolidated  Traction 
Co.  (N.  J.  1899),  44  Atl.  964.  Boy 
between  4  and  5  years  old — $5,000 
held  grossly  excessive.  This  sum 
was  awarded  on  three  different  trials 
and  set  aside  each  time  and  the  court 
declared  that  it  would  continue  to 
set  aside  excessive  verdicts  just  as 
often  as  rendered.  Consolidated 
Traction  Co.  v.  Graham,  62  N.  J.  L. 
90;  40  Atl.  773;  58  Alb.  L.  J.  93;  31 
Chic.  L.  News,  35;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
660;  17  Natl.  Corp.  Rep.  213.  Boy  4 
years  old,  ordinarily  bright,  healthy, 
affectionate  and  obedient  —  $6,000 
held  excessive.  Fox  v.  Oakland 
Consol.  St.  R.  Co.,  118  Cal.  55;  9 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  825.     Child 

5  years  old,  healthy,  well  grown,  of 
fine  mind,  bright,  able-bodied,  duti- 
ful, etc., — $2,500  held  not  excessive. 
Ross  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  44  Fed.  44. 
Daughter  5  years  Old  — $2,000  in 
favor  of  a  father  held  not  excessive. 
Huerzeler  v.  Central  Cross-Town  R. 
Co.  (C.  P.),  1  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  136;  48 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  649;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  676. 
Son  was  5  years  old — $1,000  was  re- 
covered for  damages  to  the  child 
and  nominal  damages  to  the  father. 
Westerfield  v.  Levis  (La.),  9  So.  52. 
A  5  year  old  boy— $3,000  held  not 
excessive.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  Waniata,  6  111.  App.  481,  aff'd  169 
111.  17;  48  N.  E.  437.  Child  6  years 
old — $4,500  recovered.  Ahern  v. 
Steele,  46  Hun  (N  Y.),  517;  1  N.  Y. 
Supp.  257;  16  N.  Y.  St.  R.  24;  case 
rev'd  115  N.  Y.  203;  26  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
295;  22  N.  E.  193.  Girl  6  years  old, 
healthy,  bright  and  intelligent,  only 
child  of  gardener  and  his  wife  who 
survived  her — $5,000  recovered. 
Age,  sex,  general  health  and  intelli- 
gence considered  as  factors.     Hough- 


DEATH — DAMAGES    GENERALLY 


§521 


kirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 
92  N.  Y.  210,  rev'g  38  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
407;  15  Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  aff'd 
11  Ahb.  N.  C.  (X.  Y.)72;  63  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  328;  4  Month.  L.  Bull.  65. 
Deceased  was  G  years  old  —  $2,300 
held  not  excessive.  Strutzel  v.  St. 
Paid  City  R.  Co.,  47  Minn.  543;  50 
X.  W.  690;  11  Ky.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  132. 
Son  was  6  years  old,  in  good  health 
and  of  ordinary  intelligence  and 
promise  —  $3,000  held  excessive. 
Gundersou  v.  North  Western  El.  Co., 
47  Minn.  161;  49  N.  W.  694.  Son  6 
or  7  years  old — $2,000  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Becker,  84  111.  483.  Boy  7  years  old, 
bright,  intelligent,  healthy  and  very 
industrious — $5,000  held  not  exces- 
sive. Taylor,  B.  &  II.  R.  Co.  v. 
Warner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),31  S.  W.  66. 
Son  7  years  old — $2,000  to  a  parent 
held  not  excessive.  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gilmore  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1899),  53  S.  W.  61.  Boy  7 
years  old,  bright  and  healthy — $3,500 
not  excessive.  Heinz  v.  Brooklyn 
Heights  R.  Co.,  91  Hun  (N.  Y.),  640; 
71  N.  Y.  St.  R.  023;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 
675.  Son  7  years  old — $2,500  held 
not  excessive.  Johnson  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  425;  25  N.  W. 
223.  Son  was  8  years  old— $4,000 
was  reduced  to  $2,000.  Vicksburg 
v.  McLain,  67  Miss.  4;  6  So.  774. 
Son  8  years  old — $1,200  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Strong  v.  Stevens  Point,  62 
Wis.  255;  22  N.  W.  425.  Bright  boy 
8}  years  old  —  $6,000  held  excessive. 
Schaffer  v.  Baker  Trans.  Co.,  29  App. 
Div.  (  X.  V.)  459;  51  N.  Y.  Supp.  1092. 
Boy  10  years  old — $2,850  held  not 
excessive.  Omaha  v.  Richards,  49 
Neb.  244:  68  X.  \V.  52S,  aff'd  70  X. 
W.  363.  Boy  10  years  old— $5,000  to 
next  of  kin  held  excessive.  North 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wrixon,  51  111. 
App.  307.  Boy  10  years  old  attend- 
ing school  and  at  times  did  errands 

40 


for  his  mother — $1,500  in  her  favor 
held  excessive.  Heusner  v.  Houston 
W.  St.  &  P.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  7  Misc.  (  X.  Y.  > 
48;  57  X.  Y.  St.  R.  528;  27  X.  V. 
Supp.  365.  Boy  11  years  old— $1,500 
recovered.  O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R.  R. 
Co..  38  N.  Y.  445.  Girl  11  years  old, 
healthy  and  strong — $1,500  held  not 
excessive.  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  00  Mich.  201 :  :):)  \.  W. 
300.  Son  11  years  old— $1,300  held 
not  excessive.  Citizens  St.  Ry.  Co. 
v.Lowe  (Ind.  App.),  39  N.  E.  105. 
Boy  11  years,  8  mouths  old,  intel- 
ligent, healthy  and  promising — 
$3,000,  held  not  grossly  excessive. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunden,  37 
Kan.  1;  14  Pac.  501.  Boy  about  12 
years  old — $2,500  held  not  more  than 
compensatory.  Case  was  princi- 
pally one  of  negligence  and  contrib- 
utory negligence  and  evidence  would 
have  justified  punitive  damages. 
Iron  Mountain  R.  Co.  v.  Dies,  98 
Tenn.  655;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  273. 
Boy,  12  years  old,  was  killed  by  ele- 
vator. The  death  was  occasioned 
by  defendant's  negligence.  Verdict 
of  one  cent  damages  was  held  inade- 
equate  aud  new  trial  granted.  Lee 
v.  Publishers,  137  Mo.  385;  38  S.  W. 
1107;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  297.  Boy,  12 
years  old,  healthy  and  ordinarily  in- 
telligent, had  gone  to  school  and 
learned  to  read,  write  and  cipher, 
was  gooil  boy  to  work  and  helped 
to  do  chores — $1,000  not  excessive. 
New  York  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Mush- 
rush  (Ind.  App.  1894),  37  N.  E.  904. 
Girl,  12  years  old — $2,500  held  not 
excessive.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  K. 
Co.  v.  Then,  159  111.  5:;:.;  42  X.  E. 
971.  affg  59  111.  App.  501.  Sons,  one 
13,  another  1">  years  old— $9:>;  and 
$1,050  both  held  excessive.  Telfer 
v.  Northern  II.  ('o..  30  X.  .1.  L.  L88. 
Son,  1  1  years  old,  earning  capacity 
and  expenses  of  maintainance  eon 
sidered  also — $1,250  held  not  ezces- 


§521 


DEATH— DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


sive.  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Nee 
(Pa),  13  Atl.  841,  and  annotations. 
Boy,  15  years  old,  a  farm  hand — 
$3,000  held  excessive  in  action  by 
next  of  kin — $1,500,  declared  suffi- 
cient. May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  67;  42  Atl.  165;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  417;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  517.  Boy,  15  years  old, 
strong,  robust  and  attentive  to  busi- 
ness, etc. — $1,846.40  held  not  exces- 
sive. Franke  v.  St.  Louis  (Mo.),  19 
S.  W.  938.  Son,  16  years  old— $1,700 
in  favor  of  a  mother  held  not  exces- 
sive. Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros. 
Co.,  86  Wis.  576;  57  N.  W.  298.     Son, 

16  years  old,  strong,  healthy,  indus- 
trious and  of  average  intelligence — 
$4,500,  in  favor  of  widowed  mother, 
held  not  excessive.  Turner  v.  Nor- 
folk &  W.  R.  Co.  ( W.  Va. ),  22  S.  E.  83. 
Daughter,  16  years  old— $4,000  re- 
duced to  $2,500.  Dinnihan  v.  Lake 
Ont.  B.  Imp.  Co.,  8  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. ) 
509;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  764.  Boy,  16 
years  old,  was  killed  by  collision 
with  team,  while  he  was  riding  a  bi- 
cycle— $2,000  held  not  excessive. 
Quinn  v.  Pietro,  38  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
484;  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  419.  A  17  year 
old  boy— $2,500  to  next  of  kin,  held 
not  excessive.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gilbert,  51  111.  App.  404.     Daughter, 

17  years  old — $5,000  held  excessive. 
Chicago,  E.  &  L.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Adam- 
ick,  33  111.  App.  412.  Boy,  17  years 
old,  and  a  competent  compositor — 
$2,400  held  not  excessive.  Post  v. 
Olmstead,  47  Neb.  893;  66  N.  W.  828. 
Son,  18  years  old,  industrious,  etc. — 
$5,000  held  not  excessive.  Gulf  C. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamilton  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  28  S.  W.  906.  Son,  18  years 
old— $2,250  held  excessive.  Hick- 
man v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  22  Mo. 
App.  344.  Son,  18  years  old  and 
brakeman  —  $5,000  held  excessive. 
Parson  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  94 
Mo.  286;  6  S.  W.  464.     Son,  18  years 

626 


old — $3,400  held  excessive.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield,  37  Mich. 
205.  Son,  between  18  and  19  years 
old,  robust,  healthy  and  dutiful, 
etc. —  $2,000  awarded.  Myhan  v. 
Louisiana  Elect.  L.  &  P.  P.  Co.,  41 
La.  Ann.  964;  6  So.  799;  7  L.  R.  A. 
172.  Girl,  19,>  bright  and  industri- 
ous, and  gave  earnings  to  support 
family  —  $6,000  held  excessive  — 
$4,000  sufficient.  Seeley  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&.  H.  R.  R  Co.,  8  App.  Div.  402;  40 
N.  Y.  Supp.  866;  75  N.  Y.  St.  R.  261. 
Son  19  years  old,  healthy  and  indus- 
trious—  $5,000  held  not  excessive. 
Twist  v.  Rochester,  37  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  307;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  850. 
Son  19  years  old,  strong  and  vigorous 
— $2,500  in  favor  of  the  parents  was 
recovered.  Erslew  v.  New  Orleans  & 
N.  E.  R.  Co.,  49  La.  Ann.  86;  21  So. 
153.  Deceased  was  19  years  old,  in 
good  health,  strong  and  intelligent — 
$3,000  to  next  of  kin  not  excessive. 
Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Branyon  (Ind. 
App. ),  37  N.  E.  190.  Unmarried  son 
21  years  old — $2,500  held  not  exces- 
sive. Webster  Mfg.  v.  Mulvaney,  68 
111.  App.  607,  aff'd  168  111.  311;  48  N. 
E.  168.  Deceased  was  22  years  old 
and  one  of  eight  children — $5,000 
reduced  to  $3,500  in  favor  of  parents. 
Flaherty  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 
(R.  I.),  36  Atl.  1132;  Index  S.  S.  Re- 
scripts, 19.  Son  22  years  old— $3,000 
held  excessive.  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  151.  Son  22  years 
old— $7,500  was  reduced  to  $6,000  as 
the  object  was  compensation  and  not 
benefit.  McFee  v.  Vicksburg  S.  & 
P.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  790;  7  So.  720. 
Son  22  years  old  had  given  one  half 
his  earnings  to  his  mother  who  was 
60  years  old  — $3,550  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Henry,  75  Tex.  220;  12  S.  W.  828. 
Deceased  was  23  years  old,  of  good 
habits,  etc. — $3,000  held  not  exces- 
sive.    O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  84  Cal. 


DEATH       DAMAGES    GENERALLY. 


§521 


489;  24  Pac.  2(59.  Son  26  years  old, 
only  child  of  widow  51  years  old — 
$4,200  recovered.  Texas  &  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lester,  75  Tex.  56.  Uu married 
son  33  years  old  and  supported  pa- 
rents over  70  years  old — §5,000  held 
excessive,  $3,000  declared  sufficient. 
Leiter  v.  Kiunare,  68  111.  App.  558. 
Son  35  years  old — 8870  in  favor  of 
father  ami  mother,  respectively  68 
and  67  years  old,  held  not  excessive. 
Texas  &  P.  Pc.  Co.  v.  Spence  (Tex.), 
52  S.  W.  562.  Daughter  36  years  old, 
in  good  health,  etc.  Bowles  v.  Rome 
W.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  46  Hun  (X.  Y.),  324; 
21  -V.  Y.  St.  R  457,  aff'd  113  N.  Y. 
643;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R  997;  21  \\  E.  414. 
Youn<r  man  of  perfect  and  vigor- 
ous health,  etc.  — $2,500  held  not  ex- 
cessive. Sieber  v.  Great  Northern 
R.  Co.,  76  Minn.  269;  79  N.  W.  95. 
Daughter  in  good  health  and  sup- 
porting aged  father — $3,000  not  ex- 
cessive. Purcell  v.  Lauer,  14  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  33;  43  X.  Y.  Supp.  988. 
Strong  healthy  boy  and  of  assist- 
ance to  his  widowed  mother — $3,500, 
held  not  excessive.  San  Antonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Watzlavzick  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  28  S.  W.  115.     Infant  instantly 


killed.  Hamilton  v.  Morgan  L.  &  T. 
R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  824;  8  So. 
586.  Adult  daughter  earning  small 
wages,  etc.— $4,140  held  excessive. 
Armour  v.  Czischki,  59  111.  App.  17. 
Unmarried  son  —  S3, 500,  held  ex- 
cessive by  $2,000,  in  favor  of  a 
woman  54  years  old.  Innes  v.  Mil 
waukee,  103  Wis.  582;  79  N.  W.  783. 
Son's  expectancy  of  life  was  over 
36  years— $2,000,  in  favor  of  mother 
69  years  old,  held  not  excessive. 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Royall,  18 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  86;  43  S.  W.  815. 
Deceased  son's  expectancy  of  life, 
was  23}  years,  his  health  was  good, 
etc. — $6,500,  held  not  excessive.  Lit- 
tle Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R  Co.  v.  Vos8 
(Ark.),  18  S.  W.  172.  Boy  killed  by 
an  electric  car — $2,783,  held  exces- 
sive, although  remitted  to  $2,000. 
East  St.  Louis  Elect.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burns,  77  111.  App.  529.  Amount  of 
recovery  for  minor  child  killed  by 
negligence  of  railroad  held  to  be 
$5,000.  Tobin  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R  Co. 
(Mo.).  18  S.  W.  996.  under  Mo.  Rev. 
Stat.  1889,  sec.  2305.  Infant  son- 
Si, 000  not  excessive.  Joliet  v.  Wes- 
ton, 123  111.  641. 

627 


DEATH— DAMAGES 


CHAPTER  XXV.     N 

DEATH — DAMAGES    PROPORTIONED   TO   THE   INJURY. 


522.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  I      537. 

injury — Statutes. 

523.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Statutes  —  Con- 
tinued. 

524.  Damages  proportioned  to  the       538. 

injury — Pecuniary  loss. 

525.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Pecuniary     loss —        539. 
Evidence. 

526.  Damages  proportioned  to  the        540. 

injury — Exemplary       dam- 
ages. 

527.  Damages  proportioned  to  the        541. 

injury — Jury  and     instruc- 
tions to  jury. 

528.  Damages  proportioned  to  the        542. 

injury — Factors      generally 
to  be  considered. 

529.  Damages  proportioned  to  the        543. 

injury — Sufferings     of     in- 
jured person.  544. 

530.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury— Mental     and     phy-        545. 
sical       suffering — Loss     of 
society,  etc. 

531.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Relationship    legal       546. 
and   actual   of   deceased  to 
beneficiaries — Support  and 
dependency.  547. 

532.  Same  subject  continued. 

533.  Same  subject  concluded. 

534.  Damages  proportioned  to  the        548. 

injury — Contract  relation. 

535.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Reasonable    expec-        549. 
tation  of  pecuniary  benefit. 

536.  Same  subject  continued. 

628 


Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Physical  and  finan- 
cial condition,  age,  number 
of  family,  etc.,  of  benefici- 
aries. 
Damages  proportioned  to  tbe 
injury — Expenses  of  sick- 
ness, funeral,  etc. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Annuity. 
Damages  proportioned  to  tbe 
injury — Life       expectancy — 
Annuity,  etc.,    tables. 
Damages      proportioned      to 
the   injury — Nominal  dam- 
ages. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 
iujury — Death  of  husband — 
Husband  and  father. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Death  of  wife. 
Damages  proportioned  to  tbe 

injury — Death  of  parent. 
Damages  proportioned  to  tbe 
injury — Death   of   parent — 
Care,  training,  etc.,  of  chil- 
dren. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death  of   parent — 
Children's  majority. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death  of    children 
— Generally. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death     of       minor 
children. 
Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death  of    children 
—Minority  and  majority. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


■>■> 


§550.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Death  of  children 
— Adults. 

551.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Evidence  —  Gen- 
erally. 

552.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Excessive  and  in- 
adequate damages — Gener- 
ally. 

553.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Evidence  of  de- 
ceased's habits — Mitiga- 
tion. 


554.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury      Insurance. 

555.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury — Legacy,    devise    or 
inheritance. 
550.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 
injury — Marriage      and    re- 
marriage. 

557.  Damages  proportioned  to  the 

injury  —  Defenses  —  Pre- 
scribing medicine  for  own 
family. 

558.  Damages  proportioned  to  tin- 

injury — Self-defense — justi- 
fication. 


§  522.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Statutes.  The 
statutes  of  England,  Nova  Scotia,  Ontario,  Arizona,1  Maryland, 
South  Carolina  and  Texas  3  provide   that  "  the  jury  may  give 


!Rev.  Stat.  Ariz.  1887,  sec.  2155, 
now  changed;  but  the  state  is  here 
classified  by  reason  of  the  decisions 
under  that  enactment. 

2  Eng.  9  and  10  Vict.  ch.  93,  am'd 
27  and  28  Vict.  ch.  95  (Scotland  ex- 
pressly excluded).  As  to  English 
Employer's  Liability  act,  see  43  and 
44  Vict.  ch.  42  (personal  injuries); 
English  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act,  1897,  cl.  1  (a)(i);  id.  sec.  7,  subd. 
2;  Nov.  Scot.  Kev.  Stat.  1884,  ch. 
116  Ont.  Rev.  Stat.  1887,  ch.  135  (R. 
S.  Ont.  1877,  ch.  128,  re-enacted  in 
that  province,  Lord  Campbell's  Act,  9 
and  10  Vict.  ch.  93;  In  re  The  Gar- 
land ;  Monagban  v.  Horn,  7  S.  C.  R. 
409,  Out.,  and  art.  10."j6,  C.  C.  is  re-en- 
actment and  reproduction  of  the  Con. 
Stat.  L.  C.  C.  78;  Canadian  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  14  S.  C.  It.  105, 
(Ont.)  Canada.  Code,  art.  L056. 
Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  pp.  733,  734, 
sees.  2704,  27G6  changes  Ariz.  Rev. 
Stat.  1887,  tit.  36,  sees.  2145,  2155,  and 
see  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  p.  438,  sec.  1349, 
(140),  as  to  nonabatement  by  death. 
See  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  p.  734,  sec. 
2767,  as  to   liability  of   corporation 


to  employee.  The  act  sees.  2764.  2767 
took  effect  April  19,  1901.  Md.  Pub. 
Gen.  Laws,  Poes  Code,  1888,  art.  67, 
sees.  1,  4:  Pub.  Gen.  Laws,  1888, 
sec.  25;  Pub.  Gen.  Laws,  1860,  ait. 
65,  sees.  1-4;  1852,  ch.  299.  sec.  1. 
S.  C.  1  Rev.  Stat.  1893,  pp.  800,  801, 
sees.  2315-2318;  <ieu.  Stat.  1882, 
sees.  2183,  2186;  21  S.  C.  Stat,  at  L 
p.  523.  Tex.  Const,  art.  16.  sec  26; 
Sayle's  Civ.  Stat.  &  Supp.  1900.  p. 
1113,  art.  3017  (2899);  p.  1115,  arts. 
3018  (2900).  pp.  1117-1119,  arts. 
3019-3027,  (2901-2909),  p.  1248.  arts. 
3354(3203);  arts.  L248,  1255,  3353a; 
Act  May  4,  1895,  Act  March  25,  1887; 
Pascbal's  Dig.  1866,  p.  98,  art.  15. 
Right  of  action,  etc.,  for  death,  etc., 
including  loss  of  life  by  negligence, 
etc.,  of  railroad  train,  stage  coach 
and  other  vehicles  of  conveyance 
by  common  carriers,  etc.,  Sayle's  (  i\. 
Stat.  arts.  2S99.  2909,  3202;  PaschaPs 
Dig.  1866,  art.  15,  sec.  1,  p.  98;  Kev. 
Stat.  2S79.  art.  2899.  As  to  injuries. 
etc.,  to  employees,  see  Laws,  1891, 
ch.  24.  Rev.  Stat.  1895,  arts.  3021, 3022 ; 
id.  arts.  3024,3026,  provide  only  for 
survival     of     action    for     negligent 

629 


$  522 


DEATH      DAMAGES 


such  damages  as  they  may  think  proportioned  to  the  injury 
resulting  from  such  death." 3  The  action  lies  whenever  the  death 
of  a  person  is  caused  by  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default,  such 
as  would  if  death  had  not  ensued  have  entitled  the  party  injured 
to  maintain  an  action  and  recover  damages  in  respect  thereof.1 


killing  during  lifetime  of  person  at 
fault.  Johnson  v.  Farmer,  89  Tex. 
610;  35  S.  W.  602.  Under  act  May  4, 
1895,  actions  did  not  abate  by  death 
of  either  party  and  actiou  of  personal 
injuries  received  before  passage  of 
act  survived  death  of  plaintiff. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 
15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  680;  39  S.  W.  1112; 
Under  Rev.  Stat.  1895,  s^c.  3353a, 
actions  pending  or  thereafter 
brought  for  personal  injuries,  not 
resulting  in  death,  survive  in  favor 
of  heirs  or  legal  representatives  of 
injured  party  upon  his  death.  Rev. 
Stat.  art.  1044,  provides  that  after 
appeal  the  death  of  a  party  shall  not 
abate  the  action. 

3  In  Ontario  "the  judge  or  jury." 
In  Arizona  under  Rev.  Stat.  1901, 
p.  734,  sec.  2766,  "The  jury  shall 
give  such  damages  as  they  shall 
deem  fair  and  just  not  exceeding 
$5,000." 

4  The  Ariz.  Stat,  of  1887,  sec.  2145, 
was  •'  when  the  death  of  any  person 
is  caused  by  the  wrongful  act,  neg- 
ligence, unskillfulness  or  default  of 
another,"  but  the  Stat,  of  1901  is 
same  as  in  above  text.  The  Ariz, 
act  of  1887,  also  provides  against 
"  unfitness,  gross  negligence  or  care- 
lessness," etc.,  of  certain  carriers. 
The  Texas  Stat.  Sayle's  Civ.  Stat.  & 
Supp.  1900,  p.  1113,  art.  3017,  (2899); 
id.  art.  3018  (2900),  is  the  same  as 
the  Ariz,  act  of  1887,  sec.  2145. 

The  act  applies  though  deceased 
icas  an  alien  and  was  at  the  time 
of  the  wrongful  act,  etc.,  causing  his 
death  on  the  high  seas.  The  Ex- 
plorer, 40  L.  J.  Adm,  41;  L.  R.  3 
030 


Adm.  289:  23  L.  J.  604;  19  W.  166; 
10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p.  106. 

Causes  of  action  are  several,  for 
death  of  fifty  miners  by  flooding  a 
mine,  in  favor  of  their  relatives 
brought  under  Lord  Campbell's  Act 
and  the  employer's  liability  act  and 
cannot  be  joined  in  one  action.  Car- 
ter v.  Rigby  (C.  A.  1896),  2  Q.  B.  113; 
65  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  537;  74  Law  T. 
Rep.  744. 

Pleading  and  evidence.  As  to  al- 
legation that  injuries  did  not  re- 
sult in  death,  and  evidence  of 
physicians  as  to  cause  of  death,  see 
Klatt  v.  Houston  Elec.  St.  R.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  57  S.  W.  1112. 
That  accident  to  employee  actually 
caused  by  positive  fault,  imprudence 
or  neglect  of  person  charged  must 
be  proven,  see  Montreal  Rolling 
Mills  Co.  v.  Corcoran,  26  Can.  S.  C. 
595,  an  action  by  a  widow  against  her 
husband's  employer. 

Only  ivhen  party  injured  could  have 
sued.  The  action  is  given  only  when 
deceased,  had  he  survived,  could  have 
maintained  the  action  against  the 
negligent,  etc.,  person.  Senior  v. 
Ward,  1  El.  &  El.  385;  28  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
139;  5  Jur.  (N.  S.)  172;  7  W.  R.  261: 
Read  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.,  9  B.  &  S. 
714;  37  L.  J.  Q.  B.  278;  L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
555;  18  L.  T.  82;  16  W.  R.  1040.  Uaigh 
v.  Royal  Mail  S.  P.  Co.,  52  L.  J.  Q. 
B.  640:  49  L.  T.  802;  5  Asp.  M.  C. 
189;  48  J.  P.  230;  Tucker  v.  Chap- 
lin, 2  Car.  &  K.  730:  Johnson  v. 
Farmer.  89  Tex.  610,  612,  613;  35  S. 
W.  1062,  per  Gaines,  C.  J.;  Galves- 
ton, Harrisbuig  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kutac,  72  Tex.  643,  651;  11  S.  W.  127; 


PROPORTIONED    TO    DfJl  BY. 


§522 


And,  the  person,  who  would  have  been  Liable  if  death  had  not  en- 
sued, is  liable  notwithstanding  the  death  of  the  injured  person, 
although  such  death  was  caused  under  such  circumstances  as 
amount  in  law  to  a  felony.' 


Artusy  v.  Missouri  Pae.  R.  Co.  (Tex.), 
11  S.  W.  177.  See  Armsworth  v. 
South  Eastern  Ky.,  11  Jur.  758; 
C'oyle  v.  Great  Northern  Ky.,  20  L. 
K.  Ir.  409;  Wright  v.  Midland  Ky., 
51  L.  J.  539;  Reed  v.  Northeastern 
K.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  42;  16  S.  E.  289  Not 
necessary  to  allege  that  defendant's 
negligence  was  such  that  if  death 
had  not  occurred  the  injured  party 
could  have  maintained  the  action. 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  K.  Co.  v. 
State,  Bitzer,  58  Md.  372.  Not  neces- 
sary to  charge  that  plaintiff  could 
not  recover  unless  deceased,  if  living, 
could  have  recovered.  Taylor  B.  & 
H.  B.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  79  Tex.  104;  14 
S.  W.  918;  23  Am.  Rep.  316.  There 
may  be  a  recovery  for  pecuniary  loss 
although  that  pecuniary  loss  would 
not  have  resulted  to  deceased  had  he 
lived.  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry., 
4  B.  &  S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  199;  8  L.  J.  734;  11  W. 
R.  922. 

6  Who  liable — Generally.  One  who 
fraudulently  sells  a  horse  know- 
ing that  it  has  a  contagious  disease 
may  he  liable  for  the  death  of  one 
ignorant  of  the  fact,  even  though  he 
is  merely  in  charge  of  the  horse  for 
the  purchaser,  where  such  disease 
is  the  natural  and  probable  cause  of 
the  death.  State,  llartlove,  v.  Fox. 
79  Md.  574;  29  Atl.  (101 ;  24  L.  R.  A. 
679.  So  one  may  be  liable  for  per- 
sonal injury  or  death  caused  by  his 
inducing  one  whose  mental  faculties 
are  suspended  by  intoxication  to 
swallow  spirituous  liquors  to  such  an 
excess  as  to  endanger  his  life.  Mc- 
Kue  v.  Klein,  60  Tex.  168;  48  Am. 
Rep.  261. 


Who  not  liable — Generally.  The 
failure  of  a  sheriff  to  resist  a  mob 
that  takes  a  prisoner  from  a  jail 
does  not  make  hi  in  liable,  la-  be- 
ing bona  fide  unable  to  physically 
withstand  and  there  being  no  ma- 
licious motive  on  his  part  and  no 
participation  in  the  violence,  even 
though  it  was  alleged  that  he  had 
been  warned  of  the  existence  of 
public  excitement  and  had  been  re- 
quested to  remove  him  to  a  secure 
place.  State,  Cocking,  v.  Wade,  87 
Md.  529;  40  Atl.  104;  40  L.  R.  A. 
628;  47  Cent.  L.  J.  368.  Where  a 
person  is  killed  while  illegally  en- 
gaged  in  oyster  dredging  by  a  shot 
from  one  of  the  vessels  of  the  state 
fishery  force  while  attempting  to 
arrest  him  and  seize  his  vessel, 
neither  the  Maryland  board  of  pub- 
lic works  nor  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  such  fishery  force  is  liable 
for  damages  for  the  killing.  Mister 
v.  Brown  (U.  S.  D.  C.  D.  Md.),  59 
Fed.  909.  A  principal's  liability  for 
the  acts  of  his  agent  is  confined  to 
the  class  of  cases  under  the  first 
clause  of  art.  2899  (art.  3017  of 
Stat.  1900),  and  this  does  not  in- 
clude a  sheriff  and  his  bondsmen  for 
acts  of  a  deputy  in  killing  one  at- 
tempting to  escape.  Ilendrick  v. 
Walton,  (39  Tex.  192;  <>  S.  W.  749. 
See  this  case  as  to  construction  of 
this  act  and  the  effect  of  change  of 
one  subdivision  of  said  section  by 
act  of  March  25,  1887.  When  rail- 
road companj  not  liable  for  killing 
by  its  agent,  Houston  £  T.  C.  K. 
Co.  v.  Lipscomb  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
62  S.  W.  954,  judgment  modified, 
Lipscomb  v.  Houston,  64  S.  W.  '.'23. 
Gol 


§  523 


DEATH       DAMAGES 


§  523.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Statutes — 
Continued. — The  executor  or  administrator  may  sue  in  Eng- 
land,   Nova    Scotia,    Ontario   and   South   Carolina."     While  in 


Said  art.  2899  (3017)  Does  not  in- 
clude persons  other  than  carriers, 
servants  or  agents.  Asher  v.  Cabell 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C),  2  U.  S.  App. 
158;  50  Fed.  818. 

Corporations.  A  corporation  is  a 
person  within  art.  2899  of  Tex.  Rev. 
Stat.  (art.  3017  of  Sayle's,  1900,  Stat. ). 
Kigdon  v.  Temple  Waterworks  Co., 
11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  512;  32  S.  W.  828. 
A  private  corporation  is  liable  for  in- 
juries resulting  in  death  from  what 
may  be  deemed  its  own  wrongful 
acts  or  omissions  as  distinguished 
from  acts  or  omissions  of  its  servants 
or  agents.  Cases  of  municipal  cor- 
porations should  be  distinguished 
from  this  case  under  art.  2899,  subd. 
2,  Rev.  Stat.  Tex.  and  in  view  of  art. 
3140,  id.  construing  the  word  '•per- 
son." Fleming  v.  Texas  Loan 
Agency,  S7  Tex.  23S;  27  S.  W.  126;  26 
L.  R.  A.  250  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S. 
W.  388.  Private  corporations  in- 
clude common  carriers  and  those  not 
common  carriers.  Lynch  v.  South- 
western Teleg.  &  Teleph.  Co.  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  32  S.  W.  776;  2  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  X.  S.  574.  A  corpor- 
ation is  still  liable  though  it  goes  out 
of  business.  Jones  v.  Spartenburg 
Herald  Co.,  44  S.  C.  526;  22  S.  E. 
731.     Under   the    Texas    statute    as 


it  stood  in  1884,  a  railroad  com- 
pany was  nqt  liable  in  damages  for 
the  death  of  a  person  killed  upon 
its  track,  unless  it  was  shown  by  the 
evidence  that  the  death  was  caused 
by  the  negligence  or  carelessness  of 
the  proprietor,  owner,  charterer, 
or  hirer  of  such  road  or  by  the  un- 
fitness, gross  negligence  or  careless- 
ness of  their  servants  or  agents. 
Dallas  City  R.  Co.  v.  Beeman,  74 
Tex.  291,  293;  11  S.  W.  1102,  per 
Acker  P.  J.,  citing,  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser, 
57  Tex.  305.  The  principal  case 
was  an  action  by  parents  for  dam- 
ages for  death  of  an  infant  son  who 
was  run  over  by  defendant's  car. 
Prior  to  the  Texas  act  of  March  25, 
1887,  omitting  the  word  "gross" 
from  art.  2899,  par.  2,  a  railroad 
company  was  not  liable  for  injuries 
resulting  in  death  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  servants  of  the  com- 
pany unless  the  negligence  was 
gross.  Sabine  &  East  Tex.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hawks,  73  Tex.  323,  324;  11  S.  W. 
377,  citing  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hill,  71  Tex.  451;  9  S.  W.  351.  See 
Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  p.  734,  sec.  2767, 
as  to  liability  of  corporations  to  em- 
ployees. See  as  to  English  Em- 
ployer's Liability  Act,  43  and  44  Vict, 
ch.  42.     "  Corporation  "  is  expressly 


6  See  statutes  cited  at  beginning 
of  next  preceeding  section.  In  Eng- 
land and  Ontario,  if  there  is  no  exec- 
utor or  administrator,  or  if  there  is 
one  and  no  action  is  brought  in  his 
name  in  6  months  after  the  death, 
all  or  any  of  the  persons  for 
whose  benefit  the  action  lies  may  sue. 
27  and  28  Vict.  ch.  95;  Ont.  Rev. 
Stat.  1887,  ch.  135,  sec.  7.  See  also 
Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1887,  sec.  2151; 
632 


Sayles  Civ.  Stat,  and  Supp.  1900, 
p.  1119,  art.  3023  (2905),  as  to  duty 
of  executor  or  administrator  to  sue 
within  limited  time.  Action  lies  by 
the  person  beneficially  entitled  with- 
in 6  months,  where  there  is  no  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator  (Lampman 
v.  Gainsborough,  17  O.  R.  191;  C.  P. 
D.  [Ont.],  or  by  a  relative.  Holleran 
v.  Bagwell,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  740. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INHUV. 


-  523 


Arizona  the  action  is  brought  by  the  personal  representative, 
except  that  the  father  or  in  certain  cases  the  mother  may  sue 
for  a  child's  death  or  a  guardian  for  the  death  of  his  ward,' 
and  in  Texas,8  all  the  persons  entitled  or  anyone  or  more  of 
them,  may  sue  for  the  benefit  of  all.9  Bui  in  Maryland  the  ac- 
tion is  brought  by  and  in  the  name  of  the  state  for  the  use  of 
those  entitled  to  damages."'     The  beneficiaries  in  all   the   juris- 


included  as  liable  under  Ariz.  Rev. 
Stat.  1901,  p.  733,  sec.  -'764,  and  so 
under  1  Rev.  Stat.  S.  C.  1893,  p.  800, 
sec.  2315  (2183).  while  the  Ariz,  act 
of  1887,  sec.  214."),  and  Sayle'a  Tex. 
Civ.  Stat,  and  Supp.  1900,  p,  1113,  art. 
3017  (2899)  made  and  make  certain 
carriers  liable,  and  the  same  section 
of  the  statute  in  Texas  provides  f«>r 
liability  of  receivers  of  railroads,  and 
both  the  Const.  (1876,  art.  16)  and 
the  statute  (Sayle's  1900,  p.  1117, 
art.  3020  [2902] )  of  that  state  also  ex- 
cluded regard  for  criminal  proceed- 
ings while  the  statute  (id.)  has  the 
above  text  provision  as  to  felony. 
"  Person  "  includes  bodies  politic 
and  corporate  under  the  Md.  Stat. 
sec.  34. 

Municipal  corporation  is  not  liable 
under  Texas  Rev.  Stat.  art.  2899 
(art.  3017,  Sayle's  Stat.  1900).  Ritz 
v.  Austin,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  455; 
20  S.  W.  1029,  1031;  Searight  v. 
Austin  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  42  S.  W. 
857.  Examine  City  of  Galveston 
v.  Barbour,  62  Tex.  172  ;  50  Am. 
Rep.  519,  where  it  is  said  that  in  the 
absence  of  an  express  statute  de- 
claring the  liability  of  a  municipal 
corporation  for  an  iujury  resulting 
from  neglect  of  a  city  to  keep  its 
sidewalks  and  streets  in  repair,  the 
corporation  is  liable. 

Receivers.  Although  the  Texas 
statute  of  1900  (see  beginning  of  this 
note)  contains  a  provision  as  to  a  lia- 
bility of  receivers,  the  decisions  in 
that  state  are  that  they  are  not  liable 
for  death  through  their  negligence  or 


that  of  tin-  employees  under  them 
upon  the  railroad.     Burke  v.  Dilliug 

bam  (U.  S.  C.  <'.  App.  5th  «'.  E.  I). 
T.x.i.  60.  Fe.I.  729;  Allen  v.  Dilling 
bam  |  U.  s.  < '.  C.  App.  5th  C.  E.  1). 
Tex.  |,  8  C.  C.  A.  544;  60  Fed.  176: 
Dillingham  v.  Scales  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  24  S.  \V.  '.i7.">;  Texas  &  I'ac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Collins,  84  Tex.  121;  19  S.  W. 
:}<;:,;  Turner  v.  Eddy, 83 Tex.  218;  18 
S.  W.  578;  15  1..  R.  A.  262;  Texas  & 
l'ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger,  79  Tex.  13;  15 
S.  \V.  214;  Brown  v.  Record  (Tex. 
Civ  .  A]. p.  i.  23  S.  \V.  7D4;  Texas  & 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Bledsoe  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  20  S.  W.  1135.  This  case, 
however,  makes  the  qualification 
that  they  were  not  personally  and 
immediately  guilty  of  negligence, 
etc.,  and  it  is  held  that  such  receiver 
is  not  a  necessary  but  a  proper  party 
to  the  action.  Dallas  Consol.  Tract. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hurley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  I, 
31  S.  \\\  73.  Examine  5  Thompson's 
Com.  on  Corp.    sec.  7159. 

Felony.  This  clause  is  considered 
hereinafter  under  the  section  as  to 
dofi'tises. 

7  Action  may  be  by  the  father,  or 
in  case  of  his  death  or  desertion  <>f 
his  family,  then  by  the  mother. 
Aiix.  Rev.  Stat.  1901,  p.  733,  sec.  2765. 

8  And    in    Ariz,     under    Rev.    st<t 
1877,  sec.  21 -vi. 

9  Sayle's  Civ.  Stat .  and  Supp.  1900, 
p.  HIS.  art.  31122  (2094  |. 

"  Md.  Tub.  Gen.  at  t.  67,  sec  2; 
Pub: Gen.  Laws!  I860),  art.  6".,  Bee.  2 . 
L852,  cb.  2'.".',  sec.  2. 

633 


S  523 


DEATH       DAMAGES 


dictions  noted  under  this  section  are  the  wife,  husband,  parent 
and  child,  although  the  statutes  are  differently  worded,  some  of 
them  using  the  disjunctive  "or"  and  others  the  conjunctive 
"and,"  while  the  acts  of  England,  Nova  Scotia  and  Ontario, 
extend   the   meaning  of   the    words   "parent"  and   "child."11 


11  Viz :  parent  includes  grandparent 
and  stepparent,  and  child  includes 
grandchild  and  stepchild;  and  in 
England  words  denoting  the  singu- 
lar number  include  the  plural,  and 
the  masculine  gender  includes  the 
feminine.  In  Arizona  Rev.  Stat,  of 
1887,  and  in  Texas  the  action  is  for 
the  "sole  and  exclusive  benefit," 
etc.  In  S.  C.  Rev.  Stat.  1893,  p.  801, 
sec.  2316,  dependent  heirs  at  law 
and  distributees  are  included  where 
there  are  none  of  the  others  in  exist- 
ence. An  illegitimate  child  is  not 
within  the  purview  of  the  statute. 
Dickinson  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.,  2  H. 
&  C.  735 ;  33  L.  J.  Ex.  91 ;  9  L.  T. 
299;  12  W.  R.  52;  Clarke  v.  Carfin 
Coal  Co.,  L.  R.  (1891)  App.  Cas.  412, 
H.  of  L.  (Sc).  Declarations  need  not 
negative  the  existence  of  any  rela- 
tions entitled  to  compensation 
other  than  those  on  whose  behalf  the 
action  purports  to  be  brought. 
Barnes  v.  Ward,  2  Car.  &  K.  661;  9 
C.  B.  392;  19  L.  J.  C.  P.  195;  14  Jur. 
334;  10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p. 
115.  The  question  whether  such  an 
action  can  be  maintained  for  gen- 
eral administration  instead  of  for  the 
surviving  family  cannot  be  raised  by 
allowance  of  an  amendment  as  there- 
by the  purpose  of  the  action  would 
be  changed.  All  v.  Barnwell  County, 
29  S.  C.  161;  7  S.  E.  58,  and  annot. 
Complaint  must  state  whether  per- 
son for  whose  benefit  action  is 
brought  is  only  one  beneficially  in- 
terested. Nohrden  v.  Northeastern 
R.  Co.,  54  S.  C.  492;  32  S.  E.  524;  13 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  557,  under 
21  S.  C.  Stat,  at  L.  p.  523.  Inaccu- 
634 


rate  or  erroneous  declaration  in  this 
respect  may  be  amended.  Reed  v. 
Northeastern  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  42;  16 
S.  E.  289.  As  to  what  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient averment  of  relationship  of 
plaintiff  and  her  children,  see  Lilly 
v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  C. 
142 ;  10  S.  E.  932.  Under  act  of  1859, 
existence  of  one  or  more  beneficia- 
ries must  be  averred.  Conlin  v. 
Conlin,  15  Rich.  Law  (S.  C),  201. 

One  action  for  benefit  of  all.  Suit 
by  widow  under  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1SS7, 
tit.  36,  sees.  2145,  2155.  Deceased 
was  killed  at  a  railroad  crossing;  four 
children  also  survived.  "The  ob- 
vious intent  and  effect  of  these  pro- 
visions is  that  the  action  is  to  be 
brought  once  for  all;  that  is  that  it 
is  to  be  prosecuted  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  relatives  mentioned,  the  hus- 
band, the  wife,  the  children  and 
the  parents  of  the  deceased,  and  that 
any  damages  recovered  are  to  belong 
to  all  those  relatives  and  to  be  shared 
among  them  in  the  proportions  de- 
termined by  the  verdict  of  the  jury. 
By  the  express  terms  of  the  statute 
the  action  may  be  brought  by  all  or 
any  of  them,  but  for  the  benefit  of 
all;  no  one  or  more  of  them  less 
than  all  can  excuse  the  executor  or 
administrator  from  bringing  and 
prosecuting  the  action  if  they  do  not. 
The  action  does  not  abate  by  the 
death  of  one  suing,  but  may  be  prose- 
cuted by  the  survivors  if  there  are 
any,  and  the  damages  recovered  are 
to  be  divided  among  all  of  them  in 
such  shares  as  the  jury  shall  fix  by 
their  verdict."  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v. 
Tomlinson,  163  U.  S.  369;  41  L.  Ed. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  523 


In  England  the  statute  does  Dot  give  an   independent  cause  of 
action  but  a  right  of  action  where  there  was  a  subsisting  one  al 


193;  1(5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1171,  per  Gray, 
J.    Complaint  cannot  be  amended  by 

averment  that  widow  brings  action 
for  benefit  of  herself  and  children 
and  so  entirely  change  the  nature  of 
the  action.  Lilly  v.  Charlotte,  C.  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  C.  142;  10  S.  E.  932. 
Statute  intends  but  one  action  for 
the  benefit  of  all  entitled.  Paschal 
v.  Owen,  77  Tex.  583;  11  S.  W.  203. 
Widow  may  sue  for  herself  and  for 
use  and  benefit  of  her  deceased  hus- 
band's parents  without  their  knowl- 
edge or  consent  and  even  though  the 
parents  have  no  right  to  recover. 
San  Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15 
Tex.  Civ.  A]. p.  229;  38  S.  W.  829. 
Grandchildren  are  not  necessary  par- 
ties. Dallas  Rapid  Transit  R.  Co.  v. 
Elliott  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),26  S.  \V.  455. 
Father  of  adult  leaving  wife  and  chil- 
dren is  not  necessary  patty.  St.  Louis, 
A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  5  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  668;  24 S.  W.  975.  Under  Lord 
Campbell's  Act  and  the  Employer's 
Liability  Act,  the  judgment  is  for  all, 
but  the  amount  to  be  paid  to  each 
must  be  found  and  set  forth  in  the 
judgment.  Carter  v.  Rigby  (C.  A.), 
(1896),  2  Q.  R.  113;  65  L.  .1.  Q.  I',.  \. 
S.  537;  74    Law   T.    Hep.    7 1  t. 

Not  more  than  one  action  lies  for  the 
same  subject-matter  under  the  Btat 
utes  of  England,  Nova  Scotia,  Ontario 
and  Maryland  and  the  South  Carolina 
act  makes  action  by  and  final  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  the  injured  party  a 
bar  (see  citations  of  statutes  at  be- 
ginning of  this  section ).  Judgment 
by  widow  does  not  bar  a  suit  in  favor 
of  posthumous  child,  for  although 
the  statute  contemplates  only  one 
suit,  yet  this  means  one  suit  brought 
by  all  the  beneficiaries  or  one  to 
which   they  are  parties,  and  if   the 


amount  of  the  compensation  of  any 
one  of  the  beneficiaries  is  no'  in- 
cluded in  a  suit,  he  is  entitled  to  it 
and  should  not  l»e  excluded  by  a 
judgment  iu  which  bis  rights  are  not 
considered.  Nelson  v.  Galveston,  II. 
A-  S.  A.  K.  Co.,  78  Tex.  621,  1526,  ul'7: 
14  S.  \\'.  1021;  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  Bl ; 
11  L.  R.  A.  391.  Although  the  Hex. 
Stats,  ait.  2899,  intends  that  hut  one 
suit  be  brought  nevertheless  a  person 
who  has  a  right  of  action  is  not  pre- 
cluded nor  his  rights  in  any  manner 
affected  by  a  judgment  to  which  he 
was  not  a  party,  and  a  judgment 
against  a  father  as  surviving  husband 
suing  for  himself  comes  within  this 
rule  as  to  his  children  thereafter 
suing  for  then-  mother's  death. 
Galveston,  Earrisburg  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Kutac,  72  Tex.  843,  647,  648;  11  S. 
W.  127.  Action  by  widow  and  two 
minor  children  for  death  of  husband 
and  father.  Suit  was  brought  by  de- 
ceased dining  his  lifetime  and  was 
dismissed  by  him  at  his  own  costs. 
Another  suit  was  brought  similar 
to  the  first  about  a  month  before 
his  death.  This  was  subsequently 
consolidated  with  the  suit  by  the 
widow  and  children.  Held  that  the 
fact  that  deceased  had  instituted  a 
suit  for  damages,  which  suit  was 
pending  at  his  death  was  no  bar  to 
plaint  ill's  action.  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuelm.  70 Tex.  582, 587;  8 
S.  W.  484.  See  note  to  sec.  5  t5,  herein. 
When  does  not  bar  action  on  con- 
tract. A  passenger  on  a  railway  was 
injured  by  an  accident  and  after  an 
interval  died  therefrom.  His  execu- 
trix brought  an  action  under  Lord 
Campbell's  Act  for  his  death  and  re- 
covered £750.  Held  that  his  execu- 
trix might  recover  in  an  action  for 

635 


§  523 


HEATH        HA MACKS 


tlif  lime  of  the  death,12  and  the  suit  does  not  abate  in  Arizona 
and  Texas."  While  in  Maryland  the  statute  has  created  a  new 
cause  of  action,  it  is  not  a  survival. of  deceased's  rights  to 
sue."  But  in  South  Carolina  there  seems  to  be  a  question 
whether  or  not  the  statutory  suit  is  a  continuation  of  deceased's 
cause  of  action.15  Tn  Texas,  however,  the  injured  partv's  right 
to  sue   survives.16     One    peculiar  provision   in   the  statutes  in 


breach  of  contract  against  the  railway 
company  the  damage  to  his  personal 
estate  arising  in  his  lifetime  from  in- 
ability to  attend  business.  Daly  v. 
Dublin,  Wicklow  &  W.  Ry.,  80  L.  R.  ]r. 
514;  10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p.  116. 
See  Leggott  v.  Great  Northern  Ry., 
45  L.  J.  Q.  B.  557;  1  Q.  B.  D.  599;  35 
L.  T.  334;  24  W.  R.  784;  Barnett  v. 
Lucas  Ir.  R.,  6  C.  L.  247. 

12  Read  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.,  9  B. 
&  S.  714;  37  L.  J.  Q.  B.  278;  L.  R.  3  Q. 
B.  555;  18  L.  T.  82;  16  W.  R.  1040: 
10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p.  106. 
See  note  to  sec.  544,  herein. 

13  See  citations  of  statutes  at  be- 
ginning sees.  522,  523  next  preceding. 
Upon  death  of  beneficiary,  action 
survives  to  remaining  beneficiaries. 
Texas  Loan  Agency  v.  Fleming,  18 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  668:  46  S.  W.  53;  case 
rev'd  49  S.  W.  1039;  44  L.  R.  A.  279; 
6  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  214. 

14  The  statute  has  created  a  new 
cause  of  action.  It  is  not  a  survival 
of  deceased's  cause  of  action.  It  al- 
lows recovery  of  damages  resulting 
from  the  death  alone  and  not  such 
as  the  injured  person  could  have  re- 
covered if  he  had  survived.  It 
creates  a  new  cause  of  action  for 
something  which  the  deceased  per- 
son never  had  the  right  to  sue,  that 
is  to  say  the  injury  resulting  in  his 
death,  and  has  not  undertaken  to 
keep  alive  a  cause  of  action  which 
would  otherwise  die  with  the  per- 
son. "  But  notwithstanding  that  the 
wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  is  of 

636 


the  same  character  as  that  for  which 
the  injured  party  could  have  sued  if 
he  had  survived  the  injury."  Tucker 
v.  State,  Johnson,  89  Md.  (decided 
1899)  471,  479;  43  Atl.  778;  44  Atl. 
1004;  46  L.  R.  A.  181,  per  Boyd,  J. 
See  Ott  v.  Kaufman,  68  Md.  56;  11 
Atl.  580,  andannot.  under  Rev.  Code, 
Md.  art.  50,  sec.  146. 

15  Garrick  v.  Florida  C.  cfe  P.  R.  Co.. 
53  S.  C.  448;  31  S.  E.  334;  69  Am.  St. 
Rep.  874,  dis'g  Price  v.  Richmond  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  33  S.  C.  556;  12  S.  E.  413; 
26  Am.  St.  Rep.  700,  which  holds  that 
it  is  only  a  continuation  of  the  in- 
jury party's  cause  of  action. 

16  An  action  for  personal  injury 
survives  the  death.  City  of  Mar- 
shall v.  McAllester,  18  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  159;  43  S.  W.  1043;  3  Am,  Neg. 
Rep.  743,  745,  per  Rainey,  J.,  under 
art.  3353a,  Rev.  Stat.  Tex.  1895. 
Estate  of  wrongdoer  is  not  liable 
for  injuries  resulting  in  death  where 
action  was  not  commenced  during 
lifetime  of  deceased  against  the 
wrongdoer  himself.  The  cause  of 
action  does  not  survive  in  such  case 
under  Tex.  Rev.  Stats,  arts.  3018, 
3024,  3026,  1248,  1255.  "  Until  the 
passage  of  the  act  of  May  4,  1895, 
which  changes  the  rule  of  the  com- 
mon law  as  to  the  survival  of  causes 
of  action  the  injured  party  if  he 
had  lived  could  not  have  main- 
tained a  suit  against  the  legal  repre- 
sentative of  the  person  inflicting  the 
injury  after  the  death  of  the  latter. 
Watson  v.  Loop,  12  Tex.  11.     Hence 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  524 


some  of  the  above  jurisdictions  is  that  either  a  bill  of  particulars 
of  persons  or  of  the  nature  of  the  claim  or  both  are  required,17 
while  in  England  and  Ontario,  the  defendant  may,  if  so  ad- 
vised pay  money  into  court  as  a  compensation.18 

§524.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  -Pecuniary 
loss. — Only  damages  for  the  pecuniary  loss  can  be  recovered  as 
distinguished  from  those  of  a  sentimental  character.  There 
should  be  a  pecuniary  compensation  for  the  injury  suffered  as  a 
direct  consequence  of  the  death,  and  also  for  the  probable  pro- 
spective damages  occasioned  thereby.  It  does  not  necessarily 
follow,  however,  that  such  pecuniary  injury  must  be  one  capable 
of  exact  ascertainment  in  money,  upon  a  strictly  mathematical 
calculation,  for  as  a  rule  rather  than  as  an  exception,  the  circum- 
stances will  not  admit  of  much  more  than  a  closely  approximate 
estimation  and  award.19   The  words  of  the  statute,  "  proportioned 


in  the  absence  of  some  other  provi- 
sion in  the  statute  when  the  injured 
party  dies,  the  beneficiary  under  the 
act  could  not,  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, maintain  the  action. "  Art. 
3018,  Rev.  Stat,  provides  that  the 
wrongful  act  or  negligence,  etc., 
must  be  such  as  would,  if  death 
had  not  ensued,  have  entitled  the 
party  injured  to  have  maintained 
the  action.  "  We  have  in  this  opin- 
ion cited  the  Rev.  Stats,  of  1895, 
though  at  the  time  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion arose,  as  we  infer  from  the 
briefs,  they  were  not  in  force.  Tin- 
provisions  are  the  same  as  in  the 
former  revision.  Nor  had  the  act  of 
May  4,  1895,  been  passed  when  the 
death  in  this  case  occurred."'  John- 
son v.  Farmer,  89  Tex.  610,  612,613; 
35  S.  W.  1062,  per  Gaines,  0.  J. 

17  See  statutes  of  Eng.,  Nov.  Scot. 
Ont.  and  Mil.  cited  at  the  beginning 
of  this  subject  of  statutes.  The  omis- 
sion to  furnish  particulars  with  the 
complaint  is  ground  for  setting 
aside  the  service  of  the  writ  but  not 
for    setting    aside    the    writ    itself. 


McCabe  v.  Guinness,  Ir.  R.  9  C.  L. 
510:  10  Mews  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p. 
115. 

18  See  statutes  cited  at  beginning 
of  sees.  522.  523  covering  statutes. 
See  also  Condliff  v.  Oondliff,  29  L.  T. 
831;  22  W.  R.  325;  Shallow  v.  Ver- 
non, Ir.  R.  9  C.  L.  150. 

11  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Mahone,  03  Md.  135,  140,  also  hold- 
ing that  the  damages  must  l>e 
founded  on  the  pecuniary  loss,  actual 
or  expected,  suffered  by  the  persons 
specified  in  the  statute.  Baltimore 
&  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Woodward.  41 
Md.  2GS;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  V. 
State,  Kelly,  24  Md.  271,  280,  per 
Cochran,  J.;  State,  Coughlan,  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84, 
lor,;  87  Am.  Dec.  600,  per  Bovie,  C. 
.1.;  Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  39  Fed. 
18,  per  charge  of  Maxey,  J.,  to  jury; 
San  Antonio  &  A.  1'.  K.  Co.  v.  Long, 
87  Tex.  148;  27  S.  W.  LIS;  24  L.  R. 
A.  637,  rev'g  2G  S.  W.  114.  where  it 
was  said  that  the  statute  gave  dam- 
ages only  for  the  pecuniary  loss. 
037 


§524 


DEATH  —DAMAGES 


to  the  injury,"  are  construed  to  mean  in  proportion  to  the  re- 
spective losses  sustained  by  those  entitled  to  sue,*1  and  a  charge 
which  directs  the  jury  to  assess  such  sum  as  they  might  "  think 


McGown  v.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.,  85  Tex.  289,  293;  20  S.  W.  80, 
holdiDg  that  recovery  is  limited  to 
actual  damages  such  as  are  purely 
pecuniary  and  compensatory.  St. 
Louis,  Ark.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 
78  Tex.  536,  542;  15  S.  W.  104,  per 
Gaines,  Assoc.  J.,  holding  that  dam- 
ages are  for  the  pecuniary  loss  of  the 
party  benefited  by  the  recovery. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  75 
Tex.  220,  224;  12  S.  W.  828,  per 
Acker,  P.  J.  ;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  61,  67,  68  ; 
12  S.  W.  838,  per  Henry,  Assoc.  J., 
who  also  said:  "  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  inquiry  is  not  in- 
tended to  be  narrowed  down  by  the 
law  to  a  result  that  can  be  exactly 
accounted  for  by  the  facts  in 
evidence."  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lester,  75  Tex.  56,  58;  12  S.  W. 
955;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
McDonald,  75  Tex.  41,  45;  12  S.  W. 
860,  per  Acker,  P.  J.,  Brunswig  v. 
White,  70  Tex.  504,  512;  8  S.  W.  85, 
holding  that  a  refusal  to  give  an  in- 
struction limiting  the  recovery  to 
the  pecuniary  loss  is  not  erroneous 
where  such  instruction  has  already 
been  given  by  the  court.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex.  496,  502, 
503;  7  S.  W.  857,  such  damages  as  will 
compensate  for  the  loss.  The  true 
measure  is  a  sum  equal  to  the 
pecuniary  benefit  reasonably  to  be 
expected,  except  for  the  death. 
Damages  are  essentially  indefinite, 
hence  the  law  furnishes  no  definite 
measure  therefor.  City  of  Galveston 
v.  Barbour,  62  Tex.  172,  174;  50  Am. 
Rep.   519,   per    Stayton,    Assoc.    J.; 


Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57 
Tex.  297,  301,  306,  per  Bonner,  Assoc. 
J.  Measure  of  damages  for  the  death 
of  a  husband  and  father  is  a  fair  com- 
pensation for  the  pecuniary  loss  sus- 
tained. Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Johnson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900), 
58  S.  W.  622;  Houston  &  T.  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  White,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  280; 
5()  S.  W.  204.  Louisiana  West.  Ext. 
R.  Co.  v.  Carstens,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
190;  47  S.  W.  36;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  781,  holding  that  the  dam- 
ages should  be  such  a  sum  as  will 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  pecuniary 
benefits,  etc.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hines  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S. 
W.  152,  entitled  to  the  pecuniary 
damages  sustained.  San  Antonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829,  only  pecu- 
niary loss  considered.  Gulf  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Southwick  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  30  S.  W.  590,  measure  of  dam- 
ages is  not  pecuniary  value  of  de- 
ceased wife's  services.  Hicks  v. 
Newport,  A.  &  H.  Ry.,  4  B.  &  S.  403n, 
damages  are  restricted  to  the  actual 
pecuniary  loss.  Blake  v.  Midland 
Ry..  18  Q.  B.  93;  21  L.  J.  Q.  B.  233; 
16  Jur.  562,  compensation  can  be 
given  for  pecuniary  loss  only.  Dalton 
v.  Southeastern  Ry.,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
296;  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  227;  4  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
711;  6  W.  R.  57,  probable  pecuniary 
loss  recoverable.  Grand  Trunk  R. 
W.  Co.  of  Can.  v.  Jennings,  13  App. 
Cas.  800  (Ont.),  aff'g  15  A.  R.  477, 
damages  restricted  to  actual  pecu- 
niary loss.  City  of  Montreal  v.  La- 
belle,  14  S.  C.  R.  (Ont.)  741;  Pater- 
son   v.    Wallace,   1  Mac.  H.  L.  748, 


20  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297,  301,  per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J. 

638 


PROPORTION F.T>    TO    INJURY. 


§524 


proportioned  to  the  injury,"  although  copied  from  one  article, 
of  the  statute  is  erroneous  in  that  it  ignores  the  other  article 
of  said  enactment  which  confines  the  right  of  recovery  to  ac- 
tual damages,  as  well  as  the  settled  construction  of  the  article, 
to  the  effect  that  the  sum  found  must  he  a  compensation  for  the 
pecuniary  injury  sustained.  It  is  also  error  to  refuse  to  charge 
that  the  jury  are  confined  to  the  consideration  of  the  money 
value  of  deceased's  life,21  although  it  has  heen  determined  that 
the  court  should  not  restrict  the  jury  to  such  a  sum  as  the  plain- 
tiffs would  have  received  "  in  money"  from  deceased,  had  he 
lived.22  The  jury  should  not,  however,  give  an  award  equal  to 
a  perfect  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  injury,  hut  only  what 
they  consider  under  all  the  circumstances  a  fair  compensation  j88 
and  circumstances  may  be  considered  which  are  capable  of 
pecuniary  estimate,2'  although  actual  damages  must  have  ac- 
crued.-"' So,  if  the  value  of  services  are  incapable  of  estimation 
there  is  no  pecuniary  loss.2"  Again,  in  so  far  as  the  recovery  of 
punitive  or  exemplaiy  damages  is  not  permitted,  the  statutory 
action  for  death  allows  only  the  recovery  of  actual  damages,-'7 


damages  must  be  of  a  pecuniary 
character  in  England,  contra  in  Scot- 
land.    See  further  sec.  526,  herein. 

21  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Worthy,  87  Tex.  459,  465-467;  29  S. 
W.  290,  per  Brown,  Assoc,  J.,  who 
also  said  that  it  was  well  settled  that 
under  arts.  2899,  2909.  Rev.  Stat, 
plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  recover 
the  pecuniary  value  of  the  life  lost, 
and  that  the  verdict  should  be  in  a 
sum  which  would  compensate  for 
the  injury  caused  by  the  death. 

22  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Porterheld,  19  Tex.  Civ.  225:  46  S.  W. 
919,  aff'd  49  S.  W.  361;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
R..  Cas.  N.  S.  3S;5;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
461.  But  see  San  Antonio  Tract. 
Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  Supr.  Ct.  1901), 
61  S.  W.  706;  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  616, 
rev'g  60  S.  W.  323,  where  the  court 
charged  the  jury  to  "consider  alone 
the  money  value"  and  in  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  61, 
67,  68;  12  S.  W.  839,  Henry,  Assoc.  J., 


uses  the  words  "  money  value  "  and 
"  pecuniary  loss  "  in  juxtaposition. 

23  Rowley  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry., 
42  L.  J.  Ex.  153;  L.  R.  8  Ex.  221; 
29  L.  T.  ISO;  21  W.  R.  869,  per 
Brett,  J.  Should  give  a  fair  compen- 
sation, Armsworth  v.  Southeastern 
Ry.,  11  Jur.  758. 

21  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  4 
B.  &  S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  199;  8  L.  T.  7.J4;  1  W. 
R.  922. 

25  Duckworth  v.  Johnson,  4  H.  & 
N.  653;  29  L.  J.  Ex.  25:  5  Jur.  i  \  S.  | 
6o0;  7  W.  R.  655.  See  sees.  525,  526, 
herein. 

w  Holleran  v.  Bagnell,  6  L.  R.  Ir. 
333.  This  rule,  however,  has  been 
much  qualified  as  we  have  shown 
under  other  sections,  as  in  case  of 
minor  children,  etc.,  and  see  sees. 
525,  526,  5  14.  herein. 

-7  International  &  (',.  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
McDonald,  75  Tex.  11:  12  S.  W.  S60. 
Where  the  petition  is  sufficient   for 

639 


§  525 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


and  it  is  said  that  in  determining  the  amount  to  be  awarded, 
the  jury  should  confine  themselves  to  such  compensation  as  will 
supply  the  surviving  members  of  deceased's  family,  the  same 
results  as  would  have  followed  fromN  his  labor  during  his  prob- 
able duration,  of  life  except  for  the  death,  based  of  course  upon 
other  general  factors,  such  as  we  have  elsewhere  considered.28  In 
South  Carolina  the  injury  for  which  damages  are  allowed  is 
seemingly  not  limited  to  the  pecuniary  loss  or  the  deprivation 
of  a  right  susceptible  of  measurement  by  a  pecuniary  standard, 
but  the  language  of  the  statute  is  much  broader  and  authorizes 
the  jury  to  award  such  damages  as  they  may  think  proportioned 
to  the  injury  resulting  from  the  death.29 

§  525.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Pecuniary 
loss — Evidence. — It  is  declared  that  it  is  "  necessary  for  the 
plaintiff  in  cases  of  this  kind  to  show  a  damage  of  a  pecuniary 
nature  ...  It  is  incumbent  upon  the  plaintiff  to  prove  such 
facts  and  circumstances  as  will  enable  the  jury  to  return  a  ver- 
dict upon  the  evidence  which  would  approximate  reasonable 
certainty."  *     But  it  is  also  decided  that  in  an  action  for  the 


actual  damages  it  cannot  be  reached 
by  a  general  demurrer  although  it  is 
deficient  in  the  claim  for  exemplary 
damages.  Taylor  B.  &  H.  B.  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  79  Tex.  104;  14  S.  W.  918. 
See  sec.  526,  herein. 

28  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271. 

29  Mason  v.  Southern  Ry.,  58  S.  C. 
70,  77;  36  S.  E.  440;  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
826,  per  Gary,   J.,  quoting  Petrie  v. 


any  other  fact.  "  It  is  difficult  to 
imagine  a  case  iu  which  it  can  be 
proved  directly.  It  must  be  proved 
by  circumstances  .  .  .  The  law  does 
not  and  cannot  compel  the  party 
causing  the  death  to  give  a  gratuity 
in  these  cases.  The  recovery  is  to 
compensate  the  loss  and  not  to  confer 
a  bounty."  St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Johnston,  78  Tex.  530,  542; 
15   S.   W.   104,   per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J. 


Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  303;  It  must  be  shown  that  the  parties 
7  S.  E.  515.  which  is  cited  with  ap  ;  to  whom  the  right  of  action  is  given 
proval  in  Strother  v.  South  Carolina  j  have  sustained  some  pecuniary  injury 
&  G.  R.  Co.,  47  S.  C.  375;  25  S.  E.  ;  by  the  death.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
272;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  430.  j  S.  v.  Henry,  75  Tex.  220,  223,224;  12 
so  Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  W.  828,  per  Acker,  C.  J.  And  regard 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex. ),  39  Fed.  must  be  bad  in  each  instance  to  such 
18,  per  charge  of  Maxey,  J.,  to  jury,  facts  and  conditions  as  cast  light 
In  the  entire  absence  of  proof  of  upon  the  subject.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
damages  there  can  be  no  recovery.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  61,  67,  68; 
McGown  v.  International  &  G.  N.  12  S.  W.  838,  per  Henry,  Assoc.  .1. 
K.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289,  293:  20  S.  W.  |  As  to  proof,  see  also  Houston  &  T. 
80.      The  loss  must  be  proved   like  j  C.    R.    Co.    v.   Cowser,   57   Tex.   297, 

640 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  526 


negligent  killing  of  a  wife,  a  mere  claim  for  damages  is  suffi- 
cient, it  being  unnecessary  to  either  allege  or  prove  pecuniary 
injury."  And  it  is  also  determined  in  a  South  Carolina  case 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  damages.32 

§  526.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Exemplary 

damages.  —  Punitive  or  exemplary  damages  are  not  recoverable 
under  the  Maryland  act  of  1852.ffl  And  in  South  Carolina  it  is 
error  to  charge  the  jury  that  "if  there  was  gross  carelessness 
or  recklessness  or  wilfulness  then  you  may  give  what  is  known 
as  punitive  or  smart  money  damages."  Nor  will  the  appellate 
court  uphold  the  verdict  upon  the  assumption  that  it  does  noi 
embrace  such  damages,  but  merely  gives  compensatory  dam- 
ages.34 But  in  Texas  exemplary  damages  are  recoverable  where 
the  death  was  due  to  wilful  act  or  omission,  or  gross  negligence."' 


304,  per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J.  Must 
show  a  pecuniary  loss,  Texas  &  N.  O. 
K.  Co.  v.  Brown,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
697,  29  S.  W.  140.  Jury  should  be 
limited  to  a  consideration  of  the  evi- 
dence, Galveston,  H.  <fc  S.  A.  Co.  v. 
Worthy  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W. 
420.  As  to  facts  considered  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  pecuniary  loss  by 
a  father,  to  go  to  the  jury,  see 
Hetherington  v.  Northeastern  Ry., 
51  L.  J.  Q.  B.  495;  9  Q.  B.  D.  160; 
30  W.  797.  That  pecuniary  ad- 
vantage accrued  to  survivors  during 
lifetime  of  deceased  must  be  proven, 
see  Sykes  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  44 
L.  J.  C.  P.  191;  32  L.  T.  199;  23  W. 
473.  Something  more  than  proof 
of  the  death  and  relationship  is  re- 
quired, although  in  this  case  there 
was  evidence  of  pecuniary  loss  suffi- 
cient to  sustain  the  verdict.  Duck- 
worth v.  Johnson,  4  II.  tfc  N.  653; 
29  L.  J.  Ex.  25;  5  Juv.  (N.  S. )  030; 
7  W.  655.  Damages  of  a  pecuniary 
nature  must  be  shown.  Franklin  v. 
Southeastern  Ry.,  3  II.  &  N.  211;  4 
Jur.  ( N.  S. )  565 ;  0  W.  573.  For  facts 
held  not  sufficient  evidence  of  pe 
cuniary  loss,  see  Johnston  v.  Great 

41 


Northern  Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  691;  Hol- 
leran  v.  Bagnell,  6  L.  R.  Ir.  333. 
Under  the  facts  a  nonsuit  was  ordered 
in  Mason  v.  Bertram,  18  Ont.  R.  1 
Chy.  D.  As  to  necessity  and  char- 
acter of  evidence  to  justify  exem- 
plary damages,  see  International  and 
G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  75  Tex.  41, 
45;  12  S.  W.  860,  per  Acker,  P.  J. 
See  also  sec.  525,  herein. 

31  Chapman  v.  Rothvvell,  El.  Bl.  & 
El.  168;  27  L.  J.  Q.  B.  315;  4  Jur. 
(N.   S.)    1180.     See  sec.  543,   herein. 

82  Mason  v.  Southern  Ry.,  58  S.  C. 
70,  77;  36  S.  E.  440;  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
826,  per  Gary,  J. 

33  Baltimore  &  O.  R,  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271. 

3<Garrick  v.  Florida  C.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
53  S.  C.  448;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cms. 
N.  S.  541;  31  S.  E.  334:  09  Am.  Si. 
Rep.  874. 

35  Const,  sec.  26,  art.  16,  Sayle'a 
Civ.  Stat,  and  Supp.,  1900,  p.  1117. 
art.  3019  (2901);  Sternenberg  v.  .Mail 
hoB  (U.  S.  (\  C.  A.  5th  C.  C.  C.  E. 
D.  Tex.),99  Fed.  43;  McGown  v.  ln- 
ternational  &  G.  X.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex. 
289,293;  20  S.  W.  SO;  Winnt  v.  In- 
ternational &  G.   N.   R.  Co.,  7  4  Tex. 

641 


526 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


The  right,  however,  to  such  damages  for  the  death  of  one  killed 
by  a  corporation  or  company,  is  confined  to  the  class  of  persons 
who  are  entitled  by  the  constitution  to  maintain  such  action, 
that  is,  to  the  surviving  husband  orVife,  or  heirs  of  the  body 
of  deceased,  and  this  does  not  include  the  parent.36  And  if  the 
act,  omission  or  negligence,  however  wilful  or  gross,  was  that 
of  a  mere  servant  of  the  corporation,  or  of  an  employee  thereof, 
it  must  have  been  ratified  by  the  corporation.37  So  if  there  is 
no  basis  in  the  case  for  exemplary  damages,  they  will  not  be 
considered,38  and  the  wilful  act,  etc.,  and  the  corporate  capacity 
of  the  officer,  or  the  ratification  of  the  servant  or  agent's  acts 
must  be  alleged.29  But  a  charge  for  exemplary  damages  is  harm- 
less and  will  be  disregarded  on  appeal  when  the  jury  has  found 
for  defendant  on  that  issue.40 


32;  11  S.  W.  907;  Houston  &  T.  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297,  305, 
per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J.,  In  Hall  v. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex. ),  39  Fed.  18,  ex- 
emplary damages  were  denied  under 
the  facts. 

^Winnt  v.  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.,  74 Tex.  32, 33,  35;  11  S.  W.  907; 
5  L.  R.  A.  172.  See  Houston  &  T. 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297,  305, 
per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J.;  Gulf  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,  75  Tex.  667, 
674,  675;  13  S.  W.  667. 

37McGown  v.  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289,  293;  20  S.  W. 
80.  See  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  McDonald,  75  Tex.  41,  45;  12 
S.  W.  860,  per  Acker,  P.  J.  "  The 
statute  clearly  draws  a  distinction 
between  an  act  done  by  the  owner, 
charterer  or  hirer  of  a  railroad  and 
one  by  their  servants  or  agents,  and 
also  between  actual  and  exemplary 
damages.  In  our  opinion  under  its 
proper  construction,  although  actual 
damages  may  be  given  for  death 
caused  by  the  unfitness,  gross  negli- 
gence or  carelessness  of  the  proprie- 
tor, owner,  charterer  or  hirer  him- 
self, yet  that  exemplary  damages  are 

642 


allowed  only  for  the  wilful  act,  omis- 
sion or  gross  negligence,  of  the  'de- 
fendant' to  the  suit,  if  a  corporation 
for  the  wilful  act,  omission  or  gross 
negligence,  of  one  representing  it  in 
its  corporate  capacity  as  a  corporate 
officer,  but  not  as  a  mere  ordinary 
servant  or  agent.  Exemplary  dam- 
ages being  penal  in  their  character 
for  a  quasi  criminal  act,  involves  on 
the  part  of  him  who  commits  the  act, 
the  question  of  an  express  wilf  id  in- 
tent or  that  degree  of  gross  negli- 
gence which  implies  it.  This  crimi- 
nal intent  should  not  by  implication 
be  imputed  to  the  principal  when  the 
act  has  neither  been  authorized  nor 
ratified  by  him  so  as  to  make  it  in  law 
virtually  his  own  act."  Houston  & 
T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297, 
305,  306,  per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J. 

38  City  of  Galveston  v.  Barbour,  62 
Tex.  172,  174;  50  Am.  Rep.  519,  per 
Stayton,  Assoc.  J.  See  also  Hall  v. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  39  Fed.  18. 

39Winnt  v.  International  &  G.N. 
R.  Co. ,  74  Tex.  32 ;  1 1  S.  W.  907.  Ex- 
amine  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Compton,  75  Tex.  667;  13  S.  W.  667. 

*°  Taylor  B.  &  H.  B.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 


PROPORTIONED    TO    IX.IFRT. 


§  527 


§  527.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury     Jury  and  in- 
structions to  jury. — The  amount  of  damages  is  a  question  for 

the  jury  to  determine  under  appropriate  instructions.  No  pre- 
cise definite  rule  can  be  laid  down  in  these  cases,  for  the  asj 
ment  cannot  be  based  upon  any  exact  mathematical  calculation, 
even  if  it  were  permissible.  The  question,  therefore,  being  pe- 
culiarly for  the  jury,  their  finding  or  award  should  stand  unless 
it  results  from  prejudice  or  passion,  or  it  is  clearly  evident  that 
it  rests  upon  some  palpable  error,  or  that  the  jury  have  totally 
mistaken  the  law  applicable  to  the  admeasurement  of  damages, 
or  have  shrunk  from  their  duty,  or  it  appears  that  other  im- 
proper motives  actuated  them.41     There  may,  however,  be  a  re- 


79  Tex.  104;  14  S.  W.  918;  23  Am. 
Rep.  316.  See  Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Worthy,  87  Tex.  459;  29  S. 
W.  376,  where  charge  was  held  er- 
roneous. 

«  Ross  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  44  Fed.  44, 
48,  49,  per  Maxey,  J.  Damages  are 
necessarily  indeterminate  and  much 
must  be  left  to  the  sound  sense  of  the 
jury.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  11.  Co.  v. 
Long,  87  Tex.  148,  159;  27  S.  W.  113; 
47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87;  24  L.  R.  A.  637, 
per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J.  See  also  St. 
Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
ston, 78  Tex.  536,  542;  15  S.  W.  104, 
per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J.  Whether  there 
is  a  pecuniary  loss  is  a  question  for 
the  jury.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henry,  75  Tex.  220,  224;  12  S.  W. 
828,  per  Acker,  P.  J.  So  in  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  61, 
67,  68;  12  S.  W.  838,  Henry,  Assoc.  J., 
said  in  regard  to  the  jury's  estimate 
of  pecuniary  loss  and  revision  of  the 
verdict  by  the  court:  "  When  no 
amount  is  fixed  by  law  and  no  rule 
is  prescribed  for  making  the  calcu- 
lation upon  facts  capable  of  exact 
ascertainment,  it  necessarily  follows, 
we  think,  that  the  lawmaker  in- 
tended that,  having  reference  as  far 
as  practicable  to  conditions  existing 


at  the  time  of  the  death,  juries  from 
tlieir  own  knowledge,  experience  and 
sense  of  justice  should  assess  the 
proper  sum.  They  are  expected  to 
act  uninfluenced  by  passion,  preju- 
dice or  partiality,  and  to  pay  due 
regard  to  the  ascertained  facts  and 
conditions  surrounding  the  subject. 
When  it  appears  to  the  court  that 
they  have  disregarded  these  require- 
ments, their  verdict  should  be  set 
aside.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the 
court  is  unable  to  determine  that 
these  things  have  not  been  observed 
by  the  jury  and  when  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  the  verdict  is  not  the  re- 
sult of  the  honest  endeavor  of  the 
jury  to  follow  their  own  convictions 
in  the  exercise  of  a  power  not  pre- 
cisely defined,  we  think  the  law  in- 
tends that  the  jury's  estimate  rather 
than  the  equally  undefined  one  of 
the  judges  shall  prevail.1'  Judg- 
ment was  affirmed,  the  verdict  beimj 
•310,000  for  the  wife  and  children. 
Again  it  lias  been  said  that  damages 
are  essentially  indefinite,  and  that 
the  law  furnishes  no  definite  incis- 
ure therefor  (Missouri  Tic.  ];.  Co. 
\.  Lee,  70  Tex.  496,  503;  7  S.  W.  857, 
per  Walker,  Assoc.  J.),  and  there 
is  an  element  of  uncertainty  which 
excludes  any  mathematical  standard 

643 


§52' 


DEATH  -DAMAGES 


mittitur  instead  of  setting  aside  a  verdict  where,  after  finding 
the  issue  in  plaintiff's  favor,  the  amount  is  based  upon  sympathy 
rather  than  upon  passion  and  prejudice.4'  But  notwithstanding 
the  damages  rest  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  jury43  under 
proper  instructions,  yet  the  charge  should  not  be  such  as  to  give 
them  discretionary  power  without  limitation,  leading  them  to 
believe  that  the  law  places  no  restraint  upon  the  exercise  of 
their  uninformed  discretion,44  since  the  amount  must  be  based 
as  far  as  possible  upon  the  facts  found  and  proved,  and  is  not 


of  compensation  and  unless  the  rec- 
ord or  the  size  of  the  verdict  shows 
passion  or  prejudice  it  will  not  be 
set  aside.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ormond,  64  Tex.  485,  490,  per 
Robinson,  Assoc.  J.  So  the  amount 
is  for  the  jury  to  determine  and  where 
there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the 
verdict  was  not  the  result  of  a  con- 
scientious and  honest  investigation 
of  the  case  under  all  the  facts  it  will 
not  be  disturbed.  Dallas  &  Wichita 
R.  Co.  v.  Spicker,  (51  Tex.  427,  430, 
431;  48  Am.  Rep.  297.  And  if  there 
is  evidence  for  the  jury  whereby  the 
verdict  should  be  sustained,  it  will 
be  retained.  Duckworth  v.  John- 
son, 4  H.  &  N.  653;  29  L.  J.  Ex.  25; 
5  Jur.  (N.  S. )  630;  7  W.  R.  655.  But 
if  it  is  evident  that  the  jury  has 
shrunk  from  deciding  the  issue  so 
that  the  damages  are  absurd,  a  new 
trial  will  be  granted  (Springett  v. 
Balls,  6  B.  &  S.  477),  and  if  the  dam- 
ages are  clearly  erroneous  the  court 
will  interfere.  Secord  v.  Great  West- 
ern Ry.  15  Q.  B.  ( Out. )  631.  Damages 
should  not  rest  upon  mere  conjecture 
or  speculation.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  State,  Mahone,  63  Md.  135, 147. 

42  Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson 
(Ariz.),  33  Pac.  710. 

43  St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnston,  78  Tex.  536,  542;  15  S.  W. 
104,  per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J. 

44 In  City  of  Galveston  v.  Barbour, 
62  Tex.   172,    174;  50  Am.    Rep.  519, 
644 


the  charge  was:  "As  to  amount  or 
measure  of  damages,  there  is  no  rule, 
that  I  can  give  you  as  the  proper 
measure  thereof.  If  you  should  find 
the  plaintiff  entitled  to  damages, 
you  must  look  to  all  the  evidence  and 
attendant  circumstances  to  ascertain 
what  amount  of  damages  the  plain- 
tiffs are  entitled  to,  proportioned  to 
the  injury  resulting  from  the  death," 
and  the  court,  per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J., 
said:  "The  charge  placed  no  limit 
on  the  discretion  of  the  jury  and 
tended  to  influence  the  jury  to  be- 
lieve that  the  law  placed  no  restraint 
upon  them,  and  left  the  whole  mat- 
ter to  their  own  unbridled  and  unin- 
formed discretion.  In  this  class  of 
cases  while  it  is  difficult  to  prove, 
with  that  exactness  which  may  be 
done  in  some  other  classes  of  cases, 
the  actual  damage  to  which  the  plain- 
tiff or  plaintiffs  are  entitled,  yet  it  is 
not  true  that  the  law  gives  no  meas- 
ure of  damages  in  such  cases  and 
instructions  should  be  given,  definite 
in  their  character  as  to  the  true 
measure."  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Vanderveer,  36  Pa.  St.  303."  So  the 
jury  should  not  be  charged  to  allow 
what  they  consider  a  reasonable 
compensation,  as  thereby  they  would 
be  given  discretionary  power  with- 
out limitation.  State,  Coughlan,  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84, 
107 ;  87  Am.  Dec.  600,  per  Bowie,  C. 
J. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY 


§  521 


within  the  uncontrolled  discretion  of  the  jury,  although  they 
may  refer  to  their  own  judgment,  common  sense,  experience  and 
observation.45  Again,  an  instruction  to  the  jury  is  decided  to 
be  erroneous  when  it  directs  them  to  give  such  damages  as  they 
may  think  proportioned  to  the  injury,  in  that  it  gives  no  meas- 
ure of  damages,  and  in  no  way  limits  the  recovery  to  actual  or 
compensatory  damages,  and  imposes  upon  the  jury  no  Limitation 


46  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester, 
75  Tex.  56,  61;  12  S.  W.  955,  per 
Henry,  Assoc.  J.  "  The  eighth  as- 
signment challenges  the  correctness 
of  the  charge  upon  the  mode  of  as- 
certaining the  amount  of  the  dam- 
ages, 'and  the  value  of  the  child's 
services  during  the  period  of  her 
minority  is  to  be  ascertained  by  you 
as  best  you  can  from  your  own  judg- 
ment, common  sense,  sound  discre- 
tion and  the  evidence  before  you.' 
...  In  (Houston  &  T.  C.)  R.  Co. 
v.  Nixon,  52  Tex.  24,  the  question 
was  raised,  but  not  decided  in  this 
character  of  case,  whether  '  the  jury 
can  determine  for  themselves  in  their 
own  uncontrolled  discretion  the 
amount  of  pecuniary  compensation 
which  the  parents  should  recover." 
In  57  Tex.  304,  (Houston  &  T.  C.) 
R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  in  discussing  the 
discretion  which  may  be  exercised 
by  the  jury  in  fixing  the  amount  of 
compensation,  the  court  suggests, 
1  If  it  should  be  allowed  in  any  case, 
it  would  be  upon  the  principle  of 
necessity  only  and  should  be  re- 
stricted to  that  class  of  cases  in 
which  from  the  necessity  of  the  case 
satisfactory  evidence  was  not  attain- 
able.' Again  in  57  Tex.  503,  (Inter- 
national &  G.  N. )  R.  Co.  v.  Kindred, 
in  case  of  the  mother  suing  for  dam- 
ages from  death  of  an  adult  son,  it 
was  held  that  '  the  evidence  in  this 
class  of  cases  from  the  nature  of 
things  cannot  furnish  the  measure  of 
damages  with  that  certainty  and  ac- 


curacy witli  which  it  maybe  done  in 
other  cases,  hence  the  necessity  and 
wisdom  of  leaving  the  question  of 
damages  to  the  discretion  of  the 
jury,  which  will  be  revised  by  the 
court,  but  their  finding  will  not  be 
set  aside  unless  it  be  made  to  appear 
that  such  discretion  has  been  abused.' 
Those  cases  show  the  condition  iu 
which  the  courts  leave  the  question 
raised  in  this  assignment.  In  this 
case  the  cause  of  action  is  the  dam 
ages  for  loss  of  services  during  the 
minority  of  the  child.  This  limit  in 
time  and  the  fact  that  the  parents 
have  the  legal  right  to  the  child's 
services  during  minority,  prevent  the 
direct  application  of  the  rule  in  the 
Kindred  case  as  a  matter  of  prin- 
ciple." The  court  then  considers 
Potter  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
21  Wis.  374;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Mayor,  18  111.359;  City  of  Chicago 
v.  Ilesig,  83  111.  207  and  Chicago  &  Al- 
ton R.  Co.  v.  Beecker,  84  111.  486. 
It  was  also  said,  "  '  We  cannot  and 
will  not  presume  that  the  jury  were 
other  than  intelligent  men.  They 
are  not  an  accidental  part  of  the 
tribunal  of  justice.  Juries  are  an 
institution  of  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  land  and  we  as  a  court  of  er 
rors  can  predicate  nothing  upon  their 
errors  or  call  that  an  error  of  in- 
struction which  is  intelligible  and 
right.'  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Og- 
ier,  35  Pa.  60,  73;  78  Am.  Dec.  322;  " 
Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504,  508- 
512;  8  S.  W.  85,  per  Walker.  Assoc.  J. 


§  528 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


as  to  a  consideration  of  the  evidence.46  And,  generally  the 
charge  should  confine  the  jury  with  sufficient  certainty  and 
clearness  to  the  actual  proof.  If  too  much  latitude  is  given  as 
to  the  amount  to  be  assessed,  there  will  be  much  in  the  objec- 
tion that  it  constitutes  error.47  So  a  charge  is  erroneous  which 
instructs  the  jury  to  assess  a  widow's  damages  at  such  sum  as 
they  believe  from  the  evidence  she  would  probably  have  re- 
ceived from  her  husband  in  a  pecuniary  way.4"  But  a  requested 
instruction  should  be  refused  which  is  calculated  to  restrict  the 
jury  too  closely  in  assessing  damages,4''  although  a  charge  as 
to  exemplary  damages  which  is  harmless  or  not  prejudicial  will 
not  be  considered.50  Again,  the  findings  as  to  the  cause  of  death 
of  a  wife,  and  that  the  husband  has  suffered  no  damage  but 
awarding  a  specified  sum  to  the  minor  child,  are  not  inconsistent 
to  the  extent  of  granting  a  new  trial,  since  damage  to  one  does 
not  necessarily  follow  from  damage  to  the  other.51 

§  528.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Factors  gen- 
erally to  be  considered. — The  factors  which  constitute  the  gen- 
eral basis  for  a  recovery  for  death  from  negligence,  etc.,  under 
those  statutes  where  damages  are  proportioned  to  the  injury  are 
substantially  the  same  as  in  other  cases  and  are  deceased's  age. 


46  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Worthy,  87  Tex.  459;  29  S.  W.  376; 
27  S.  W.  426.  Especially  so  where 
a  request  embodying  such  necessary 
elements  is  refused. 

47 Thus  a  charge  that  "you  will 
take  into  consideration  the  age, 
health  and  strength  of  the  deceased, 
his  usual  earnings  and  length  of 
time  he  could  probably  live  and  give 
such  damages  as  you  see  proper," 
is  within  this  objection.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ormond, 
62  Tex.  274;  S.  C.  65  Tex.  167;  S.  C. 
Ormond  v.  Hayes,  60  Tex.  180, 
where  question  of  damages  for  death 
was  not  considered. 

48  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Loeffler  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51  S.  W. 
536. 

48  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ran- 

646 


son,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  689;  41  S.  W. 
826,  as  that  they  should  award  such 
a  sum  as  would  purchase  an  annuity 
equal  to  the  value  of  the  pecuniary 
aid  which  would  have  been  received, 
based  upon  the  evidence. 

5°  Taylor  B.  &  H.  B.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
79  Tex.  104;  14  S.  W.  918;  23  Am. 
Rep.  316,  where  the  jury  has  found 
on  that  issue  for  the  complaining 
party.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
White,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  280;  56  S.  W. 
204,  where  a  special  charge  cured 
whatever  error  might  have  existed 
in  an  instruction  which  did  not  dis- 
tinguish between  the  elements  of 
damages  and  the  circumstances 
which  were  the  ground  thereof. 

«i  Kerry  v.  England  (P.  C.)  (1898), 
A.  C.  742 ;  67  L.  J.  P.  N.  S.  150. 


PROPORTIONED   TO    IN.ll'l:V.  £  528 

mental  and  physical  health  and  condition,  life  expectancy,  occupa- 
tion at  time  of  injury  and  prior  thereto;  skill,  experience  and 
ability,  or  degree  of  expertness  as  a  laborer,  mechanic,  business 
or  professional  man.  activity  in  business,  whether  deceased  was 
in  the  line  of  promotion,  competency  to  fill  a  higher  position  and 
chances  for  promotion,  and  in  this  connection  the  relations  sus- 
tained towards  the  employer  and  reasonable  future  expectations  : 
additional  skill  from  experience  ;  the  holding  higher  positions 
in  the  past;  preparation  for  trade  or  a  profession  or  for  a  higher 
position  ;  character  of  professional  reputation  and  extent  of  prac- 
tice ;  amount  of  earnings  or  income  ;  value  of  services  ;  prob- 
able future  earnings  ;  earning  capacity  and  increase  thereof  with 
experience;  whether  earning  capacity  would  probably  be  con- 
tinuous;  but  earnings  are  not  an  exclusive  test  nor  is  the  re- 
covery limited  by  the  amount  thereof,  nor  is  evidence  thereof 
necessary,  nor  is  recovery  precluded  because  deceased  was  out 
of  employment  at  the  time  of  his  injury,  nor  are  the  damages 
restricted  to  pecuniary  benefits  from  mental  or  bodily  labor  of 
the  deceased.  Therefore  the  source  of  income  may  rest  solely 
upon  property,  although  superior  ability  of  deceased  in  manag- 
ing the  same  advantageously  will  be  considered.  Other  ele- 
ments are:  deceased's  habits  of  sobriety,  industry,  thrift,  econ- 
omy or  otherwise  ;  the  disposition  of  earnings  in  the  support  of 
a  family  and  the  character  of  home  furnished  it ;  the  amount  of 
his  property  or  financial  condition  ;  his  expenses,  condition  in 
life  and  circumstances  generally ;  the  persons  dependent  upon 
him  for  support,  if  any  ;  whether  he  is  married  or  single,  and  in 
case  the  deceased  was  achild,  his  mental  characteristics,  disposi- 
tion, age,  health  and  general  ability  to  be  useful  and  render  ser- 
vice will  be  considered."'-     Under  the  English  statutes,  however, 


52  Evidence  whether  deceased 
saved  anything  out  of  his  earnings 
is  irrelevant.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  State,  Chambers,  81  Md.  371; 
32  Atl.  201.  Life  expectancy  of  de- 
ceased and  of  widow  are  factors. 
Baltimore  &  Reistertown  Twp.  v. 
State,  Grimes,  71  Md.  573;  18  Atl. 
884.  Deceased  minor  son  was  a  farm 
hand  and  earned  from  §110  to  $120  a 
year.     Agricultural  &  Mech.  Assoc. 


v.  State,  Carty,  71  Md.  86;  18  Atl. 
37;  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  507.  The  value 
of  deceased's  services  is  a  proper 
factor.  Baltimore  »fr  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Mahone,  6.",  Md.  135.  The 
professional  income  of  deceased  is 
admissible  evidence  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  testimony  of  witnesses 
who  knew  his  character  and  profes- 
sional reputation  and  the  extent  of 
his  practice   in   the  locality  and  its 

647 


§528 


DEATH  — DAMAGES 


the  courts  do  not  seem  to  have  extended  their  inquiries  into  the 
circumstances  as  fully  as  have  the  courts  of  those  states  in  this 


neighborhood.  State,  Grice,  v. 
County  Commrs.,  54  Md.  426.  Life 
expectancy  of  widow  should  be  con- 
sidered. Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Trainer,  33  Md.  542.  Age  and 
condition  of  health,  occupation, 
habits  admissible.  In  this  case, 
however,  there  was  no  evidence  of 
the  specific  wages  paid  deceased  and 
it  was  said  that  the  rate  of  wages  was 
not  the  true  and  exclusive  standard 
of  damages,  and  also  the  proof  of 
being  out  of  employment  should 
not  limit  the  recovery.  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Kelly,  24  Md.  271, 
280-282.  Health  and  mental  condi- 
tion may  be  testified  to  by  brother  of 
deceased  after  stating  facts  on  which 
opinion  is  based.  Financial  condi- 
tion of  deceased  during  illness  ad- 
missible to  offset  release  under  claim 
of  imposition  and  duress.  Price  v. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  377; 
17  S.  E.  739;  33  S.  C.  556;  12  S.  E. 
413;  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  700.  Deceased 
sou  was  eighteen  years  old,  strong, 
healthy,  sober,  hard  working,  and  it 
was  alleged  that  his  earning  capacity 
would  have  increased  and  his  occu- 
pation was  that  of  a  fireman  on  rail- 
road. Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C.  Tex.),  35  C. 
C.  A.  105;  92  Fed.  953,  955,  956;  13 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  520.  De- 
ceased was  5  years  old  and  a  stout, 
able-bodied  boy  with  a  fine  mind 
and  well  grown.  He  was  kind,  duti- 
ful and  had  begun  to  be  of  service. 
There  was  no  evidence  of  actual 
earnings.  Ross  v.  Texas  P.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  44  Fed.  44. 
Testimony  may  include  the  circum- 
stances of  deceased  son,  his  occupa- 
tion, age,  health,  habits  of  industry, 
sobriety  and  economy,  his  skill  and 

648 


capacity  for  business,  the  amount  of 
his  property,  his  annual  earnings 
and  the  probable  duration  of  his  life. 
Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  39  Fed.  18, 
per  Maxey,  J.,  charging  the  jury. 
Deceased  son  was  35  years  old,  but 
was  dissipated  and  a  spendthrift — 
$870  in  favor  of  his  parents  not  ex- 
cessive. Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spence  ( Tex. ),  52  S.  W.  562.  A  ge  of 
deceased  and  expectancy  of  life  are 
evidence  for  the  jury  and  need  not 
be  alleged.  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Knight,  91  Tex.  660;  45 
S.  \V.  556;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  79,  rev'g 
45  S.  W.  167.  Deceased  adult  son  was 
employee  of  railroad  company  and 
was  preparing  himself  for  a  machin- 
ist and  engineer.  Bonnett  v.  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  89  Tex. 
72,  76,  77;  33  S.  W.  334.  Alleged 
that  deceased  was  an  experienced 
railroad  engineer  earning  $175 
monthly  and  capable  of  continually 
earning  that  sum;  that  he  was  43 
years  old.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Worthy,  87  Tex.  459;  29  S.  W. 
376.  Deceased  had  property  from 
which  she  derived  most  of  her  in- 
come, aud  the  recovery  is  not  limited 
to  pecuniary  benefits  resulting  from 
deceased's  mental  or  bodily  labor. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Long, 
87  Tex.  148,  150,  153;  27  S.  W.  113; 
47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87,  case  re- 
verses 26  S.  W.  114.  The  value  of 
the  wife's  services  should  be  proven. 
In  this  case  there  was  no  proof  of 
the  value  of  services  nor  of  reason- 
able expectations  and  deceased  had 
been  an  invalid  in  the  last  stages  of 
consumption.  McGown  v.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289: 
20  S.  W.  80.     Deceased  was  40  years 


PROPORTIONED   TO    IN.n'KY. 


§  528 


country  which  have  the  same  statutory  clause  as  to  the  damages 
to  be  awarded.59     Again,  under  the  English  Workmen's  Conipen- 


old,  in  good  health,  an  experienced 
railroad  man  who  had  held  higher 
positions  in  such  service  in  another 
state  and  had  capacity  to  fill  a  higher 
position — $10,000  not  excessive,  be- 
ing divided  among  the  parties — a 
widow,  children  and  mother.  Texas 
&  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  82  Tex. 
657;  17  S.  W.  1041;  27  Am.  St.  Rep. 
929.  Deceased  was  a  healthy,  robust 
man,  29  years  old,  an  engineer  earn- 
ing about  $125  a  month,  with  a  life  ex- 
pectancy of  36  years — $  10,000  for  wife 
not  excessive.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.Geiger,  79  Tex.  13,22;  15  S.  W.  211. 
Deceased  was  a  railroad  engineer 
and  competent,  and  the  average  pay 


of  such  employees  was  $125  monthly. 
The  proof  must  cover  the  age  of  de- 
ceased and  survivors,  the  former's 
earning  capacity.  St.  Louis,  Ark.  A: 
Tex.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  78  Tex. 
536,  542;  15  S.  W.  104,  per  Gaines, 
Assoc.  J.  Deceased  was  55  years 
old,  a  healthy,  active,  vigorous 
business  man  with  a  life  ex- 
pectancy of  16  or  17  years,  always 
supported  his  wife  and  earned  from 
$500  to  SI, 200  a  year— $6,200,  for 
widow,  not  excessive.  Paschal  v. 
Owen,  77  Tex.  583;  14  S.  \V.  203. 
Age  and  employment  of  deceased 
considered.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.   Compton,  75  Tex.  667;  13  S.   YV. 


63  Deceased  was  a  bricklayer  and 
received  the  wages  of  a  skilled  la- 
borer from  his  father,  to  whom  he 
was  of  great  assistance,  the  father 
being  also  a  bricklayer.  But  dam- 
ages were  not  allowed.  Sykes  v. 
Northeastern  Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  R.  191; 
32  L.  T.  199;  23  W.  R.  473.  Deceased 
was  an  attorney  and  40  years  old  at 
the  time  of  his  death.  Rowley  v. 
London  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  L.  R.  8  Ex.  22]  ; 
42  L.  J.  Ex.  153;  29  L.  J.  180;  21  W. 
R.  869.  Deceased  son's  age  and 
weekly  earnings,  duration  of  employ- 
ment, and  the  fact  that  he  was  out 
of  employment  at  the  time  of  his 
death  were  considered.  Duckworth 
v.  Johnson,  4  H.  &  N.  653;  29  L.  J. 
Ex.  25;  5  Jur.  (N.  S.)  630;  7  \Y.  R. 
055.  Deceased  son's  age  and  earn- 
ings considered.  Franklin  v.  South- 
eastern Ry.,  3  H.  &  N.  211;  4  Jur. 
( N.  S. )  5(55 ;  5  YV.  R.  573.  Deceased's 
earnings  and  her  disposition  thereof 
towards  the  family's  support  were 
in  evidence.  Johnston  v.  Great 
Northern     Ry.,     26   L.     R.    Ir.    691. 


Deceased  mother's  services  in  the 
household  were  proven.  Hull  v. 
Great  Northern  Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  289. 
Deceased  son's  age,  health,  mental 
ability  and  that  he  was  being  edu- 
cated for  mercantile  pursuits  were 
considered.  Bourke  v.  Cork  &  Mac- 
room  Ry.,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  282.  Deceased 
was  a  blacksmith  35  years  old.  the 
patentee  of  an  invention  for  im- 
proved plows.  He  was  industrious, 
careful,  etc.;  $5000  awarded  and 
now  trial  granted.  Morley  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.,  16  Q.  B.  (Out.)  504. 
Deceased  son  was  employee  in  ma- 
chine shop,  but  also  worked  on  his 
father's  faun  without  wages,  and 
was  intending  to  take  a  course  of 
medical  study.  Mason  v.  Bertram, 
18  Out.  R.  1  Chy.  D.  Household 
services  of  deceased  wife  have  a  value 
wheu  they  would  have  to  lie  replaced 
by  hired  service.  St.  Lawrence  <S 
Ottawa  i;.  W.  C<>.  v.  Lett,  11  S.  C.  R. 
(Out.)  422.  aff'd  ('.  A.  (11  A.  R.  1) 
which  rev'd  Q.  B.  D.  (1  O.  R.  545). 

649 


§528 


DEATH  —DAMAGES 


sation  Act,51  the  amount  of  compensation  paid  dependents  for 
death  is  based  upon  the  period  of  continuous  employment  im- 
mediately preceding  said  death.® 


667.  Deceased's  age,  salary  aud  ex- 
penses considered — -13,550  not  exces- 
sive. Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry, 
75  Tex.  220;  12  S.  W.  828.  Damages 
are  not  limited  by  amount  of  earn- 
ings. In  this  case,  deceased  was  a 
laborer  about  35  years  old  and  earned 
SI. 25  per  day.  He  was  "stout, 
healthy  and  sober."  Missouri  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lebmberg,  75  Tex.  61;  12  S. 
W.  838.  Deceased  was  the  only  child 
of  a  widowed  mother.  He  was  26 
years  old,  a  locomotive  engineer, 
was  economical,  industrious  aud 
temperate  and  earned  $1,000,  a  year. 
Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester,  75 
Tex.  56;  12  S.  W.  955.  Age  of  child 
and  mental  characterestics  and  its 
bodily  health  and  strength  were 
shown  and  also  its  ability  to  be  use- 
ful. Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex. 
504;  8  S.  W.  85.  Deceased  was  old- 
est son  of  widow.  He  was  sober, 
industrious  and  economical.  His 
life  expectancy  was  also  considered 
and  from  the  evidence  of  his  charac- 
ter, etc.,  he  gave  prospects  of  being 
a  useful  and  prosperous  citizen. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex. 
496,  502,  503;  7  S.  W.  857,  per  Walker, 
Assoc.  J.  Deceased  was  a  young 
and  robust  man  with  probabilities 
of  a  long  life.  He  was  a  skilled 
workman  whose  loss  could  not  be 
estimated  solely  by  the  remuneration 
he  had  received  for  his  labor — -$15,000 
not  so  clearly  excessive  as  to  be  set 


aside  although  larger  than  ought  to 
have  been  given.  East  Line  &  Red 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  65  Tex.  167;  S. 
C,  62  Tex.  274.  The  age,  life  ex- 
pectancy and  earnings  of  deceased 
might  yield  a  much  smaller  sum 
than  that  awarded— $12,000— "but 
the  additional  skill  which  may  have 
been  acquired  in  some  of  the  years 
of  life  he  was  deprived  of,  would 
increase  his  wages,'1  and  verdict 
sustained.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Oimond,  64  Tex.  485,  490,  per 
Robertson,  Assoc.  J.  Deceased  was 
31  years  old,  sober,  industrious  and 
of  good  physical  constitution  for 
some  time  before  he  sustained  the 
injury.  But  there  was  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  at  some  former 
period  he  may  have  been  intemper- 
ate. He  was  a  druggist  by  profes- 
sion, although  at  his  death  he  was 
engaged  in  other  business  under 
contract  with  persons  who  bad  un- 
dertaken to  grade  a  railroad  and  lay 
the  rails  and  he  was  to  receive  $2.50 
a  day.  And  there  was  evidence  of 
ability  to  furnish  pecuniary  aid  to 
his  wife  and  mother — $5,000  not 
excessive.  Dallas  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
S picker,  61  Tex.  427;  48  Am.  Rep. 
297.  See  S.  C,  60  Tex.  435.  Evidence 
should  show  the  circumstances  of 
deceased,  his  occupation,  health, 
habits  of  industry,  sobriety  and 
economy,  his  skill  and  capacity 
for    business,    the    amount    of    his 


6*  Act  1897,  cl.  1,  (a)  (i). 

65 Appleby  v.  Horseley  Co.  (No.  1), 
(C.  A.),  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.N.  S.  892(1899), 
2  Q.  B.  521.  In  this  case  the  em- 
ployment had  not  been  continuous, 
for  there  was  an  interval  of  eleven 
months  when  deceased  was  not  in 

650 


said  employ,  and  at  the  time  of  his 
death  he  had  returned  and  was  work- 
ing under  another  contract,  although 
the  period  from  the  beginning  of 
his  original  employment  was  a 
few  months  less  than  three    years. 


PROPORTIONED   TO    [NJ1   BY. 


8  529 


§  5'iO.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  -Sufferings  of 

injured  person.     Under  the  statutory  clause  providing  that 


property,  liis  annual  earnings  and 
the  probable  duration  of  bis  life. 
Deceased  here  was  over  21  years  of 
age.  Houston  <fe  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
(  owser,  51  Tex.  297,  301,  per  lionner, 
Assoc  J.,  citing  Pierce  on  Rds.  390; 
2  Thorn  p.  on  Neg.  1200.  The  present 
and  probable  future  earnings  of  de- 
ceased and  bis  age  should  be  con- 
si.  I. >red.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
White,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  280;  SOS. 
W.  204.  Deceased  was  31  years  old, 
healthy  and  industrious  and  earned 
$60  a  month,  but  had  been  divorced 
and  remarried.  Son  by  first  wife  re- 
covered $5,000.  Not  excessive. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Delaney,  22 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  427;  55  S.  W.  538. 
Deceased  was  30  years  old  with  a  life 
expectancy  of  35  years,  was  in  good 
health,  an  expert  railroad  man  earn- 
ing about  $75  a  month,  of  which 
about  $45  a  month  was  expended 
for  his  wife  and  two  small  children. 
He  provided  a  comfortable  home  for 
them,  was  industrious  and  thrifty  and 
bad  presumptively  the  usual  chances 
of  promotion  by  his  employ- 
ers— $15,000  not  excessive  although 
a  less  sum  might  have  covered  the 
loss.  Ft.  Worth  &  II.  G.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kime,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  271;  51  S. 
W.  558,  aff  d  54  S.  W.  240.  Deceased's 
income  from  her  estate  and  superior 
business  ability  in  managing  the 
same  are  factors.  San  Antonio  & 
A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  19  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  049;  48  S.  \V.  599.  Deceased 
was  a  fireman  in  the  line  of  promo- 
tion to  locomotive  engineer,  and  the 
wages  of  the  latter  were  held  compe- 
tent evidence  as  showing  reasonable 
expectations  as  to  the  future.  Gal- 
veston, A.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  46  S.  W.  77.     De- 


ceased was  about  40  years  old,  a  rail- 
road brakeman  who  stood  well  with 
his  employers  and  had  good  busini  ss 
prospects.  He  had  asthma  but  was 
temperate,   industrious,   frugal    and 

ei nical,  and  earned $60  a  month 

and  supported  bis  wife  and  5  child- 
ren— $10,000  not  excessive.  Mis- 
souri, K.  <fe  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  15 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  689;  41  S.  W.  826. 
$5,000  is  not  excessive  for  death  of  a 
healthy  young  man  although  he  bad 
been  out  of  employment.  San  An- 
tonia  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  229;  48  S.  W.  829.  Finan- 
cial condition  of  deceased  may  be 
shown.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Gormley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  |,  35  S.  W. 
488.  Evidence  is  competent  as  to  de- 
ceased's affection,  etc.,  for  his  family. 
Missouri  I'.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  30  S.  W.  930.  That  deceased 
was  unmarried  was  a  factor  in  de- 
termining whether  or  not  the  dam- 
ages are  excessive.  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McNeel  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  29  S.  W.  1133.  Reasonable 
prospect  of  promotion  and  increasing 
wages  are  factors.  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F. 
R.  Co.  v.  John  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29 
W.  S.  558.  Evidence  is  admissible  as 
to  the  amount  of  cotton  and  corn 
deceased  could  raise  yearly,  and  his 
earnings  in  money.  International 
&  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuchn  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  I,  21  S.  \Y.  58.  The  following 
Texas  cases  are  to  much  the  -amc 
effect  as  the  preceding  ones:  Mis 
souri,  K.  A:  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilmore  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1899),53S.  W.61;  Houston 
&  T.  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Loeffler  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  51  S.  W.  536;  San  Antonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  19  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829;  Chicago,  K. 
I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Porterfield,  19  Tex. 
651 


§  529 


DEATH  — DAMAGES 


damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  shall  be  awarded,  the  most 
important  consideration  is  whether  the  action  is  for  the  death 
alone  or  a  survival  action.56  And  where  the  recovery  is  for  the 
death  itself  nothing  can  be  awarded  as  damages  for  deceased's 
physical  or  mental  suffering."'7  But  the  survival  action  for  per- 
sonal injuries  carries  with  it  the  right  to  damages  for  mental 
and  physical  anguish  and   suffering  of  deceased.^8     In  South 


Civ.  App.  225;  46  S.  W.  919;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  461,  aff  d  49  S.  W.  361;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  383;  Louis- 
iana W.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Carstens,  19  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  190;  47  S.  W.  36;  12  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  781;  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Culpepper,  19  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  182;  46  S.  W.  922;  Tyler 
S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  McMahon  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  34  S.  W.  796;  Tyler  S.  E.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rasberry,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
185;  34  S.  W.  794;  3  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  376;  Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hyatt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S. 
W.  677;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Harding,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  497; 
33  S.  W.  373;  3  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  389;  Taylor  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Warner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31  S.  W. 
66 ;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  906; 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gorm- 
ley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  1051; 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Arispe, 
5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  611;  23  S.  W.  928, 
rehearing  denied  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
617;  24  S.  W.  31. 

56  See  sees.  522,  523,  herein  and 
notes.  "  This  suit  you  are  aware  is 
brought  not  by  the  person  injured 
.  .  .  but  by  the  father.  The  measure 
of  damages  in  the  two  cases  is  en- 
tirely different.  Hall  v.  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D. 
Tex.),  39  Fed.  18.  The  measure  of 
damages  is  not  the  same  as  when  the 
party  injured  sues  and  recovers  com- 
pensation for  physical  and  mental 
suffering.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co. 
652 


v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297,  per  Bonner. 
Assoc.  J. 

57  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Manila,  79  Tex.  577,  holding  that 
pain  and  suffering  of  deceased  are 
not  elements.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lester,  75  Tex.  56;  12  S.  W.  955, 
holding  also  that  although  there  was 
evidence  that  deceased's  body  was 
mangled  and  that  he  died  a  few 
hours  thereafter,  the  testimony  of 
the  mother  that  she  was  at  the  hos- 
pital where  there  was  only  a  parti- 
tion between  her  and  her  son  and 
that  she  could  hear  him  "  moaning 
until  he  died  "  is  no  more  suggestive 
of  his  suffering  pain  than  the  other 
evidence.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cowser,  57  Tex.  297,  301,  per  Bonner, 
Assoc.  J.,  citing  Southern  Cotton  P. 
&  Mfg.  v.  Bradley,  52  Tex.  601; 
March  v.  Walker,  48  Tex.  375.  In 
Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504, 
8  S.  W.  85,  the  judgment  was  af- 
firmed but  the  charge  of  the  court 
below,  which  was  not  considered  also 
excluded  physical  and  mental  suffer- 
ing of  deceased.  See  San  Antonio 
Tract.  Co  v.  White  (Tex.  Supr.  Ct. 
1901),  61  S.  W.  706;  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
616;  60  S.  W.  323. 

68  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Settle, 
19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  357;  1  J.  A.  37; 
47  S.  W.  825,  the  same  as  if  the  suit 
had  been  tried  before  the  death  and 
includes  also  loss  of  time  and  dimin- 
ished earning  capacity  future  as  well 
as  past.  See  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Rogers,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  680;  39 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  530 


Carolina  the  action   is  a  new  right  and  not  a  survival  of  the 
action  which  deceased  might  have  brought  for  the  injuries.*' 

§  530.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  Mental  and 
physical  suffering — Loss  of  society,  etc.  Nothing  is  al- 
lowed as  damages  by  way  of  solatium  to  the  survivors  for  be- 
reavement,  grief,  physical  or  mental  suffering  or  anguish,"  but 
the  comfort  afforded  his  family  by  deceased  has  been  declared 
to  be  a  proper  element  of  damages,61  although  the  Texas  rases 
exclude  the  loss  of  the  comfort  of  a  child's  society,"2  and  the 
loss  of  society  in  general  in  estimating  the  award.'"     Nor  in  the 


S.  W.  1112,  as  to  rights  of  widow  and 
who  is  widow  in  survival  suit. 

*>  In  re  Mayo's  Estate,  60  S.  C. 
401;  38  S.  E.  634;  Ex  parte  North- 
eastern R.  Co.,  id.,  under  Rev.  Stat. 
1893;  sees.  2315,  231(5,  2318. 

60  Agricultural  &  Mecli.  Assoc,  v. 
State,  Carty,  71  Md.  SG;  18  Atl.   37; 

17  Am.  St.  Rep.  507;  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Mahone,  63  Md. 
135,  146;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Kelly,  24  Md.  271,280;  State, 
Coughlan,  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
24  Md.  84,  106;  87  Am.  Dec.  600,  per 
Bowie,  C.  J.  ;  Hall  v.  Galveston,  H. 
&  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D. 
Tex.),  39  Fed.  18;  McGown  v.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289, 
293;  20  S.  W.  80;  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Henry,  75  Tex.  220,  224;  12  S. 
W.  828,  per  Acker,  P.  J.  ;  City  of 
Galveston  v.  Barbour,  62  Tex.  172, 
174;  50  Am.  Rep.  519;  Houston  & 
T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex. 
297,  per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J. ;  San 
Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829; 
Storrie  v.  Marshall  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
27  S.  W.  224;  Blake  v.  Midland  Ry., 

18  Q.  a  93;  21  L.  J.  Q.  B.  233;  16 
Jur.  562;  Paterson  v.  Wallace,  1  Mao. 
H.  L.  748;  Canadian  Pacif.  R.  W. 
Co.  v.  Robinson,  14  S.  C.  R.  105 
( Ont. ) :  St.  Lawrence  &  Ottawa  R. 


W.  Co.  v.  Lett,  11  S.  C.  422  (Out.), 
afTg  11  A.  K.  1.  which  rev'dQ.  B.  D. 
(  1  O.  R.  545  j;  Filial  rault  v.  Canadian 
Par.  R.  Co.,  Rap.  .hid.  Quebec,  18  C. 
S.  491.  See  City  of  Montreal  v.  La- 
belle,  14S.C.  R.  741  (Ont.);  Storrie  v. 
Marshall  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W. 
224.  See  San  Antonio  Tract.  Co.  v. 
White  (Supr.  Ct.  Tex.  1901),  61  S. 
W.  706;  9  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  G16,  rev'g 
60  S.  W.  323.  Contra  in  Scotland, 
Paterson  v.  Wallace,  1  Macq.  H.  L. 
748. 

«i  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271. 

62  Hall  v.  (ialveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  I).  Tex.).  39  Fed. 
18;  Taylor  B.  *  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner 
(Tex.),  19  S.  W.  449.  See  Sao  Anto- 
nio Tract  Co.  v.  White  (Supr.  Ct. 
Tex.  1901).  61  S.  W.  706:  9  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  616.  rev'g  60  S.  W.  323. 

63  Galveston.  II.  A-  S.  A.  1!.  Co.  v. 
Worthy,  87  Tex.  459,  466,  467;  29 
S.  W.  376;  McGown  v.  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289,  293;  -"> 
S.  W.  80.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Matula.  79  Tex.  577,583, 
584;  15  S.  W.  57::;  San  Antonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829;  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gormley  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.).  27  S.  W.  1051.  Loss  of 
society  not  an   element   in  England. 

653 


§531 


DEATH— DAMAGE* 


absence  of  proper  pleadings  can  the  loss  of  advice  and  counsel 
of  a  father  and  husband  be  considered,64  although  the  fact 
may  be  admissible  that  a  deceased  son  had  aided  his  mother 
with  counsel  and  advice.65  And  loss  to  deceased's  personal  es- 
tate by  reason  pf  his  inability  to  attend  to  business  is  a  proper 
element  of  damages.68 

§  531.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Relationship 
legal  and  actual  of  deceased  to  beneficiaries— Support  and 
dependency. — The  legal  and  actual  relations  between  the  de- 
ceased and  those  entitled  to  damages  are  important  factors  in 
arriving  at  the  amount  to  be  awarded  for  the  death.  But  they 
are  not  exclusively  determining  elements.  Thus  a  widow  or  a 
mother,  son  or  daughter,  may  be  entitled  to  recover  for  a  hus- 
band or  father's  death,  even  though  he  may  have  separated  and 
is  living  apart  from  them,  especially  in  case  of  a  widow  who 
has  not  by  any  act  of  hers  lost  her  legal  right  to  support.67     But 


Blake  v.  Midland  Ry.,  18  Q.  B.  93; 
21  L.  J.  Q.  B.  233;  16  Jur.  562. 

64  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Worthy,  87  Tex.  459,  466,  467;  29  S. 
W.  376.     See  next  following  note. 

66  Missouri  Pao.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70 
Tex.  496;  7  S.  W.  857.  See  Galves- 
ton, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gormley 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W.  1051; 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamilton 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  906. 

66  Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  &  York- 
shire Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  148;  L.  R. 
10  C.  P.  189;  31  L.  T.  847;  23  W.  R. 
310. 

67  But  the  appellant's  sixth  prayer 
contained  a  proposition  which  we 
think  is  not  sustained  either  by  rea- 
son or  authority.  It  asks  the  court 
for  instruction  that  if  they  find 
that  the  decedent  had  been  separated 
from  his  family  for  a  period  of  about 
twelve  years  immediately  preceding 
his  death,  and  that  he  had  contrib- 
uted nothing  to  the  support  of  his 
wife  or  infant  child  during  that  pe- 
riod, that  then  the  plaintiff  was  only 

654 


entitled  to  nominal  damages.  In 
this  we  do  not  concur.  The  marital 
relation  still  continued  to  exist  be- 
tween the  parties  at  the  time  of  the 
death  of  the  husband  aud  whilst  they 
had  not  for  the  period  stated  lived 
together  as  man  and  wife,  her  legal 
rights  had  suffered  no  change  or  im- 
pairment. It  is  very  clear  from  the 
testimony  in  the  record  that  the  wife 
had  not  by  her  own  wrong  forfeited 
her  right  to  a  decent  support  from 
her  husband  in  accordance  with  her 
station  in  life.  The  marital  relation 
created  this  right,  and  it  continued 
to  exist  in  law  to  the  death  of  her 
husband,  and  this  too  without  refer- 
ence to  the  will  or  wishes  of  the  hus- 
band.' '  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Chambers,  81  Md.  371,  389;  32 
Atl.  201,  per  Roberts,  J.  So  in  an 
action  by  a  widow  for  the  benefit  of 
herself  and  mother,  there  was  evi- 
dence showing  some  estrangement 
between  the  wife  and  husband  and 
the  court  said  that  while  deceased 
may  have  left  his  wife  for  a  year  or 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§531 


a  wife  ma}*,  by  separating  from  her  husband  and  entering  a 
house  of  prostitution,  forfeit  her  right  to  his  support  and  con- 
sequent damages  for  his  death,  especially  so  where  her  immoral 
conduct  is  not  justified  by  his  misconduct.68     And  a  husband 

who  has  quarreled  with  and  separated  from  his  wife,  living 
apart  from  and  holding  no  communication  with  her  for  years, 
can  recover  nothing  for  her  death  even  though  she  would  have 
been  absolutely  entitled  to  a  large  sum  of  money  had  she  sur- 
vived her  aged  mother.63  So  a  father  who  has  abandoned  his 
family  and  has  contributed  nothing  to  their  support  for  years 
and  has  held  no  communication  with  them,  and  who  has  never 


more  before  his  death  and  after  leav- 
ing her  may  have  had  no  further 
communication  with  her  and  may 
have  intended  never  to  return  to  her 
or  contribute  to  her  support,  yet  so 
long  as  the  marital  relation  existed, 
without  reference  to  the  will  of  the 
husband,  the  wife  not  being  shown 
to  have  forfeited  her  right  thereto 
by  her  own  wrong,  she  was  entitled 
to  a  decent  support  in  accordance 
with  their  station  in  life,  from  her 
husband.  The  marital  relation 
created  this  right  and  it  would  have 
continued  to  exist  so  long  as  the  re- 
lationship continued  and  so  without 
reference  to  the  will  of  her  husband. 
There  is  no  legal  presumption  that 
such  relation  would  ever  have  been 
dissolved  prior  to  the  time  when  one 
of  the  parties  thereto  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  events  would  have  died. 
Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  Co.  v.  Spicker, 
61  Tex.  427,  431;  48  Am.  Rep.  297, 
per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J.  See  <S>.  C, 
60  Tex.  435.  See  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Delanoy,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
427;  55  S.  W.  538,  where  there  was  a 
divorce  and  remarriage  by  husband, 
and  son  by  first  marriage  recovered. 
International  &  (J.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Cul- 
pepper, 19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46 
S.  W.  922,  holding  that  a  minor 
daughter   could   recover  for  her  fa- 


ther's death  even  though  he  had 
been  divorced  from  her  mother  with 
whom  she  was  living. 

68  Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Floyd 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  21  S.  W.  544.  At 
the  trial  of  an  action  brought  by  the 
plaintiff  as  the  widow  of  the  deceased 
under  the  provisions  of  Lord  Camp- 
bell's Act  (9  and  10  Vict.  ch.  93),  S.  2, 
against  the  defendants  for  negligence 
which  caused  the  deceased's  death,  it 
appeared  that  the  plaintiff  was  at  the 
time  of  her  husband's  death  and  had 
for  many  years  previously,  been  liv- 
ing apart  from  him  in  adultery  with 
another  man.  During  the  time  they 
were  so  living  apart  the  deceased  did 
not  support  the  plaintiff,  though  he 
occasionally  gave  her  small  sums  of 
money.  Held  that  the  action  was 
not  maintainable,  inasmuch  as  the 
plaintiff  had  lost  her  legal  right  to 
support  by  reason  of  her  adultery 
and  had  no  reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  advantage  by  the  de- 
ceased remaining  alive  which  could 
be  taken  into  account  by  a  jury. 
Stimpson  v.  Wood.  .'.7  L.  .1.  Q.  B. 
484;  5!)  L.  T.  218;  36  W.  R.  734;  52 
J.  I'.  822.  See  10  Mew's  Eug.  Dig. 
(  is! IS)  p.  105. 

69  Harrison  v.  L.  N.  W.  Ry.,  1  Cab. 
&  E.  540. 

655 


531 


DEATH  —DAMAGES 


been  assisted  or  aided  by  bis  son,  has  sustained  no  such  pecu 
niary  injury  by  tbe  hitter's  death  as  entitles  him  to  damages,  for 
while  the  relationships  named  in  the  statute  give  the  right  of 
action,  they  do  not  of  themselves  give  the  right  of  recovery.™ 
While,  however,  legal  relationship  and  consequent  legal  obliga- 
tions are  to  be  considered  as  a  basis  of  pecuniary  benefit  and  of 
reasonable  expectation  of  advantage,71  nevertheless,  the  dam- 
ages are  not  to  be  given  with  reference  merely  to  the  loss  of  a 
legal  right,  but  should  be  calculated  with  reference  to  the  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  as  of  right,  or  other- 
wise, from  the  life  of  deceased  had  he  not  been  killed.7'     Again, 


70  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry, 
75  Tex.  220,  222-224;  12  S.  W.  828. 

71  Duckworth  v.  Johnson,  4  H.  & 
N.  653;  29  L.  J.  Ex.25;  5  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
630;  7  W.  R.  655;  Sykes  v.  North- 
eastern Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  191;  32  L. 
T.  199;  23  W.  R.  473;  Dalton  v.  South- 
eastern Ry.,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)296;  27  L. 
J.  C.  P.  227;  4  Jur.  (N.  S.)  711;  6  W. 
R.  574;  Baltimore  &  ().  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Kelly,  24  Md.  271,  281;  Lilly 
\.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  C. 
142;  10  S.  E.  932,  holding  that  an 
allegation  of  dependency  upon  de- 
ceased by  a  widow  and  children  is 
not  a  sufficient  allegation  of  neces- 
sary relationship.  St.  Louis,  Ark.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  78  Tex.  536, 
542;  15  S.  W.  104,  per  Gaines, 
Assoc,  J.,  declaring  that  a  husband's 
duty  is  to  support  his  family,  etc., 
and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  hus- 
band of  a  surviving  daughter  to  sup- 
port her.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cody,  20  Tex.   Civ.   App.  520; 

50  S.  W.   135,  writ  of   error  denied, 

51  S.  W.  329,  holding  that  where  the 
relationship  is  denied  evidence  that 
deceased  supported  plaintiffs  is  ad- 
missible to  show  that  he  was  their 
husband  and  father.  See  also  addi- 
tional cases  cited  under  notes  to  this 
section.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Culpepper,  19  Tex.   Civ.  App. 


leged  relationship,  etc.,  and  was 
held  sufficient,  holding  that  a  minor 
daughter  has  a  legal  right  to  sup- 
port. Winnt  v.  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.,  74  Tex.  32-35;  11  S.  W. 
907;  5  L.  R.  A.  172,  holding  that  the 
right  of  action  is  confined  to  the 
persons  named  in  the  statute  where 
exemplary  damages  are  sought. 

72  Franklin  v.  Southeastern  Ry., 
3  H.  &  X.  211;  4  Jur.  (N.  S.)  565;  6 
W.  R.  573.  Not  necessary  to  prove 
that  persons  described  in  the  statute 
had  a  claim  upon  deceased  for  sup- 
port or  services,  which  amounted  to 
a  legal  right  but  proof  of  reasonahle 
expectation,  etc.,  sufficient.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Mahone, 
63  Md.  135,  145,  per  Robinson,  J. 
Not  merely  for  loss  of  a  legal  right. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271,  281.  The  dam- 
ages are  such  as  the  jury  think  are 
proportioned  to  the  injury  and  are 
not  confined  to  the  deprivation  of 
some  legai  claim  so  that  it  need  not 
appear  that  children,  as  in  the  case  of 
adults,  had  any  legal  claim  upon  de- 
ceased for  support.  Mason  v.  South- 
ern Ry.,  58  S.  C.  70,  77;  36  S.  E.  440; 
79  Am.  St.  Rep.  826,  per  Gary,  J. 
Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  N.  R.  Co., 
29  S.  C.  303;  7  S.  E.  515.  Damages 
are  not  restricted  to  loss  of  benefits 


182:  46  S.  W.  922,  where  petition  al- 1  to  which  plaintiff  had  a  legal  right. 
656 


PROPORTIONED    TO   INJURY. 


§  531 


in  some  jurisdictions  the  parent  has  by  statute  an  action  against 
a  child  for  support,  but  apart  from  any  such  enactment  there  is 
certainly  an  indisputable,  natural  obligation  for  a  child  to  care 
for  a  necessitous  parent.73  And  it  has  been  asserted  that  a 
mother  has  such  a  Legal  claim  upon  her  son  for  support  as  coupled 
with  actual  assistance  given,  that  her  claim  to  damages  is  valid  ; 
but  even  if  there  was  no  legal  obligation  on  a  child  to  maintain 
a  parent,  it  is  declared  that  the  imperfect  moral  obligation  of  a 
son  who  was  his  mother's  only  support  would  constitute  a  suffi- 
cient basis  for  the  claim.74  In  those  jurisdictions,  however, 
where  the  law  does  not  impose  upon  a  child  any  legal  duty  to 
care  for  necessitous  parents,  the  reasonable  expectation,  irrespec- 
tive of  legal  right  resulting  from  the  condition  of  the  child, 
coupled  with  his  ability  and  disposition  to  aid  and  bestow  upon 
them  pecuniary  benefits  in  obedience  to  filial  duty  or  otherwise, 
constitutes  a  valid  basis  of  damages,  especially  where  there  has 
been  such  assistance  on  the  part  by  the  child  and  a  promise  of 
continued  future  aid,  even  though  such  promises  cannot  be  le- 
gally enforced.75 


Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  5th  C.  Tex.),  35  C.  C.  A.  105; 
92  Fed.  953,  955,  95G;  13  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  520,  per  Parlance,  Dist.  J. 
Are  not  to  be  given  with  reference 
to  the  loss  of  a  legal  right,  etc.  Hall 
v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  39  Fed.  18,  per 
Maxey,  J.,  charging  jury. 

Ta  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  C.  Tex.),  35  C.  C.  A. 
105;  92  Fed.  953,  955,  95G;  13  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  520,  per  Parlance, 
Dist.  J. 

7*Weemsv.  Mathieson,  4  Siacq.  II. 
L.  215. 

75  Hall  v.  Galveston,  II.  AS.  A.  K. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  I).  Tex.),  39  Fed. 
18,  per  Maxey,  J.,  charging  the  jury: 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (TJ.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  5th  C.  Tex.),  35  C.  0.  A. 
105;  92  Fed.  95:5.  it:,.-),  956,  per  Par- 
lance, Dist.  J.  See  St.  Louis.  Ark.  & 
Tex.    R.    Co.    v.  Johnston,    78    Tex. 

42 


536,  542;  15  S.  W.  104,  per  Gaines, 
Assoc.  J.;  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  Co. 
v.  Spicker,  61  Tex.  427;  48  Am.  Rep. 
297.  See  6'.  C,  60  Tex.  435.  In  such 
a  case  it  would  be  proper  to  show 
the  reasonable  expectation  of  benefit 
which  the  parent  would  have  re- 
ceived had  the  child  not  been  killed, 
and  in  the  absence  of  legal  right  to 
benefit  prior  to  the  death  of  the 
child  this  would  depend  on  the  will 
and  ability  of  the  child  to  confer 
benefit  on  the  parent.  In  such  a 
case  evidence  throwing  lisht  on  these 
matters  would  be  proper,  and  should 
be  considered  by  the  jury  under  a 
proper  instruction.  In  this  case 
evidence  was  introduced  to  enable 
the  jury  to  ascertain  the  ability  <if 
the  deceased,  had  he  lived,  to  con- 
tribute pecuniary  aid  to  his  wife 
and  mother,  and  the  fact  that  the 
damage  given  to  the  mother  is  very 
small    furnishes   no  ground   of   com- 

i,;,7 


§  532 


DEATH  —DAMAGES 


§  532.  Same  subject  continued. — The  law  distinguishes 
as  to  the  legal  right  and  reasonable  expectation  of  advantage 
between  the  cases  of  a  parent's  right  to  damages  and  the  meas- 
ure thereof  for  the  death  of  a  minor  or  an  adult  child.76  But 
it  is  error  to  charge  the  jury  that  the  measure  of  damages  for 
the  death  of  a  son  is  the  amount,  if  any,  in  the  way  of  pecu- 
niary aid  such  son  would  have  contributed  to  his  parents,  or 
which  they  would  have  received  from  him  had  he  not  been 
killed.  Such  a  charge  assumes  that  such  amount  is  fixed  by 
law  as  the  measure  of  damages,  and  takes  from  the  jury  the 
right  to  consider  whether  or  not  a  less  sum  paid  now  would 
compensate  the  parents  for  the  loss  of  the  aid  which  their  son 
would  have  rendered,  as  he  would  probably  have  rendered  it 
during  the  rest  of  their  lives.  And  in  this  connection  it  is  er- 
ror to  refuse  a  request  to  charge  that  if  the  jury  should  find 
that  the  plaintiff  "  would  have  received  pecuniary  aid  from  the 
deceased,  what  do  you  find  to  be  the  reasonable  compensation  or 
value  of  the  same  ?  "  since  the  question  for  the  jury  would  be 
whether  the  present  value  of  such  periodical  future  contribu- 
tions was  their  sum  or  a  less  amount.77  Necessarily,  therefore, 
the  questions  of  dependency  and  of  the  amount  and  extent  of 


plaint  to  the  appellant,  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  the  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  wife  is  excessive."  Id.  431, 
43*2,  per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J.,  cited  in 
Winut  v.  International  &  G.  N.  K. 
Co.,  74  Tex.  32,  35,  36;  11  S.  W.  907; 
5  L.  R.  A.  172,  per  Hobby,  J.  In  In- 
ternational &  G.  N.  K.  Co.  v.  Knight 
(Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.),  52  S.  W.  640,  the 
son  had  declared  his  purpose  to  re- 
main with  and  provide  for  his  father. 
In  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  K.  Co.  v. 
Bonnett(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38  S.  W. 
813,  disposition  of  adult  son  to  aid 
father  was  considered.  See  also 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  468;  23  S.  W.  301, 
aff'd  23  S.  W.  1019. 

76  Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  Co.  v. 
Spicker,  61  Tex.  427;  48  Am.  Rep. 
297.  See  S.  C,  60  Tex.  435.  Exam- 
ine San  Antonio  Tract.  Co.  v.  White 

658 


(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  60  S.  W.  323, 
rev'd  (Sup.  1901),  61  S.  W.  706. 

77  Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  R.  Co. 
v.  Morrison,  93  Tex.  527;  56  S.  W. 
745.  In  this  case  the  action  was  by 
the  father  and  mother  to  recover 
damages  from  the  appellant  railway 
company  occasioned  by  the  death  of 
their  20-year  old  son,  who  was  em- 
ployed by  said  compauy  as  a  stenog- 
rapher. He  received  $30  a  month. 
$20  of  which  he  gave  to  his  parents 
monthly  towards  their  support,  they 
being  poor  and  64  years  old  and  in 
bad  health,  and  the  evidence  also 
showed  other  benefits  of  a  pecuniary 
value.  The  court  upon  review  said: 
"  The  charge  given  required  the  jury 
only  to  find  the  amount  of  the  pe- 
cuniary aid  which  the  plaintiffs 
would  have  received  from  their  son 
if  he  had  not  been   killed,   and   as- 


PROPORTIONED    To    I  N.I  TRY. 


§  532 


the  aid  and  assistance  rendered  affect  the  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit,  and  are  most  important  elements  in 
determining  the  sum  to  be  assessed  as  damages  for  the  negli- 


sumed  that,  such  amount  was  fixed 
by  law  as  the  measure  of  damages. 
This  took  from  the  jury  the  right  to 
consider  the  question  whether  or  not 
a  less  sum  paid  now  would  compen- 
sate the  parents  for  their  loss  of  the 
aid  which  their  son  would  have  ren- 
dered, as  he  would  probably  have 
rendered  them  during  the  whole  of 
their  lives.  The  right  of  the  plain- 
tiffs was  to  recover  compensation  for 
the  loss  sustained,  and  such  loss  was 
of  the  aid  or  benefits  which  their  son 
would  have  bestowed  upon  them. 
They  are  therefore  to  he  compensated 
for  the  value  of  these,  but  are  not 
to  receive  them  as  they  would  have 
received  them  from  him  from  time  to 
time  throughout  their  lives,  but  in  a 
lump  sum  paid  now.  Whether  or 
not  a  less  sum  than  that  to  which 
the  son's  whole  contributions  would 
have  amounted  to  would  compensate 
the  plaintiffs  for  the  loss  of  such 
contributions  as  he  would  have  made 
them,  was  a  question  which  should 
not  have  been  taken  from  the  jury 
by  a  charge  which  assumed  that  the 
compensation  must,  necessarily  <•,  in- 
sist of  a  sum  equal  in  amount  to 
that  of  such  contributions.  The 
jury  should  have  been  left  free  to 
determine  under  all  the  circum- 
stances the  sum  which  would  com- 
pensate plaintiffs  for  the  loss  of  the 
benefits  having  a  pecuniary  value 
which  the  son  would  have  rendered 
to  his  parents.  The  charge  given 
without  the  submission  of  a  further 
inquiry  was  therefore  insufficient 
aud  erroneous.  The  special  instruc- 
tion, though  not  so  fully  expressed 
as  it  might  have  been,  sought  t<> 
have   the  jury   pass  upon    the  ques- 


tion of  compensation,  which  was  the 
true  one.  and  with  the  general 
charge  standing  as  it  did  should 
have  been  given.  This  is  not  as  in- 
tended by  the  appellee,  an  applica- 
tion of  the  rule  of  annuities,  some- 
times insisted  upon,  nor  of  any 
mathematical  rule  for  the  ascertain- 
ment of  damages.  On  the  contrary, 
it  leaves  the  determination  of  amount 
to  the  jury  acting  upon  all  proper 
considerations,  of  which  a  possible 
difference  in  value  between  an 
amount  paid  in  prasseuti  and  the  same 
amount  paid  in  contributions  made 
at  intervals  through  a  period  of  time 
is  one.  It  has  often  been  said  that 
the  measure  of  damages  in  this  class 
of  cases  is  'a  sum  equal  to  the  pe- 
cuniary benefit  the  parent  had  a  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  receiving  from 
the  child  had  he  not  died.'  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex.  503; 
City  of  Galveston  v.  Barbour.  H2 
Tex.  174.  In  those  cases  the  court 
had  no  occasion  to  consider  or  dis- 
cuss such  a  question  as  that  now  be- 
fore u.s.  All  of  the  authorities 
recognize  the  proposition  that,  com- 
pensation is  the  fundamental  meas- 
ure, and  wii  li  t  he  idea  of  compensa- 
tion in  mind  the  statement  of  the 
measure  in  the  cases  referred  to  is 
collect  and  means  equality  in  coin 
pensation.  not  necessarily  in  amount 
hut  in  value."  Per  Williams.  Assoc. 
J.  And  it  is  also  held  in  Ft.  Worth 
A-  D.  ('.  K.  <',,.  v.  Morrison  (Tex. 
civ.  A,. p.  L900),  56  S.  W.  931.  that 
only  the  present  value  of  such 
henetits  is  recoverable,  and  not  the 
reasonable  amount  of  pecuniary  aid 
the  parents  would  have  received. 

659 


§  582 


DEATH— DAMAGES 


gent  killing  of  children,73  or  of  a  parent  or  husband  or  both.79 
The  petition  need  not,  however,  specially  aver  the  nature  of  the 
aid  extended  in  the  lifetime  of  a  deceased  mother  to  each  of  the 


78  Agricultural  &  Mechanical  Asso- 
ciation v.  State,  Carty,  71  Md.  86;  18 
Atl.  37;  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  507;  Balti- 
more &  R.  T.  R.  Co.  y.  State,  71  Md. 
573;  18  Atl.  884;  Hall  v.  Galveston,  H. 
&  S.  A.  R.  Co.  ( U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex. ), 
39  Fed.  18  per  Maxey,  J.,  charging 
jury,  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Knight,  91  Tex.  660;  45  S.  W.  556, 
rev'g  45  S.  W.  167;  Missouri  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Henry,  75  Tex.  220;  12  S.  W. 
828;  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester, 
75  Tex.  56;  12  S.  W.  955;  Winnt  v. 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  74 
Tex.  32,  35,  36;  11  S.  W.  907;  5  L.  R. 
A.  172,  per  Hobby  J.;  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex.  496,  502,  503;  7 
S.  W.  857,  per  Walker,  Assoc.  J.; 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser, 
57  Tex.  297,  305.  In  this  last  case 
deceased  had  at  one  time  contributed 
some  property  and  had  at  sometime 
contributed  two  thirds  his  wages, 
but  there  was  no  evidence  of  his 
pecuniary  circumstances  or  of  what 
his  wages  had  been  or  then  were,  al- 
though such  testimony  was  easily 
accessible.  "  Without  such  evidence 
the  verdict  of  the  jury  could  have 
been  but  little  more  than  a  merely 
speculative  one  and  the  court  had 
no  standard  by  which  to  determine 
its  correctness."  Houston  &  T.  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  White,  23  Tex.  Civ.  A  pp. 
280:  56  S.  W.  204,  holding  that  the 
amount  of  earnings  contributed  to 
the  parent's  support  and  tlie  probable 
duration  of  such  support  are  proper 
elements.  Brush  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co. 
v.  Lefevre  (Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.  1900),  55 
S.  W.  396,  holding  that  the  aid  and 
assistance  rendered  and  reasonably 
to  be  expected  are  evidential  facts. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Power 
660 


(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  629; 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  37; 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Knight  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  52  S.  W. 
640;  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Spence 
(Tex.),  52  S.  W.  562;  Gulf  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Royall,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
86;  43  S.  W.  815:  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonnett  (  Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
38  S.  W.  813;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Southwick  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S. 
W.  592;  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  McNeel  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29 
S.  W.  1133;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hamilton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S. 
W.  906;  Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co.  v. 
Finch  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S.  W. 
1028;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arispe,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  611;  23  S. 
W.  928,  rehearing  denied  5  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  617;  Simmons  v.  White 
(C.  A.),68L.  J.Q.  B.N.  S.  507(1899), 
1  Q.  B.  1005.  See  this  case  also  as  to 
parents  being  "in  part  dependent.'1 
Hetherington  v.  Northeastern  Ry., 
51  L.  J.  Q.  B.  495;  9  Q.  B.  D.  160;  30 
W.  R.  797;  Franklin  v.  Southeastern 
Ry.,3  H.  &N.  211;  4  Jur.  (N.  S.)  565; 
5  W.  R.  573;  Condon  v.  Great  South- 
ern &  Western  Ry.,  16  Iv.  C.  L.  415; 
Van  Wart  v.  New  Brunswick  Ry.,  27 
Sup.  Ct.  Jud.  (N.  B. )  rev'd  on  App.  to 
Sup.  C.  C.  In  Bourke  v.  Cork  &  Mac- 
room,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  282,  the  father 
was  independant  of  his  son's  earn- 
ings. 

79  An  instruction  is  sufficiently 
restrictive  which  directs  the  jury  to 
exclude  all  damages  to  adult  chil- 
dren unless  they  find  they  were  de- 
pendent upon  their  father  for  sup- 
port and  maintenance  by  reason  of 
some  want  of  ability  to  support  and 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


i  532 


children  who  were  plaintiffs.  The  fact  thai  deceased  during 
her  life  contributed  to  the  support  of  her  children  may  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  in  an  action  for  damages  occasioned  by  her 
wrongful  death,  and  perhaps,  where  the  children  are  adults  and 

no  longer  reside  under  the  parental  roof,  some  evideace  oi  like 
character  or  effect  may  he  necessary  to  justify  an  award  of  dam- 
maintain  themselves.  Baltimore  &  entitled  to  such  sum  as  they  might 
<).  R.  Co.  v.  state,  Ilauer,  60  Md.  have  received  from  the  assistance  or 
449,  468.  Support  of  family  should  earnings  of  deceased.  San  Antonio 
be  considered.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  St.  R.  C<».  v.  Henken,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
Co.  v.  State,  Kelly, '-'4  Md.  271.  Wife  App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829;  1  Am.  Neg. 
and  children  were  entirely  depend-  Rep.  354.  Where  adult  son  and  mai- 
eut  upon  deceased's  labor  for  sup-  ried  daughters  had  received  and  ex- 
port, Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Et.  Co.  pected  nothing  from  deceased  e.\- 
v.  Worthy,  87  Tex.  4.")0,  465;  29  cept  occasional  presents  and  were 
S.  W.  376.  Divorced  husband  never  independent  of  his  support,  there 
contributed  to  support  of  wife  or  can  be  no  recovery.  Si.  Louis,  S.  & 
son,  so  that  son  recovered  damages.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bishop,  14  Tex.  Civ. 
Gulf  C.  &S.  F.  K.  Co.  v.  Delaney,  22  App.  504;  37  S.  W.  764.  Decease! 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  427;  55  S.  W.  538.  gave  his  entire  salary  to  support  his 
See  as  to  allegation  of  support,  In-  ;  wife  and  children.  Tyler  S.  E.  R. 
ternational  &  (t.  N.  K.  Co.  V.  Cul-  Co.  v.  McMahon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.j. 
pepper,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46  34  S.  W.  796.  Widow  and  children 
S.  W.  922.  In  this  last  case  how-  had  been  entirely  dependent  upon 
ever  there  was  no  proof  of  sup-  deceased's  professional  earnings  for 
port,  but  child  was  a  minor  and  their  maintenance.  Sanderson  v.  San 
recovered.  Deceased  supported  his  derson,  36  L.  T.  S47.  The  fact  that 
mother,  wife  and  child.  Chicago,  R.  a  deceased  husband  and  father  had 
I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Porterfield,  19  Tex.  sent  his  wife  and  child  but  two  small 
Civ.  App.  225;  46  S.  W.  919;  4  Am.  sums  of  money  may  be  accounted 
Neg.  Rep.  461,  aff'd  49  S.  W.  361;  12  for  by  the  fact  that  he  had  been  out 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  383.  De-  of  employment,  and  that  at  bis 
ceased  devoted  the  greater  part  of  death  bis  employer  owed  him  about 
his  wages  to  the  support  of  his  wife  three  months'  wages.  As  to  the  other 
and  5  children.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  beneficiaries,  there  was  no  evidence 
R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  that,  deceased  had  contributed  any- 
689;  41  S.  W.  826.  Widow  entitled  to  thing  to  their  support  and  he  had 
probable  amount  of  contributions  to  nothing  with  which  to  support 
her  maintenance,  etc.  Missouri,  K.  himself.  St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ilines  (Tex.  Civ.  Co.  v.  Johnston.  78  Tex.  536,  ">42: 
App.),  40  S.  W.  152.  Adult  sous  not  15  S.  W.  104,  per  Gaines,  \ssoc.  J. 
entitled  to  recover  where  they  have  It  was  also  said  in  this  case  that  the 
received  no  pecuniary  aid  or  sup-  circumstances  repelled  the  idea  that 
port  from  deceased  and  expected  the  latter  named  beneficiaries  had 
none.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  any  just  grounds  to  expect  pecuniary 
Brown,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  697;  39  assistance  from  deceased. 
S.    W.    140.    Widow     and    children  | 

661 


§  532  DEATH — DAMAGES 

ages.  But  such  facts  are  not  in  themselves  substantive  facts 
which  justify  a  judgment,  and  being  mere  matters  of  evidence 
need  not  be  pleaded  either  in  detail  or  with  any  great  degree  of 
particularity.  Therefore  an  allegation  is  not  vague  and  indefi- 
nite which  sets  forth  that  the  deceased  mother  "  during  her  life- 
time aided,  in  the  support  and  maintenance  of  each  one  of  the 
plaintiffs,  cared  for  them  in  time  of  sickness  and  at  other  times, 
and  that  her  house  was  their  home  whenever  they  desired  to 
make  it  such,  and  that  each  had  every  reasonable  expectation 
that  if  said  mother  had  lived  she  would  have  continued  to 
aid  and  assist  in  the  support  and  maintenance  of  each  of  them 
as  aforesaid,  and  they  aver  that  by  her  death  each  of  them  has 
been  deprived  of  her  motherly  care  and  assistance  and  her  said 
support  and  maintenance,  all  in  their  damage,"  etc.80  Again, 
evidence  of  a  daughter  is  not  irrelevant  upon  the  issue  of  pe- 
cuniary loss  that  the  deceased  mother  had  in  her  lifetime  aided 
in  the  support  of  all  her  adult  children,  and  that  her  house  was 
their  home  whenever  they  desired  to  make  it  so  ;  that  three  of 
said  children  lived  with  her  when  not  away  from  home  ;  that 
she  furnished  one  of  the  latter  with  money  for  her  support  and 
to  pay  for  medicine  and  medical  attention  when  needed  ;  that 
she  also  remitted  money  at  different  times  to  another  daughter 
and  to  a  son  ;  that  she  aided  one  of  the  sons,  who  lived  with 
her,  with  money  and  also  assisted  him  in  the  support  of  his 
children  by  giving  them  clothes,  etc.,  and  that  deceased  was  a 
woman  of  simple  tastes  and  habits,  and  was  always  ready  to  aid 
her  children  with  her  means  whenever  they  needed  it.  And  pe- 
cuniary benefits  are  not  limited  to  the  results  of  a  mother's  men- 
tal and  bodily  labor,  since  evidence  is  admissible  that  she  had 
an  income  from  the  rents  of  property  and  interest  on  loans,  and 
that  she  devoted  it  to  the  support  of  herself  and  children.  But 
a  question  and  answer  upon  the  point  whether  the  children  had 
any  expectation  of  continuance  of  support  during  the  life  of 
deceased,  and  asking  for  the  facts  upon  which  such  expectation 
is  based,  are  inadmissible  in  so  far  as  they  seek  for  and  elicit  the 
witnesses's  opinion,  and  to  this  extent  should  be  excluded.*1    In 

80 San   Antonio  &   A.  P.   K.  Co.  v.  i      "San   Antonio  &  A.   P.   R.  Co.  v. 

Long,  87  Tex.  148,  152;  27  S.  W.  113;    Lout;-,  87  Tex.  148,  152,  153;  27  S.  W. 

47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87.  |  113;  47   Am.    St.    Rep.   87;    19   Tex. 
QQ2 


PROPORTIONED   TO    INJl  BY. 


§  532 


addition  the  actual  relations  sustained  between  the  parties  are 
material.  Thus  that  deceased  was  kind,  affectionate  and  indul- 
gent to  his  family  has  been  declared  to  be  competent  evidence,82 
although  it  cannot  be  shown  in  mitigation  of  damages  that  he 
was  a  negro,  upon  the  theory  that  in  that  race  the  family  ties  are 
not  strong."  But  the  fact  whether  the  deceased  and  the  sur- 
vivors lived  apart  or  under  the  same  roof,  whether  the  survivors 
were  married  or  unmarried  and  the  character  of  tin-  services  or 
aid  rendered,  if  any,  are  factors  entering  into  the  determination 
of  damages. M 


Civ.  App.  649;  48  S.  W.  .".99.  In  this 
case  the  mother  was  a  woman  whose 
superior  business  management  of 
her  estates  enabled  her  to  provide 
for  her  children  in  an  increasing  de- 
gree even  to  the  extent  of  furnishing 
them  a  home. 

8-i  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  930.  See  also 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271;  Ft.  Worth  &  K. 
G.  R.  Co.  v.  Kime,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
271;  51  S.  W.  558,  aff'd  54  S.  W.  240. 

83  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Moody 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23  S.  W.  41. 

84  Deceased  made  her  permanent 
home  with  her  daughter — one  of  the 
plaintiffs.  She  attended  to  the  house- 
work and  looked  after  the  children 
while  the  daughter  was  away  at 
work.  These  services  enabled  the 
daughter  to  work  out  constantly  and 
when  so  at  work  she  earned  $6  a 
week,  and  since  her  mother's  death 
she  had  been  unable  to  go  out  to 
work  because  she  had  no  one  to  take 
care  of  the  house  and  children.  It 
was  declared  that  such  services  were 
a  pecuniary  benefit  which  the  daugh- 
ter had  a  right  to  expect  from  the 
continuance  of  the  mother's  life  and 
such  value  was  to  bo  assessed  by  the 
jury  and  was  not  what  the  daughter 
might  earn  by  going  out  to  work, 
because  by  hiring  sonic  one  else  she 
might  still  go  out  to  work.     In   the 


same  case  there  were  also  two  sons 
as  plaintiffs;  one  was  2d  years  old, 
married  and  had  one  child,  the  other 
28  years  old,  married  and  had  two 
children.  The  mother  although  she 
made  her  home  at  her  daughter's 
was  in  the  habit  of  assisting  the  sick 
members  of  her  two  sons'  families. 
How  often  she  went,  how  long 
she  remained  and  what  was  the 
value  of  her  services  did  not  appear 
nor  was  there  any  evidence  to  show 
that  in  case  of  sickness  the  sons 
were  obliged  to  employ  some  one 
else.  Held  that  there  was  no  evi- 
dence legally  sufficient  of  pecuniary 
loss.  "To  attempt  to  assess  dam- 
ages  under  such  circumstances  would 
be  to  indulge  in  mere  conjecture  or 
speculation."  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  .State,  Mahoue,  03  Md.  136, 
146,  147.  Three  of  the  plaintiffs  had 
resided  with  their  mother  for  whose 
death  recovery  was  sought.  San  An- 
tonio &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Lonjr,  87  Tex. 
14S,  153,  158,  159;  27  S.  W.  11:);  47 
Am.  St.  Rep.  87.  Son's  knowledge  of 
father's  business  affairs  admissible. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  335;  54  s.  W,  009. 
That  one  of  the  beneficiaries  was  a 
married  woman  was  considered. 
St.  Louis.  Ark.  &  Tex.  IX.  Co.  v. 
Johnston,  78  Tex.  636,  542;  15  S.  W. 
104,  per  Gaiues,  Assoc.  .1.  So  the 
business  relations  of  the  parties  are 

663 


533 


DEATH     -DAMAGES 


§  533.  Same  subject  concluded.— Again,  it  is  decided  in  a 
recent  case  in  Texas  that  the  statute  does  not  impose  the  con- 
dition precedent  to  a  recovery  of  damages,  that  deceased  must 
have  contributed  to  the  support  of  the  beneficiaries,  and  there- 
fore a  married  daughter  can  recover  for  her  father's  negligent 
killino-.85  And  it  is  determined  in  the  same  decision,  that  even 
though  the  aid  furnished  was  gratuitous  and  given  at  irregular 
intervals,  nevertheless  she  was  damaged  by  said  death.  Under 
the  English  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1897,  which  pre- 
scribes a  scale  of  compensation  payable  to  the  dependents  of  a 
workman,  "  where  death  results  from  the  injury,"  it  is  held  that 
the  defendants  are  entitled  to  compensation  on  that  scale  if  death 
results  in  fact  from  the  injury,  even  though  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  it  could  not  be  reasonably  expected  as  the  probable  con- 
sequences thereof.86  And  where  an  employee,  a  son  of  fourteen, 
had  turned  over  all  his  wages  to  his  parents,  receiving  from 
them  such  pocket  money  as  they  thought  right,  and  he  had 
been  employed  for  five  weeks  before  his  death,  it  was  held  that 
such  parents  were  "in  part  dependent"'  on  such  employee,  un- 
der the  English  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.*7  Again,  the 
pecuniary  damage  requisite  is  shown,  although  the  assistance 
rendered  the  father  by  his  son  extended  only  over  a  period  of 
about  six  months  when  the  former  was  out  of  work,  and  no  aid 


factors  as  where  the  son  assisted  his 
father  iu  business  although  in  this 
case  it  was  held  that  there  was  no 
pecuniary  loss.  Sykes  v.  Northeast- 
ern Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  191;  32  L.  T. 
109 ;  23  W.  R.  473.  In  an  action  for 
a  stepmother's  death,  her  earnings, 
their  application  to  the  support  of 
the  family,  that  plaintiff  resided  with 
her  father  and  and  stepmother  up  to 
the  time  of  the  accident  were  con- 
sidered, but  it  was  held  that  there 
was  no  evidence  of  pecuniary  loss. 
Johnston  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  26 
L.  R.  Ir.  691.  Deceased  mother  re- 
sided with  plaintiff  and  was  lodged 
and  maintained  by  her  and  assisted 
her  daughter  as  laundress,  in  house- 
keeping, cooking  and  serving  meals. 
It  did  not  appear  that  the  value  of 

664 


her  services  exceeded  the  cost  of 
keeping  her  and  verdict  for  plaintiff 
was  set  aside.  Hull  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.,  20  L.  R.  Ir.  289. 

85  Texas  &  P.  R.  f'o.  v.  Martin 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60  S.  W.  803; 
Sayle's  Civ.  Stat.  arts.  3021-3027.  See 
also  Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co., 
29  S.  C.  303;  7  S.  E.  515. 

86  Syllabus  to  Dunham  v.  Clare,  71 
L.  J.  K.  B.  683;  C.  A.  under  60  and 
61  Vict.  ch.  37,  Schedule  I,  1  (A.); 
English  Work.  C.-mp.  Act,  1897. 

"Simmons  v.  White  (C.  A.),  68 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  507  (1899),  1  Q  B. 
1005.  Under  English  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  of  1897,  sec.  7, 
subd.  2,  son  received  $17  per  week 
on  the  average. 


PKOI'OKTIONEJ)    TO    INJURY. 


§§  534,  535 


had  been  given  for  five  or  six  years.  It  also  appeared,  however, 
that  the  plaintiff's  ability  to  work  had  decreased,  that  he  was 
physically  injured,  and  was  also  nearly  blind,  although  he  was 
only  fifty-nine  years  old*  So  the  jury  may  consider  the  fact 
of  the  probable  increase  of  the  son's  earning  capacity  and  also 
that  lie  would  have  contributed  some  of  his  earnings  to  his 
widowed  mother's  support,  and  this  even  though  said  son  had 
never  earned  any  money  at  the  time  of  his  death.89  But  it  is 
also  decided  that  there  must  be  evidence  of  some  pecuniary 
assistance  rendered.90 

§  534.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Contract  re- 
lation.— If  the  only  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  survivors  entitled 
to  sue  is  derived  from  a  contract  which  they  had  entered  into 
with  deceased,  they  are  not  entitled  to  recover.91 

§  535.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Reasonable 
expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit. —  The  reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit  or  prospective  advantage  to  the  beneficial^ 
had  the  deceased  remained  alive  should  be  considered  whether 
resulting  as  of  right  or  otherwise,  and  this  expectation  may  be 
shown  by  acts  in  the  past  or  by  evidence  of  actual  or  legal  rela- 
tions, although  it  is  not  dependent  upon  the  latter.  In  certain 
eases  no  recovery  can  be  had  where  there  is  no  proof  of  the  loss 
of  a  reasonably  probable  pecuniary  expectation  or  advantage.1'' 


88  Hetherington  v.  North  Eastern 
Ry.  Co.,  9  Q.  B.  D.  160. 

89  Condon  v.  The  Great  S.  W.  R. 
Co.,  16  Irish  L.  R.  X.  S.  415,  son 
was  14  years  old. 

90  Bourke  v.  Cork  &  M.  R.  Co.,  4 
L.  R.  Irish,  682. 

91  Sykes  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  44  L. 
J.  C.  P.  191;  32  L.  T.   199;  23   W.  R. 

.473. 

92  The  reasonable  expectation  of 
pecuniary  advantage  by  the  rela- 
tion remaining  alive  may  be  taken 
into  account  by  the  jury  and  dam- 
ages may  be  given  in  respect  of 
that  expectation  being  disappointed 
and  the  probable  pecuniary  loss 
thereby       occasioned.       Dalton       v. 


South  Eastern  Ry.,  4  C.  B.  (X.  S. ) 
296;  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  227:  4  Jur. 
(X.  S.)  711;  6  W.  R.  574;  10  Mew's 
Eng.  Dig.  (1S98)  p.  108.  Damages 
should  be  calculated  with  reference 
to  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary benefit  as  of  right  or  otherwise 
from  a  continuance  of  the  life  of  tie- 
ceased.  Franklin  v.  South  Eastern 
Ry.,  ::  H.  &  X.  211;  4  Jur.  X.  S.  565; 
6  W.  R.  :,7:'.:  in  Mew's  Eng.  Dig 
i  1898)  p.  ins.  Reasonable  expecta- 
tion, should  he  considered.  Pym  v. 
Great  Northern  Ry.,  4  B.  &  S.  396; 
32  1..  .1.  Q.  B.  ::T7:  10  Jur.  N.  S.  199; 
S  L.  T.  734;  11  W.  R,  922;  Weems  v. 
Mathieson,  l  Macq.  II.  L.  215.  Sneli 
probability  may  be  increased  by  evi- 

665 


§  535 


DEATH-  -DAMAGES 


Such  advantages,  however,  should  be  such  only  as  might  rea- 
sonably be  expected  under  all   the  circumstances  and  do  not 


dence  of  past  acts.     Condon  v.  Great 
Southern  &  W.  Ry.   16  Ir.  C.  L.   R. 
415,   not  necessary  to    show    pecu- 
niary advantage;  sufficient  if  there 
is  reasonable  expectation  of   future 
pecuniary  benefit  in  case  of  death  of 
minor   child.     Ricketts  v.  Markdale 
(Can.  1900),  (Div.  Ct.)  31  Ont.  610; 
Rombough   v.    Balch,  27   Ont.   App. 
32.     Proof  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a 
recovery  where  there  is  evidence  of 
pecuniary   benefit,    the   continuance 
of  which  a  surviving  daughter  had  a 
right  to  expect.     Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Co.  v.  State,  Mahone,  63  Md.  135.  145, 
146,  per  Robinson,   J.,  citing   Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Hauer,  60 
Md.  449,  which  applies  the  rule  to 
adult  children  in  the  case  of  their 
father's  death,  and  also  holds  that  it 
includes  past  and  prospective  losses 
suffered  as  a  direct  consequence  of 
the  death,  and  this  last  case  follows 
Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co.    v.    State, 
Woodward,    41   Md.    263.      See   also 
Agricultural  &  M.   Assoc,    v.  State, 
Carty,   71   Md.    86;    IS    Atl.    37;  29 
CeDt.  L.  J.  250.      Reasonable  expec- 
tation of  continuance  of  pecuniary 
advantage  from  a  son's  continued  life 
is  a  proper  element.     Texas  &  P.  R. 
Co.    v.  Wilder  (U.   S.  C.   C.  A.  5th 
C.Tex.),   92   Fed.    953,   955,  956;  35 
C.  C.  A.  105;  13   Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.    S.    520;    Hall   v.   Galveston,    H. 
&  S.   A.'R.  Co.   (U.  S.   C.  C.  W.  D. 
Tex.),    39   Fed.    18;    Fort   Worth   & 
Denver  City  R.  Co.   v.  Morrison,  93 
Tex.  527;  56  S.   W.  745.     This  case 
is  cited  in  San  Autonio  Tract.  Co.  v. 
White    (Supr.   Ct.   Tex.   1901),  61  S. 
W.  706;  9  Am.  Xeg.   Rep.  616,  rev'g 
60  S.  W.  323;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Long,  87  Tex.  148;  27  S.  W. 
113;  24  L.  R.  A.  H37;  47  Am.  St.  Rep. 
666 


87;   case  reverses  26  S.  W.  114,  hold- 
ing  also    that    amount    of    benefits 
should  be  shown  with  some  degree 
of  accuracy.    Id.  159.     Pecuniary  ad- 
vantage  reasonably  to   be  expected 
must  be  shown.     McGown  v.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289; 
20   S.   W.   80.      Loss  of   prospective 
pecuniary    benefits    recoverable    in 
case  of    son's  death.   Gulf  Colo.   & 
S.    F.    R.    Co.  v.  Comptou,   75  Tex. 
6(57 ;  13  S.  W.  67.    Must  show  expected 
pecuniary  benefit  from  son.     Winnt 
v.  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  74 
Tex.    32,   35,   36;  11   S.   W.   907,   per 
Hobby,  J.     Measure  of  damages  is  a 
sum  equal  to  the  reasonable  expec- 
tation   of    pecuniary    benefit.     Mis- 
souri  Pac.   R.    Co.   v.   Lee,   70  Tex. 
496,  502,  503;  7  S.  W.  857,  per  Walker, 
Assoc,  J.;  City  of  Galveston  v.  Bar- 
bour, 62  Tex.  172,  174;  50  Am.  Rep. 
519,  per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J.;  Galves- 
ton,  H.   &  S.  A.  R.  Co.   v.   Hughes 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  264. 
Proper  to  show  such  reasonable  ex- 
pectation.    Dallas  &  Wichita  R.  Co. 
v.  Spicker,  61  Tex.  427,  431,  432;  48 
Am.  Rep.  297,  per  Stayton,  Assoc,  J. 
See    S.    C,  60  Tex.  435.     Charge  to 
jury  should  not  exclude  considera- 
tion of  such  expectation.     Galveston, 
H.   &  S.  A.   R.  Co.   v.  Power   (Tex. 
Civ.  App.   1S99),  54  S.   W.  629.     As 
to  reasonable  expectations  of  contri- 
butions from  son,  see  San  Antonio 
Tract.  Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  Civ.  App. ), 
61  S.  W.  706,  rev'g  (Tex.   Civ.  App. 
1900),  60  S.   W.   723.     The    proof  of 
past  support,  etc.,   shows  such  rea- 
sonable expectation.     Galveston,  H. 
&  S.   &   R.   Co.   v.   Ford    (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  37.     Evidence 
inadmissible    to    enhance     damages 
may  be  given  to  show  such  reason- 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY 


<  .">:',.", 


cover  all  benefits  which  might  possibly  have  b<-en  received.98 
And  in  an  English  case  it  was  held  that  there  was  such  a  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  as  would  sustain  an 
action  by  a  widow  and  children  of  deceased,  where  he  died  in- 
testate and  his  income  ceased  with  his  death,  even  though  there 
was  a  jointure  and  certain  settlements  secured  u>  the  survivors, 
and  although  it  was  ;i  matter  of  uncertainty  whether  deceased 
would  have  saved  or  accumulated  anything  from  his  income  to 
provide  fur  the  beneficiaries  at  his  death,  and  it  was  also  uncer- 
tain what  disposition  deceased  would  have  made  of  his  income 
in  connection  with  his  family's  social  and  domestic  advantages. 


able  expectation.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  K.  Co.  v.  Bonnett  (Tex.  Civ. 
A  pp.  I.  88  S.  W.  813. 

What  proof  required — What  con- 
stitutes reasonable  expectation. 
Though  pecuniary  loss  required  to 
sustain  such  an  action  may  be  evi- ; 
dence  by  proof  of  a  reasonable  ex- 
pectation of  pecuniary  benefit,  yet 
tliere  must  be  some  evidence  from 
which  a  jury  shall  be  able  to  arrive, 
otherwise  than  by  guess  or  specula- 
tion at  the  conclusion  that  there  was  [ 
such  reasonable  expectation,  and  I 
this  involves  (1)  a  reasonable  expec- 
tation that  profit  would  be  made 
from  the  continuance  of  the  life;  ) 
(2)  a  reasonable  expectation  that 
some  part  of  the  profit  so  made 
would  become  the  property  of  the 
person  on  whose  behalf  damages 
are  claimed,  either  as  of  bounty  or 
of  right.  Hourke  v.  Cork  &  Macroom 
Ry.,  L.  R.  Ir.  282,  per  Pallas,  C.  B.; 
10 Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  pp.  107, 
108.  In  a  case  of  this  description, 
the  plaintiff  could  not  succeed  with- 
out proof  of  a  state  of  facts  in  which 
pecuniary  advantage  arose  or  bad 
formerly  arisen,  and  was  likely  to 
again  arise  to  the  father,  and  the 
continuance  or  renewal  of  which 
pecuniary  advantage  the  father  might 
have  reasonably  expected  if  the  son's 


life  had  continued.  Id.,  per  Dowse, 
B.  The  action  was  by  a  father  for 
the  death  of  a  minor  son,  and  it  was 
held  that  there  was  no  evidence  of 
deprivation  of  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  advantage. 

ll'A'  //  proof  insufficient,  no  recovery. 
If  the  proof  does  not  show  a  reason- 
able prospect  or  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary benefit,  then'  can  be  no  recov- 
ery. Harrison,  L.  &  N.  W,  Ry.,  1  Cab. 
&  E.  540.  Action  for  wife's  death, 
parties  were  living  apart.  Mason  v. 
Bertram,  18  Ont.  R.  1  Chy.  D.  Ac- 
tion for  death  of  son,  who  had  just 
reached  majority.  Baltimore  &  O. 
R.  Co.  v.  State,  Mahone,  63  Md.  135, 
It".  Action  for  mother's  death. 
Two  of  the  beneficiaries  were  adult 
married  sons,  who  were  denied  re- 
covery. St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R. 
Co.  v.  Johnston,  78  Tex.  536,  542; 
15  S.  W.  104.  Xo  reasonable  expect- 
ation shown,  sufficient  to  entitle 
two  of  the  beneficiaries,  a  son  near 
majority  and  a  married  daughter,  to 
recover.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown  (Tex.  Civ.  App.).  39  S.  W. 
140.  Adult  sons  proved  no  reasonable 
expectation  of  aid  from  deceased. 

»«Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hyatt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W. 
677.  An  action  for  death  of  a  minor 
child. 

607 


§  536 


IH2AT11       DAMAGES 


It  was,  however,  declared  that  the  jury  should  consider  all  the 
contingencies  and  uncertainties  and  whether  there  was  such  a 
reasonable  and  well-founded  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  as 
could  be  estimated  in  money.94 

§  536.  Same  subject  continued. — In  Maryland  it  is  held 
that  in  case  of  a  son's  death,  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary benefit  from  the  continuance  of  his  life  after  majority 
constitutes  no  ground  of  recovery  in  favor  of  a  parent.95  But 
prospective  benefits  to  children  may  be  estimated  up  to  majority, 
and  a  widow  is  entitled  to  prospective  pecuniary  damages.1*1 
Again,  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  husband  and  father,  it  is  no  ob- 
jection to  the  recovery  of  a  fair  compensation  that  such  measure 
of  damages  might  not  be  what  the  plaintiffs  had  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  receiving,  and  an  instruction  may  be  refused  that 
the  recovery  should  be  limited  to  a  sum  representing  the  pres- 
ent worth  of  future  earnings  of  deceased,  which  they  had  a  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  receiving  had  he  survived,  where  such 
requested  charge  also  contains  the  clause  that  said  present 
worth  be  calculated  upon  the  basis  of  six  per  cent  per  annum.97 
Nor  should  such  reasonable  expectation  be  excluded  from  the 
jury's  consideration.98  And  the  disposition  by  deceased  of  his 
earnings  may  affect  the  question  of  probable  aid  and  of  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit  or  of  continued  support.99     Although 


«  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
2  Best  &  S.  759;  8  Jur.  N.  S.  819; 
6  L.  T.  N.  S.  1537;  31  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
249;  10  Wkly.  R.  737,  aff'd4  Best* 
S.  396;  10  Jur.  N.  S.  199;  32  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  377;  11  Wkly.  R.  922.  Pecuni- 
ary advantage  derived  from  a  minor 
child  need  not  be  shown.  It  is  suf- 
ficient that  the  evidence  justifies  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  future 
pecuniary  benefit  capable  of  being 
estimated.  Ricketts  v.  Markdale 
(Div.  Ct.),  31  Ont.  010;  Rombough 
v.  Balch,  27  Ont.  App.  32. 

95  Agricultural    &    M.     Assoc,     v. 
State,  Carty,  71  Md.  86;  18  Atl.  37; 
29  Cent.   L.  J.  250  ;  Baltimore   &  O. 
R.  Co.  v.  State,  60  Md.  449. 
668 


96  Baltimore  &  R.  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  71  Md.  573;  IS  Atl.  884. 

97  Galveston  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  58  S.  W. 
622. 

98  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Power  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54 
S.  W.  629,  a  case  of  death  of  son. 

99  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Knight  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  52  S.  W. 
640.  Deceased  son  gave  his  earn- 
ings to  his  father  in  this  case. 
Ft.  Worth  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Kime, 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  271 ;  51  S.  W.  558, 
aff'd  54  S.  W.  240.  Deceased  pro- 
vided a  comfortable  home  for  and 
supported  his  family  in  this  case. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY.  §  537 

the  fact,  that  no  proof  was  offered  of  what  sum  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  purchase  the  equivalent  of  the  pecuniary  benefit  which 
the  widow  and  children  might  have  reasonably  expected  from 
deceased's  life,  will  not  be  a  ground  for  disturbing  a  verdict  as 
excessive  where  the  other  facts  in  evidence  justify  its  sustaining 
such  verdict.100  Hut  where  the  value  of  all  the  prospective 
benefits  that  would  have  accrued  to  the  beneficiary,  except  for 
the  death,  is  exceeded  by  the  amount  received  by  him  from  the 
estate  of  the  decedent,  there  can  be  no  recovery  under  a  statute 
providing  for  a  separate  recovery  by  each  beneficiaiy  of  a  speci- 
fied class  of  relatives  and  giving  damages  only  for  the  pecuniary 
injury.1 

§  537.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Physical  and 
financial  condition,  age,  number  of  family,  etc.,  of  benefici- 
aries.— In  considering  whether  or  not  evidence  of  the  character 
indicated  by  the  above  headlines  is  admissible  under  statutes 
permitting  the  recovery  of  damages  proportioned  to  the  injury, 
it  may  be  stated  as  an  abstract,  independent  proposition  that  it 
is  a  technical  general  rule  of  law  that  evidence  of  this  nature 
will  be  rejected  when  offered  for  the  single  or  express  purpose 
of  enhancing  or  mitigating  damages,  although  even  this  rule  has 
been  subject   to  exceptions   and  qualifications.     On   the  other 

100  Ft.    Worth   &    R.  G.   R.   Co.    v.  continued  life,  so  declared  in  Gulf, 

Kime,   21   Tex.    Civ.   App.  271;  51  S.  Colorado  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger, 

W.  558,  aff'd  54  S.  \V.  240.  90  Tex.  387;   38  S.  W.    1121;   1    Am. 

1  San  Antonio  &   A.   P.    P.  R.  Co.  Nej;.  Rep.  378,  per   Brown  J.     As  to 

v.   Long    (Tex.),  27  S.    W.   113;    24  instruction    concerning     reasonable 

L.    R.    A.    637,    rev'ji  26  S.    W.    114.  expectation  of  pecuniary  assistance 

Widow  may   recover    for  husband's  from  deceased   husband  and  father. 

death  probable    amount    which    he  Bee  San  Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken, 

would     have     contributed     to      her  15  Tex.  Civ.   App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829. 

maintenance    and   support    had    he  As  to  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 

lived.     Missouri,  K.  &  T.   It.  Co.  v.  cuniary  aid  from  deceased  adult  son, 


Ilines  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W. 
152.  In  case  adult  sons  had  re- 
ceived and  had  no  expectation  of 
receiving  pecuniary  aid,  no  damages 


see  Galveston,  II.  A-  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bonnett(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38  S.  W. 
813.  Adult  son  and  married  daugh- 
ter cannot   recover   where    the    evi- 


can  be  recovered.     Texas  &  N.  ().  R.    deuce  fails  to  show  a  reasonable   ex- 
Co.  v.  Brown,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  697;   peotation    of    pecuniary   assistance. 

39   S.    W.    140.     Evidence  is  adrnis-    St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.    Co.  v.  Bishop,  14 
sible  to  show  what  aid  a  child  could    Tex.  Civ.  App.  ">04:  37  S.  W.  7<i4. 
expect    to   receive  from   a    mother's  | 

669 


537 


DEATH  — DAMAGES 


hand  the  statute  may,  by  specifying  the  class  entitled  to  recover, 
necessitate  proof  of  the  age,  mental  and  physical  condition,  de- 
pendency and  number  of  beneficiaries  that,  under  a  different 
designation  of  those  entitled  to  damages,  might  be  inadmissible. 
Again,  the  undoubted  tendency  of  the  decisions  is  that  all  the 
circumstances  should  be  considered  which  are  legally  admissible 
on  any  relevant  ground,  and  which  might  aid  in  reaching  a 
proper  conclusion.  Thus  the  reasonable  expectation  of  future 
benefit  or  advantage  from  the  continued  life  of  the  person  killed 
may  depend  largely  upon  evidence  of  the  above  character.  Again 
such  testimony  may  be  necessary,  material  and  relevant  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining,  showing,  or  tending  to  show  the  admis- 
sibility or  relevancy  of  other  relevant  evidence.  In  addition, 
the  appellate  courts  have  not  hesitated  when  the  evidence  is  be- 
fore them,  to  consider  age,  physical  and  financial  condition,  de- 
pendency, etc.,  of  beneficiaries  in  order  to  determine  whether 
the  damages  are  excessive  or  inadequate,  except,  perhaps,  where 
the  question  of  the  admissibility  of  such  testimony  is  directly  in 
issue  for  review.  The  force  of  the  above  remarks  will  be  evi- 
dent from  the  appended  citations  wherein  facts  have  been  con- 
sidered relating  to  the  physical  and  financial  condition  of  bene- 
ficiaries, their  age,  the  number  and  state  of  the  familj%  their 
dependency  and  surroundings,  and  in  certain  cases,  the  amount 
of  earnings  of  survivors,  their  occupation  and  ability  or  inability 
to  work,  whether  they  were  in  humble  life  or  otherwise,  and 
their  life  expectancy.  This  especially  applies  to  parents  or 
children  who  survived     Again,  evidence  of  the  financial  condi- 


2  In  connection  with  what  we  have 
stated  in  the  text  and  with  the  ap- 
pended citations  as  well  as  with 
those  of  like  character  throughout 
this  title,  and  without  advocating 
the  admissibility  or  inadmissibility 
of  evidence  of  the  character  above 
noted,  we  fail  to  see  why  if  such  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  in  any  given 
case,  the  appellate  courts  can  con- 
sistently review  the  factors  of  age, 
etc.,  of  beneficiaries  in  any  case 
where  it  should  have  been  rejected 
in    the   court   below.     We  except  of 

670 


course  those  cases  where  such  evi- 
dence is  before  the  court  by  consent 
of  parties.  Author's  remarks. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson,  163 
U.  S.  369;  41  L.  Ed.  193;  16  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  1171.  Action  by  widow  under 
Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  1887,  tit.  36,  sees. 
2145-2155.  Deceased  left  a  widow 
and  four  children.  Baltimore  &  Reis- 
tertown  Twp.  v.  State,  Grimes,  71 
Md.  573;  18  Atl.  884.  Widow's  life 
expectancy  and  joint  life  expectancy 
with  deceased  will  be  considered. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  v.  State,  Mahone, 


PROPORTION  KI>    TO    IN.IPRY. 


§  537 


tion  of  the  head  of  the  family  at  the  time  of  the  wife's  death  is 
admissible  where  the  action  is  in  behalf  of  said  husband  and  his 
minor  daughter,  to  show  what   aid  the  child  could  expect  to  re- 


63  Md.  135.  Surviving  daughter's 
earnings  on  account  of  being  able  to 
go  out  to  work  because  the  deceased 
had  remained  at  home  and  cued  for 
the  household,  and  also  the  age  of 
two  surviving  sons,  and  that  both 
were  married  and  had  children  were 
considered.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  State,  Kelly,  24  Md.  271.  Proof  of 
age  and  condition  of  health  of  de- 
ceased and  members  and  state  of 
family  sufficient  for  more  than  nom- 
inal damage.  Lilly  v.  Charlotte  C. 
&  A.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  C.  142;  10  S.  E. 
932.  Allegation  of  dependency  con- 
sidered not  sufficient.  Texas  &  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  5th 
0.)i  35  C.  C.  A.  105;  92  Fed.  953, 
955,  956;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  las.  N. 
S.  520.  Courts  avail  themselves  of 
all  circumstances  which  may  assist 
them.  Ross  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  ('.  C.  W.  O.  Tex.),  44  Fed.  44. 
Plaintiffs  were  poor,  father  was  56 
years  old  and  wife  52,  and  kept  hotel 
at  time  of  son's  death.  Hall  v.  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
W.  U.  Tex.),  39  Fed.  18.  In  charge 
to  jury  it  was  said  that  the  testi- 
mony should  include  tho  circum- 
stances of  the  plaintiff  (action  was 
for  death  of  son),  his  atie  and  health, 
the  amount  of  bis  property  and  the 
duration  of  bis  life.  The  father  here 
was  dependent  and  in  feeble  health. 
Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  R.  Co.  v. 
Morrison,  93  Tex.  527;  56  S.  W.  74:.. 
Jury  should  consider  all  the  circum- 
stances and  aid  to  parents.  Here 
the  parents  were  poor,  04  years  old 
and  in  bad  health.  International  & 
G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Knight  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  52  S.  W.  640.  Father's  pov- 
erty may  be  shown.     Same  case,  91 


Tex.  660;  45  S.  W.  550;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep. 79;  rev'g  43  S.  W.  167;  St.  Louis, 
Ark.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  78 
Tex.  536,  542;  15  S.  W.  104,  per 
Gaines,  Assoc.  J.  Age  of  minor  child, 
and  that  another  beneficiary  was 
married  and  that  a  widow  and  child 
were  left,  were  considered.  Gulf  C. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,  75  Tex. 
667;  13S.  W.667.  Surviving  mother's 
life  expectancy  need  not  be  proven 
by  other  than  age  and  physical  con- 
dition. Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henry,  75  Tex.  220;  12  S.  W.  828. 
Plaintiff  was  60  years  old;  she  was 
in  good  health,  strong  and  vigorous, 
and  was  aided  in  her  support  by  de- 
ceased. Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehm- 
berg,  75  Tex.  61:  12  S.  W.  S38.  One 
of  the  surviving  children  was  4  years 
old  and  the  other  was  born  about  a 
month  after  the  father's  death. 
Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester,  75 
Tex.  56;  12  S.  W.  955.  Action  by 
widow  for  son's  death;  the  fact  that 
her  advancing  years  might  create 
a  greater  necessity  and  dependence, 
proper  matters  for  consideration. 
Brunswig  v.  While.  70  Tex.  504;  8 
S.  W.  85.  The  circumstances  of 
the  parents  who  sue  often  becomes 
necessary  evidence,  not  as  a  basis 
for  increasing  or  diminishing  the 
amount,  but  to  illustrate  the  acts  of 
the  deceased  child  as  useful  or  Other- 
wise. In  this  case  all  the  family 
worked  and  were  poor  people,  en- 
gaged in  the  dairy  business.  Mis- 
souri Pac  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex. 
496;  7  S.  W.  857.  Plaint  ill's  age  and 
life  expectancy  are  proper  factors.  It 
may  be  shown  that  one  of  the  plain- 
tiffs was  a  ciipple  in  an  action  by  the 
widow  and  children,   under    Sayle's 

071 


§  537 


DEATH  — D  ASIA  GES 


ceive  from  the  continuance  of  the  mother's  life  in  the  given  state 
of  circumstances  surrounding  them.  This  rule  does  not,  how- 
ever, entitle  the  child  to  recover  more  or  less  damages  because 


Civ.  Stat.  art.  3027,  Texas  Midland  R. 
Co.  v.  Crowder  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901), 
64  S.  W.  90.  So  evidence  that  the 
parents  were  very  poor  and  had  no 
means,  may  be  admitted  in  an  action 
for  the  son's  killing,  where  the  jury 
were  told  at  the  time  that  such  evi- 
dence should  not  be  considered  as  a 
basis  for  increasing  or  diminishing 
the  damages,  but  only  to  show  the 
child's  usefulness.  Citizens  It.  Co. 
v.  Washington  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1900),  58  S.  VV.  1042;  Houston  & 
T.  C.  K.  Co.  v.  White,  23  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  280;  56  S.  W.  204.  Pecuniary 
condition  of  parents  of  deceased 
adult  may  be  shown  and  also  plain- 
tiffs' ages.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  K.  Co.  v. 
Delaney,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  427;  55 
S.  W.  538.  That  there  were  no 
children  by  second  marriage  of  de- 
ceased was  considered.  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  22  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  335;  54  S.  W.  909.  Sur- 
viving father's  age  and  pecuniary 
ability  are  competent  evidence. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  37. 
Surviving  parents  and  8  other 
children  and  were  aided  by  de- 
ceased. Texas  &  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Spence 
(Tex.),  52  S.  W.  562.  Plaintiff's  age 
in  case  of  son's  death  considered. 
Ft.  Worth  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Kime, 
■1\  Tex.  Civ.  App.  271;  51  S.  W. 
558,  aff'd  54  S.  W.  240.  Deceased 
left  a  widow  and  two  small  chil- 
dren; there  was  no  proof  of  the 
wife's  life  expectancy.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Porterfielcl,  19  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  225;  46  S.  W.  919;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  461,  case  aff'd  49  S.  W.  361; 
12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  383. 
Surviving   father  was  decrepit    and 

672 


dependent.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Royall,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  86;  43 
S.  W.  815.  Surviving  mother's  age 
and  life  expectancy  and  dependency 
considered.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bonnett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
38  S.  W.  813.  That  father  was  very 
poor,  admissible  to  show  reasonable 
expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit 
but  not  for  the  purpose  of  increas- 
ing damages.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Gormley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
35  S.  W.  488.  Financial  condition 
of  deceased  admissible.  Ft.  Worth 
&  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hyatt  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  34  S.  W.  677.  Surviving 
mother's  age  and  number  of  her 
children  admissible.  Gulf,  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  South  wick  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  j,  30  S.  W.  592.  In  action  by 
child  for  mother's  death  the  child's 
surroundings  should  be  considered. 
International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Neel  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W.  1133. 
The  surviving  mother  was  a  widow 
and  dependent.  Austin  Rapid- 
Trans.  R.  Co.  v.  Cullen  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  29  S.  W.  256,  rehearing  de- 
nied 30  S.  W.  578.  Plaintiff's  (par- 
ents) were  poor.  San  Antonio  &  A.  i 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  5  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  195;  23  S.  W.  745.  Evidence 
admissible  of  the  parent's  wealth  or 
poverty  to  show  whether  plaintiffs 
were  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence in  permit!  ing  the  child  to  go 
unattended  on  a  railroad  track. 
Sanderson  v.  Sanderson,  36  L.  T. 
847.  Deceased  left  a  widow  and  four 
infant  children  dependent.  Hetlier- 
ington  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  51  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  495;  9  Q,  B.  D.  160;  30  W.  R. 
747.  Father's  age,  that  he  was  nearly 
blind    and    injured    in  his    leg   and 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  537 


of  the  fact  that  the  family  was  rich  or  poor.  But  the  circum- 
stances surrounding  a  mother  and  child  arc  different  in  wealthy 
and  poor  families  and,  therefore,  such  facts  may  be  proven  for 
the  purpose  above  specified/'  And  the  husband's  financial  con- 
dition during  his  illness  preceding  his  death  has  been  admitted 


hands  and  comparative  inability  to 
work,  and  that  he  did  sometimes 
work  and  also  that  he  had  been  out 
of  work  were  considered.  Sykes  v. 
Northeastern  Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  191; 
32  L.  T.  199;  23  W.  R.  473.  The 
surviving  father's  occupation  to 
show  loss  of  deceased's  assistance 
was  considered.  Rowley  v.  London 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Ex.221; 
42  L.  J.  Ex.  153;  29  L.  J.  180;  21 
W.  R.  809.  Mother's  age  considered 
in  connection  with  annuity  right. 
Pyni  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  4  P.  & 
S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10  Jur. 
(N.  S.)  199:  8  1,  T.  734;  11  W.  R. 
922.  The  loss  of  the  comforts  and 
conveniences  of  life  owing  to  the 
father's  condition  in  life  were  con- 
sidered. Duckworth  v.  Johnson. 
4  H.  &  N.  653;  29  L.  J.  Ex.  25;  5 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  030:  7  W.  R.  655.  The 
father's  condition  in  life  was  that 
of  a  workinginan.  Franklin  v. 
South  Eastern  Ry.,  3  II.  &  N.  211;  4 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  565;  5  W.  R.  573.  Sur- 
viving father  was  old  and  growing 
infirm;  his  condition  in  life  was  also 
poor.  .Johnston  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  691.  Plaintiff  was 
in  humble  life;  her  earnings,  that 
she  worked  in  a  factory,  and  her 
inability  to  work  from  weakness 
and  poor  health  were  considered. 
Hull  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  26  L. 
R.  Ir.  2S9.  Plaintiff  received  lodg- 
ing and  maintenance  and  assisted 
her  deceased  mother.  Bourke  v. 
Cork  &  Macroom  Ry.,  4  L.  R.  Ir. 
282.  Plaintiff's  (the  father's)  con- 
dition in  life  was  that  of  tradesman 
and  he  was  independent  of  deceased 

43 


sou's  earnings.     See  Dalton  v.  South 
Eastern  R.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  N.  S.  296. 

3  Gulf,  Colo.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Younger,  90  Tex.  387,  391,  392;  38 
S.  W.  1121;  1  Am.  Xeg.  Re]).  378, 
per  Brown,  Assoc.  J.  The  evidence 
in  controversy  was  that  the  father 
was  a  man  of  means,  president  of  a 
bank,  worth  from  $30,000  to  *50,000. 
The  testimony  was  offered  for  the 
purpose  as  stated  to  the  trial  court 
of  enabling  the  jury  to  intelligently 
and  properly  pass  upon  the  question 
of  damages  because  it  is  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge  that  children  of 
poor  and  indigent  parents  are  more 
dependent  upon  their  parents,  partic- 
ularly upon  their  mother,  for  train- 
ing and  culture  and  nurture  than  are 
children  of  parents  better  circum- 
stanced; that  while  children,  partic- 
ularly daughters,  of  people  of  very 
moderate  circumstances  were  al- 
most entirely  dependent  upon  their 
mother  for  training,  nurture,  educa- 
tion, educational  advantages,  etc.: 
that  ordinarily  persons  of  moderate 
competence,  moderate  means  and 
well  to  do,  when  their  daughters 
reached  the  age  of  Delia  Younger, 
14  years,  sent  their  daughters  off  to 
boarding   School,    procured  for   them 

teachers  and  tutors  and  gave  them 
better  opportunities  than  people  of 
moderate  means  were  able  to  furnish 
their  children  and  thereby  to  a  large 
extent  removed  them  from  imme- 
diate dependence  upon  their  mother 
for  nurture,  training,  etc.,  and  there- 
fore measured  by  the  ordinary  eon 
duet  of  men,  the  loss  of  a  mothei  to 
a  minor  daughter  was  greater  where 

673 


§  538 


DEATH  — DAMAGES 


to  show  imposition  and  duress  in  obtaining  a  release  which  has 
been  pleaded  in  bar.1 

§  538.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Expenses  of 
sickness,  funeral,  etc. — Under  the  English  statute  compensation 
for  the  funeral  expenses  or  for  family  mourning,5  or  for  medi- 
cal expenses  incurred  by  the  injured  person  is  not  recoverable.6 
But  where  a  railway  passenger  is  injured  and  thereafter  dies, 
medical  expenses  and  loss  occasioned  during  his  lifetime  may  be 
recovered  by  his  executrix  in  an  action  for  damages  to  his  per- 
sonal estate  arising  from  breach  of  the  carrier's  contract  for  safe 
carriage.7     In  South  Carolina  funeral  expenses  paid  are  a  proper 


parents  were  in  moderate  circum- 
stances tlian  where  they  were  in 
better  condition  financially;  that  the 
defendant  was  entitled  to  show  the 
financial  condition  of  the  plaintiff, 
Dr.  Younger,  that  the  jury  might  in- 
telligently pass  upon  the  extent  of 
damage  that  the  plaintiff's  daughter, 
Delhi  Younger,  had  sustained  by  the 
death  of  his  wife.  On  appeal  the 
court  per  Brown,  Assoc.  J.,  id.  392, 
quotes  from  Tilly  v.  Ry.  Co.,  24  N. 
Y.  476,  as  to  the  duty  of  nurture,  in- 
tellectual, etc.,  training  owing  from 
parents,  especially  the  mother,  to 
children,  and  as  to  the  loss  thereof 
through  death,  being  a  pecuniary  in- 
jury as  distinguished  from  injuries 
to  the  feelings  and  sentiments  and 
says  in  addition  :  "  In  the  absence 
of  proof  a  jury  might  assess  damages 
in  such  a  case  based  upon  a  common 
knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which 
mothers  usually  perform  such  duties 
(Gainesville  H.  &  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Lacy, 
86  Tex.  244,  24  S.  W.  269 ).  It  is  true, 
however,  that  these  duties  are  dis- 
charged and  rendered  to  children  in 
various  degrees  according  to  the  tem- 
perament, education  and  other  cir- 
cumstances of  the  different  mothers 
and  it  is  always  proper  to  inform  the 
jury  of  every  fact  and  circumstance 

674 


which  will  assist  them  to  deter- 
mine what  aid  the  child  would  iu 
all  probability  have  received  from  the 
mother  in  the  particular  case  if  she 
had  lived.  By  this  means  we  ap- 
proach as  near  as  practicable  the  ac- 
tual pecuniary  injury  sustained  by 
the  death  of  a  parent,"  citing  several 
cases. 

4  Price  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co., 
38  S.  C.  377;  17  S.  E.  732;  same  case, 
33  S.  C.  556;  12  S.  E.  413;  26  Am. 
Rep.  700. 

5Daltonv.  Southeastern  Ry.,  4  C. 
B.  (N.  S.)  296;  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  227;  4 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  711;  6  W.  R.  574. 

6  Pulling  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.,  9 
Q.  B.  D.  110.  In  Osboru  v.  Gillett, 
42  L.  J.  Ex.  53;  8  Ex.  88;  28  L.  T. 
197;  21  W.  R.  409,  damages  were 
claimed,  including  burial  expenses 
paid  for  by  plaintiff,  and  an  auswer 
was  held  good  as  a  bar  to  recovery 
of  any  damages,  that  the  death  was 
instantaneous. 

7  Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  &  York- 
shire Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  148;  L.  R.  10 
0.  P.  189;  31  L.  T.  847;  23  W.  R.  310. 
See  10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  pp. 
107,  111,  115.  See  cases  cited  in  note 
headed  "  When  does  not  bar  ac- 
tion"  under  sec.  523,  herein,  as  to 
statutes. 


PROPOI; TlnNKI)    To    INJURY. 


§  539 


element  of  damage,8  and  in  Texas  medical  and  other  like  ex- 
penses may  be  included  in  an  action  for  a  minor  child's  death.0 
So  funeral  expenses  incurred  by  a  husband  by  reason  of  his 
wife's  deatli  arc  part  of  the  damages,1"  but  evidence  of  the 
value  of  a  physician's  services  cannot  be  given  unless  specially 
pleaded." 


§  539.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Annuity.— 

It  has  been  said  that  perhaps  the  nearest  measure  of  damages, 
approximating  reasonable  certainty,  would  be  such  a  sum  as 
would  purchase  an  amount  equal  to  the  value  of  the  pecuniary 
aid  which  the  plaintiff  would  have  derived  from  the  deceased, 
calculated  upon  the  basis  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  of 
the  particular  case,  reasonably  accessible  in  evidence  and  in- 
cluding the  probable  duration  of  life.1-  But  it  is  also  decided 
that  the  jury  are  restricted  too  closely  in  estimating  damages 
by  an  instruction  which  directs  the  finding  of  a  sum  which 
would  purchase  such  an  annuity."  And  in  Canada  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  for  the  benefit  of  a  mother  for  the  death  of 
her  son  is  held  to  be  a  sum  which  would  purchase  an  annuity 
equaling  the  fair  and  moderate  value  of  the  maintenance  which 
she  had  a  reasonable  expectation  of  receiving  from  him  for  the 
rest  of  her  life,  and  since  she  has  a  legal  recourse  against  any 
one  of  her  children  alone  for  her  maintenance,  the  fact  that  she 
has  surviving  children  cannot  operate  to  reduce  the  amount  so 
recoverable." 


8  Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co., 
29  S.  C.  303;  7  S.  E.  515. 

9  Brunswig  v.  White.  70  Tex.  504; 
8  S.  W.  85.  See  also  id.  512.  When 
•'  necessarily  incurred."  City  of  Gal- 
veston v.  Barbour,  02  Tex.  172,  174; 
50  Am.  Rep.  519,  per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J. 
Incidental  expenses  accruing  from 
the  injury  and  death  of  a  son  may 
be  recovered  even  though  the  mother 
maybe  improperly  joined  as  to  that 
item.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Evans,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  68;  41  S.  W. 
80. 

io  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  South- 
wick  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  502. 


&     T.     R.    Co.    v. 
Civ.    App.  889;    11 


11  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S.  \V.  423. 

'-'Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cow- 
ser,  57  Tex.  297.  304,  per  Bonner. 
Assoc.  J. 

1:f  Missouri,  K. 
Ransom,  15  Tex. 
S.  W.  826. 

"Bernard  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co. 
Rapports  Judic.  De  Quebec,  11  Cour. 
Super.  9.  The  following  is  the 
ByllabuB  of  a  frequently  cited  Eng 
lish  decision:  At  the  trial  of  an  ac- 
tion under  9  and  10  Vict.  cb.  93, 
brought  for  the  benefit  of  tbe 
mother,  widow  and  children   of  R.. 

675 


§540 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


§  540.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Life  expect- 
ancy— Annuity,  etc.,  tables. — We  have  considered  generally  the 
subject  of  life  expectancy  as  one  of  the  general  elements  of 


claiming  damages  from  the  defend- 
ants for  having  by  their  negligence 
caused  the  death  of  R.,  it  was  proved 
that  deceased  was  under  a  covenant 
to  pay  his  mother  an  annuity  of  £  200 
during  their  joint  lives.  A  witness 
was  then  called  by  the  plaintiff,  who 
stated  that  he  was  an  "accountant" 
and  that  he  had  personal  experience 
as  to  the  mode  in  which  insurance 
business  was  conducted.  He  gave 
evidence  after  referring  to  certain 
tables  used  by  insurance  offices 
called  the  "  Carlisle  Tables'1  as  to 
the  average  duration  of  life  of  two 
persons  of  the  ages  of  the  mother 
and  sou  respectively,  and  as  to  the 
price  for  which  an  annuity  for  the 
mother's  life  could  be  bought. 
The  admissibility  of  this  evidence 
was  objected  to  by  defendants  and 
was  ruled  to  be  admissible.  In 
summing  up  the  learned  judge 
directed  the  jury  that  they  might, 
if  they  thought  proper,  calculate 
the  mother's  damages  by  ascertain- 
ing what  was  the  sum  which  would 
purchase  an  annuity  of  £  200  for  a 
person  of  her  age,  according  to  the 
average  duration  of  human  life; 
and  that  in  calculating  the  widow's 
and  children's  damages,  they  might, 
if  they  thought  proper,  take  as  a 
guide  the  probable  duration  of  life 
of  a  person  of  the  age  of  the  de- 
ceased. On  the  argument  of  the 
bill  of  exceptions  tendered  to  the 
ruling  of  the  learned  judge  in  ad- 
mitting the  evidence  and  to  his  di- 
rection to  the  jury,  held  first  (by 
Blackburn,  Keating,  Grove  and 
Archibald,  JJ.),  that  the  witness 
was  competent  to  give  evidence  as 
to  the  probahle  duration  of  life  and 

676 


the  price  of  the  annuity,  although 
not  an  actuary,  and  (Brett,  J.,  dis- 
senting) that  the  evidence  was 
relevant  and  properly  admitted. 
Secondly,  by  the  whole  court,  that 
the  direction  to  the  jury  as  to  the 
calculation  of  the  mother's  damages 
was  wrong.  By  Blackburn,  Keat- 
ing, Archibald  and  Honyman,  JJ. 
The  direction  was  erroneous  in  not 
noticing  the  circumstance  that  the 
annuity  of  the  mother  was  on  the 
joint  lives  of  herself  and  son,  and 
that  it  was  only  secured  by  the  per- 
sonal covenant  of  her  son.  By 
Honyman,  J.  The  direction  was 
also  erroneous  in  authorizing  the 
jury  to  find  the  term  for  which  an 
annuity  is  to  be  purchased  solely 
by  reference  to  the  average  duration 
of  life,  without  taking  into  account 
the  state  of  health  of  the  particular 
annuitant.  By  Brett,  J.  The  only 
legal  direction  to  the  jury  would 
have  been  that  they  ought  not  to 
attempt  to  give  damages  to  the  full 
amount  of  a  perfect  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury,  but  must 
take  a  reasonable  view  of  the  case 
and  give  what  they  considered 
under  all  the  circumstances  a  fair 
compensation:  and  the  direction 
was,  therefore,  erroneous,  inasmuch 
as  it  left  it  open  to  the  jury  to  give 
as  damages  the  utmost  amount 
which  they  might  think  was  an 
equivalent  for  the  pecuniary  mis- 
chief done.  Thirdly  (by  Black- 
burn, Keating,  Grove  and  Archibald, 
JJ.,  Brett,  dissenting),  that  the 
direction  as  to  the  mode  of  calculat- 
ing the  damages  recoverable  by  the 
widow  and  children  might  be  con- 
strued as  meaning  that  the  probable 


PROPORTIONED    TO    lN.UkV. 


6  540 


damages,15  but  it  may  be  stated  here  that  in  an  action  for  the 
death  of  the  husband,  the  reasonable  probability  of  the  continu- 
ance of  life  of  the  deceased  and  of  the  widow  may  be  factors,  or 
as  it  has  been  more  exactly  expressed,  in  estimating  damages 
to  the  widow  the  probable  duration  of  the  joint  lives  of  herself 
and  husband  should  be  considered,  and  this  probability  is  such 
as  the  jury  may  find  reasonable  under  the  circumstances.16  So 
the  life  expectancy  of  a  deceased  child  and  of  the  parent  are 
important,"  and  it  may  be  given  in  evidence  without  being 
specially  pleaded.18  Nor  does  plaintiffs  failure  to  prove  the  same 
preclude  recovery,  for  although  the  evidence  of  experts  is  ad- 
missible in  proof  thereof,  it  is  not  necessary.     'Hie  statute  con- 


duration  of  the  life  of  a  person  of 
the  same  age  and  in  the  same  cir- 
cumstances as  the  deceased  was  an 
element  to  be  taken  into  the  calcu- 
lation of  the  jury  with  the  rest  of 
the  evidence  and  being  so  construed 
was  correct.  The  facts  of  the  case 
were  these:  The  deceased  was  an 
attorney  and  by  articles  of  partner- 
ship between  his  father  and  himself, 
he  covenanted  to  pay  his  mother  an 
annuity  of  £200  during  the  joint 
lives  of  himself  and  mother.  He 
was  40  years  old  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  and  his  mother  (51  years  old  at 
that  time.  Rowley  v.  London  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  H.  8  Ex.  221;  42  L.  J. 
Ex.  153;  29  L.  J.  180;   21  W.  R.  869. 

15  See  sec.  528,  herein. 

16  Baltimore  &  Reistertown  Twp. 
v.  State,  Grimes,  71  Md.  573,  583, 
584;  18  All.  884,  per  Robinson,  J., 
citing  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co. 
v.  State,  Bitzer,  58  Md.  372;  Cum- 
berland &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Ilogan, 
45  Md.  234;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  State,  Woodward,  41  Md.  268; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Traiuor,  33  Md.  542.  See  also  Pas- 
chal v.  Owen,  77  Tex.  583;  14  S.  W. 
203,  where  the  life  expectancy  of 
deceased  was  considered.  Ft.  Worth 
&   R.    G.    R.    Co.    v.  Kime,    21  Tex. 


Civ.  App.  271;  51  S.  W.  r>:>s.  aft  d  54 
S.  W.  240,  where  the  deceased's  life 
expectancy  was  35  years.  Tyler,  S. 
E.  R.  Co.  v.  Rasberry,  13  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  185;  34  S.  W.  7!>4;  :l  Am.  & 
Eug.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  370,  husband's 
life  expectancy  was  35  years.  Row- 
ley v.  London  &  X.  W.  Ry..  42  L.  J. 
Ex.  153;  L.  R.  8  Ex.  221:  29  L.  T. 
180;  21  W.  R.  809.  See  digest  of 
this  case  in  full  under  sec.  539, 
herein. 

17 Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex.),  39  Fed. 
18,  per  Maxey,  J.,  charging  the  jury. 
Missouri  Pae.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70  Tex. 
496,  502,  503;  7  S.  W.  857,  per  Walker, 
Assoc.  J.  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cilmore  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899), 
where  it  was  admitted  that  a  minor 
child  had  an  expectancy  of  life  until 
majority.  International  &  G.  X.  R. 
Co.  v.  McXeel  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29S. 
W.  L138.  The  surviving  mother's  ex- 
pectancy of  life  was  over  28  years. 
Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co.  v.  Finch  (Tex. 
Civ.  App. ),  27  S.  W.  1028.  Surviving 
mother's  expectancy  was  13j  years. 

18  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  \. 
Knight,  91  Tex.  060;  45  S.  W.  556;  4 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  79,  rev'g  45  S.  W. 
167. 


§541 


DEATH       DAMAGES 


templates  that  the  jury  shall  judge  of  this  upon  evidence  of  age 
and  physical  condition.19  So  mortuary  tables  included  in  an  in- 
surance manual  are  admissible  upon  being  shown  to  be  reliable 
and  standard  authority  with  insurance  men;  and  American  ex- 
perience tables  published  in  the  United  States,20  and  mortality 
tables  are  properly  admitted  even  though  they  do  not  consider 
the  vocations  of  men,21  and  even  though  plaintiff  is  in  poor  health.--' 
So  a  life  insurance  agent,  familiar  with  mortuary  tables  and  hav- 
ing had  experience  thereunder,  is  a  competent  witness.4'  But 
annuity  tables  do  not  govern  in  estimating  the  value  of  de- 
ceased's life,  for  the  jury  must  give  what  they  consider  fair 
damages.24  And  however  useful  such  evidence  may  be,  courts 
cannot  hold  juries  bound  by  statistics  or  calculations  of  life  ex- 
pectancies.4"'  Again,  a  book  containing  tables  of  expectation  of 
years  cannot  be  shown  in  evidence  in  the  absence  of  proof  of 
its  correctness  where  it  is  not  one  of  those  standard  works  of 
which  courts  take  judicial  notice  and  recognize  as  authority.26 


§  541.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Nominal  dam- 
ages.— In  England  the  action  does  not  lie  merely  for  nominal 
damages,27  and  the  right  thereto  is  not  given  by  mere  proof  of 


is  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Comp- 
ton,  75  Tex.  667;  13  S.  W.  667.  See 
also  Armsworth  v.  Southeastern  Ry., 
11  Jur.  758. 

20  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ran- 
som, 15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  680:  41  S.  W. 
826.  Life  tables  are  admissible  to 
show  a  deceased  husband's  life  ex- 
pectancy, even  though  they  have  no 
reference  to  the  widow's  age.  Mis- 
souri, K.  &T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W.  152.  Properly 
authenticated  life  tables  used  by  in- 
surance companies  are  admissible. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Tex. 
Civ.  App. ),  26  S.  W.  644.  Deceased's 
life  expectancy  as  shown  by  ap- 
proved tables  is  to  be  considered. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser,  57 
Tex.  297,  304,  per  Bonner,  Assoc.  J. 

21  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  31  S.  W.  255. 

678 


82  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Leonard  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  29  S.  W. 
955. 

23  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kuehn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  21  S.  W.  58. 

2*  Armsworth  v.  Southeastern  Ry., 
11  Jur.  758. 

25  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lester, 
75  Tex.  56,  61;  12  S.  W.  955,  per 
Henry,  Assoc.  J. 

2<5  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arispe,  81  Tex.  517;  17  S.  W.  47;  48 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  350.  In  this 
case  plaintiffs  introduced  in  evidence 
a  book  entitled  "  A  Million  of  Facts; 
Conkling's  Handy  Manual  of  Useful 
Information  and  Atlas  of  the  World, 
all  for  twenty-five  cents." 

27  Boulter  v.  Webster,  11  L.  T.  598; 
13  W.  R.  298. 


PBOPORTION  ED   TO    IN.M'UY. 


§541 


the  death  and  the  relationship  of  the  parties,  since  actual  dam- 
ages must  have  accrued  from  the  death.28  In  Arizona  the  de- 
I'endant  may  object  to  a  remittitur  reducing  the  verdict  to  nom- 
inal damages,  where  they  have  been  unlawfully  fixed  by  the  plain- 
tiff of  record  and  the  defendant  is  thereby  left  open  to  the  danger 
of  another  suit  by  some  of  the  persons  entitled.'-3  In  Maryland 
it  is  decided  that  the  recovery  is  not  limited  to  a  nominal  sum 
merely  because  of  the  separation  of  deceased  from  his  family  and 
noncontribution  to  their  support,30  and  in  thatstate  proof  of  age, 
etc.,  is  not  necessary  to  warrant  such  a  recovery.31  Again,  the 
fact  that  the  deceased  had  contributed  nothing  to  the  support 
of  his  wife  or  child  for  about  twelve  years,  during  which  time 
he  had  been  separated  from  them,  is  held  not  to  prevent  the  re- 
covery of  more  than  nominal  damages  for  their  benefit."  In 
South  Carolina  it  is  not  required  to  prove  pecuniary  damages 
in  an  action  for  an  infant's  death/3  But  in  Texas  the  statute 
limits  the  recovery,  and  where  there  is  no  proof  of  the  value  of 
services  of  a  deceased  wife,  nor  of  any  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit,  the  doctrine  of  nominal  damages  does  not  apply.34  Op- 
posed, however,  to  this  decision,  is  an  earlier  case  in  which  it  is 
declared  that  if  the  killing  of  a  child  was  wrongful,  etc.,  the 
parents  are    entitled  to  recover  at  least  a  nominal  sum,35   al- 


28 Duckworth  v.  Johnson,  4  H.  & 
N.  653;  29  L.  J.  Ex.  25;  5  Jur.  N.  S. 
630;  7  W.  K.  656;  10  Mew's  Eng.  Dig. 
(1898)  p.  111.  See  also  Bourke  v. 
Cork  &  Macroom  Ry.,  4  L.  R.  Ir. 
282,  where  there  was  no  evidence  of 
reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
beuefit,  all  hough  the  death  and  cer- 
tain other  facts  were  proven,  yet 
judgment  was  for  defendant.  That 
it  is  not  necessary  to  show  pecuniary 
advantage  in  case  of  death  of  minor 
child,  see  Ricketts  v.  Markdale  (Div. 
Ct.),  31  Out.  610;  Kombough  v. 
Baleh,  27  Out.  A  pp.  32. 

29  Southern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson, 
163  U.  S.  3(59;  41  L.  Ed.  193;  16  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  1171,  under  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat. 
1887,  sees.  214."),  2155. 

80 Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 


Chambers,  81  Md.  371,  3S9;  32  Atl. 
201.  See  quotation  from  this  case  un- 
der sec.  531,  herein. 

ai  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Kelly,  24  Md.  271,  280. 

83  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Chambers  (Md.),  32  Atl.  201. 

1)3  Mason  v.  Southern  Ry.,  58  S.  C. 
70;  36  S.  E.  440;  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  826. 

84  McGown  v.  International  &  G. 
N.  R.  Co.,  S5  Tex.  289,  293;  20  S.  W. 
80;  Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R,  Co.  v. 
Goimley  (Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.),  27  S.  W. 
1051. 

^Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504; 
8  S.  W.  85,  per  Walker.  Assoc.  J.;  id. 
pp.  508,  512.  See  also  Austin  Kip. 
Trans.  R.  Co.  v.  Cullen  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ).  29  S.  W.  256,  rehearing  denied 
30  S.  W.  578. 

679 


^  f)42  DEATH       DAMAGES 

though  it  is  also  decided  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  specially 
plead  the  fact  in  order  to  show  generally  the  services  of  a  wife 
and  that  the  mere  claim  of  damages  is  sufficient/* 

§  542.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Death  of  hus- 
band—Husband  and  father.— Outside  of  the  general  elements 
of  damages  fully  considered  elsewhere,'7  the  legal  and  actual 
relations  sustained  by  deceased  to  the  other  members  of  the 
family  is  important,  and  this  includes  the  fact  whether  or  not 
the  husband  and  wife  were  living  together  or  separately .ss  Again, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  head  of  a  family  to  support  his  wife  and 
children,  and  the  presumption  is  that  he  would  have  continued 
to  discharge  that  duty.39  So  that  the  consequent,  legal  and  ac- 
tual dependency  should  be  considered,  extent  of  aid  furnished,4" 
as  well,  also,  as  the  condition  in  life  of  deceased.41  These  mat- 
ters further  embrace  the  reasonable  prospect  of  pecuniary  bene- 
fit to  the  survivor  or  survivors.42  Again,  the  loss  of  deceased's 
advice  and  counsel  may,  in  some  cases,  be  a  proper  element  of 
damages,  although  no  recovery  can  be  had  in  an  action  for  the 
death  itself  for  mental  and  physical  suffering  of  deceased,  nor 
can  damages  be  had  for  the  loss  of  his  society,  nor  for  mental 
anguish  of  the  survivors.43  But  if  the  statute  specifies  the  class 
of  beneficiaries  entitled  to  recover,  their  number,  ages  and  sex 
become  important.41  The  petition,  however,  by  a  widow  and 
child  to  recover  for  the  negligent  killing  of  their  husband  and 
father,  need  not  allege,  as  against  a  general  demurrer,  that  they 
were  damaged,  where  the  prayer  is  for  a  specified  sum  as  dam- 
ages and  the  other  allegations,  are  sufficient  to  show  a  cause  of 

86  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger  I  also  Louisiana  W.  E.  R.  Co,   v.  Car- 
(Tex.    Civ.    App.),    40  S.     W.     423;   stens,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  190;  47  S.  W. 


Chapman  v.  Roth  well,  El.  &  Bl. 
168;  27  L.  J.  Q.  B.  315;  4  Jur.  (N. 
S.)  1180. 

87  See  sec.  528,  herein. 

88  See  sees.  531,  554,  herein. 

89  St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnston,  78  Tex.  530;  15  S.  W.  104, 
per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J. 

40  See  sec.  531,  herein. 

41  See  sec.  528,  herein. 

42  See   sees.  535,  536,  herein.     See 

680 


36;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  781; 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 
som, 15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  689;  41  S.  W. 
826;  Missouri.  K.  *  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S.  W.  152;  San 
Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  229;  35  S.  W.  829; 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  30  S.  \V.  930. 

43  See  sec.  530,  herein. 

44  See  sec.  535,  herein. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    fNJURY. 


§  542 


action.45  Again,  under  an  English  decision,  the  representatives 
may  maintain  an  action  for  the  benefit  of  the  surviving  widow 
and  younger  children,  even  though  there  was  a  settlement  of 
the  bulk  of  the  property  of  deceased  upon  the  eldest  son,  and 
the  loss  of  education  and  comforts  and  conveniences  of  Life  to 
them  may  be  considered  with  reference  to  their  reasonable  ex- 
pectations of  pecuniary  benefit  from  his  continued  life.41'  So  the 
widow  may  recover  for  damages  occasioned  to  deceased's  per- 
sonal estate  where  he  dies  after  an  interval,  in  consequence  of 
an  accident  through  defendant's  negligence.17  And  there  may 
be  a  recovery  by  the  widow  and  children,  even  though  there  is 
no  evidence  of  the  life  expectancy,  nor  of  the  sum  which  would 
purchase  the  equivalent  of  the  pecuniary  benefit  reasonably  to 
be  expected  from  the  continuance  of  deceased's  life.48    But  where 


46  So  held  in  International  &  G.  N. 
K.  Co.  v.  Culpepper,  19  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  182;  46  S.  W.  922.  A  widow 
bringing  an  action  as  administratrix 
does  not  sue  in  the  same  right  as  in 
an  ordinary  action,  but  as  trustee 
for  a  specific  class  of  persons  under 
the  English  statute.  Leggott  v. 
Great  Northern  Ky.,  45  L.  J.  Q.  15.  557 ; 
1Q.  B.  D.  599;  35  L.  T.  334.  As  to  lib- 
erty of  father  and  mother  to  appear 
at  trial  in  action  by  widow  and  ad- 
ministratrix, see  Steele  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.,   26  L.  R.  Ir.  96. 

Evidence.  In  an  action  by  a  widow 
for  damages  for  her  husband's  death 
brought  against  the  same  defend- 
ant's as  those  in  the  suit  by  her  hus- 
band brought  during  his  lifetime, 
but  abating  by  his  death,  his  exam 
ination  de  bene  esse  is  admissible 
where  he  was  cross-examined  by  said 
defendants  (Eidruan  v.  Walkerton, 
20  Ont.  App.  444),  but  evidence  of  the 
cost  of  raising  a  child  is  inadmissi- 
ble. International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kuehn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  21  S.  W.  58. 

wPymv.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  4  B. 
&  S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  199;  8  L.  T.  734;  11  W.  R, 
922. 


47  Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  &  York- 
shire Ry.,  44  L.  J.  C.  P.  148;  L.  R. 
10  C.  P.  189:  31  L.  T.  847;  23  W.  R. 
310. 

Excessive  or  absurd  damages.  The 
court  will  interfere  where  the  dam- 
ages awarded  the  widow  and  chil- 
dren are  excessive  (Secord  v.  Great 
Western  Ry.,  15  Q.  B.  631)  [Ont.]), 
or  where  they  are  so  small  as  to 
be  absurd.  Springett  v.  Balls,  6  B. 
&  S.  477.  In  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1900),  57  S.  W.  702.  810,000  in  favor 
of  the  widow  and  (5,000  for  each  of 
two  children  was  held  excessive. 
But  in  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  of  T. 
v.  Ferris,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  215. 
$10,000  in  favor  of  the  wife  and  chil- 
dren was  held  not  excessive.  So  in 
Fr.  Worth  cv  It.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Kim.-. 
21  Tex.  Civ.  App.  271;  -".1  S.  W.  558, 
aff'd  54  S.  W.  210,  $15,000  in  favor  of 
the  widow  and  two  small  children 
was  held  not  excessive.  See  further 
as  to  excessive  damages,  sec.  528, 
and  note  herein. 

Ft.    Worth   &   R.    G.    R.    Co.    v. 
Kimc.  21    Tex.  Civ.    App.    271;  51  S. 

W.  558,  aff'd  54  S.  W.  240. 

681 


§  542 


DEATH  — DAMAGES 


the  husband  was  accustomed  to  give  his  monthly  earnings  to 
his  wife,  an  instruction  is  erroneous  which  directs  the  jury  to 
assess  her  damages  in  sucli  sum  as  they  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence she  would  probably  have  received  in  a  pecuniary  way  from 
deceased,  since  the  jury  may  infer  that  the  sums  she  would 
have  probably  received  from  said  earnings  was  the  measure  of 
damages.49  Again,  it  is  decided  that  a  deceased  husband's  earn- 
ings do  not  limit'  the  widow's  recovery/*  since  she  is  entitled 
to  such  a  sum  as  will  compensate  her  for  the  loss  of  the  pecuni- 
ary benefits  she  would  have  probably  received  except  for  her 
husband's  death.51  But  an  instruction  which  directs  the  jury 
to  assess  a  widow's  damages  for  killing  her  husband,  in  such 
sum  as  they  believe  from  the  evidence  she  would  probably  have 
received  in  a  pecuniary  way  from  her  husband  had  he  lived,  is 


49  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Loeffler  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51  S.  W. 
536. 

50  Louisiana  West.  Extension  R. 
Co.  v.  Carstens,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
190;  47  S.  W.  36;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  781.  See  also  Missouri 
ifc  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex. 
61;  12  S.  W.  838;  Baltimore  &  O. 
R.  Co.  v.  State,  Chambers,  81  Md. 
371;  32  Atl.  201;  State,  Grice,  v. 
County  Commrs.,  54  Md.  426;  Bal- 
timore &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Kelly, 
24  Md.  276,  280-282;  San  Autonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Renken,  15  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  229;  38  S.  W.  829.  See  also 
sec.  528,  herein. 

51  Louisiana  West.  Exten.  R.  Co. 
v.  Carstens,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  190: 
47  S.  W.  36;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
N.  S.  781.  See  further  as  to  damages 
recoverable  by  widow  or  widow  and 
children.  Baltimore  &  Reistertown 
Twp.  v.  State,  Grimes,  71  Md.  573; 
18  Atl.  884;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Woodward,  41  Md.  268;  Bal- 
timore &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  Kelly, 
24  Md.  271 ;  Strotber  v.  South  Car. 
&  G.  R.  Co.,  47  S.  C.  375;  25  S.  E. 
272;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  430; 
Galveston,    H.    &    S.    A.    R.    Co.    v. 

682 


Worthy,  87  Tex.  459;  29  S.  W.  376; 
St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnston,  78  Tex.  536;  15  S.  W.  104; 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg, 
75  Tex.  61;  12  S.  W.  838;  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 75  Tex.  41;  12  S.  W.  860; 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Loeffler 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51  S.  W.  536; 
Louisiana  West.  Ext.  R.  Co.  v. 
Carstens,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  190;  12 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  781;  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter- 
field,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  225;  46  S. 
W.  919,  aff'd  49  S.  W.  361;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  383;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  461;  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
689;  41  S.  W.  826;  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
40  S.  W.  152;  Hicks  v.  Newport,  A. 
&  H.  Ry.,  4  B.  &  S.  403  n.;  Rowley 
v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  L.  R.  8  Ex. 
221;  42  L.  J.  Ex.  153;  29  L.  J.  180: 
21  W.  R.  869.  See  this  case  un- 
der sec.  539  herein  as  to  annuities. 
Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  4  B.  & 
S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10  Jur. 
(N.  S.)  199;  8  L.  T.  734;  11  W.  R. 
922. 


im:<>i><>i:ti<>ni;i>  to   INJURY. 


8  543 


erroneous,  when  his  disposition  of  his  earnings  was  to  give  them 
all  to  her,  since  the  jury  might  well  infer  that  they  should  as- 
certain what  sums  she  would  probably  have  received  from  such 
earnings."'-  Again,  where  the  parents  have  in  fact  no  right  to 
recover  and  it  is  alleged  by  a  widow  in  an  action  for  her  hus- 
band's death  that  such  parents  are  joined  merely  for  a  final  ad- 
judication of  their  rights,  and  that  they  resided  in  a  foreign 
country,  and  did  not  receive  and  would  not  have  received  any 
pecuniary  aid  from  the  deceased,  such  petition  does  not  show  a 
want  of  good  faith  in  suing  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  parties  en- 
titled to  recover  under  the  'Texas  stilt ate.38 

§  543.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  Death  of 
wife. — In  determining  the  husband's  right  to  damages  for  his 
wife's  death,  not  only  their  actual  and  legal  relations  should  be 
considered,'1  but  also  his  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit  j55  and  he  can  recover  not  only  for  the  actual  injury  result- 
ing to  him  from  her  death,53  but  he  is  entitled  to  the  pecuniary 
value  of  her  services  less  the  cost  of  suitably  and  properly  main- 
taining her,';  and  he  sustains  a  substantial  loss  where  he  is 
obligated  to  replace  her  household  services  by  hired  labor. 
Again  if  there  are  children,  the  mother's  care  and  moral  training 
should  be  considered.™  But  where  a  husband  and  child  sur- 
vive, it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  he  has  sustained  damage 


■'-'  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Loeffler  (Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.),  51  S.  W. 
530.  Deceased  was  a  brakeman  and 
widow  was  held  entitled  to  recover 
ldr  the  loss  of  the  pecuniary  benefits 
she  would  have  received.  Louis- 
ville Western  Ex.  K.  Co.  v.  Caistens, 
19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  190;  47  S.  W.  36; 
12  Am.  A-  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  781. 

63  San  Antonio  St.  K.  Co.  v.  Ren- 
ken,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  229;  38  S.  W. 
829. 

61  Harrison  v.  L.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  1 
Cab.  &  E.  540.  See  also  sec.  531 
herein. 

65  Harrison  v.  L.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  1 
Cab.  &  E.  540;  McGown  v.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289; 


20  S.  W.  80.     See  also  sees.  535,  536, 
herein. 

■•'•  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Matula,  70  Tex.  577,  583,  584;  15  S. 
W.  .~i7:'.:  McGown  v.  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  85  Tex.  289;  2d  S.  W. 
80;  St.  Lawrence  a-  Ottawa  R.  W. 
Co.  v.  Lett,  11  S.  C.  R.  (Out.  i  422, 
affg  II  A.  R.  1,  which  rev'd  Q.  B. 
D.  (1  O.  R.  54).     See  sec.  530,  herein, 

■'■'  Gulf,   C.   A'   S.    P.    R.    CO.    V.  South- 

wick    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    30   S.    W. 
592. 

08  St.  Lawrence  &  Ottawa  R.  W. 
Co.  v.  Lett,  11  S.  C.  R.  (Ont)  422, 
aft" g  11  A.  R.  1.  which  rev'd  Q.  B. 
I).  (1  O.  R.  545).  As  to  evidence  of 
services  see  sec.  539,  herein. 

683 


§544 


DEATH       DAMAGES 


because  the  child  is  damaged  by  the  killing  of  the  wife  and 
mother.59 

§  544.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Death  of 
parent. — What  we  have  said  elsewhere  in  regard  to  the  death 
of  the  husband  and  father  applies  here.'0  Primarily  it  is  the 
duty  of  a  father  to  support  his  minor  children.1'1  but  this  legal 
right  of  minors  does  not  preclude  an  action  by  an  adult  child 
for  the  parent's  death.6-'  And  a  child  unborn  or  a  posthumous 
child  is  within  the  word  "  children  "  and  is  a  surviving  child 
under  the  Texas  statute,  giving  the  right  to  sue  for  a  parent's 
death."  So  a  minor  daughter  who  is  living  with  her  mother, 
from  whom  her  father  is  divorced,  is  entitled  to  damages  for  his 
negligent  killing,  where  the  decree  of  divorce  failed  to  provide 
for  such  child,  and  it  does  not  appear  that  he  had  aided  in  her 
support.*1     It  may.  however,  be  generally  stated  that  in  assess- 


»  Kerry  v.  England  (P.  C).  (1898) 
A.  C.  742;  67  L.  J.  P.  C.  N.  S.  150. 
Examine  Davies  v.  Thompson  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  50  S.  W.  1062.  See  sec. 
526,  herein. 

60  See  sec.  542,  herein. 

61  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Culpepper,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46 
S.  W.  922;  Linskie  v.  Kerr  (Tex.  Civ. 
App),  34  S.  W.  765,  also  holding  that 
such  support  must  he  given  out  of  the 
father's  property,  and  not  out  of  the 
child's,  unless  absolutely  required. 
St.  Louis,  Ark.  &  Tex.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  78  Tex.  536;  15  S.  W.  104, 
per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J. 

«2Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co., 
29  S.  C.  303;  7  S.  E.  515.  A  case  of 
a  mother's  death.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kutac,  72  Tex.  643, 
653;  11  S.  W.  127,  holding  that  an 
adult  is  included  within  the  word 
"children,"  for  the  statute  makes 
no  distinction  upon  the  ground  of  age. 
The  action  here  was  for  the  death  of 
a  mother. 

63  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson, 
82  Tex.  657;  17  S.   W.  1041;  27  Am. 

684 


St.  Rep.  929;  Nelson  v.  Galveston,  H. 
&  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  78  Tex.  621;  14  S.  W. 
1021;  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  81;  11  L.  R.  A. 
391.  And  under  Lord  Campbell's  Act 
a  child  in  ventre  sa  mere  may  re- 
cover after  its  birth  for  a  father's 
death  prior  to  such  birth.  The 
George  &  Richard,  L.  R.  3  Adm.  466; 
24  L.  T.  717;  20  \V.  R.  246.  In  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75 
Tex.  61;  12  S.  W.  838,  one  of  the 
children  was  born  a  month  after  his 
father's  death,  but  the  question  was 
not  discussed.  See  sees.  522,  523, 
herein  as  to  statutes. 

64  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Culpepper,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46 
S.  W.  922.  But  the  petition  in  be- 
half of  a  minor  child  should  allege 
directly  or  state  inferential  facts 
showing  that  he  is  a  child  of  the 
deceased  wife  (Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Younger  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
29  S.  W.  948),  although  a  mother 
as  next  friend  is  entitled  to  recover 
damages  for  the  father's  death,  but 
if  the  recovery  exceeds  §500,  she  can 
only  collect  the  same  upon  qualifying 


PROPORTION KD    To    INJURY. 


§   544 


ing  the  sum  to  be  awarded  minor  children,  they  should  be  given 
such  pecuniary  damages  as  will  compensate  them  for  what  the}- 
have  suffered,  or  will  suffer  as  the  direct  consequence  of  the 
parent's  death.85  And  every  parent  has  for  his  children  a 
pecuniary  value,  beyond  the  amount  of  his  earnings.'"  So  in  the 
ease  of  both  minor  and  adult  children,  the  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit  should  be  considered,  including  past 
and  prospective  losses  or  benefits.63  And  in  the  ease  of  adults 
especially,  this  expectation  must  be  based  largely  upon  the  legal 
and  actual  relations  sustained  between  them  and  deceased,  and 
also  upon  their  dependency  and  the  aid  and  assistance  rendered 
of  necessity  or  otherwise.  These  last  two  questions  are.  how- 
ever, fully  considered  herein  under  their  respective  headings."' 
In  Texas  where  a  minor  daughter  had  a  legal  right  to  support, 


as  guardian.  International  &  G.  N. 
K.  Co.  v.  Sein,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  386; 
33  S.  W.  558,  under  Sayle's  Tex.  Civ. 
Stat.  art.  121  la,  as  ain'd  by  act  of  Feb- 
ruary 11.  1893.  Where  damages 
were  awarded  on  an  improper  basis 
for  the  death  of  a  parent,  and  there 
was  no  cross  appeal  to  sustain  the 
verdict,  the  action  was  dismissed 
with  costs  in  City  of  .Montreal  v.  La- 
belle,  14  S.  C.  R.  (Ont.)  741. 

<*  Baltimore  &  R.  Twp.  v.  Stale, 
Crimes,  71  Md.  57:'..  583,  584;  18  Atl. 
884,  per  Robinson.  J.  Action  was 
for  use  of  widow  and  infant  children. 

60  Missouri  Pac.  II.  Co.  v.  Lehm- 
berg,  75  Tex.  01,  07,  OS;  12  S.  W.  838, 
per  Henry,  Assoc.  J. 

87  Baltimore  &  O.  K.  Co.  v.  State, 
Mahone,  03  Md.  135,  145,  per  Robin- 
son. J.;  Baltimore  it  ().  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  Hauer,  00  Md.  440;  Gulf,  C.  & 
S,  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger,  00  Tex. 387; 
38  S.  YV.  1121:  San  Antonio  &  A.  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Long,  87  Tex.  148,  152,  L53; 
27  S.  W.  113:  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87: 
Texas  &  X.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  14 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  097:  30  S.  W.  140; 
St.  Louis,  S.  &  W.  B.  Co.  v.  Bishop, 
14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  504;  37  S.  W.  764; 
Pym  v.  Great  Northern   Ry.   4   B.   & 


S.  30(i :  32  L.  .1.  Q.  B.  377;  10  Jur.  N. 
S.  199;  S  L.  T.  734:  11  W.  R.  9_'2. 

68  See  sees.  531,534,  herein.  See 
further  as  to  death  of  parents  gener- 
ally, State,  Grice,  v.  County  Commrs., 
54  Md.  42*1;  International  &  C  X.  EL 
Co.  v.  McDonald,  75  Tex.  41:  12  S. 
W.  860;  International  &  G.  X.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ormond,  64  Tex.  485;  Da  vies  v. 
Thompson  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  50  S. 
W.  1062;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Long,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  049:  48 
S.  W.  599:  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
v.  Kansom.  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  089;  41 
S.  YV.  820;  International  A-  C.  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kuehn  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  21  S. 
W.  58;  Kerry  v.  England  (P.  C. ) 
(1898),  A.  C.  742;  07  L.  J.  P.  C.  X. 
S.  150;  Appleby  v.  Horsely  Co.  |  No. 
1)  (C.  A.),  08  L.  J.  Q.  B.  X.  s.  892 
(1899);  2  Q.  B.  521:  Condliff  v. Cond- 
liff,  29  L.  T.  S3;  22  W.  Et  325; 
Springett  v.  Balls.  6  B.  A-  S.  477; 
Pym  v.  Greal  Northern  Ry.,  4  B.  & 
S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  15.  :,.77;  10  Jur. 
(X.  S.)  199;  8  L.  T.  731;  11  W.  R. 
922;  Hull  v.  Great  Northern  By..  26 
L.  R.  Ir.  289;  Shallow  v.  Vernon,  [r. 
B..  9  C.  L.  150;  Morh-v  \.  Great 
Western  Ry..  16  Q.  B.  (Ont  I  504; 
Secord  v.  Great    Western    Ry.,  16  Q. 

685 


§545 


DEATH  —DAMAGES 


of  which  her  father's  death  had  deprived  her,  it  was  held  that 
she  was  entitled  to  recover  for  his  negligent  killing,  even 
though  it  was  not  proved  that  he  had  contributed  to  her  sup- 
port, and  although  her  mother  with  whom  she  was  living  had 
been  divorced.  No  provision,  however,  had  been  made  for  the 
daughter  in  the  decree.69  And  where  the  mother,  whose  income 
was  derived  solely  from  her  estate,  had  been  able  by  reason  of 
her  superior  management  to  provide  in  an  increasing  degree  for 
not  only  the  present  but  possible  necessities  of  her  children,  even 
to  the  extent  of  furnishing  them  a  home,  and  she  was  willing  to 
furnish  such  aid  although  her  estate  would  go  to  them  upon  her 
death,  yet  such  facts  were  held  to  constitute  a  basis  for  pecuniary 
damage  to  them,  consequent  upon  her  negligent  killing.70  Again, 
a  married  daughter  can  recover  damages  for  her  father's  death.'1 

§  545.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Death  of  par- 
ent—Care, training,  etc.,  of  children. — A  mother  owes  to  her 
children  the  duty  of  nurture,  and  of  intellectual  and  moral  and 
physical  training,  and  of  such  instruction  as  only  can  proceed 
from  her,  and  these  are  elements  which  relate  to  their  future 
welfare  and  success  in  life,  and  in  the  absence  of  proof  a  jury 
might  assess  damages  in  such  cases  based  upon  the  common 
knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which  mothers  commonly  perform 
such  duties,  although  the  temperament  and  education  of  the 
mother  and  other  circumstances  may  affect  the  manner  of  render- 
ing such  aid  to  children.  Again,  the  wealth  or  poverty  or  the 
surroundings  of  the  child  or  mother  may  affect  the  question  of 
the  aid,  culture,  moral  and  intellectual  training  of  a  child. 
Therefore  these  facts  may  all  be  considered  and  this  would  also 
include  as  an  element  of  damages  in  an  action  for  a  mother's 
death,  the  financial  condition  of  the  husband  as  head  of  the 
family.72     So  under  an  English  decision  it  is  declared  that  the 


B.  (Ont.)  631.  As  to  death  of  father 
and  stepmother,  see  Johnston  v. 
Great  Northern  Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  691. 

69  International  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Culpepper,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  182;  46 
S.  W.  922. 

70  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Long,  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  649;  48  S. 
W.  599. 

686 


71  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60  S.  W.  803. 

72  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Younger,  90  Tex.  387;  38  S.  W.  1121; 
1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  378,  per  Brown,  J.; 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Southwick 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  592;  St. 
Lawrence  &  Ottawa  R.  W.  Co.  v. 
Lett,  11  S.  C.   R.  (Ont.)  422,  aff'g  11 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY.  §§  546,  547 

loss  of  advantages  to  minor  children,  as  well  also  as  of  the 
greater  comforts  and  conveniences  of  life,  depends  on  the  pos- 
session of  pecuniary  means  to  procure  them,  and  where  the 
father's  income  ceases  with  his  life,  a  pecuniary  injury  is  sus- 
tained.73 

§  546.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Death  of 
parent— Children's  majority. — In  .Maryland  where  the  action 
was  for  the  use  of  the  widow  and  her  infant  children,  the  court 
instructed  the  jury  that  as  to  the  latter,  prospective  damages 
could  be  estimated  to  their  majority,7*  and  this  instruction  fol- 
lowed a  prior  decision  in  the  same  state  which  limited  such  re- 
covery to  said  period.'5  But  in  Texas  the  contrary  rule  has 
been  asserted.76 

§  547.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Death  of 
children— Generally. — In  Texas  the  father  and  mother  may 
join  in  an  action  for  the   death  of  their  child.''     So  where  a 


A.  R.  1,  which  rev'd  Q.  B.  I).  (1  O. 
K.  545),  holding  that  loss  to  the  chil- 
dren o'f  the  care  and  moral  training 
of  their  mother  are  grounds  of  dam- 
ages. 

73  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

2  Best  &  S.  759;  31  L.  J.  Q.  B.  249; 
10  Wkly.  R.737,  per  Cockburn,  C.  J., 
aff'd  4  Best  &  S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
377;  11  Wkly.  R,  922. 

74  Baltimore  &  R.  Twp.  v.  State, 
Grimes,  71  Md.  573;  18  Atl.  884, 
and  cases  cited. 

76  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Trainor,  33  Md.  542. 

76  Tyler  S.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Rasberry, 
13  Tex.   Civ.  A  pp.  185;  34  S.  W.  794: 

3  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  \.  s.  376. 

77  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall  (Tex.  |, 
19  S.  W.  121.  And  a  stepfather  may 
be  joined  after  suit  brought  by  the 
mother  of  deceased.  San  Antonio 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cailloute,  79  Tex.  341; 
15  S.  W.  390.  So  a  widow  suing  for 
her  husband's  death  may  sue  also 
for  the  use  and  benefit  of  her  hus- 
band's   parents,    even    though   they 


have  no  knowledge  ^hereof,  where 
such  suit  is  for  t lie  purpose  of  final 
adjudication  of  their  rights  notwith- 
standing such  parents  could  not  re- 
cover. San  Antonio  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Renken,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  229;  38  S. 
W.  829.  As  to  right  of  father  to  have 
his  name  added  as  a  party  to  the  rec- 
ord and  liberty  granted  to  appear  by 
counsel,  and  put  in  evidence  at  the 
trial,  see  Johnston  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.,  20  L.  R.  4,  and  see  Van 
Warl  v.  New  Brunswick  Ry.,  27 
Supr.  Ct.  Jud.  (N.  B.)  59,  rev'd  on 
App.  to  Sup.  C.  C.  Vol.  17,  p.  35. 
Where  a  child  sues  for  his  own  per- 
sonal injuries  and  dies  after  verdict 
but  before  judgment  signed,  a  new 
trial  w;is  refused.  Kramer  v.  Way- 
mark,  4  II.  &  C.4l'7;  35  L.  Ex.  148;  L. 
R.  1  Ex.  241;  12  Jur.  (N.  S.i  395;  14 
L.  T.  368;  14  W.  R.  659.  An  unmar- 
ried man  having  come  to  his  death 
by  reason  of  injuries  indicted  by  the 
defendants,  two  act  ions  were  brought 
to  recover  damages  occasioned  by 
his  death.     The  first  in  point  of  time 

687 


§54T 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


husband  had  abandoned  his  wife  and  contributed  nothing  to 
her  support  for  many  years  and  she  brought  an  action  in  her 
own  name,  without  joining  her  husband,  to  recover  for  the  loss 
by  the  negligent  killing  of  her  son  who  had  supported  her, 
nevertheless,  if  the  husband  hud  received, any  pecuniary  benefit 
from  the  son  during  his  life,  the  damages  should  be  apportioned 
between  them  for  the  amount  both  would  have  received,  but 
otherwise,  in  absence  of  a  finding  of  any  such  benefit  received 
by  the  father.78  If  the  child  is  legitimate,79  the  measure  of 
damages  for  its  death  is  based  primarily  upon  the  value  of  the 
child's  services,  combined  with  the  reasonably  probable  pecu- 
niary benefit  which  the  parent  or  parents  would  have  received 
except  for  the  killing.  This  necessarily  involves  a  considera- 
tion of  the  child's  age,  health,  strength,  mental  and  physical 
capabilities  by  way  of  usefulness,  ability  to  earn  a  livelihood 
and  to  render  aid,  assistance  or  support  to  his  parents,  coupled 
also  with  the  fact  of  what  the  child  has  done  in  that  connec- 
tion. Other  considerations  are  also  involved  and  are  con- 
sidered else\vhere  herein,  such  as  legal  and  actual  relations  be- 
tween deceased  and  the  survivors,  and  the  general  elements  of 
damages  so  far  as  applicable  to  children  of  deceased's  age  ;  and 
the   dependency  of   parents   is    a  material   element.80      Again, 


was  brought  by  the  paternal  grand- 
father and  grandmother  of  the  de- 
ceased, and  the  second  by  his  mother 
who  had  obtained  letters  of  adminis- 
tration to  his  estate  after  the  bring- 
ing of  the  first  action  upon  a  motion 
by  the  mother  to  stay  one  or  the 
other  of  the  actions.  Held  that 
while  the  grandfather  and  grand- 
mother could  legally  proceed  with 
their  action  under  Rev.  St.  Ont.  1897, 
ch.  166,  although  brought  within  six 
months  of  the  death,  so  long  as  there 
was  no  executor  or  administrator, 
yet,  an  administratrix  having  been 
appointed  and  an  action  brought  by 
her  within  the  six  months,  she  was 
entitled  to  proceed  with  it  and  the 
first  action  was  the  one  to  be  stayed. 
Lampman  v.  Township  of  Gainsbor- 
ough (1888),  17  Ont.  R.  191.  and  Hol- 
688 


leran  v.  Bagnell  (1879),  4  L.  R.  Ir. 
740,  explained  and  followed.  Held 
also  that  the  administrator  would 
have  the  right  iu  her  action  to  claim 
damnges  sustained  by  the  personal 
estate  of  the  deceased.  Leggott  v. 
Great  Northern  R.  Co.  (1876),  1  Q. 
B.  D.  599,  followed;  syllabus  to  Mum- 
mery v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  W.  Co.; 
Whalls  v.  Same,  1  Ont.  L.  R.  622. 

78  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  75 
Tex.  220;  12  S.  W.  828. 

79  See  as  to  illegitimate  children, 
sec.  523,  herein  and  notes. 

80  In  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee, 
70  Tex.  496;  7  S.  W.  857,  deceased 
was  the  oldest  son  of  his  widowed 
mother.  He  was  sober,  industrious 
and  economical.  He  worked  for  his 
mother  and  aided  her  with  advice 
and  counsel.      His   devotion   to  her 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  547 


in  determining  whether  or  not  the  parent  has  sustained  dam- 
ages by  her  daughter's  death,  the  loss  none  the  less  exists,  be- 
cause the  deceased's  means  of  aiding  her  mother  were  derived 
from  her  husband.81  But  there  must  be  some  showing  of  a 
pecuniary  loss  actually  sustained  according  to  the  English  de- 
cisions;  thus,  although  there  was  a  deprivation  of  the  son's 
assistance,  and  an  inability  of  the  father  to  take  contracts  which 


was  such  that  the  neighbors  could 
testify  to  repeated  declarations  that 
he  would  support  lier  as  long  as  she 
lived.  He  was  a  farm  hand,  working 
for  wages  and  his  mother  was  a 
renter.  The  idea  given  in  the  testi- 
mony of  this  boy's  character,  habits, 
and  person,  was  that  of  a  prospec- 
tive useful  and  prosperous  citizen 
from  whom  the  mother,  but  for  his 
being  killed,  would  have  received  as- 
sistance greater  probably  than  that 
given  her  by  the  verdict.  Id.  503, 
per  Walker,  Assoc,  J.,  who  also  said 
( id.  502,  503) :  "  The  measure  of  dam- 
ages given  by  the  court  is  '  such  sum 
as  you  may  under  the  circumstances 
reasonably  believe  plaintiff  might 
have  received  from  the  assistance  of 
Robert  E.  Lee  (the  deceased)  had  he 
not  been  killed  by  the  train  of  de- 
fendant, and  you  may  in  estimating 
such  sum,  if  any,  consider  under  the 
evidence  before  you,  the  age  of  said 
deceased,  the  time  he  might  have 
lived,  the  age  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
time  she  may  probably  live  and  any 
other  evidence  tending  to  show  what 
damages,  if  any,  she  may  have  suf- 
fered by  the  killing  of  said  Robert  E. 
Lit.  .  .  .  You  will  find  for  plaintiff 
such  damages  under  the  instructions 
hereinbefore  given  as  you  may  think 
will  compensate  her  for  the  loss,  if 
any,  she  may  have  sustained  by  the 
killing,'  etc.  We  do  not  believe  the 
word  'might'  instead  of  'would' 
could  have  misled  the  jury  as  deBCi  Ip- 
tive  of  the  pecuniary  beuefits  antici- 

44 


pated,  nor  does  it  appear  that  the 
enumeration  of  subjects  of  considera- 
tion necessarily  or  even  probably  ex- 
tended the  limits  of  investigation  by 
the  jury  beyond  what,  from  the  testi- 
mony, plaintiff  reasonably  would 
have  received  had  her  son  lived,  nor 
is  the  further  clause  as  to  compensa- 
tion misleading,  for  express  reference 
is  made  to  the  preceding  part  of  the 
charge.  The  true  measure  is  'a  sum 
equal  to  the  pecuniary  benefit  the 
parent  had  a  reasonable  expectation 
of  receiving  from  her  child  had  he 
not  died.'  City  of  Galveston  v. 
Barbour,  62  Tex.  172,741;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Ormond,  64 
Tex.  485,  490:  Houston  &  T.  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  293;  Houston 
&  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Nixon,  52  Tex.  19; 
Rev.  Stat.  2609."  See  also  as  sup- 
porting the  last  clause  in  the  above 
opinion  as  to  "true  measure,"  etc., 
Galveston,  II.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hughes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  54 
S.  W.  264.  See  further  as  support- 
ing the  above  text,  Galveston,  II. 
&  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Ford  (Tex  Civ. 
App.  ISO!)).  54  S.  W.  37;  Interna- 
tional &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Knight 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  52  S.  W.  640;  Chi- 
cago, Rock  Isl.  it  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Por- 
terfield.  19  Tex.  Civ.  App.  225;  16 
S.  W.  919;  4  Am.  Neg.  Rep,  461, 
aff'd  49  S.  \V.  361;  12  Am.  A  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  383.  See  sees.  .".31.  534, 
herein. 

Bl  Gulf,  C.  A-  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  South- 
wick  i  Tex.  Civ.  App.  ).  30  S.  W.  592. 

689 


§548 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


he  had  taken  during  his  son's  lifetime,  yet,  where  such  son 
had  received  from  his  father  the  wages  of  a  skilled  laborer, 
it  was  determined  that  there  was  no  pecuniary  loss.83  Again, 
where  the  mother  of  deceased  was  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  the 
fact  that  she  had  been  allowed  an  annuity  of  £200,  during 
their  joint  lives  under  a  personal  covenant  was  a  factor.83 
Again,  the  legal  or  moral  obligation  of  a  child  to  support  his 
parent  has  been  considered.*4 

§  548.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Death  of 
minor  children. — The  loss  of  services  of  a  minor  child  consti- 
tutes a  ground  of  action  by  the  parents,85  or  by  the  mother  as 
sole  surviving  parent,86  and  the  husband  and  wife  may  recover 
jointly,  since  they  are  equally  entitled  in  case  of  their  child's 
death.87  Again,  in  determining  the  value  of  such  minor's  ser- 
vices, the  fact  that  she  was  bright  and  intelligent  and  rendered 
such  aid  in  the  household  duties  as  enabled  her  mother  to  use 
her  time  to  a  pecuniary  advantage  will  be  evidential  facts  and 
the  question  of  such  value  is  for  the  jury.38     And  although  such 


82  Sykes  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  44 
L.  J.  C.  P.  191;  32  L.  T.  199;  2:)  W. 
R.  473.  See  sec.  525  herein,  as  to 
pecuniary  interest. 

8i  Rowley  v.  London  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 
L.  R.  8  Exch.  221. 

84  Weems  v.  Mathieson,  4  Macq. 
H.  L.  215.     See  sec.  531,  herein. 

85  Sternenberg  v.  Maillios  (TJ.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  5th  C.  E.  D.  Tex.),  99  Fed. 
43.  See  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Beall,  91  Tex.  310;  42  S.  W.  1054;  41 
L.  R.  A.  807,  and  note.  See  Dallas  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Spicker,  61  Tex.  427,  431 ; 
48  Am.  Rep.  297,  per  Stayton,  Assoc, 
J.,  quoted  from  in  sec.  550  herein  as 
to  adults.  It  is  error  to  submit  the 
issue  to  the  jury  of  defendant's  lia- 
bility -where  the  minor  was  in  de- 
fendant's employ  without  the  par- 
ent's consent.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Vieno  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  20  S. 
W.  230. 

86  But  the  petition  should  allege 
the  value  of   the  child's  services  to 

690 


recover  exemplary  damages,  even  if 
the  statute  allows  such  damages. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,' 
75  Tex.  667;  13  S.  W.  667.  See  State, 
Coughlin,  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
24  Md.  84,  107;  87  Am.  Dec.  600,  per 
Bowie,  C.  J.;  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Crowder,  70  Tex.  222,  225;  7  S.  W. 
709,  per  Stayton,  C.  J.  But  a  mother 
has  no  standing  iu  the  maritime 
court  of  Ontario  not  having  sued 
as  personal  representative  of  the 
child.  In  re  The  Garland;  Mona- 
ghan  v.  Horn,  7  S.  C.  R.  (Ont.)  409. 

87  Bruuswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504, 
512;  8S.  W.  85. 

88  Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504, 
508-512;  8  S.  W.  85,  per  Walker, 
Assoc,  J.  In  this  case  deceased 
was  6  years  old,  was  in  good  health, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  chills, 
and  was  of  great  assistance  in  the 
household,  caring  for  the  baby,  help- 
ing to  wash  dishes  and  sweep  and 
rendering  other  important  services. 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§548 


minor  is  of  tender  years,  the  facts  that  be  had  begun  to  be  of 
some  service,  that  he  was  well  grown,  kind  and  dutiful,  of  fine 
mind  and  able-bodied,  have  been  considered.  So  notwithstand- 
ing an  absence  of  evidence  of  actual  earnings,  and  although  it 
is  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  very  young  child  could  find 
employment  by  which  wages  might  be  earned,  still  it  cannot  be 
said  that  the  parents  have  suffered  no  pecuniary  injury  by  its 
death."9  So  the  habits  and  energy  of  deceased  are  proper  ele- 
ments.'" And  a  value  may  he  placed  upon  a  child's  services 
even  though  he  has  never  earned  wages.  So  the  probability  may 
be  considered  that  he  would  have  devoted  a  part  of  such  earn- 
ings to  his  widowed  mother's  support,  and  the  deceased's  past 
tilial  conduct  will  increase  such  probability.91     Under  the  English 


See  quotation  from  opinion  in  this  | 
case  in  note  to  sec.  527  herein.  In 
Wolfe  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  26  L. 
K.  Ir.  548,  the  deceased  daughter 
was  10  years  old  and  rendered  such 
services  to  her  parents  as  enabled 
them  to  dispense  with  a  servant,  they 
having  employed  one  two  years  be- 
fore. Hut  after  the  child's  death 
they  were  again  ohliged  to  employ 
hired  help.  The  exact  value  of  the 
child's  services  was  not  proven.  It 
was  declared  however  that,  there  was 
sufficient  evidence  for  a  finding  of 
some  pecuniary  value  for  deceased's 
services.  But  in  Bourke  v.  Cork  & 
Miuioom  Ry.,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  282  (10 
Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  1898,  pp.  107,  108), 
the  action  was  by  a  father  for  the 
death  of  a  son,  aged  about  14  years. 
It  did  not  appear  that  the  plaintiff 
had  ever  received  from  the  deceased 
benefits  or  services  which  could  in 
any  sense  be  regarded  as  of  any  pe- 
cuniary value.  It  was,  however, 
proved  that  the  child  was,  up  to  tin- 
time  of  his  death,  a  strong,  intelli- 
gent and  well-disposed  boy,  thai  be 
had  been  receiving  a  school  educa- 
tion for  mercantile  pursuits  and  that 
in  a  few  years,  if  he  had  lived,  his 
services  would  have  been  worth  a  sub- 


stantial sum  in  the  plaintiff's  own 
shop  or  a  similar  establishment.  The 
plaintiff  himself  was  a  respectable 
salesman  and  his  position  rendered 
him  independent  of  any  earnings 
which  his  son  might  have  been  after- 
wards competent,  to  gain.  Held  that 
there  was  no  evidence  to  enable  the 
jury  to  say  it  was  reasonably  proba- 
ble that  pecuniary  benefit  would 
have  resulted  to  the  father  from  the 
continance  of  the  child's  life  and 
that  defendants  were  entitled  to 
judgment. 

s9  lloss  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  W.  I).  Tex.),  44  Fed.  44.  47. 
48,  1'.'.  per  Maxey,  J. 

so  Missouri,  K.  A-  T.  K.  Co.  v.  cil- 
more  (Tex.  Civ.  Api>.  1899),  :>'■',  S.  W. 
61.  It)  this  case  deceased  was  7 
years  old.  lie  helped  his  father 
farm,  worked  willingly,  was  obedi- 
ent, brought  wood  and  water,  was 
sound  in  mind  and  body  and  learned 
well  at  school.  In  Austin  Rapid- 
Transit  R.  Co.  v.  Cullen  (Tex.  Civ. 
App. ),  i".'s.  w.  u  r.  i "» .  rehearing  denied, 
30  S.  W.  578,  the  child  was 25  months 
old.  obeyed  his  mother,  uudei 
what  was  said  to  him  and  was  just 
beginning  to  talk. 

91  Condon  v.  Great  Southern  A  W. 
691 


§548 


DEATH      DAMAGES 


Workmen's  Compensation  Act  recovery  may  be  had  for  a  minor's 
death,  although  he  had  been  employed  only  a  short  time  before 
he  was  killed,  where  he  turned  over  all  his  earnings  to  his  par- 
ents and  received  from  them  such  pocket  money  as  they  deemed 
right.*2  But  where  the  evidence  was  only  of  trifling  household 
services,  rendered  incapable  of  estimation  on  a  pecuniary  basis, 
damages  were  denied.93  In  addition,  much  the  same  elements 
of  damasre  enter  into  the  amount  recoverable  for  a  minor  child's 
death  as  we  have  stated  under  the  last  preceding  section,  the 
principal  factor  being  the  prospective  pecuniary  benefit  which 
might  have  accrued  to  the  parents  had  the  child  survived.94  If 
the  minor  has  reached  an  age  where  he  can  be  of  service  to  his 
parents,  that  should  be  considered,  together  with  his  ability,  con- 
dition and  disposition  to  aid  them,  evidenced  by  actual  acts 
coupled  with  the  parent's  right  to  claim  service,  or,  perhaps, 
the  filial  obligations  of  the  child  irrespective  of  legal  claim 
may  be  of  importance,  at  least  as  a  guide  in  connection  with 
other  testimony,  as  where  the  son  had  promised  to  aid  his  par- 
ents. In  such  case  that  fact  has  been  considered  even  though 
limited  by  an  instruction  that  such  promise  could  not  be  legally 
enforced.  The  child's  age,  etc.,95  and  that  of  the  parents'96  are 
important,  and  it  has  been  said  that  the  contingency  of  the  son's 
marriage  should  be  considered  as  affecting  the  fulfillment  of  his 
promises  and  ability  in  that  respect.97     Another  factor  also  en- 


Ry.,  16  Ir.  C.  L.  R.  415.  See  Wolfe 
v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir. 
548. 

92  Simmons  v.  White  (C.  A.),  68 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  507  (1899);  1  Q.  B. 
1005,  under  act  189".  sec.  7.  snbd.  2. 

93  Holleran  v.  Bagnell,  f>  L.  R.  Ir. 
333;  child  here  was  7  years  old. 

94  See  cases  next  cited.  See  sec- 
tions 531,  535,  herein. 

95  See  cases  cited  in  third  follow- 
ing note.     See  section  528,  herein. 

96  See  section  537,  herein. 

97  Hall  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex. ),  39  Fed. 
18,  where  the  charge  of  Maxey,  J., 
to  the  jury,  covers  in  an  exhaustive 
manner  the  elements  of  damage  in  an 

692 


action  for  the  killing  of  a  son,  in- 
cluding also  all  the  above  points  in 
the  text.  See  also  Ft.  Worth  &  Den- 
ver City  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison,  93  Tex, 
527;  50  S.  W.  745  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
56  S.  W.  931,  fully  considered  under 
sec.  531  herein.  This  case  is  cited  in 
San  Antonio  Tract.  Co.  v.  White 
(Tex.  Supr.  Ct.  1901),  61  S.  W.  706; 
9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  616,  rev'g  60  S.  W. 
323,  and  the  court,  per  Williams,  J., 
said :  "  The  true  measure  of  damages 
is  compensation  for  the  loss  sus- 
tained by  plaintiff  from  the  death  of 
her  son."  See  further  as  to  pecu- 
niary benefits,  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Compton,  75  Tex.  667;  13  S. 
W.    667;  City   of   Galveston  v.   Bar- 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


S  549 


ters  into  the  estimation  of  damages  for  the  death  of  a  minor 
child,  especially  where  such  minor  is  of  very  tender  years,  and 
that  is  the  expense  of  rearing  or  maintaining  and  educating 
such-  child.98  But  it  should  likewise  he  considered  that  the 
father  is  entitled,  to  all  his  son's  earnings  while  he  remains  a 
minor  under  his  control.99 


§  549.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Death  of 
children — Minority  and  majority.  It  is  deelared  that  in  an  ac- 
tion to  recover  for  the  wrongful,  etc.,  death  of  a  minor  child, 
employee  of  a  railroad  company,  the  only  respect  in  which  his 
minority  can  be  considered  would  he  upon  an  inquiry  whether 
or  not  the  employer  had  used  such  care  towards  him  as  his  years 
or  inexperience  would  make  necessary.  But  that  if  the  action 
is  for  loss  of  services  of  such  child,  the  rule  would  be  differ- 
ent,100 and  the  jury  may  consider  the  disposition  and  ability  of 
the  son,  both  before  and  after  majority,  to  aid  the  father.1  But 
not  all  the  possible  benefits  which  might  have  been  received 
after  majority  should  be  considered,  the  damages  being  limited 
to  such  pecuniary  advantages  as  might  be  reasonably  expected 
after  such  period  commenced.-     And  under  a  Federal  decision 


bour,  62  Tex.  172,  174;  50  Am.  Rep. 
519;  Hetherington  v.  Northeastern 
Ry.,  51  L.  J.  Q.  B.  495;  9  Q.  B.  D.  160; 
30  W.  R.  797;  Bouike  v.  Cork  &  Mac- 
room  Ry.,  4  L.  R.  Ir.  282. 

98  Ft.  Worth  &  T).  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hy- 
att, 12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  435;  34  S.  W. 
677;  3  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
397.  See  Wolfe  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.,  26  L.  R.  Ir.  548;  San  Antonio 
Tract.  Co.  v.  White  (Supr.  Ct.  Tex. 
1901),  61  S.  W.  706;  9  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
616,  rev'g  60  S.  W.  323.  In  Duck- 
worth v.  Johnson,  4  H.  &  N.  653:  29 
L.  J.  Ex.  25;  5  Jur.  (N.  S.)  630;  7  W. 
R.  655.  there  was  no  evidence  of  the 
cost  of  boarding  and  clothing  the  de- 
ceased son,  and  a  verdict,  for  £  50  was 
retained.  In  Brunswig  v.  White,  70 
Tex.  504,  512;  8  S.  W.  85,  Walker, 
Assoc.  J.,  said:  "  It  is  insisted  also 
that  the  court  should  have  limited 


the  value  to  probable  net  proceeds, 
excluding  expenses  of  nurture,  edu- 
cation, etc.  We  do  not  think  thai  a 
jury  of  ordinary  intelligence  would 
need  such  a  caution  from  the  judge." 
See  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Comp- 
ton,  75  Tex.  667,  674,  675;  13  S.  W. 
667. 

99  Bonnett  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.,  89  Tex.  72:  :!:;  s.  \Y.  ;;;;4.  And 
see  as  to  obligation  to  support  chil- 
dren, Linskie  v.  Kerr  (Tex.  <'iv. 
App.),  34  S.  W.  765. 

io°  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Crowder, 
70  Tex.  222,  225;  7  S.  W.  To'.',  per 
Stayton,  C.  J. 

1  So  held  in  Galveston.  II.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Davis.  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  468; 
•_>:;  s.  W.  301,  aff'd  -';'.  S.  W.  1019. 

-Ft.  Worth  &  I).  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hyatt 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  34  S.  W.  677.  See 
as  to  what   is  sufficient  evidence  of 

G93 


§549 


DEATH — DAMAGES 


the  pecuniary  benefits  are  not  limited  to  those  which  the  parents 
might  have  received  during  minority.3 


contributions  which  the  parent  had  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  receiving 
after  the  son's  majority,  San  An- 
tonio Tract.  Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1900),  60  S.  W,  323,  rev'd  (Sup. 
1901),  61  S.  W.  706. 

3  The  damages  are  not  restricted  to 
such  benefits  as  the  plaintiffs  might 
have  received  from  the  services  of 
the  son  up  to  majority.  The  jury 
had  a  right  to  consider  what  reason- 
able expectations  the  plaintiff  had 
of  pecuniary  benefits  after  majority 
was  reached.  The  statutes  provide 
for  full  pecuniary  compensation  for 
the  parents  for  the  loss  of  a  son,  and 
this  is  not  restricted  to  the  loss  of 
benefits  to  which  plaintiffs  had  a 
legal  right.  Much  difficulty  arises  in 
assessing  damages,  aud  courts  must 
avail  themselves  of  all  circumstances 
which  may  assist  them  in  reaching  a 
proper  conclusion.  In  this  case  the 
son  was  over  18,  was  dutiful  and 
evinced  willingness  to  assist  his 
parents  by  freely  giving  his  earnings 
to  his  mother,  and  it  was  plainly 
proper  to  instruct  as  to  reasonable 
expectation,  that  son  would  con- 
tinue to  assist  after  majority.  Texas 
&  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilder  ( U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
5th  C.  Tex.),  92  Fed.  953,  '.'55,  956; 
35  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  105;  13  Am.  &  Eng. 
K.  Cas.  N.  S.  520,  per  Parlance,  Dist. 
J.,  citing  Houston  City  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sciacca,  80  Tex.  350;  Gulf,  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,  75  Tex.  667. 
See  principal  case  also  as  to  allega- 
tions of  complaint.  In  the  last 
cited  case  (75  Tex.  667;  13  S.  W. 
667),  the  deceased  son  was  18  years 
old  and  was  employed  with  plain- 
tiff's consent  in  defendant's  shops 
and  was  sent  out  as  a  fireman,  and 
was  killed  in  a  collision.  It  was 
694 


decided  that  a  mother,  who  is  a  sole 
surviving  parent,  is  entitled  to  ser- 
vices of  son  during  his  minority  and 
is  therefore  entitled  to  recover,  if  at 
all,  damages  not  only  for  the  loss  of 
such  services  during  such  period, 
but  also  for  the  loss  of  any  prospec- 
tive pecuniary  benefits  after  he  would 
have  attained  majority,  for  her  right 
to  recover  is  not  restricted  to  minor- 
ity and  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  to 
charge  that  the  measure  of  damages 
is  limited  to  the  value  of  services 
from  death  to  the  age  of  21,  less  the 
cost  of  maintenance  and  support  for 
said  time.  See  this  last  case  also  as 
to  allegations  in  action  by  mother. 
But  see  Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex. 
504,  508-512;  8  S.  W.  85,  where  the 
court  seems  in  one  part  of  its  opinion 
to  limit  the  recovery  to  the  child's 
minority.  There  is  an  extended 
quotation  from  this  case  in  an  note  to 
sec.  527,  herein,  and  see  San  Antonio 
Tract.  Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
60  S.  W.  323;  rev'd  61  S.  W.  706; 
9  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  616.  Contra,  in 
Agricultural  &  M.  Assoc,  v.  State, 
Carty,  71  Md.  86;  18  Atl.  37;  17  Am. 
St.  Rep.  507,  it  was  decided  that  there 
could  be  no  consideration  of  any 
expectation  of  pecuniary  advantage 
beyond  child's  minorityeven  though 
the  son  was  emancipated  2  years 
before  he  was  killed,  and  was  work- 
ing for  himself,  and  had  aided  his 
father  each  year  out  of  his  wages, 
giving  him  over  one  half  thereof, 
and  it  was  also  held  that  vague 
declaration  or  promise  to  aid  after 
minority  was  too  slight  to  base  any 
reasonable  expectation  of  advantage 
thereon.  See  also  State,  Coughlan, 
v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84, 
107;  87  Am.  Dec.  600,  per  Bowie,  C.  J. 


PROPOl; TIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§   550 


§550.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  —  Death  of 
children — Adults. — There  is  a  distinction  between  a  suit  by  a 
parent  for  the  negligent  killing  of  a  minor  and  that  of  an  adult 
child.  The  law  gives  to  the  father  tin;  right  in  the  former 
case  to  the  services  and  the  proceeds  of  his  labor,  and  the  pr< (li- 
ability that  the  minor  would  remain  in  the  service  of  the  parent 
during  minority,  or  would  have  permitted  the  parent  to  have 
the  proceeds  of  his  labor,  is  said  to  be  unimportant.  Hut  where 
the  deceased  was  an  adult,  the  above  rule  does  not  apply,  for 
the  right  to  services  no  longer  exists.  And  in  an  action  by  the 
mother,  she  must  allege  something  more  than  the  amount  of 
damages.4     The  measure  of  recovery,  therefore,  depends  in  such 


4  Winnt  v.  International  &  G.  N. 
R.  Co.,  74  Tex.  32,  35,  36;  11  S.  W. 
907;  5  L.  R.  A.  172,  per  Hobby,  J., 
who  also  says,  "  In  such  a  suit 
should  be  shown  the  reasonable  ex- 
pectation of  benefit  the  parent 
would  have  received  had  the  adult 
child  not  been  killed  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  legal  right  to  his  services 
this  would  depend  upon  the  ability 
and  will  of  such  child  to  confer  the 
benefit  on  the  parent.  Dallas  &  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Spicker,  61  Tex.  429,  431 ;  48 
Am.  Rep.  297  (  per  Staytou,  Assoc.  J. ). 
See  also  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
&  M.  P.  R.  Cos.  v.  Kindred,  57  Tex. 
498.  There  are  no  allegations  in  the 
petition  which  would  authorize  any 
proof  upon  this  point  to  support 
the  claim  for  actual  damages.  The 
averments  were  that  by  his  death 
so  occasioned,  she,  'as  his  sole  surviv- 
ing parent,  had  been  damaged 
$10,000,  actual  damages.'  It  did 
not  follow  that  she  had  been  so 
damaged  by  reason  of  the  death  of 
her  son,  alleged  to  have  been  over 
21  years  of  age,  as  a  necessary  con- 
sequence. In  the  absence  of  some 
averment  showing  that  he  supported 
or  contributed  to  her  support,  or 
that  there  was  some  expectation  of 
benefit  of  a  pecuniary  character   to 


be  derived  by  the  plaintiff  from  the 
services  of  her  son,  there  could  be 
do  presumption  of  law  arising  from 
the  mere  fact  that  she  had  been 
damaged  by  the  death  of  her  adult 
son."  Only  necessary  to  the  al- 
leged amount  of  damage.  Interna- 
tional &  G.  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Knight,  91 
Tex.  660;  45  S.  W.  556;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  79,  rev'g  45  S.  W.  1<>7.  The 
father  is  not  a  necessary  party  to 
an  action  for  the  death  of  an  adult 
son.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  668;  24  S. 
W.  975.  In  the  Dallas,  etc.,  v. 
Spicker  case  above  cited  the  court, 
per  Stayton,  Assoc.  J.,  said  (id.  p. 
431),  that  in  so  far  as  the  claim  to 
damages  might  be  based  upon  the 
services  of  a  minor  "child  before 
majority,  the  will  of  the  child  to 
render  its  services  to  the  parent  or 
to  permit  the  parent  to  have  the 
proceeds  of  its  labor  would  be  an 
unimportant  inquiry,  for  the  law 
gives  the  parent  the  right  to  both. 
Hence,  an  inquiry  as  to  the  proba- 
bility that  the  child  during  minority 
would  have  remained  in  the  service 
of  the  parent,  or  would  have  per- 
mitted the  parent  to  have  the  pro- 
ceeds of  its  labor  rendered  in  the 
service  of  others,    would  be  likewise 

695 


§  550 


DEATH  -DAMAGES 


cases  upon  the  pecuniary  injury  sustained  and  rests  solely  upon 
the  doctrine  of  compensation  with  reference  to  the  deprivation 
by  the  death  of  prospective  benefit,  and  this  includes  as  a  prin- 
cipal factor  the  loss  of  contributions,  aid  or  assistance,  the  rea- 
sonable probability  of  the  continuance  thereof,  the  disposition 
and  ability  of  deceased  to  render  such  aid,  the  dependency  of 
the  parents  and  other  elements,  such  as  age,  etc.,  of  deceased, 
and  of  the  survivors  which  are  fully  considered  elsewhere 
herein,  under  appropriate  headings.5 


unimportant  and  irrelevant  unless 
it  was  shown  that  the  child  had  in 
some  way  been  emancipated  by  its 
parent.  The  same  rule  would  not 
apply  where  no  legal  right  to  benefit 
existed  as  iu  the  case  of  a  suit  by 
the  parent  for  injury  to  a  child  after 
majority  which  resulted  in  death." 
After  majority,  a  father  is  not  en- 
titled to  his  son's  earnings  and  this 
should  be  considered  in  determining 
what  elements  enter  into  the  esti- 
mation of  damages  for  the  death  of 
adult  children.  Bonnett  v.  Galves- 
ton, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.,  89  Tex.  72; 
33  S.  W.  334  (Tex.  Civ.  App.);38 
S.  W.  813.  See  also  as  to  mother's 
right  to  services,  State,  Conghlin, 
v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84, 
107;  87  Am.  Dec.  GGO,  per  Bowie, 
C.  J. 

6 Missouri  Pac.  K.  Co.  v.  Henry 
75  Tex.  220;  12  S.  W.  828,  holding 
also  that  the  statute  expressly  au- 
thorizes a  suit  by  the  mother  with- 
out accounting  for  the  nonjoinder 
of  her  husband,  provided  she  bring 
the  action  for  the  benefit  of  all  par- 
ties concerned,  and  in  good  faith 
prosecutes  it  for  the  benefit  of  all. 
In  case  she  sues  for  the  benefit  of 
herself  and  husband,  it  is  proper  to 
instruct  the  jury  that  if  it  was  shown 
that  the  father  of  deceased  and  hus- 
band of  plaintiff  would  have  received 
any  pecuniary  benefit  from  the  son 
during  his  lifetime,  then  to  return  a 

696 


verdict  for  the  amount  the  father  and 
mother  would  both  have  received 
from  the  deceased  son  had  he  lived, 
and  apportion  that  amount  between 
them  according  to  the  sum  each 
would  have  received,  and  if  the  father 
would  not  have  received  any  pecu- 
niary benefit  from  the  son,  if  he  had 
lived,  then  they  would  not  find  any 
amount  for  him.  See  as  to  adult 
child's  death.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lester,  75  Tex.  56;  12  S.  W.  955; 
Wiunt  v.  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.,  74  Tex.  32;  11  S.  W.  907;  5  L. 
R.  A.  172;  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cowser,  57  Tex.  297;  Houston  & 
T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  23  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  280;  56  S.  W.  204;  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Power  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.  1899),  54  S.  W.  629;  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonnett 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  38  S.  W.  813;  89 
Tex.  72;  33  S.  W.  334;  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McNeel  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  29  S.  W.  1133;  St.  Louis,  A.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
668;  24  S.  W.  975.  All  the  above 
cases  are  considered  fully  herein 
under  their  appropriate  headings  as 
to  reasonable  expectations  of  pecu- 
niary benefit,  aid  and  assistance  ren- 
dered and  dependency,  the  general 
elements  of  damage,  etc.  In  Mason 
v.  Bertram,  18  Out.  R.  1  Chy.  D. 
deceased  had  just  attained  majority 
when  he  was  killed.  He  had  been 
temporarily    employed    as     a    ma- 


PEOPORTIONED   TO    INJURY. 


§  551 


§  551.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Evidence- 
Generally. — Inasmuch  as  evidence  and  its  admissibility  or  re- 
jection is  a  question  which  runs  through  and  affects  the  measure 
of  damages  in  all  its  various  phases  relating  to  a  recovery  for 
the  injury  occasioned  by  death  by  negligence,  we  shall  only  con- 
sider under  this  section  such  general  points  as  affect  the  recov- 
ery. Thus  it  has  been  asserted  that  while  damages  in  actions 
of  this  nature  are  necessarily  indeterminate,  and  while  much 
must  be  left  to  the  sound  sense  of  the  jury  in  every  case,  it  does 
not  follow  that  plaintiffs  need  not  prove  with  a  reasonable  de- 
gree of  certainty  the  data  from  which  their  compensation  is  to 
be  assessed,  when  it  is  practicable  to  do  so.  And  where  it  is 
within  the  power  of  a  beneficiary  to  show  with  some  degree  of 
accuracy  the  amount  of  benefits  received  by  him,  his  failure  to 
testify  specifically  to  the  facts  ought  to  be  a  circumstance  against 
him  sufficient  to  justify  setting  aside  an  excessive  verdict/'  It 
is  also  true,  however,  that  damages  do  not  admit  of  exact  proof 
and  cannot  be  made  a  question  of  mathematics.1  If  the  de- 
ceased was  an  adult  son,  it  is  not  error  to  exclude  testimony  as 
to  the  receipts  of  the  father  from  his  son's  wages,  before  the  lat- 
ter arrived  at  age.  Such  evidence  does  not  tend  to  prove  what 
the  child  would  have  given  him  after  his  earnings  became  his 
own  to  be  disposed  of  at  his  will,  and  although  it  had  been  tes- 
tified that  the  deceased,  just  before  his  death,  was  preparing  him- 
self to  become  a  machinist,  evidence  cannot  be  given  as  to  the 
wages  ordinarily  received  by  machinists  and  engineers,  the 
probability  being  too  remote,  contingent  and  speculative,  to  show 
the  son's  probable  future  earnings,  and  also  being  calculated  to 


chinist.  Prior  thereto  he  had  at- 
tended school  and  worked  on  his 
father's  farm  without  wages.  It  was 
also  intended  that  he  should,  during 
vacations,  while  pursuing  a  medical 
course,  also  work  on  the  farm  as 
usual.  The  expense  to  his  father  of 
such  professional  education  would 
he  about  $1,000,  the  course  being 
from  three  to  four  years.  In  an  ac- 
tion by  his  father  for  his  death,  a 
nonsuit  was  ordered  as  there  could 


be  no  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary henefit. 

«  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Long,  87  Tex.  148,  159;  27  S.  YV.  113; 
47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87;  24  L.  R.  A.  637, 
per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J.  See  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex.  01. 
67,  68;  12  S.  W.  838,  per  Henry. 
Assoc.  J. 

1  St.  Louis.  Ark.  &  Tex.  K.  Co.  v. 
Johnston,  78  Tex.  536,  542;  15  S.  W. 
104,  per  Gaines,  Assoc.  J.     See  also 

697 


8  551 


DEATH— DAMAGES 


mislead  the  jury.8  Again,  pecuniary  injury  must  be  proven,9 
although  it  is  also  determined  that  in  case  of  a  minor  child's 
death  it  is  sufficient  that  there  is  evidence  of  a  reasonable  ex- 
pectation of  benefit  capable  of  estimation,  and  that  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  prove  a  pecuniary  advantage  except  for  the  killing."1 
But  the  evidence  in  this  class  of  cases  cannot  furnish  the  meas- 
ure of  damages  with  any  certainty  and  accuracy,  especially  in 
case  of  young  children,  where  the  age  and  undeveloped  state  of 
the  child  precludes  any  accurate  approximation  of  the  value  of  the 
child's  services,  although  as  the  age  increases  and  the  faculties 
and  ability  develop,  testimony  as  to  actual  services  can  and  should 
be  produced,  even  though  their  value  is  indefinite  as  to  amount.11 
The  statements  of  deceased  that  he  could  support  his  mother  are 
admissible.12  So  the  son's  knowledge  of  his  father's  business 
and  plans  and  his  ability  to  carry  them  out  may  be  proven." 
Again,  a  mother's  conclusions  that  the  cause  of  the  death  of 
her  three  months'  old  child  was  exposure,  will  be  admissible  in 
connection  with  other  evidence  as  to  the  infant's  previously 
healthy  condition,  the  mother's  age  and  the  large  number  of 
offspring  she  had  had,  and  that  immediately  after  such  exposure 
the  child  contracted  a  cold  which  grew  worse  until  he  died.14 


Ross  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  W.  D.  Tex. ),  44  Fed.  44,  48,  49, 
per  Maxey,  J. 

8  Bonnett  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
R.  Co.,  89  Tex.  72,  76,  77;  33  S.  W.334. 

9  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry, 
75  Tex.  220,  224;  12  S.  W.  828,  per 
Acker,  P.  J.  See  Winnt  v.  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  74  Tex.  32, 
35,  30;  11  S.  W.  907;  5  L.  R  A.  172, 
per  Hobby,  J.;  Hetherington  v. 
Northeastern  Ry.,  51  L.  J.  Q.  B.  495; 
9  Q.  B.  D.  160;  30  W.  R.  797. 

10  Ricketts  v.  Markdale  (Div.  Ct.), 
Ont.  610;  Roinburgh  v.  Baleb,  27 
Out.  A  pp.  32. 

i1  Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504, 
508-512;  8  S.  W.  85,  per  Walker, 
Assoc.  J.  In  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co. 
v.  Crowder,  70  Tex.  222,  225;  7  S. 
W.  709,  it  is  declared,  per  Stayton, 
C.  J.,  that  in  an  action  by  a  mother 

698 


for  the  death  of  her  minor  son,  it  is 
incumbent  on  her  to  show  such  facts 
as  would  have  entitled  her  son  to 
have  recovered  had  he  lived.  But 
evidence  of  the  value  of  the  services 
of  a  farm  hand  is  admissible  even 
though  not  alleged.  International 
&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Knight  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.).  52  S.  W.  C40. 

12  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70 
Tex.  496,  503;  7  S.  W.  857;  Houston 
&  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  23  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  280;  56  S.  W.  204.  See 
also  Electric  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Lefevre 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1900),  55  S.  W.  396. 
But  see  State,  Coughlan,  v.  Baltimore 
&  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84,  107;  87  Am. 
Dec.  600,  per  Bowie,  C.  J. 

13  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  25  Tex.  Civ.  App.  335;  54  S. 
W.  909. 

"Ft.    Worth   &   D.    C.    R.    Co.   v. 


PBOPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§  552 


§552.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  Excessive 
and  inadequate  damages  -Generally.  The  verdict  will  not  be 
reversed  merely  because  the  damages  awarded  are  larger  than 
the  evidence  might  probably  justify, n  although  it  will  be  set 
aside  where  it  is  greatly  in  excess  of  what  is  shown  to  be 
warranted."1  So  a  new  trial  may  be  granted  where  the  damages 
are  manifestly  too  small.1. 


Hyatt  (Tex.    Civ.    App.),  34   S.    W. 
677. 

'■•  .Missouri  Pac.  K.  Co.  v.  Lee,  70 
Tex.  496;  7  S.  W.  857. 

w  Plaintiff's  son  lived  with  her 
and  give  lier  all  his  wages  of  about 
$30  a  month,  reserving  only  enough 
to  buy  clothes.  Her  expectancy  of 
life  was  only  1S\  years— $6,000  re- 
duced to  $3,000.  Mexican  Nat.  R. 
Co.  v.  Finch  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  S. 
W.  1028.  Son  was  a  young  man  who 
lived  with  his  father  aud  assisted 
him  in  carrying  coals  around  the 
wards  of  a  hospital,  for  which  the 
father  was  paid  a  small  allowance. 
The  son  earned  also  good  wages,  but 
as  the  father  was  not  in  need  the  son 
did  not  aid  him  in  any  other  way, 
than  as  above  stated;  £  75,  was  held 
excessive.  Franklin  v.  Southeastern 
l;y..  3  II.  &  N.  211;  4  Jur.  (X.  S.) 
565;  5  W.  It.  573. 

When  damages  not  excessive.  $870 
in  favor  of  parents,  aged  OS  and  07 
years,  even  though  deceased  was 
dissipated  and  a  spendthrift,  but 
was  35  years  old  and  aided  with  the 
other  children  in  supporting  the 
plaintiffs.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Spence  (Tex.),  52  S.  W.  562.  $2,000 
for  death  of  7  years  old  son.  Mis- 
souri,   K.    &    T.    R.   Co.   v.   Gilmore 


(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  53  S.  W.  61. 
$10,000  in  favor  of  widowed  mother 
for  death  of  son  23  years  old,  un- 
married, industrious,  sober  and 
healthy  aud  who  contributed  from 
$30  to  $50  a  month  to  his  mother's 
support  out  of  earnings  of  865 
monthly.  The  son  was  qualified  for 
a  locomotive  engineer,  at  which  his 
wages  would  have  been  from  8108 
to  8125  monthly.  International  & 
G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McNeel  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  29  S.  \V.  1133.  $-',000  in 
favor  of  mother;  son  had  a  life  ex- 
pectancy of  over  36  years,  earned 
from  $60  to  $70  a  month,  and  gave 
his  mother  from  820  to  835  monthly; 
she  was  69  years  old.  Gulf,  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  Co.  v.  Royall,  18  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  86;  13  S.  W.  815.  85,000— son 
was  7  years  old,  healthy,  industrious 
bright  and  intelligent—verdict  was 
in  favor  of  mother.  Taylor  B.  &  II. 
R.  Co.  v.  Warner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  i.  31 
S.  W.  66.  $6,000.  deceased  son  was 
a  month  over  2  years  old;  he  was 
healthy,  stout  and  sensible.  Austin 
Rapid-Transit  II.  Co.  v.  Cullen  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  29  s.  \V.  256,  rehearing 
denied  30  S.  \V.  578.  $5,000  in 
favor  of  mother  for  sou  18  years  old, 
who  gave  her  $20  a  month  and  had 
good  habits  and  was  industrious,  and 


17  Deceased  husband  was  28  years 
old  and  widow  29  years  of  age;  con- 
tributed $300  a  year  to  her  support; 
earned  from  $1.50  to  $1.75  per  day 
and  was  constantly  employed.     Ho 


was  also  in  perfect  health: 
held  insufficient.  Under  Rev.  Stat, 
art.  1452,  a  new  trial  was  granted. 
Hums  v.  Merchants  &  P.  O.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  63  S.  W.  1061. 
699 


$§  553,  554 


DEATH — DAMAGES. 


§  553.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury— Evidence  of 
deceased's  habits — Mitigation. — It  may  be  shown  that  de- 
ceased's habits  were  such  that  he  was  a  worthless  person  and  that 
therefore  his  family  lost  little  in  the  value  of  his  services.ls 

§554.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  Insurance- 
Life  insurance  moneys  received  under  a  policy  on  deceased's  life 
cannot  be  considered  in  defense  or  in  mitigation  of  damages.19 
But  under  an  English  decision  the  contrary  rule  obtains,20  and 
although  this  ruling  has  been  approved  in  an  Ontario  decision, 
it  was  determined  in  that  case  that  insurance  money  on  a  de- 
ceased husband's  life  is  not  to  be  deducted  from  the  amount  of 
damages  previously  assessed,  irrespective  of  such  consideration  ; 
that  she  is  benefited  only  by  the  accelerated  receipt  of  the  amount 
of  the  policy,  therefore  the  benefit  represented  by  the  interest  of 
the  money  during  the  period  of  acceleration  could  be  compen- 
sated by  deducting  future  premiums  from  the  estimated  future 
earnings  of  deceased.21 


she  also  relied  upon  his  personal  aid 
and  comfort.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hamilton  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S. 
W.  906.  $3,500  in  favor  of  mother 
for  strong,  healthy  boy.  San  An- 
tonio St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watzlavzick 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  28  S.  W.  115. 
$3,000  for  son  aged  20  years,  who 
gave  his  parents  $15  to  $20  a  month. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arispe,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  671;  23  S. 
W.  928,  rehearing  denied  5  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  617;  24  S.  W.  33. 

18Standlee  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  R. 
Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1901),  60  S.  W. 
781. 

19  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cody,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  520;  5  S.  W. 
135,  writ  of  error  denied,  51  S.  W. 
329.  Money  was  received  by  the 
widow  and  children.  Houston  &  T. 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
41  S.  W.  846.  Life  insurance  received 
by  dependents.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rain  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  40  S. 
W.  635;  Tyler  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Ras- 
700 


berry,  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  185;  34  S. 
W.  794;  3  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas.  N.  S. 
376.  Insurance  was  on  life  of  em- 
ployee. 

20  Hicks  v.  Newport  A.  &  H.  Ry., 
4  B.  &  S.  403  n. 

21  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  of  Can.  v.  Jen- 
nings, 13  App.  Cas.  800  (Out.),  58 
L.  J.  P.  C.  1;  59  L.  T.  679;  37  W.  R. 
403,  aff  g  15  A.  R.  477;  contra  Yates 
v.  White,  4  Bing.  (N.  C.)  272;  5 
Scott,  640;  7  L.  J.  C.  P.  116.  See  10 
Mew's  Eng.  Dig.  (1898)  p.  112;  Brad- 
burn  v.  G.  W.  Ry.,  44  L.  J.  Ex.  9;  L. 
R.  10  Ex.  1 ;  31  L.  T.  464;  23  W.  R.  48. 
The  deceased  had  effected  a  policy 
of  insurance  on  his  life  which  was 
in  force  at  the  time  of  his  death.  At 
the  trial  the  jury  were  directed  to 
deduct  the  amount  of  the  policy  from 
the  verdict  wliich  amount  was  after- 
wards added  by  the  divisional  court 
(8  O.  R.  601).  On  appeal  the  court 
being  equally  divided  in  opinion  on 
this  branch  of  the  case,  the  appeal 
was  dismissed    with  costs.    Hagarty 


PROPORTIONED    TO    INJURY. 


§555 


§  555.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury  —  Legacy, 
devise  or  inheritance.  —  Evidence  is  admissible,  in  mitiga- 
tion of  damages,  of  a  mother's  will,  whereby  there  is  vested  ab- 
solutely in  a  part  of  the  surviving  children  the  title  to  the 
corpus  of  all  her  property  which  had  been  the  only  source  of 
her  income,  and  of  the  only  aid  which  the  children  had  derived 
from  her,  all  of  said  income  with  the  exception  of  a  very  small 
proportion  thereof  having  been  used  in  assisting  all  of  them. 
In  such  case  the  value  of  the  property  exceeds  the  prospective 
benefits.  There  is  this  qualification,  however,  that  in  the  state 
where  this  rule  is  asserted  the  statute  permits  each  beneficiary 
of  the  class  specified  to  recover  separately  for  his  own  special 
injury."     But  where  one  seized  in  fee  tail  of  landed  estates  pos- 


C.  J.  O.  and  Osier,  J.,  were  of  opin- 
ion that  the  actual  loss  or  injury  re- 
sulting from  the  death  can  alone  be 
recovered  in  such  a  case,  and  if  a 
large  increase  of  fortune  occurs  to 
the  parties  as  the  result  of  such 
death  or  property  or  money  falls  to 
them  as  a  like  result,  whether  under 
a  settlement  or  in  the  shape  of  a  life 
insurance  effected  for  their  benefit, 
that  must  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion in  estimating  the  loss  sustained. 
Burton,  J.  A.,  was  of  opinion  that 
under  the  circumstances  the  divi- 
sional court  were  right  in  increasing 
the  verdict  by  the  amount  of  the 
insurance  money.  Per  Patterson,  J. 
A.  The  receipt  of  the  insurance 
money  is  a  proper  matter  for  the 
consideration  of  a  court  or  a  jury 
in  estimating  the  damages  and 
might  afford  ground  for  making 
some  reduction  from  va  gross  as- 
sessment, but  in  the  present  case 
there  was  nothing  shown  to  war- 
rant any  reduction  (Hicks  v.  New- 
port, etc.,  R.  W.  Co.,  4  13.  &  S. 
403  n.,  commented  on).  Beckett  v. 
Grand  Trunk  R.  W.  Co.,  13  A.  R.  174; 
16  S.  C.  B.  713  (Ont.).  See  3  Ont. 
Dig.  (Smith,  Joseph  &  Cartwright) 
p.  1396. 


22  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Long,  87  Tex.  148,  153, 158,  159;  27  S. 
W.  113;  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  87;  24  L.  R. 
A.  637,  rev'g  26  S.  W.  114.  See  A'.  C, 
19  Tex.  Civ.  A  pp.  649;  48  S.  W.  599. 
The  deceased  left  all  her  property  by 
will  to  four  of  her  adult  daughters 
who,  with  two  adult  sons,  were  the 
plaintiffs,  three  of  whom  resided 
with  their  mother.  The  testimony 
in  this  case  by  one  of  the  daughters 
in  addition  to  the  above  was  that  de- 
ceased left  surviving  neither  father 
nor  mother;  that  plaintiffs  were  her 
only  children;  that  the  value  of  her 
property  was  $18,500,  and  the  in- 
come about  $l.,s<JU,  and  that  only 
$250  was  used  by  her.  The  daughter 
on  cross-examination  was  unable  to 
give  either  dates  or  amounts  of  any 
donation,  nor  the  amount  in  the  ag- 
gregate which  any  one  received  in 
any  one  year.  There  were  remit- 
tances of  money,  clothing,  etc.  In 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger, 
90  Tex.  387;  38  S.  \V.  1121;  1  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  378  and  note,  the  above 
cited  decision  was  relied  on  to  sup- 
port a  contention  that  evidence  of 
the  husband's  marriage  after  the 
wife's  death  was  admissible,  and 
the  court,  per  Brown,  Assoc.  J.,   id. 

701 


§  556 


DEATH— DAMAGES 


sessed  an  income  of  £4,000  a  year  was  killed,  and  there  was  a 
settlement  upon  the  oldest  son  of  the  bulk  of  the  property,  a 
part  being  reserved  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife  and  younger 
children,  it  was  decided  that  even  though  the  family  in  general 
was  benefited  by  deceased's  estate,  nevertheless  the  widow  and 
younger  children  were  entitled  to  damages  as  a  compensation 
for  the  loss  of  their  reasonable  expectations  of  pecuniary  benefit 
consequent  upon  his  death."3  But  the  right  which  the  wife  has 
of  an  absolute  inheritance  in  case  she  survives  her  mother,  does 
not  constitute  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  such 
as  will  entitle  the  husband  to  recover  where  the  wife  and  he  live 
separately  and  she  dies  before  the  mother .a 

§  556.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Marriage  and 
remarriage. — Evidence  of  the  marriage  of  the  husband  after  the 


p.  391,  said:  "  Iu  that  case  it  was 
claimed  that  the  income  of  the  de- 
ceased from  which  she  aided  her 
children  was  derived  chiefly  from 
her  property,  and  this  court  held 
that  the  evidence  was  admissible  to 
be  considered  by  the  jury  in  deter- 
mining the  pecuniary  loss  sustained 
by  the  children  through  the  death  of 
their  muther.  The  court,  speaking 
by  Judge  Gaines,  discussed  a  num- 
ber of  propositions  bearing  more  or 
less  directly  upon  the  question  be- 
fore it,  and  passing  from  these  ques- 
tions finally  announced  its  conclusion 
as  follows:  'But  however  that  may 
be  the  case  is  very  different  when 
the  only  aid  which  the  beneficiaries 
have  received  from  the  deceased 
during  his  life  has  been  a  part  of 
the  income  of  his  property,  and  when 
upon  his  death  the  title  to  the  cor- 
pus of  such  property  absolutely  vests 
in  them,  and  we  are  therefore  of  the 
opinion  that  in  a  case  involving  simi- 
lar facts  they  should  be  admitted  in 
evidence  to  be  considered  by  the 
jury,1  and  after  discussing  another 
proposition  of  law  contended  for  by 
the    parties    before    the    court,  the 

702 


judge  said:  'The  rule  thus  an- 
nounced is  doubtless  correct  as  ap- 
plied to  the  facts  of  the  particular 
case,  and  it  may  be  applicable  gen- 
erally under  the  statute  of  Pennsyl- 
vania. It  does  not  apply  under  the 
statute  of  this  state  to  a  case  like  the 
present  in  which  the  prospective  aid 
was  mainly  if  not  wholly  from  the 
income  of  property,  and  in  which 
upon  the  death  some  of  the  bene- 
ficiaries take  by  bequest  all  the  es- 
tate and  others  get  none.'  To  the 
extent  that  the  aid  given  by  the 
mother  to  the  children  was  derived 
from  income  of  property,  which  the 
heirs  received  at  the  mother's  death, 
such  aid  was  not  lost  by  the  mother's 
death.  But  the  fact  that  the  chil- 
dren received  property  at  the  death 
of  the  mother  constitutes  no  defense 
against  the  claims  of  such  children 
to  be  compensated  by  the  pecuniary 
loss  sustained  by  death." 

23  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  4  B. 
&  S.  396;  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  377;  10  Jur. 
N.  S.  199;  8  L.  T.  734;  11  W.  R.  922. 

24  Harrison  v.  L.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  1 
Cab.  &  E.  540. 


i'i:<»i'(.i;TK»Ni:i)  To   INJURY. 


§557 


wife's  death  is  properly  rejected  as  it  cannot  operate  to  mitigate 
the  damages."'  So  the  contingency  of  a  widow's  remarriage 
will,  it  is  determined,  not  be  considered.26  And  it  has  also  been 
decided  that  the  remarriage  of  a  widow  pending  suit  docs  not 
preclude  her  right  of  action,  although  in  that  case  it  evidently 
affected  the  verdict  as  less  damages  were  awarded  to  her  than 
were  "iven  to  each  of  the  children.'-'7  Again,  a  common-law 
marriage  entitles  the  widow  and  the  issue  by  such  marriage  to 
recover  damages  sustained  by  the  husband's  death.*  But  if  the, 
marriage  is  after  the  husband's  injury,  the  cause  of  action  for 
damages  therefor  is  not  community  property  and  does  not  sur- 
vive to  her  after  the  husband's  death.29 

§  557.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Defenses- 
Prescribing  medicine  for  own  family. — In  an  action  by 
parents  for  the  death  of  a  minor  daughter  caused  by  negligence 
of  a  druggist  in  selling  morphine  instead  of  quinine,  which 
plaintiffs  without  knowledge  of  the  poisonous  nature  thereof 


•■*  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger, 
90  Tex.  387;  33  S.  W.  1121  (citing 
Davis  v.  Guariiieri,  45  Ohio  St.  470; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Garr,  57  Ga.  277; 
Phillpot  v.  Ry.  Co. ,  34  Atl.  856;  Dim- 
iny  v.  Ry.  Co.,  27  W.  Va.  32).  The 
action  in  the  principal  case  was  by 
the  husband  iu  his  own  behalf  and 
that  of  his  minor  daughter  for  death 
of  the  wife  and  mother,  killed  by  de- 
fendant's train  in  operation  by  its 
servants.  And  Brown,  Assoc.  J.,  said, 
"If  the  plaintiff's  wife  was  killed 
through  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant, he  then  lost  the  value  of  her 
life  as  a  wife,  and  the  fact  that  her 
place  has  been  supplied  by  a  subse- 
quent marriage  does  not  in  any  man- 
ner operate  to  mitigate  the  damages 
for  which  the  wrongdoer  was  re- 
sponsible." In  Gulf,  C.  A  S.  F.R.  Co. 
v.  Delaney,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App.  4_'7:  55 
S.  W.  538,  the  deeeased  had  remar- 
ried after  a  divorce,  but  had  no 
children  thereby.  II is  minor  son  by 
the  first  marriage  recovered.     Under 


the  Texas  Stat.  1895,  art.  3027,  the 
right  to  damages  is  not  affected  by 
remarriage.  Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co.  v. 
Slater  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.),  115 
Fed.  593. 

26  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
Trainor,  33  Md.  :A2. 

27  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Euehn,  70  Tex.  582,  587;  8  S.  W.  484. 
holding  also  that  the  fact  that  the 
second  husband  acts  as  next  friend 
to  the  minor  children  is  not  error, 
where  he  was  not  interested  in  the 
suit  by  them.  Id.  587.  If  the  action 
is  by  a  widow  for  her  son's  death, 
and  she  remarries  pending  suit,  the 
second  husband  should  be  made  a 
party  on  suggestion  of  the  marriage. 
San  Antonio  St.  Ry,  <'<>.  v.  Cailloutte, 
79  Tex.  341;  15  S.  W.  390. 

» Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cody,  •_'()  Tex.  Civ.  App.  520;  50  S. 
W.  135,  writ  of  error  denied  51 
S.  \V.  329. 

-9  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 
15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  080;  39  S.  W.  1112. 
703 


§  558 


DEATH  -  DA  MAGES 


administered  to  said  daughter,  the  court  said :  "  How  much  of 
nonexpert  medical  practice  ma}'  be  indulged  in  is  not  for  the 
courts  to  determine.  Only  in  case  of  alleged  injury  are  such 
matters  brought  before  the  courts.  It  ma}'  be  that  many  men 
are  their  own  physicians,  prescribing  for  themselves  and  fami- 
lies," but  this  will  not  excuse  negligence  which  causes  death.30 

§  558.  Damages  proportioned  to  the  injury — Self-defense 
— Justification. — If  self-defense  or  justification  is  relied  on,  it 
must  be  established  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  as  in  civil 
cases.31 


30  Brunswig  v.  White,  70  Tex.  504, 
512;  8  S.  W.  85,  per  Walker,  Assoc. 
J. 

31  Tucker  v.  State,  Johnson,  89 
Md.  471,  475,  485;  43  Atl.  778;  44 
Atl.  1004;  46  L.  R.  A.  181.  In  this 
case  Boyd,  J.,  said:  "  This  is  the  first 
time  this  court  lias  been  called  upon 
to  review  a  case  iti  which  the  death, 
which  is  the  foundation  of  the  suit, 
was  occasioned  by  the  discharge  of 
a  loaded  pistol  at  the  person  killed. 
Our  statute  .  .  .  provides  that  the 
action  is  to  be  brought  in  the  name 
of  the  state  for  the  benefit  of  the 
wife,  husband  or  parent  and  child  of 
the  deceased  'whenever1  ...  If 
the  plaintiff's  testimony  had  pre- 
sented any  facts  from  which  justifi- 
cation or  legal  excuse  for  the  shoot- 
ing was  shown,  or  could  properly  be 
inferred,  then  the  case  would  have 
been  different,  but  it  did  not  and 
the  defendant  sought  to  excuse  him- 
self by  trying  to  convince  the  jury 
that  he  believed  Reynolds  was  in 
imminent  danger:  that  the  only  way 
to  protect  him  was  to  shoot  at  or 
towards  Johnson,  and  that  he  had 
good  grounds  for  that  belief  and 
acted  on  it.  It  was  not  a  question 
as  to  whether  Johnson  was  still  beat- 

704 


ing  Reynolds  when  defendant  fired 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  the  real 
difference  between  the  witnesses,  but 
the  defense  depended  mainly  upon 
the  belief  of  the  defendant,  his  ob- 
ject in  shooting  and  the  necessity  for 
it.  He  thus  set  up  distinct  affirma- 
tive matters  of  defense  which  under 
all  the  rules  of  evidence  applicable 
to  such  cases,  he  was  required  to 
establish  by  preponderating  evidence 
to  meet  the  case  proved  by  the  plain- 
tiffs of  the  wrongful  killing  of  John- 
son." This  court  cited  Broks  v. 
Haslan,  65  Cal.  421,  and  dis'd 
Nichols  v.  Winfrey,  79  Mo.  545; 
March  v.  Walker,  48  Tex.  377.  See 
also  as  to  liability  in  damages  of  one 
who  kills  another  while  the  latter  is 
fleeing,  Stephens  v.  Wallace  (Tex. 
Civ.  App. ),  30  S.  W.  1099.  That  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  as  to  a  crim- 
inal action  having  been  instituted  or 
not  against  the  one  who  did  the  kill- 
ing, see  Croft  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  51  S.  W.  1089.  See  further 
Garcia  v.  Sanders,  90  Tex.  103;  37  S. 
W.  314,  rev'g  35  S.  W.  52,  as  to  self- 
defense  and  killing  while  attempting 
arrest,  and  see  as  to  burden  of  proof 
of  self-defense,  Croft  v.  Smith 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  51  S.  W.  1089. 


DEATH       FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

DEATH— "FAIR     AND   JUST    COMPENSATION    FOB     THE    PECUN 

1AUY    INJURY." 


§559.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
—Statutes  and  constitu- 
tion—(Generally. 

560.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Pecuniary  loss  only. 

561.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Nature  of  action  and 
proof  of  damages — Nomi- 
nal damages. 

562.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
—Damages  for  jury— Ex- 
cessive or  inadequate  dam- 
ages. 

563.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Factors  generally  to  he 
considered. 

564.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
—Sufferings  of  person  in- 
jured not  a  factor. 

565.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Exemplary  or  vindictive 
damages. 

566.  "  Fair  and  just   compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  "' 
—Solatium— Mental  suf- 
fering not  a  factor. 

567.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  tlve  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Loss  of  society  of  de- 
ceased. 

45 


568.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Relationship  legal  and 
actual  of  deceased  to  heue- 
ficiaries. 

569.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury'" 
—Legal  duty  or  obligation 
of  deceased— Legal  right 
of  beneficiaries — Support 
and  assistance,  depen- 
dency. 

570.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  *' 
— Reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit — 
Prospective  damages. 

571.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Prospect  of  inheriting. 

572.  '•  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  '* 
— Physical  and  financial 
condition,  age,  number  of 
family,  etc. — When  admis- 
sible. 

573.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Physical  and  financial 
condition,  age.  number  "f 
family,  etc.— When  inad- 
missible. 

574.  •  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
—  Financial  advantages 
accruing  from  death  inad- 
missible to  reduce  dam 
ages. 

7  On 


§  559 


DEATH — FAIR  AND  JUST    COMPENSATION 


§  575.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
—  Probable  accumula- 
tions. 

576.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Funeral  expenses  and 
expenses  for  sickness, 
etc. 

577.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Funeral  and  medical  ex- 
penses, support,  etc.,  paid 
by  defeudaut — Mitigation 
of  damages. 

578.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Life  expectancy  —  Mor- 
tality tables. 

579.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  husband. 

580.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  wife  —  Death 
of  wife  and  mother. 

581.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
—Death  of  parent. 
682.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Support,  care,  etc.,  of 
children. 

583.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Death  of  parent — Dam- 
ages not  limited  to  chil- 
dren's minority. 

584.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Death  of  children — Gen- 
erally. 


585.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury1' 
— Death  of  children — Evi- 
dential factors  relating  to 
children. 

586.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — Evi- 
dential factors  relating  to 
parents,  or  next  of  kin. 

587.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  children — De- 
cisions and  opinions. 

588.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Services  of  minor,  cost 
of  support,  etc. — Damages 
not  limited  to  minority. 

589.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 

—  Nominal  damages  — 
Death  of  infants. 

590.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 
— Death  of  unborn  child. 

591.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury  " 
— Death  of  child — Ex- 
pense occasioned  by 
mother's  sickness. 

592.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

for  the  pecuniary  injury" 

—  Collateral  kindred  — 
Next  of  kin. 

593.  Death  —  Mitigation  of    dam- 

ages —  Defenses  —  Insur- 
ance. 

594.  Death —  Defense  —  Provoking 

difficulty  —  Liability  of 
sheriff  or  officer. 

595.  Death — Allowance  of  interest. 


§  559.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Statutes    and    constitution — Generally. — The    New 

York  Code  '  provides  that  in  actions  for  death  caused  by  negli- 

1  2  Stover's  Ann.  Code  Civ.   Proc.  I  (ed.  1898)  sec.  1904,  as  am'd,  ch.  946 

I  of  1895,  took  effect  January  1,  1896. 

706 


rOB    THE    PECUN1  YKY    IN.MKV. 


§  560 


gence,etc,  the  damages  tube  awarded  shall  be  a  "  fair  and  just  com- 
pensation for  the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from  decedent's 
death," 2  and  this  is  the  language  of  the  North  Carolina  Code 
with  a  slight  difference  in  the  wording.  I  tie  earlier  New  York 
statutes l  limited  the  amount  of  damages,  but  the  New  York 
constitution3  provides  that  the  amount  recoverable  in  Buch 
actions  shall  never  be  subject  to  statutory  limitations  and  the 
right  of  action  shall  never  be  abrogated."  This  provision,  how- 
ever, does  not  authorize  the  recovery  of  any  except  actual  dam- 
ages sustained  in  excess  of  the  limit  which  theretofore  prevailed. 
Nor  does  it  call  for  the  affirmance  of  a  verdict  clearly  in  excess  of 
the  pecuniary  loss.7 

§  560.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "—Pecuniary  loss  only — The  measure  of  damages  un- 
der this  statutory  provision  as  to  "  fair  and  just  damages  for 
the  pecuniary  injury  "  existing  in  New  York  and  North  Carolina 
is  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  the  negligent  death,  and  the 
recovery  is  limited  thereto,8  for  the  interest  which  the  next  of 


*"The  damages  awarded  to  the 
plaintiff  may  be  such  a  sum  as  the 
jury,  upon  a  writ  of  inquiry,  or  upon 
a  trial,  or,  where  issues  of  fact  are 
tried  without  a  jury,  the  court  or 
referee  deems  to  be  a  fair  and  just 
compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
juries resulting  from  the  decedent's 
death,  to  the  person  or  persons  for 
whose  benefit  the  action  is  brought." 
Interest  on  the  sum  awarded  from 
the  decedent's  death  is  included. 
X.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proa,  sec.  1004. 

SN.  C.  Code,  1883,  sec.  14<J9. 
••  The  plaintiff  in  such  action  may 
recover  such  damages  as  are  a  fair 
and  just  compensation  for  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  resulting  from  such 
death."  See  Rev.  Code,  1855,  ch.  1, 
sees.  8-11,  p.  65;  Battle's  Rev.  Code, 
sees.  121-123,  p.  414. 

4  N.  Y.  Stat.  1847,  ch.  450,  sec.  1, 
2,  am'd  Stat.  1849,  ch.  256,  sec.  14; 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  (Banks,  1888)  sec. 
1904. 


6  Art.  1,  sec.  18,  adopted  1894,  in 
effect  January  1,  1895. 

6  This  constitutional  provision  is 
prospective  only.  Isola  v.  Weber, 
1  17  \.  V.  329;  69  N.  Y.  St.  Hep.  691; 
41  N.  E.  704,  citing  and  adopting  the 
reasoning  of  the  opinion  by  Follett, 
J.,  in  O'Reilly  v.  Utah,  N.  &  C. 
Stage  Co.,  87  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  406;  68 
N.  V.  St.  R.  432;  34  N.  Y.  Supp. 
358,  rev'g  13  Misc.  (X.  Y. )  97;  re- 
argument  denied  148  X.  Y.  736. 
S.e  Weber  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
12  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  512;  42  X.  Y. 
Supp.  789;  76  X.  Y.  St.  R.  789; 
Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.,  1"> 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  158;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
687;  :'.'>  X.  Y.  Supp.  1002.  But  ex- 
amine Burns  v.  Houston,  West  St.  & 
P.  F.  R.  Co.,  15  Misc.  (X.  Y.)  19;  36 
X.  Y.  Supp.  774. 

7  Medinger  v.  Brooklyn  Heights 
R.  Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  42;  39  N. 
Y.  Supp.  613. 

8  Etheringtou    v.  Prospect   Park  & 

707 


§  561 


DEATH   FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


kin  have  in  the  life  is  pecuniary."  And  if  any  pecuniary  injury 
be  shown,  the  jury  are  at  liberty  to  give  such  damages  as  they 
shall  deem  a  fair  and  just  compensation,10  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from  such  death.11  But  the  statute 
does  not  confine  the  recovery  to  the  immediate  loss  of  money 
or  property;  it  contemplates  damages  or  advantages  of  a  pecu- 
niary nature  occasioned  by  the  death  as  opposed  to  those  for  in- 
juries to  the  sentiments  or  affections.12 

§  561.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Nature  of  action  and  proof  of  damages— Nominal 
damages. — As  a  preliminary  statement  it  is  important  to  re- 
member that  the  statute  has  been  held  in  New  York  to  create 
a  new  cause  of  action  for  the  benefit  of  the  husband  or  wife 
and  next  of  kin  of  a  decedent,  and  it  also  deals  with  remote 
and  uncertain  damages  not  recoverable  at  common  law.13  The 
statute  is  also  applicable  to  the  case  of  any  person  where  death 
ensues,  who  could  himself  if  living  have  maintained  the  action 
and  is  not  limited  to  the  cases  of  a  wife,  for  the  loss  of  a 
husband  or   children  of  parents,14  and  the   cause   of  action  is 


C.  I.  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641,  affg 
24  Hun  (N.  Y.),  235;  Tilley  v. 
Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  252;  24 
N.  Y.  471;  23  How.  (N.  Y.)  363; 
Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y. 
465,  469;  Dickins  v.  New  York  C.  R. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  158;  1  Keyes,  23;  1 
Abb.  Dec.  504.  See  id.  28  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  41;  Oldfield  v.  New  York  & 
Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310;  Bier- 
bauer  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  559,  aff'd  77  N. 
Y.  588;  Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co., 
32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  25,  afTd  30  How. 
(N.  Y. )  593  n.;  Lehman  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 29  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  234;  Wise  v. 
Teerpenning,  2  Edm.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  112. 
See  Medinger  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R. 
Co.,  6App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)42;  39  N.  Y. 
Supp.  613;  Keller  v.  New  York  C.  R. 
Co.,  17  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  102;  Pick- 
ett v.  Wilmington  R.  Co.,  117  N.  C. 
616;  Kesler  v.  Smith,  66  N.  C.  154. 
See  sees.  561,  ")6'2,  herein. 

708 


9  Lehman  v.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  234. 

10  Cornwall  v.  Mills,  44  N.  Y.  Supr. 
(12  J.  &  S.)  45;  Etherington  v.  Pros- 
pect Park  &  C.  I.  R.  Co.,  88  N".  Y. 
641.  See  cases  in  next  note.  See 
cases  considered  in  note  to  sec.  562, 
herein,  as  to  discretion  of  jury,  etc. 

11  Mclutyre  v.  New  York  C.  R. 
Co.,  37  N.  Y.  287;  35  How.  (N.  Y.) 
36;  4  Trans.  App.  1;  Tilley  v.  Hud- 
son R.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  252;  Dickens 
v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Abb.  Dec. 
504;  1  Keyes  (N.  Y.),  23. 

12  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  471;  Bierbauer  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
559,  aff'd  77  N.  Y.  588.  See  sees.  565- 
567,  herein. 

13  Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker, 
164  N.  Y.  58,  62,  63,  per   Bartlett,  J. 

14  Oldfield  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  316,  per  the 
court  (under  Laws  of  1847,  ch.  450). 


FOR    THE    PEC1   N I  \  l:Y    INJURY. 


§  561 


the  death  and  not  the  injury.1''  Again  the  pecuniary  loss  to 
be  considered  and  which  a  party  is  entitled  to  recover  may 
consist  of  special  damages,  that  is  of  actual  and  definite  loss  cap- 
able of  admeasurement  and  of  prospective  general  damages,  in- 
culpable of  being  accurately  estimated.  The  former  should  be 
shown  to  have  been  sustained  and  their  amount  proven,  while 
the  latter  depend  as  a  basis  of  computation  upon  the  existence 
and  proof  of  certain  general  elements  of  damages  such  as  age, 
etc.,  elsewhere  noted."5  But  evidence  of  specific  pecuniary  Loss 
to  the  next  of  kin  is  unnecessary  to  justify  an  award  of  sub- 
stantial damages,  proof  of  the  above  noted  general  elements 
being  sufficient.17  And  it  is  the  rule  that  affirmative  proof  of 
actual,  definite,  pecuniary  damage  need  not  be  given  to  justify 
an  award  of  some  or  nominal  damages. IS     So  the  fact  that  the 


This  language  of  the  court  is  quoted 
in  Matter  of  Suedeker  v.  Snedeker, 
164  N.  Y.  58,  62,  per  Bartlett,  J. 

15  Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  K. 
Co.,  15  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  158:  35  X.  Y. 
Supp.  1050.  Examine  Whitford  v. 
Panama  K.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  465,  484; 
Dibble  v.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.,  25 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  183.  The  statutory 
liability  accrues  only  by  reason  of 
the  death.  Stuber  v.  McEntee,  142 
X.  Y.  200,  203,  per  O'Brien,  J. 

16  Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H. 
Canal  Co.,  92  N  Y.  219,  rev'g  28 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  407;  15  Week.  Dig.  522. 
Future  as  well  as  past  consequences 
will  be  considered.  Ganiard  v. 
Rochester  City  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 
Hun(N.  Y.),22;  IS  X.  Y.  St.  R.  692; 
2  Y.  N.  Supp.  470,  case  aff'd  121 
X.  Y.  661;  24  X.  E.  1092.  See  Old- 
field  v.   X.  Y.  &  Harlem   R.  R.  Co., 

.14  X.  Y.  310;  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R. 
Co.,  29  X.  Y.  252;  Mitchell  v.  Xew 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  535;  5  T.  &  C.  (X.  Y.)  122, 
aff'd  64  X.  Y.  655.  See  sees.  560, 
563,  herein. 

17  Lustig  v.  Xew  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.   R.  Co.,  65  Hun(X.  Y.),547;  48 


X.   Y.    .St.    R.   916;    20  X.   Y.   Supp. 
477. 

18  Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  R. 
Co.,  14  X.  Y.  St.  H.  699;  14  Daly, 
418;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  572,  aff'd  113 
X.  Y.  628;  22  X.  V.  St.  R.  994;  20 
X.  E.  878;  Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker 
Ice  Co.,  110  X.  Y.  504;  18  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  130;  18  X.  E.  108,  aff'g  41  Hun. 
X.  Y.  404;  3  X.  Y.  St.  R.  133;  25 
Wkly.  Di£.  46;  Ihl  v.  Forty-Second 
St.  R.  Co.,  47  X.  Y.  317;  Prender- 
gast  v.  Xew  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  58 
X.  Y.  652.  See  Kane  v.  Mitchell 
Transp.  Co.,  90  Hun  (X.  Y.),  65;  70 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35  X.  Y.  Supp.  581. 
aff'd  153  X.  Y.  680:  Gorham  v.  Xew 
York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  23  Hun  (X.  Y.j, 
449;  O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co., 
38  X.  Y.  445;  Mclntyre  v.  Xew  York 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  37  X.  Y.  287:  35  How. 
(X.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans.  App.  1:  Tilley 
v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29  X.  Y.  252: 
Oldlield  v.  X.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co., 
14  X.  Y.  310,  aff'g  3  E.  D.  Smith. 
103;  Keller  v.  Xew  York  C.  R.  Co., 
2  Abb.  Dec.  (X.  Y.)  4S0;  24  How. 
|N.  Y.i  172,  aff'g  17  How.  (X.  Y.) 
102;  Safford  v.  Drew,  3  Duer  (X.  Y.  |, 
027;  Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  32 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  25. 


8  561 


DEATH-   FAIR    AND    JUST    <  O.M  I'KN  NATION 


result  in  ascertaining  the  probable  pecuniary  benefit  is  some- 
what subject  to  chance,  does  not  prevent  a  recovery  nor 
limit  it  to  nominal  damages,19  since  the  recovery  is  not  restricted 
to  such  pecuniary  loss  as  is  susceptible  of  definite  proof.20  And 
in  this  connection  it  is  expressly  declared  that  the  theory  of 
the  statute  is  that  the  next  of  kin  have  a  pecuniary  interest  in 
the  life  of  the  person  killed  and  the  value  of  this  interest  is 
the  amount  for  which  the  jury  are  to  give  their  verdict,  and 
the  statute  imputes  to  them  a  direct  pecuniary  loss  from  the 
negligent  killing  of  one  whose  life  has  a  greater  or  less  value.21 
Again  in  the  case  of  collateral  relatives  it  is  declared  that  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  a  pecuniary  loss  results  and  if  so  to  what 
extent,  but  nevertheless  damages  may  be  recovered  in  such 
case,  and  the  jury's  discretion  in  awarding  the  same  will  not  be 
disturbed,  where  no  principle  of  law  has  been  violated,  since 
the  law  does  not  require  direct  and  exact  proof  upon  this  sub- 
ject." But  it  is  also  held  that  under  the  New  York  Act  of 
1847,  the  complaint  must  aver  that  deceased  left  a  widow  or 
next  of  kin  who  sustained  a  pecuniary  loss  by  his  death.23  So 
in  another  case  it  is  decided  that  in  actions  for  negligent 
death,   the  plaintiff  must   show  a  pecuniary  damage  or  loss.24 


19  Thomas  v.  Utica  &  Black  River 
R.  Co.,  6  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  353,  aff'd 
34  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  626,  aff'd  98  N.  Y.  49. 

2°  Oldfield  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aft'o  3  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y),  103;  Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R. 
Co.,  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)25,  and  cases 
in  last  preceding  note.  See  sees.  559, 
560,  herein.  See  Lockwood  v.  New 
York.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co..  98  X.  Y. 
523,  526,  affg  20  Wkly.  Dig.  341; 
Lehman  v.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  234.  Case  of  nominal  damages, 
Keller  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co..  17  How. 
Pr.  ( N.  Y. )  102. 

21  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  N.  Y.  432,  435, 
per  Comstock,  J.  As  to  allegation 
of  damages  and  nominal  damages, 
see  Kenney  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 
49  Hun  (N.  Y.),  535;  15  Civ.  Proc. 
(N.  Y.)  347;  18  N.  Y.  St.  R.  441;  2 
N.  Y.  Supp.  512;  54  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
710 


143;  26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  636;  7  N.  Y. 
Supp.  255,  aff'd  125  N.  Y.  422;  35  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  447;  20  N.  E.  626.  See 
Safford  v.  Drew, 3  Duer  (N.  Y.),  627; 
12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  150,  noted  post. 
in  this  section. 

—  Dickens  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 

1  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)504;  1  Keyes, 
232;  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  41,  which  was 
rev'd  23  N.  Y.  158.  Case  was  decided 
before  amd't  Laws,  1870,  ch.  78.  See 
Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  R.  Co., 
14  Daly  (N.  Y.),  418;  14  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
699;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  572,  aff'd  113  N.  Y. 
628;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  994;  20  N.  E. 
878. 

23 Safford  v.  Drew,  3  Dner  (N.  Y.). 
627;  12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  150. 

21  Mitchell  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 

2  Hun  (N.  Y.),  535;  5  Supr.  Ct.  (5 
T.  &  C.)  (N.  Y.)  122,  case  aff'd  64 
N.  Y.  655;  Staal  v.  Grand  St.  &  N. 


FQH    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.UKV.  §    ">62 

And  in  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  married  woman  it  is  deter- 
mined that  some  pecuniary  injury  must  be  proven,  to  enable 
the  husband  to  maintain  the  action,  although  very  slight 
evidence  is  sufficient.25  Again  it  is  declared  that  the  jury  "are 
required  to  judge  and  not  merely  to  guess,  and  therefore  such 
basis  for  their  judgment  as  the  facts  naturally  capable  of  proof 
can  give  should  always  be  present  and  is  rarely  if  ever  absent* 
And  where  a  widowed  mother  was  suing  to  recover  damages 
for  her  child's  death  and  was  examined  as  a  witness  before  the 
jury,  so  that  they  might  approximately  determine  her  age,  the 
failure  to  prove  her  age  was  held  not  to  preclude  a  recovery 
of  more  than  nominal  damages,  where  it  was  in  evidence  that 
she  had  young  children  and  her  circumstances  and  condition  in 
life  were  proven.'-7  So  damages  are  implied  from  an  allegation 
of  the  wrongful  act.28 

§  562.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Damages  for  jury — Excessive  or  inadequate  damages. 

— The  amount  of  damages  upon  the  evidence  is  for  the  jury  and 
rests  largely  upon  their  sound  sense,  judgment  and  discretion. 
This  does  not  mean  an  arbitrary,  unlimited  discretion,  nor  can 
they  base  their  verdict  upon  any  mere  inference  or  guess,  for  they 
are  to  judge  the  amount  of  recovery  within  the  limits  of  a  fair  and 
just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  injury  sustained.  But  the 
discretion  to  be  exercised  may  be  liberal,  although  just,  espe- 
cially where,  as  in  case  of  prospective  general  damages,  the  plain- 
tiff is  unable  to  show,  direct,  specific,  pecuniary  loss,  or  even 
though  the  proof  may  be  unsatisfactory  and  the  damages  quite 
uncertain  and  contingent.  The  jury,  in  brief,  must  take  those 
elements  of  damages  properly  in  evidence  before  them  and  make 
the  best  estimate  they  justly  can  within  the  terms  of  the  statute.29 


R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  625;  1  Silv.  C.  A. 
516;  11  X.  Y.  St.  R.  352;  25  Wkly. 
Dig.    241,  rev'g  36  Hun  (X.  Y.),  208. 

^Cornwall  v.  Mills,  44  X.  Y.  Supr. 
Ct.  (12  J.  &  S.)  45. 

^Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  II. 
Can.  Co.,  92  X.  Y.  225,  per  the 
court,  quoted  in  Serensen  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Mont.), 
45  Fed.  407,  410. 


-'  Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,  68  Hun  (X. 
Y.),  102;  52  X.  Y.  St.  R.  216;  22  X. 
Y.  Supp.  732. 

28  Kenney  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  R. 
R.  Co.,  2  X.  Y.  Supp.  512. 

29  The  verdict  should  not  be  of  such 
an  amount  as  to  clearly  more  than 
cover  the  pecuniary  loss  to  the  next 
of  kin.  Taylor  v.  Long  Island  R  Co., 
16  App.   Div.   (X.    Y.)    1;  44    X.    Y. 

711 


§  562 


DEATH       FATE    AND   JUST    ('<  >MPENS  ATlON 


And  the  protection  against  excessive  verdicts  is  found  in  the 
power  of  courts  in  some  of  the  modes  allowed  by  law  to  revise 
or  set  aside  such  verdicts.*  This  rule  would  also  apply  to  pro- 
tection against  inadequate  verdicts.31     The  above  rule,  however, 


Supp.    820;  2    Am.    Neg.    Rep.    608. 
Jury  should  not  give  damages  clearly 
in   excess    of     the    pecuniary    loss. 
Medinger  v.   Brooklyn    Heights     R. 
Co.,  6App.  Div.    (N.  Y.)   42;    39  N. 
Y.  Supp.  613.     Measure   of  damages 
in  such  a  case  (where  deceased  was 
adult  and  left  widowed   mother  and 
adult    hrothers   and     sisters)     must 
usually  he  left  to  the  jury,   there  be- 
ing no  well-defined  rule  by  which  it 
can  be  determined.     Kane  v.  Mitch- 
ell Trans.  Co.,  90  Hun  (N.   Y.),  65; 
70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
581,  aff'd  153  N.   Y.  680.     Jury  can- 
not base  its  verdict  on  any  inference 
or  guess.     Eastwood  v.  Retsofs  Min- 
ing Co.,  86  Hun  ( N.  Y. ),  91 ;  68  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  38;  34  N.   Y.   Supp.    196,  case 
aff'd  152  N.  Y.  651;  47  X.  E.   1106. 
Amount   of   damages   for   death    of 
young  child  is  for  determination  of 
jury.    Biikettv.  Knickerbocker  Ice 
Co.,  110  N.  Y.  504;  18   N.   Y.   St.   R. 
130;  18  N.  E.  108,  afTg  41  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  -104;  3  N.  Y.  St.    R.   133;  10  Civ. 
Proc.    R.    (N.    Y.)   52.     In    but   few 
cases  can  direct,   specific  pecuniary 
loss  be  shown.    Jurors     must  make 
best  estimate  they  can    from   proof 
furnished,    although    proof    unsatis- 
factory and  damages  uncertain  and 
contingent.    Lockwood  v.  New  York, 
L.  E.    &   W.  R.  Co.,    98  N.   Y.  523. 
Jury  are  not  to  guess   the  amount 
but  must  judge  the  same.     Hough- 
kirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.   Can.   Co.,   92 
N.  Y.  219,  case  reverses  28  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  407;  15  Wkly.   Dig.  522.     There 
is  no  way   to  ascertain   mathematic- 
ally what  the   pecuniary  loss   is.     It 
is  to  a  great  extent  speculative   and 
amount  must  be  left  to  good  judg- 

712 


meut  of  jury,  which  there  is  nothing 
to  control  or  fix  except  their  discre- 
tion and  the  statutory  limitation  of 
the  amount  (then  limited  by  statute 
of  1847).  Etherington  v.  Prospect 
Park  &  C.  I.  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641, 
aff'g  24  Hun  (N.  Y.),  235.  Jury  has 
a  liberal  discretion.  Dickens  v.  New 
York  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.) 
504;  1  Keyes,  232 ;  28  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  41, 
rev'd  23  N  Y.  158.  Damages  must  be 
somewhat  indefinite  and  must  de- 
pend upon  good  judgment  of  jury. 
Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb. 
25,  32,  case  aff'd  30  How.  (N.  Y.) 
593  n.  For  jury's  discretion  where 
enough  evidence  of  pecuniary  injury, 
see  Cornwall  v.  Mills,  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.   (12  J.  &  S.)  45. 

3°  Lockwood  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  98  X.  Y.  525,  per  Earl,  J. 
See  Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.  C. 
Co.,  92  N.  Y.  219. 

31  See  as  to  the  general  rule  applica- 
ble to  excessive  or  inadequate  ver- 
dicts, Kennedy  v.  Rochester  City 
&  B.  B.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  (N.  Y.),  183; 
26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  871:7  N.  Y.  Supp. 
221,  rev'd  on  different  grounds,  130 
N.  Y.  654;  3  Silv.  C.  A.  591;  41  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  329;  29  X.  E.  141;  Le  Frois 
v.  Monroe  Co.,  88  Hun,  109;  68  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  535;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  612; 
Hempenstall  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R. 
Co.,  82  Hun  (N.  Y.),  285;  64  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  76;  Rowe  v.  New  York  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Hun  (N.  Y.),  153; 
63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  753;  Pineo  v.  New 
York  C.  R.  Co.,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.),  80, 
aff'd  99  N.  Y.  644;  Tisdale  v.  Del- 
aware &  H.  Can.  Co.,  4  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  812;  25  Wkly.  Dig.  308,  aff'd 
116  N.  Y.  416;  20   N.  Y.  St.  R.  887; 


Fnl:    THE    PECUNIARY    [K.TtJRl 


8  562 


seems  in  its  application  to  be  largely  a  matter  of  discretion  as  is 
clearly  evidenced  by  the  verdicts  that  have  been  sustained,  modi- 
fied or  set  aside  according  to  what  may  be  designated  as  the  court's 
sense  of  justice,  based  upon  the  various  factors  existing  in  each 
particular  case.*     It  is  held  in  North  Carolina  that  a  motion  to 


22  N.  E.  700:  Peck  v.  New  York  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Hun  (N.  Y.),  236; 
6  T.  &  C.  430;  8  Hun  (N.  Y.),  286, 
aff'd  70  N.  Y.  587;  Potter  v.  Thomp- 
son, 22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  87;  Potter  v. 
Hopkins,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  417; 
Woodward  v.  Paine,  15  Johns.  (N. 
Y. )  493.  See  cases  noted  in  second 
following  note  herein.  If  the  court 
determines,  however,  that  a  verdict 
is  excessive  it  may  order  the  same 
to  be  reversed  unless  the  amount  is 
reduced  by  a  specified  sum,  in  which 
case  it  will  be  affirmed  as  modified. 
See  Taylor  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  16 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  1;  44  N.  Y.  Supp. 
820;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  608;  McCor- 
mack  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co.,  18  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  333;  46  N.  Y.  Supp. 
230;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  631,  denying 
rehearing  16  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  24;  78 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  684;  44  N.  Y.  Supp. 
684. 

3-  Deceased  was  a  railroad  fire- 
man 34  years  old.  He  never  earned 
more  than  $2  a  day.  He  left  a  wife, 
son  and  daughter — $15, 000  excessive. 
Cooper  v.  New,  Y'ork,  O.  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  25  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  383;  49  N. 
Supp.  481.  Deceased  was  a  helper 
on  an  ice  wagon — $12,000  held  ex- 
cessive "  The  reason  why  we  reach 
this  conclusion  is  that  the  pecuniary 
loss  to  the  next  of  kin  does  not  in 
any  fair  view  reach  the  amount  of 
the  verdict.  It  scarcely  adds  to  the 
settlement  of  any  fixed  rule  to  set 
out  our  reasons  in  detail  upon  this 
question,  as  each  case  must  stand 
upon  its  own  particular  facts.'"  Mo- 
Cormack  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  Co.,  18 
App.    Div.   (N.     Y.)    333;  46    N.    V. 


Supp.  230;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  631, 
denying  rehearing  in  16  App.  Div. 
(N.  V.)  24;  78  N.  Y.  St.  R.  084:  44 
N.  Y.  Supp.  (>84,  per  Hatch,  J.  See 
Medinger  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  K. 
Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  42;  30  N. 
Y.  Supp.  613.  Deceased  was  a 
laborer  52  years  old,  earning  82.50 
a  day — $10,000  excessive.  Taylor 
v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  16  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  1;  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  820;  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  608.  Deceased  was  a 
steel  and  iron  worker,  29  years  old, 
earned  $3.50  a  day,  and  had  regular 
employment  —  $25,000  reduced  to 
$15,000.  Schmitt  v.  Metropolitan 
L.  Ins  Co.,  13  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  120; 
77  N.  Y.  St.  R.  318;  43  N.  Y.  Supp. 
318.  Deceased  was  a  woman  63 
years  old,  did  housework  for  the 
family,  consisting  of  husband  and 
three  grown  sons— $7,500  reduced  to 
$5,000.  Medinger  v.  Brooklyn 
Heights  It.  Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.  | 
42;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  613.  Death  of 
wife  and  mother;  no  pecuniary  aid 
received  from  her — $5,000  excessive. 
$2,500  sufficient.  Klemm  v.  New 
Y'ork  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  277;  60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  231;  28  N. 
Y.  Supp.  S61.  Deceased  was  about 
48  years  old,  earning  capacity  was 
about  $1  a  day  and  board.  She  was 
a  seamstress  and  widow  and  lived 
with  a  married  daughter  who  was 
one  of  three  surviving  children,  all 
of  aye.  She  had  also  assisted  in 
making  small  articles  of  clothing  for 
her  children.  She  left  no  property — 
$3,500  reduced  to  $1,000.  Mclntyre 
v.  New  Y'ork  C.  K.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  287; 
35  How.  (N.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans.   App. 

713 


§  562 


DEATH   FAIR  AM)  JUST  COMPENSATION 


set  aside  a  verdict,  because  excessive,  rests  in  the  discretion  of 
the  trial  court,  and  such  discretion  is  not  reviewable  by  the  su- 
preme court.3' 


1,  aff'g  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  515.  De- 
ceased was  60  years  old  and  was  a 
strong,  healthy  woman.  She  did  all 
the  housework  and  drove  a  milk 
wagon  for  her  husband — $150  in- 
sufficient. Meyer  v.  Hart,  23  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  131;  48  X.  Y.  Supp.  904. 
Deceased  was  61  years  old,  actively 
engaged  in  business  and  enjoyed 
good  health — $10,000  not  excessive. 
Beecher  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  53 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  324;  65  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  642.  Deceased  was  a  member  of 
the  police  force  of  New  York  city; 
salary  was  $1,250  a  year;  age  43. 
He  left,  dependent  upon  him  for 
support,  rive  children,  the  oldest  a 
daughter  21  year's  old  and  the 
youngest  a  son  10  years  old — $9,000 
not  excessive.  Wallace  v.  Third 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  36  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. ) 
57;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  132;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  215.  Deceased  was  a  laborer 
33  years  old,  married,  of  temperate 
habits,  good  health  and  sole  support 
of  family  —  $5,000  not  excessive. 
Felice  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)345;  43  N. 
Y.  Supp.  922.  Deceased  was  a  daugh- 
ter in  good  health  and  comfortably 
supporting  her  father,  who  was  82 
years  old,  with  a  life  expectancy  of 
ten  years  and  was  penniless  and  de- 
pendent —  $3,000  not  excessive. 
Purcell  v.  Lauer,  14  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  33;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  988.  Action 
by  father  106  years  old,  for  death  of 
industrious  son  27  years  old — $S00 
not  excessive.     Burke  v.  Witherbee, 


18  Wkly.  Dig.  (N.  Y.)  369,  case 
rev'd  98  N.  Y.  562.  Deceased  was 
72  years  old,  strong  and  healthy, 
and  did  general  housework  for  her- 
self and  two  children — $1,500  not 
excessive.  Walls  v.  Rochester  R. 
Co.,  92  Hun  (X.  Y.),  581;  72  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  250;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  1102, 
aff'd  154  N.  Y.  771.  Deceased  was  26 
years  old,  unmarried,  sober  and  in- 
dustrious, and  earned  about  $400 
during  each  season  of  navigation. 
There  was  no  evidence  that  he  had 
ever  contributed  to  the  support  of 
the  survivors,  a  widowed  mother  and 
adult  brothers  and  sisters — $3,000 
not  excessive.  Kane  v.  Mitchell 
Transp.  Co.,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.),  65;  70 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  581, 
aff'd  153  N.  Y.  680.  Deceased  was  a 
woman  63  years  old;  she  did  all  the 
housework  for  her  husband  and 
daughter,  and  was  living  with  them 
— $5,000  not  excessive.  Lyons  v. 
Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun,  374;  69 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  816;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  372, 
aff'd  152  N.  Y.  654;  47  N.  E.  1109. 
Deceased  was  unmarried,  22  years 
old,  earned  $1.85  a  day.  He  lived 
with  his  father,  his  next  of  kin,  who 
was  58  years  old — $3,000  not  exces- 
sive. Fitzgerald  v.  New  York  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Hun  (N.  Y.),359;  68 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  762;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  762, 
case  rev'd  154  N.  Y.  263;  48  N.  E. 
514.  Deceased  was  33  years  old,  un- 
married, healthy  and  lived  with  his 
father  for  whom  he  made  pianos, 
I  receiving   such   amount   therefor  as 


33  Benton  v.  North  Carolina R.  Co., 
122  N.  C.  1007;  30  S.  E.333.  Seelhlv. 
Forty-Second  St.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 
317;  Catlin  v.  Pond,  101  N.  Y.  649; 
Williams  v.  Sargeant,  46  N.  Y.  481; j  76  N.  Y.  594 

714 


Link  v.  Sheldon,  136  N.  Y.  1,  5,  per 
Gray,  J.,  citing  Oldfield  v.  New  York 
&  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  321; 
Gale  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 


POT?    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.M   l:\ 


S  563 


§  563.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "Factors  generally  to  be  considered.  The  factors  to  be 
considered  generally  are  deceased's  age,  sex,  health,  strength, 
and  within  this  element  height  and  weight  have  been  noticed, 
activity,  mental  condition,  character,  qualities  and  capacity, 
general  intelligence,  business  qualifications,  skill  or  ability  to 
work  or  labor,  competency  or  incompetency  to  till  a  better  posi- 
tion, occupation,  whether  regularly  employed  or  not,  present  or 
former  employment  and  character  thereof,  earnings  or  income, 
proceeds  of  business,  probable  profits,  earnings  in  immediately 
prior  employment,  earning  capacity  and  its  probability  that  it 
may  increase  or  diminish  with  advancing  age,  value  and  charac- 
ter of  services  in  case  of  a  deceased  wife  or  child,  disposition  of 
earnings,  cost  of  living,  habits  of  industry,  sobriety  or  otherwise, 
expenditures  and  care  exercised  therein,  life  expectancy,  whether 


the  father  thought  proper;  prospect 
of  inheritance  considered  also — 
§5,000  not  excessive.  Johnson  v. 
Long  Island  R.  Co.,  80  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
306;  62  X.  Y.  St.  R.  46;  30  X.  Y. 
Supp.  318,  aff'd  144  X.  Y.  719;  70  X. 
Y.  St.  K.  868;  29  X.  E.  857.  Xo  evi- 
dence was  given  as  to  deceased's 
earnings  or  of  the  value  of  his  life  to 
his  next  of  kin,  who  were  a  brother 
and  sister  in  Ireland  and  three 
nephews  in  New  York  city,  nor  did 
it  appear  that  he  ever  supported  or 
assisted  them  in  any  way— I si, 000  not 
excessive.  Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third 
St.  R.  Co.,  14  Daly  (X.  Y.),  418;  14 
X.  Y.  St.  R.  699;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  572, 
aff'd  113  X.  Y.  628;  22  \.  Y.  St.  R. 
994;  20  X.  E.  878.  Deceased  daughter 
was  3j  years  old,  in  good  health, 
earned  $8  t<>  $9  a  week  for  5  or  0 
years  prior  to  her  death.  In  twenty 
years  she  had  contributed  from  $300 
to  $400  a  year  towards  her  parents1 
support.  Her  father  was  66  years  old 
and  in  infirm  health;  the  wife  was  58 
years  old;  both  were  without  prop- 
erty— $4,000  not  excessive.  Bowles 
v.  Rome  Watertown  R.  Co.,  46  Hun 
(N.   T.)i  324;    12  X.    Y.  St.   R.  457, 


aff'd  113  X.  Y.  043;  22  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
997;  21  X.  E.  414.  Action  was  for 
death  of  sister  aged  14:  father  had 
not  provided  for  family  for  years 
and  was  not  known  to  be  living — 
$3,500  not  excessive.  Pineo  v.  Xew 
York  C.  R.  Co.,  34  Huu  (X.  Y.),  80, 
aff'd  99  X.  Y.  044.  Deceased  was  an 
engineer,  industrious,  etc.  His 
mother  was  his  next  of  kin— $5,000 
not  excessive.  Erwin  v.  Xeversink 
S.  S.  Co.,  23  Hun  i  N.  V.  i.  573,  aff'd 
88  X.  Y.  184.  Deceased  did  all  the 
housework  for  her  husband  and  three 
children,  assisted  in  taking  charge 
of  store  and  sometimes  earned  as 
much  as  $20 a  week  sewing.  All  her 
earnings  were  used  in  family's  sup- 
port. Husband  died  and  his  admin- 
istrator recovered  for  loss  of  her 
earnings  and  services — $2,500  not 
excessive.  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Cross- 
town  R.  Co.,  IS  Hun,  368.  Deceased 
was  22  years  old.  He  was  unmarried, 
earned  $25  a  month.  His  father, 
mother,  two  brothers  and  a  sister 
resided  abroad — $5,000  not  excessive. 
Biei'bauer  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  Hun  (X.  Y.),  55'.'.  afFd  77 
X.  Y.  588. 

715 


<:»i;:; 


DEATH--  -KAli:    AND    JIST    <  OMI'KNSATION 


deceased  was  married  or  unmarried  and  the  relation  of  the  sur- 
vivors to  deceased,  their  age,  sex,  situation  and  condition.  There 
are  also  other  elements  dependent  upon  whether  deceased  was  a 
wife,  adult,  or  minor,  etc.,  which  are  noted  elsewhere  herein 
under   appropriate  headings.*1     But  it  is  unnecessary  to  prove 


34  In  but  few  of  the  cases  cited  be- 
low is  there  any  discussion  as  to  the 
above  factors  being  elements  of 
damages.  They  are  as  a  rule  merely 
mentioned  as  facts  which  are  in  evi- 
dence or  as  determining  factors  in 
the  case,  being  generally  conceded 
to  be  such.  Life  expectancy  con- 
sidered— death  of  minor.  Keenan 
v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  145  N.  Y. 
348;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  813;  40  N.  E. 
15.  Character,  qualities,  capacity 
and  condition  of  deceased,  age  and 
condition  of  next  of  kin.  Lockwood 
v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  98 
N.  Y.  523,  aff'g  20  Wkly.  Dig.  341. 
Age,  sex,  general  health  and  intelli- 
gence of  deceased,  situation  and  con- 
dition of  survivors  and  their  relation 
to  deceased.  Houghkhk  v.  Delaware 
&  H.  Can.  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  219,  rev'g  28 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  407:  15  Wkly.  Dig.  522, 
which  aff'd  11  Abb.  X.  C.  (N.  Y.)  72; 
63  How.  (N.  Y.)  328;  4  Month.  L. 
Bull.  65.  Life  expectancy.  Sauter 
v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  66 
N.  Y.  50;  23  Am.  Rep.  18  affg,  6  How. 
(N.  Y.)  446.  "What  did  deceased 
usually  earn'?'1  is  a  pertinent  and 
material  question.  Mclntyre  v.  New 
York  C.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  287;  35  How. 
(N.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans.  App.  1,  aff'g  47 
Barb.  ( N.  Y. )  515.  Deceased  mother's 
business  capacity  and  her  habitual 
employments,  and  value  of  her  earn- 
ings to  show  capacity  are  admissible. 
Til  ley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  Y. 
252;  24  N.  Y.  471;  23  How.  (N.  Y.) 
463.  Earning  capacity  of  deceased 
may  be  shown.  Seifter  v.  Brooklyn 
Heights  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y,  Supp.  1107; 
55  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)10.  That  de- 
716 


ceased  was  an  active  business  man 
in  good  health,  (>1  years  old,  and 
that  exceptional  activity  promised 
long  life  were  considered  and  jury 
were  not  bound  by  decedent's  actual 
earnings  during  his  life,  but  might 
consider  whether  his  earning  capac- 
ity would  have  increased  or  dimin- 
ished. Beecher  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,  53  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  324;  65  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  642.  Evidence  of  wages 
not  incompetent,  although  appren- 
ticeship articles  did  not  require 
them.  Kimmer  v.  Weber,  81  Hun 
599;  63  N.  Y.  St.  R.  291;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1103.  Age,  height  and  weight, 
health  and  strength,  mental  ability. 
Morris  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co., 
51  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  512;  64  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  878;  30  Civ.  Proc.  R.  ( N.  Y.) 
371.  Health,  youth,  industry,  earn- 
ings and  disposition  thereof  con- 
sidered. Twist  v.  Rochester,  37  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  307;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  850. 
Deceased  was  a  contractor  and  evi- 
dence by  a  partner  as  to  the  amount 
of  capital  invested  by  them,  the 
number  of  employees  and  the  firm's 
net  income  from  short  duration  con- 
tracts was  held  inadmissible  to  prove 
earning  capacity.  Read  v.  Brooklyn 
Heights  R.  Co.,  32  App.  Div.  503; 
53  N.  Y.  Supp.  209.  Deceased  never 
earned  more  than  two  dollars  a  day 
in  the  course  of  his  employment  and 
this  fact  was  considered  in  holding 
the  damages  excessive.  Cooper  v. 
New  York,  O.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  25  App. 
Div.  383;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  481.  Age 
and  occupation  were  also  factors  in 
this  last  case.  Age,  sex,  health, 
strength,  amount  of  work  and  char- 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.H'RY. 


§  568 


all  these  elements  in  order  to  recover  damages.  Thus  failure 
to  prove  a  widowed  mother's  age  is  not  fatal  to  her  recovery, 
beyond  nominal  damages  for  the  death  of  her  son,  where  certain 
other  factors  arc  proven  and  she  appears  as  a  witness  before  the 


:icter  of  services,  earnings  and  prob- 
able profits  considered.  Meyer  v. 
Hart,  23  App.  Div.  (N.  V.)  131;  48 
N.  Y.  Supp.  904.  Occupation  con- 
sidered. McCormack  v.  Nassau  Elec. 
R.  Co.,  18  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  333;  46 
N.  T.  Supp.  2:50;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
631.  Denying  rehearing  of  case 
(priucipal  question  was  that  of  im- 
putable negligence  and  negligence), 
16  App.  Div.  (  X.  Y.)  24;  77  X.  Y\  St. 
R.  684;  44  \.  Y.  Supp.  684.  Age, 
earnings,  life  expectancy,  inability 
to  earn  continuously,  decrease  of 
same,  deduction  of  living  expenses, 
net  earnings  considered.  Taylor  v. 
Long  Island  R.  Co.,  16  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  1:  44  N.  Y.  Supp.  820;  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  COS.  Ages  of  deceased 
and  surviving  father  considered. 
Seeley  v.  New  York  C.  &  II.  R.  R. 
Co.,  8  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  402:  40  N. 
Y.  Supp.  806.  That  deceased  was  a 
woman,  was  63  years  old  and  had  no 
source  of  income,  and  that  she  did 
the  general  housework  for  her  fam- 
ily was  considered.  Mediuger  v. 
Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  6  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  42;  30  X.  Y".  Supp.  01:;.  Age, 
health,  industry,  sobriety  and  aver- 
age daily  earnings  considered.  Krul- 
der  v.  Woolverton,  11  Misc.  (X.  Y. ) 
537;  32  X.  Y.  Supp.  742.  Age,  sex 
and  occupation  considered.  Ilenn- 
ing.v.  Caldwell,  4:>  X.  Y.  St.  R.  373; 
18  X.  Y.  Supp.  339,  afFd  137  N.  Y. 
553;  50  N.  Y.  St.  R.  931;  33  X.E.  337. 
Age  and  good  health  of  wife  and 
mother,  and  character  of  new  services 
considered.  Lyons  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  89  Hun  (X.  Y.),374;  69  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  816;  33  X.  Y.  Supp.  372.  afFd  152 
X.  Y.  654;  47  X.  E.  1109.    Intemperate 


habits  is  an  important  factor. 
Devor  v.  Van  Vranken,  29  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  201.  Occupation,  industry  and 
disposition.  Erwin  v.  Xeversink  S. 
S.  Co.,  2:;  Hun  (N.  Y.),573,  aff'd  88 
X.  Y.  184.  Age  and  relation  to  de- 
ceased appeared,  but  no  evidence  of 
her  abilities  or  condition  in  life. 
Mitchell  v.  Xew  York,  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Hun  (X.  Y.),  535;  5  T.  &  C. 
122,  aff'd  64  X.  Y.  6.").").  Value  of  sup- 
port by  husband,  and  father  of  wife 
and  children,  loss  of  earnings  con- 
sidered. Althorf  v.  Wolfe,  2  Hilt. 
( X.  Y. )  344,  aff'd  22  X.  Y.  355.  Age, 
sex,  life  expectancy  considered.  Mc- 
Intyre  v.  Xew  York  C.  R.  Co.,  47 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  515,  case  aff'd  37  X.  Y. 
287;  35  How.  30;  4  Trans.  App.  1. 
Loss  of  services  of  wife,  and  whether 
or  not  she  was  an  amiable  and  edu- 
cated woman  may  be  considered. 
Green  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co..  32  Barb. 
I  X.  Y.  |  25,  affd  80  How.  (  X.  Y. )  593  n. 
Life  expectancy  and  probable  gross 
income  are  factors.  Russell  v. 
Windsor  S.  S.  Co.,  120  X.  C.  361;  36 
S.  E.  191.  Personal  living  expenses 
admissible  to  show  net  income  and 
care  exercised  in  the  matter,  also  in- 
competency of  deceased  to  fill  a 
better  position  admissible,  where  it 
is  shown  that  he  had  occupied  a 
more  remunerative  one,  and  where 
it  was  in  evidence  that  he  was  em- 
ployed as  fireman  on  defendant's 
road  at  the  time  of  his  death.  Testi- 
mony is  incompetent  as  to  his  occu- 
pation, when  not  on  duty,  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  he  was  remunerated 
therefor,  but  it  was  competent  to 
prove  deceased's  earnings  as  engineer 
which  position  he  had  filled  prior  to 
717 


§564 


DEATH   FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


jury  and  is  examined  so  that  they  may  approximately  determine 
her  age.35  So  proof  of  the  character,  quality,  capacity  and  con- 
dition of  deceased  and  of  the  age,  condition  and  circumstances 
of  the  next  of  kin  is  sufficient  to  warrant  recovery  of  substan- 
tial damages.36 


§  564.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation   for  the   pecuniary 
injury  "—Sufferings  of  person  injured  not  a  factor — The 

"fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  injury  "  given 
under  the  statute  in  cases  of  loss  resulting  from  death,  rep- 
resents the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  the  beneficiaries  for 
whose  benefit  the  legislature  created  a  new  cause  of  action.37 
It  is  the  pecuniary  interest  which  they  have  in  the  life  of  de- 
ceased which  is  the  ground  of  recovery  and  even  though  the 


that  of  fireman,  there  being  evidence 
as  to  his  habits,  industry  and  ability. 
Burns  v.  Asheboro  &  M.  R.  Co.,  125 
N.  C.  304;  34  So.  495.  And  where 
deceased  was  addicted  to  drink,  and 
a  question  arose  as  to  the  cause  of 
his  death,  he  having  been  fouud  dead 
near  defendant's  railroad  tracks,  the 
case  was  held  properly  left  to  the 
jury.  Powell  v.  Southern  R.  Co., 
125  N.  C.  370;  34  S.  E.  530.  Cost  of 
living  and  expenditures,  and  life 
expectancy  considered.  Mendenhall 
v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co.,  123  N.  C. 
275;  31  S.  E.  480.  Same  facts  and 
present  value  of  accumulation  of  net 
income  considered.  Benton  v.  North 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  1007;  30 
S.  E.  333.  Age,  habits,  industry, 
means,  business  qualifications  and 
skill  are  factors.  Benton  v.  North 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  1007;  30 
S.  E.  333.  Cost  of  living  and  ex- 
penditures, net  and  gross  income, 
habits  of  sobriety  and  condition  of 
health  are  factors.  Coley  v.  States- 
ville,  121  N.  C.  301;  28  S.  E.  482. 
Expectancy  of  life  a  factor,  also  net 
income.  Pickett  v.  Wilmington  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  C.  616;  23  S.  E. 
264;  30  L.  R.  A.  257.  Net  earnings, 
718 


health  and  habits  are  factors.  Black- 
well  v.  Moorman,  111  N.  C.  151;  16 
S.  E.  12;  17  L.  R.  A.  729.  See  Burton 
v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  82  N.  C. 
504;  84  N.  C.  192;  Kesler  v.  Smith, 
66  N.  C.  154. 

35  Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,  68  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  102;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  216;  22 
N.  Y.  Supp.  732. 

36  Lustig  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  65  Hun  (N.  T.),  547;  48 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  916;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  417. 
See  Pineo  v.  New  York,  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.),  80,  aff'd  99 
N.  Y.  644;  Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third 
St.  R.  Co.,  14  Daly  (N.  Y.),  418;  14 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  699;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  372, 
aff'd  113  N.  Y.  628;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
994;  20  N.  E.  878.  But  examine 
Ahern  v.  Steele,  48  Hun  (N.  Y.),  517; 
16  N.  Y.  St.  R.  24;  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 
259,  rev'd  115  N.  Y.  203;  26  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  295;  22  N.  E.  193;  Mitchell  v. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  535;  5  T.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  122, 
aff'd  64  N.  Y.  155;  Carpenter  v, 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  38  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  116.  See  further  sees.  561, 
herein,  as  to  nominal  damages. 

37  Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker. 
164  N.  Y.  58,  62,  63,  per  Bartlett,  J. 


FOR  THE  PECUNIARY  INJURY. 


§  565 


action  can  be  maintained  only  in  the  cases  in  which  it  could 
have  been  brought  by  deceased  had  he  survived,  nevertheless 
the  damages  are  given  upon  different  prineiples  and  for  different 
causes.*  Again,  as  we  have  elsewere  stated,  the  cause  of  action 
is  for  the  death  and  not  for  the  injury  to  deceased.39  The  re- 
covery therefore  to  which  the  beneficiaries  are  entitled  by  reason 
of  the  death  is  not  the  recompense  which  would  have  belonged 
to  deceased  had  he  lived  and  necessarily  does  not  include 
damages  for  the  pain  and  suffering  of  mind  and  body  endured 
by  the  injured  person,  nor  for  the  personal  wrong  to  him,  even 
though  had  he  not  been  fatally  injured  he  might  himself  have 
recovered  therefor.40  But  if  it  is  stipulated  that  the  action  by 
the  injured  person  for  his  personal  injuries  shall  not  abate  by 
his  death,  then  his  personal  executors  may,  it  is  held,  recover 
what  he  might  have  done  had  he  lived." 

§  565.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "—Exemplary  or  vindictive  damages. — Under  the  New 
York  statute  B  the  measure  of  damages  is,  as  we  have  elsewhere 
stated  "such  a  sum  "  as  is  deemed  to  be  "a  fair  and  just  com- 
pensation for  the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from  the  death" 
and  so  reads  the  North  Carolina  enactment.*5  And  this  provi- 
sion excludes  the  recovery  of  exemplary  or  vindictive  damages.44 


38  Wliitford  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  465,  469.  See  Dibble  v.  New 
York  &  E.  R.  Co.,  25  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
183;  Littlewood  v.  Mayor,  89  N.  Y. 
24;  14  Wkly.  Dig.  400,  case  affirms 
47  Super.  (N.  Y.)  547.  See  sees.  559- 
560,  herein. 

39  Smith  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.,  15  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  158;  35  X.  Y. 
Supp.  1062  (1050);  7  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  253;  74  N.  Y.  St.  R.  706; 
40  N.  Y.  Supp.  148.  "  The  statutory 
liability  has  no  existence  in  his  life- 
time and  accrues  only  by  reason  of 
his  death."  Stuber  v.  McEntee,  142 
N.  Y.  200:  31  Abb.  X.  C.  (X.  Y. ) 
246;  58  X.  Y.  St.  R.  455;  36  X.  E. 
878,  per  O'Brien,  J. 

40  Etheringtou    v.    Prospect     Park 


&  C.  I.  R.  Co.,  88  X.  Y.  641,  aff  g 
24  Hun,  235;  Whitford  v.  Panama 
R.  Co.,  23  X.  Y.  465,  469;  Quin  v. 
Moore,  15  X.  Y.  435,  per  Comstock, 
J.;  Oldrield  v.  New  York  &  Harlem 
R.  Co.,  14  X.  Y.  310,  case  affirms  3 
E.  D.  Smith,  103;  Lehman  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 29  Barb.  (X.  Y.)234;  Dorman 
v.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  16  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
753. 

«  Cox  v.  X(  w  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  11  Hun  (X.   Y.),  621. 

**2  Stov.  Annot.  Code  (ed.  1898), 
sec.  1904. 

"Code,  \.  C  1883,  sec.  1499. 

41  Wise  v.  Teeipennin?,  2  Edw. 
S.  C.  iN.  Y.)  112.  See  sees.  564, 
569,  herein. 

719 


^§  566,  567       faii;  and  just  compensation 

So  punitive  damages  cannot  be  recovered  against  a  physician 
for  malpractice  resulting  in  a  wife's  death.43 

§  566.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Solatium — Mental  suffering  not  a  factor. — The  words 
of  the  statute  are  exclusive  in  so  far  as  mental  suffering,  an- 
guish or  grief  of  the  beneficiaries  are  concerned,  since  no  recov- 
ery can  be  had  therefor  nor  for  any  injury  whatsoever  to  the 
feelings  alone  ;  for  what  has  been  frequently  designated  as 
sentimental  damages  or  injuries  to  the  affections  or  sentiments 
cannot  be  pecuniarily  measured.46 

§  567.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Loss  of  society  of  deceased. — Nothing  can  be  recov- 
ered for  loss  resulting  from  the  deprivation  of  the  companionship 
of  relatives  or  for  the  comfort  therefrom,  as  such  loss  is  incapa- 
ble of  compensation  by  any  recognized  measure  of  value.47  And 
where  a  husband  brought  an  action  for  loss  occasioned  by  his 
wife's  injury,  it  was  held  that  he  might  recover  for  loss  of  com- 
fort from  his  wife's  society,  but  upon  his  death  that  such  right 
ceased  as  to  that  element  of  damages  and  did  not  survive  to 
his  personal  representatives.48 


"Gray  v.  Little,  127  N.  C.  304;  37 
S.  C.  270. 

46  Felice  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  345;  43  N. 
Y.  Supp.  922;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  637; 
Etherington  v.  Prospect  Park  &  C.  I. 
R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641,  aff'g  24  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  235;  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R. 
Co.,  24  N.  Y.  471,  474;  29  N.  Y.  252; 
Oldfield  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 
Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aff'g  'i  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y. ),  103;  Mclutyre  v.  New  York 
C.  R.  Co.,  47  Barb.  515,  aff'd  37  N.  Y. 
287;  35  How.  (N.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans. 
App.  1;  Green  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  25,  aff'd  30 
How.  (N.  Y.)  593  n; Lehman  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 29  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  234. 

47  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  471;  23  How.  363;  Felice  v. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
App.     Div.     (N.   Y.)   345;    43   N.   Y. 

720 


Supp.  922,  per  the  court,  case  of  de- 
ceased husband  and  father;  Ether- 
ington v.  Prospect  Park  &  C.  I.  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641,  per  the  court,  aff'g 
24  Hun  (N.  Y.),  235;  case  of  de- 
ceased daughter;  Green  v.  Hudson 
R.  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  277; 
2  Keyes,  294,  aff'g  31  Barb.  260,  aff'g 
16  How.  (N.  Y.)  230;  28  Barb.  9;  30 
How.  (N.  Y.)  593,  aff'g  32  Barb.  25. 
See  Lehman  v.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  234; Mclutyre  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  Co.  37  N.  Y.  287;  35  How. 
(N.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans.  App.  1,  aff'g  47 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  515. 

48  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Crosstown 
R.  Co.,  83  Hun  (N.  Y.),  595,  rev' g  19 
Hun  (N.  TO,  349;  38  Am.  Rep.  474; 
75  N.  Y.  192.  See  Foels  v.  Tona- 
wanda,  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  150;  20  N.  Y. 
Supp.  447. 


FOB    THE    PECUN1  \i:Y    INJUBY. 


§568 


§  568.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "—Relationship,  legal  and  actual,  of  deceased  to  benefi- 
ciaries.- While  a  recovery  dues  nol  in  New  York  depend 
necessarily  upon  a  legal  obligation  or  duty  on  the  part  of  de- 
ceased but  upon  the  existence  of  beneficiaries,48  nevertheless  the 
relationship,  legal  and  actual,  of  deceased  to  the  beneficiaries  is 
an  important  and  relevant  factor  admissible  on  the  question  of 
damages.  Thus  the  legal  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  parent 
and  minor  child,  are  both  material  upon  the  points  of  who  are 
entitled  to  recover,50  and  they  also  affect  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages, since  a  wife  is  entitled  to  her  support  and  the  father  is 
obligated  to  support  his  children  during  minority,  and  the  latter 
are  also  entitled  to  a  certain  degree  of  personal  care,  nurture,  in- 
struction and  training,  and  in  addition  this  legal  relationship 
entitles  him  to  their  earnings  and  services  until  majority,  as  we 
have  elsewhere  stated.  Again,  under  certain  circumstances  an 
obligation  rests  upon  children  to  aid  their  parents."1  What  we 
have  above  stated  is  illustrated  by  the  following  decisions. 
Thus  one  element  in  determining  the  amount  of  recovery  for 
prospective  damages  is  the  relation  of  the  beneficiaries  to  de- 
ceased.52 So  "recent  statutes  changing  the  rule  of  the  common 
law  recognize  the  ties  of  kindred,  the  mutual  dependence  of 
parents  and  children,  husband  and  wife,  and  of  persons  standing 
in  other  degrees  of  relationship."  a  So  the  general  character  of 
deceased  for  affection  and  kindness  towards  his  relatives  may 
be  proven,  although  evidence  cannot  be  given  of  specific  acts.M 


49  See  next  following  section. 

50  "  Husband,  wife  or  next  of  kin  " 
are  the  persons  entitled  under  N.  Y. 
Code  Civ.  Proc.  sec.  1902  (Stover's 
Ann.  Code,  1898).  As  to  those  en- 
titled under  North  Carolina  Code, 
see  sees.  559,  560,  herein. 

61  See  next  following  section. 

52  Hoii<ihkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H. 
Can.  Co.,  92  X.  H.  219,  rev'g  28  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  407;  15  Wkly.  Dig.  522, 
which  afTd  11  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y. ) 
72;  63  How.  (X.  Y. )  328;  4  Month. 
L.  Bull.  05. 

w  Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  143 
N.  Y.  417,  420,  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J.; 
46 


62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  432;  38  N.  E.  454, 
case  rev'd  4  Misc.  (N.  Y.  )  401;  53 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  664;  24  X.  Y.  Supp.  142. 
The  principal  point  was  that  of 
damages  resulting  from  the  death  of 
prospective  offspring.  Case  also 
aff'd  3  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  453:  30  Abb.  \. 
C.  78:  52  \.  Y.  St.  R.  498;  23  X.  Y. 
Sup  J).  163.  See  Oldfield  v.  Xew 
York  A  Barlem  R.  Co.,  14  X.  Y.  :!10, 
316,  quoted  from  by  Bartlett,  J.,  in 
Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker,  164 
X.  Y.  58,  62,  and  considered  in  text 
of  sec.  569  next  following,  herein. 

**  Quinn  v.  Tower,  2'.»  Hun  i  X  Y.j, 
183.     See  Lockwood    v.    Xew    York, 

72] 


§  569  DEATH— FAli;    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

And  a  deceased  daughter's  long  continued  voluntary  care  of 
her  father  and  mother  may  be  shown.55  But  as  to  actual,  possi- 
ble future  relations,  it  is  held  that  the  jury  may  not  consider 
the  advice  and  counsel  which  the  parents  might  have  received 
from  a  minor  son,  since  the  fact  that  they  might  become  en- 
feebled from  old  age,  imbecility  or  otherwise,  and  become  de- 
pendent upon  others  for  advice  and  counsel,  is  too  remote  to 
constitute  a  ground  of  recovery .x  Again,  this  question  of  legal 
and  actual  relations  between  deceased  and  the  beneficiaries  in- 
volves other  factors,  such  as  the  relative  condition  and  circum- 
stances of  the  parties,  the  reasonable  expectation  of  the  continu- 
ance of  past  benefits,  as  in  case  of  contribution  to  support,  past 
gifts  and  the  like,  a  total  absence  in  the  past  of  any  disposition 
on  the  part  of  deceased  to  render  aid,  etc.57 

§  569.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Legal  duty  or  obligation  of  deceased— Legal  right  of 
beneficiaries  —  Support  and  assistance,  dependency.  —  The 

questions  of  the  legal  duty  or  obligation  of  deceased  with  refer- 
ence to  the  beneficiaries,  and  of  any  legal  rights  which  they  may 
possess  with  reference  to  deceased,  in  so  far  as  they  affect  the 
measure  of  damages,  are  involved  in  the  discussion  of  support,  de- 
pendency of  certain  relatives  and  of  prospective  damages.  But 
it  is  held,  seemingly  as  a  general  proposition  of  law,  that  the 
damages  do  not  necessarily  depend  upon  any  legal  duty  or  ob- 
ligation of  deceased  had  he  continued  to  live,  nor  upon  the  loss, 
impairment  or  destruction  of  any  established  legal  right.58  It  is 
also  held  that  the  right  to  damages  for  causing  death  does  not 
depend  upon  the  right  to  maintenance,  and  that  a  request  to 
charge  that  there  could  be  no  recovery,  because  the  only  person 
dependent  upon  deceased  for  support  was  one  whom  he  was 
under  no  legal  obligations  to  support,  was  properly  refused.51' 


L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  523,  affg 
20  Wkly.  Dig.  341. 

65  Bowles  v.  Rome,  "Watertown  R. 
Co.,  46  Hun  (N.  N.),  324;  12  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  457,  aff'd  113  N.  Y.  643;  22  N. 
Y.St.  R.  997;  21  N.  E.  414. 

56  Gill  v.  Rochester  &  P.  R.  Co., 
37  Hud  (N.  Y.),  107. 

722 


57  See  next  following  section. 
These  points  are  also  elsewhere  con- 
sidered under  the  proper  headings 
herein. 

58  Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R., 
38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  116. 

59  Palmer  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  St.  R.  436;  26  Wkly. 


FOK    THE    PECUNIARY    [NJ1   RY.  ^  569 

The  statute  docs  not,  as  has  been  supposed  by  some,  only  create 
a  liability  in  those  cases  where  the  relations  of  the  parties  to  be 
indemnified  to  the  person  killed  were  such  that  the  former  had 
a  legal  right  to  some  pecuniary  benefit  which  would  result  from 
a  continuance  of  the  life  of  the  latter  and  which  was  lost  by  his 
death.  It  is  applicable  to  the  case  of  any  person  where  death 
ensues,  who  could  himself,  if  living,  have  maintained  the  ac- 
tion.60 Again,  a  recover}-  Mas  sustained  where  the  only  next  of 
kin  were  a  brother  and  sister  and  three  nephews,  and  it  did  not 
appear  that  deceased  had  ever  supported  or  assisted  them  in  any 
way.61  So  in  another  case  a  verdict  was  sustained  as  not  ex- 
cessive, although  deceased  had  never  contributed  anything  to 
the  support  of  his  next  of  kin  who  were  a  widowed  mother  and 
adult  brothers  and  sisters,12  and  also  where  deceased  was  a  wile 
and  mother  and  no  pecuniary  aid  had  been  received  from  her.63 
But  these  decisions,  while  holding  that  the  recovery  does  not 
depend  of  necessity  upon  a  legal  or  moral  obligation  to  perform 
a  duty,  nor  upon  a  legal  right  to  demand  the  performance  of  a 
like  obligation  as  the  material  factor  which  constitutes  a  basis 
for  damages,  nevertheless  they  do  not  exclude  proof  of  such  duty 
or  right,  and  in  certain  cases  as  is  illustrated,  by  the  obligation 
of  a  husband,  father,  mother  or  child  to  render  support  and  aid, 
such  factors  are  most  important  in  determining  the  measure  of 
damages.  Thus  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  child,  under  certain 
circumstances  he  or  she  might,  after  majority,  owe  the  duty  of 
support  which  could,  by  legal  proceedings,  be  enforced,*1  as  is 
evidenced  bv  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure  of  New  York,63 


Dig.  26,  case  affd   112  X.  Y.  234;  20 

V  Y.  St.  R.  904;   19   N.   E.  (578.     See 
cases  at  the  end  of  this  section. 

»01dfield  v.  New  York  &  Harlem 
H.  Co..  14  N.   Y.  310,  316.      Language 


Hun  i  N.  Y.),  65:  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  20:5; 
33  N.  Y.  Supp.  581,  afFd  153  X.  Y. 
680. 

esjKlemm  v.  New  York  C.  &  11.  R. 
K.  Co.,  7s  II .in  i  N.  Y...  277;  GO  X.  Y. 


of  the  court  in  considering  the  Laws  '■  St.  R.  231 :  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  361. 


of  1847,  ch.  450,  quoted  by  Bartlett, 
.].,  in  Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Sned- 
ekcr,  164  N.  T.  58,  62. 

61  Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  R.  Co., 
14  Daly,  418;  14  X.  Y.  St.  R.  699;  27 
Wkly.  Dig.  572,  aff'd  113  X.  Y.  628; 
22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  994;  20  N.  E.  878. 

62  Kane  v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  90 


1,1  Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  I  . >.. 
110  N.  Y.  :,()4.  508;  18  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
130  ;  18  X.  E.  108,  per  Earl,  J., 
case  affirms  41  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  404;  8 
X.  Y.  St.  K.  138;  25  Wkly.  Dig.  46. 

'     Sec.    91  I    which     provides     that 

"  the  father,  mother  ami  children  of 

Sufficient    ability    of    :i   poor    person 

723 


§  569  DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

although  the  jury  should  not  be  charged  that  a  "father  could 
compel  the  son  to  support  him  in  his  old  age,  and  the  jury  had 
a  right  to  consider  that  fact,"  without  reference  to  the  condi- 
tion or  inability  of  the  father  to  support  himself  and  the  son's 
"  sufficient  ability  "  or  means  wherewith  to  relieve  and  maintain 
him  as  provided  by  statute,  and  within  the  intent  thereof,  es- 
pecially so  where  in  the  same  charge  the  question  is  left  in  doubt 
as  to  the  father's  right  to  the  son's  earnings  after  he  became  of 
age.6"  Again,  in  the  case  of  infants  of  very  tender  years,  this 
duty  to  support  parents  after  the  child  reaches  majority,  and 
the  possibility  that  the  future  situation  of  the  parties  might  bring 
them  within  the  above  decision  or  statute,  would  certainly  be  a 
factor  dependent  upon  many  contingencies  and  most  remote  and 
uncertain.67  Although  the  jury,  in  estimating  the  pecuniary 
value  of  a  child  to  the  next  of  kin  could  take  into  consideration 
all  the  probable  or  even  possible  benefits  which  might  result  to 
them  from  such  child's  life,  modified,  as  in  their  estimation  they 
should  be,  by  all  the  chances  of  failure  or  misfortune,  using 
their  own  good  sense  for  their  guidance.68  And  it  is  also  true  that 
the  fact  of  contribution  to  support,  or  the  rendering  of  aid  and 
assistance,  or  the  legal  and  perhaps  the  moral  obligation  to  ren- 
der it,  or  the  legal  right  to  demand  the  same,  or  that  deceased 
was  the  sole  support  of  the  beneficiary,  or  the  extent  of  depend- 
ency upon  deceased  for  maintenance,  or  facts  showing  a  reason- 
able expectation  of  the  continuance  of  support,  contributions 
thereto,  or  of  aid  and  assistance,  are  all  admissible  in  evidence 
and  affect  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  measure  of  damages. 
They  are  also  factors  which  the  courts  have  frequently  con- 
sidered in  determining  whether  the  verdict  should  stand,  be  set 
aside,  reversed  or  modified.61'     The  question  of  support  or  de- 


who  is  blind,  old,  lame,  impotent  or  i  of  Gill  v.  Rochester  &  Pittsburg  R. 
decrepit  so  as  to  be  unable  by  work    Co.,  37  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  107. 
to  maintain  himself  must  at  theirown  !      68  Birkett    v.     Knickerbocker    Ice 
charge  relieve  and  sustain  him."  Co.,  110  N.  Y.  504,  508;  18  N.  Y.  St. 


66  Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  11.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  348;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  813; 
40  N.  E.  15,  rev'g  8  Misc.  (N.  Y. )  601 ; 


R.  130;  18  N.  E.  108,  language  of 
Earl,  J.,  case  affirms  41  Hun  (N.  Y. ), 
404;  3   N.  Y.   St.   R.    133;  25    Wkly. 


60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  831;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  Dig.  46. 

325.  69 Evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the 

67  See  the  somewhat  analogous  case  extent  to  which  deceased  contributed 

724 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY, 


S  569 


pendency  also  involves  primarily  that  of  the  existence  of  bene- 
ficiaries which  is  necessary  to  be  shown  in  New  York,  even 
though  recovery  may  be  had  by  them  without  proof  of  depend- 
ency for  support,10  as  it  is  not  required  that  the  degree  of  kin- 


to  the  support  of  his  family.  Seifter 
v.  Brooklyn  Heights  B.  Co.,66N.  V. 
Supp.  1107;  55  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  10. 
Deceased  son  la  years  old  gave  wages  ■ 
to  his  father.  Twist  v.  Rochester, 37 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)3<)7:  55  N.  Y.  Supp. 
850.  Deceased  woman  68  years  old, 
dependent  to  some  extent  for  sup- 
port upon  contributions  from  her 
children.  Phalen  v.  Rochester  R. 
Co.,  31  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  448:  52  \. 
Y.  Supp.  836;  28  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y. ) 
42.  Deceased  was  33  years  old  and 
sole  support  of  family.  Felice  v. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.R.  Co.,  14  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)345;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  922; 
1  Am.  \eg.  Rep.  637.  Deceased 
daughter  comfortably  supported 
father,  a  penniless  and  dependent 
old  man,  and  she  was  only  child 
upon  whom  he  could  depend  for  sup- 
port in  his  old  age.  Purcell  v. 
Lamer,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  33;  43 
N.  Y.  Supp.  988;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  57. 
Deceased,  a  woman  54  years  old,  had 
six  children  more  or  less  dependent 
upon  her  for  support.  Henning  v. 
Caldwell,  45  X.  Y.  St.  R.  373:  is  N. 
Y.  Supp.  339,  affd  137  X.  Y.  553;  50 
N.  Yr.  St.  R.  931:  33  \.  E.  337.  De- 
ceased son  contributed  to  bis  moth- 
er's support.  Waldele  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R,  K.  Co.,  29  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
35,  rev'gGl  How.  (X.  Y. )  350,  rev' d 
95  N.  Y'.  274.  Deceased  daughter 
had  contributed  from  $300  to  |400 
a  year  to  her  parents'  support. 
Bowles  v.  Rome,  YVatertown  R.  Co., 
46  Hun  (X.  Y\),  324;  12  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
457,  affd  113  X.  Y.  643;  22  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  997;  21  N.  E.  414.  Action  for 
death  of  sister  aged  14:  father  bad 
not  provided    for  family  for   years. 


Pineo  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co,  34 
Hun  (X.  Y. ),  80,  affd  99  N.  Y.  644. 
Deceased  was  a  wife  and  mother; 
all  her  earnings  were  used  in  tlie 
family's  support  Cregin  v.  Brook- 
lyn Cro8stown  R.  Co.,  18  Hun  (X. 
Y'. ),  368.  Value  of  support  of  wile 
and  children  by  father  may  be  con- 
sidered. Altborfv.  Wolfe,  2  Hilt. 
i  \.  Y. )  344,  affd  22  \.  Y.  355.  See 
further  as  to  necessity  of  showing 
support  or  dependency,  legal  duty, 
etc.,  Lockwood  v.  Xew  Y'ork,  L.  K. 
&  W.  R.  Co..  98  X.  Y.  523,  aff'g  20 
Wklv.  Dig.  341;  Quin  v.  Moore,  15 
X.  Y.  432;  Keller  v.  Xew  York  (  .  R. 
Co.,  2  Abb.  Dec.  (X.  Y. )  4S0;  24  How. 
(N.  Y.)  172,  aff'g  17  How.  (N.  Y.) 
102;  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  44  n. 

70  Under  the  present  Xew  York 
Code  (Stover's  Annot.  Code,  L898), 
sec.  1902.  "  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator of  a  decedent  who  has 
left  him  or  her  surviving  a  hus- 
band, wife  or  next  of  kin,  may  main- 
tain an  action,"  etc.,  but  the  former 
statute  read  "  widow  and  next  of 
kin,"  and  the  action  was  maintain- 
able where  there  was  next  of  kin 
only,  and  no  widow,  or  where  tbere 
was  a  widow  only  and  no  next  of 
kin.  McMahon  v.  Mayor,  33  X.  Y. 
642;  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  V  Y.  432; 
Oldlield  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 
Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aff'g  3  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y.),  103;  Keller  v.  New  York  ('. 
R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Dee.  |  N.  Y.)  480;  2  1 
How.  (N.  Y.)  172,  aff'g  17  How 
(N.  Y.)  102;  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  44  u 
Safford  v.  Drew.  3  Duer  I N.  Y. ). 
027:  "Next  of  kin"  is  defined  by 
section  1905  of  the  Code  of  Xew 
Y'ork  as  having  the  same  meaning  as 
1-25 


§  5"° 


DEATH— FAIR    AND    .JUST    COMPENSATION 


dred  should  be  such  as  to  create  the  duty  of  sustenance,  support 
or  education.71  But  in  North  Carolina  the  existence  of  next 
of  kin  seems  unnecessary  to  maintain  the  action.72 

§  570.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "-  Reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit — Pro- 
spective damages. — Future  proximate  results  as  well  as  past 
consequences  should  be  considered,  although  prospective  dam- 
ages are  incapable  of  being  accurately  estimated.  The  compen- 
sation for  the  pecuniary  injury  includes  the  deprivation  of  what 
reasonably  may  have  been  expected,  by  those  for  whose  benefit 
the  recovery  is  had,  if  the  deceased  had  not  been  killed.  The 
damages  may  cover  those  which  the  jury  may  believe,  and  find, 
will  in  the  future  result  from  the  death  as  the  proximate  cause 
thereof.  In  brief,  the  money  value  of  the  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  next  of  kin  from  the  continu- 
ance of  the  life  of  deceased  should  be  considered.73     And  the 


that  given  by  id.,  section  1870,  and  in- 
cludes those  entitled  to  share  under 
the  law  of  distribution  of  personal 
property,  "  other  than  a  surviving 
husband  or  wife."  That  existence 
of  beneficiaries  necessary,  see 
Davidow  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  N.  Y.),  85  Fed.  043; 
Dickins  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  158;  Lucas  v.  New  York  C. 
R.  Co.,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  245  ;  Saf- 
ford  v.  Drew,  3  Duer  (N.  Y.),  627; 
12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  150.  Examine 
Hegerick  v.  Keddie,  99  N.  Y.  258;  1 
N.  E.  787,  rev'g32  Hun  (N.  Y.),  141; 
5  Civ.  Proc.  228;  Quin  v.  Moore,  15 
N.  Y.  432;  Oldfield  v.  New  York  & 
Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aff'g  3 
E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  103;  Keller  v. 
New  York  C.  R.  Co.,  24  How.  (N.  Y. ) 
172;  2  Abb.  Dec.  102,  aff'g  28  Barb. 
44  n.;  17  How.  (N.  Y. )  102;  Yertore 
v.  Wiswall,  16  How.  (N.  Y.)  8,  28. 

•!  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  474,  cited  in  Matter  of  Sne- 
deker  v.  Snedeker,  164  N.  Y.  58,  63. 

'•-  Warner  v.  Western    N.  C.  R.  Co., 

726 


94  N.  C.  250.  This  case  is  cited  to 
the  point  that  the  law  ordinarily  will 
presume  that  a  deceased  person  has 
heirs,  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to 
name  the  heirs  in  Budd  v.  Meriden 
Elec.  R.  Co.,  69  Conn.  272;  37  Atl. 
683;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  335,  342,  per 
Andrews,  Ch.  J.  Examine  Kessler 
v.  Smith,  66  N.  C.  154.  It  is  impor- 
tant, however,  to  note  that  the  North 
Carolina  statute  differs  from  the 
New  York  statute  as  to  the  persons 
who  are  or  may  become  entitled  to 
the  amount  recovered  as  damages. 
See  sec.  901.  herein  as  to  distribution 
of  damages. 

78  Thomas  v.  Utica  &  B.  R.  R.  Co., 
6  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  353,  aff'd  34 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  626,  aff'd  98  N.  Y.  49; 
Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  50  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  116;  Houghkiik 
v.  Delaware  &  H.  C.  Co.,  92  N.  Y. 
219,  rev'g  28  nun  (N.  Y.),  407;  15 
Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  aff'd  11  Abb. 
X.  C.  (N.  Y.)72;  63  Horo.  (N.  Y.) 
328;  4  Month.  L.  Bull.  65;  Keenan  v. 
Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  145  N.  Y.  348, 


FOB    THE    PECUNIARY     INJURY. 


570 


statutes  recognize  the  reasonable  expectation  that  pecuniary 
aid  or  assistance,  even  outside  of  legal  obligations,  will  be  ex- 
tended by  relatives  to  each  other  in  case  of  necessity,  and  upon 
this  basis  have  given  a  statutory  action  for  the  benefit  of  the 
widow  and  next  of  kin.71  So  the  benefit  of  the  counsel  of  a  hus- 
band and  father  are  of  pecuniary  value.'"'  In  New  York  it  is 
held  that  it  does  not  follow  that  damages  should  be  red  need 
although  it  does  not  appear  that  the  next  of  kin  would  have 
been  benefited  by  the  continuance  of  decedent's  life.76  So  the 
prol table  earnings  which  deceased's  family  would  receive  after 
the  cost  of  his  own  living  was  deducted,  were  considered  in 
determining  whether  a  verdict  was  excessive.77 


350,  351,  per  Haight,  J.;  64  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  813;  40  N.  E.  15;  Birkett  v. 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  110  X.  Y.  504; 
18  N.  N.  St.  R.  130;  18  N.  E.  108,  aff'g 
41  Hun  (N.  Y.),  404;  3  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
133;  25  Wkly.  Dig.  4G;  Stanl  v.  Grand 
St.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  625;  1  Silv. 
C.  A.  516;  11  N.  Y.  St.  R.  352;  25 
Wkly.  Dig.  241;  Lockwood  v.  New 
York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y. 
523,  aff'g  20  Wkly.  Dig.  341;  Ihl 
v.  Forty-Second  St.  &.  G.  St.  F. 
U.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  317;  O'Mara  v.  Hud- 
son R.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  445;  Til- 
ley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y. 
471;  29  N.  Y.  252;  Oldtield  v.  New 
V«»rk  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310, 
aff'g  3  Ed.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  103;  John- 
son v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  306;  62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  46;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  318,  affd  144  N.  Y.  719;  70  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  808;  29  N.  E.  857;  Ganiard 
v.  Rochester  City  &  13.  R.  Co.,  50  Hun 
( N.  Y. ),  22 ;  18  N.  Y.  St.  R.  692 ;  2  N. 
Y.  Supp.  470,  affd  121  N.  Y.  661;  24 
N.  E.  1092;  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Cross- 
town  R.  Co.,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  341, 
case  rev'd  83  N.  Y.  595;  Cregin  v. 
Brooklyn  Crosstown  R.  Co.,  IS  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  368;  Kelly  v.  Twenty-Third 
St.  R.  Co.,  14  Daly  (N.  Y.),  41S;  14 
N.  Y.  St.  609 ;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  572, 
aff  d  113  N.  Y.  628;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  994; 


20  N.  E.  878;  Kesler  v.  Smith,  66  N. 
C.  154.  As  to  jury  not  being  limited 
to  actual  damages  specifically  proven 
and  their  right  to  consider  prospec- 
tive or  indefinite  damages,  see  Coun- 
tryman v.  Fonda,  J.  &  G.  R.  Co., 
166  X.  Y.  201;  59  N.  E.  822,  rev'g 
54  N.  Y.  Supp.  1098. 

74  Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  143 
X.  Y.  417,  420;  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J.; 
62  N.  Y.  St.  R.  432;  38  N.  E.  454. 

75  Felice  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  A  pp.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  345;  43 
X.  Y.  Supp.  922;  1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep. 
637.  See  (Jill  v.  Rochester  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  37  Hun  (X.  Y.),  107. 

70  Phalen  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  31 
App.  Div.  448;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  836; 
28  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  42.  In  this 
case  deceased  was  a  woman  68  years 
old;  she  was  dependent  to  some  ex- 
tent upon  her  children  and  was  not 
in  robust  health;  $800  was  held  not 
excessive  notwithstanding  sec.  1904, 
N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 

77  Taylor  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
16  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  1;  44  X.  Y. 
Supp.  820;  2  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  608. 
In  this  case  deceased  was  a  laborer. 
As  to  deduction  of  earning  of  benefi- 
ciaries, see  Althorf  v.  Wolfe,  2  Hilt. 
(N.  Y.)  344,  case  affd  22  X.  Y.  355. 
The  question  is  what  were  the  prob- 
79.7 


§§  571,  572  FAIU    AND    JtfRT    COMPENSATION 


§571.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  " — Prospect  of  inheriting. — The  jury  have  the  right  to 
consider  not  only  the  amount  the  deceased  would  have  brought 
to  the  next  of  kin  while  living,  but  their  prospect  of  inheriting 
from  him  after  death.78  But  the  prospect  that  children  would 
upon  their  father's  death  and  intestacy  have  received  an  estate 
increased  by  the  value  of  the  earnings  of  a  deceased  wife  and 
mother  does  not  constitute  a  proper  item  of  damages  in  an 
action  for  her  death,  brought  by  him  as  administrator  of  his 
wife.79  So  evidence  is  admissible  in  an  action  by  a  husband  as 
his  wife's  administrator,  as  to  the  amount  of  her  earnings  and 
probable  profits,  where  she  had  no  descendants,  and  under  the 
Code  her  husband  was  entitled  to  her  personal  estate.80 

§  572.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury"— Physical  and  financial  condition,  age,  number  of 
family,  etc. — When  admissible. — The  age,  number,  sex,  phy- 
sical and  financial  condition  and  the  circumstances  of  the  next 
of  kin  have  been  considered  in  numerous  cases,  either  by  the 
court  below  or  by  the  appellate  court  in  reviewing  the  case. 
In  most  of  the  decisions,  it  is  true,  there  has  been  no  discus- 
sion as  to  the  admissibility  of  such  evidence,  and  in  some,  the 
relevancy  is  apparent.     Again,  even  though  these  factors  may 


able  chances  of  pecuniary  benefit 
from  a  continuance  of  the  life  under 
all  the  circumstances,  and  that  the 
result  may  be  somewhat  subject  to 
chance  does  not  prevent  a  recovery. 
Thomas  v.  Utica  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y.)  353,  case  affd  34 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  626,  which  is  affd  93 
X.  Y.  49. 

78  Eeenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  348,  351,  per  Haight,  J.; 
64  X.  Y.  St.  R.  813;  40  X.  E.  15.  This 
was  a  case  of  a  minor  son's  death. 
It  reverses  8  Misc.  (X.  Y.),  601;  60 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  S31;  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  325. 
The  court  cites  on  the  above  propo- 
sition, Johnson  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,  80  Hun  (X.  Y.),  306;  62  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  46;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  318,  affd 
144  X.  Y.  719;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  868; 
728 


29  X.  E.  357;  Thomas  v.  Utica  &  B. 
R.  R.  Co.,  6  Civ.  Proc.  (X.  Y.)  626, 
case  affd  34  Hun  (X.  Y.),  626,  affd 
98  X.  Y.  49.  See  sees.  570,  575, 
herein.  This  proposition  differs 
from  that  involved  in  Terry  v.  Jew- 
ett,  7  Hun  (X.  Y.),  395;  78  N.  Y. 
338,  as  this  relates  to  the  right  to 
receive  certain  benefits  as  damages, 
while  the  Terry  case  merely  relates 
to  the  reduction  of  benefits  by  the 
inheritance.     See  sec.  574,  herein. 

'9Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
X.  Y.  471;  23  How.  (X.  Y.)  363. 

80  Meyer  v.  Hart,  23  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  131;  82  X.  Y.  St.  R.  907;  48 
X.  Y.  Supp.  904,  under  X.  Y.  Code 
Civ.  Proc.  sec.  2732  (relating  to 
order  of  distribution),  sec.  2734  (re- 
lating to  estates  of  married  women). 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    [NJXJBY. 


§572 


not  be  directly  material  for  the  express  purpose  of  enhancing  or 
mitigating  damages,  yet  they  may  be  relevant  and  material  as 
showing  or  tending  to  prove  certain  other  relevant,  material  and 
competent,  evidential  facts  or  elements.81     Thus  that  a  father  is 


81  See  Lockwood  v.  New  York,  L. 
E.  &  YV.  K.  Co.,  20  Wkly.  Dig.  341, 
aff'd  98  N.  Y.  523;  lloughkirk  v. 
Delaware  &  H.  Cau.  Co.,  92  X.  Y. 
219,  rev'g  28  Hun  (N.  Y\),  407;  15 
Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  aff'd  11  Abb. 
N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  72;  63  How.  328;  4 
Month.  Law  Bull.  65;  Lustig  v.  New 
York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  65  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  547;  48  N.  Y.  St.  R.  916; 
20  N.  Y.  Supp.  417.  Wife  was  de- 
prived of  her  home  and  support. 
Beecher  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  53 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  324;  65  N.  Y. 
Supp.  642.  Ages,  number  and  de- 
pendency of  children  considered  in 
action  for  father's  death.  Wallace 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  36  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  57;  55  N.  Y.  Supp.  132;  5 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  215.  Deceased  left  a 
wife,  son  and  daughter.  Cooper  v. 
New  York,  O.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  25  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  383;  49  N.  Y.  Supp.  481. 
Deceased  left  a  wife  and  three 
children  of  whom  he  was  the  sole 
support.  Felice  v.  New  York  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  345; 
43  N.  Y.  Supp.  922;  1  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  637.  Deceased  loft  six  children 
more  or  less  dependent  upon  her. 
Henning  v.  Caldwell,  45  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
373;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  339,  aff'd  137 
N.  Y.  553;  50  N.  Y.  St.  R.  931;  33 
N.  E.  337.  Surviving  father  was  a 
penniless  and  dependent  old  man. 
Purcell  v.  Laurer,  14  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  33;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  988;  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  57.  Surviving  father 
was  61  years  old.  Seeley  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  402;  40  \.  Y.  Supp. 
866.  Deceased  woman's  family  con- 
sisted of  a  husband  65  years  old  and 


live  grown  up  sons,  only  three  of 
whom  lived  at  home,  and  deceased 
had  no  .source  of  income.  Medinger 
v.  Brooklyn   Heights  R.  Co.,  6  App. 

Div.  (X.  Y.)  4l';  39  X.  Y.  Supp.  01:;. 
The  fact  that  deceased  left  a  wid- 
owed mother  and  adult  brothers 
and  sisiers  was  considered.  Kane 
v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  90  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  65;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35 
N.  Y.  Supp.  581;  aff'd  153  X.  Y. 
680.  Deceased  woman's  family  con- 
sisted of  husband  and  daughter  for 
whom  she  performed  the  household 
work.  Lyons  v.  Second  Ave.  R. 
Co..  89  Hun  (X.  Y. ).  374;  69  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  816;  35  X.  Y.  Supp.  372, 
aff'd  152  X.  Y.  654;  47  X.  E.  1109. 
Deceased  lived  with  his  father,  his 
next  of  kin,  who  was  58  years  old. 
Fitzgerald  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  88  Hun  (X.  Y.),  359;  68  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  762;  34  X.  Y.  Supp.  702,  case 
was  rev'd  154  X.  Y.  203;  48  N.  E. 
514,  upon  insufficient  e\idence  as  to 
cause  of  death.  That  parent  was 
aged  and  infirm  and  his  health  and 
pecuniary  circumstances  and  that  he 
had  an  aged  wife,  both  of  thorn 
being  without  means  of  support, 
may  be  shown  where  he  issuing  for 
an  adult  daughter's  death  and  is  the 
only  next  of  kin.  Bowles  v.  Rome, 
Watertown  R.  Co.,  46  Hun  (X.  Yr), 
324;  12  X.  Y.  St.  R.  457;  113  X.  Y. 
643;  22  N.  Y.  St.  R.  997;  21  X.  E. 
414.  Age  and  circumstances  of  next 
of  kin  should  be  shown  to  sustain  a 
verdict.  Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N. 
Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  38  Hun  (X.  Y.),  116. 
So  the  occupation  of  the  father  and 
circumstances  and  condition  in  life 
of  the  parents  may  he   considered  in 

729 


8  572 


DEATH  —  FAIR    AND    JUST    C<  >M  1'KNSATION 


aged,  poor  and  unable  to  support  himself,  may  be  proven  in 
connection  with  evidence  that  a  deceased  son,  for  whose  death 
the  action  for  damages  is  brought,  might  have  become  of  suf- 
ficient abilit\r  or  means  to  support  him,  except  for  the  death, 
and  so  become  obligated  for  such  support.82  And  logically  this 
decision  should,  by  virtue  of  the  criminal  code,  extend  to  the 
mother  and  children  of  sufficient  ability  of  a  poor  person  who 
is  blind,  old,  lame-,  impotent  or  decrepit,  so  as  to  be  unable  by 
work  to  maintain  himself,*3  provided  such  poor  person  is 
within  the  statutory  class  and  "  next  of  kin."  w  And  in  this 
connection  it  may  be  stated  that  the  sum  to  be  recovered  rep- 
resents the  entire  pecuniary  loss  to  each  and  all  the  relatives, 
as  a  class,  who  are  mentioned  in  the  statute.85  Again,  in  case 
of  children  of  deceased,  their  number,  ages,  sex  and  condition 
of  health  may  be  proven,  also  their  situations  with  reference  to 
deceased,  whether  they  are  married  or  unmarried,  whether  they 
lived  with  deceased  or  away  from  home,  whether  they  are  de- 
pendent upon  him  or  self-supporting,  and  it  may  also  be 
shown  that  such  children  have  no  property  of  their  own,  and 
the  character  of  services,  if  any,  rendered  by  them  to  deceased  in 


an  action  for  a  child's  death.  Ihl  v. 
Forty-Second  St.  &  G.  St.  F.  R.  Co., 
47  N.  Y.  317,  321.  So  the  fact  that 
the  mother  had  no  means  of  her  own 
may  be  shown  in  an  action  for  her 
son's  death.  Waldele  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
35,  rev'g  61  How.  (N.  Y.)  350, 
rev'd  95  N.  Y.  274.  Three  children 
survived,  of  whom  two  were  mar- 
ried and  lived  away  from  deceased 
who  was  a  widow  about  50  years 
old,  likely  to  became  dependent 
within  ten  years.  Mclntyre  v.  New 
York  C.  R.  Co.,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
515,  aff'd  37  N.  Y.  287;  35  How. 
(N.  Y.)  36;  4  Trans.  App.  1.  In 
an  action  for  death  of  her  son,  the 
plaintiff  was  permitted  to  prove  that 
she  was  disqualified  from  working, 
owing  to  a  malady,  and  that  she 
had  no  means  at  the  time  of  the 
son's  death.     Harlinger  v.  New  York 

730 


C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Wkly.  Dig. 
(N.  Y.)  392,  aff'd  92  N.  Y.  661. 

82  Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  348;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  813;  40 
N.  E.  15,  rev'g  8  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  C01; 
60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  831;  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
325;  Johnson  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
80  Hun  (N.  Y.),  306;  62  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
46;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  318,  aff'd  144  N. 
Y.  719;  79  N.  Y.  St.  R.  868;  29  N.  E. 
857. 

63  N.  Y.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  sec.  914. 
The  complaint  showed  that  deceased 
left  a  mother,  her  next  of  kin,  de- 
pendent upon  her.  Green  v.  Hudson 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  263, 
aff'd  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  260,  which  was 
aff'd  on  appeal. 

84  See  sec.  573,  herein. 

85  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker,  164  N. 
Y.  58,  63,  per  Bartlett,  J.,  aff'g  47 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)471. 


FOR    THE    i'i:crviAl:V    IN.liUY.  ^o.L' 

return  for  support,  as  in  the  case  where  an  unmarried  daughter 
did  the  housework  ;  it  also  appearing  thai  she  was  afflicted  with 

a  disease  which  incapacitated  her  from  labor.86  As  we  have 
stated  elsewhere,  the  jury  may  consider  those  factors  of  mental 
and  physical  health  and  condition,  etc.,  of  deceased,  which 
show  what  probable  and  possible  pecuniary  benefits  the  next  of 
kin  would  have  derived  from  the  continuance  of  life  of  de- 
ceased.^ And  throughout  all  the  decisions  it  is  apparent  that 
since  the  pecuniary  injury  only  is  to  be  considered,  evidence  is 
admissible  as  to  the  factors  of  pecuniary  loss,  present  and  pro- 
spective,88 and  this  necessarily  involves  the  consideration  of  the 
pecuniary  or  financial  condition  of  deceased  at  the  time  of  his 
death  and  of  his  reasonably  probable  accumulations  had  he 
lived.811  So  that  proof  is  relevant  and  material  which  shows  the 
situation,  means,  circumstances  and  physical  or  financial  con- 
dition of  deceased.  Thus  the  fact  that  the  father  of  a  deceased 
child  was  prosperous  and  paid  for  said  son's  education  and  did 
not  rely  upon  him  for  a  source  of  income,  may  be  considered  in 
determining  the  inadequacy  of  the  damages/'1  And  the  receipt 
of  an  adult  son's  earnings  and  the  use  thereof  in  paying  house 
rent  and  supporting  a  family,  of  whom  deceased  was  one,  may 
properly  be  proven.91  So  proof  of  the  mother's  financial  cir- 
cumstances is  relevant  upon  the  question  of  her  pecuniary 
damage  from  the  loss  of  her  son.*'  And  evidence  of  the  father's 
pecuniary  condition,  in  that  he  required  his  child's  services  to 
maintain  his  household,  is  competent.93  Again,  the  circumstances 
and  condition  in  life  of  a  widowed  mother,  suing  for  the  death 
of  her  youngest  child,  and  the  fact  that  she  had  three  minor 
children  was  considered,  not  only  in  deciding  that  the  dam- 
ages were  not  excessive,  but  also   as   being  material   in  deter- 

88  Lockwood  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  j  91  Lipp  v.  Otis  Brothers  &  Co., 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  08  X.  Y.  523;  20  Wkly.  161  N.  V.  559,  563,  per  Parker,  Cli.  J. ; 
Dig.  ;J4l.  56  N.  E.  79,  ease  reverses  28   A  pp. 

87  See  sees.  5GG,  570,  herein.  Div.  (N.  Y. )  228. 

68  See  sec.  570,  herein.  M  Fowler  v.    Buffalo  Furnace  C<>., 

89  See  sec.  r>7:>,  herein.  41  App.  Div.   (X.    Y.)  84;  58  X.  Y. 

90  Morris  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ky.  Supp.  223,  appeal  dismissed  1G0  N. 
Co.,  51  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  512;  04  X.  I  Y.  C65. 

Y.  St.  R.  878;  30  Civ.  Proc.  R.  (X.  |  93  Pressman  v.  Mooney,  5  App. 
Y.)  371.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  121;  39  X.    V.  Supp.  44. 


31 


§  573 


DEATH—FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 


mining  that  the  failure  to  prove  her  age  was  not  fatal  to  a  re- 
covery,'" and  evidence  is  admissible  that  deceased  left  no  estate 
and  the  administratrix  may  so  testify.96  And  in  North  Carolina 
the  means,  skill  and  business  qualifications,  etc.,  may  be  con- 
sidered.'"5 Again,  the  financial  and  physical  condition  of  the 
parents  may  be  proven,  as  where  the  mother  of  the  deceased,  a 
son  thirteen  years  old,  had  no  means  and  was  unable  to  work, 
because  of  a  malady  which  she  had.97  And  the  admission  of 
proof  of  financial  circumstances  has  been  sanctioned  in  the  case 
of  a  mother  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  amount  of  her 
pecuniary  damage  for  the  loss  by  death  of  her  son.95  But  the 
fact  that  the  parents  might  by  reason  of  imbecility  or  feebleness, 
arising  from  old  age  or  other  causes,  possibly  become  dependent 
upon  others  for  advice  and  counsel  is  too  remote  to  constitute 
a  basis  of  recovery  for  the  loss  by  death  of  a  son  seventeen 
years  old.99 

§  573.  "Fair and  just compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury"—Physical  and  financial  condition,  age,  number  of 
family,  etc. — When  inadmissible. — Evidence  is  inadmissible 
as  to  the  poverty,  misfortunes  or  riches,  the  number  of  the  fam- 
ily, inability  to  work  or  of  any  other  fact  relating  to  the  situa- 
tion, condition  or  circumstances  of  the  brothers,  sisters  or  other 
relatives  of  deceased,  who  are  not  the  next  of  kin,  where  an  ac- 
tion is  brought  by  a  father  to  recover  damages  for  his  adult 
son's  killing,  and  he  is  the  sole  next  of  kin  and  entitled  to  the 
entire  damages  which  may  be  recovered.100     Nor  can  evidence  be 


9*  Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,68  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  102;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  216;  22  N.  Y. 
Supp.  732,  aff'd  140  X.  Y.  619;  55  N. 
Y.  St.  R.  929;  35  N.  E.  890.  But  see 
sec.  593,  herein. 

95  Kooserowska  v.  Glasser,  8  N.  Y. 
Supp.  197. 

96  Benton  v.  North  Carolina  R. 
Co.,  122  N.  C.  1007;  30  S.  E.  323. 

97  Harlinger  v.  New  York  Cent.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  Wkly.  Dig.  (N.  Y.)  392, 
aff'd  92  N.  Y.  661. 

98  Fowler  v.  Buffalo  Furnace  Co., 
41  App.   Div.  (N.   Y.)  84;  58  N.  Y. 

732 


Supp.  223,  appeal  dismissed  160  N. 
Y.  665. 

99  Gill  v.  Rochester  &  Pitts.  R.  R. 
Co.,  37  Hun  (N.  Y.),  107. 

100Lipp  v.  Otis  Bros.  &  Co.,  161 
N.  Y.  559;  56  N.  E.  79  (under  N.  Y. 
Code  Civ.  Pioc.  sees.  1903,  1904,  2732, 
subd  7,  and  sec.  1870),  iev'g28App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  228.  The  court  said  in 
that  case:  "We  are  unable  to  agree 
with  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the 
appellate  division  in  so  far  as  it  ex- 
cuses, if  it  does  not  fully  justify,  the 
course  of  the  plaintiff  in  calling  as 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    INJUKY. 


§  574 


given  as  to  the  property  of  the  mother  of  a  deceased  wife,  and 
an  instruction  to  disregard  such  evidence  does  not  render  it 
harmless.1  Nor  can  the  number  of  children  of  deceased  be 
proven  in  North  Carolina.2 

§  574.  »'  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 


his  last  witness  his  own  son  to  tell 
the  jury  about  the  children  and 
grandchildren  of  the  plaintiff  and 
thus  calling  attention  to  the  great 
opportunities  that  the  plaintiff  had 
to  make  a  charitable  use  of  any  sur- 
plus moneys  he  might  have  after 
satisfying  his  own  personal  necessi- 
ties. The  evidence  could  serve  no 
other  purpose  than  to  arouse  the 
sympathies  of  the  jury,  for  none  of 
the  persons  described  were  next  of 
kin  of  deceased,  nor  were  their  riches 
or  poverty  entitled  to  consideration 
at  the  hands  of  the  jury.  .  .  .  George 
Lipp  died  leaving  no  wife  or  children 
but  he  left  a  father,  this  plaintiff, 
who  was  his  sole  next  of  kin  (Code, 
see.  1870  and  sec.  2732,  subd.  7),  and 
as  such  entitled  to  the  entire  amount 
of  recovery  in  this  action.  .  .  .  From 
the  first  question  to  the  last,  cov- 
ering nearly  three  printed  pages  of 
the  record,  the  plaintiff's  counsel 
asked  of  the  witness  not  a  question 
which  did  not  relate  to  the  brothers, 
sisters  and  nephews  and  nieces  of  the 
deceased,  not  one  of  whom  was  next 
of  kin  of  the  deceased,  who  alone 
were  entitled  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration by  the  jury  in  determining 
the  amount  of  damages  which  they 
should  award.  .  .  .  The  first  ques- 
tion asked  of  the  witness  after  he  had 
testilied  that  he  was  the  son  of  the 
plaintiff  and  a  married  man  was: 
'  Q.  When  were  you  married?  '  And 
after  objection  had  been  overruled 
and  the  exception  noted,  the  answer 
<-ame,  '  I  was  married  ten  years  ago. 
Cj.    Have   you   a    wife    and    family? 


A.  I  have,  and  a  big  family,  too.' 
Other  questions  related  to  sisters, 
both  married  and  unmarried,  the 
last  question  eliciting  the  answer 
that  the  unmarried  sister  was  not 
able  to  work.  Every  question  was 
objected  to  and  the  learned  counsel 
for  the  plaintiff  was  fully  apprised 
of  the  contention  of  the  defendant 
that  the  plaintiff  had  no  legal  right 
to  have  the  jury  consider  the  mis- 
fortunes or  the  poverty  of  the  broth- 
ers and  sisters  and  nephews  and 
nieces  of  the  dead  man,  in  determin- 
ing the  amount  of  compensation 
which  should  be  awarded  to  the 
father  for  the  injuries  sustained  by 
the  death  of  his  son.  .  .  .  That  the 
answers  elicited  from  the  witness 
were  irrelevant  and  immaterial  to 
the  issues  presented  for  trial  by  the 
pleadings  is  not  open  to  question  nor 
should  it,  we  think,  be  said  it  was 
harmless.  .  .  .  The  judgment  should 
be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  granted.11 
Id.  562-565,  per  Parker,  Ch.  J.  It 
appeared  that  the  deceased  son  was 
30  years  old.  But  see  Moskovitz  v. 
Lighte,  68  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  102.  aff'd  140 
X.  Y.  619,  considered  under  sec.  572. 
herein;  Bowles  v.  Rome,  Watertown 
R.  Co.,  46  Hun  (N.  Y),  324,  aff'd  113 
X.  Y.  643,  considered  in  first  note  to 
sec.  572,  herein. 

1  Malonee  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 
20  Wkly.  Dig.  (X.  Y. )  252,  action  by 
husband. 

2  Burton  v.  Wilmington,  etc..  EL 
Co.,  82  X.  C.  504;  Kessler  v.  Smith, 
66  X.  C.  154. 

733 


575 


DEATH— FAIK  AMD  JUST  COMPENSATION 


jury  " — Financial  advantages  accruing  from  death  inadmissi- 
ble to  reduce  damages. — The  jury  have  no  right  to  consider  in 
reduction  of  damages  the  financial  advantages  accruing  to  de- 
cedent's next  of  kin  in  acquiring  property  of  deceased  by  reason 
of  his  negligent  or  wrongful  killing.3 

§  575.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury "—Probable  accumulations. —Inasmuch  as  the  pecuniary 
loss  includes,  as  we  have  stated  elsewhere,  probable  and  possi- 
ble prospective  benefits,  it  is  evident  that  probable  accumula- 
tions are  necessarily  an  important,  relevant  and  material  factor, 
although  it  is  equally  self-evident  that  the  net  sum  which  would 
represent  a  husband's  or  parent's  earnings  during  his  life  expect- 
ancy would,  in  probably  a  large  majority  of  cases,  amount  to  little 
or  nothing  as  probable  accumulations,  such  net  sum  being  depend- 
ent, of  course,  principally  upon  the  size  of  his  family  or  number 
of  dependents,  his  income  and  habits  of  saving  and  expenditure, 
although  the  other  factors  of  age,  health,  strength,  business, 
qualifications,  ability,  activity,  skill  and  probable  increase  or 
decrease  of  physical  or  mental  powers  are  all  of  weight  in  de- 
termining whether  there  would  be  any  probable  accumulations, 
and  if  so,  their  amount.'  In  this  connection  it  may  be  stated 
that  a  mother's  capacity  to  conduct  business  and  make  money 
may  be  considered,5  although  her  earnings  and  probable  accum- 
ulations will  be  affected,  in  so  far  as  her  children's  right  in  and 
to  such  probable  estate  is  concerned,  by  the  fact  that  their 
father's  life  intervenes."  Again,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the 
present  value  of  the  net  income  or  net  pecuniary  worth  of  de- 
ceased, and  this  is  arrived  at  by  ascertaining  his  gross  income 
and  deducting  therefrom  the  cost  of  his  own  living  and  expen- 
ditures, and  then  estimating  the  present  or  net  value  of  the  ac- 
cumulations of  such  net  income,  based  upon  his  life  expectancy.' 


3  Terry  v.  Jewett,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
395,  aff'd  78  N".  Y.  338. 

4  See  Mclntyre  v.  New  York  C.  R. 
Co.,  37  N.  Y.  287.  See  sees.  570,  571, 
herein.  See  last  two  cases  under  last 
note  to  this  section. 

5Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N. 
Y.  252. 

734 


o  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N. 
Y.  471;  23  How.  (N.  Y.)  36.  See  as 
to  wife's  and  mother's  earnings,  sees. 
562,  563,  hereiu  and  notes. 

7  Mendenhall  v.  North  Carolina  R. 
Co.,  123  N.  C.  275;  31  S.  E.  480;  Ben- 
ton v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co..  122  N. 
C.  1007;  30  S.  E.  333;   Burns  v.  Ashe- 


FOK    THE    PECUNIAR*    INJ1   l:Y 


§  570 


And  it  is  also  held  that  a  refusal  to  instruct  that  the  measure 
of  damages  would  be  the  present  value  of  accumulations  aris- 
ing from  deceased's  life  expectancy  is  not  cured  by  a  charge 
that  such  damage  is  the  net  money  value  of  the  deceased's  life 
to  those  dependent  upon  him.8 


§  576.   ''Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  "Funeral  expenses  and  expenses  for  sickness,  etc.— 

Necessary  funeral  expenses  are  recoverable  where  the  beneficia- 
ries are  legally  liable  therefor,  and  this  rule  does  not  necessitate  a 
liability  for  such  expenses  on  the  part  of  all  of  said  beneficiaries,9 
and  a  physician's  bill  and  funeral  expenses  of  a  child  may  be 
recovered.10  So  also  may  expenses  of  nursing  and  medical  at- 
tendance,11 and  the  item  of  expenses  so  incurred  survives  the 


boro  &  M.  R.  Co.  (N.  C),  34  S.  E. 

495;  Burton  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R. 

Co.,  82  N.  C.  504;  84  N.  C.  192;  Kess- 

ler  v.  Smith,  60  N.  C.  154.     See  Coley 

v.  Statesville,  121   X.  C.  301;  28  S.  E. 

482. 

*  Pickett  v.  Wilmington   &  W.  R. 

Co.,  117  N.  C.  616;  23  S.  E.  264;  30 
L.  R.  A.  257.     Net  earnings,   health 

and  habits  are  factors.     Blackwell  v. 

Moorman,  111  N.  C.  151;  16  S.  E.  12; 
17  L.  R.  A.  72! t. 

9  Murphy  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  445 ;  14  Wkly.  Dig.  150, 
all-  25  Bun,  311;  13  Wkly.  Dig.  213. 
"Under  a  similar  statute  in  England 
it  has  been  held  that  funeral  expenses 
cannot  be  recovered.  Dalton  v. 
Southeastern  R.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  N.  S.  296; 
Boulter  v.  Webster,  13  Weekly  Rep. 
289.  But  in  this  country,  so  far  as  I 
can  discover,  it  has  been  uniformly 
held  that  the  plaintiff  can  recover 
such  expenses  if  the  law  imposes 
upon  the  relatives  for  whose  benefit 
the  suit  is  brought  tin'  obligation  to 
bear  them.  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Bantoin,54 
Pa.  St.  495;  Owen  v.  Brock-Schmidt, 
."•4  Mo.  285;  Roeder  v.  Ormsby,  22 
How.  Pr.  276;"  Murphy  v.  New  York 


C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  445,  446, 
447,  per  Earl,  J.  In  this  case  the  ac- 
tion was  brought  by  the  husband  for 
the  benefit  of  himself  and  children. 
and  it  was  also  decided  that  "  it  is 
immaterial  that  the  children  were 
not  bound  to  defray  these  funeral 
expenses,  aud  that  all  of  them  fell 
exclusively  upon  the  husband.  They 
form  au  item  of  the  pecuniary  loss 
caused  by  the  death,  and  were  proper 
for  the  consideration  of  the  jury  in 
estimating  the  damages  to  be 
awarded.'1  Id.  447,  Andrews,  Ch.  J., 
dissented.  That  the  funeral  expenses 
were  $120  was  considered  with  other 
factors  in  determining  that  a  verdict 
of  $150  was  grossly  insufficient  for  a 
wife's  killing.  Meyer  v.  Hart,  23 
A]. p.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  131;  48  N.  V. 
Supp.  1104.  Funeral  expenses  are 
recoverable.  Stuebing  v.  Marshall. 
2  Civ.  Proc.  (N.  Y. )  77,  aff'd  2  Civ. 
Proc.  (N.  Y.)  81;  10  Daly  (N.  Y.), 
tiit;.  Death  of  minor  child.  Green 
v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co..  16  How.  Pr. 
(X.  Y.)  263,  aff'd  31  Barb.  263. 

10  Pack  v.   Mayor,   etc.,  :?  N".  Y.  (3 
Comst.)  489. 

u  Stuebing     v.     Marshall.     2    Civ. 

735 


§  577  DEATH  — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

death  of  a  husband  pending  an  action  for  negligent  injury  occa- 
sioning the  wife's  death.19  But  only  such  expenses  are  recov- 
erable as  are  necessary  and  reasonable,  although  these  facts 
need  not  be  averred,  and  in  an  action  for  an  infant's  killing,  an 
allegation  that  the  father  was  compelled  to  pay  a  certain  speci- 
fied sum  of  nione}'  for  medical  attendance,  funeral  and  other 
expenses  caused  by  the  death  is  sufficient  on  demurrer.13  In 
connection  with  the  allowance  of  such  expenses  it  is  held  that 
the  value  of  a  physician's  services  is  not  necessary  to  be  proven, 
since  the  bill  is  sufficient  evidence.14 

§577.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  "—Funeral  and  medical  expenses,  support,  etc.,  paid 
by  defendant— Mitigation  of  damages. — The  fact  that  defend- 
ant has  paid  for  the  support,  maintenance  and  medical  expenses 
of  deceased  from  the  time  of  his  injury  to  his  death,  and  also 
for  his  burial  cannot  be  shown  in  mitigation  of  damages.15  With 
all  due  respect  to  the  learned  court,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  so 
much  of  this  decision,  as  relates  to  medical  and  funeral  expenses, 
with  those  cases  elsewhere  noted  herein,  which  permit  the  re- 
covery thereof,  for  logically  if  such  expenses  are  a  proper  element 
of  damages,  it  should  make  no  difference  whether  the  defendant 
paid  them  voluntarily  before  the  death  or  by  way  of  a  judgment 
and  as  part  of  the  damages  after  death.  But  it  is  not,  how- 
ever, intended  by  this  criticism  to  convey  the  idea  that  such 
payment  by  defendant  should  operate  other  than  as  a  reduction 
of  the  damages  to  the  amount  so  paid.  We  are  encouraged 
somewhat  in  making  this  criticism  by  a  case  decided  in  1894, 
in  the  same  state,  where  the  claim  was  that  the  payment  of  a  cer- 


Proc.  (N.  Y. )  77,  aft'd  2  Civ.  Proc. 
(N.  Y.)  81;  10  Daly  (N.  Y.),  406. 
The  action  in  this  case  was  for  a 
minor  child's  death.  See  Green  v. 
Hudson  R.  K.  Co.,  10  How.  Pi.  (N. 
Y.)263,  aff'd  31  Barb.  200.  Exam- 
ine Murray  v.  Usher,  117  N.  Y.  542; 
27  N.  Y.  St.  R.  928;  23  N.  E.  5(54, 
aff'g  46  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  404;  11   N.  Y. 


Hun  (  X.  Y. ),  341.  See  S.  C,  75  N. 
Y.  194;  56  How.  (N.  Y.)  465,  which 
affirms  56  How.  (N.  Y.)  32. 

'»  Roeder  v.  Ormsby,  13  Abb.  (N. 
Y.)  334;  11  How.  (N.  Y.)270. 

14  Morseman  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co., 
10  N.  Y.  Supp.  105;  32  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
61;   16  Daly  (N.  Y.),  249. 

is  Murray  v.  Usher,  117  N.  Y.  242; 


St.  R.  7S9;  27  Wkly.  Dig.  411.  27  N.    Y.   St.    R.   928;  23  N.  E.  564, 

12  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn Crosstowu  R.  |  aff'g    46  Hun,  404;   11   N.  Y.  St.   R. 
Co..  83  N.   Y.  595,  case  reverses   19   789:  27  Wkly.  Dig.  411. 

736 


FOB    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.H'KY. 


578 


tain  sum  of  money  by  defendant  before  suit  brought  operated 
as  a  release,  which  point  was  decided  adversely  to  defendant, 
upon  the  facts  before  the  court,  but  it  was  held  that  it  might, 
without  doubt,  be  shown,  as  the  facts  were,  that  the  payment 
was  made  and  that  it  was  applied  to  the  expenses  of  the  funeral 
and  burial  of  deceased,  and  that  the  jury  should  credit  the  amount 
to  defendant  in  estimating  the  damages,  if  any,  which  the  plain- 
tiff should  recover."1  This  certainly  is  a  most  logical  and  just  con- 
clusion operating  to  the  benefit  of  parties  in  needy  circumstances 
and  depriving  those  entitled  to  recover  for  the  death,  of  none  of 
their  rights  to  a  fair  and  just  compensation.  It  is  true  that  in 
this  latter  case  the  expenses  were  all  incurred  after  the  death, 
while  in  the  former,  only  a  part  thereof  were  for  expenses  so 
incurred.  But  the  decisions  are  that  expenses  of  the  sickness 
and  of  the  funeral  are  both  recoverable  as  an  element  of  dam- 
ages for  the  killing,  and  the  1894  ruling  ought  to  cover  all  ex- 
penses concerning  which  evidence  is  admissible  to  increase  the 
damages. 

§  578.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Lite  expectancy — Mortality  tables. — Life  expectancy 
is,  as  we  have  seen,17  an  important  factor,  and  it  involves  the  con- 
sideration of  other  elements.  Thus  the  fact  that  a  mother  has 
only  a  life  expectancy  of  ten  years  may  bring  into  consideration 
the  probability  that  she  will  become  dependent  upon  her 
children  and  so  affect  the  measure  of  damages.1*  So  earning 
capacity  may  be  affected  in  that  it  would  in  certain  cases  prob- 
ably diminish,  as  advanced  age  lessened  the  life  expectancy  and 
ability   to  earn  continuously."     Again,  the  probability  that  a 


16Stuber  v.  McEntee,  142  X.  Y. 
•200;  81  Abb.  X.  C.  246;  58  X.  Y.  St. 
II.  455;  36  X.  E.  878,  case  reverses 
47  X.  Y.  St.  R.  294:  10  X.  Y.  Sup]). 
900.  The  amount  paid  was  $400, 
which  was  used  by  the  family  to  pay 
the  funeral  expenses  and  the  cosl  of 
a  lot  in  the  cemetery  and  to  pur- 
chase a  gravestone  to  mark  the  bu- 
rial place. 

17  See  sec.  562,  herein  and  note. 

"Mclntyre  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 
47 


47  Barb.  (X.  Y. )  515,  case  affd  37 
X\  Y.  2ST:  :'.".  How.  36:  4  Trans.  App. 
1.  See  Purcell  v.  Earner,  14  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y. )  33;  43  X.  Y.  Supp.  988; 
2  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  57. 

"Taylor  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co..  16 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y. )  1:  14  X.  Y.  Supp. 
820;  _'  Am.  Neg.  Kep.  i'»0s.  per  Hatch, 
.1.,  who  in  considering  whether  the 
verdict  was  excessive  says  that  the 
deceased  was  ti:1.  years  "hi  and 
"taking      into      consideration      his 

7:37 


§579 


DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


very  old  man  would  live  a  longtime  may  be  important  upon  the 
question  of  his  pecuniary  loss  by  the  deprivation  of  his  support 
through  defendant's  negligence,  and  the  jury  having  him  before 
them  may  judge  from  his  appearance  something  of  the  years  al- 
lotted to  him  in  the  future.20  So  the  fact  that  exceptional  activ- 
ity promised  long  life  to  a  man  even  though  in  advanced  years 
constitutes  a  factor.21  And  the  probable  duration  of  a  life  may  be 
shown  by  the  Northampton  tables,22  although  as  above  stated 
the  jury  may  judge  of  this  fact  from  the  party's  appearance. 
But  something  more  than  the  probable  duration  of  the  life  of 
deceased  and  of  one  relative  whom  he  was  supporting  should  be 
considered.23  So  proof  of  the  life  expectancy  of  the  surviving 
parents  would  seem  to  be  necessary  in  an  action  for  a  child's 
death.21  And  in  North  Carolina  the  life  expectancy  of  a  de- 
ceased child,  when  not  fixed  by  statute,  is  a  matter  of  evidence.25 
And  mortuary  tables  embodied  in  the  Code  may  be  considered 
by  the  jury  without  having  been  put  in  evidence.26 

§  579.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  " — Death  of  husband. — The  primary  question  in  the 
case  of  a  husband's  death,  as  in  other  cases,  is  what  was  the 
probable  chance  of  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  widow  as  well,  also, 
as  the  extent  of  the  present,  actual  pecuniary  loss.     In  deter- 


probable  duration  of  life,  and  his 
ability  to  earn  continuously,  which 
could  not  increase,  but  would  cer- 
tainly diminish,  the  sum  which  his 
family  would  receive  as  a  result  of  his 
earnings,  after  the  cost  of  his  own  liv- 
ing was  deducted,  we  can  readily  see 
that  the  pecuniary  loss  to  the  next  of 
kin  was  more  than  covered  by  the 
sum  which  is  rendered.11  See  Beecher 
v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  53  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  324;  65  N.  Y.  St.  R.  642. 
See  sec.  563,  herein,  and  notes. 

20  Purcell  v.  Laurer,  14  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  33;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  988;  2  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  57,  per  Ward,  J.  See  also 
upon  the  last  point,  Moskovitz  v. 
Lighte,  68  Hun  (N.  Y.),  182;  52  N. 
Y.  St.   R.  216;  22  N.  Y.   Supp.  732, 

738 


case  aff'd  140  N.  Y.  619;  55  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  929;  35  N.  E.  890. 

21  Beecher  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
53  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  324;  65  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  642. 

22  Sauter  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  6  Hun  (N.  Y.),  446,  aff'd  G6  X. 
Y.  50;  23  Am.  Rep.  18. 

23  Palmer  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  26  Wkly.  Dig.  26;  5  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  536,  aff'd  112  N.  Y.  234;  20  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  904;  19  N.  E.  678. 

24  Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  116. 

25  Russell  v.  Windsor  Steamboat 
Co.,  126  N.  C.  961;  36  S.  E.  191. 

26Coley  v.  Statesville,  121  N.  C. 
301;  28  S.  E.  482. 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    INJUBY.  §580 

mining  these  the  general  factors  of  age,  etc.,27  are  important  ele- 
ments, but  the  extent  of  the  proof  available  in  any  certain  case 
must  necessarily  differ  according  to  the  varying  circumstances, 
and  the  courts  of  New  York  have  certainly  not  been  illiberal  in 
awarding  damages  and  sustaining  verdicts  for  want  of  exact  or 
extended  proof.28  But  vindictive  or  exemplary  damages  arc  ex- 
cluded as  well,  also,  as  mental  .suffering,  etc.,  and  Bufferings  of 
the  injured  husband  prior  to  his  death.29  A  material  element 
of  damages  exists  by  reason  of  the  rule  that  a  wife  is  entitled  to 
her  support,  and  the  deprivation  of  such  maintenance  and  of  her 
home,  and  the  facts  that  her  husband  was  in  a  position  to  give 
them  to  her  by  reason  of  his  health,  business  activity  and  prom- 
ise of  long  life,  notwithstanding  his  advanced  age,  will  justify  a 
fair  award  of  damages  for  his  negligent  killing,  and  in  this  con- 
nection the  amount  of  his  earnings,  his  earning  capacity  and  the 
probability  of  its  increasing  or  diminishing  are  material  and  rele- 
vant.30 So  the  husband's  chances  of  promotion,  his  competency 
or  incompetency  to  fill  a  better  position,  his  actual  living  ex- 
penses, care  exercised  therein,  his  net  income,  former  and  present 
employment  and  industry  are  all  admissible  in  evidence.11  In 
New  York  it  is  decided  in  an  early  case  that  the  value  of  the 
support  of  the  widow  and  children,  during  the  time  deceased 
would  probably  have  lived,  less  their  earnings,  may  be  con- 
sidered.:a 

§  580.  »4  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  "—Death  of  wife— Death  of  wife  and  mother.     Under 

the  former  statute  of  New  York,  the  husband  suing  as  admin- 
istrator for  his  wife's  death  by  negligence  could  not  prove  the 
value  to  him  of  her  services  and  could  not  recover  therefor  as 
the  damages  were  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  "  widow  and 
next  of  kin,"  and  went  in  such  case  to  the  next  of  kin.33     But 


27  Examine  sees.  563-572,  herein. 

28  See  as  to  jury  not  being  restricted 
to  the  pecuniary  loss  proven,  sec.  560, 
herein. 

29  See  sees.  563-567,  herein. 

30  Beecher  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
53  App.  Div.  (X.  Y/.)324;  05  N.  V. 
St.  R.  642.     See  Althorf  v.  Wolfe,  2 


Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  344,  aff'tl  22  N.  V.  355. 
See  sees.  562,  569,  574,  herein. 

;i  Barns  v.  Asheboro  &  M.  R.  Co., 
125  N.  ('.  304:  31  S.  K.  405. 

*>  Althorf  v.  W.-lfe.  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y. ) 
344,  aff'd  22  \.  V.  3.".:.. 

43  Dickens  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co., 
23  N.  Y.  158,  rev'g  28  liarb.  41. 

739 


§  580 


DEATH  — FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 


where  the  husband  is  entitled  to  the  wife's  entire  personal  es- 
tate, she  having  no  descendants,  he  can  show  the  amount  and 
character  of  her  work,  her  earnings  and  probable  profits  as  well 
as  the  amount  of  her  funeral  expenses,  and  her  age  and  health, 
where  he  sues,  as  administrator,  for  her  killing.34  These  cases 
differ  from  those  where  the  husband's  right  of  action  for  loss  of 
the  wife's  services  by  reason  of  personal  injuries  survives  her 
death,35  and  from  causes  of  action  for  the  loss  of  the  wife's  ser- 
vices, loss  of  her  society  and  comfort  and  expenses  of  her  in- 
jury and  the  death  of  the  husband  after  suit  brought.36  It 
should  also  be  remembered  that  the  present  Code,37  provides 
that  the  husband,  wife  or  next  of  kin  are  entitled  to  sue  and 
that  the  damages  recoverable  are  exclusively  for  their  benefit, 
and  the  change  making  the  husband  a  beneficiary  was  affected 
in  1870.:B  The  surviving  husband,  wife  or  next  of  kin,  are 
therefore  the  class  named  and  are  entitled  to  the  proceeds  of 
the  recovery  to  be  distributed  as  if  they  were  unbequeathed 
assets,  etc.39  If  the  husband  is  the  sole  surviving  beneficiary, 
the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  him  as  the  husband  might  differ 
in  character,  in  so  far  as  the  loss  of  his  wife's  services  is  con- 
cerned, from  that  sustained  by  other  surviving  next  of  kin  who 
are  entitled  to  share  in  the  proceeds  of  the  recovery.  But, 
however  this  may  be,  it  is  held  that  very  slight  evidence  of  pe- 
cuniary injury  to  the  husband  is  required,  although  some  evi- 
dence thereof  is  necessary  to  justify  a  recovery.40  It  would 
also  seem  to  logically  follow  that  the  intent  of  the  statutory 
amendment  above  mentioned  would  entitle  the  husband  when 


:ii  Meyer  v.  Hart,  23  App  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  131;  48  N.  Y.  Supp.  904. 

35  In  Sweet  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R. 
Co.,  18  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  355;  41  X.  Y. 
Supp.  549,  the  action  was  for  the  loss 
of  services  from  the  wife's  injury 
and  it  was  held  to  survive  her  death. 

36  See  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Cross- 
town  R.  Co.,  83  X.  Y.  595;  38  Am. 
Rep.  474,  rev'g  19  Hun,  341;  8.  C, 
75  N.  Y.  192;  56  How.  465;  31  Am. 
Rep.  459,  aff'g56  How  32;  S.  C,  18 
Hun,  368;  Foels  v.  Tonawanda,  65 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  624:  48  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
150;  20  X.  Y.  Supp.  447. 

740 


37  2  Stov.  Annot.  Code  (1898),  sees. 
1902,  1903,  1908  and   see  sec.  1870. 

36  See  X.  Y.  Laws,  1847,  ch.  440, 
ch.  450,  sees.  1,  2;  Laws,  1849, 
ch.  236,  ch.  256;  Laws,  1870,  ch.  78. 
See  Lynch  v.  Davis,  12  How.  (X.  Y.) 
323. 

39  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker,  164  X.  Y. 
58,  62,  per  Bartlett,  J. 

40  Cornwall  v.  Mills,  44  X.  Y. 
Supr.  45.  See  Mitchell  v.  Xew 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun  (X. 
Y. ),  535 ;  5  T.  &  C.  122,  aff 'd  64  X.  Y. 
655. 


FOIL    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY. 


S  581 


suing  as  one  of  a  surviving  class  to  prove  the  loss  of  his  wife's 
services  us  a  part  of  the  damages,  eveD  though  lie  would  receive- 
no  greater  share  in  the  amount  recovered  for  that  reason,  alone, 
and  in  this  connection  it  is  held  that  the  jury  may  take  into  ac- 
count  the  wife's,  or  wife's  and  mother's  prospective  earnings 
and  the  loss  of  her  services,  and  in  determining  the  value  of  the 
hitter,  the  character  of  the  services  rendered  may  he  considered, 
including  not  only  the  household  labor  and  care  of  the  family 
but  also  the  nature  of  whatever  other  occupation  she  was  en- 
gaged in  and  from  which  a  pecuniary  benefit  by  way  of  earn- 
ings or  otherwise  was  derived  and  which  was  lost  by  reason  of 
her  premature  death.  The  disposition  of  her  earnings  is  also  a 
relevant  factor,  us  where  the  family  was  wholly  or  in  part  sup 
ported  thereby,  or  whether  all  or  only  a  part  of  said  earnings 
were  so  used.  The  size  of  the  family  and  the  age  and  sex  of 
the  children  may  also  be  relevant  and  the  fact  that  the  deceased 
had  no  income  may  also  be  material.  Xecessarily  the  age,  health, 
etc..  of  deceased  may  be  proven.  This  last  question  has.  how- 
ever been  fully  considered  elsewhere  herein  as  have  the  ques- 
tions of  funeral  and  medical  expenses,  loss  of  society,  mental 
and  physical  suffering." 

§581.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury ''—Death  of  parent. — In  determining  the  measure  of 
damages  to  surviving  children  for  loss  occasioned  by  the  kill- 
ing of  a  parent  or  parents,  the  liability  of  the  parent  for  the 
support  of  a  minor  must  constitute  a  factor,  in  so  far  as  the 
parent's  death  deprives  such  minor  thereof.      The   pecuniary 


41  See  upon  the  above  points, 
Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Crosstown  R. 
Co.,  83  N.  Y.  595;  38  Am.  Rep.  474, 
rev'g  19  Hun,  341;  6'.  C,  75  N.  V. 
192;  5(1  How.  405;  31  Am.  Rep.  459, 
aff'g  50  Bow.  32;  8.  C,  18  Hun,  368; 
Medinger  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  R. 
Co.,  6  App.  Div.  (  N.  Y.  i  42;  39  X.  Y. 
Supp.  013;  Lyons  v.  Second  Ave.  It. 
Co.,  89  Hun  (X.  Y.),  374;  09  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  810;  35  X.  Y.  Supp.  372,  aff'd 
152  X.  Y.  054;  47  X.  E.  1109,  Klemin 
v.  New  York,  C.  &  H.  R.  R.   Co  .  78 


Hun  (X.  Y.),  277;  60  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
231;  28  X.  Y.  Supp.  861:  Creen  v. 
Hudson  U.  R.  Co..  32  Burb.  i  N.  V.i 
25,  afTd  30  How.  593  n.  See  also 
8.  C.,  28  Barb.  (X.  Y.  i  9:  If,  Bow. 
230,  203,  aff'd  31  Barb.  200.  which  is 
aff'd  2  Abb.  Dec.  277:  2  Kcycs.  294; 
:!0  How.  59:l.  Examine  also  Malonee 
v.  X.  Y.  C  A-  H.  K.  R  Co.,  20  Wklv. 
Dig.  (X.  Y. )  252;  Mitchell  v.  Xew 
York  C.  A  H.  R.  II.  Co.,  2  Hun  (X. 
Y.  i.  5:15:  5  Thoinp.  &  C.  (X.  Y.i  122. 
aff'd  64  X.  Y.  655. 

741 


§  581 


DEATH       FAIR    AND    .1 1  Si'    COMPENSATION 


benefit,  therefore,  which  would  have  accrued  to  surviving  chil- 
dren, had  the  parent  not  have  been  prematurely  killed,  should  be 
considered,  and  they  ma}r  recover  such  prospective,  pecuniary 
losses  as  are  actually  shown  by  the  evidence  to  be  the  proximate 
damages  from  the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing,  although  the 
jury  is  not  confined  to  those  actually  proven  in  order  to  award 
such  damages.  The  elements  which  may  be  proven  and  which 
are  of  weight  in  determining  the  amount  of  the  verdict,  or 
whether  or  not  such  verdict  should  be  reversed,  set  aside  or 
modified,  are  the  age  and  sex  of  deceased,  his  or  her  mental  and 
physical  health,  character,  quality,  capacity,  condition,  occupa- 
tion, and,  if  a  father,  his  chances  of  advancement  in  his  employ- 
ment, earnings,  earning  capacity,  situation  and  circumstances  in 
life,  financially  and  otherwise,  dependency  upon  children,  pecun- 
iary aid  furnished  the  latter  by  them,  whether  or  not  deceased 
was  the  children's  sole  support  and  his  life  expectancy.  The 
size  of  deceased's  family  or  number  of  surviving  children  may  be 
shown,  also  their  age,  sex,  mental  and  physical  health,  circum- 
stances or  financial  condition  as  involved  in  the  question  whether 
they  were  solely  dependent  upon  the  parent's  aid  for  support,  or 
whether  they  were  self-supporting,  wholly  or  partially,  whether 
the  children  which  are  next  of  kin  were  married  or  unmarried, 
living  away  from  home  or  at  home,  whether  able  to  work  or  not, 
their  capacity  therefor,  and  whether  and  to  what  extent  they 
aided  or  supported  the  deceased.  It  is  not,  however,  essential 
that  all  these  factors  should  be  proven  for  the  reason,  as  we 
have  stated  elsewhere,  that  prospective  damages  are  of  such  a 
character  as  to  be  incapable  of  direct  or  exact  proof,  and  nominal 
damages  will  be  given  without  such  proof. 4- 


42  In  a  majority  of  the  following 
cases  the  factoi-s  noted  are  con- 
sidered, but  without  discussion.  Age 
of  deceased  father,  his  occupation, 
health,  salary,  number  of  children, 
the  entire  dependency  upon  him  for 
support,  their  age  and  sex  con- 
sidered. Wallace  v.  Third  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  36  App.  Div.  ( N.  Y. )  57 ;  55  N.  Y. 
Supp.  132;  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  215. 
Deceased  was  a  woman  68  years  old, 
not  in  robust  health   and  somewhat 

742 


dependent  upon  her  children  for  sup- 
port, but  held  that  it  did  not  follow 
that  her  life  was  of  no  pecuniary 
benefit  to  her  next  of  kiu.  Phalen 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  31  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  448;  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  836;  22 
Civ.  Proc.  42.  Day  laborer,  33  years 
old,  left  wife  and  three  children. 
He  was  their  sole  support,  earned 
$1.25  a  day  and  was  of  temperate 
habits.  His  chances  of  advancement 
were  also  considered.     Felice  v.  New 


FOB   THE    I'Kri'Nl  \l;\     lN.il  i:Y. 


§  *82 


§  582.  "Fair and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury"— Support,  care,  etc.,  of  children The  benefit  of  the 

counsel  of  a  husband  and  father  is  of  pecuniary  value,1  and  bo 
is  the  loss  of  maternal  nurture  and  education,  and  the  jury  may 
consider  the  parent's  capacity  to  bestow  such  physical,  moral 
and  intellectual  instruction,  training  and  education  as  may  be 
of  service  to  the  children  in  after  life,  and  which  would  have 
been  received  from  deceased.41  And  this  rule  may  include  not 
only  minor  but  adult  children.'"' 


Fork  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  345;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  922;  1 
Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  037.  Deceased  was 
widow,  age  and  health  and  number 
of  children  noted,  also  that  she  did 
the  housework.  Walls  v.  Rochester 
R.  Co.,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.),  581;  72  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  250;  36  X.  Y.  Supp.  1102. 
Death  of  wife  and  mother,  no  pe- 
cuniary aid  received  from  her,  $5,000, 
reduced  to  $2,500.  Klemm  v.  New 
York  C.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  277; 
(50  N.  Y.  St.  R.  231;  28  X.  Y.  Supp. 
361.  Deceased  was  a  woman,  her  oc- 
cupation, age,  strength,  activity, 
number  of  children  and  their  de- 
pendency upon  her  considered.  Ilen- 
ning  v.  Caldwell,  45  X.  V.  St.  R.  373; 
18 N.  Y.  Supp.  339;  aff'd  137  N.  Y.  553; 
50  X.  Y.  St.  R.  931;  33  X.  E.  337. 
Pecuniary  injury  should  be  ascer- 
tained from  proof  of  the  character, 
qualities,  capacity  and  condition  of 
deceased  and  number,  age,  sex,  cir- 
cumstances and  condition  of  health 


of  children  or  next  of  kin  of  de- 
ceased. Rut  it  does  not  follow  that 
there  is  no  pecuniary  loss  because 
children  are  of  full  age  ami  living 
away  from  home  and  supporting 
themselves.  There  was  also  a  sick 
daughter  at  home,  one  sou  and  daugh- 
ter, one  married  and  the  other  un- 
married and  children  had  no  prop- 
erty. Lock  wood  v.  Xew  York,  L.  E. 
&  \V.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  523,  aff'g  20 
Wkly.  Dig.  341.  Age,  earnings,  oc- 
cupation, life  expectancy  and  proba- 
bility of  dependency  of  mother, 
a  widow,  also  number  of  children; 
that  some  were  married  and  did  not 
live  with  deceased,  and  that  all  were 
of  age  and  that  she  aided  her  children 
by  making  small  things  which  were 
useful  to  them,  were  all  considered. 
Mclntyre  v.  Xew  York  C.  R.  Co.,  47 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  51:).  aff'd  37  X.  Y.  287: 
35  How.  30;  4  Trans.  App.  1.  See 
same  case,  43  Barb.  532,  as  to  nonsuit 
not  being  granted  where  services  are 


43  Felice  v.  Xew  York  C.  &  II.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  App-  Div.  (N.  Y.)  345;  43  X. 
V.  Supp.  922;  1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  037. 

"Tilleyv.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
N.  Y.  252:  24  \.  Y.  471;  23  IIow.(N. 
V.  |  303  (cited  1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  380). 
In  this  case  besides  performing  her 
household  duties  and  other  outside 
work,  the  mother  sent  her  children 
to  school  and  instructed  them,  ami 
also  nursed  them  when  they  were 
sick.     Her  religious  activity  in  the 


church,  as  well  as  her  business  ca- 
pacity and  ability  to  save,  were  also 
factors  in  this  connection.  See  also 
Mclntyre  v.  Xew  York  C.  R.  Co.,  37 
X.  Y.  287;  35  How.  (X.  Y. )  36;  4 
Trans.  App.  1,  aff'g  47  Barb.  515. 

45 See  Tilley  case,  cited  in  last  pre- 
ceding note.  In  this  case  there  were 
five  children,  the  eldest  being  an 
adult  23  years  of  age.  See  next  fol- 
lowing section  herein. 

743 


§§583,584         FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

§  583.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Death  of  parent — Damages  not  limited  to  children's 
minority. — In  estimating  the  pecuniary  injury  to  children  oc- 
casioned by  a  parent's  negligent  or  wrongful  killing,  there  is  no 
sufficient  legal  reason  for  limiting  the  damages  to  the  children's 
minority,  if  there  is  evidence  to  satisfy  the  jury  that  the  pecu- 
niary benefits  would  have  been  continued  afterward,  or  that  the 
damages  will  continue  after  such  minority. "' 

§  584.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Death  of  children — Generally. — In  considering  the 
general  elements  of  damages  in  connection  with  the  loss  occa- 
sioned to  parents  by  the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing  of  their 
children,  the  courts  have  classified  the  cases  so  that  they  dis- 
tinctly cover  (1)  children  of  tender  age,  (2)  minors  generally, 
and  (3)  adults,  and  it  is  obvious  that  as  a  child  becomes  more 
advanced  in  years  the  character  of  the  proof  of  pecuniary  injury 
is  of  necessity  more  specific,  even  though  it  cannot  even  in  cases 
of  adults  be  exact.  Evidence  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  at- 
tending the  injury  and  death  are  as  a  rule  available,  but  beyond 
such  evidence  the  proof  becomes  at  once  of  comparatively  little 
value  in  so  far  as  the  actual  pecuniary  loss  is  concerned,  espe- 
cially so  where  the  deceased  was  a  young  child,  for  specific  loss 
is  difficult  of  approximation,  and  whether  the  case  be  that  of 
minors  or  of  adults  there  can  be  no  well-defined,  positive  rule 
worthy  of  more  than  the  most  general  application,  or  which  of- 
fers any  safe  basis  for  estimating  the  value  of  the  life.  All 
probable  and  possible  benefits  should  be  considered,  and  present 
and  prospective  losses  to  the  next  of  kin,  including  the  prospect 
of  inheriting  from  the  child.17     But  the  probability  of  loss  of 


proven  which  are  of  some  value  or 
where  they  are  of  some  pecuniary 
benefit.  That  jury  may  include 
prospective  losses  actually  shown  by 
evidence  to  result  to  the  next  of  kin 
as  the  proximate  damages  and  as  to 
value  of  mother's  earnings  and  pros- 
pect of  inheritance,  see  Tilley  v. 
Hudson  K.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  471.  See 
also  sees.  570,  571,  574,  herein.  As 
to  duty  to  support,  dependency,  etc. 

744 


physical  and  financial  condition, 
see  sees.  568,  569,  572,  573,  575, 
herein.  As  to  value  of  support  of 
wife  and  children  and  deduction  of 
earnings,  see  Althorf  v.  Wolfe,  2 
Hilt.  344,  aff'd  22  N.  Y.  355. 

46  Tilley  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
N.  Y.  252. 

47  See  on  the  three  general  propo- 
sitions the  following  citations  and 
the  opinions  of  the  courts  therein: 


Knl:    Till'.    PECUNIAE?    INJURY.  §  585 

advice  and  counsel  of  a  child  in  case  the  parents  become  aged 
and  dependent,  physically  or  mentally  upon  others  for  advice,  is 
held  to  be  too  remote  an  element  of  damages.48  A  general  rule 
would  be  that  the  net  moneyed  value  of  the  child's  life  consti- 
tutes the  measure  of  damages,  or  a  fair  and  just  compensation 
for  the  pecuniary  injury  sustained  by  the  next  of  kin  or  those 
entitled  to  recover. " 

§  585.  "  Fair  and   just  compensation  for  the   pecuniary 
injury  " — Death  of  children     Evidential  factors  relating  to 

children.— In  determining  what  constitutes  a  fair  and  just 
compensation  for  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  reason  of  the 
killing  of  children  through  negligence  or  wrongful  act,  it  must 
be  remembered  that,  as  we  have  stated  elsewhere,  the  very  ten- 
der years  of  a  child  may  of  necessity  preclude  proof  of  facts 
which  might  be  available  and  applicable  in  case  of  children  of 
advanced  years  or  of  adults,  and  in  stating  the  following  gen- 
eral factors  as  elements  of  damage,  we  have  given  those  which 
have  been  proven  and  considered  in  the  various  cases  of  very 
young  infants,  minors  generally  and  adult  children.  These  fac- 
tors are  deceased's  age  and  sex,  mental  and  physical  condition 
and  ability,  and  this  includes  height,  weight  and  strength  in 
certain  cases,  ability  to  work  continuously,  when  of  age  to  ren- 
der services  or  to  labor,  the  child's  brightness  and  general  intelli- 
gence, attendance  at  school  and  progress  there,  general  character, 
adaptability  and  capacity.  If  the  child  is  of  sufficient  age  to 
have   developed   habits   of    industry   or  sobriety   or  otherwise. 


Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  145 
N.  Y.  348,  350,  351 ;  64  N.  Y.  St.  K. 
813;  40N.  E.15;  Butler  v.  Manhattan 
R.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  417,  421;  62  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  432;  38  N".  E.  454;  Birkctt.  v. 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  110  X.  Y.  504; 
18  N.  Y.  St.  R.  130;  Houghkirk  v. 
Delaware  &  II.  Can.  Co.,  92  N.  Y. 
219;  Ihl  v.  F..rty-Second  St.  &  G.  St. 
F.  R.  ('«>.,  47  N.  Y.  :!17;  Kane  v. 
Mitchell  Trans.  Co.,  90  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
65;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  203;  35  X.  Y. 
Supp.  581;  Johnson  v.  Long  Island 
R.  Co.,  80  Hun  (X.  Y.),  306;  62  X.  Y.  ' 


St.  R.  46;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  318,  aff'd 
144  X.  Y.  719;  70  X.  Y.  St.  R.  868; 
29  Nr.  E.  857. 

«  Gill  v.  Rochester  A-  P.  R.  Co.,  M 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  107.  See  sec.  569, 
herein. 

49  Russell  v.  Windsor  Steamboal 
Co.,  126  X.  C.  961:  36  S.  E.  191,  cit- 
ing Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  [ce  Co., 
110  X.  Y.  r.iU:  18  N.  V.  Si.  R.  130; 
Ihl  v.  Forty-Second  St.  A  G.  St.  F. 
R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  317,  and  numerous 
other  cases. 

745 


§  586  DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

these  are  important  and  relevant  factors.  Life  expectancy  is 
also  material,  and  whether  or  not  there  was  a  promise  of  a  con- 
tinued and  useful  life.  If  the  child  was  of  suitable  years  the 
fact  whether  he  or  she  was  married  or  not  may  be  considered, 
and  also  whether  deceased,  especially  if  an  adult,  lived  at  home 
with  the  parents  or  elsewhere.  The  occupation,  earnings  and 
saving  capacity  of  the  child  when  of  age  and  ability  to  perform 
labor  are  relevant'  and  material  evidence,  and  whether  continu- 
ously employed,  the  number  of  years  engaged  in  labor,  whether 
the  employment  was  by  the  parent  or  otherwise,  the  child's  dis- 
position of  his  or  her  earnings,  whether  they  were  given  all  to 
the  parent  or  only  a  part  thereof  or  were  wholly  used  by  the 
child,  and  in  case  of  employment  by  the  father  whether  the 
child  received  fixed  wages  for  his  services  or  a  sum  dependent 
upon  the  father's  judgment  and  good  will,  the  disposition  made 
by  the  parent  of  the  child's  earnings  by  way  of  support  of  the 
family  or  otherwise,  are  all  important,  material  and  relevant 
factors.  In  addition  there  are  other  elements  of  damages  re- 
lating more  particularly  to  children  of  tender  age  and  minors 
generally  which  are  given  elsewhere.  It  is  not  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  prove  all  the  above  factors.50 

§  586.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  " — Death  of  children — Evidential  factors  relating  to 
parents  or  next  of  kin. — The  evidential  factors  to  be  consid- 
ered upon  the  question  of  damages,  resulting  from  the  negli- 
gent or  wrongful  killing  of  children,  and  which  relate  to  the 
parents  or  next  of  kin,  as  distinguished  from  those  relating  to 
the  deceased  child  as  elements  of  damages,  are  the  age  of  the 
parent  or  parents  or  of  surviving  next  of  kin,  the  sex  of  the 
latter,  and  also  whether  the  sole  parent  surviving  was  a  father 
or  mother ;  the  parent's  physical  and  mental  health  and  condi- 
tion, character  and  capacity ;  the  circumstances,  position  and 
condition  in  life,  as  that  the  father  or  mother  were  penniless  or 
without  means  of  support  or  otherwise,  whether  or  not  such 
parent  or  parents  were  dependent  wholly  or  in  part  upon  the 
deceased  for  support,  and  whether  the  latter  was  supporting 

60  For  authorities   supporting  the  I  above  propositions,  see  note  to  next 

I  following  section. 

746 


FOB    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.M"I:Y.  §  586 

them  wholly  or  partly  or  furnishing  no  pecuniary  aid,  and  this 
would  also  include  the  question  of  legal  obligation  of  children 
of  sufficient  means  to  support  indigent  parents ;  the  duration 
and  extent  of  care  of  parents  by  children  and  of  contributions  if 
any,  to  their  support;  and  the  employment  of  the  child's  wages 
or  earnings  therefor.  The  fact  that  the  child's  care  was  volun- 
tary lias  also  been  considered.  Other  elements  are  the  parent's 
or  parents'  life  expectancy,  occupation  and  earnings.  Evidence 
is  also  material  and  relevant  that  the  deceased  left  no  widow  or 
children,  that  the  father  was  the  sole  heir  and  next  of  kin  and 
exclusive  beneficiary,  that  a  widowed  mother  survived,  whether 
or  not  there  were  any  next  of  kin  and  the  character  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  surviving  next  of  kin  and  their  number  and  ages. 
But  the  number,  ages  and  condition,  mental,  physical  or  finan- 
cial of  those  who  are  not  next  of  kin  is  inadmissible,  nor  may 
it  be  shown  whether  they  are  married  or  unmarried.  Evidence 
has  also  been  considered,  showing  that  the  parents  or  other  next 
of  kin  resided  in  a  foreign  country  as  bearing  upon  the  pecuni- 
ary injury  to  them,  and  the  nature  of  their  actual  relations  with 
the  deceased.  It  may  also  be  stated  that  it  is  clearly  apparent 
throughout  the  decisions  that  the  statute  contemplates  possible 
and  uncertain  damages  not  before  recoverable  and  the  range  of 
probabilities  is  seemingly  limited  only  by  those  which  are  based 
on  some  reasonable  expectation  and  which  are  within  the  intent. 
by  fair  construction  of  the  statute,  having  in  view  the  rem- 
edy contemplated,  and  we  may  here  repeat  what  was  said  in 
the  last  section,  that  there  is  no  necessity  of  proving  all  the 
above-mentioned  elements  of  damages  to  warrant  a  recovery/'1 

51  Some  of  the  following  citations  j  the  entire  pecuniary  loss.      Birkett 
have     been     considered     elsewhere  I  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  110  N    Y. 


herein  under  their  appropriate  head- 
ings, but  owing  to  the  importance 
of  this  subject  of  the  death  of  chil- 
dren and  for  more   convenient  and 


504;  18  N.  V.  St.  R.  130;  18  N.  E. 
108,  aff'g  41  Hun.  404:  3  X.  Y.  St.  R. 
133;  '25  Wkly.  Dig.  46.  This  case  is 
cited  as  to  the   measure  of  damages 


ready  reference,  they  are  also  given  j  for  the  killing  of  an  infant  of  tender 
in  this  note.     See  also  cases  consid-   years  in   Russell  v.  Windsor  Steam 
ered  under  the  next  following  section,    boat  Co.,  126  X.  C.  961;  36  S.  E.  191. 


In  case  of  a  young  child,  loss  is  to  be 
estimated  upon  all  the  facts  proven, 
including  probable  and  possible  ben- 


Father  was  aged  106;  deceased  son 
was  27  years  old  and  industrious. 
Burke  v.  Wetherbee,  9S  X.  V.  562, 


efits,  and  the  measure  of  damages  is  I  rev'g  18  Wkly.  Dig.  3G9.     Deceased 

747 


£   587  DEATH — FAIK    .VXD    JtTST    COMPENSATION 

§  587.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Death  of  children — Decisions  and  opinions. — In  a  de- 
cision which  turned  upon  the  right  of  the  father  to  share  in  the 


son  was  13  years  old.  Mother  had 
no  means  and  was  unable  to  work 
because  of  a  malady;  evidence  held 
admissible.  Harlinger  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Wkly.  Dig. 
392,  aff'g  92  N.  Y.  661.  Deceased 
daughter  was  6  years  old,  intelligent 
and  healthy;  parent's  occupation  was 
market  gardener;  circumstances  of 
death  proven,  no  other  evidence, 
special  and  prospective  damages  re- 
coverable, the  first  proven  by  char- 
acter and  amount  thereof,  the  second 
by  age,  sex,  general  health  and  intelli- 
gence of  deceased,  and  the  situation 
and  condition  of  survivors  and  their 
relation  to  deceased.  General  indef- 
initeness  and  inaccuracy  of  proof 
considered  at  length  by  the  court. 
Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  II.  Can. 
Co.,  92  X.  Y.  219,  rev'g  28  Hun,  407; 
15  Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  aff'd  11 
Abb.  X.  C.  72;  63  How.  (X.  Y. )  328; 
4  Month.  Law  Bull.  65.  Age  and  sex 
of  deceased,  social  condition  and 
standing  of  next  of  kin  and  proba- 
bility of  their  sustaining  any  pecuni- 
ary damage  by  infant's  death  should 
be  considered  by  the  jury.  Deceased 
Avas  daughter  of  plaintiff.  Ether- 
ington  v.  Prospect  Park  &  C.  I.  R. 
Co.,  88  X.  Y.  641,  aff'g  24  Hun,  235. 
Father  may  recover  full  damages  for 
loss  of  infant  son,  where  recovery  is 
for  his  exclusive  benefit,  and  this 
includes  loss  of  his  son's  services 
during  minority.  McGovern  v.  Xew 
York,  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  X.  Y. 
417.  Where  child  is  of  tender  years 
affirmative  proof  of  special  damages 
unnecessary.  Prendegast  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  X.  Y. 
652.  See  also  sec.  561,  herein.  De- 
ceased was   about  three  years  old. 

748 


Damages  may  be  estimated  from  age 
and  sex  of  child  and  circumstances, 
condition  and  position  in  life  of  par- 
ents and  occupation  of  father,  pres- 
ent and  prospective  damages  to  be 
considered.  Difficulty  of  furnishing 
any  specific  or  direct  proof  consid- 
ered by  the  court.  Ihl  v.  Forty-Sec- 
ond St.  &  G.  St.  F.  R.  Co.,  47  X.  Y. 
317;  7  Am.  Rep.  450,  cited  as  to  the 
measure  of  damages  for  killing  an 
infant  of  very  tender  years  in  Rus- 
sell v.  Windsor  Steamboat  Co.,  126 
X.  C.  961;  36  S.  E.  191.  Value  of 
services  of  minor,  aged  11,  may  be 
determined  by  jury  of  their  own 
knowledge.  O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R. 
R.  Co.,  38  X.  Y.  445.  Examine  also 
the  last  cited  case.  Xot  necessary 
that  deceased  infant  son  should 
leave  a  widow  and  next  of  kin  to 
entitle  father  to  recover.  McMahon 
v.  Mayor  (X.  Y.),  33  X.  Y.  642.  De- 
ceased was  between  6  and  7  years 
old;  no  proof  of  damages  necessary. 
Oldfield  v.  New  York  &  Harlem 
R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aff'g  3  E.  D. 
Smith  103.  Mother  for  son's  death, 
her  financial  circumstances  admissi- 
ble. Fowler  v.  Buffalo  Furnace  Co., 
41  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  84;  58  X.  Y. 
Supp.  223,  appeal  dismissed  160  X. 
Y.  665.  Boy  16  killed  while  riding- 
bicycle,  circumstances  of  accident 
proven  and  $2,000  held  not  exces- 
sive. Quinn  v.  Pietro,  38  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  484;  56  X.  Y.  Supp.  419;  5 
Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  692.  Deceased  son 
was  19  years  old,  healthy,  industri- 
ous and  earning  wages  which  he 
gave  to  his  father — $5,000  not  exces- 
sive. Twist  v.  Rochester,  37  App. 
Div.  (X.  Y.)  307;  55  X.  Y.  Supp.  850. 
Deceased  was  a  bright  boy  8}  years 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY    IN.H   RY. 


S  587 


recovery  by  the  widow,  the  court,  per  Bartlett,  J.,  says:  "It 
does  not  follow  that  the  father  has  no  pecuniary  interest  in  the 
death  of  his  son.     It  might  have  happened  had  the  son  survived 


old — $6,000  held  excessive.  Sch after 
v.  Baker  Transfer  Co.,  29  App.  Div. 
i  X.  Y.)  459;  51  X.  Y.  Supp.  1092. 
Only  evidence  was  of  the  age,  sex 
and  general  intelligence  of  deceased 
(child  was  5  years  old);  nominal 
damages  recoverable.  Howell  v. 
Rochester  R.  Co.,  24  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  502;  49  X.  Y.  .Supp.  IT.  De- 
ceased daughter  was  a  vigorous 
woman  before  the  injury,  about  60 
years  old.  She  was  large  and  weighed 
about  180  pounds.  The  facts  of  the 
accident  and  injury  were  proven. 
The  plaintiff  was  next  of  kin  and 
was  before  the  jury  and  they  could 
judge  somewhat  as  to  his  probable 
duration  of  life.  He  was  penniless 
and  dependent,  82  years  old  and 
might  live  10  years.  Deceased  was 
his  only  child  and  was  comfortably 
supporting  him  at  the  time  of  the 
injury — $3,000  uot  excessive.  Pur- 
cell  v.  Lamer,  14  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
33;  43  X.  Y.  Supp.  988;  2  Am.  Neg. 
"Rep.  57.  Only  evidence  was  that 
father  was  a  laborer  and  deceased 
daughter  was  16  years  old  and  since 
her  mother's  death  had  taken  care 
of  his  house.  There  was  no  evidence 
as  to  his  or  her  character  or  capabil- 
ities or  of  the  relations  existing  be- 
tween them — (4,000  was  reduced  to 
$2,500.  Dinnihan  v.  Lake  Ontario 
Beach  Imp.  Co.,  8  App.  Div.  (X.  Y. ) 
509;  40  X.  Y.  Supp.  764.  Deceased 
daughter  was  19  years  old;  she  was 
bright  and  industrious  and  earned  $7 
a  week,  which  she  gave  to  her  mother 
to  aid  supporting  family.  Her  fa- 
ther was  61  years  old — $6, 000  reduced 
to  $4,000.  Seeley  v.  Xew  York  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  App.  Div.  (  X.  Y. )  402: 
75  X.  Y.  St.  R.  261 ;  40  X.  Y.  Supp.  866. 


Deceased    was    an    infant    daughter 
and  father  was  exclusive  beneficiary. 

Held  that  he  could  recover  the  entire 
pecuniary  loss  and  that  prospective 
earnings  during  infancy  were  in- 
cluded and  this  covered  loss  of  ser- 
vices during  infancy.  Also  that  an 
instruction  winch  precluded  recov- 
ery for  loss  of  earnings  while  an 
infant  and  until  majority,  was  not, 
cured  by  an  instruction  that  the  jury 
were  not  confined  to  minority,  but 
might  find  for  pecuniary  damages 
thereafter.  Coghlan  v.  Third  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  7  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  124;  39 
X.  Y.  Supp.  1098,  aff'g  16  Misc.  677; 
25  Civ.  Proc.  249:  39  X.  Y.  Supp. 
113.  Action  by  father  for  death  of 
child  7  years  old  ;  evidence  admissi- 
ble that  services  of  child  were  re- 
quired in  household.  Pressman  v. 
Mooney,  5  App.  Div.  (X.  Y". )  121:  39 
N".  Y.  Supp.  44.  Deceased  was  3J 
years  old;  the  number  of  brothers 
and  sisters  surviving  and  their  ages 
was  shown,  also  the  age  of  the  fa- 
ther, his  occupation  and  amount  of 
his  earnings  per  week — $375  not  set 
aside  as  inadequate.  Roger  v.  Roch- 
ester R.  Co..  2  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  5: 
73  X.  Y.  St.  R.  209.  Deceased  was 
a  boy  7  years  old,  bright  and  healthy 
— $3,500  held  not  excessive.  Heinz 
v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.,  91  Hun 
(X.  Y.),  640;  71  X.  Y.  St.  R.  623;  36 
X.  Y.  Supp.  675.  Deceased  wa>  26 
years  old,  an  unmarried  man.  so- 
ber and  industrious,  adult  brothers 
and  sisters  and  a  widowed  mother 
survived.  He  had  never  contributed 
to  their  support — (3,000  not  exces- 
sive. Kane  v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.. 
90  Hun  (X.  Y.i.  65:  7<>  X.  Y.  St.  l:. 
203;    35    X.    Y.   Supp.    581,    aff'd    15:'. 

749 


§  587 


DEATH—  FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


thirty  years,  that  his  wife  would  have  died  childless  and  he  be 
left  as  the  only  support  of  an  aged  and  penniless  father ;  or  if 
no  father  was  living  but  several  next  of  kin  of  the  same  degree, 


N.  Y.  680.  Deceased  was  22  years 
old;  he  was  unmarried:  earned  $1.85 
per  day.  His  father  with  whom  he 
lived  was  his  next  of  kin  and  was  08 
years  old.  Fitzgerald  v.  New  York, 
C.  &  H.  K.  R.  Co.,  88  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
359;  68  N.  Y.  St.  R.  762;  34  N.  Y. 
Supp.  762,  case  rev'd  154  N.  Y.  263; 
48  N.  E.  514,  upon  ground  that  cause 
of  death  did  not  suffciently  appear 
as  due  to  negligence  of  defendant. 
Deceased,  a  man,  was  unmarried,  33 
years  old,  worked  for  his  father  but 
at  no  fixed  wages,  such  amount  be- 
ing paid  him  as  the  father  judged 
proper.  Present  and  prospective 
loss  and  prospect  of  inheritance  con- 
sidered. Johnson  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,  80  Hun  (N.  Y.),  306:  62  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  46;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  318,  aff'd 
144  N.  Y.  719;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  868; 
29  N.  E.  857.  Only  proof  was  that 
deceased,  a  boy  7  years  old,  attended 
school  and  did  errands  for  his  mother 
— $1,500  excessive.  Heusner  v. 
Houston,  W.  St.  &  P.  F.  Co.,  7 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  48;  57  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
528;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  365.  Deceased 
was  4  years  old.  The  mother  was 
a  widow  with  three  surviving  chil- 
dren of  the  ages  of  13  and  under; 
her  circumstances  and  condition  in 
life  were  shown  and  she  was  exam- 
ined before  the  jury  to  enable  them 
to  determine  her  age,  failure  to 
otherwise  prove  her  age  held  not 
fatal  to  a  recovery  of  more  than 
nominal  damages — $2,000  not  exces- 
sive. Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,  68  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  102;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  216;  22 
N.  Y.  Supp.  732,  aff'd  140  N.  Y.  619; 
55.  N.  Y.  St.  R.  929;  35  N.  E.  890. 
Deceased  was  a  son;  mother  had  no 
means;  son  aided   her.     Waldele   v. 

750 


New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  35,  rev'g  61  How.  350, 
rev'd  95  N.  Y.  274.  Deceased  boy  was 
aged  2  years  and  9  months  and  was 
in  good  health;  only  nominal  dam- 
ages in  absence  of  further  proof 
and  verdict  therefor  will  not  be  set 
aside  as  inadequate.  Silberstein  v. 
Williams  Wicke  Co.,  29  Abb.  N.  C. 
(N.  Y.)  291;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  170. 
Deceased  daughter  was  5  years  old 
— $2,000  to  father  not  excessive. 
Huerzeler  v.  Central  Crosstown  R. 
Co.,  1  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  136;  48  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  649;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  676,  aff'd  739 
N.  Y.  490;  54  N.  Y.  St.  R.  836;  34  N. 
E.  1101,  upon  point  of  imputed  negli- 
gence of  mother,  and  Earl,  J.,  said, 
"  The  question  of  damages  is  not  be- 
fore us.  There  was  sufficient  evidence 
in  the  case  upon  the  question  of  dam- 
ages for  the  jury,"  citing  Houghkirk 
v.  Delaware  &  H.  Can.  Co.,  92  N.  Y. 
219,  noted  at  beginning  of  this  note. 
Deceased  was  6  years  old — $4,500 
not  excessive,  although  the  court 
doubted  that  the  death  of  so  young 
a  child  could  result  in  pecuniary 
damages.  Ahern  v.  Steele,  48  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  517;  16  N.  Y.  St,  R.  24;  1 
N.  Y.  Supp.  257,  case  rev'd  115  N.  Y. 
203;  26  N.  Y.  St.  R.  295;  22  N.  E. 
193,  case  is  cited  in  Missouri,  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilmore  (Tex.  Civ.  App. 
1899),  53  S.  W.  61.  Deceased  daugh- 
ter was  36  years  old  and  was  in  good 
health.  The  amount  of  her  weekly 
earnings,  for  5  or  6  years  prior  to 
her  death,  was  proven  and  also  her 
yearly  contributions  to  her  parents' 
support  for  20  years  and  her  volun- 
tary care  of  her  father  and  mother. 
Her  father  was  the  only  next  of  kin. 
He  was  66  years  old  and  infirm  in 


FQB    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY, 


?   •>' 


it  is  within  the  range  of  possibilities  that  the  decedent  might  have 
accumulated  within  his  added  years  of  life  a  considerable  sum 
and  then  died,  leaving  it  to  them.  The  statute  evidently  deals 
with  remote  and  uncertain  damages  not  recoverable  at  common 
law."  The  deceased  in  this  case  left  no  children.52  In  another 
case  the  deceased  son  was  thirty  years  old.  He  left  no  wife  or 
children  and  only  his  father,  who  was  his  sole  next  of  kin  and 
so  entitled  to  the  entire  amount  recovered.  The  son,  at  the 
time  of  the  accident  occasioning  his  death,  was  in  good  health, 
had  never  been  sick  since  he  was  a  boy  and  had  never  been 
known  to  stay  away  from  wrork  one  day  on  account  of  his  ill- 
health.  His  trade  was  st  one  cutting,  which  he  had  followed  since 
he  was  16  years  old.  Every  two  weeks  he  would  turn  over  to  his 
father  the  sum  of  sixty  dollars,  of  which  the  father  would  return 
to  him  twelve  dollars,  being  six  dollars  a  week  with  which  to 
buy  clothes  and  pay  bis  incidental  expenses,  the  remaining  sum 
of  forty-eight  dollars  being  used  by  the  plaintiff  in  paying  house 
rent  and  supporting  his  family,  which  included  boarding  plain- 
tiffs intestate  and  furnishing  him  with  a  home,  and  the  court 
declared  that  all  of  this  evidence  was  helpful  and  proper,  but 
the  plaintiff  did  not  rest  here,  and  proved  the  marriage,  size  of 
family,  physical  condition,  misfortunes  and  poverty  of  survivors, 
who  were  not  the  next  of  kin,  and  for  such  error  the  judgment 


health,  and  without  property,  as  was 
also  the  mother  who  was  58  years 
old.  There  were  also  personal  ser- 
vices rendered  by  the  daughter. 
Bowles  v.  Rome,  Watertown  R.  Co., 
46  Hun  (N.  Y.),  324;  12  N.  Y.  St.  K. 
457,  aff'd  113  N.  Y.  643;  22  X.  Y.  St. 
K.  997;  21  N.  E.  414.  Mother  had 
no  means  and  son  contributed  to  her 
support.  Age,  circumstances  and 
condition  of  next  of  kin  should  be 
shown.  Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  X.  Y. 
&  P.  R.  Co.,  38  Hun  (N.  Y.),  116. 
Deceased  son  was  17  years  old;  pos- 
sibility of  loss  of  advice  and  counsel 
to  parents  or  possible  need  by  rea- 
son of  future  feebleness,  etc.,  not 
considered.  Gill  v.  Rochester  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  37  Hun,  107.     Deceased  was 


about  22  years  old;  he  earned  $25  a 
month  and  was  unmarried;  survivors 
were  a  father,  65  years  old,  and  a 
mother,  two  brothers  and  a  sister, 
who  all  resided  in  a  foreign  country. 
Bierbauer  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  559,  aff'd  77 
N.  Y.  588.  Court  considered  the 
probable  burden  and  expense  that  a 
deceased  child  would  have  been,  and 
his  probable  inability  to  support 
himself.  Child  was  about  4  years 
old.  Lehman  v.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  234.  See  sees.  561,  ."'71. 
herein. 

62  Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker. 
164  X.  Y.  58,  63,  aff'g  47  App.  Div. 
471 

751 


§  587  DEATH  —  FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

below  was  reversed.  In  this  case  evidence  as  to  the  son's  earn- 
ings was  held  admissible  to  show  what  use  the  father  was  accus- 
tomed to  make  of  such  wages  and  this  part  of  the  case  was  not 
reversed  and  accords  with  the  ruling  of  the  appeal  court.55 
Again,  where  deceased  was  a  boy  five  years  of  age  and  the 
plaintiff  was  his  father  and  next  of  kin,  the  trial  judge  charged 
that :  "  In  an  action  for  the  loss  of  services  of  a  child  by  the 
father,  the  limit  of  recovery  is  twenty-one  years  of  age ;  but  in 
deciding  this  case  you  may  take  into  account,  if  you  find  it  to 
be  probable,  that  this  boy  might  have  lived  beyond  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years,  and  you  may  compensate  the  father  for  what- 
ever age  you  find  the  probabilities  of  the  case  to  be  that  this  boy 
would  have  lived."  The  court  also  charged  as  an  abstract 
proposition  of  law,  "  that  the  father  has  no  legal  claim  upon 
the  earnings  of  the  son  beyond  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,"  and 
added,  "  that  the  father  could  compel  the  son  to  support  him  in 
his  old  age  and  the  jury  had  a  right  to  consider  that  fact,"  but 
the  court  refused  to  charge  upon  request,  as  a  proposition  of 
law,  "  that  the  father  has  no  claim  on  the  earnings  of  the  son 
beyond  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  except  in  case  the  father  be- 
comes poor  and  unable  to  support  himself  and  the  son  is  shown 
to  have  means."  For  this  refusal  to  so  charge  the  judgment 
was  reversed  and  a  new  trial  granted.  The  court  of  appeals, 
per  Haight,  J.,  affirmed  the  rule  declared  in  an  earlier  case  as 
setting  forth  the  various  elements  of  pecuniary  loss  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  in  estimating  the  damages  and  which  is  as 
follows :  "  First,  the  probable  earnings  of  the  son  during  his 
minority,  over  and  above  his  support,  clothing  and  education  ; 
next,  the  probability  of  his  living  and  becoming  of  sufficient 
ability  to  support  his  father  in  case  of  his  becoming  aged,  poor 
and  unable  to  support  himself;  and  then  they  had  the  right  to 
consider  the  amount  he  would  have  brought  to  his  next  of  kin 
while  living,  and  their  prospect  of  inheriting  from  him  after 
death,"  54  and  in  addition  it  was  declared  that,  "  the  father  had 
no  right  to  the  earnings  of  his  son  as  such,  after  he  became 


53  Lipp  v.  Otis  Brothers  &  Co.,  161 
N.  Y.  559,  per  Parker,  Ch.  J.,  56  N. 
E.  70,  rev'g  28App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  227; 
51  N.  Y.  Supp.  13. 

54  Citing   Johnson   v.  Long   Island 

752 


R.  Co.,  80  Hun  ( N.  Y. ),  306 ;  62  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  46;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  318,  aff'd 
144  N.  Y.  719;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R.  868; 
29  N.  E.  857. 


FOR    THE    PECUNIARY     IN.MItV.  §  588 

twenty-one  years  of  age."55  Another  declaration  of  the  court 
of  appeals,  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J.,  although  made  in  connection 
with  the  question  of  damages  for  a  miscarriage  resulting  from 
personal  injury  is  also  pertinent  here.  The  court,  after  stating 
the  difficulty  of  estimating  damages  for  an  infant's  killing,  as- 
serts that  the  ascertainment  of  the  value  of  an  infant's  life  is  in 
a  great  degree  a  matter  of  speculation  and  conjecture,  dependent 
upon  the  probabilities  whether  the  infant  would  have  lived  to 
an  age  capable  of  rendering  service  and  whether  the  continued 
life  would  be  a  pecuniary  benefit  or  a  burden,  and  also  upon 
numerous  contingencies.  But  it  was  added  that  the  material 
facts  capable  of  proof  were  the  age  and  sex  of  the  infant,  its 
mental  and  physical  condition,  its  bodily  strength,  and  generally 
whether  there  was  an  apparent  promise  of  a  continued  or  use- 
ful life  or  the  contrary,  and  in  view  of  the  facts  of  the  case  be- 
fore the  court  there  is  a  strong  intimation  that  proof  is  neces- 
sarv  as  to  the  sex,  mental  and  physical  capacit}^  of  the  child, 
although  such  intimation  would,  however,  only  be  binding  as 
such,  in  a  like  or  analogous  case.*  In  another  decision  in  the 
appeal  division  a  judgment  of  six  cents  damages  was  set  aside 
as  insufficient  where  it  appeared  that  the  deceased  was  a  boy 
sixteen  years  old,  who  was  attending  school  and  expected  to 
graduate  therefrom  the  following  summer.  Said  son  was  healthy 
and  strong,  six  feet  in  height  and  weighed  one  hundred  and 
forty  pounds.  The  father  did  not  depend  upon  the  son  for  a 
source  of  income  but  on  the  contrary  was  prosperous,  and  paid 
the  expenses  of  his  education.57 

§  588.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Services  of  minor,  cost  of  support,  etc. — Damages  not 
limited  to  minority. — Outside  of  those  general  elements  of 
damages  where  an  action  is  brought  to  recover  for  the  death  of 
children,38  there  are  certain  factors  which   relate  particularly  to 


66  Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  348;  04  X.  Y.  St.  R.  813;  40 
N.  E.  15,  rev'g  8  Misc.  601;  60  N.  Y'. 
St.  It.  831;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  325. 

56 Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  143 
N.  Y.  417,  421;  62  X.  Y.  St.  II.  432; 
60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  873;  38  N.  E.  454,  rev'g 
4  Misc.  401:  53  N.  Y.    St.    R.   664:  24 

4K  753 


X.  Y.  Supp.  142,  aff'g3  Misc.  45:',:  30 
Abb.  \.  ('.  78;  52  N.  Y.  St.  K.  198; 
23  X.  Y.  Supp.  103. 

67  Morris  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co., 
51  A  pp.  Div.  (X.  Y.i  512;  04  \.  Y. 
St.  R.  878:  30  Civ.  Proc.  II.  371. 

68  See  sees.  584  et  seq.,  herein. 


§  588  DEATH— FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

minor  children.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  chil- 
dren of  very  tender  years  can  render  no  services  of  provable 
value  and  in  extreme  infancy  their  services  can  be  of  no  actual 
pecuniary  value,  while  the  burden  necessarily  rests  upon  the 
parents  of  support,  clothing  and  education  during  minority,  or 
at  least  until  emancipation.  But  before  majority  is  reached  a 
child's  services  may  be  of  actual  provable  value  not  only  as  a 
wage  earner,  aiding  in  the  care  and  support  of  the  family  but, 
as,  in  many  cases,  bearing  the  entire  burden  of  support  thereof. 
Or  a  child  may  be  of  service  in  performing  household  duties, 
even  though  it  ma}r  be  very  young.  And  in  view  of  the  law 
that  present  and  prospective  damages  may  be  awarded,  it  can- 
not be  said  that  a  child's  services  are  of  no  pecuniary  value,  even 
though  such  value  is  not  susceptible  of  definite  proof,  nor  will 
it  be  held  that  the  cost  of  support,  clothing  and  education  of  a 
child  exceed  the  value  of  its  services.  A  father  is  legally  en- 
titled to  the  services  of  his  child  during  its  minority  and  also  to 
such  child's  earnings  except  in  so  far  as  the  child's  emancipation 
may  change  the  rule.  When,  however,  majority  is  reached, 
these  legal  claims  of  the  father  cease,  except  the  conditions  are 
such  as  to  bring  the  child  within  the  rule  in  New  York,  enforc- 
ing a  legal  obligation  under  certain  circumstances  to  support 
indigent,  etc.,  parents.  It  follows  that  a  father  can  recover  for 
the  loss  of  services  during  minority  and  for  the  probable  earn- 
ings of  the  child  during  that  period,  over  and  above  its  support. 
Nor  is  the  recovery  limited  to  the  child's  minority,  for  all  the 
benefits  probable  and  possible,  as  modified  by  the  chances  of 
failure  and  misfortune  which  might  result  to  the  next  of  kin 
from  the  child's  life  after  majority  would  have  been  reached, 
may  also  be  considered.  In  addition  the  action  is  not  based 
upon  the  loss  of  the  child's  services  but  upon  the  statute  and 
therefore  the  recovery  is  held  not  to  be  restricted  to  such  loss 
of  services  but  is  the  whole  pecuniary  loss.59     In  North  Carolina 


59  Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co., 
110  N.  Y.  504;  18  N.  Y.  St.  R.  130; 
13  Cent.  130;  18  N.  E.  108,  aff'g  110 
N.  Y.  504;  3  N.  Y.  St.  R.  133;  25 
Wkly.  Dig.  46;  Keenan  v.  Brooklyn 
City  R.  Co.,  145  N.  Y.  348,  350,  per 
Haight,  J.;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  843;  40 
754 


N.  E.  15,  citing  Johnson  v.  Long  Is- 
land R.  Co.,  80  Hun  (N.  Y.),  306;  62 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  46;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  318, 
aff'd  144  N.  Y.  719;  70  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
868;  29  N.  E.  857;  McGovern  v.  New 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  417; 
Ihl  v.  Forty-Second  St.  &  G.  St.  F.  R. 


FOR    THE    I'EITMAKY    IN. HU\ 


§  589 


under  the  same  wording  of  the  statute  as  to  the  amount  to  be 
awarded  being  a  fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury,  the  infant's  probable  gross  income,  based  upon  his  ex- 
pectancy of  life,  less  the  expenditures  for  his  living,  constitutes 
the  measure  of  damages.60 

§589.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury  "—Nominal  damages— Death  of  infants.— We  have 
considered  under  a  prior  section  the  question  of  nominal  dam- 
ages for  the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing  of  other  than  chil- 
dren.'11    In  case  an  infant  is  negligently  or  wrongfully  killed  if 


Co.,  47  N.  Y.  317;  7  Am.  Rep.  450; 
O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y. 
445;  Coghlan  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  7 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  124; 39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1098,  aff'g  16  Misc.  677;  25  Civ.  Proc. 
249;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  113;  Pressman 
v.  Mooney,  5  App.  Div.  (  N.  Y. )  121; 
30  X.  Y.  Supp.  44;  Ford  v.  Monroe, 
•_'()  Wend.  (N.  Y. )  210.  See  Morris  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  51  App.  Div. 
i  \.  Y.  )  512;  64  N.  Y.  St.  R.  878;  30 
Civ.  Proc.  371;  Stuebingv.  Marshall, 
2  Civ.  Proc.  (X.  Y.)  77,  aff'd  2  Civ. 
Proc.  81:  10  Daly,  406. 

60  Russell  v.  Windsor  Steamboat 
Co..  126  \.  C.  961;  36  S.  E.  191.  And 
in  that  state  Uiere  is  a  legal  presump- 
tion that  a  father  is  entitled  to  his 
minor  son's  earnings  and  if  he  con- 
tinues as  a  member  of  the  family 
after  his  minority,  services  rendered 
by  him  are  presumed  to  be  gratui- 
tous. Grant  v.  Grant,  109  N.  C.  710; 
14  S.  E.  90.  As  to  mother's  right  to 
sue  for  loss  of  services  of  her  infant 
unmarried  daughter  by  reason  of 
death  caused  by  malpractice,  see 
Sorensen  v.  Balaban,  11  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  164;  76  X.  Y.  St.  R.  654;  42 
N.  Y.  Supp.  654.  As  to  emancipation 
of  infant  and  right  of  such  minor  to 
work  for  herself,  sec  Taylor  v. 
Welsh.  92  Hun  (X.  V.i.  272:  72  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  316;  36  X.  Y.  Supp.  952.  Father 


liable  for  abandoned  minor  son's 
necessaries.  Manning  v.  Wells.  S 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  646;  <il  X.  V.  St.  R. 
59;  29  X.  Y.  Supp.  1044.  aff'd  85 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  27;  66  X.  Y.St.  R.  109; 
32  X.  Y.  Supp.  601.  That  mother 
must  allege  and  prove  that  child  was 
in  her  service  when  she  sues  for  dam- 
ages for  injury,  see  Geraghty  v. 
Xew,  7  Misc.  i  N.  V.  I  30;  57  N.  V.  St. 
R.  497;  27  X.  Y.  Supp.  403.  As  to 
right  of  emancipated  child  to  con- 
tract with  father  for  wages  or  com- 
pensation for  services,  see  Kain  v. 
Larkin,  131  X.  Y.  307:  43  X.  Y.  St. 
R.  197:  30  X.  F.  106,  rev'g  42  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  571;  17  \.  Y.  Supp.  223.  See 
as  to  right  of  parents  to  earnings  of 
child.  McClurg  v.  McKercher,  56 
Hun  i  N.  Y.i.  305.  Where  the  child 
was  killed  in  New  Mexico  it  is  nec- 
essary to  aver  that  deceased  was  a 
minor  under  the  act  of  that  state 
which  gives  a  right  to  the  father  and 
mother.  \>>  sue  if  the  child  was  a 
"  minor  and  unmarried."  Isaac  v. 
Denver  &  Rio  Grande  R.  Co.,  12 
Daly  (N.  V.  >.  340,  aff'd  102  X.  Y.  718. 
As  to  right  of  action  for  loss  of  ser- 
vice of  child  killed,  see  notes  41 
L.  R.  A.  S07;  34  id.  788.  And  see  as 
to  value  of  children,  15  Cent.  L.  .T.2SG. 
6i  See  sec.  560.  herein. 

7-").") 


§  589  DEATH — FAIR    AND   .JUST    COMPENSATION 

the  child  is  of  very  tender  years,  the  proof  upon  the  question 
of  damages  must  of  necessity  be  limited  and  cannot  extend 
much  beyond  that  of  the  age  and  sex  of  the  child,  the  situation 
or  circumstances  and  condition  in  life  of  the  parents  and  other 
facts  existing  at  the  time  of  the  death  and  trial,  while  in  some 
cases  the  infant's  mental  and  physical  condition  ma}r  be  sus- 
ceptible of  proof,  and  in  a  general  way  the  last  might  be  true  as 
to  all  very  young. children.  The  pecuniary  value  of  the  life  of 
an  infant  for  several  years  after  its  birth  is  from  a  strictly  legal 
standpoint  a  matter  concerning  which  it  would  be  most  difficult 
if  not  impossible  to  determine  even  approximately,  for  all 
evidence  beyond  that  above  mentioned  would  be  merely  specu- 
lative and  hypothetical  and  of  no  aid  to  the  jury.  But  to  hold 
that  such  a  life  is  of  no  pecuniary  value  and  that  no  recovery 
can  be  had  except  upon  proof  of  the  pecuniary  loss  occasioned 
by  its  wrongful  taking  would  put  a  premium  on  negligence. 
The  jury,  therefore,  have  been  given  a  large  discretion  in  de- 
termining what  constitutes  a  fair  and  just  compensation  in  this 
class  of  cases.  And  the  rule  is  that  in  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing  of  an  infant  of  tender 
years,  proof  of  special  or  direct  pecuniary  damage  or  injury  is 
not  necessary,  either  to  maintain  the  action  or  to  enable  the  jury 
to  give  nominal  damages,  nor  will  they  be  restricted  to  nominal 
damages  in  such  case.  This  is  likewise  true  where  there  is  an 
absence  of  proof  of  pecuniary  injury  as  such,  or  other  than  as 
above  stated.62     But  it  is  also  intimated  in  a  case  decided  in 


62  Rule  applied  in  an  action  for 
the  killing  of  an  infant  .">  years  old 
although  the  only  evidence  was  of 
the  age,  sex  and  general  intelligence 
of  deceased.  Howell  v.  Rochester 
R.  Co.,  24  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  502;  49 
N.  Y.  Supp.  17.  The  recovery  is 
not  limited  to  nominal  damages  but 
rests  upon  such  proof  as  can  be  made, 
and  the  amount  to  be  assessed  rests 
in  the  jury's  discretion  subject  to 
review  upon  abuse  of  such  discre- 
tion. Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice 
Co.,  110  X.  Y.  504;  18  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  130;  18  N.  E.  108,  aff'g  41  Hun. 
404;  3  X.   Y.    St.     R.    188?  25   Wkly. 

750 


Dig.  46.  This  case  is  cited  as  to  the 
measure  of  damages  for  an  infant's 
death  in  Russell  v.  Windsor  Steam- 
boat Co.,  126  N.  C.  961 ;  36  N.  E.  191. 
Deceased  was  6  years  old,  healthy 
and  bright.  The  facts  attending  her 
death  and  parents'  occupation  were 
shown.  There  was  no  other  proof 
of  pecuniary  injury  and  the  court 
declared  that  although  the  proof 
was  inadequate,  no  more  could  be 
required  than  it  was  possible  to  give, 
and  the  matter  was.  therefore,  for  the 
jury  to  determine  the  pecuniary  loss. 
Houghkirk  v.  Delaware  &  H.  C.  Co., 
92  N.  Y.   219,    rev'g  28  Hun,  407;  15 


FOE    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY 


)89 


1894  that  while  there  are  some  material  facts  capable  of  proof, 
such  as  the  age  and  sex  of  the  infant,  its  mental  and  physical 
condition,  its  bodily  strength,  and  generally  whether  there  was 


Wkly.  Dig.  522,  which  affM  11   Abb. 
N.  C.  72;  03  How.  328;  4  Month.  Law 
Bull.   65.     In  the  case  of  the  death 
of  an  infant  daughter,   i  he  court  de- 
clared that  the  jury  should  consider 
the  age  and  sex  of  the  deceased  and 
the  social  condition  and  standing  of 
tbe  next  of  kin,  and  the  probability 
of   their    sustaining    any    pecuniary 
damage  by  her  death,  and  that  noth- 
ing could  be  allowed  which  was  not 
of  definite  pecuniary  value,  while  the 
verdict  must  be  only  for  the  pecu- 
niary   injury,  but  that  there  was  no 
way     to    ascertain     mathematically 
what  that  damage  would  be,  there- 
fore  it  must  be  to  a  great    extent 
speculative  with   nothing  to  control 
the  jury  or  fix  the  amount   of  the 
verdict  except  their  good  judgment 
and  the  statutory  limit.     This  limit 
does  not.  however,  now  exist.     Eth- 
erington  v.  Prospect  Park  &  C.  I.  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  641,  aff'g  24  Hun,  235. 
Proof  is  not  necessary  as    to  special 
pecuniary     damage.       Kennedy      v. 
Rvall,  67  N.   Y.  379,  aff'g  40  N.   Y. 
Super.  347.     See    sec.    561,    herein. 
Where  deceased  was  only  3  years  old, 
it  was  held  that  proof  of  special  pecu- 
niary  damages    was  unnecessary  to 
maintain  the  action  or  to  warrant  the 
jury  in  finding  more  than  nominal 
damages,  and  that  the  jury  might  es- 
timate the  damages  with  reference  to 
the  pecuniary  injury,  present  or  pros- 
pective,  upon  all   the  facts   proved, 
which  were  sustained   by  those  en- 
titled to  recover.     The  jury  in  this 
case   had  before  them  the    parents, 
their  position  in  life,  the  occupation 
of  the  father  and  the  age  and  sex  of 
the  child.   A  nonsuit  was  refused  and 
the  court  declared    that    any  other 


evidence  would  necessarily  be  specu- 
lative and  hypothetical  and  would 
not  aid  the  jury.  There  is  also  a 
discussion  as  to  the  impracticability 
of  furnishing  direct  evidence  of 
specific  loss  in  these  cases  and  a 
further  declaration  that  to  require 
such  proof  would  render  the  statute 
nugatory  in  most  cases.  Ihl  v. 
Forty-Second  St.  &  <i.  St.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  47  N.  Y.  317;  7  Am.  Rep.  450. 
In  case  of  the  killing  of  a  boy  11 
years  old  jury  may  use  their  own 
judgment,  and  may  infer  that  his 
services  were  of  some  value.  O'Mara 
v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  44:». 
No  proof  of  pecuniary  damage  re- 
quired where  child  about  7  years  old 
was  killed.  The  statute  does  not 
limit  the  recovery  to  the  actual  loss 
proven.  Oldfield  v.  New  York  A: 
Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310,  aff'g  3 
E.  D.  Smith,  103.  In  case  of  a  child 
about  4  years  old  only  nominal  dam- 
ages were  held  recoverable  under  a 
ruling  which,  and  upon  an  opinion 
which  is  certainly,  at  the  least,  not 
in  harmony  with  the  law  of  New  York 
as  evidenced  by  the  decisions.  Leh- 
man v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  '29  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  "234.  A  verdict  for  nominal 
damages  will  not  be  set  aside  on  the 
ground  of  a  presumption  of  pecuni- 
ary loss  to  the  next  of  kin  from  the 
killing  of  an  infant  of  tender  years. 
It  was  also  held  in  this  case  that 
only  nominal  damages  could  he  re- 
covered where  there  was  no  proof  of 

other  than  deceased's  age,  which  was 
2  years  and  nine  months,  and  of  his 
health.     Silberstein  v.  Wicke  Co.,  29 

Abb.    N.   C.    (N.    Y.)  291;  22  N.    Y. 
Supp.    170.     Deceased  child   was  .'.' 
years  old.     The  ages  and  number  of 
7")  7 


§  590 


DEATH  —  FA  III    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 


an  apparent  promise  of  a  continued  or  useful  life  or  the  con- 
trary, yet  the  jury's  verdict  must,  though  speculative,  have 
some  of  these  safeguards  slight  as  they  were,  and  must  rest 
upon  some  of  these  elements,  such  as  sex  or  mental  or  physical 
condition.63 


§  590.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury " — Death  of  unborn  child. — The  death  of  an  unborn  child 
does  not  constitute  an  element  of  damages.64 


brothers  and  sisters,  the  occupation 
of  the  father  and  his  age  and  earn- 
ings were  shown,  hut  the  court  re- 
fused to  set  aside  as  inadequate  a 
verdict  of  $375.  Reger  v.  Roch- 
ester Ry.  Co.,  2  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)5;  73  N.  Y.  St.  R.  209.  Where 
the  deceased  was  16  years  old  and 
there  was  no  evidence  other  than 
that  of  her  age,  and  that  she  had 
cared  for  the  house  since  her  mother's 
death,  $4,000  was  held  excessive 
where  the  action  was  for  her  father's 
sole  benefit.  Dinnihan  v.  Lake  On- 
tario B.  Imp.  Co.,  8  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  509;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  764.  Held 
that  the  father  might  recover  the  en- 
tire pecuniary  loss  for  the  death  of 
an  infant  daughter.  Coghlan  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  124;  39  X.  Y.  Supp.  11098, 
aff'g  16  Misc.  677.  See  McGovern  v. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N.  Y. 
417.  The  only  proof  of  pecuniary 
loss  from  death  of  boy  of  10  years  of 
age  was  that  although  attending 
school  he  sometimes  did  errands  for 
his  mother  ;  $1,500  in  favor  of 
mother  held  excessive.  Heusner  v. 
Houston,  7  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  48;  57  X.  Y. 
St.  R.  528;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  365.  Age 
of  widowed  mother  need  not  be 
proven  where  otherwise  determina- 
ble. Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,  68  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  102;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  216;  22 
N.  Y.  Supp.  732,  aff'd  140  N.  Y.  619; 
55    N.  Y.   St,   R.   9l:9;  35   N.   E.  890. 

758 


Although  it  does  not  appear  that 
there  is  any  pecuniary  damage  be- 
cause the  child  is  so  young,  yet  the 
court  will  not  disturb  the  verdict  for 
that  reason  alone.  Ahern  v.  Steele, 
48  Hun  (N.  Y.),  517;  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 
259,  case  reversed,  115  N.  Y.  203;  26 
N.  Y.  St.  R.  295;  22  N.  E.  193,  and 
the  case  in  48  Hun,  rev'd  7  N.  Y.  St. 
R.  416;  26  Wkly.  Dig.  474;  the  case 
in  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  259,  is  cited  in  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Oil  more 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1899),  53  S.  W.  61. 
Error  to  nonsuit  plaintiff  or  to  di- 
rect that  nominal  damages  be  given 
for  child's  death  where  there  is  no 
proof  of  special  damages.  Gorham 
v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  Hun  (N.  Y.),449.  Error  to  non- 
suit or  to  direct  verdict  for  nominal 
damages  for  absence  of  proof  of  spe- 
cial damages.  Gorham  v.  New  York 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
449. 

68 Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  143 
N.  Y.  417,  421,  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J. ; 
60  N.  Y.  St.  R.  873  ,  case  affirms  3 
Misc.  453;  30  Abb.  N.  C.  78;  52  N.  Y. 
St.  R.  498;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  163,  case  re- 
verses 4  Misc.  401 ;  53  N.  Y.  St.  R. 
(i64;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  142.  See  also 
Carpenter  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  I!. 
Co.,  38  Hun  (N.  Y. ),  116;  and  exam- 
ine cases  in  last  preceding  note. 

64  Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  14;', 

N.  Y.  417,  421,  per  Andrews,  Ch.  J. ; 

|  62  N.  Y.  St.  R.   432;  60  N.  Y.  St.  R. 


FOB    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY. 


§§  591,  592 


§591.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury"— Death  of  child— Expense  occasioned  by  mother's 

sickness.— Where  by  reason  of  the  death  of  her  son  and  con- 
sequent shock  to  her  maternal  feelings,  the  mother  suffers  sick- 
ness and  the  husband  and  father  is  subjected  to  expense  there- 
for, he  may  allege  such  expense  as  special  damages  and  may 
recover  the  same  in  an  action  for  his  son's  killing.'13 

§  592.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  pecuniary 
injury"  —Collateral  kindred— Next  of  kin — In  New  York  no 
distinction  seems  to  be  made  as  to  collateral  kindred  and  those  im- 
mediately related.  The  words  of  the  statute  do  not  create  a  liabil- 
ity merely  in  those  cases  where  the  relations  between  the  parties 
are  such  that  the  persons  to  be  indemnified  had  a  legal  right  to 
some  pecuniary  benefit  which  is  lost  by  the  death  of  the  person 
killed.  The  right  of  action  is  given  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife,  and  next  of  kin  exclusively,  and  by  next  of  kin  are  meant 
those  parties  who  are  pecuniarily  injured  by  the  death  of  the 
person  to  whom  they  stand  in  that  relation.  It  is  not  required 
that  the  degree  of  kindred  should  be  such  as  to  create  the  duty 
of  sustenance,  support  or  education.  Nor  does  it  matter  that 
some  of  the  next  of  kin  have  suffered  greater  pecuniary  loss 
than  others  from  the  death.  The  sum  to  be  recovered  represents 
the  entire  pecuniary  loss  resulting  from  the  death  to  each  and 
all  the  relations  mentioned  in  the  statute.  The  legislature 
created  the  remedy  for  the  husband  or  wife  or  next  of  kin  as  a 
class,  and  the  damages  are  for  the  benefit  of  every  person  con- 
stituting that  class,  who  survives.  There  is,  therefore,  no  dis- 
crimination with  reference  to  the  degree  of  kinship  nor  with 
reference  to  those  enumerated  in  the  statute  as  beneficiaries.66 


163;  38  ST.  E.  454;  26  L.  It.  A.  46,  rev'g 
4  Misc  401;  53  X.  Y.  St.  R.  664;  24  X. 
Y.  Supp.  142,  aff'g  3  Misc.  453;  30 
Abb.  N.  C.  78;  52  N.  Y.  St.  R.  498; 
23  N.  Y.  Supp.  163. 

05  Ford  v.  Monroe,  20  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  210. 

66  Matter  of  Snedeker  v.  Snedeker, 
164  N.  Y.  58,  62,  63,  per  Bartlett,  J., 
citing  Oldfield  v.  New  York  &  Har- 
lem R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310;  Tilley  v. 


Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  474; 
Murphy  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  447.  See  also  Kelly 
v.  Twenty-Third,  14  Daly  (N.  Y.), 
418;  14  N.  Y.  St.  R.  699;  27  Wkly. 
Dig.  .".72,  case  aff'd  113  X.  Y.  628;  22 
X.  V.  St.  R.  904;  20  N.  E.  878.  Ex- 
amine generally  as  to  recovery, 
Kane  v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  90 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  65;  70  X.  V.  St.  K.  203; 
35  X.  Y.   Supp.  581,  aff'd   158  X.   Y. 

T.V.i 


SS  593-595  fair  and  just  compensation 

§  593.  Death— Mitigation  of  damages— Defenses— Insur- 
ance.— Insurance  upon  the  life  of  deceased  cannot  be  considered 
in  mitigation  of  damages.67 

§  594.  Death— Defense— Provoking  difficulty— Liability 
of  sheriff  or  officer. — Where  one  in  the  custody  of  a  sheriff 
provokes  a  difficulty  with  a  fellow  prisoner  and  strikes  the  first 
blow  and  is  killed,  and  no  reason  to  anticipate  the  affray  exists, 
the  sheriff  is  not  liable  in  damages  for  the  death,  although  lie 
is  chargeable  by  law  with  the  duty  of  receiving  and  safely 
keeping  those  persons  committed  to  his  custody.68  But  an  offi- 
cer who  kills  another  without  justification  is  liable  to  decedent's 
representatives,  notwithstanding  he  may  also  be  criminally  pros- 
ecuted.69 

§  595.  Death— Allowance  of  interest. — Interest  may  be  al- 
lowed from  the  time  of  the  death  to  the  date  of  the  verdict,  at 
the  rate  provided  by  the  statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  ver- 
dict.70 If,  however,  the  cause  of  action  arises  under  a  foreign 
statute  which  does  not  permit  the  recovery  of  interest  upon  the 
damages  given  in  such  cases,  such  statute  controls,  and  interest 
cannot  be  recovered  since  the  New  York  statute  only  relates  in 


680;  Pineov,  New  York  C.R.  Co.,  34 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  80,  aff'd  99  N.  Y.  044; 
Dickens  v.  New  York  C.  R.  Co.,  1 
Abb.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  504. 

67  Kellogg  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  79  N.  Y.  72;  Altborf  v.  Wolfe, 
2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  344,  aff'd  22  N.  Y. 
355. 

es  Guntber  v.  Jobnson,  36  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  437:  55  N.  Y.  Supp. 
869. 

69  Kain  v.  Larkin,  56  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
79;  29  N.  Y.  St.  R.  643;  9  N.  Y. 
Supp.  89,  under  N.  Y.  Code  Civ. 
Proc.  sec.  1899  (Stover's  Annot, 
Code,  1898),  wbicb  provides  tbat 
"wbere  tbe  violation  of  a  rigbt  ad- 
mits of  a  civil  and  also  of  a  criminal 
prosecution,  the  one  is  not  merged  in 
the  other."  This  section  is  a  part  of 
article  4th  which  includes  sees.  1902 
760 


-1905,  relating  to  death  by  negli- 
gence, and  the  title  of  the  article  is 
"  certain  actions  to  recover  damages 
for  wrongs."  As  to  intentional  kill- 
ing and  excuse  or  justification  and 
that  master  not  liable  for  servant's 
wilful  act,  etc.,  see  Fraser  v.  Freeman, 
56  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  243,  rev' d  43  N.  Y. 
566. 

70  Salter  v.  Utica  &  Black  R.  R. 
Co.,  86  N.  Y.  401,  case  affirms  23 
Hun,  203,  decided  under  act  1870, 
ch.  78,  although  it  is  held  that  tins 
act  does  not  apply  to  pending  cases, 
and  therefore  the  rule  in  the  text  is 
not  within  the  statutes.  Cook  v. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  10 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  426.  See  Erwin  v. 
Neversink  Steamboat  Co.,  23  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  578,  aff'd  88  N.  Y.  184. 


FOR    THE 


•K<    r\IAi:Y     I  N.I  I'll  V 


>95 


this  respect  to  matters  of  procedure,  etc.71  But  interest  on  the 
damages  is  to  be  added  in  the  entry  of  judgment,  and  is  not 
within  the  province  of  the  jury  to  compute.7' 


"  Kiefer  v.  (hand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  12 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  28;  76  N.  V.  St. 
R.  171;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  171,  afPd 
153  N.  Y.  088. 

11  Manning  v.  Port  Henry  Iron  Ore 
Co.,  91  N.  Y.  004:  10  Wkly.  Dig.  401, 
rev'g27Hun,  219.  But  see  Boyd  v. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  K.  Co.,  li  Civ. 
Proc.  (X.  Y\ )  222;  Sinne  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  8  Civ.  Proc.  (\.  Y. )  252  note. 
"  When  final  judgment  for  the  plain- 


tiff is  rendered,  the  clerk  must  add 
to  the  sum  awarded  interest  there- 
upon from  the  decedent' 8  death,  and 
include  it  in  the  judgment.  The  in- 
quisition, verdict,  report  or  decision 
may  specify  the  day  from  which  in- 
terest is  io  lie  computed;  if  it  omits 
to  do  so,  the  day  may  be  determined 
by  the  clerk  upon  affidavits."  2 
Stover's  N.  Y.  Ann.  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
sec.  1904. 

761 


DEATH       FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

DEATH — "FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION  WITH  REFERENCE 
TO  THE  PECUNIARY  INJURIES  " — "  DIRECT  DAMAGES"" 
SUSTAINED— FORFEITURE  OR  FINE — "  SUCH  SUM  AS  THE 
JURY    MAY    DEEM    REASONABLE.'1 


§  596.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  —  Stat- 
utes. 

597.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Stat- 
utes— Continued  —  Gener- 
ally. 

598.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Stat- 
utes —  Continued  —  Bene- 
ficiaries, etc. 

599.  "  Direct  damages  sustained" 

— Miners'  statute. 

600.  Forfeiture    or    fine  —  Indict- 

ment —  Railroads  —  Com- 
mon carriers — Statute. 

601.  "Such  sum   as  the  jury  may 

deem  reasonable  "  — Stat- 
ute. 

602.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Pecu- 
niary loss. 

603.  Same  subject  continued. 

604.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  —  Ex- 
emplary damages. 

605.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  inference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  —  Jury 
and  instructions. 

762 


606.  Same   subject  —  Proper     and 

erroneous  instructions  — 
Illustrations. 

607.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Fac- 
tors generally  to  be  consid- 
ered. 

608.  Same      subject     continued — 

Evidence  of  wages. 

609.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Suffer- 
ings of  person  injured. 

610.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Sola- 
tium —  Mental  suffering, 
loss  of  society,  etc. 

611.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Phy- 
sical injury  to  benefici- 
ary. 

612.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Rela- 
tionship, legal  and  actual, 
of  deceased  to  beneficia- 
ries. 

613.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"  —  Legal 
or  moral  obligation  —  Le- 
gal right — Support  or  de- 
pendency. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIAR'?    INJURIES. 


6  596 


§  614 
61".. 

616. 


61' 


618. 
610. 
620. 
621. 


622. 


623. 


624. 


625 


626 
627 


628 


Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject  concluded 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary benefit. 

•■  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  "  —  Phy- 
sical and  iiuancial  condi- 
tion— Age  and  number  <>f 
beneficiaries. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject  continued. 

Same  subject — Conclusion. 

'•  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Wealth 
of  defendant. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries" — Prob- 
able accumulations. 

"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the   pe- 
cuniary    injuries  "  —  Ex- 
penses  of    sickness,       fu- 
neral, etc. 
"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with   reference   to  the  pe- 
cuniary   injuries"  —  Life 
expectancy    —    Mortality 
tables. 
"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries'*  —  Nomi- 
nal damages. 
Same  subject  continued. 
"  Fair  and  just  compensation 
with   reference   to  the  pe- 
cuniary   injuries" —  Death 
of  husband— Husband  and 
father. 
Same      subject  —  Annuity  — 
Dower,  etc.  —  Instruction 
and  opinion  of  court. 


620.  ••  Fair  and  jusl  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries'1  -Death 
of  wife. 

630.  Same     subject     continued  — 

Mai  i  ied  woman's  act. 

631.  -Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  t"  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries "     Death 

of  patent. 

632.  "Fair  and  just  compensation 

witli  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries*"  -Train- 
ing, etc.,  of  children — 
Death  of  parent. 

633.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  " — Death 
of  children. 

634.  Same  subject  continued. 

635.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  *' — Death 
of  children — Minority  and 
majority. 

636.  "  Fair  ami  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  *'  —  Death 
of  children — Adults. 

637.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries'" — Collat- 
eral kindred. 

638.  Defenses— Mitigation  of  dam- 

ages— Insurance. 

639.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation 

with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries'" — De- 
fenses —  Remarriage  and 
marriage. 

640.  Death— Defenses— Pension  to 

widow  and  children  in 
mitigation. 

641.  Damages   assessed   on    affirm- 

ance of  judgment. 


§  596.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 


8  596 


I>KATI1       FAN:    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


pecuniary  injuries  " — Statutes. — In  Arkansas,  Illinois,  Maine, 
Montana  and  Nebraska,  the  jury  may  give  such  damages  under  the 
General  Statutes  as  they  shall  deem  a  fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pecuniary  injuries.  In  Arkansas  the  con- 
stitution '  prohibits  a  limitation  of  the  amount  to  be  recovered. 
In  Illinois,  Maine  and  Nebraska,  the  damages  are  limited  to  five 
thousand  dollars,  and  in  Montana  they  must  not  exceed  twenty 
thousand  dollars.  The  wife  and  next  of  kin  are  the  designated 
beneficiaries  in  Arkansas,  Illinois,  Montana  and  Nebraska,  and 
the  amount  recovered  is  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  widow 
and  next  of  kin,  while  in  Maine  the  damages  are  those  result- 
ing from  the  death  to  the  persons  for  whose  benefit  the  action 
is  brought,  and  the  recovery  is  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the 
widow,  if  no  children,  and  of  the  children  if  no  widow,  and  if 
both,  then  of  her  and  them  equally,  and  if  neither,  of  his  heirs. 
The  action  in  all  the  above  named  states  must  be  brought  by 
and  in  the  name  of  the  personal  representative.  The  right  to 
sue  exists  where  the  death  is  caused  by  wrongful  act,  neglect 
or  default,  such  as  would  if  death  had  not  ensued,  have  entitled 
the  party  injured  to  maintain  an  action,  and  recover  damages 
in  respect  thereof,  and  this  even  though  the  death  shall  have 
been  caused  under  such  circumstances  as  amount  in  law  to  a 
felony.'- 


i  Art.  5. 

•^  Ark.  Sandels  &  Hill's  Dig.  Ark. 
Stats.  1894,  p.  1310,  sees.  5911,  5912. 
(See  id.  p.  1309,  131,  sec.  5908,  id. 
pp.  1311-1314,  sees.  5920-5939,  as 
to  revivor  of  actions  in  general. ) 
Mansfield's  Dig.  sees.  5225,  5226. 
Sanborn  &  Hill's  Dig.  sees.  5912,  5925, 
111.  Hurd's  111.  Rev.  Stat.  1899, 
p.  964,  ch.  70;  1  Starr  &  C.  Ann.  St. 
oh.  70;  Rev.  Stat.  174,  p.  582;  1  111. 
Rev.  Stat.  1858,  sees.  1,  2,  p.  422;  111. 
Act,  Feb.  12,  1853.  Indian  Ty. 
Mansfield's  Ark.  Dig.  sees.  5225,  5226, 
adopted  as  law  of  Indian  Territory, 
by  act  of  congress,  May  2,  1890;  for 
construction  of  act  and  application, 
see  Arc!  more  Coal  Co.  v.  Bevil  (U. 
S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  Civ.),  61  Fed.  757. 
Me.     Acts,  1891,  cb.   124,    sees.  1,  2; 

764 


Freeman's  Suppl.  1885-1895,  p.  438. 
Mont.  Codes  (Civ.  Proc),  1895, 
sees.  578,  579;  Comp.  Stat.  1888, 
p.  911,  sees.  981,  982;  Rev.  Stat.  1879, 
p.  508;  Codes  (Civ.),  1895,  sees.  4353, 
4354,  provides  for  payment  of  debts 
by  one  who  kills  another  in  a  duel, 
and  also  for  maintenance  of  widow 
and  minor  cbildren  of  the  person 
slain  or  disabled.  As  to  survival  of 
actions,  see  Const.  Codes  &  Stats. 
1895,  sec.  587,  p.  792.  See  also  cbaps. 
23, 31,  herein.  Neb.  Comp.  stat.  1901, 
p.  523,  sees.  2503,  2504  (that  action 
does  not  abate,  see  id.  p.  1248,  sec. 
5632,  and  as  to  revival  generally, 
see  id.  p.  1311,  sees.  6035,  et  seq. ) ; 
Comp.  Stat.  1897,  ch.  21;  Comp.  L. 
1881,  ch.  21,  sees.  1,  2. 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECl  MAKV    INJURIES. 


19' 


§  597.  *«  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 

pecuniary  injuries"     Statutes  —  Continued  — Generally.— 

Damages  may  be  recovered  in  all  cases  under  the  Nebraska 
statute  for  the  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  of  another  where 
the  injured  party  might  have  maintained  the  action  had  he  sur- 
vived the  injury,8  and  this  applies  bo  one  whose  death  was  oc- 
casioned by  injuries  while  being  transported  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany.' So  the  Arkansas  death  act  applies  to  all  cases  in  which 
a  recovery  may  be  had  for  negligent,  etc.,  killing,  regardless  of 
the  agency  inflicting  the  injury,  and  supersedes  the  act  of  1875, 
relating  to  injuries  by  railroad  trains."'  In  Illinois  the  compen- 
sation to  be  awarded  is  to  be  considered  in  view  of  the  fact 
whether  or  not  the  death  results  from  a  cause  other  than  the 
injuries  for  which  the  suit  is  brought.'1  This  involves  the 
question  whether  there  was  conscious  suffering  or  an  instan- 
taneous death.1  And  in  the  same  connection  the  survival 
statute  is  important,8  as  is  also  the  determination  of  the 
point  whether  the  action  is  for  the  death  or  the  injury  and  the 
necessary  elements  of  damages  in  connection  with  these  actions 


3  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  V.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  58  Neb.  678;  79  X.  W.  556; 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  343; 
Neb.  Comp.  Stat.  1897,  chap.  21. 

*  Chicago,  K.  I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zernecke  (Neb.).  82  X.  \V.  26. 

5  Davis  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  53  Ark.  117;  13  S.  W.  801;  7  L. 
R.  A.  283;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
690. 

6  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  119  111.  586;  6  West.  773; 
9  N.  E.  203:  19  111.  App.  591;  Merri- 
hew  v.  Chicago  City  R.  Co.,  92  111. 
App.  386,  under  Act,  Feb.  12,  1853, 
Laws,  1853,  p.  97.  See  sec.  009, 
herein. 

7  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dyliuski,  67  111.  App.  114;  2  Chic. 
L.  J.  Wkly.  77;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Dawson.  68  Ark.  1;  56 
S.  W.  40,  citing  numerous  cases;  St. 
Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mahoney,  ''.7 
Ark.  617;  55  S.   W.  S4U;  Sawyer  v. 


Perry,  88  Me.  42;  33  Atl.  660;  State 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  61  Md.  114, 
indictment;  State  v.  Maine,  C.  R. 
Co.,  00  Me.  490,  indictment. 

s  Ark.  Const,  ait.  5;  Ark.  Dig. 
Stat.  1884,  sec.  5223;  111.  Rev.  Stat. 
1891,  ch.  3,  sec.  122;  1  Starr*  C. 
Ann.  Stat.  1885,  p.  247:  p.  123,  sec. 
123;  Comp.  Stat.  Mont.  1887,  sec.  22. 
Examine  Hill  v.  Bryant,  61  Ark. 
203;  32  S.  W.  500,  under  Sanb.  &  R. 
Ark.  Dig.  sec.  5925.  Does  not  sur- 
vive against  wrongdoer's  personal 
representative.  Davis  v.  Nichols 
(Ark.),  15  S.  W.  880.  That  action 
lies  against  corporation  for  re- 
ceiver's negligence  after  receiver's 
discharge  and  restoration  of  prop- 
erty, see  Bartlett  v.  Cicero  Light, 
II.  &  P.  Co.,  177  HI.  68;  52  N.  E. 
389;  48  Cent.  L.  J.  11C;  42  L.  R.  A. 
715,  rev'g  69  111.  App.  576.  Exa- 
mine cases  cited  in  laBt  preceding 
note  herein. 

Tt'.o 


§  597 


DEATH  — FA  IK  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


and  which  are  dependent  upon  the  character  thereof,  since  if 
the  death  act  is  exclusive,  the  measure  of  damages  would  not 
rest  upon  the  same  factors  as  under  a  survival  action.9  The 
above  considerations  further  involve  the  question  whether  or 
not  there  can  be  more  than  one  recovery  and  to  what  extent 
the  action  for  the  injury  or  a  judgment  in  the  survival  action 
bars  an  action  for  damages  for  the  pecuniary  loss  suffered  by 
the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing.1"  Although  a  father  may 
sue  as  administrator  and  recover  for  the  death  of  a  son,  and  the 
judgment  is  not  a  bar  to  an  action  by  him  in  the  same  capacity 
for  damages  for  the  death  of  another  son  from  the  same  act 
of  negligence.11  In  Arkansas,  however,  these  actions  are  dif- 
ferent and  neither  is  a  bar  to  the  other  and  there  may  be  a 
recovery  for  the  damages  resulting  from  the  injuries  and  also 
for  those  occasioned  by  the  death.1-  And  in  the  case  of  a  minor 
child's  death  the  father  has  also  a  common-law  action  for  loss  of 
services.  There  is  also  the  survival  right  in  the  personal  repre- 
sentatives so  that  three  actions  lie  in  such  case  which  may  be 
prosecuted  at  the  same  time  and  recoveries  had  in  each  and  all 
of  them.1J 


9  See  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  119  111.  586;  6  West.  773; 
9  N.  E.  263;  19  111.  App.  591;  Holton 
v.  Daly,  106  111.  App.  591,  both  cited 
in  Martin  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  58 
Kan.  475;  49  Pac.  605;  7  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  576;  3  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
165. 

10  See  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v. 
Machl,  130  111.  551;  22  N.  E.  715, 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Connor, 
119  111.  586;  6  West.  773;  9  X.  E.  263; 
19  111.  App.  591;  Beard  v.  Skeldon, 
113  111.  584;  13  111.  App.  54;  Holton 
v.  Daly,  106  111.  131.  See  Quincy 
Coal  Co.  v.  Hood,  77  111.  68;  Chicago, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Morris,  26  111.  400; 
Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  349.  Ex- 
amine Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dylinski,  67111.  App.  114;  2  Chic.  L. 
J.  Wkly.  77. 

11  Illinois  C.   R.   Co.  v.  Slater,  139 

766 


111.  190;  28  N.  E.  830;  49  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  480,  aff'g  39  111.  App.  69. 

12  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweet,  63  Ark.  563;  40  S.  W.  463:  2 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  295,  per  Bates  J.,  a 
case  of  death  from  injuries  caused 
by  the  derailment  of  a  train  and  the 
pendency  of  the  action  for  the  injury, 
and  verdict  thereon  was  averred. 
Administrators  may  maintain  two 
actions,  one  under  act  of  1838  and 
one  under  act  of  1883.  Davis  v.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  53  Ark.  117; 
13  S.  W.  801;  7  L.  R.  A.  283;  44  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  690. 

13  So  held  in  Davis  v.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  53  Ark.  117;  13 S.  W. 
801;  7  L.  R.  A.  283;  44  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  690.  The  act  of  1883  does 
not  take  away  the  survival  right 
under  Mansf.  Dig.  sec.  5223.  This 
statute  (id.   sees.  5225,  5226),  super- 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES.         6   598 


§  598.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries" — Statutes— Continued  -IScncfieiurics, 
etc. — In  Arkansas,  under  the  death  loss  act,  the  suit  is  brought 
by  the  personal  representative  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  and 
next  of  kin,  and  the  father  has  also  his  common-law  right 
of  action,"  and  the  damages  are  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  es- 
tate.1"' In  Maine  the  damages  recoverable  are  limited  to  those 
which  result  to  the  beneficiaries  themselves.16  So  in  Montana 
the  existence  of  beneficiaries  is  necessary,  and  a  complaint  is 
fatally  defective  which  fails  to  aver  whether  deceased  left  a 
widow  or  next  of  kin.17  In  Nebraska  the  complaint  must  show 
some  person  entitled  to  recover  under  the  statute,  and  it   must 


sedes  the  act  of  1875,  relating  to 
suits  for  injuries  by  railway  trains. 
As  to  action  being  new,  see  State 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  Gl  Me.  114, 
indictment;  State  v.  Maine  C.  R.  Co., 
60  Me.  400,  indictment. 

M  Davis  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  53  Ark.  117;  13  S.  W.  801;  7  L. 
R.  A.  283;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
690.  As  to  the  existence  of  benefi- 
ciaries being  necessary  under  prior 
act,  see  Little  Rock  <fc  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Townsend, 41  Ark.  382.  Asto  "heir- 
at-law,"  see  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Needham,  52  Fed.  373. 

15  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweet,  57  Ark.—;  21  S.  W.  58. 
But  see  this  same  case  63  Ark.  ."J03; 
40  S.  W.  463;  2  Am.  Neg.  Kep.  295, 
opinion  of  Battle,  J.,  given  in  note, 
sec.  623  herein  as  to  funeral  ex- 
penses, etc. 

16  Kay  v.  New  England  Dredging 
Co.,  92  Me.  454;  43  Atl.  29.  See  sec. 
600,  herein. 

17  "  Complaint  fails  to  state  that 
deceased  had  any  widow  or  next  of 
kin.  There  was  no  claim  that  he 
left  a  widow  ...  I  cannot  agree 
With  the  view  that  there  should  be 
no  allegations  in  a  complaint  as  to 
there  being  any  widow  and  next  of 
kin.      Unless  there  be   a    surviving 


widow  or  next  of  kin  there  is  no  one 
to  whom  the  damages  recovered  for 

injuries  resulting  in  death  can  go. 
.  .  .  The  complaint  was  fatally  de- 
fective in  not  stating  that  there  wen- 
next  of  kin  of  the  deceased,  in  my 
opinion.  It  is  urged,  however,  that 
there  was  evidence  of  next  of  kin  in- 
troduced in  this  case  and  that  this 
defect  was  cured  by  verdict.  The 
defendant,  however,  objected  to  the 
introduction  of  this  evidence,  and 
has  embodied  his  exceptions  in  his 
bill  of  exceptions.  When  material 
evidence  is  introduced  under  the  ob- 
jection of  the  party  against  whom 
the  same  is  offered,  and  it  was  error 
to  have  admitted  the  same,  the  rule 
does  not  apply.  Neither  do  ]  think 
a  defendant  is  bound  to  exercise  his 
objection  to  a  defective  complaint 
by  demurrer.  The  plaintiff  is  re- 
sponsible for  his  pleadings  and  its 
defects  and  not  the  defendant.  The 
civil  practice  act  of  Montana  says 
the  objection  that  a  complaint  does 
not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  cause  of  action  is  not  waived  by 
a  failure  to  demur  to  the  same." 
Serensen  v.  Northern  Pac.  II.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  I).  Mont.).  45  Fed.  407, 
408,  40°,  per  Knowles,  J.;  Rev.  Stat 
Mont.  1879,  p.  508. 

767 


,<  598 


DEATH    -FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 


also  aver  other  necessary  statutory  prerequisites  to  a  recovery.18 
But  a  complaint  otherwise  sufficient  is  proper  where  it  avers 
that  deceased  left  a  widow  and  children,111  or  where  the  widow 
and  next  of  kin  are  described,*  or  where  the  names  of  deceased's 
surviving  dependent  children  are  alleged,  even  though  it  fails 
to  aver  that  he- left  a  widow.21  It  is  sufficient  in  the  absence  of 
a  demurrer  to  allege  that  deceased  left  a  widow  and  next  of  kin. 
This  averment  may  be  made  at  the  end  of  the  declaration  and 
need  not  be  set  forth  in  each  count.22  But  the  mother  may  be 
entitled  to  only  a  fractional  part  of  the  damages  under  the  stat- 
ute of  distributions  and  so  not  recover  her  actual  loss.25  Again, 
the  action  for  personal  injuries,  which  survives  must  be  prose- 
cuted by  the  personal  representative  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow 
and  next  of  kin,24  although  the  degree  of  relationship  may  or 
may  not  be  important.25  But  the  right  to  sue  as  administratrix 
need  not  be  proven  unless  put  in  issue  by  plea,26  and  where  the 
declaration  alleged  that  the  next  of  kin  were  the  father,  mother, 
two  brothers  and  five  sisters,  and  only  father  and  mother  were 
proven  and  no  objection  was  made  in  the  trial  court,  it  is  not 
available  on  appeal.2'    And  in  an  action  for  loss  by  death  brought 


18  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  58  Neb.  (378;  79  N.  W.  556; 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  343; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Bond,  58 
Neb.  385;  78  N.  W.  310;  6  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  116;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N. 
S.  759;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Van  Buskirk,  58  Neb.  218;  78  N.  W. 
514;  Burlington  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Crockett,  17  Neb.  570;  24  N.  W.  219. 
Action  lies  where  deceased  leaves 
either  a  widow  or  next  of  kin  de- 
pendent upon  him  for  support.  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Oyster,  58 
Neb.  1;  78  N.  W.  359;  12  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  655.  That  husband  not 
next  of  kin,  see  Warren  v.  Engle- 
hart,  13  Neb.  283;  13  N.  W.  401. 

19  Friend  v.  Burleigh,  53  Neb.  674; 
74  N.  W.  50,  a  case  of  defective  side- 
walk, injury  and  death.  But  see 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Yocum, 
34  Ark.  493. 

768 


2(>  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Crow, 
54  Neb.  747;  74  N.  W.  1066. 

21  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Oys- 
ter, 58  Neb.  1;  78  N.  W.  359;  12  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  655. 

22  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hession,  150  111.  546;  37  N.  E.  505, 
aff'g  50  111.  App.  685.  See  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Yocum,  34  Ark. 
493. 

23  Falkenan  v.  Rowland,  70  111. 
App.  26. 

24  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 119  111.  586;  6  West.  773;  9  N.  E. 
263;  Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131. 

25  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon, 
43  111.  338,  per  the  court. 

26  Union  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Schacklett 
(111.),  8  West.  63. 

27  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Gacin- 
nowski,  150  111.  189;  40  N.  E.  601, 
aff'g  54  111.  App.  276. 


DEATH       •'  DIREC  I'    DAM  \  <.!.>. 


§   599 


against  a  railroad  company,  there  must  be  a  widow  and  next  of 
kin  and  the  existence  of  such  persons  must  be  alleged,38  although 
the  hushand  suing  as  administrator  may  recover.39  And  do  cause 
of  action  is  stated  in  a  declaration  which  does  not  aver  that  any 
one  suffered  any  pecuniary  loss  because  of  deceased's  killing, 
nor  that  she  left  her  surviving  a  husband  and  next  of  kin  *  And 
it  must  also  he  alleged  that  a  child  born  after  deceased  was  killed 
was  one  of  the  next  of  kin.81 

§  599.  "Direct  damages  sustained  "Miners'  statute.— In 

Illinois  there  is  a  statute  known  as  the  miners'  act  which  pro- 
vides for  the  recovery  of  "direct  damages  sustained*"  for  a 
wilful  violation  thereof  or  for  a  wilful  failure  to  comply  there- 
with. Under  this  enactment  the  right  of  action  accrues  to  the 
widow  of  deceased,  his  lineal  heirs  or  adopted  children,  or  any 
person  dependent  for  support  upon  deceased  before  he  was 
killed  and  the  limit  ofrecovery  is  five  thousand  dollars.83  Hut 
the  action  under  this  statute  is  not  to  recover  a  penalty  but  only 
the  damages  alleged  to  have  been  occasioned  by  a  violation  of 
the  law.;!     And  an  allegation  of  a  ''wilful  omission  *'  to  comply 


88  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Morris, 
26  111.  400. 

»  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Raddeley,  150  111.  328:  36  X. 
E.  965,  aff'g  52  111.  App.  94. 

30  St.  Luke's  Hospital  v.  Foster,  86 
111.  App.  282.,  See  further  as  to  ex- 
istence of  beneficiaries  being  neces- 
sary, etc.  Lake  Shore,  etc.,  R.  Co, 
v.  Hession,  150  111.  546;  Quincy 
Coal  Co.  v.  Hood,  77  111.  68;  Conant 
v.  Griffin,  48  111.  410;  West  Chicago 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mabie,  77  111.  App.  176, 
holding  also  that  the  omission  of  the 
essential  averment  of  the  existence 
of  next  of  kin  is  not  cured  by  ver- 
dict. As  to  instruction  fixing  tlie 
term  next  of  kin,  see  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Shannon,  43  111.  338.  As  to  re- 
covery whore  no  next  of  kin  or  pecu- 
niary loss  proven,  see  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Gillam,  27  111.  App.  386. 
The  loss  for  the  death  of  a  wife  is 
for  the  surviving  husband  and  next1  74  111.  App.  567 

49 


of  kin.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago 
Title  &  T.  Co.,  79  111.  App.  623;  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dowd, 
115  111.  659;  2  West.  882. 

31  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Logue. 
47  111.  App.  292. 

82 3 Starr  &  C.  Ann.  St.  (am'd  1887 1 
ch.  93,  sees.  4,  14,  p.  400;  Hurd's  Rev. 
Stat.  1889,  ch.  93,  sees.  6,  8,  14.  Sec.  4 
of  this  act  requires  an  inspection  of 
the  mine  each  morning  before  the 
miners  enter,  and  for  a  report  thereof, 
and  where  deceased  was  killed  in 
said  mine  by  a  fall  of  dirt,  no  re- 
covery can  be  had  where,  after  the 
employees  had  commenced  work  but 
three  hours  prior  to  the  accident  an 
inspection  had  been  made,  since  a 
defect  which  existed  earlier  could 
have  been  discovered  when  the  in- 
spection was  made.  Missouri  it  I. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Schwalb,  74  111.  App.  567. 

:"  Missouri  &  I.  Coal  Co.  v.  Schwalb, 


'i;m 


600 


DEATH       FORFEITURE    Oil    FINE. 


with  the  requirement  as  to  providing  a  sufficient  light  does  not 
involve  a  charge  of  wrongful  intent,  but  that  such  omission  con- 
stituted conscious  acts  of  the  mind  and  not  merely  inadvertence, 
and  it  is  proper  therefore  to  refuse  testimony  of  an  intention  to 
comply  with  the  statute  in  good  faith.34  Another  important  con- 
sideration is  that  this  statute  gives  a  right  of  action  for  the  in- 
jury and  also  a  right  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  life,33  and  although 
different  beneficiaries  are  named  under  this  act  than  are  desig- 
nated by  the  general  death  loss  act,  it  seems  that  the  action  is 
not  brought  by  the  personal  representative,  but  that  the  widow 
may  sue,  although  others  may  be  benefited  who  are  shown  to 
exist.36 

§  600.  Forfeiture  or  line  —  Indictment— Railroads — Com- 
mon carriers — Statute. — In  Maine  in  addition  to  the  statutes 
elsewhere  herein  noted,  railroad  corporations  and  other  common 
carriers  forfeit  for  loss  of  life  through  their  negligence  or  care- 
lessness or  by  that  of  their  servants  or  agents,  not  less  than  five 
hundred,  nor  more  than  five  thousand  dollars  to  be  recovered  by 
indictment.  But  due  care  and  diligence  is  required  to  have  been 
exercised  by  the  person  killed  and  a  fine  is  precluded  where  de- 
ceased was  killed  while  walking  in  the  road  or  while  there  con- 
trary to  the  company's  rules  and  regulations.  The  recovery  is  for 
the  same  class  of  beneficiaries  as  under  the  general  death  stat- 
ute.37 The  action,  however,  while  in  form  by  indictment  is  anal- 
ogous in  some  respects,  at  least,  to  the  civil  action  for  death,  in 
so  far  as  the  rules  of  evidence  and  general  legal  principles  gov- 


34  Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Denman,  185 
111.  413;  57  N.  E.  192,  aff'g  84  111. 
App.  190.  See  also  Hawley  v.  Daly, 
13  111.  App.  391. 

85  3  Starr  &  C.  Ann.  Stat,  (am'd 
1887)  ch.  93,  sees.  4,  6,  8,  14;  Hurd's 
Rev.  Stat.  1889,  ch.  93,  sees.  4,  6,  8,  14. 

36  See  Litchfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
81  111.  590;  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v. 
Maehl,  130  111.  551;  22  N.  E.  715; 
Beard  v.  Skeldon,  113  111.  584;  13  111. 
App.  54.  See  sec.  598,  herein,  as  to 
beneficiaries. 

37  Rev.  Stat.  Me.  1883,  ch.  51,  sees. 
68,  69;  id.   ch.  52,  sec.  7;  Rev.  Stat. 

770 


1871,  ch.  51,  sec.  36;  Rev.  Stat.  Me. 
1857,  ch.  51,  sec.  42,  p.  370;  ch.  52, 
sec.  7,  p.  376;  Act  1855,  ch.  161.  As 
to  contributory  negligence,  see  State 
v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  70  Me.  357; 
19  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  312.  As  to 
Ark.  Act,  1875,  relating  to  injuries  by 
railway  trains,  see  Davis  v.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  53  Ark.  117; 
13  S.  W.  801;  7  L.  R.  A.  283;  44  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  690.  As  to  Neb. 
Comp.  Stat.  ch.  72;  Ark.  1,  sec.  3,  see 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Zernecke 
(Neb.),  82  N.  W.  26. 


I»l..\  I  i! 


REASONABLE       BUM. 


§601 


erning  the  recovery  are  concerned.38  This  statement  is  subject, 
however,  to  this  qualification  that  in  survival  actions  a  different 
rule  as  to  the  elements  of  damages  generally  exists  than  in  cases 
where  the  action  is  for  the  death  itself.39  Sothatit  maybe  stated 
not  only  as  pertinent  to  the  above  assertion,  but  also  as  a  rule 
under  this  enactment  under  consideration  that  in  determining 
whether  the  action  for  killing  lies  under  this  statute  or  another 
act  in  that  state,  the  test  is  the  instantaneous  death,"1  which  in- 
volves the  survival  of  the  injured  party's  right  of  action,  and  the 
construction  of  the  statutes  upon  the  question  of  the  legislative 
intent  to  create  two  remedies  for  the  same  injury,  which  latter 
cannot  be  assumed."  Again,  it  will  be  observed  by  comparison 
of  this  enactment  with  the  general  death  loss  act  that  as  we 
stated  at  the  beginning  of  this  section  the  persons  entitled  t<> 
recover  are  the  same,  therefore  the  same  rules  as  to  the  existence 
of  beneficiaries  being  a  prerequisite  to  the  action  should  apply 
in  both  cases.4-  In  Arkansas  there  is  a  statutory  remedy  in 
case  an  adult  is  killed  by  the  running  of  a  railroad  train  in  that 
stated 

§  601.  "Suck  sum  as  the  jury  may  deem  reasonable"— 

Statute.— Another  statute  !4  in  Maine  provides  for  the  recovery 
of  such  sum  as  the  jury  may  deem  reasonable  as  damages  where 
the  life  of  any  person  is  lost  through  defect  or  want  of  repair  or 
sufficient  railing  in  any  highway,  causeway  or  bridge,  and  the 
county  or  town  obligated  to  keep  the  same  in  repair  is  liable, 
provided  it  had  the  required  statutory  notice.1"' 


38  State  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  58 
Me.  176. 

39  See  sees.  503,  609,  herein. 

40  See  chap.  37  herein  as  to  in- 
stantaneous death. 

41  State  v.  Maiue  G.  R.  Co.,  60  Me. 
490,  per  the  court;  Sawyer  v.  Perry, 
88  Me.  42;  33  Atl.  660.  See  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Zernecke  (Neb.), 
82  N.  W.  20.      See   see.    609,  herein. 

42  See  sec.  598,  herein.  Existence 
of  beneficiaries  necessary  and  should 
be  averred.  State  v.  Grand  Trunk 
R.  Co.,  60  Me.  145,  indictment. 


43  Sandel  &  Hill's  Dig.  Ark.  Stat. 

1894,  p.  1310,  sec.  5910;  Act,  Febru- 
ary :'.,  1875,  sec.  3.  See  also  Sanb.  «£ 
H.  Dig.  1894,  sees.  6349,6357,  as  to 
damages  to  persons  or  property  by 
railroads.  As  to  injury,  etc.,  to  em- 
ployees of  railroads,  see  111.  Act. 
February  28,  1893;  Stats,  sees.  6248 
6250.  As  to  death  of  employee  in 
Montana,    see    Codes    (Civ.    Proc.), 

1895,  sees.  578.  579. 

44  See   sees.   599,    600,    herein,  for 
other  Maine  statutes. 

45  Rev.  Stat.  (Me.  1888),  ch.  18. 

771 


§  602 


DEATH— FAIR     VNI>   JUST    COMPENSATION 


§  602.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Pecuniary  loss. — The  plaintiff  in  the 
case  of  negligent  or  wrongful  death  is  entitled  to  recover  a  fair 
and  just  compensation  for  the  benefit  of  those  entitled  for  the 
pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  them  by  reason  of  the  death,  not 
exceeding  the  sum  limited  by  statute  16  where  the  statute  fixes 
such  limit.  Only  the  pecuniary  loss  can,  however,  be  recov- 
ered.47 This  rule  is  well  settled,  and  has  been  asserted  in  a 
large  majority  of  the  cases  wherein  actions  have  been  brought 
to  recover  the  loss  occasioned  by  negligent  and  wrongful  killing 
in  the  states  which  come  under  this  fair  and  just  compensation 
statute.  But  the  damages  awarded  must  be  within  such 
amount  as  the  statute  limits  as  the  extent  of  the  recover}-  in 
states  where  there  is  such  a  limitation,4"1  although  the  actual  pe- 


46  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.,  35  Neb.  95;  52  N.  W.  849.  See 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Keenan,  190  111.  217;  60  N.  E.  107, 
aff'g  92  111.  App.  430. 

47  St.  Louis  &  \V.  R.  Co.  v.  Henson 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C),  (E.  D.  Ark.) 
58  Fed.  531;  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am. 
Rep.  44;  19  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  195, 
212;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron, 
5  Wall.  ( U.  S. )  90 ;  18  L.  Ed.  591,  aff'g 
Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  111.)  412,  453;  Bai- 
ley v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co..  4  Biss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  111.)  430;  Economy 
Light  &  P.  Co.  v.  Stephen,  187  111. 
137;  58  N.  E.  359,  aff'g  87  111.  App. 
220;  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolridge,  174  111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701, 
rev'g  72  111.  App.  55;  Calumet  Elec. 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Pelt,  173  111.  70;  50 
N.  E.  678,  aff'g  68  111.  App.  582;  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dowd,  115 
111.  659;  2  West.  882;  Holton  v. 
Daly,  106  111.  131;  Rockford,  R.  I.  & 
St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Uelaney,  82  111.  198; 
25  Am.  Rep.  198;  St.  Louis,  P.  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Rawley,  90  111.  App.  653; 
Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Gillam,  27 
111.  App.  386;  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co. 

772 


v.  Mabie,  77  111.  App.  176;  Illinois  C. 
R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Title  &  T.  Co.,  79 
111.  App.  623;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ashline,  56  111.  App.  475;  Chicago 
Cousol.  B.  Co.  v.  Tietz,  37  111.  App. 
599;  Malott  v.  Shimer,  153  Ind.  35; 
1  Repr.  1234;  54  M.  E.  101;  (i  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  263;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  774;  McKay  v.  New  Eng- 
land Dredging  Co.,  92  Me.  454;  43 
Atl.  29;  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  35  Neb.  95;  52  N.  W.  840. 
See  sees.  605,  610,  herein.  Under 
the  general  allegation  of  damages 
evidence  is  admissible  as  to  all  dam- 
ages necessarily  and  naturally  re- 
sulting from  the  death  (Serensenv. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.[U.  S.  C.  C.  D. 
Mont.],  45  Fed.  407,  411,  per 
Knowles,  J.),  and  the  complaint  need 
not  allege  special  damages  to  the 
next  of  kin,  and  need  not  show  that 
they  have  suffered  a  pecuniary  loss 
by  the  death.  Serensen  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Mont.), 
45  Fed.  407,  409,  410,  following  Illi- 
nois C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron,  5  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  90,  per  Nelson,  J. 

«  Calumet  Elect.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 
Pelt,  173  111.  70:  50  N.  E.  678,  aff'g  68 
111.   App.   582;  Anderson  v.  Chicago, 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY     INJURIES. 


cuniary  loss  is  not  the  limitation  of  damages  for  the  reasonable 
expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit.40  So  the  right  to  nominal 
damages80  and  the  right  of  action  under  the  survival  statutes, 
and  the  elements  of  damages  in  such  cases  should  be  consid- 
ered.51 Nor  will  the  total  amount  of  pecuniary  damages  be  in- 
creased to  aid  one  of  the  beneficiaries  lo  get  enough,  even  though 
that  one  be  entitled  to  more  than  the  others.52 

§  G03.  Same  subject  continued. — The  question  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  alleging  and  proving  pecuniary  loss  becomes  impor- 
tant, but  it  is  also  closely  involved  with  that  of  the  recovery  of 
nominal  damages,53  for  if  the  statute  was  intended  to  give  such 
damages  without  proof  of  actual  loss,  then  it  is  obvious  that 
the  allegations  need  not  go  beyond  the  legal  proof  required  to 
justify  the  recovery  of  some  damages.  In  Illinois  the  aver- 
ments of  the  complaint  will  be  sufficient  if  they  are  such  as  to 
admit  evidence  of  the  pecuniary  loss  ;  but  special  pecuniary 
injury  need  not  be  pleaded,  and  an  allegation  of  damages  in  a 
stated  sum  is,  it  seems,  also  sufficient, :'[  although  a  complaint 
in  which  it  does  not  appear  that  any  one  suffered  any  pecuniary 
loss  because  of  the  death  is  insufficient.55     Special  or  pecuniary 


R.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  35  Neb.  95;  52  N.  W. 
840.  See  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cozby, 
174  111.  109;  50  N.  E.  1011,  aff'g  69 
111.  A  pp.  256;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
K.  Co.  v.  Dowd,  115  111.  659;  2  West. 
882.  But  examine  Illinois  C.  I!.  Co. 
v.  Ashline,  56  111.  App.  475.  See 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Rohlfs, 
51  111.  App.  215;  Calumet  Iron  & 
Steel  Co.  v.  Martin,  115  111.  368;  2 
West.  50.     See  sec.  605,  herein. 

49  Chicago  v.  Keefe,  114  111.  222;  1 
West.  352. 

5'  See  sec.  625,  herein. 

S1  See  sees.  503,  596  n,  609  and  chap. 
23  herein. 

62  Falkenan  v.  Rowland,  70111  App. 
20. 

63  See  sec.  625,  herein. 

54  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Carey, 
115  111.  115:  2  West.  73;  3  N.  E.  519; 


Stafford  v.  Rubens,  115  111.  196;  1 
West.  640;  Chicago  v.  Hesing,  83  111. 
204.  See  cases  cited,  sec.  625,  herein. 
See  further  as  to  pleading  and  evi- 
dence, Ilolton  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131; 
Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  111.)  412.  An  allegation 
that  defendants  promised  and  under- 
took to  perform  certain  acts  for  the 
safety  of  the  deceased  is  mere  sur- 
plusage in  an  action  of  trespass  on 
the  case  for  death  caused  by  defend- 
ants' negligent  acts,  and  that  it  is  no 
obstacle  to  the  action  that  abroach  of 
contract  arises  from  the  wrong  done 
or  duty  neglected.  Kinnare  v.  Chi- 
cago, 70  111.  App.  106,  aff'd  171  111. 
332;  49  X.  E.  536;  3  Chic.  L.  Jour. 
Wkly.  128. 

58  St.   Luke's    Hospital    v.    Foster. 
86  111.  App.  282.     But  see  Falkenan 

773 


§608  DEATH       FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

loss  need  not  be  averred  under  the  Montana  statute  of  1879.5* 
But  in  Nebraska  it  must  not  only  appear  that  the  person  for 
whose  benefit  the  suit  is  brought,  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in 
the  life  of  deceased,"'7  but  there  must  also  be  an  averment  of 
pecuniary  injury  with  reference  to  the  survivor,58  although  it 
is  sufficient,  if  the  facts  set  forth  with  respect  to  the  deceased 
and  the  relation  the  survivors  sustained  to  him  are  such  as  show 
a  pecuniary  loss.59.  And  it  seems  that  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  words,  damage,  injury  or  loss  be  used  to  ensure  the  absolute 
sufficiency  of  the  complaint  or  petition.60  The  necessity  of  proof 
of  pecuniary  loss,  as  well  as  the  requirement  of  an  allegation 
thereof,  is  involved  with  that  of  the  right  to  nominal  damages 
and  has  been  considered  in  connection  therewith/'1 


v.  Rowland,  70  111.  App.  20;  3  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  530,  where  there  was  no 
proof  of  pecuniary  interest  of  the 
brothers  and  sisters  in  deceased's 
life. 

56  Page  508;  Serensen  v.  Northern 
P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Mont.),  45 
Fed.  407. 

57  Chicago,  R.  1.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  58  Neb.  678;  79  N.  W.  556; 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  343,  un- 
der'Neb.  Comp.  Stat.  1S97,  chap.  21. 
See  cases  in  next  following  note. 

58  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  v.  Bond, 
58  Neb.  385;  78  N.  W.  710;  15  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  759;  6  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  116;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.  v.  Van  Buskirk,  58  Neb.  218;  78 
N.  W.  514;  Orgall  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.,  46  Neb.  4;  64  N.  W.  450; 
Orgall  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.  is 
same   case. 

59  Friend  v.  Burleigh,  53  Neb.  674; 
74  N.  W.  50.  Deceased's  good 
health,  active  conduct  of  business 
and  that  he  left  a  widow  and  chil- 
dren, held  sufficient  in  this  case. 
Kearney  Electric  Co.  v.  Laugldin, 
45  Neb.  390;  63  N.  W.  941,  holds  that 
there  is  a  sufficient  showing  of  pe- 
cuniary injury,  where  the  petition 
avers  that   minor  children  are    left, 

774 


who   were  wholly    dependent   upon 
deceased  for  support. 

60  Kearney  Elect.  Co.  v.  Laugh lin, 
45  Neb.  390;  63  N.  W.  941,  under 
Neb.  Comp.  Stat,  1893,  ch.  21,  sec.  2. 

61  See  sees.  613,  625,  herein.  When 
declarations  of  one  killed  that  he 
intended  to  take  passage  on  a  train 
are  part  of  the  res  gestse  relating 
to  the  act  of  departure.  Chicago 
&E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Chancellor,  165  111. 
438;  46  N.  E.  269,  rev'g  60  111.  App. 
525.  As  to  no  necessity  of  exact 
proof  of  loss,  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Then,  159  111.  535;  42  N.  E. 
971,  aff'g  59  111.  App.  561.  That  ad- 
ministrator suing  for  the  death  is 
a  competent  witness  on  his  own  be- 
half, Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Reardon, 
157  111.  372;  41  N.  E.  871.  That  evi- 
dence must  afford  some  data  to 
enable  the  extent  of  the  loss  to  be 
ascertained,  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wangelin,  152  111.  138;  38  N.  E.  760. 
As  to  necessity  of  proof  of  pecuniary 
loss,  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  349. 
As  to  reduction  of  damages  where 
no  special  precuniary  injury  is 
shown  in  case  of  death  of  a  4-year 
old  child.  West  Chicago  R.  Co.  v. 
Mabie,  77  111.  App.  176.  Decedent's 
daughter,  though  not  an  expert,  may 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES.         §  604 


§  604.  "Fair  and  jnst  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "—Exemplary  damages — The  intent  of 
this  statutory  provision,  specifying  the  measure  of  compensation, 
does  not  cover  exemplary  or  vindictive  damages,  since  no  dam- 
ages are  allowed  by  way  of  punishment."  Nor  can  a  husband 
recover  anything  except  the  value  of  his  deceased  wife's  services 
estimated  in  dollars  and  cents  upon  the  evidence.68  Nor  can 
punitive  damages  he  awarded  under  the  Maine  statute  of  1891.*' 


testify  as  tn  hi-;  health   and  physical 
ability.      Ashley   Wire    Co.    v.    Me- 
Fadden,  66  111.  App.  26.    As  to  reduc- 
tion of    damages    where    no    proof 
existed  as  to  age,  etc.,  see  Serensen 
v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D. 
Mont.),    45  Fed.    407.     In    case    of 
death  and  an  action  under   accident 
insurance  policy,  see   as  to    declar- 
ations as  to  the    fact,     nature    and 
extent  of  injury  made  hy  the  injured 
party  a  few  minutes  after    the  acci- 
dent being  admissible  as  res  gesta3. 
Travelers  Protect.  Assoc,  of  America 
v.  West  (U.    S.    C.   C.    A.     111.),    42 
C.    C.    A.   2S4;  102    Fed.    226.     The 
declarations  of  a   party    himself  to 
whomsoever    made    are    competent 
evidence  when   confined    strictly   to 
such   complaints,    expressions     and 
exclamations  as  furnish  evidence  of 
a  present  existing  pain  or  malady  to 
prove   liis  condition,  ills,   pains  and 
symptoms,  whether  arising  from  sick- 
ness or  from  an  injury  or  accident 
or  violence.     If  made   to   a  medical 
attendant  they  are  of   more  weight 
than  if  made  to  another  person.     So 
is  a  declaration  made  by  a  deceased 
person  contemporaneously  or  nearly 
so  with  a  main  event,  in  consequence 
of  which  it  is  alleged   he  died  as  to 
the  cause  of   that   event.      Though 
generally  the   declarations   must  be 
contemporaneous  with  the  event,  yet 
where  there  are  connecting  circum- 
stances, they  may  even  when  made 
sometime  afterwards,   form    a  part 


of  the  whole  res  gestae.  Where  the 
principal  fact  is  the  fact  of  bodily 
injury  the  res  gestae  are  the  state- 
ments of  the  cause  made  by  the 
party  injured  almost  contemporane- 
ously with  the  occurrence  of  the  in- 
jury, and  those  relating  to  the 
consequences  made  while  the  latter 
subsisted  and  were  in  progress.  In- 
surance Co.  v.  Mosely,  8  Wall.  (U. 
S. )  397,  cited  Mutual  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Hillman,  145  U.  S.  296;  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.  v.  Rambo,  59  Fed.  77; 
North  Am.  Ace.  Assoc,  v.  Woodson, 
64  Fed.  691;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co. 
v.  Roller,  100  Fed.  752,  756.  See 
4  Joyce  on  Ins.  sees.  3820,  3821.  See 
further  as  to  evidence,  sees.  605,  613, 
625,  herein  as  to  nominal  damages, 
support  and  dependency,  jury  and 
instructions,  and  the  cases  giving 
facts  under  sec.  607,  herein,  as  to 
factors  generally. 

G- Barron  v.  Illinois  Cent.  K.  Co..  1 
Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  X.  I).  111.1453,  455, 
45t>,  charge  of  Davis,  J.,  to  jury,  the 
case  was  affirmed,  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Barron,  5  Wall.  (72  U.  S)  99; 
18  L.  Ed.  591.  See  same  case  gener- 
ally, 1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  X.  I).  111.) 
412. 

<*St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ilenson 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.). 
58  Fed.  531;  7  C.  C.  A.  349. 

6H)akes  v.  Maine  Cent.  K.  Co.,  95 
Me.  103;  49  Atl.  418;  Stat.  1891,  c.  124. 
See  sees.  602,  603,  herein. 

775 


§  60.' 


DEATH       I'Ali:     AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


§  605.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries" — Jury  and  instructions.— The  jury  should 
determine  what  is  a  fair  and  just  compensation,  and  this  must 
depend  upon  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence  before 
them  in  each  particular  case.  There  are  cases,  however,  in 
which  much  must  necessarily  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  discre- 
tion of  the  jury,  especially  so  where  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
action  there  can  be  no  certain  definite  proof  of  the  pecuniary  in- 
jury, as  is  evidenced  in  a  suit  for  the  death  of  young  children  of 
too  tender  years  to  render  services.  But  however  much  discre- 
tion is  vested  in  the  jury,  the  verdict  must  not  be  the  result  of 
passion  or  prejudice,  and  the  jury  should  be  properly  instructed 
by  the  court,  while  their  award  of  damages  is  subject  to  be 
modified,  reversed  or  set  aside  for  proper  cause,  as  where  the 
verdict  is  excessive,  etc.65 


66  In  an  action  of  this  kind  the  con- 
stant factor  is  the  practical  knowl- 
edge, varied  experience  and  sound 
judgment  of  12  men.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Needham  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  A.  8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.),  3  C.  C.  A. 
129;  10  U.  S.  App.  339;  52  Fed.  371, 
377;  5  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas.  88,  per  San- 
born, Cir.  J.  The  court  should  limit 
the  jury  to  the  assessment  of  such 
damages  as  the  evidence  shows.  Mc- 
Nulta  v.  Jenkins,  91  111.  App.  309. 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  in- 
struct the  jury  as  to  the  basis  upon 
which  the  damages  are  to  be  com- 
puted, and  the  pecuniary  value  of 
deceased's  life  ascertained.  Hunt  v. 
Kile  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  111.),  38  C.  C.  A. 
641;  98  Fed.  49.  The  jury  should 
not  consider  the  comments  of  the 
coroner's  jury  on  the  situation  at  the 
place  of  accident,  nor  should  they 
take  with  them  depositions  or  a  plat 
attached  to  the  coroner's  verdict, 
nor  should  they  consider  the  defend- 
ant's conduct  in  regard  to  the  acci- 
dent in  connection  with  the  same. 
Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dahlin,  67  111.  App.  99.  Where  de- 
776 


ceased  is  a  minor,  the  value  of  her 
services  may  be  estimated,  without 
proof  thereof,  from  the  child's  age, 
and  the  juror's  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience in  matters  of  common  obser- 
vation. Callaway  v.  Spurgeon,  63 
111.  App.  571.  An  instruction  should 
refer  to  the  evidence  as  the  basis  of 
damages.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rohlfs,  51  111.  App.  215.  Jury 
should  be  instructed  as  to  the  ele- 
ments on  which  to  estimate  the  dam- 
ages, and  not  generally  directed  to 
award  them  according  to  their  be- 
lief. Chicago  E.  &  L.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Adamick,  33  111.  App.  412.  Damages 
must  depend  upon  the  good  sense 
and  sound  judgment  of  the  jury  upon 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances  of 
each  particular  case,  and  the  pecun- 
iary injury  is  uncertain  and  indefi- 
nite. Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron 
(111.  Stat.),  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  18 
L.  Ed.  591,  per  Nelson,  J.;  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  349.  As 
to  damages  being  left  to  jury's  dis- 
cretion, etc.,  see  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Davis,  55  Ark.  462;  18  S. 
W.  628;  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co. 


Willi     REFERENCE  TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES. 


g  606 


§  600.  Same  subject— Proper  and  erroneous  iust  met  ions- 
Illustrations.  It  is  not  improper  to  charge  the  jury  that  they 
may  consider  whatever  they  may  from  the  evidence  believe  tin- 
widow  and  next  of  kin  might  have  reasonably  expected  in  a 
pecuniary  way  from  the  continued  life  of  the  intestate,®  and  an 
instruction  is  not  objectionable  that  if  the  jury  believed  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  to  recover 
under  any  count  of  the  declaration  they  might  award  such  dam- 
ages as,  under  the  evidence,  they  thought  the  parties,  for  whose 
use  the  suit  was  brought  had  actually  sustained,  if  any,  not 
exceeding  the  amount  demanded  in  the  declaration.'17  And  the 
jury  may  be  charged  that  if  they  find  for  the  plaintiff  they  shall 
assess  the  damages  at  such  sum  as  they  believe  will  be  a  fair 
and  just  compensation,  based  on  the  pecuniary  loss,  if  any,  re- 
sulting from  the  death  to  the  next  of  kin,  not  exceeding  the  sum 


v.  Barker,  39  Ark.  491;  Chicago  v. 
Scholten,  75  111.  468;  McLean  Coal 
Co.  v.  McVey,  38  111.  App.  158;  Chi- 
cago M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson, 
35  111.  App.  346;  Salem  v.  Harvey, 
29  111.  App.  483,  affd  129  111.  344; 
21  N.  E.  1076;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Slater,  28  111.  App.  73,  aff'd  129  111. 
91;  21  N.  E.  575;  6  L.  R.  A.  418. 
While  the  court  should  not  state 
what  constitutes  a  reasonable  and 
just  compensation,  yet"  it  may  ex- 
press the  extreme  limit  to  which  a 
verdict  should  go.  Couley  v.  Maim' 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  95  Me.  149;  49  Ail. 
668;  State  v.  Maine  C.  R.  Co.,  76 
Me.  357;  Johnson  v.  Missouri  P. 
R.  Co.,  18  Neb.  690;  26  N.  W.  347. 
Deceased  was  twelve  years  old — 
$2,500  not  excessive.  Baltimore  & 
O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Then,  159  111. 
535;  42  N.  E.  971,  affg  59  111. 
App.  561.  Judgment  for  §2,000  will 
be  reversed  as  attributable  to  pas- 
sion, where  boy  was  killed  and  evi- 
dence is  meager.  East  St.  Louis 
Elec.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Burns,  77  111. 
App.  529.  Deceased  was  less  than 
4  years    old;  no    special    pecuniary 


injury  was  shown —$4,000  excessive. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mabie, 
77  111.  App.  176.  Deceased  was  5 
years  old  —  $3,000  not  excessive. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Waniata, 
68  111.  App.  481,  affd  169  111.  17;  48 
N.  E.  437.  Deceased  was  a  10-year 
old  boy  —  $5,000  excessive.  North 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wrixon,  51 
111.  App.  307.  Deceased  was  an  in- 
fant son — $1,000  not  excessive. 
Joliet  v.  Weston,  22  111.  App.  225, 
affd  123  111.  641;  14  N.  E.  665;  12 
West.  750.  Deceased  sou  was  10 
years  old  —  $2,850  not  excessive. 
Omaha  v.  Richards,  49  Neb.  244:  68 
N.  W.  528,  aff'd  70  N.  W.  36:5.  De- 
ceased boy  was  17  years  old— 82.400 
not  excessive  in  behalf  of  father 
who  was  poor  and  had  dependent 
children.  Post  v.  Olmstead,  47  Neb. 
893;  66   X.  W.  828. 

w  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly, 
182  111.  267;  54  N.  E.  '.'7'.'.  affg  80 
111.  App.  675. 

67  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cozby,  174 
111.  109;  50  N.  E.  1011,  affg  69  111. 
App.  256. 

777 


§  606  DEATH       FAIi:    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

claimed  in  the  declaration.68  So  an  instruction  is  not  erroneous 
that  if  the  plaintiff  has  proved  his  case  as  alleged,  the  jury 
should  find  the  defendant  guilty  and  assess  plaintiff's  damages 
at  such  sum  as  proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence, 
where  the  jury  are  also  explicitly  directed  that  they  must  be 
governed  solely  by  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  and  the  manner 
of  estimating  such  loss  is  charged.69  Again,  if  the  jury  find  the 
defendant  guilty  of  the  wrongful  act,  neglect  and  default  under 
the  evidence  aud  the  court's  instructions,  and  as  averred  in  the 
complaint  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  may  recover  such  dam- 
ages as  the  jury  may  deem  from  the  evidence  and  proofs  a  fair 
and  just  compensation  having  reference  to  the  pecuniary  injuries 
sustained  through  the  death  by  such  widow  and  next  of  kin 
within  the  statutory  limitation,  and  an  instruction  to  this  effect 
is  proper.70  But  a  charge  not  to  assess  the  damages  above  the 
amount  demanded  in  the  declaration  is  censurable  although 
not  reversible,  although  the  amount  claimed  exceeded  the  statu- 
tory limit.  It  appeared,  however,  that  the  verdict  was  not  af- 
fected by  such  instruction.71  And  a  direction  to  the  jury  is  too 
general  and  indefinite  and  is  erroneous,  that  the  jury  are  not 
limited  to  the  actual  present  loss  that  might  be  proved,  but  that 
they  might  go  further  and  compensate  for  the  relative  injury 
with  reference  to  the  future  and  compensate  for  the  pecuniary  in- 
juries present  and  prospective  ;  nor  should  they  be  charged  as  to 
deceased's  disposition  to  aid  his  mother,  for  they  should  be  con- 
fined to  the  facts  of  actual  help  or  obligation  to  help.Vi  So  an 
instruction  is  erroneous  which  merely  states  that  the  jury  may 
assess  the  damages  at  whatever  sum  in  their  opinion  to  which 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled,  not  exceeding  five  thousand  dollars." 
But  a  charge  is  not  objectionable  as  placing  no  limitation  upon 
the  amount  recoverable,  where  the  jury  are  directed  that  if  they 
believe  defendant's  negligence   caused  the  death,  plaintiff  was 


68  Calumet  Elec.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Pelt, 
173  111.  70;  50  N.  E.  678,  aff'g  68  Hi. 
App.  582. 

69  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  162  111. 
583;  44  N.  E.  856.  Above  instruction 
does  not  direct  damages  to  be  al- 
lowed as  a  solatium. 

™  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.   Co.  v. 
778 


Dowd,  115  111.  659;  3  West.  882;  4  N. 
E.  368. 

71  Calumet    Iron    &  Steel     Co.    v. 
Martin,  115  111.  368;  2  West.  50. 

72  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Shan- 
non, 45  111.  197. 

™  Hunt  v.  Kile  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  111.), 
38  C.  C.  A.  641 ;  98  Fed.  49. 


will!    mi- i:i:i:n<k  To    rr.n  \  iai:\    iN.JtJRlES.        $007 

entitled  to  recover  in  such  sum  as  in  the  jury's  judgment  the 
evidence  warrants.71  Again,  instructions  which  amount  to  a  per- 
suasive argument  to  render  a  large  verdict,  as  where  attention 
is  directed  to  the  amount  specifically  claimed  as  damages  in  the 
declaration  and  allowed  by  statute,  are  not  reversible  error 
even  though  improper,  where  the  verdict  assesses  the  damages  at 
only  half  such  amount.15  So  a  charge  is  improper  that  in  sub- 
stance states  that  tin'  damages  that  can  he  recovered  cannot 
exceed  five  thousand  dollars  and  that  the  law  of  the  state  limits 
the  recovery  to  that  sum.''1  And  an  instruction  is  erroneous  in 
failing  to  refer  to  the  evidence  as  a  basis  for  awarding  daunt-.-. 
where  the  jury  are  directed  that  if  they  find  for  the  plaintiff  they 
may  assess  the  damages  at  such  a  sum  as  will  he  a  fair  compen- 
sation with  reference  to  the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting  from 
such  death,  not  exceeding  five  thousand  dollars.77 

§  607.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Factors  generally  to  be  considered.— 

There  are  certain  elements  of  damages,  or  rather  certain  factors 
to  be  considered  in  estimating  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be 
awarded,  which  apply  especially  to  particular  legal  relations, 
such  as  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  which  have  been 
treated  of  herein  under  these  different  headings.  There  are  also 
some  evidential  matters,  the  materiality  or  admissibility  of  which 
have  been  the  subject  of  discussion  in  the  several  states  which 
have  this  statutory  provision  as  to  fair  and  just  compensation, 
which  we  have  discussed  elsewhere,  such  as  the  ages  and  number 
of  the  surviving  family,  the  physical  and  financial  condition  of 
surviving  beneficiaries,  etc.  The  following  factors,  however,  sub- 
ject to  such  adverse  rulings  as  we  have  stated  elsewhere,  under 
the  separate  consideration  thereof,  may  generally  be  considered 
in  arriving  at  the  amount  of  damages  which  shall  be  deemed 
fair  and  just.     Thus  deceased's  age,  sex,  mental  and  physical 


w  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolridge,  72  111.  App.  551,  case 
rev'd  174,  111.  3:30;  51  N.  E.  701. 

75  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibbons, 
65  111.  App.  550. 

70  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashline,  56 
111.  App.  475. 


«  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rohlfs,  51  111.  App.  215.  As  to  in- 
structions see  further  Lake  Shore  A 
M.  S.  It.  Co.  v.  Parker,  131  111.  557;  23 
\.  E.  2;;;;  North  Chicago  R.  M.  Co. 
v.  Morrisey,  111  111.  046;  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Harwood,  SO  111.  88. 
77'.' 


§  HOT  DEATH       I'ATI;    AM"    ,TtJRT    COMPENSATION 

health  and  strength,  his  life  expectancy,  and  if  deceased  was  a 
minor,  his  general  intelligence  and  personal  characteristics  are 
material  and  relevant.  So  are  deceased's  capability  or  incapabil- 
ity as  to  self-support,  his  capacity  and  ability  to  perform  hard 
labor,  also  the  fact  whether  he  was  skilled  or  unskilled,  his  ex- 
perience and  business  qualifications,  his  education,  his  activity 
in  business  or  otherwise,  his  occupation  and  the  character  thereof, 
whether  in  business  pr  retired,  employed  or  out  of  employment, 
whether  he  worked  part  of  the  time  or  steadily,  his  chances  of 
promotion,  his  habits  as  to  industry,  steadiness,  sobriety,  pru- 
dence, carefulness,  saving  or  the  contrary,  his  earning  capacity 
and  the  probability  whether  it  would  increase  or  diminish,  his 
earnings  or  income  and  the  source  thereof,  the  disposition  of 
such  earnings,  personal  expenses,  amount  given  family,  or  the 
character  and  extent  of  aid  rendered  beneficiaries,  whether  he 
was  the  family's  sole  support,  whether  his  occupation  was  his 
sole  source  of  income,  whether  the  income  ceased  with  his  death, 
as  in  case  of  a  pension,  whether  deceased  was  divorced,  married 
or  single,  and  if  the  latter,  the  possibility  of  his  marriage  had  he 
lived  as  affecting  the  descent  of  his  property  ;  the  probability 
whether,  if  deceased  had  property,  it  would  have  been  retained 
unimpaired,  or  would  have  increased  or  diminished,  in  so  far  as 
such  facts  depended  upon  deceased's  ability,  etc.  Again,  the 
facts  are  important  which  show  the  character  of  the  services 
rendered  by  the  deceased  wife,  son  or  daughter  in  the  household, 
in  so  far  as  they  affect  the  actual  pecuniary  loss.  So  the  age 
and  life  expectancy,  etc.,  of  the  surviving  father  or  mother  may 
be  proven,  and  in  some  cases  the  physical  and  financial  condition, 
acres,  sex  and  numbers  of  survivors  have  been  held  admissible, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  damages,  but  to  show  the 
character  of  the  pecuniary  injury.  So  the  character  of  the  rela- 
tions, lineal  and  collateral,  legal  or  actual,  may  be  material,  as 
in  case  of  dependency,  or  whether  deceased  had  lived  at  home 
or  elsewhere,  or  the  beneficiaries  had  resided  abroad  and  were 
not  dependent.78 


78  The  admissibility  of  these  factors 
is  not  discussed  in  all  the  following 
cases,  being  mentioned  in  many  of 
them  as  proven  or  in  evidence,  their 
admissibility  and  relevancy  being  ap- 

780 


parently  conceded.  Deceased  was  a 
railroad  yard  master,  had  an  earning 
capacity  of  $85  to  $90  a  month.  He 
was  industrious,  experienced,  sober, 
prudent,  faithful   to   his  family  and 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES. 


E  608 


§  608.  Same  subject  continued—Evidence  of  wages.  -In 

an  action  by  a  widow  and  two  children  for  the  death  of  a  fire- 
man killed  in  a  train  collision  owing  to  the  negligent  and 
conflicting  orders   of  a    train   despatcher,   a  schedule  showing 


his  life  expectancy  was  thirty-two 
years — $17,820  not  excessive.  Dwyer 
v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  K.  Co.  (U.  S.  C. 
C.  W.  D.  Ark. ).  52  Fed.  87.  Deceased 
was  a  switchman  and  earned  $00  a 
month,  aided  in  support  of  children, 
although  divorced  from  wife,  injury 
caused  deatli  in  4  hours — $500  for 
pain  and  suffering,  and  $2,500  to 
children,  not  excessive.  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v.  .McCain.  67  Ark. 
377;  55  S.  W.  165.  Deceased  was 
husband  and  father,  held  that  his 
earning  capacity,  character  and  busi- 
ness qualifications  could  be  consid- 
ered (under  Sanborn  &  H.  Ark.  Dig. 
sec.  5912),  Itappeared  that  he  was 34 
years  old  with  a  life  expectancy  of  25 
years,  was  in  good  health,  robust, 
temperate,  industrious,  trustworthy, 
careful,  painstaking,  gave  $800  to 
$900  yearly  to  his  wife  and  children 
for  their  support,  and  possessed  good 
business  qualifications.  Only  a  small 
part  of  his  time  was  passed  at  home 
— $10,000  not  excessive.  St.  Louis 
I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v.  Sweet,  (10  Ark. 
550;  31  S.  W.  571.  Decedent's  in- 
come and  the  fact  that  he  received 
a  monthly  pension  of  $72  and  that  he 
at  times  sought  and  obtained  employ- 
ment will  be  considered,  also  that 
he  possessed  ordinary  business  abil- 
ity, was  52  years  old,  energetic  and 
industrious.  In  this  case,  $7,500 
in  favor  of  a  widow  and  minor 
children  was  recovered.  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Maddry,  57  Ark. 
506;  21  S.  W.  472;  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  327.  Deceased  was  29  years 
old,  a  railway  brakeman,  gave  his 
family  from  $40  to  $55  monthly  out 
of  wages  of  $60  a  month.     It  did  not 


appeal  thai     his    earning    capacity 

would  have  increased  and  he  had  no 
other  source  of  income  *7,500  exces- 
si\e  for  wife  and  children.  St.  Louis 
I.  M.  &  S.  R  Co.  \.  Kobbius,  57  Ark. 
377;  21  S.  W.  886.  Deceased's  earn- 
ings over  and  above  his  board,  the 
small  amount  of  his  yearly  expenses, 
the  constantly  increasing  value  of 
his  services,  the  amount  sent  to  his 
father,  and  the  latter' 6  poverty,  de- 
pendence, and  life  expectancy  were 
all  considered — $2,391  not  excessive. 
Fordyce  v.  Mc(  ants,  55  Ark.  384; 
18  S.  W.  371;  51  Ark.  509;  11  S.  \V. 
694;  4  L.  R.  A.  290.  Deceased's 
health,  life  expectancy,  earnings, 
amount  of  money  given  monthly  to 
mother  and  sister,  their  several  ages 
and  life  expectancy  and  her  physical 
condition  were  considered.  Little 
Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Voss  (Ark.  |, 
18  S.  W.  172.  Deceased  was  a 
minor  and  brakeman;  chances  of 
promotion  considered.  Davis  v.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  53  Ark.  117; 
13  S.  W.  801;  44  Am.  &  Fng.  R.  (as. 
690;  7  L.  R.  A.  283.  Deceased  child's 
intelligence,  obedience  and  mother's 
poverty  considered.  Little  Rocfe  & 
Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker,  33  Ark.  350; 
34  Am.  Rep.  44;  19  Am.  &  Fug.  II. 
Cas.  195,  212.  See  charge  of  Davis. 
J.,  to  jury,  Barron  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  X.  D. 
111.)  453.  Changes  and  chances  of 
human  life,  health  and  sickness  are 
factors.  Bailey  v.  Chicago  &  A.  F. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  X.  D.  111.).  4  Biss. 
430.  Deceased  was  a  girl  12  years 
old.  Baltimore  *  <>.  s.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Then,  159  111.  535;  42  \.  F.  Mil. 
aff'g  59  111.  App.  561.  Loss  of  wages 
781 


§  608  DEATH— FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

the  rate  of  wages  to  all  classes  of  the  defendant's  employees 
was,  in  connection  with  other  evidence,  held  competent  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  the  wages  paid  the  fireman  in  its  employ.™ 


of  minor  son  not  the  limit  of  damages. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Beardon,  157  111. 
372;  41  N.  E.  871.  Deceased  brother 
was  habitual  drunkard,  and  incapable 
of  self-support.  North  Chicago  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Brodie,  156  111.  317;  40 N.  E.  942, 
rev'g  57  111.  App.  564.  Evidence 
should  afford  some  data  for  ascertain- 
ment of  loss.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wangelin,  152  111.  138;  38  N.  E.  760. 
As  to  habits,  capacity,  etc.,  see  Chi- 
cago v.  Scholten,  75  111.  468.  As  to 
instruction  as  to  present  and  pro- 
spective loss  being  too  general  and 
indefinite,  see  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Swett,  45  111.  197.  Deceased 
•was  a  son,  the  character  and  amount 
of  aid  rendered  parents,  father's  age 
and  financial  condition  considered 
— $2,000  not  excessive.  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon,  43  111.  388. 
Deceased  was  son  and  brother;  his 
age,  occupation,  income,  property, 
probable  increase  or  decrease  of 
wealth,  that  he  was  unmarried  and 
possibility  that  he  might  have  mar- 
ried are  material.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Barron  (Stat.  111.),  5  Wall.  (U. 
S.)  90;  18  L.  Ed.  591;  Barron  v. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (IT.  S.  C. 
C.  N.  D.  111.)  412,  453.  Deceased 
man's  age,  health,  strength,  earning 


capacity,  daily  wages,  and  that  he 
left  a  wife  and  children  considered 
—$5,000  not  excessive.  Economy 
Light  &  P.  Co.  v.  Stephen,  87  111. 
App.  220,  affd  (111.);  58  N.  E. 
359.  Evidence  of  habits  of  deceased 
may  be  competent  upon  question  of 
contributory  negligence.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Downey,  85  111. 
App.  175.  Age,  earnings  and  finan- 
cial condition  admissible.  Chicago 
&  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  82  111.  App. 
605.  Earning  until  21  years  of  age, 
not  the  limit  of  damages.  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dooley,  76  111. 
App.  424;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  238. 
Deceased  was  a  girl  4  years  old — 
$3,500  reduced  to  $2,000.  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlon,  68  111. 
App.  628;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  113, 
affd  168  111.  34;  48  N.  E.  148.  De- 
ceased son  was  33  years  old;  he  sup- 
ported parents  70  years  old — $5,000 
reduced  to  $3,000.  Leiter  v.  Kin- 
nare,  68  111.  App.  358.  Age  of  de- 
ceased adult  son,  that  he  was  un- 
married and  disposition  of  his  wages 
considered.  Webster  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Mulvany,  68  111.  App,  607,  affd  168 
111.  311;  48  N.  E.  168.  Deceased's 
age,  occupation  and  property  owned 
by  him  considered— $5,000  not  exces- 


T9  The  witness  here  was  a  termi- 
nal agent  and  as  such  had  been  of- 
ficially furnished  with  and  had 
possession  of  this  official  schedule 
of  wages  paid  employees.  Moreover 
there  was  competent  evidence  to 
show  about  what  the  earnings  of  a 
fireman  were  on  the  company's  road 
if  it  was  material  to  prove  the  fact, 
and  it  is  not  essential  to  prove  the  in- 
dividual earnings  of  a  fireman  killed 
where  it  is  shown  that  he  was  paid 

782 


on  a  mileage  basis  and  the  rate  there- 
of. And  the  jury  may  take  notice  of 
the  fact  that  such  employees  are  paid 
under  a  general  schedule  of  wages 
as  well  also  as  of  other  facts  in  the 
common  knowledge  of  intelligent 
men,  and  they  may  exercise  their 
good  sense  and  judgment  in  esti- 
mating damages.  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
R.  Co.  v.  Elliott  (TJ.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th 
C.  C.  C.  A.  Ind.  Ty. ),  102  Fed.  96  ; 
42  C.  C.  A.  188. 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY     IXJl   l:lis.  §   tin-: 

It  also  decided  in  the  same  case  that  the  admission  of  evidence 
of  what  deceased  told  witness  he  earned  per  month  when  he 
first  commenced  work  in  defendant's  switch  yards  and  of  the 
amount  of  his  wages  when  he  became  fireman  is,  if  incompetent, 


sive.  Louisville,  X.  A.  it  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Patchen,  66  111.  App.  206.  Healtb 
and  ability  to  perform  hard  labor 
may  be  proven.  Ashley  Wire  Co. 
v.  McFadden,  66  111.  App.  26.  De- 
ceased's age  and  occupation  and  age 
of  surviving  child  considered — 
$5,000  excessive.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
B.  Co.  v.  Gunderson,  65  111.  App.  638. 
Death  of  mother,  adult  sous  lived 
with  her  and  she  kept  house  for  them. 
Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Ptacek, 
62  III.  App.  375;  1  Chic  L.  J.  Wkly. 
53.  That  daughter  was  an  adult, 
and  her  earnings  and  aid  rendered 
parents  considered — $4,140  exces- 
sive. Armour  v.  Czischki,  59  111. 
App.  17.  Deceased  employee's  earn- 
ings which  he  might  have  given 
family  are  not  the  limit  of  recovery. 
Swift  v.  Foster,  55  111.  App.  286. 
Deceased,  laborer,  earned  $1.50  a  day. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  54 
111  App.  215.  Deceased  minor  sons, 
age  and  daily  earnings  considered — 
$2,500  not  excessive.  Illinois  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Gilbert,  51  111.  App.  404.  De- 
ceased was  45  years  old:  when  he 
was  employed,  he  earned  weekly 
$9  or  $10  and  supported  his  fam- 
ily —  $5,000  not  excessive.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ouska,  51 
111.  App.  334,  affd  151  111.  232;  27 
N.  E.  899.  Deceased  was  31  years 
old,  and  in  good  health  and  sole  sup- 
port of  family.  Chicago  &  E.  I. 
R.  Co.  v.  Knevrim,  48  111  App. 
243.  Age  of  deceased  husband,  his 
health,  education,  habits  of  sobriety 
and  steadiness,  the  fact  that  he  had 
learned  a  trade  and  that  he  was  un- 
employed considered — $2, 000  not  ex- 
cessive.    Marschall  v.  Laughran,  47 


111.  App.  29.  Habits  and  character 
of  deceased  as  affecting  next  of  kin*s 
pecuniary  relations  with  him  and 
support  received  admissible.  Chi- 
cago &  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Travis,  44  111. 
App.  466.  Dependency  of  surviving 
sister  on  deceased  brother,  her  occu- 
pation and  earnings  considered. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin,  43 
111.  App.  324.  Deceased  adult  daugh- 
ter was  school-teacher,  aided  in  sup- 
port of  family  and  lived  with  parents. 
City  of  Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111.  App. 
483,  affd  129  111.  1076;  21  W.  E.  1076. 
Deceased  son's  age,  occupation, 
disposition  of  earnings  with  relation 
to  parents,  etc.,  considered.  Chicago 
&  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  28  111.  App. 
102.  Deceased  was  73  years  old, 
labored  at  odd  jobs  for  part  of  time 
and  earned  about  8215  yearly — $1,200 
held  excessive.  Conley  v.  Maine 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  95  .Me.  149;  49  Atl.  668. 
Earning  capacity,  ability  to  labor 
and  probabilities  of  obtaining  profit- 
able employment  are  elements  of 
damages.  Oakes  v.  Maine  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  95  Me.  103;  49  Atl.  418,  under 
Stat.  1891,  cb.  124.  Deceased  was 
laborer,  unskilled,  aged  23,  had  not 
saved  anything  and  had  no  family — 
$8,000  excessive  and  also  more  than 
statutory  limit.  ODouuellv.  Maine 
C.  R.  Co.,  86  Me.  552:  30  Atl.  116:  10 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Rep.  293;  25  L. 
R.  A.  658.  Occupation  and  daily 
earnings  were  in  evidence  and  also 
the  facts  that  some  of  the  kindred 
resided  abroad  but  there  was  no  evi- 
dence as  to  age,  earning  or  saving 
capacity — 11,750  excessive.  Seven- 
sen  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S  I 
C.  D.  Mont. ),  45  Fed.  407.  See  John- 
783 


§  609 


DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


immaterial  error,  where  it  is  merely  cumulative  evidence  of  a 
fact  abundantly  proved  by  competent  testimony,  and  is  in  addi- 
tion a  fact  which  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  Nor  will 
such  testimony  be  a  ground  of  reversal  where  no  objection  is 
interposed  to  it  as  hearsay  at  the  time  of  its  introduction.  The 
admission  of  incompetent  evidence  of  a  material  fact  being  an 
error  without  prejudice,  where  the  fact  is  proved  by  other  com- 
petent evidence  or  the  party  complaining  of  the  error  was  in- 
strumental in  excluding  competent  evidence  to  prove  the  fact, 
or  where  the  fact  is  one  of  common  knowledge.80 

§  609.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "  — Sufferings  of  person  injured. — Where 
the  trial  court  permits  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the  nature  of  in- 
testate's injuries  and  that  they  had  occasioned  his  death, 
but  it  also  charged  the  jury  that  "  nothing  can  be  allowed  for 
the  pain  and  suffering  of  deceased,"  such  action  is  not  error 
for  which  there  will  be  a  reversal  of  the  case.81  But  where 
there  was  only  a  moment's  interval  of  conscious  suffering,  a 
verdict  of  four  thousand  dollars  for  the  pain  and  suffering  of 


son  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  18  Neb. 
690;  26  N.  W.  347.  Deceased's  age 
at  the  time  of  death  important. 
Soyer  v.  Great  Falls  Water  Co.,  15 
Mont.  1 ;  37  Pac.  837.  Life  expect- 
ancy of  deceased  material,  so  are  his 
good  health  and  activity  in  business 
and  manner  of  his  death.  Friend  v. 
Burleigh,  53  Neb.  674;  74  N.  W.  50. 
Deceased  minor  son's  age  and  that  of 
his  father,  the  latter's  poverty  and 
condition  with  relation  to  dependent 
children,  the  son's  occupation  and 
competency  therein,  earning  capac- 
ity and  amount  of  earnings  consid- 
ered— $2,400  not  excessive.  Post  v. 
Olmstead,  47  Neb.  893;  66  N.  W. 
828.  Life  expectancy  just  before  the 
injury  and  value  of  services  may  be 
proved.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Baier 
(Neb.),  55  N.  W.  913.  Deceased's 
indulgence  in  liquors,  careless  and 
and     nonsaving     habits     and     fail- 

784 


ure  to  aid  next  of  kin  considered. 
Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 
(Neb.),  52  N.  W.  840.  See  further 
Roose  v.  Perkins,  9  Neb.  304  ;  Staf- 
ford v.  Rubens,  115  111.  19t>;  1 
West.  640;  Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L. 
R.  Co.  v.  Delaney,  82  111.  198;  25  Am. 
Rep.  198;  Malott  v.  Shimer,  153  Ind. 
35;  1  Reptr.  1,234;  54  N.  E.  161;  15 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  774;  6  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  263;  Gran  v.  Houston,  45 
Neb.  813;  64  N.  W.  245. 

go  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  El- 
liott (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  C.  C. 
A.  Ind.  Ty.),  102  Fed.  96;  42  C.  C.  A. 
188. 

81  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hicks 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  W.  D.  Ark.),  79  Fed. 
262;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  793,  per 
Thayer,  Cir.  J.  In  this  case  an  em- 
ployee of  a  lumber  company  was 
killed  by  reason  of  open  switch  on 
railroad  track. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES.         §  610 

deceased  will  be  reversed,"-'  although  a  verdict  of  "two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars  will  stand  where  deceased  suffered  intense 
pain  and  anguish  for  the  twenty-four  hours  during  which  he 
survived  the  injuries,  and  he  suffered  a  terrible  shock  to  his 
system  and  his  leg  was  mangled.83  In  the  states  however  which 
come  under  this  provision  of  the  statute  as  to  fair  and  just  com- 
pensation, etc.,  this  question  of  recovery  for  the  pain  and  suf- 
fering of  the  injured  party  is  also  involved  in  that  of  the  survival 
of  the  cause  of  action,  as  well  as  that  whether  or  not  the  action 
for  the  death  is  separate  and  distinct  from  that  which  survives," 
and  if  the  death  is  occasioned  by  a  cause  other  than  the  injury, 
there  is  precisely  the  same  basis  of  recovery  as  the  person  him- 
self would  have  had  had  he  lived,  otherwise  his  bodily  pain  and 
suffering  cannot  be  considered, s"'  and  it  may  be  generally  stated 
that  nothing  can  be  allowed  for  the  pain  and  suffering  of  the 
injured  person.86 


§  610.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "—Solatium— Mental  suffering,  loss  of 
society,  etc. — Nothing  can  be  allowed  for  the  grief  or  distress  of 


82  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dawson,  68  Ark.  1;  56  S.  W.  46.  In 
this  case  a  child  6  years  old  was 
killed  on  railroad  track.  Examine 
also  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Maho- 
uey,  67  Ark.  617;  55  S.  W.  840.-  Ser- 
vant was  killed  in  this  case.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  McCain, 
67  Ark.  377;  55  S.  W.  165.  A  ser- 
vant was  killed  in  this  case.  Fore- 
man of  switching  crew  and  switch- 
man of  another  crew  are  not  fellow 
servants  under  Sanb.  &  B.  Dig. 
sees.  6248,  6249. 

83 St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Robbins,  57  Ark.  377:  21  S.  W.  886, 
brakeman  killed. 

84 An  action  survives  in  favor  of 
the  widow  and  children  in  Indian 
Territory.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 
(Ind.  Ty.),  51  S.  W.  1007:  14  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  ( 'as.  X.  S.  587.  See  sec.  596  n, 
herein. 

50 


85  Chicago*  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 119  111.  586;  6  West.  773;  9  X.  E. 
263;  19  111.  App.  591.  See  also  Hol- 
tou  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131. 

86  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Needham  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E. 
D.  Ark.), 3  C.  C.  A.  129;  10  U.  S.  App. 
339;  52  Fed.  371,  378;  5  Am.  &  EnS. 
R.  Cas.  88,  per  Sanborn.  C.  J.:  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron.  5  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  90;  IS  L.  Ed.  591,  per  Nel- 
son, J.;  Barron  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  1  Hiss.  (U.  S.  C.  •  '.  X.  D.  111.) 
412,  and  charge  of  Davis,  J.,  in  same 
case;  id.  445.  453.  4:.."):  .Maney  v. 
Chicago,  B.  *  Q.  R.  Co..  in  111.  App. 
in:,;  Malotl  v.  Shimer,  15::  Ind.  :;.",: 
1  Repr.  1234;  5  1  \.  K.  L01 ;  15  Am. 
*  Eng.  R.  Cas.  V  S.  771;  6  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  263;  Oakes  v.  .Maine  <  cut.  Et 
Co.,  95  Me.  in.::  49  Atl.  lis.  under 
Stat.  1891,  ch.  124. 

785 


611 


DEATH— FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


anyone,8*  whether  husband,  wife,  parent,  child  or  other  lineal 
or  collateral  kindred,  for  mental  anguish  or  suffering  is  excluded 
as  an  element  of  damages  under  this  statutory  provision  which 
allows  only  a  fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury,88  nor  for  loss  of  a  wife's  companionship,  of  her 
love  and  affection  or  anything  of  that  kind.89  Nor  can  anything 
be  allowed  for  the  wounded  feelings  of  a  parent.90  Nor  can 
there  be  any  recovery  for  loss  of  companionship  and  association 
of  a  deceased  child.91  Nor  for  loss  of  society  of  other  deceased 
persons,92  and  although  the  declaration  alleges  that  the  next  of 
kin  are  deprived  of  the  deceased's  comfort,  assistance  and  com- 
panionship, an  instruction  to  give  such  damages  as  are  proved  by 
a  preponderance  of  evidence  is  not  open  to  the  objection  that  it 
allows  damages  as  a  solatium  where  it  also  explicitly  charged 
that  the  jury  must  be  governed  solely  by  the  pecuniary  loss.9' 

§611.  "Fair  and   just  compensation    with  reference  to 
the  pecuniary  injuries  "—Physical  injury  to  beneficiary.— 

The  physical  injury  sustained  by  a  beneficiary,    although  re- 


87  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hicks 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  W.  D.  Ark.),  49  U.  S. 
App.  112;  79  Fed.  262;  1  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  793.     But  see  sec.  609,  herein. 

88  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Henson 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.), 
58  Fed.  531;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Needham  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th 
C.  E.  D.  Ark.),  3  C.  C.  A.  129;  10 
U.  S.  App.  339;  52  Fed.  371,  378;  5 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  88,  per  Sanborn, 
Cir.  J.;  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am.  Rep. 
44;  Barron  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1 
Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  111.)  412;  id. 
453,  455,  456,  charge  by  Davis,  J.,  aff'd 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron,  5 
Wall.  (U.  S. )  90;  18  L.  Ed.  591 ;  Bailey 
v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
N.  D.  111.),  4  Biss.  430;  Wabash  R. 
Co.  v.  Smith,  162  111.  583;  44  N.  E. 
856;  Chicago  Consul.  Bottling  Co.  v. 
Tietz,  37111.  App.  509;  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Gillam,  27  111.  App.  386; 
Malott   v.    Shinier,     153    Ind.   35;    1 

786 


Repr.  1234;  54  N.  E.  101;  6  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  263  ;  15  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  N.  S.  774;  Oakes  v.  Maine 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  95  Me.  103;  49AU.418; 
Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
35  Neb.  95 ;  52  N.  W.  840. 

89  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Henson 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.), 
58  Fed.  531. 

90  Bailey  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  111.),  4  Biss.  430. 
Barron  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  N.  D.  111.)  412;  id.  453, 
455,  456,  per  Davis,  J.,  charging  the 
jury;  case  aff'd  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 
v.  Barron,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  18  L. 
Ed.  591. 

oi  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am.  Rep. 
44. 

92  Kerkow  v.  Bauer,  15  Neb.  150. 
See  cases  cited  in  preceding  notes  to 
this  section. 

93  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  162  111. 
583;  44  N.  E.  856. 


WITH    REFEUENCE    DO    PECUNIAR*    [NJUBIES.  §612 

suiting  from  the  killing,  as  in  case  of  ill  health  occasioned  by 
overwork,  consequent  upon  the  death,  is  nut  a  ground  of  re- 
covery." 

§  012.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Relationship,  legal  and  actual,  of  de- 
ceased to  beneficiaries.  -The  relationship,  legal  and  actual, 
sustained  by  deceased  to  the  beneficiaries,  is  important  in  de- 
termining not  only  the  actual  loss,  hut  also  in  ascertaining  the 
pecuniary  advantage  which  the  beneficiaries  had  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  deriving  except  for  the  death.  So  that  damages 
may  be  based  upon  this  reasonable  probability  of  pecuniary  ben- 
efit, whether  arising  from  legal  or  family  relations.11''  Thus  the 
fact  that  deceased  was  at  borne  only  a  small  part  of  the  time, 
coupled  with  his  business  energy  and  habits  will  be  considered 
in  connection  with  the  value  of  his  instruction  and  training  of 
his  children.96  So  the  relations  between  deceased  and  his  next 
of  kin,  lineal  or  collateral,  are  important,1'7  and  although  legal 
relations  may  have  ceased  between  a  husband  and  wife,  yet  his 
actual  relations  with  her  by  the  way  of  aid  furnished  her  for 
their  children  will  be  considered.95  But  if  legal  relations  be- 
tween husband  and  wife  have  been  terminated,  the  right  of  re- 
covery has  ended."  Again,  the  pecuniary  relations  of  deceased 
with  the  surviving  beneficiaries  are  material  and  relevant.1"0  And 
in  fact  this  question  of  legal  and  actual  relations,  in  so  far  as  ii 
affects  the  measure  of  damages,  is  involved  in  nearly  every  ease 
where  recovery  is  sought  for  the  negligent  or  wrongful  killing 
of  a  person,  and  to  add  to  this  section  the  decisions  which  come 
within  this  classification  would  be  to  substantially  repeat  most 
of  the  cases  which  have  been  considered  elsewhere  under  other 
headings.     The  reader  is,  therefore,  referred  to  the  several  sec- 

94  Elshire    v.    Schuyler,     15    Nob.  591;   Barron  v.  Illinois  C.   R.  Co..  1 

561.  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  412,  4.-):;. 

1,5  McKay  v.  New  England  Dredg-  w  St.     Louis.    I.     M.     &    S.   R   Co. 

ingCo.,  92Me.  454;  43Atl.  29,  under  v.    McCain,    87    Ark.  377;  55   S.    W. 

Me.  act,  1891,  ch.  124.  105. 

90  St.  Louis,  1.   M.  &  s.   R.  Co.  v.  w  North    Chicago   v.    Brodie,    156 

Sweet,  60  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571.  111.  317;  40  N.  E.  942. 

97  Illinois  C.  K.  Co.  v.  Barron  (111.  100Chicago«&  G.  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Travis. 

Stat.),  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  18  L.  Ed.  44  111.  A.pp.  460. 

7-7 


§  613  DEATH— FAIB    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

tions  relating  to  damages  for  death  under  this  fair  and  just  com- 
pensation statute.1 

§  613.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Legal  or  moral  obligation — Legal 
right — Support  and  dependency. — What  has  been  lost  by  the 
death  depends  upon  what  constitutes  the  "  pecuniary  injury  " 
and  therefore  that  is  the  basis  of  recovery,3  but  the  question 
at  once  arises  whether  the  legal  or  moral  obligation  to  support 
those  in  certain  relations,  such  as  the  wife  or  the  minor  children, 
or  the  legal  or  moral  right  of  such  persons  to  claim  support 
can  enhance  the  damages,  and  it  has  been  decided  that  it  must 
appear  that  there  was  a  legal  obligation  to  support  the  next  of 
kin  because  of  their  dependency,  or  that  it  must  be  shown  that 
they  were  supported  in  whole  or  in  part  by  deceased,  in  order 
to  recover  more  than  nominal  damages,  although  it  was  subse- 
quently held  in  the  same  case  that  the  inability  of  the  next  of 
kin  to  support  themselves  and  the  question  of  their  depend- 
ence were  not  material  or  admissible  evidence  to  show  pecuniary 
injury.3  And  it  has  also  been  declared  that  it  need  not  be 
proven  that  a  legal  claim  to  support  exists  to  justify  a  recov- 
ery.4 In  case  of  a  child's  death  in  so  far  as  the  parent's  legal 
right  to  services,  and  also  the  former's  right  and  the  latter's 
obligation  to  support  are  concerned,  it  is  certain  that  the  dam- 
ages rest  largely  upon  the  legal  obligation  and  legal  right 
coupled  with  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit. 
But  where  the  child  is  too  young  to  render  services  of  any 
value,  then  it  is  apparent  that  the  question  is  one  rather  of  a 
deprivation  of  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  advantage 
than  otherwise.5 


lrrhe  point  is  particularly  involved  I      4  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron  (111. 

in   those   sections,    which    relate   to    Stat.)  5  Wall.   (U.    S. )  90,   106;    18 

support  and  to  reasonable  expecta-  <  L.    Ed.   591;    Barron    v.    Illinois    C. 

tion    of     pecuniary    benefit     under  '  K.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  )412.    See 

sees.  613-616,  herein.  McKay  v.   New   England    Dredging 

2  See  sees.  602,  603,  herein.  Co.,  92  Me.  454;  43  Atl.  29;  Chicago 

B  Chicago    P.    &  St.    L.   K.    Co.   v.    &  A.  R.   Co.    v.   Shannon.     See  sec. 

Woolridge,   72    111.   App.   551,    rev'd    625,  herein. 

174  111.  330;  51  X.  E.  701.     See  John  ■■     5  See  sees.  616,  635,  636,  herein. 

Morris  Co.  v.  Burgess,  44  111.  App.  27.  i 

788 


WITH  REFERENCE  TO  PECUNIARY  I  \.H' I:  I  F.s. 


&  614 


§  OH.  Same  subject  continued.— The  statutes  of  those 
stairs  which  come  within  this  provision  as  to  fair  and  jusi  com- 
pensation are  evidently  intended  to  benefit  those  who  as  bene- 
ficiaries have  been  deprived  by  the  death  of  certain  rights  due 
from  one  who  sustained  at  the  time  of  the  killing  certain  legal 
relations  burdened  with  certain  legal  obligations  such  as  the 
duty  to  support  and  the  right  to  claim  thesame.6  Therefore  in 
Arkansas  and  Illinois  the  amount  of  contributions  of  tie- de- 
ceased towards  the  support  of  his  wife  and  children,  and  all  the 
various  factors  which  show  the  ability  of  the  intestate  in  the 
matter  of  supporting  his  family  will  be  considered,  as  well  as 
the  reasonable  expectancy  from  his  continued  life  had  he  not 
been  killed.7  And  in  these  states  where  the  deceased  was  either 
a  minor  or  adult  child,  the  extent  of  his  contributions  to  his 
parents  for  their  support  or  to  other  kindred  as  well  as  the 
intent  to  continue  the  same  will  be  relevant  and  material  upon 
the  question  of  damages,  although  the  recovery  may  also  rest 
upon  the  reasonable  expectation  of  benefit  of  pecuniary  advan- 
tage, shown  by  the  evidence.8  So  that  it  is  apparent  that  in 
this  latter  instance  the  recovery  does  not  rest  upon  any  legal 
obligation  or  legal  right,  but  rather  upon  the  loss  of  a  pecuniary 


6  See  sec.  598,  herein. 

i  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v. 
Sweet.  80  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571; 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Maddry, 
57  Ark.  500;  21  S.  W.  472;  58  Am.  cV 
Eng.  R.  Cas.327;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Robbing,  57  Ark.  377; 
21  S.  W.  SSi):  Pennsylvania,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
Keane,  143  111.  172,  175;  32  X.  E.  260; 
Chicago  &  Edison  Co.  v.  Moren,  86 
111.  App.  152,  affd  57  X.  E.  773:  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ouska.  51 
111.  App.  334,  affd  151  111.  232;  27 
N".  E.  897:  Chicago  A-  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kni'vrim,  48  111.  App.  243;  Chicago  & 
C.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Travis,  44  111.  App. 
4(3(3.  Widow's  testimony  that  she 
was  supported  by  her  husband  is 
competent.  St.  Louis  P.  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Dorsey,  1S9  111.  251:  59  X.  E. 
593,  affg  89   111.  App.  555.      Hut  sec 


Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda. 
93  111.  302;  Swift  ifc  Co.  v.  Foster, 
103  111.  50;  44  X.  E.  37:  12  Xar.  Corp. 
Rep.  396. 

■  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis.  55  Ark.  402;  IS  S.  W.  02S:  For- 
dyce  v.  McCants,  55  Ark.  384;  18  S. 
W.  371:  51  Ark.  509;  11  S.  W.  694;  l 
L.  R.  A.  296;  Letter  v.  Kinnare,  68 
111.  App.  358;  Armour  v.  Czischki, 
59  111.  App.  17;  St.  Louis.  A.  &  T.  11. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bauer,  5:',  111.  App.  526, 
affd  156  HI.  106;  W  N.  E.  148;  City 
of  Salem  v.  Harvey.  29  111.  App.  183, 
aff'd  12'."  [11.  344:  21  X.  E.  1076;  Cl.i- 
oago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  28  111. 
App.  102.  Hut  examine  Little  Rock. 
M.  R.  .V  T.  K.  <••>.  v.  Leveret t,  48 
Ark.  333:  3  S.  W.  50,  and  sees.  617- 
019,  herein. 

789 


§614  DEATH— FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

benefit."  But  in  another  case  some  stress  seems  to  have  been 
put  by  the  court  upon  the  legal  obligation  of  a  deceased  son  to 
have  aided  his  mother,  for  it  was  decided,  that  one  of  the  ques- 
tions to  be  considered  was  whether  he  was  bound  to  aid  her.10 
Again,  an  instruction  is  held  erroneous  which  allows  the  jury  to 
award  such  damages  as  will  be  a  just  compensation  for  the  dam- 
age to  the. means  of  support  of  the  next  of  kin.11  In  Illinois,  as 
we  have  elsewhere,  stated,12  proof  of  support  of  lineal  kindred 
does  not  seem  necessary,13  although  upon  this  question  the  deci- 
sions are  not  in  harmony.14  In  that  state  under  the  statute 
limiting  the  damages  to  the  pecuniary  injuries  sustained  by  the 
wife  and  next  of  kin,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  lineal  descendants 
were  dependent  upon  the  deceased  and  were  unable  to  support 
themselves.1"1  But  it  is  also  held  that  it  is  not  a  material  factor 
that  minor  children  had  other  means  of  support  after  the 
father's  negligent  death,16  and  evidence  of  the  deceased  widow's 
ability  to  earn  money  is  admissible  under  allegations  that  by  her 
negligent  death  the  children  are  deprived  of  their  education 
and  means  of  support.17  But  evidence  of  pecuniary  loss  is  ad- 
missible upon  an  averment  that  the  widow  and  minor  children 
have  by  the  death  of  the  husband  and  father  been  deprived  of 
support,  etc.,18  and  the  amount  of  the  recovery  will  be  affected 


9  Examine  McKay  v.  New  England 
Dredging  Co.,  92  Me.  454;  43Atl.  29. 

10  Chicago  &  N.  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Swett, 
45  111.  197. 

ii  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartle,  94 
111.  App.  57. 

i'2  See  sec.  625,  herein. 

13  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Gun- 
derson,  174  111.  495;  51  N.  E.  708, 
aff'g  74  111.  App.  356.  See  Illinois 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron  (111.  Stat.),  5 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  90,  106;  18  Lawy.  Ed. 
591. 

i*  See  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Foster,  163 
111.  50;  44  N.  E.  837;  12  Nat.  Corp. 
Rep.  396,  see  sees.  617-619,  herein. 

15  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolrklge,  174  111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701, 
rev'g  72  111.  App.  551,  under  111. 
Rev.  Stat.  eh.  70,  sec.  2.  This  last 
case  (72  111.  App.  551)  held  that  in 
790 


order  to  recover  more  than  nominal 
damages,  it  was  necessary  in  an  action 
by  the  administrator  to  prove  that 
the  next  of  kin  were  wholly  or  in 
part  supported  by  the  deceased,  or 
that  by  reason  of  their  dependence 
he  was  legally  bound  to  support 
them. 

16  Heyer  v.  Salsbury,  7  111.  App.  93. 

17  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Carey, 
115  111.  115;  3  N.  E.  519. 

is  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Carey, 
115  111.  115;  3  X.  E.  519;  2  West.  73. 
Hut  see  Mayers  v.  Smith,  121  111. 
442;  13  N.  E.  216;  11  West.  :>7:>; 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda, 
93111.  302;  .John  Morris  Co.  v.  Bur- 
gess, 44  111.  App.  27.  See  further  as 
to  loss  of  support  and  recovery  there- 
for, Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  May,  108 
111.  288. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIAR?    INJURIES.  §  615 

by  the  fact  that  the  next  of  kin  have  received  no  aid  or  contrib- 
uted towards  their  support,  and  this  also  where  they  are  not 
dependent  therefor  upon  deceased.19 

§  615.  Same  subject  concluded. — If  collateral  kindred 
have  been  aided  and  needed  support,  proof  of  the  amount  is  de- 
cided not  to  be  accessary  to  justify  the  award  of  substantial  dam- 
ages.20 And  the  recovery  is  not  limited  by  the  contributions 
to  the  family's  support  \>y  deceased/1  nor  is  it  the  entire  expense 
of  supporting  tbe  family,  but  the  damages  arc  to  be  measured 
by  a  fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  means  of 
support  with  which  they  would  probably  have  been  provided 
bad  there  been  no  death.22  In  Nebraska  there  should  be  a  party 
survivor  who  was  dependent  upon  or  legally  entitled  to  support 
by  deceased  ;  ^  as  well  also  that  there  was  some  one  dependent 
upon  him  therefor,21  or  that  there  are  kindred  upon  whom  the 
law  confers  a  right  to  be  supported.25  Although  if  facts  are  al- 
leged showing  ability  to  support,  such  as  health  and  the  active 
conduct  of  business,  together  with  such  averment  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  proper  persons,  it  will  be  sufficient,  although  evi- 
dence which  is  otherwise  competent  to  show  tbe  pecuniary  loss 
to  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  is  not  rendered  incompetent  be- 
cause of  the  fact  that  the  next  of  kin  are  self-supporting  ami 
independent  of  the  earnings  of  deceased,  none  of  which  are  de- 
voted to  their  maintenance.26     And  the  extent  of  the  loss  may 

*  Chicago  v.  Scholten,  75  111.  468;  I     21  Swift  v.  Foster,  55  111.  App.  286. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Swett,  45        w  Ohio  &   M.   R.    <',,.  v.  Simras.  43 


111.  197;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shan- 
non, 43  111.  338;  Chicago  v.  Hosing,  83 
111.  204;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron 
(111.  Stat.),  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  IS 
L.  Ed.  591;  Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R. 
Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.  ('.  C.)  412.  De- 
ceased was  an  adult  and  one  of  the 
collateral  kindred  had  received  some 


111.  App.  260. 

-'  Chicago,  !'..  &  <.>.  K.  Co.  v.  Bond, 
58  Neh.  385;  78  N.  W.  710;  6  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  116;  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  N.  S.  759,  citing  Chi. 'ago.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Buskirk,  58  Xeb. 
218;  78  N.  W.  -".li:  Friend  v.  Bur- 
leigh, 53  Xeb.  074;  74  X.  W.  50.  • 


aid.     In   Falkenan    v.    Rowland,    70  M  Chicago,     B.     &    Q.     R.    Co.    v. 

111.  A|.p.  20,  brothers  and  sisters  had  Oyster.  58   Neb.    1:   78    N.  W.  359;   12 

at  times  received  pecuniary  aid  from  Am.  it  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  655. 

deceased  but  they  had  no  pecuniary  -•'  Omaha  A:    R,   V.  K.  Co.  v.  Crow, 

interest  in  his  life.  54  Neb.  747:  74  N.  W.  106(5. 

»Ohio  &   M.    R.   Co.  v.  Wangelin,  -"Friend  v.  Burleigh.  53    Neb.  <'-74; 
43  111.  App.  324.                                         I  74  X.  \V.  50. 

791 


8  616 


DEATH — FAIR     AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


be  shown  by  evidence  of  deceased's  competency  to  support  his 
family,  coupled  with  proof  of  their  need.27  So  the  fact  that 
minor  children  are  "  wholly  dependent "  upon  deceased  shows 
pecuniary  injury.28  But  evidence  showing  noncontribution  to 
the  support  of  brothers  and  sisters  will  affect  the  amount  of  re- 
covery.29 But  in  these  cases,  as  also  in  the  case  of  a  father  where 
the  son  has  been  killed,  there  may,  it  seems,  be  a  recovery,  al- 
though there  was  no  legal  obligation  to  support  the  beneficiary.80 
Another  question  of  dependency  upon  deceased  arises  in  con- 
nection with  those  cases  where  proof  is  admissible  by  a  widow 
of  the  number  of  minor  children  left  by  the  death  of  a  husband 
and  father.31 

§  616.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit. — The  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  of 
which  the  parties  entitled  to  recover  have  been  deprived  by  the 
negligent  killing  is  to  be  considered  under  this  statutory  provi- 
sion as  to  "  fair  and  just  compensation."  *     The  reasonable  char- 


27  See  facts  in  Post  v.  Olm  stead,  47 
Neb.  893;  66  N.  W.  828. 

28  Kearney  Electric  Co.  v.  Laugh- 
lin,  45  Neb.  390;  63  N.  W.  941.  See 
as  to  minor  children,  right  to  recover 
for  loss  of  support,  Westphal  v. 
Austin,  39  111.  App.  230;  Bloedel  v. 
Bimmerman,  41  Neb.  695. 

29  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.,  35  Neb.  95;  52  N.  W.  840.  And 
see  as  to  father  who  had  received  no 
aid  from  deceased  son,  Johnson  v. 
Missouri  P.  K.  Co.,  18  Neb.  690;  26 
N.'W.  347. 

30  See  cases  in  last  note.  See 
sees.  617-619,  625,  herein. 

si  See  sec.  617-619,  herein. 

32"St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Maddry,  57  Ark.  306;  21  S.  W.  472. 
Action  was  in  favor  of  decedent's 
widow  and  minor  children.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
55  Ark.  462;  18  S.  W.  628,  death  of 
child.  Fordyce  v.  McCants,  51  Ark. 
509;  11  S.  W.  694;  4  L.  R.  A.  296;  55 
792 


Ark.  384,  388;  18  S.  W.  371,  father 
for  adult  son's  death.  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Freeman,  36  Ark.  41, 
death  of  child.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  & 
St,  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Keenan,  190  111.  217; 
60  N.  E.  107,  aff'g  92  111.  App.  430; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelley,  80 
111.  App.  675,  holding  that  instruc- 
tion is  not  objectionable,  that  jury 
may  consider  whatever  they  may 
from  the  evidence  believe  that 
widow  and  next  of  kin  might  have 
reasonably  expected  in  a  pecuniary 
way  from  the  life  of  the  intestate, 
afTd  182  111.  267;  54  N.  E.  979;  Illi- 
nois C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron  (Stat.  111.), 
5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  18  L.  Ed.  591; 
Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.)  412,  453,  action  for 
death  of  adult  man  for  benefit  of 
father,  brothers  and  sisters.  Balti- 
more &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Then, 
159  111.  535;  42  N.  E.  971,  aff'g  59  111. 
App.  461,  death  of  girl.  Chicago  v. 
Keefe,  114  111.  232;  1  West.  352;  West 


WITH     REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES. 


6  61 


acter,  however,  of  such  expectation  must  appear  from  the  facts 
proven,  and  these  determine  the  measure  of  damages.  This 
reasonable  expectation  includes  also  the  light  to  recover  for 
prospective  losses  by  way  of  probable  support,  expected  gifts, 
aid  or  assistance  and  the  like,  as  more  fully  appears  under  other 
appropriate  headings  herein.  Again,  it  is  decided  that  the  dam- 
ages awarded  must  be  the  present  worth  of  the  future  pecuniary 
benefits,  lost  to  the  beneficiary  by  the  wrongful  killing.  So  the 
probabilities  that  deceased  would  have  obtained  profitable  em- 
ployment may  be  considered.51  So  every  reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit  or  advantage,  from  the  continuance  of  the 
life  of  deceased,  of  which  there  is  any  legal  evidence,  should  be 
considered  by  the  jury.35 

§  617.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "—Physical  and  financial  condition  Age 
and  number  of  beneficiaries.— The  poverty  and  dependency 
of   a  father  or  of   parents   will  be   considered*  although   the 


Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dooley,  7G  111. 
App.  424;  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  238, 
death  of  child.  Chicago  &  G.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Travis,  44  111.  App.  460;  Ohio 
&  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Simms,  43  111.  App. 
2(50,  death  of  man  with  family.  Mc- 
Lean Coal  Co.  v.  McVey,  38  111.  App. 
158,  death  of  son.  McKay  v.  New- 
England  Dredging  Co.,  02  Me.  454; 
43  Atl.  29,  to  next  of  kin.  Missouri, 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Baier  (Neh.),  55  X. 
W.  913;  Johuson  v.  Missouri,  P. 
R.  Co.,  18  Neb.  699:  20  X.  W.  347, 
death  of  son.  But  see  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Swett,  45  111.  197.  See  sec. 
635  herein,  upon  the  point  whether 
this  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary benefit  extends  beyond  mi- 
nority of  children. 

88  Fordyce  v.  McCants,  51  Ark.  509; 
US.  W.  694;  4L.  11.  A.  296. 

^Oakes  v.  Maine  Cent.  R  Co.,  95 
Me.  103;  49  Atl.  418,  under  Stat. 
1891,  oh.  124. 

86  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dooley,  76  111.   App.  424;  3  Chit-.  1.. 


J.  Wkly.  238.     See  McLean  Coal  Co. 
v.  McVey,  38  111.  App.  158. 

;"  Fordyce  v.  McCants,  55  Ark.  384; 
18  S.  W.  371:  51  Ark.  509:  4  L.  R.  A. 
296;  11  S.  W.  694:  Little  Rock,  M. 
R.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Leverett,  48  Ark. 
333;  3  S.  W.  50;  Little  Hock  &  It.  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  39 
Ark.  491.  Mother  in  this  case  was 
poor  and  kept  boarders;  a  case  of 
excessive  damages.  Chicago*  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Shannon,  43  111.  3SS.  Pecuniary 
condition  of  father  and  aid  rendered 
by  deceased  son  considered.  Chicago 
v.  Powers,  42  111.  169.  Parents'  condi- 
tion admissible:  this  case  is  ex- 
plained and  distinguished  in  Chicago 
A-  X.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield.  37  Mich. 
205;  St.  Louis,  A.  *  T.  II.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bauer,  53  111.  App.  525,  afPd  156  111. 
1(16:  40  \.  E.  4  IS.  Aid  was  Furnished 
parents  who  were  advanced  in  years; 
a  case  of  not  excessive  damages. 
Aurora  v.  Seedel  man,  34  111.  App.  285 
Pecuniary  condition  of  parents  ad- 
missible for  death  of   small  child  to 

793 


£  618  DEATH       FAN;    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

financial  condition  of  a  father  who  sues  as  administrator  for  the 
next  of  kin  cannot  be  shown,  as  that  plaintiff  was  wealthy  and 
able  to  hire  others  to  perform  services  in  place  of  a  deceased 
son,  where  there  is  no  proof  that  the  latter  was  unable  to  care 
for  himself.157  Nor  can  the  pecuniary  loss  be  affected  by  the 
number  of  children  left  by  deceased  and  their  ages,  nor  by  the 
fact  that  he  supported  his  family,  nor  is  such  evidence  admissi- 
ble as  it  is  calculated  to  awaken  the  sympathies  of  and  prejudice 
the  jury  on  other  issues.58  And  in  line  with  this  decision  it  is 
determined  that  an  instruction  is  not  misleading  as  basing  the 
recovery  upon  the  pecuniary  condition  of  the  widow  and  chil- 
dren after  his  death,  where  such  instruction  allows  a  recovery, 
if  by  the  wrongful  death  said  beneficiaries  have  been  and  are 
deprived  of  their  means  of  support.39  And  it  is  also  decided 
that  a  surviving  father's  physical  condition,  as  that  he  had  but 
one  arm,  is  inadmissible  evidence  as  it  could  not  affect  the  loss.* 
So  it  has  been  decided  in  another  case  that  the  pecuniary  cir- 
cumstances of  the  widow  and  her  minor  daughter  could  not  be 
considered,  nor  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  was  physically  crippled, 
since  the  question  was  one  of  pecuniary  loss  only  as  the  meas- 
ure of  damages.41 

§  618.    Same  subject  continued. — Evidence   is   admissible 


show  inability  to  keep  more  vigilant 
■watch  over  their  children. 

37  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater,  28  111. 
App.  73,  affd  129  111.  91;  21  N,  E. 
575;  6  L.  R.  A.  418. 

38  St.  Louis,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rawley,  90  111.  App.  653;  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  v.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  (12  Otto) 
451;  26  L.  E.  141,  has  been  cited  as 
supporting  the  point  that  evidence 
of  the  size  of  the  family  is  irrelevant, 
but  that  was  a  personal  injury  case. 
Widow  cannot  show  the  number  of 
her  family.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ashline,  56  111.  App.  475. 

39  Economy  Light  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Stephen,  187  111.  137;  58  N.  E.  359, 
aff'g  87  111.  App.  220. 

40  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Bandy,  88 
111.  App.  629.     See  also   Chicago,  P. 

794 


&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Woolridge,  72 
111.  App.  551,  rev'd  174  111.  330;  51 
N.  E.  701;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Moranda,  93  111.  302,  holding  that 
evidence  is  inadmissible  that  the 
earnings  of  deceased  were  the  sole 
means  of  support  of  plaintiff  and 
her  child.  John  Morris  Co.  v.  Bur- 
gess, 44  111.  App.  27,  holding  that 
widow  cannot  be  asked  as  to  source 
of  support  of  herself  and  children  at 
the  time  of  her  husband's  death. 
See  further  Beard  v.  Skeldon,  13  111. 
App.  54;  Chicago  v.  McCulloch,  10 
111.  App.  459;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Henry,  7  111.  App.  322 ;  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  6  111.  App. 
569. 

"Illinois  C.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Baches, 
55  111.  379. 


WITH     REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    INJURIES. 


§  til!* 


as  to  the  dependency  of  the  widow  and  children  before  and  at 
the  death  of  deceased,  although  their  pecuniary  circumstances 
since  the  death  cannot  be  shown.*2  So  evidence  may  be  given 
that  deceased  Left  childeren,4  and  the  facts  that  a  deci 
daughter  left  a  father,  mother,  two  brothers  and  a  sister  and 
her  pecuniary  relations  to  the  family  have  been  of  weight  in 
determining  the  amount  of  damages.44  So  where  it  is  claimed 
that  deceased  at  the  time  of  the  injury  was  contributing  to  the 
assistance  of  the  next  of  kin,  his  father,  in  the  performance  of 
the  latter's  legal  duty  of  supporting  the  mother  and  other  chil- 
dren, the  fact  of  the  existence  of  such  mother  and  other  children 
would  seem  to  be  entirely  admissible,  not  us  a  direct  ground 
for  the  juty's  action,  but  as  showing  what  deceased  was  doing 
and  likely  to  do  to  make  his  life  pecuniarily  valuable  to  the 
plaintiff.  The  evidence  is  admissible  not  as  establishing  di- 
rectly a  greater  right  to  consideration  from  the  jury,  but  as 
showing  what  consideration  plaintiff  was  receiving  and  likely 
to  receive  in  the  future  from  this  deceased  son.15  So  where  a 
child  was  killed,  the  family  was  shown  to  be  poor,  living  by 
daily  labors  of  the  father  and  mother,  since  in  case  of  such 
poverty  the  fact  that  the  boy  would  have  commenced  early  to 
assist  in  supporting  them  is  relevant.1'1  Again,  the  facts  that 
the  mother  was  poor  and  kept  boarders  was  considered  a  factor 
in  determining  the  measure  of  damages  for  the  loss  of  a  son 
who  was  an  only  child.4' 


§  619.  Same  subject,  continued.— In  Arkansas  the  fact 
that  the  sister  of  deceased  was  an  invalid,  and  that  he  had  con- 
tributed to  her  support,  was  considered  as  bearing  upon  the  ex- 


42  Swift  &  C».  v.  Foster,  163  111. 
50;  44  X.  E.  837;  12  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
396;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Keane. 
143  111.  172:  32  X.  E.  260;  Mayers  v. 
Smith,  121  111.  442;  13  X.  E.  216;  11 
West.  575. 

48  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Maelil, 
130  111.  551;  22  X.  E.  715;  Heard  v. 
Skeldon,  113  111.  584;  13  111.  App. 
54. 

44  City  of  Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111. 


App.  48::,  affd  129  111.  :I44:  21    X.   K. 
1076. 

45  South  Omaha  Waterworks  Co. 
v.  Vocasek  (Neb.  1901),  87  X.  W. 
53t>;  10  Am.  Nog.  Rep.  .V 

per  Hastings,  C. 

46  Bailey  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R  Co. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  X.  1).  111.  i.  4  Bias.  430. 

47  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  38  Ark.  491. 
$4,500  held  excessive  and  18,500,  re- 
duced by  $1,285. 

795 


§619  DEATH— FAIR    AND   JUST   COMPENSATION 

tent  of  aid  rendered  his  mother.48  But  it  cannot  be  shown  that 
surviving  minor  children  have  other  means  of  support,41'  nor 
that  lineal  next  of  kin  are  unable  to  support  themselves,  and 
are  dependent  upon  decedent.30  Again,  where  the  beneficiaries 
or  next  of  kin  of  the  deceased  sustain  the  relation  specified  un- 
der the  statute,  the  appellate  courts  in  determining  whether  or 
not  the  damages  awarded  are  excessive,  have  considered  the 
number,  ages  and  sex  of  such  beneficiaries  or  next  of  kin,  their 
life  expectancy,  circumstances,  dependency  and  physical  con- 
dition, the  contribution  by  deceased  to  their  support  as  a  family 
or  individually,  and  as  bearing  upon  their  pecuniary  loss,  and 
the  intestate's  ability  to  aid  them,  his  age,  physical  condition, 
expectancy  of  life,  occupation  and  earnings,  have  been  deemed 
factors.51     So  evidence  may  be  given  showing  the  financial  con- 


«  Little  Kock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Voss(Ark.),  18  S.  W.  172. 

49  Hyer  v.  Salisbury,  7  111.  App. 
93. 

50  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolridge,  174  111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701, 
rev'g  72  111.  App.  55.     . 

51  Survivors  were  a  mother  and  in- 
valid sister.  The  former  was  59 
years  old  with  a  life  expectancy  of 
nearly  15  years,  and  the  latter  was 
19  years  old  with  a  life  expectancy 
of  42  years.  Deceased  was  in  good 
health  with  a  life  expectancy  of 
over  32  years,  and  he  had  contrib- 
uted money  to  the  joint  and  indi- 
vidual support  of  his  mother  and 
sister,  the  former  being  his  next  of 
kin,  and  the  aid  rendered  her 
daughter  was  considered  a  contri- 
bution to  her  support— $6,500  held 
not    excessive.      Little    Rock  &  Ft. 

,S.  R.  Co.  v.  Voss  (Ark.),  18  S.  W. 
172.  In  the  following  decisions  the 
facts  noted  have  frequently  been 
briefly  stated  by  the  court  as  in  evi- 
dence without  any  discussion  as  to 
their  admissibility,  and  where  there 
is  no  such  discussion,  it  is  apparent 
that  such  facts  were  admitted  in  the 
trial    court    or    their    admissibility 

796 


conceded,  and  the  weighing  of  such 
facts  by  the  higher  court  in  de- 
termining whether  or  not  the  dam- 
ages are  excessive,  while  not  having 
the  force  or  effect  of  a  direct  adjudi- 
cation, is  nevertheless  entitled  to 
some  weight,  for  it  cannot  beasumed 
that  an  appellate  court  would,  in  de- 
ciding a  cause,  consider  evidence  if 
it  was  clearly  inadmissable.  Motion 
may  show  that  deceased  was  sole  sup- 
port. Kerkow  v.  Bauer,  15  Neb.  150. 
There  were  7  minor  children  be- 
tween 5  months  and  13  years  old, 
wholly  dependent  upon  deceased  for 
their  maintenance.  Kearney  Elect. 
Co.  v.  Laughlin,  45  Neb.  390;  63  N. 
W.  941.  Names  of  surviving  minor 
dependent  children  averred  in  com- 
plaint overcomes  insufficiency  by 
reason  of  failure  to  allege  that  de- 
cedent left  a  widow.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Oyster,  38  Neb.  1 ;  78  N. 
W.  359;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
655.  Father's  age,  that  he  was  a 
poor  man  with  four  dependent  young 
children  considered  in  action  for 
death  of  minor  son — $2,400  not  ex- 
cessive. Post  v.  Olmstead,  47  Neb. 
893;  66  N.  W.  828.  Deceased  left  a 
widow  and  2  children;  a  case  of  not 


WITH  REFERENCE  TO  PECUNIARY  INJURIES.    §  620 

dition  and  circumstances  of  the  parent  or  parents  in  case  of  the 
death  of  a  minor,  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  pecuniary 
loss  sustained  by  the  survivor  or  survivors.5-'  And  the  pecuniary 
circumstances  of  the  parents  may  also  be  proven,  in  the  case 
where  a  small  child  is  killed,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  their 
inability  to  keep  a  more  vigilant  watch  over  their  children." 

§  620.  Same  subject — Conclusion. — It  is  apparent  from  the 
preceding  decisions  that  the  courts  of  the  above  specified  states, 
do  not  intend  to  adhere  strictly  to  any  rule  winch  will  unquali- 

exeessive  damages.  Economy  Light  vaoced  in  years,  and  deceased  sou 
&  P.  Co.  v.  Stephen,  87  111.  App.  [had  aided  in  their  support;  a  case 
'220,  aff'd  (111.);  558  N.  E.  369.  of  not  excessive  damages.  St.  Louis, 
Deceased  left  widow  and  4  children,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Bauer,  53  111. 
the  eldest  heing  14,  and  the  young-  App.  525,  aff'd  156  111.  100;  40  N.  E. 
est  3  years  old.  Deceased  was  the  |  448.  Deceased  was  only  support  of 
family's  supporter.  Chicago,  Edi-  wife  and  three  children — a  case  of 
son  Co.  v.  Moren,  80  111.  App.  152,  not  excessive  damages.  Chicago  & 
aff'd  (111.);  -V7  N.  E.  773.  Earn-  E.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Knevrim,  48 HI.  App. 
ings.  financial  condition,  age  and  24:5.  As  to  proof  that  deceased  con- 
family  of  deceased  admissible,  tributed  to  sister's  support,  and  that 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  82  she  needed  it.  See  Ohio  &  M.  R. 
111.  App.  005.  Support  or  depend-  Co.  v.  Wangeliu,  4:1  111.  App.  324. 
eucy  for  support  must  be  shown  to  Deceased  left  father,  brothers  and 
recover  more  than  nominal  damages,  sisters  whom  he  aided.  Illinois  & 
In  this  case  a  son  was  shown  to  be  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen,  19111.  App. 
crippled  and  so  dependent.  Chi-  !  110.  Fathers,  brothers  and  sisters, 
cago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Wool-  all  of  whom  deceased  had  aided, 
ridge,  72  111.  App.  551,  case  rev'd  survived ;  amount  of  deceased's  prop- 
174  111.  330:  51  N.  E.  701.  Deceased  erty  and  probable  increase  or  de- 
left a  mother  60  years  old,  and  live  crease  of  his  wealth  held  proper 
brothers  and  sisters.  Falkenan  v.  factors.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rowland.  70  111.  App.  20;  3  Am.  Barron,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  (111.  Statute), 
Neg.  Rep.  530.  Deceased  left  a  wife  90;  18  L.  Ed.  591;  Barron  v.  Illinois 
and  two  children,  and  owned  two  C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (V .  S.  C.  C.)  412. 
teams— a  case  of  not  excessive  dam-  453.  See  also  cases  cited  iu  the 
ages.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  preceeding  notes  under  this  section. 
v.  Patchen,  00  111.  App.  206.  De-  I  5-  City  of  Chicago  v.  Powers,  42 
ceased's  youngest  child  was  10  years  111.  100:  89  Am.  Dec.  418,  cited  to 
old;  a  case  of  excessive  damages,  substantially  the  same  points  in 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Gunder-  Gulf,  Colo.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger, 
son,  05  111.  App.  63S.  Deceased  left  90  Tex.  387;  38  S.  W.  1121;  1  Am. 
a  widow  and  two  minor  children:  a  Neg.  Rep.  378,  380,  per  Brown,  J. 
case  of  not  excessive  damages.  i:;  Aurora  v.  Seidelman,  34  [11. 
Baltimore*  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  ">4  App.  2S.-J.  Examine  Chicago  v.  Mc- 
111.    App.     21.").     Parents    were     ad-  j  Culloch,  10  111.  App.   159. 


§§  021-623  FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 

liedly  exclude  evidence  of  age,  physical  and  financial  condition 
and  the  like,  of  beneficiaries ;  but  that  the  tendency  is  to  ex- 
clude such  evidence  in  the  abstract,  where  it  is  offered  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  or  mitigating  the  damages.  If, 
however,  the  nature  of  the  statute  and  the  class  of  the  benefi- 
ciaries designated  is  such  as  to  make  the  testimony  relevant 
under  the  terms  of  the  statute,  then  it  will  be  admitted.  It 
may  also  be  admissible  in  certain  cases  to  show  that  a  pecuniar)' 
loss  has  been  sustained  by  the  wrongful  killing  by  reason  of  the 
especial  circumstances  of  the  case  or  the  particular  class  of 
beneficiaries,  or  to  show  a  deprivation  of  a  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  advantage  from  the  loss  of  the  particular  life  ; 
or  it  may  be  admissible  in  connection  with,  or  as  explaining  or 
as  tending  to  show  the  relevancy  or  admissibility  of  other  mate- 
rial evidence. 

§  621.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries." — Wealth  of  defendant.51 — Defendant's 
wealth  cannot  be  shown  to  affect  the  measure  of  damages.55 

§  622.  "Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Probable  accumulations. — Deceased's 
probable  accumulations  or  probable  increase  or  decrease  of 
wealth  may  constitute  important  factors.*  They  would,  however, 
be  dependent  upon  various  other  elements,  such  as  occupation, 
earnings  or  income,  earning  capacity,  ability,  experience,  habits 
of  industry,  saving,  age,  etc.57 

§623.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "—Expenses  of  sickness,  funeral,  etc. — In 

Arkansas  funeral  expenses  are  not  a  proper  element  of  damages 
in  an  action  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  brought 
for  the  killing  of  a  passenger  by  a  railway  company,  and  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  that  the  casket  has  not  been  paid  for  by 
either  the  company  or  the  widow.53     In  a  subsequent  appeal  in 


64  See  sees.  607,  617,  herein. 
55Conant  v.  Griffin.  48  111.  410. 


111.)   412,   453;  Roose   v.   Perkins,   9 
Neb.  304. 


56  See  Illinois  C.   R.   Co.  v.  Barron,  j      57See  sec.  607,  herein. 
5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  Barron  v. "Illinois  j      58Sfc    Louis,   I.  M.   &  S.   R.  Co.   v. 
C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C,  X.  D.    Sweet,  57  Ark.—;  21  S.  W.  58. 

798 


WITH     Kl.i  Kl;  I. N<  IE    TO    PECUNIAE     INJURIES. 


the  same  action  the  question  of  the  allowance  fur  medical  and  sur- 
gical attention  and  for  funeral  expenses  was  considered  and  the  de- 
cision undoubtedly  qualifies  the  rule  above  stated.58  In  an  earlier 
decision,  however,  where  the  action  was  brought  against  a  railway 
company  for  killing  a  child,  the  recovery  included  expen 
And  the  husband  may  recover  expenses  consequent  upon  his 
wife's  injuries  from  malpractice  incurred  thereafter,  up  to  the 
time  of  her  death  therefrom.0  In  Maine,  however,  an  action  by 
a  father  cannot  be  maintained  for  loss  of  a  minor's  services  and 
for  burial  expenses  which  is  not  under  the  act  of  1891,  where 
the  child  was  instantaneously  killed.'3 

§  624.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries'"— Life   expectancy  — Mortality  tables. — 

We  have  seen  that  the  natural  expectancy  of  lib:  of  deceased 
and  of  the  beneficiaries  constitutes  an  important  factor  in  the  es- 
timation of  a  fair  and  just  compensation.65  And  to  prove  such 
expectancy  the  Carlisle  tables  are  admissible,61  even  though  the 
next  of  kin  are  not  dependent  upon  deceased's  earnings/'"'     But 


53  "  The  instruction  as  to  damages 
is  erroneous  in  this:  It  told  the  jury 
that  in  estimating  the  damages  they 
might  take  into  consideration,  among 
other  tilings,  the  amount  for  which 
the  estate  of  the  deceased  was  liable 
for  medical  and  surgical  attention 
and  for  funeral  expenses.  The  es- 
tate was  not  liahle  for  such  attention 
and  expenses  of  a  claim  for  tin; 
amount  due  therefor  was  not  pro- 
bated within  two  years  after  the 
date  of  letters  of  administration  of 
appellee,  and  moreover  the  amount 
due  for  or  the  value  of  medical  and 
surgical  attention  is  not  shown.  The 
giving  of  this  instruction  is  a  prej- 
udicial error."  St.  Louis.  I.  M.  &  S. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sweet,  03  Ark.  5113;  40  S.  \V. 
463;  2  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  295,  per  Bat- 
tle, .J.,  citing  Railroad  Co.  v.  Barry, 
58  Ark.  108;  23  S.  W.  1007;  Foster 
v.  Pitts  (Ark.),  38  S.  W.  111. 
That  parent  not  liable  for  medical 
expenses  of    a    son  who  has  reach- 


ed majority,  see  Vorass  v.  Rosen- 
berry,  85  111.  Ap[>.  623. 

60  Little  Rock  &.  F.  T.  S.  K.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am.  Rep.  44. 

11  Nixon  v.  Ludlam,  50  111.  App. 
273. 

''•-'  Bligh  v.  Biddeford  &  S.  R.  Co., 
94  Me.  499;  48  Atl.  112. 

63  See  sec.  007,  herein.  Little  Rock 
&  Ft.  S.  1!.  Co.  v.  Voss  (Ark.), 
18  S.  \V.  172:  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet,  00  Ark.  550:  31  S. 
W.  571;  Fordyce  v.  McCants.  55  Ark. 
384;  18  S.  W.  371;  Dwyer  v.  St 
Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W. 
D.  Ark),  52  Fed.  87;  Missouri 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Baier  iXeb.),  55  N.  W. 
913. 

« Friend  v.  [ngersoll  (Neb.),  58 
N.  W.  281;  Friend  v.  Burleigh.  5:'. 
Neb.  674;  74  X.  \\\  50;  Sellars  v. 
Foster.  27  Neb.  118;  42  X.  W.  907. 

«s  Friend  v.  Burleigh,  53  Neb.  074; 
74  X.  \Y.  50. 

799 


§§  1 125,  62G         FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION 

such  tables  are  not  conclusive   and  should   be  considered  with 
other  competent  and  material  evidence.66 


§  625.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries" — Nominal  damages. — Where  a  recovery 
is  sought  for  the  benefit  of  the  father  of  a  person  killed  by  a 
railroad  company's  negligence,  only  nominal  damages  can  be  re- 
covered unless  facts  are  proven  showing  a  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit  from  the  continued  life  of  decedent,  or 
that  the  father  was  assisted  by  deceased.67  In  Illinois,  however, 
proof  of  support  is  unnecessary  to  warrant  a  recovery  of  at  least 
nominal  damages  by  lineal  kindred.68  And  where  a  mother  is  en- 
titled to  the  earnings  of  her  minor  son,  proof  of  pecuniary  loss  is 
unnecessary  as  it  will  be  presumed,  while  a  question  of  error 
of  law  is  presented  on  appeal  from  the  refusal  to  instruct  that 
only  nominal  damages  can  be  given  to  the  mother  and  brothers 
of  a  deceased  child.69  So  the  law  presumes  pecuniary  loss  where 
the  relation  of  parent  and  child  or  husband  and  wife  exists,  and 
the  death  is  shown,70  although  in  Nebraska  there  can  be  no 
recovery  of  even  nominal  damages  unless  the  petition  shows 
that  the  persons  entitled  to  recover  have  sustained  pecuniary 
injury  byr  the  death.71 

§  626.  Same  subject  continued. — Although  a  mother  may 
be  the  only  one  entitled  to  more  than  nominal  damages,  yet  the 
fact  that  under  the  statute  of  distributions  she  will  take  only  a 


66  Friend  v.  Ingersoll  (Neb.),  58 
N.  W.  281.  See  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  R.  Co.  v.  Needham  ( U.  S.  C.  C.  A. 
8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.),  3  C.  C.  A.  1:39; 
10  U.  S.  App.  339;  52  Fed.  371,  375; 
54  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  88. 

67Fordyce  v.  McCants,  51  Ark.  509; 
US.  W.  694;  4  L.  R.  A.  296.  See 
Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker, 
39  Ark.  491. 

68  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Gun- 
derson,  174  III.  495;  51  N.  E.  708, 
afTg  74  111.  App.  356.  But  see  sees. 
613-615,  617-619,  herein. 

«9  Bradley  v.  Sattler,  156  111.  603; 
41  N.  E.  171,  afTg  54  111.  App. 
800 


504;  Stafford  v.  Rubens,  115  111.  196; 
1  West.  640;  Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111. 
131;  Rockford,  R.  1.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Delaney,  82  111.  198.  See  Johnson 
v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  18  Neb.  690. 

70  Chicago  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolridge,  72  111.  App.  55;  case 
was  rev\l  as  to  dependency  in  174 
111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701;  West  Chicago 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlan,  68  111.  App. 
626;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  113,  afTd 
16S  111.  34;  48  N.  E.  149;  Chicago  v. 
Scholten,  75  111.  468. 

71  ( )rgall  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co..  46  Neb.  4;  64  N.  W.  450.  See 
sees.  602,  603,  herein. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIAR?    INJ1   RIES. 


6  626 


fractional  part  of  the  amount  recovered,  will  not  justify  an  award 
of  more  than  the  total  loss  in  order  to  enable  her  to  recover  the 
full  amount  of  her  loss.,;  Again,  where  a  deceased  brother  was 
an  habitual  drunkard  and  incapable  of  supporting  himself,  only 
nominal  damages  will  be  allowed.'"  And  in  case  of  collateral 
kindred  where  then;  is  no  proof  of  pecuniary  loss  by  way  of  sup- 
port, aid  or  otherwise,  only  nominal  damages  will  be  awarded.71 
Outside,  however,  of  the  question  of  proof  of  pecuniary  lo&Sj 
would  seem  that  proof  is  necessary  of  the  statutory  prerequisites, 
such  as  the  death,  the  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default,  the  ex- 
istence of  such  circumstances  as  would  have  entitled  the  injured 
party  to  recover  damages  had  he  lived,  and  the  existence  of 
some  of  the  designated  beneficiaries,  otherwise  nominal  dam- 
ages ought  not  to  be  awarded,76  although  damages  have  been 
awarded  where  there  has  been  no  proof  as  to  next  of  kin.73 
Dependency,  however,  for  support  seems,  as  above  stated,  to  be 
the  test  of  the  recovery  of  nominal  or  substantial  damages,'3 
although  this  is  immaterial  in  case  of  lineal  next  of  kin.79 


72  Falkenan  v.  Rowland,  TO  111.  App. 
20. 

78  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brodie,  150  111.  317;  40  N.  K.  942, 
rev'g  57  111.  App.  564,  under  III.  Act, 
Feb.  12,  1853.  See  also  Anderson  v. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co..  35  Neb.  95: 
52  N.  W.  840. 

74  Falkenan  v.  Rowland,  70  111.  App. 
20,  citing  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brodie,  156  111.  317.  See  Chicago, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Gillam,  27  111.  App. 
386;  Chicago  v.  Ilesing,  83  111.  204; 
Chicago  v.  Scholten,  75  111.  468; 
Serensen  v.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S. 
C.  C.  D.  Mont. ),  45  Fed.  407.  In  this 
case  there  was  an  absence  of  certain 
proof  and  $1,750  was  held  excessive 
for  cousin.  Examine  Lazelles  v. 
Newfane,  70  Vt.  440;  41  Atl.  511. 

76  See  sees.  602,  603,  herein. 

78  See  Quincy  Coal  Co.  v.  Hood,  77 
111.  68;  Conant  v.  Griffin,  48  111.  410; 
Chicago  v.  Scholten,  75  111.  408.  The 
plaintiiT  has  a  right  to  show  that  de- 
ceased   received   injuries    which   re- 

51 


suited  in  his  death,  although  it  is  un- 
necessary to  show  the  exact  nature 
of  injuries  and  to  enter  into  details. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hicks 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  W.  D.  Ark.).  70  Fed. 
262;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  793,  per  Traver, 
Cir.  J. 

77  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Gillam, 
27  111.  App.  386.  But  see  sec  598, 
herein,  as  to  degree  of  relationship 
and  proof.  See  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Shannon,  43  111.  338,  per  the  court. 
This  case  is  disapproved  in  Lazelles 
v.  Newfane,  70  Vt.  440;  44  Atl.  511. 

^Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Swett, 
45  111.  197;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shannon,  43  111.  338,  per  the  court ; 
Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  YVhalcn.  19 
111.  App.  116.  See  further  as  to  nomi- 
nal damages  being  recoverable  and 
pecuniary  loss,  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  \. 
Gilbert,  157  111.  354:  41  N.  K.  724; 
Chicago  v.  Eeefe,  114  111.  222;  Chi- 
cago v.  Major,  18  111.  349;  Johnson  v. 
Missouri   P.  R.  Co.,  18  Neb.  896. 

71  Chicago.  P.  &  St  L.  R.  Co.  v, 
801 


§  627 


DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


§  627.  "  Fair  aud  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries"  —  Death  of  husband  —  Husband  and 
father.— In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  negligent  or 
wrongful  killing  of  a  husband  or  of  a  husband  and  father,  the 
first  point  to  be  considered  is  the  intent  of  the  statute  in  des- 
ignating the  beneficiaries,80  and  then  the  question  whether  the 
action  is  based  upon  the  death  loss  act  or  rests  upon  the  survival 
of  the  action  which  accrued  to  the  injured  party.81  The  widow, 
however,  should  receive  such  a  sum  as  will  compensate  her  for 
the  pecuniary  injury.83  The  general  elements  of  damages  ap- 
plicable to  this  class  of  cases  in  common  with-  others  have  been 
considered  elsewhere,83  but  there  are  certain  factors  which  more 
particularly  apply  to  the  damages  for  a  husband's  or  husband's 
and  father's  death.  Thus  the  right  of  the  wife  and  minor  chil- 
dren to  support  is  important.81  The  extent,  however,  of  such 
dependency  and  the  evidence  showing  it  has  been  limited.85  But 
the  entire  expense  of  supporting  the  family  is  not  the  measure 
of  damages  but  a  fair  and  just  compensation  for  the  deprivation 
of  the  means  of  support  which  deceased  might  have  provided 
except  for  the  death,86  although  an  averment  of  the  depriva- 
tion of  support  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  constitutes  a 
basis  of  evidence  of  pecuniary  loss,87  and  necessarily  the  various 
factors  which  show  upon  what  his  contributions  to  sujjport  of 
his  wife  and  family  are  based,  such  as  the  actual  amount  of 
his  earnings,  expenditures,  ability,  industry,  etc.,  are  material 
and  relevant,88  although  it  is  decided  that  the  damages  are  not 


Woolridge,  17-4  111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701, 
rev'g  72  111.  App.  55.  See  sees.  613- 
615,  herein. 

80  See  sec.  598,  herein. 

81  See  sec.  607,  herein. 

82  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Needham  (U.  S.  C.  C.  8th  C.  E.  D. 
Ark.),  3  C.  C.  A.  129;  10  U.  S.  App. 
339;  52  Fed.  371,  375;  5-4  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  88.  See  Cleveland,  C.  & 
St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Keenan,  190  111.  217; 
60  N.  E.  107,  aff'g  92  111.  App.  430. 

83  See  sees.  607,  608,  herein. 

84  See  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Wel- 
don,  52  111.  290. 

802 


85  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Foster,  163  111. 
50;  44  N.  E.  837;  12  Nat.  Corp.  Rep. 
396.  See  sees.  613-615,  617-619, 
herein. 

86  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Simms,  43 
111.  App.  260. 

87  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Carey, 
115  111.  115;  2  West.  73;  3  N.  E.  519. 

88  Dwyer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  W.  D.  Ark.),  52  Fed. 
87;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweet,  60  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571;  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Robbins, 
57  Ark.  377;  21  S.  W.  886;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.   Co.  v.  Ouska,  51 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    IKJUEIES. 


6  628 


limited  to  the  amount  of  money  of  which  deceased's  earnings 
might  have  contributed  to  the  support  of  his  family.''  So  the 
size  of  the  family  of  deceased  has  been  considered  and  also  his 
financial  condition,90  and  his  probable  accumulations,91  cai 
his  family,92  and  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit 
from  his  continued  life93  are  important  factors.  In  ease  of  abso- 
lute divorce  there  is,  as  a  rule,  no  pecuniary  loss,;M  although 
where,  notwithstanding  a  divorce,  the  husband  frequently  sent 
the  wife  money  to  aid  in  the  support  of  his  children,  they  may 
recover  their  pecuniary  loss.11"'  Again,  evidence  of  marriage  may 
become  material  in  certain  cases,'10  although  the  general  rule  is 
that  it  is  immaterial,'7  for  it  is  not  important  until  the  distribu- 
tion whether  the  claimed  widow  is  so  in  fact  or  not,  nor  is  it 
material  who  the  next  of  kin  are,  it  being  sufficient  to  show  that 
a  widow  and  next  of  kin  exist.98  In  an  action  for  damages  for 
the  widow  and  her  minor  children,  she  cannot  be  questioned 
on  cross-examination  whether  she  was  entitled  to  a  pension  and 
its  amount,  her  husband  having  drawn  one,  since  the  amount 
as  fixed  by  congress  is  not  properly  a  subject  of  testimony  by 
her."  Other  matters,  such  as  expenses  of  the  funeral,  sickness, 
etc.,  and  the  question  of  solatium  have  been  fully  considered 
elsewhere.110 

§  628.  Same  subject — Annuity — Dower,  etc.— Instruction 


111.  App.  334,  aff'd  151  111.  232;  27 
N.  E.  897;  Chicago,  Edison  Co.  v. 
Moren,  86  111.  App.  152,  aff'd  (111.) 
57  N.  E.  773;  Friend  v.  Burleigh,  53 
Neb.  074;  74  X.  W.  50.  See  sees.  007, 
608,  herein. 

89  Swift  v.  Foster,  55  111.  App.  280. 

90  See  sees.  607,  608,  herein. 

91  See  sec.  622,  herein. 

«  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweet,  60  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571. 
See  sec.  032,  herein. 

93  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v. 
Maddry,57  Ark.  500;  21  S.  W.  17-';  58 
Am.  &  Eug.  11.  (as.  327;  Chicago  «£ 
A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelley,  182  111.  267;  54 
ST.  E.  979,  aff'g  80  111.  App.  075.  See 
sec.  616,  herein. 


M  See  Ninth  Chicago  v.  Brodie, 
156  111.  317;  40  N.  E.  042. 

«  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.  v. 
McCain,  67  Ark.  377;  -V>   S.  W.  165. 

96  Toledo,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks, 
81  111.  245. 

97  Conaut  v.  Griffin,  48  111.  410. 

98  Conaut  v.  Griffin,  48  111.  410.  See 
last  note  to  see.  629,  herein.  See  as 
to  nominal  damages  where  it  appears 
that  such  widow  and  next  of  kin 
exist.  Johnson  v.  Missouri  1'.  R. 
Co.,  18  Neb.  090,  and  sees.  625,  629, 
herein. 

99  St.  Louis.  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  <  !o.  \. 
Maddry.  57  Ark.  506;  21  S.  YV.  472: 
58   \in.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  327. 

'"'  See  sees.  010,  023,  herein. 

803 


§  628 


DEATH — FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION. 


and  opinion  of  court.— In  a  frequently  cited  case  in  the  Federal 
court,1  the  question  of  annuity  and  the  manner  of  ascertain- 
ing the  amount  thereof  as  well  as  the  factor  of  dower  was  in- 
corporated in  the  charge  to  the  jury  among  other  instructions 
not  criticised.-  The  court,  per  Sanborn,  Cir.  J.,  said:  "Aside 
from  the  palpable  errors  arising  from  the  unsuccessful  attempt 
to  divide  the  cause  of  action  given  by  the  statute,  one  vice  of 
this  instruction  is  that  it  positively  directs  the  jury  to  measure 
plaintiff's  damages  by  mathematical  calculation  based  upon  the 
yielding  power  of  money  when  invested  in  an  annuity.  It  was 
undoubtedly  proper  for  the  jury  to  consider  under  the  evidence 
what  amount  of  money  so  invested  would  yield  the  yearly 
amount  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  would  probably  have  re- 
ceived from  the  deceased  if  he  had  lived,  but  they  were  not 
bound  to  allow  damages  based  upon  that  method  nor  any  partic- 
ular method  of  investment  of  money.  It  would  be  proper  for 
a  jury  upon  proper  evidence  to  consider  what  amount,  invested 
in  government  bonds,  well  secured  mortgages  on  real  estate  or 


1  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Needham  (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E. 

D.  Ark. ),  3  C.  C.  A.  129 ;  10  U.  S.  App. 
339;  52  Fed.  371,  375,  377;  54  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  88. 

2  The  following  is  a  part  of  the 
charge:  After  stating  the  rule  as  to 
pecuniary  loss  and  the  factors  to  be 
considered,  the  court  added:  "  When 
this  is  ascertained  you  will  allow 
plaintiff  such  sum  not  to  exceed  the 
probable  earnings  of  deceased,  nor 
the  amount  named  in  the  complaint, 
as  will  purchase  an  annuity  for  such 
sum  as  will  yield  annually  during 
the  term  of  expectancy  of  deceased, 
an  amount  equal  to  the  annual  value 
of  the  pecuniary  benefits  that  plain- 
tiff would  have  received  from  her 
said  husband  during  said  time.  But 
if  the  jury  find  that  the  probable 
duration  of  plaintiff's  life  is  shorter 
than  that  of  her  said  husband,  then 
she  should  only  be  allowed  such 
sum  as  will   equal   the    value  of  the 

80t 


benefits  she  would  have  received 
during  the  term  of  her  life,  and  if 
the  jury  believe  that  plaintiff's  ex- 
pectancy of  life  is  greater  than  that 
of  her  said  husband,  then  they  will 
add  such  additional  sums  as  will 
equal  the  present  value  of  any  prop- 
erty that  she  would  probably  re- 
ceive from  her  said  husband  as 
dower  in  the  event  she  should  so 
survive  him,  provided  the  jury  find 
that  the  said  deceased  would  have 
accumulated  any  such  property,  in 
excess  of  what  was  required  for  the 
support  and  maintenance  of  himself 
and  family.  In  plaintiff's  case  the 
amount  of  such  dower  interest 
would  be  one  half  of  any  personal 
property  and  a  life  estate  in  one  half 
of  any  realty,  which  her  husband 
would  own  at  his  death  if  no  children 
survived  him,  and  if  he  left  children 
her  interest  would  be  one  third 
instead  of  one  half." 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIAR?    [NJURIES.  §  629 

any  other  safe  .security,  would  yield  the  annual  amount  the  in- 
jured parties  would  probably  have  received  from  deceased  had 
he  lived,  hut  it  would  not  be  the  province  of  the  court  to  direct 
them  to  allow  an  amount  based  upon  any  one  of  these  methods 
of  investment.  Indeed  if  after  considering  all  of  tin-  evidence 
they  found  difficulty  in  arriving  at  a  conclusion  by  mathemat- 
ical calculations  based  on  any  method  of  investment,  the)'  would 
be  authorized  to  estimate  the  loss  according  to  their  own  good 
sense  and  sound  judgment."  It  was  also  declared  that  ••  the 
same  vice  runs  through  that  portion  of  the  instruction  where  the 
jury  was  directed  in  case  they  believed  the  plaintiffs  expectancy 
of  life  was  greater  than  that  of  her  husband  to  add  to  the 
amount  that  would  purchase  the  annuity  referred  to,  the  present 
value  of  any  property  that  she  would  probabl}'  have  received 
from  her  said  husband  as  dower  if  he  had  not  been  killed.  At 
the  death  of  the  husband  the  plaintiff  was  20  years  old  and 
her  expectancy  of  life,  according  to  the  tables,  was  41.53,  while 
her  husband  was  22  years  old  and  his  expectancy  of  life  was 
40.85  years.  He  was  a  fireman  earning  875  or  $80  a  month 
and  the  expenses  of  his  household  during  his  lifetime,  had  con- 
sumed all  his  wages.  Under  this  evidence  so  many  chances 
and  contingencies  of  life  and  death,  of  sickness  and  health,  of 
accident  and  injury,  of  marriage  and  divorce,  of  the  birth  and 
rearing  of  children,  conditioned  the  lives  and  relations  of  this 
husband  and  wife,  that  no  court  was  authorized  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  must  allow  the  widow  one  third  or  one  half 
of  the  present  value  of  the  husband's  future  accumulations  if 
they  were  of  the  opinion  she  would  probably  have  outlived 
him  if  he  had  not  been  killed." 

§  629.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to 
the  pecuniary  injuries  " — Death  of  wife.  In  Illinois  a  hus- 
band may  recover,  in  an  action  by  him  as  administrator,  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries  resulting  to  him  as  husband  for  the  negligent 
killing  of  his  wife,  since  a  liberal  construction  of  the  statute 


3  It  was  further  decided  in  this 
case  that  a  widow  suing  must  join 
all   persons    having   an    interest    iu- 


cluding  a   half-brother,    who   is  en- 
titled to  share  in  the  damages. 

4  See  sees.  590  n,  602,  GO;},  609,  810, 
013,  and  chap.  37,  herein. 

805 


§  630 


DEATH   FAlK  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


does  not  limit  the  damages  to  those  resulting  to  her  and  her 
next  of  kin,5  although  in  case  of  absolute  divorce  there  is  no 
pecuniary  loss  recoverable.6  The  amount  of  damages,  however, 
is  subject  to  the  statutory  limitation.7  Again,  in  case  of  death 
through  malpractice  in  performing  a  surgical  operation,  the  hus- 
band as  such  cannot  maintain  an  action  for  the  killing  of  his 
wife,  although  he  is  entitled  to  damages  for  the  loss  of  her  ser- 
vices for  the  time  she  survives  the  operation  and  for  his  conse- 
quent expense  during  that  period. s  There  are  other  factors 
which  enter  into  the  measure  of  damages  for  a  wife's  death 
which  are  not  peculiar  to  the  relation  of  wife,  and  this  is  true 
of  actions  where  the  husband  and  next  of  kin  survive.  The 
limitation  of  damages  to  the  pecuniary  loss,  the  exclusion  of 
mental  suffering  as  an  element,  the  relevancy  of  the  survival 
act,  the  questions  of  dependency,  instantaneous  killing  and 
other  material  factors  are  considered  elsewhere  herein,  and  the 
reader  is  therefore  referred  to  the  several  sections  covering  these 
points. 

§  630.  Same  subject  continued — Married  woman's  act. — 

It  is  decided  that  a  widower  is  not  a  beneficiary  or  a  party  un- 
der the  Arkansas  statute  of  1889,9  and  therefore  cannot  re- 
cover under  that  enactment  for  the  killing  of  his  wife.1"  Hut 
it  is  also  determined  that  the  married  woman's  act  of  that  state 
does  not  so  far  preclude  a  husband's  right  to  his  wife's  services, 
or  relieve  her  from  the  ordinary  legal  duties  arising  from  the 
relation,  as  to  prevent  his  recovering  the  pecuniary  loss  sus- 
tained by  her  death.  Nothing,  however,  can  be  recovered  by 
him  except  the  value  of  her  services  to  him  in  dollars  and  cents, 
as  shown  by  the  proof.11 


5  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Baddeley,  150  111.  328;  36  N.  E. 
965,  aff'g  52  111.  App.  94.  That  the 
measure  of  damages  is  the  pecuniary 
loss  to  the  surviving  husband  and 
next  of  kin,  see  Illinois  C.  R.  Co. 
v.  Chicago  Title  &  T.  Co.,  79  111. 
App.  623.  See  sees.  598,  602,  603, 
herein. 

6  See  North  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Bro- 
die,  156  111.  317;  40  N.  E.  942.     But 

806 


see  St.   Louis,  I.   M.  &  S.  R.  Co.   v. 
McCain,  67  Ark.  377;  55  S.  W.  165. 

7  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Title 
&  T.  Co.,  79  111.  App.  623. 

8  Nixon  v.  Ludlani,  50  111.  App. 
273. 

9  Sees.  4518,  4519. 

10  Western  Un.  Teleg.  Co.  v.  McGill 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  Dist.  Kan.), 
57  Fed.  699. 

a  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Henson 


WITH    ];|;fKI:1:N('K    TO    PECUNIARY    LNJDRtBS. 


§631 


§  631.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries" — Death  of  parent.— Under  this  fair  and 
just  compensation  statute,  the  rights  of  children  as  beneficiaries 

as  well  as  the  general  construction  of  the  statutes  and  tin- 
meaning  of  the  woids  "pecuniary  injury  ""  are  of  some  impor- 
tance. Primarily  minor  children  are,  as  a  rule,  entitled  to  sup- 
port, so  that  such  right  as  well  as  the  extent  of  contribution 
to  such  support  is  a  most  material  factor18  upon  which  the  rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit14  must  largely  depend. 
The  amount  of  compensation  to  be  awarded  also  rests  somewhat 


(U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  E.  D.  Ark.), 
58  Fed.  531.  The  charge  and  opin- 
ion was  as  follows:  "I  will  say  to 
you,  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  hus- 
band and  wife,  that  while  in  this 
state  it  is  true  that  so  long  as  the 
wife  chooses,  her  earnings  and  her 
property  are  her  own,  and  not  sub- 
ject to  the  control  or  direction  or 
management  of  her  husband,  yet  if 
she  chooses  to  give  him  her  services 
then  he  may  have  them,  and  in  de- 
termining this  question  as  to  the 
value  of  her  services,  if  you  find 
from  the  testimony  that  she  did, 
from  the  time  of  her  marriage  up  to 
the  time  of  her  death,  give  him  her 
services  and  her  earnings,  that  is  a 
circumstance  to  consider  in  deter- 
mining whether  or  not  she  would 
continue  to  do  so.  If  you  shall  find 
from  the  testimony  that  her  services 
were  given  to  him,  the  next  question 
is  what  were  they  worth  in  dollars 
and  cents."  "  The  act  provides  that 
a  married  woman  may  bargain,  sell, 
assign  and  transfer  her  separate  per- 
sonal property,  and  carry  on  any  trade 
or  business  and  perform  any  labor  or 
service  on  her  sole  and  separate  ac- 
count, and  that  the  earnings  of  any 
married  woman  from  her  trade,  busi- 
ness, labor  or  services  shall  be  her 
sole  and  separate  property,  and  may 
be  used  or  invested  by  her  in  her  own 


name.  The  contention  of  the  plain- 
tiff in  error  is  that  under  this  act  the 
husband  has  no  valuable  right  in  the 
services  of  his  wife,  and  that  he  suf- 
fers no  pecuniary  loss  by  her  death. 
This  act  does  not  put  the  wife  on  a 
footing  of  a  concubine  to  her  hus- 
band. It  does  not  relieve  her  from 
those  marital  duties  and  obligations 
she  takes  upon  herself  at  the  mar- 
riage altar,  and  which  are  inherent 
in  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife 
among  all  Christian  people.  The 
statute  does  not  purport  to  relieve  a 
wife,  and  was  not  intended  to  relieve 
her  from  the  legal  duty  of  perform- 
ing those  services  which  it  is  the 
pleasure  of  every  good  housewife  to 
render  her  husband  in  sickness  and 
in  health,  independently  of  any  mere 
technical  obligation,  and  which  she 
would  render  despite  any  statute 
that  could  be  enacted  to  the  con- 
trary. These  rights  and  duties  are 
imposed  by  a  law  having  a  much 
higher  and  better  source  than  the 
common  law,  which  simply  imparts 
totheni  that  legal  sanction  essential 
to  their  maintenance  and  protection 
in  a  court  of  law  against  invasion 
from  any  quarter."  Id.  533,  per 
Caldwell,  Cir.  J.;  7  C.  C.  A.  :;49. 

u  See  sees.  59S,  602,  603,  herein. 

1;  See  sees.  613-615,  herein. 

14  See  sec.  616,  herein. 

807 


§  632  DEATH  — FAIR    AND   JUST   COMPENSATION 

upon  the  general  elements  of  damages  such  as  age,  etc.,  of  de- 
ceased, 15  and  undoubtedly  every  material  and  relevant  fact  and 
circumstance  should  be  considered  to  enable  the  jury  to  deter- 
mine what  is  a  fair  and  just  compensation.16  Again  the  question 
of  the  admissibility  in  evidence  showing  the  physical  condition 
and  dependency. of  children  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
discussion  17  in  the  states  which  come  within  this  fair  and  just 
compensation  clause,  and  inasmuch  as  the  cases  are  not  in  ex- 
act harmony,  we  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  section  wherein 
this  subject  is  considered.18  In  the  case  of  adult  sons  who  have 
suffered  pecuniary  injury  by  a  mother's  death,  the  facts  that  she 
lived  with  them  and  rendered  services  in  keeping  house  for 
their  benefit  has  been  considered  in  determining  whether  or  not 
the  actual  damages  awarded  are  excessive.19  If  the  court  is  not 
requested  to  limit  the  damages  to  the  minor  children  by  an  in- 
struction to  that  effect,  and  evidence  is  admitted  without  objec- 
tion in  regard  to  adult  children,  this  cannot  be  availed  of  on 
appeal.20  And  it  seems  that  the  facts  that  the  children  have 
reached  majority  and  are  self-supporting  and  not  living  with 
the  deceased,  are  not  of  themselves  sufficient  evidence  to  con- 
trovert such  children's  pecuniary  loss.21 

§  632.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries"— Training,  etc.,  of  children— Death  of 

parent If  the  father  was   a  careful,  painstaking,  temperate, 

industrious  man,  spent  part  of  his  time  at  home,  was  trustworthy 
and  possessed  of  good  business  ability,  or  otherwise  fitted  to 
train,  care  for  or  educate  his  minor  children,  the  value  of  such 


15  See  sees.  607,  608,  herein. 

ld  Little  Rock,  M.  R.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Leverett,  48  Ark.  333,  344;  3  S.  W. 
50,  and  Chicago  v.  Powers,  42  111. 
173,  are  cited  upon  this  point  in  Gulf, 
Colorado  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Younger, 
90  Tex.  387;  38  S.  W.  1,112;  1  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  380. 

"  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Woolridge,  72  111.  App.  551,  rev'd 
714  111.  330;  51  N.  E.  701. 

i8  See  sees.  617-619,  herein. 

»  Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
808 


Ptacek,  62   111.    App.  375;  1  Chic.  L. 
J.  Wkly.  53. 

20  Hughes  v.  Richter.  161  111.  409; 
43  N.  E.   1066,  aff'g  60  111.  App.  616. 

21  Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111.  App.  21, 
aff'd  129  111.  344;  21  N.  E.  1076. 
Where  the  youngest  child  was 
19  years  old  at  the  time  of  the 
trial  and  deceased  was  a  shoemaker 
65  years  old — $5,000  was  held  exces- 
sive. Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gunderson,  65  111.  App.  638. 


Willi    l:i:i'i;i;l.\(  K   TO    PECU  N  I  Ai:  V    INJURIES. 


§  633 


training,  care  or  education  may  be  considered  in  awarding  the 
damages  for  the  parent's  negligent  or  wrongful  killing.8  - 
the  loss  of  instruction,  physical,  moral  and  intellectual  training 
by  the  parent  is  material  and  relevant.23  Bui  it  seems  that 
there  should  be  some  evidence  that  such  parent,  whether  lather 
or  mother,  was  able  or  fitted  to  render  such  service 

§  633.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries"— Death  of  children.— The  first  proposi- 
tion to  be  considered  is  the  right  of  parents  as  beneficiaries  or  to 
share  in  the  distribution,  or  their  right  of  action."'  Also  the  righl 
to  recover  if  death  had  not  ensued.*'  So  it  is  important  whether 
or  not  one  or  more  actions  can  be  maintained.-'7  And  in  Ar- 
kansas the  question  of  conscious  suffering  or  instantaneous 
death  is  material  and  relevant.28     Again,  the  measure  of  com- 


22  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweet,  60  Ark.  550;  31  S.  W.  571; 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Townsend 
(Ark.  1901),  63  S.  W.  994.  See  cases 
cited  in  next  following  note. 

23  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Maddry,  57  A.rk.  506;  21  S.  W.  472; 
58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  327.  See 
Little  Rock,  M.  R.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Leverett,  48  Ark.  333,  344;  3  S.  W. 
50;  Chicago  v.  Powers,  42  111.  173, 
both  cited  upon  the  point  of  the  loss 
of  such  training,  etc.,  through  a 
mother's  death  and  the  fact  that 
the  temperament,  education,  etc.,  of 
different  mothers  affect  their  fitness 
to  discharge  the  duty,  in  (iulf,  Colo. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  Younger,  90  Tex.  387; 
38  S.  W.  1121;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  378; 
Baltimore,  etc.,  It.  Co.  v.  Stanley, 
54  111.  App.  215.  If  it  is  alleged  that 
minor  children  have  been  deprived 
of  means  of  education,  it  is  a  sufflcieul 
allegation  to  admit  evidence  of  pe- 
cuniary loss.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Carey,  115  111.  115;  8  \.  E.  519;  2 
West.  73. 

a*  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Austin,  69  111.  426,  cited    in   Walker 


v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
Mich.  518;  69  X.  W.  1114:  3  Det.  L. 
N.  775;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  267  I  which 
was  an  appeal  from  a  trial  after  new- 
trial  granted  in  104  Mich.  606;  2  Det. 
L.  N.  34;  62  N.  W.  1032),  which  held 
that  such  damages  as  loss  of  train- 
ing, etc.,  could  not  be  considered, 
especially  in  the  absence  of  evidence 
on  the  matter,  and  where  deceased 
rendered  only  such  assistance  as  any 
parent  would  <rive  his  childreu. 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Welden,  52  111. 
290. 

25  See  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lyons,  47  111.  App.  292;  Bradley  v. 
Sattler,  156  111.  60:1:  41  N.  E.  171. 
aff'g  ">4  111.  App.  504;  Chicago  v. 
Major.  18  111.  849;  .Mcohan  v.  Chi- 
cago &  X.  W.  K.  Co.,  67  ill.  App.  89. 
See  sec.  901,  herein. 

-'■  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  849. 

27  See  Illinois  ( lent.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater, 
139  111.  190:  28  V  E.  880;  49  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  480,  affg89  111.  69.  See 
sec.  597,  herein. 

a  See  St.  Louis,  s.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mahoney,  67  Ark.  617;  55  S.  W.  S4U. 
See  sec.  609,  herein. 

809 


634 


DEATH    -FAIR   AND  JCST   COMPENSATION 


pensation  depends  upon  whether  the  deceased  child  was  a  minor 
or  an  adult,  since  in  the  former  case  the  right  of  the  father  to 
the  services  and  earnings  of  such  child  and  the  hitter's  right  to 
support,  etc.,  are  necessarily  involved.'-'9 

§631.  Same  subject  continued. — The  general  rule,  there- 
fore, is  that  the  parent,  whether  father  or  mother,  who  is  so  en- 
titled and  upon  whom  such  obligation  rests  may  recover  for  the 
loss  of  services  or  earnings  of  a  minor  child  less  the  cost  of  main- 
tenance, education  and  like  expenses.30  But  the  loss  of  wages 
from  the  time  of  death  until  the  child  would  become  of  age  is 
not  the  proper  measure  of  damages  for  the  killing  of  a  minor 
son,31  and  the  question  whether  or  not  the  damages  are  confined 
to  minority  is  important.'2  Again,  it  is  decided  in  Arkansas, 
that  for  loss  of  services  of  a  minor  the  damages  are  limited  to 
those  which  accrued  during  the  period  between  the  injury  and 
the  death  and  cannot  include  those  accruing  after  the  death.33 


^  Until  the  Ark.  act  of  1873  a 
female  was  a  minor  in  that  state 
until  the  age  of  21.  Roland  v.  Mc- 
guire,  64  Ark.  412;  42  S.  W.  1008. 
In  Illinois  a  mother  upon  the  father's 
death  is  entitled  to  the  services  and 
earnings  of  her  minor  children  as  she 
is  the  head  of  the  family.  Bradley  v. 
Sattler,  156  111.  603;  41  N.  E.  171, 
aff'g  54  111.  App.  504.  See  as  to 
mother's  obligation  to  provide  for 
her  children  when  she  had  sufficient 
means,  Mowbry  v.  Mowbry,  64  111. 
383,  cited  in  Wing  v.  Hibbert,  9  Ohio 
C.  P.  Dec.  65.  Father  entitled  to 
son's  earnings.  Gilley  v.  Gilley,  79 
Me.  92.  As  to  emancipation,  see 
Nicolaus  v.  Snyder,  56  Neb.  531. 
That  consent  to  emancipation  may 
be  inferred,  see  Bucksport  v.  Rock- 
land, 56  Me.  22,  Examine  White  v. 
Henry,  24  Me.  531.  As  to  earnings 
and  instruction  as  to  same  and  dam- 
ages, see  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Slater,  129  111.  91;  21  N.  E.  575;  6 
L.  R.  A.  418,  case  affirms  28  111.  App. 
73.  Mother  can  recover  for  killing 
of  illegitimate  child.     Security  Title 

810 


&  T.  Co.  v.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co., 
91  111.  App.  332. 

30  Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
v.  Delaney,  82  111.  198;  25  Am.  Rep. 
198;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Freeman,  36  Ark.  41;  Little  Rock  & 
Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker,  33  Ark.  350; 
34  Am.  Rep.  44;  19  Am.  &  Eng.  K. 
Cas.  195,  212;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Becker,  84  111.  483  (These  last 
two  cases  are  cited  in  Russell  v. 
Windsor  Steamboat  Co.,  126  N.  C. 
961;  36  S.  E.  191.);  Bradley  v.  Sattler, 
156  111.  603;  41  N.  E.  171,  aff'g  54 
111.  App.  504;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Slater,  129  111.  91;  21  N.  E.  575;  6  L. 
R.  A.  418,  aff'g  28  111.  App.  73;  Staf- 
ford v.  Rubens,  115  111.  196;  1  West. 
640;  Chicago  v.  Keefe,  114  111.  222; 
2  N.  E.  267 ;  Chicago  v.  Hesing,  83 
111.  204. 

31  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Reardon,  157 
111.  372;  41  N.  E.  871. 

32  See  sec.  635,  herein. 

33  Davis  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co., 
53  Ark.  117;  13  S.  W.  801;  7  L.  R.  A. 
283;  44  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  690. 


WITH    REFERENCE!   TO    PECUNIAR*    tNJURlE8. 


In  case  of  the  death  of  a  very  young  child  incapable  of  earning 

anything  or  of  rendering  services  of  value,  the  difficulty  of  prov- 
ing any  actual  damages  is  obvious,  and  necessarily  much  must 
be  left  to  the  jury's  sound  discretion  for  there  can  be  no  rule  of 
damages  in  such  eases.3'  But  it  is  proper  to  consider  the  child's 
general,  mental  and  physical  ability  or  capacity,  and  personal 
characteristics,  as  that  he  was  bright,  intelligent,  industrious, 
obedient  and  the  general  character  of  such  services  as  are  ren- 
dered, etc.,85  although  where  the  parentis  entitled  to  earnings 
and  services  of  the  minor,  damages  may  be  allowed,  even  though 
there  is  no  proof  of  the  value  of  the  services,  such  evidence 
being  unnecessary.36  And  the  value  of  a  child's  services  will  not 
be  based  on  the  parent's  estimate  thereof.1  Other  factors  are 
involved,  but  they  are  considered  elsewhere  herein.  '  Again, 
there  can  be  no  recovery  for  a  minor  child's  death  where  the 
father  has  abandoned  the  mother  and  has  not  aided  the  family 
for  years.39  But  it  is  held  that  evidence  should  go  to  the  jury, 
that  the  father  was  a  foreigner  and  had  received  no  aid  from 
his  son  after  the  latter's  arrival  in  this  country  a  short  time 
prior  to  his  decease.10 

§  635.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  "Death  of  children— Minority  and  ma- 
jority.— The  recovery  for  (bath  of  a  minor  child  may  include 


a*  Chicago,  >I.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  35  111.  App.  346;  Callaway 
v.  Spurgeon,  03  111.  App.  571.  See 
sec.  604,  herein. 

86  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am.  Rep. 
44;  Chicago  v.  Scholten,  75  111.  468; 
Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  ('<>.  v. 
Delaney,  82  111.  198;  --'5  Am.  Rep. 
198. 

(  allaway  v.  Spurgoon,  (33  111. 
App.  571;  Little  Roek  A  Ft.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Barker,  39  Ark.  191;  Bradley 
v.  Sattler,  156  111.  00:5;  41  X.  E.  171, 
aff'g  54  111.  App.  504;  Stafford  v. 
Rubens,  115  ill.  L96;  1  West.  040; 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Scanlan, 
08  111.  App.  020;  2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 


113,  aff'd  108  111.  34;  48  X.  E.  L49. 
But  see  sec.  ti25,  herein. 

•i7  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Freeman,  36  Ark.  41. 

38  The  questions  of  the  physical  aud 
financial  condition  of  parents'  de- 
pendency for  support  and  contribu- 
tion thereto  by  the  child,  the  parents' 
and  child's  ago,  sex,  etc.,  the  reason- 
able expectation  of  pecuniary  bene 
fit,  mental  suffering,  loss  of  society 
or  companionship,  etc.,  have  been 
considered  under  appropriate  head- 
ings, herein. 

89  Thompson  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  1).  Net).),  104 
Fed.  845,  per  Munger,  Dist.  J. 

40  Johnson  v.  Missouri,  18  Neb. 
090;  26  X.  W.  347. 

811 


635 


DEATH       FAIi:    AND    JUST    COMPENSATION 


the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  for  a  period  be- 
yond minority,  where  the  deceased  has  manifested  an  intention 
to  contribute  to  his  parents'  support  after  attaining  majority. 
This  has  been  expressly  so  decided  in  a  case  where  a  deceased 
minor  son  had  contributed  to  his  father's  support  prior  to  the 
injury  resulting  in  death.41  Other  cases  do  not,  however,  extend 
the  estimate  of  probable  damages  beyond  minority  of  the  child, 
but  restrict  the  pecuniary  loss  to  that  period.4'3  Again,  the 
amount  of  the  yearly  expenses  of  a  son  and  the  disposition  of 
his  earnings  above  his  living  expenses  are  factors. Vl  In  another 
decision  an  adult  daughter  who  earned  only  small  wages,  had 
given  her  parents  about  one  quarter  thereof  and  they  relied  upon 
such  contributions,  and  these  facts  were  considered  in  determin- 
ing the  amount  of  damages  for  such  daughter's  death.44  And  it 
is  held  that  the  question  is  not  what  disposition  the  deceased  may 
have  had  to  aid  his  mother,  but  that  the  point  was,  did  he  aid 
her,  was  he  bound  so  to  do  and  what  was  her  loss  in  this  respect 
arising  from  her  son's  death.45  In  Arkansas,  the  fact  that  the 
deceased  had  contributed  to  his  father's  support  and  maintenance 
and  showed  an  intention  so  to  do  after  his  majority,  may  be 
availed  of  for  such  parent's  benefit  as  the  next  of  kin  in  an  action 
to  recover  damages  for  the  loss  occasioned  b}*  the  child's  wrong- 
ful or  negligent  killing*  So  the  intention  of  the  deceased  to 
continue  his  assistance  to  his  parent  or  parents  after  his  ma- 
jority is  material  and  relevant  evidence  for  the  jury.4'  In  Illi- 
nois the  loss  of  a  minor  son's  wages  by  the  father  during  the 
period  between  his  death  and  his  attaining  majority  had  he  lived. 


41  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  55  Ark.  462;  18  S.  W.  628. 

*2  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barker.  33  Ark.  350;  34  Am.  Rep. 
44;  19  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  195,  212; 
dis'd  in  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cross,  58  Kan.  424;  49  Pac. 
599;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Freeman,  36  Ark.  41. 

43  Fordyee  v.  McCants,  55  Ark. 
384;  18  S.  W.  371.  Deceased's  ex- 
pectancy of  life  was  17  years  and  he 
sent  his  father  all  his  earnings  above 
his  living  expenses  which  were  only 

812 


$125  yearly.  See  also  Fordyee  v. 
McCants,  51  Ark.  509;  11  S.  W. 
694. 

44  Armour  v.  Czichki,  59  111.  App. 
17.     $4,140  held  excessive. 

45  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Swett,  45 
111.  197. 

« St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  55  Ark.  462;  18  S.  W.  628. 
Examine  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Freeman,  36  Ark.  41. 

47  McLean,  etc.,   Co.  v.  McVey,  38 
III.  App.  158.     See  Armour  v.   Czi 
chki,  50  111.  App.  17. 


WITH    REFERENCE   T<  >    PECUNIARY    INJURIES. 

is  held  not  the  proper  measure  of  damages*  In  that  Btate,  how- 
ever, the  pecuniary  benefits  which  the  nexl  of  kin  might  have 
derived  had  the  minor  child  not  met  with  premature  death,  include 
what  the  next  of  kin  might  have  received  from  the  child  at  any 
age  or  every  reasonable  expectation  they  had  of  obtaining  any 
pecuniary  advantage,  as  shown  by  the  evidence  from  the  con- 
tinuance of  his  or  her  life,  and  the  recovery  is  not  Limited  to 
tin'  value  of  the  deceased's  services  or  earnings  before  becoming 
of  age.11' 

§  tiM.  "  Fair  and  jnst  compensation  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injuries"-  -Death  of  children— Adults.  In  determin- 
ing the  measure  of  damages  for  the  death  of  adult  children  under 
this  statutory  provision  as  to  a  fair  and  just  compensation,  the 

principal  factors  are  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit  or  the  extent  of  the  contributions  to  the  support  of,  or 
the  aid  rendered  to  the  parent  by  deceased,  and  in  this  connection 
the  latter's  ability  and  willingness  to  assist,  evidenced  by  bis 
acts,  will  be  considered,  as  will  also  his  occupation,  earnings,  ex- 
penditures, the  increasing  or  diminishing  value  of  his  services, 
the  disposition  of  his  earnings  with  relation  to  the  parent  or 
parents,  the  character  and  amount  of  his  contributions  to  them, 
their  physical  and  financial  condition  are  all  important  and 
relevant  in  Arkansas,  and  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit  depends  upon   the  proof.""     Substantially  the  same  rule 


"Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Reardon, 
157  111.  372;  41  N.  E.  871.  The  jury 
are  not  limited  to  the  earnings  of 
deceased  until  he  should  attain  ma- 
jority. West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dooley,  76111.  App.  424;  3  Chic.  L. 
J.  Wkly.  238;  McLean  Coal  Co.  v. 
McVey,  38  111.  App.  158.  See  fur- 
ther Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Slater. 
129  111.  91 ;  21  X.  E.  575. 

■*»  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Then,  159  111.  535;  42  N.  E.  971,  aff  g 
59  111.  App.  561,  deceased  was  a  girl. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Reardon,  157 
111.  372;  41  N.  E.  871,  deceased  was 
a  son.  Illinois  Cent.  K.  Co.  v.  Slater, 
129  111.  91;  21  N.  E.  575:  6  L.    R.  A. 


418,  aff'g  28  111.  App.  73;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Dooley,  70  111. 
App.  424:  3  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly. 
McLean  Coal  Co.  v.  MoVey,  38  111. 
App.  158.  See  Chicago  Consol.  B. 
Co.  v.  Tietz,  37  111.  App.  599.  Kx- 
amine  Rockford,  K.  I.  &  St.  L.  K. 
Co.  v.  Delaney,  82  111.  198;  25  Am. 
Rep.  198;  Chicago  v.  Scholten,  75 
111.  468. 

»Fordycev.  McCants,  55  Ark.384, 
388;  18  S.  W.  371;  51  Ark.  509;  I  L 
K.  A.  29G;  11  S.  W.  694;  Little  Rook 
&  Ft.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Vosa  (Ark.), 
18  S.  W.  172.  See  BBC.  616  herein  as 
to  reasonable  expectation. 

813 


§  637 


DEATH — FAIR  AND  JUST  COMPENSATION 


prevails  in  Illinois,  subject  to  such  exceptions  as  may  exist  in 
relation  to  proof  of  the  physical  or  financial  condition  of  the 
parent  or  next  of  kin.51  There  is,  however,  an  early  decision  in 
that  state  which  excludes  the  question  of  mere  disposition  to 
aid  the  mother  as  a  determining  factor,  for  it  expressly  holds 
that  the  point  is,  in  such  cases,  did  he  help  her,  was  he  bound 
to  do  so,  and  what  did  she  lose  in  this  respect?3'  Other  ele- 
ments which  have  been  eonsidered  are  whether  the  deceased  was 
married  or  not,  lived  with  his  parents  or  elsewhere,53  age,  earn- 
ing capacity,  etc.54 

§  637.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injuries  " — Collateral  kindred. — The  nearness  of 
the  degree  of  relationship  is  declared  to  be  immaterial  in  case  of 
collateral  kindred,  where  there  has  been  no  pecuniary  assistance 
and  no  need  thereof,  but  it  is  also  said  that  if  there  exists  a  de- 
pendency for  support  upon  deceased,  it  is  then  immaterial  how 
remote  the  relationship,55  and  this  question  of  support  and  de- 
pendency *  is  most  material  in  considering  the  amount  of  dam- 


51  Adult  son  contributed  to  support 
and  for  the  benefit  of  his  mother 
paid  a  life  insurance  premium  on 
father's  life.  The  latter  had  some 
property  also.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co. 
v.  Shannon,  43  111.  388.  Adult  son 
gave  his  wages  amounting  to  $18  a 
-week  to  his  father.  Webster  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Mulvaney,  68  111.  607,  aff  d  168 
111.  .311;  48  N.  E.  168.  Adult  son 
supported  parents  over  70  years  old. 
Leiter  v.  Kinnare,  68  111.  App.  368. 
Adult  daughter  earned  but  85  cents 
a  day  and  had  given  her  parents  $60 
to  $75  a  year.  Armour  v.  Czichki, 
59  111.  App.  17.  Adult  daughter 
aided  in  support  of  family.  She  was 
a  school-teacher,  and  left  a  father, 
mother,  and  other  kindred.  City  of 
Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111.  App.  483, 
aff'd  129  111.  344;  21  N.  E.  1076. 
Adult  son  gave  his  wages  to  his 
mother  and  otherwise  aided  her. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  28  111. 
App.   102.     See  further,   Chicago  & 

814 


A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  182  111.  267;  54  N. 
E.  979,  aff'd  80  111.  App.  675;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  v.  Barron,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
(Stat.  111.)  90.  As  to  physical  and 
financial  condition,  see  sees.  617-619, 
herein. 

52  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Swett, 
45  111.  197. 

53  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon, 
43  111.  388.  Son  lived  with  father  part 
of  time.  Webster  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mul- 
vaney, 68  111.  App.  607,  aff'd  168  111. 
311;  48  N.  E.  168.  Son  was  unmar- 
ried. Leiter  v.  Kinnare,  68  111.  App. 
368.  Son  was  unmarried.  City  of 
Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111.  App.  483, 
aff'd  129  111.  344;  21  N.  E.  1076. 
Daughter  lived  with  her  father, 
mother  and  sister. 

^  See  sees.  602,  604,  607,  608,  625, 
626,  herein. 

35  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon, 
43  111.  338. 

56  See  sees.  617-619,  herein. 


REFERENCE   TO   PECUNIARY    [NJUBEBS.     §§638,    I 


ages  to  be  awarded  to  collateral  kin.',;     Although  it  is  not  es- 
sential that  the  evidence  should  be  such  as  to  enable  the  loss  to 

be  ascertained  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  certainty  where  the 
action  i.s  by  a  sister  for  a  brother's  death,"  and  the  evidence 
shows  assistance  rendered  and  her  necessities.89  But  the  dam- 
ages recoverable  for  a  brother's  death  may  be  limited,  where  by 
reason  of  habitual  drunkenness  he  was  unable  to  support  him 
self.'"  Outside  of  the  above  decisions,  it  may  be  stated  that 
much  the  same  general  rules  apply  to  the  damages  in  case  of 
collateral  next  of  kin  as  govern  in  other  cases. 

§  638.  Defenses— Mitigation  of  damages  -Insurance.— In- 
surance money  on  the  life  of  deceased  cannot  operate  as  a  re- 
duction of  the  compensation  for  the  negligent  or  wrongful 
killing,61  although  the  fact  that  the  father's  life  was  insured 
for  the  mother's  benefit,  and  that  the  deceased  son  paid  and 
had  promised  to  keep  paid  the  premium  thereon  will  be  con- 
sidered.62 

^  639.  "  Fair  and  just  compensation  with  reference  to 
the  pecuniary  injuries"— Defenses — Remarriage  and  mar- 
riage.— Remarriage  by  a  widow  and  the  seeming  thereby  of  a 
new  means  of  support  cannot  be  considered  upon  the  question 
of  the  measure  of  damages  for  the   former  husband's  killing.''1 


:'1  See  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Keaue, 
143111.  172;  32  X.  E.  2(H);  Chicago  v. 
Hesing,  83  111.  204;  Chicago  v.  Schol- 
ten,  75  111.  4G8;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barron  (111.  Stat.),  5  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
90;  18  L.  Ed.  591;  Barron  v.  Illinois 
C.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  412; 
Falkenan  v.  Rowland,  70  111.  App.  20; 
3  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  530  (citing  North 
Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Brodie,  150  III.  317); 
City  of  Salem  v.  Harvey,  29  111.  App. 
•483,  aff'd  129  111.  344;  21  X.  E.  L076; 
Illinois  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen,  19 
111.  App.  116;  Serenscn  v.  Northern 
P.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  D.  Mont.  i.  15 
Fed.  407.     See  sees.  625,  626,  herein. 

68Ohio  A  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wan-din, 
152  111.  138;  38  N.  E.  760. 


59  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin,  43 
111.  App.  324. 

60  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bro- 
die, 156  111.  317;  40  X.  E.  942,  rev'g 
57  111.  App.  564,  under  111.  act  Feh.  12, 
1853. 

,;1  Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son. 56  111.  138. 

62  Chicago  »t  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon, 
43  111. 

'  o.  S.  Richardson  Fueling  Co.  \. 
Peters,  82  111.  App.  "'tis.  Asto  plain- 
tiff's marriage  with  deceased  and 
evidence  thereof,  see  Toledo  R.  Co. 
v.  Brooks.  Si  111.  2I.">;  Conant  v. 
Griffin,  48  111.  410.  As  to  remarriage 
bt- inj-C  consistent  with  allegation  of 
being  widow,  see  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  A 
S.  K.  Co.  v.  Yoeum,  34  Ark.  493. 

815 


§§  6-10,  641        FAIR    AND   JUST    COMPENSATION. 

Nor  is  the  fact  material  that  the  living  husband  stands  in  loco 
parentis  to  deceased's  children  by  reason  of  said  remarriage.64 
But  it  is  at  least  intimated  that  the  probability  that  a  bachelor 
might  marry,  and  his  property  descend  through  another  may  be 
considered.'5 


§  640.  Death —Defenses — Pension  to  widow  and  children 

in  mitigation.— It  cannot  be  shown  in  mitigation  of  damages 
that  the  widow  and  children  are  under  an  act  of  congress  en- 
titled to  a  pension.86 

§  641.  Damages  assessed  on  affirmance  of  judgment.— 

Ten  per  cent  damages  may  be  assessed  upon  affirmance  of  the 
judgment  under  the  Arkansas  statute,  which  is  in  force  in  In- 
dian Territory.1' 


64  O.  S.  Richardson  Fueling  Co.  v. 
Peters,  82  111.  App.  508. 

65  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Barron  (111. 
Stat.).  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  90;  18  L.  Ed. 
591;  Barron  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co., 
1  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  412,  453. 

66  St.  Louis,  I.    M.   &  S.   R.  Co.  v. 

816 


Maddry,  57  Ark.  506;  21  S.  W.  472; 
58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  327. 

67  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  El- 
liott (U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  8th  C.  Ind.  Ty. ), 
102  Fed.  96,  under  Mans.  Dig.  Ark. 
sec.  1311. 


DEATH — FAIR    AND    JUST    DAMAGES. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


DEATH — "FAIR     AND    JUST  "     DAMAGES     "WITH     REFERENCE 
TO    THE    PECUNIARY    INJURY." 


§  642. 


643. 
644. 
645. 


646. 
647. 


648. 


649. 


650. 


651 


652 


"Fair    and    just"     damages 
"  with    reference    to  the 
pecuniary   injury  " — Sta- 
tutes— Generally. 
Same  subject  continued. 
Same  subject  concluded. 

"  Fair    and    just  "     damages 
"  with    reference   to   the 
pecuniary     injury  " — Pe- 
cuniary loss. 
Same  subject  continued. 

"Fair  and  just"  damages 
"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Dam- 
ages for  the  jury. 

"  Fair  and  just "  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Fac- 
tors generally  to  be  con- 
sidered. 

"Fair  and  just"  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Sev- 
erance of  contract  rela- 
tions— Partnership. 

"Fair  and  just"  damages 
"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Suf- 
ferings of  the  person  in- 
jured. 

••  Fair  and  just "  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — So- 
latium—Mental suffering. 

"Fair  and  just"  damages 
"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Re- 
lationship, legal  and  ac- 
tual, of  deceased  to  bene- 
ficiaries. 

52 


653.  "  Fair    and    just "     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Le- 
<,m1  nr  moral  obligation- 
Legal  right — Support  and 
dependency. 

654.  Same  subject  continued. 

655.  "Fair    and   just"     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Rea- 
sonable expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary bench  t. 

656.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Pros- 
pect of  inheritance. 

657.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  witli  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Phy- 
sical and  financial  condi- 
tion, ajrp.  number,  of 
family,  etc.— When  ad- 
missible. 

658.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Fin- 
ancial condition — When 
inadmissible. 

659.  ••  Fair    and    just "     damages 

••  wit h  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury"  —  Prob- 
able accumulations. 

660.  "  Fair    and    just  "     damages 

••  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Ex- 
pense of  funeral,  sickness, 
etc. 


B17 


§642 


DEATH— FAIR    AND    JUST    DAMAGES. 


661.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Life 
expectancy  and  mortuary 
tables. 

662.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Nom- 
inal damages. 

663.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury11 — 
Death  of  husband — Hus- 
band and  father. 

664.  "Fair    and    just11     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury11  — 
Death  of  wife. 

665.  "Fair    and  just11     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury11 — 
Death  of  parent. 

666.  "Fair    and     just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury11  — 
Training,  etc.,  of  chil- 
dren. 


667.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  of  the 
pecuniary  injury" — 
Death  of  children. 

668.  Same  subject  continued. 

669.  Same  subject  concluded. 

670.  "Fair    and    just11     damages 

"with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — 
Death  of  adults. 

671.  Death  of  children — Minority 

and  majority. 

672.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — 
Death  of  children  —  Mi- 
nority and  majority. 

673.  "Fair    and    just"     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — 
Mother's  sickness  from 
child's  death. 

674.  "Fair    and    just11     damages 

"  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Col- 
lateral kindred. 


§  642.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Statutes — Generally.  — In  Michigan,  New 
Jersey  and  Wisconsin,  the  jury  may  give  such  damages  as  they 
shall  deem  fair  and  just  with  reference1  to  the  pecuniary  injury 
resulting  from  the  death  to  the  persons  designated  by  the  statute  ; 
and  the  action  lies  against  the  person  who  would  have  been 
liable  if  death  had  not  ensued,  and  such  parties  are  liable  in 
the  two  first  named  states,  although  the  death  shall  have  been 
caused  under  such  circumstances  as  amount  in  law  to  a  felony ; 
while  in  all  these  states  the  action  lies  where  death  is  caused  by 
wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  such  as  would,  if  death  had  not 
ensued,  have  entitled  the  party  injured  to  maintain  an  action 
and  recover  damages  in  respect  thereof,  and  the  action  must  be 
brought  by  the  personal  representative  of  deceased.  In  New 
Jersey  the  amount  recovered  is  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the 
widow  and  next  of  kin,  while  in  Wisconsin  the  beneficiaries  are 

1  In  Wis.   "  in  reference." 

818 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIAR!     tNJUEY.  .   642 


the  surviving  husband  or  widow,  if  any,  otherwise  his  or  ber 
lineal  descendants  and  in  default  thereof  to  his  or  her  Lineal  an- 
cestors, and  in  this  last  state  the  amount  recoverable  is  limited 
to  five  thousand  dollars.  The  Michigan  statute  also  provides 
for  recovery  against  railroad  companies  with  like  provisions  as 
those  above  noted  in  that  state,  bul  the  beneficiaries  under,  with 
these  statutory  provisions  in  this  state,  are  the  persons  who 
would  be  entitled  to  distribution  of  personal  property  left  by 
persons  dying  intestate.  Again,  a  peculiar  provision  of  the  New 
Jersey  enactment  requires  a  delivery  to  and  upon  request,  bv 
defendant  or  his  attorney,  of  a  particular  account  in  writing  of 
the  nature  of  the  claim  in  respect  to  which  damages  shall  be 
sought  and  recovered.1  Other  factors  involved  in  the  deter- 
mination of  damages  are  the  survival  acts  and  these  would  also 
include  the  question  as  to  the  effect  of  these  acts  and  whether 
or  not  the  death  loss  statutes  give  a  new  and  different  cause  of 
action  from  that  under  such  revival  enactments,  or  whether  they 
rest  upon  the  same  principles,  and  also  whether  the  surviving 
beneficiaries'  right  of  action  is  exclusive,  being  only  connected 
with  the  injured  party's  right  of  action  by  the  provision  of  the 
death  loss  statutes  as  to  the  beneficiaries'  right  of  recovery  being 
dependent  upon  the  injured  person's  cause  of  action  had  death 
not  resulted.  We  have  given  some  consideration  to  these  ques- 
tions elsewhere.  But  we  may  state  here  that  in  Michigan,  New 
Jeisey  and  Wisconsin  there  are  survival  statutes  for  the  recov- 
ery of  damages  to  the  person. 


'-'  Mich.  Com]).  Laws.  1897,  p.  3151, 
sees.  10427.  1042S;  id.  p.  1989,  sec. 
6308;  i'l.  p.  1997,  sit.  6309;  id.  p. 
2021),  sc.s.  6389,  6390;  id.  p.  _".i7.~>; 
sec.  9728;  Bowell's  Aim.  Stat.  1883, 
sec.  8313;  2  Howell's  Ann.  Stat.  L882, 
secs.8313j  8314, 3391, 3392,  3491,3492; 
Dewey's  Comp.  Laws.  1872,  pp.  188, 
771,  .sl4;  Rev.  Stats.  1857,  ch.  515, 
sees.  1,  2,  p.  1329.  As  to  survival  of 
art  ions,  see  Mich.  Comp.  Laws,  1897, 
p.  3007,  sees.  10113  et  seq.  N.  .1. 
Geu.  Stat,  1895,  p.  1188,  see.  10 
tsec.  1),  see.  11  (sec.  2),  sec.  L2  s<  •■. 
3);  Am'd  Sess.  Laws,  1897,  p.  134, 
eh.  58,  sec.  2:  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  p.  294, 


sees.  1  :'.:  Approved  Act,  March  '■'>, 
isis.  p.  I..  L848,  p.  L51;  1  Lev.  Laws. 
1877,  p.  293.  Wis.  Sanborn  &  Berry- 
man's  Stat.  1898,  sees.  42:.:.,  4256, 
4219,  1224,  subd.  3;  A  mi. a.  Stat 
1889,  sees.  4255,  4256;  Taylor's  Rev. 
Mat.  1858,  eli.  135,  sees.  12,  1:;.  p.  800 
I  see  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  see.  1816,  re- 
pealed 1880).  As  t..  1. ill  of  particu- 
lars, see  Telfer  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  30 
\.  .1.  L.  L88. 

II. .well's  Ann.  Slat.  (Mich. ) 
see.  7-;'.'7:  2  N.  .1.  Gen.  Stat.  ]..  1426, 
see-,  i.  :,:  l  N.  .1.  Gen.  Stat.  pp.  919, 
925,  sees.  65,  92;  Wis.  Lev.  Stat. 
1898,    see.    4253;    Wis.    Laws.    1887, 

819 


643 


DEATH — FAIR    AND    JV ST    DAMAGES 


§  643.  Same  subject  continued. — In  Wisconsin  the  bene- 
ficiaries designated  in  the  statute  must  be  shown  to  be  in  being 
by  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  otherwise  the  action  for 
damages  for  the  death  cannot  be  sustained.  Nor  will  the  court 
uphold  the  claim  that  by  the  statutes  the  right  of  action  for  the 
wrongful  death  of  a  person  is  conditional  only  upon  the  circum- 
stances being  such  that  if  death  had  not  ensued  the  decedent 
could  have  proceeded  against  the  wrongdoer  for  damages.1     So 


oh.  280.  Action  does  not  abate  on 
death  of  beneficiary,  although  the 
duration  and  extent  of  the  personal 
injury  is  limited  to  the  beneficiary's 
lifetime.  Cooper  v.  Shore  Elec.  Co. 
(N.  J.  1899),  44  Atl.  623.  As  to  ef- 
fect of  Dakota  survival  statute 
(Com p.  Laws,  sec.  5498)  in  Wiscon- 
sin, see  Belding  v.  Black  Hills  &  Ft. 
P.  K.  Co.  (Wis.),  53  X.  W.  750;  52 
Am.  &  Eng.  E.  Cas.  624.  That  ac- 
tion survives  and  is  separate  and 
distinct  from  action  for  death  loss, 
and  that  the  latter  is  exclusive,  and 
for  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  this 
question,  see  Brown  v.  Chicago  & 
Northwestern  R.   Co.,  102  Wis.  137; 

77  N.  W.  748;  44  L.  R.  A.  579; 
13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  603;  5 
Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  255,  rehearing  denied 

78  X.  W.  771;  44  L.  R.  A.  585:  13 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  603.  This 
last  case  cites  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  R. 
Co.,  84  Mich.  539:  4S  N.  W.  44:  Leh- 
man v.  Farwell,  95  Wis.  185:  70  X. 
W.  170,  and  numerous  other  cases. 
See  also  Topping  v.  St.  Lawrence,  86 
Wis.  526;  57  N.  W.  365,  cited  in 
Sachs  v.  City  of  Sioux  City,  109 
Iowa,  224;  80  X.  W.  336;  as  to  sur- 
vival of  action  and  suit  being  barred 
by  failure  to  give  notice,  etc.,  to  cor- 
poration defendant,  other  Wiscon- 
sin cases  are  also  cited  therein  to  the 
same  point.  That  second  husband 
cannot  continue  suit  after  the 
widow's  death  brought  by  her  for 
damages  for  the  death  of  her  former 

820 


husband,  see  Schmidt  v.  Menosha 
Wooden  Ware  Co.,  99  Wis.  300;  74 
X.  W.  797.  The  Michigan  survival 
act,  sec.  7397,  applies  only  where  the 
death  results  from  other  causes  than 
the  injuries,  and  damages  are  not  re- 
coverable by  the  heirs  for  the  pecu- 
niary loss  to  them,  and  also  by  the 
personal  representative  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  estate  under  the  survival 
act.  3  How.  Ann.  Stat.  sec.  7397; 
and  the  death  act,  2  How.  Ann. 
Stat.  sees.  8313,  8314;  Sweetland  v. 
Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.,  117  Mich. 
329;  75  X.  W.  1006;  43  L.  R.  A.  568; 
5  Det.  L.  X.  283.  As  to  abatement 
by  death  under  General  Statutes,  see 
Plume  v.  Lock  wood,  10  N.  J.  L.  J. 
119;  Ferguson  v.  Wilson  (Mich. 
1899),  80  X.  W.  1006;  Beith  v.  Por- 
ter. 119  Mich.  365;  78  X.  W.  336;  5 
Det.  L.  X.  837;  Wisconsin,  M.  &  X. 
R.  Co.  v.  Weselins,  119  Mich.  505; 
78  X.  W.  544;  5  Det.  L.  X.  873.  The 
power  to  proceed  against  a  corpora- 
tion judicially  is  wholly  divested  by 
its  dissolution,  except  by  special 
statutory  authority.  Combes  v.  Mil- 
waukee &  M.  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  297;  62 
X.  W.  89;  27  L.  R.  A.  369. 

4  Brown  v.  Chicago  &  Xorthwest- 
ern  R.  Co.,  102  Wis.  137;  77  X.  W. 
748;  44  L.  R.  A.  579;  13  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cas.  X.  S.  603;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep. 
255,  rehearing  denied  78  X.  W.  771; 
44  L.  R.  A.  585;  13  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cas.  X.  S.  603,  citing  several  Wiscon- 
sin cases.     See  Wiltse  v.   Tilden,  77 


WITH     REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    IN-'l    RY. 


!  643 


in  Michigan  the  complaint  should  show  the  existence  of  a  wife 
and  children  who  would  be  entitled  to  damages/  And  in  this 
state  the  children's  right  of  action,  no  husband  or  widow  sur- 
viving, constitutes  no  part  of  deceased's  estate  and  a  final  set- 
tlement thereof  is  not  a  bar  to  a  suit  by  the  personal  representa- 
tive for  such  children's  benefit.6  Another  peculiarity  of  the 
Wisconsin  enactment,  noted  under  the  preceding  section,  is  that 
only  the  surviving  husband  or  widow  is  entitled  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  the  damages,  then  his  or  her  lineal  descendants,  and  fin- 
ally his  or  her  lineal  ancestors.1  And  infant  children  are  the  only 
proper  beneficiaries  and  the  complaint  should  show  that  some  of 
the  children  are  minors."  While  in  New  Jersey  the  words  for 
the  "exclusive  benefit  of  the  widow  and  next  of  kin"  do  not 
prevent  bringing  an  action  by  the  next  of  kin  when  no  widow- 
survives,  for  the  statute  does  not  apply  solely  to  the  cases  where 
deceased  leaves  surviving  a  widow.1'  And  in  Michigan  the  per- 
sons entitled  to  distribution  of  the  personal  estate  of  intestate 
are  the  beneficiaries.1"  Another  factor  which  has  a  bearing  upon 
the  right  to  recover  damages  for  death  by  negligence,  etc.,  is 
that  under  the  Wisconsin  statute."  Railroad  companies  are  lia- 
ble to  employees  for  the  negligence  of  co-employees  and  where 
a  railroad  employee  is  killed  by  such  fellow  servant's  negligence 


Wis.  52;  46  X.  W.  234;  McKeigue  v. 

Janesville,  68  Wis.  50;  31  \.  W.  298. 
Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  8.  R 
C<>.  (Mich.),  62  X.  W.  1032;  5  Det.  L. 
N.  34.  See  Charlebois  v.  Gogebie  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  59;  51  N.  W.  812. 

•Hubbard  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R. 
Co.,  104  Wis.  160;  80  X.  W.  454.  See 
Brown  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  It.  Co., 
102  Wis.  132;  78  X.  W.  771:  44  L.  R. 
A.  58o,  denying  rehearing  77  X.  W. 
748;  44  L.  R.  A.  579;  5  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  255;  13  Am.  &  Kn£.  R.  (.'as.  \. 
S.  603;  Gores  v.  Graff,  77  Wis.  174; 
46  X.  W.  48.  Examine  also  Abbott 
v.McCaddan,  si  wis.  563;  51  X.  W. 
1079;  Schadelwald  v.  Milwaukee,  L. 
S.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  55  Wis.  560;  13  X.  W. 
458. 

7<;.>rcsv.  Graff.  77  Wis.  174:  16  V 
W.  48;  Schmidt  v.   Deegan,   60  Wis. 


300;  34  X.  W.  83.  See  also  Brown  v. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.,  102  Wis. 
137;  78  X.  W.  771:  44  L.  R.  A.  585, 
denying  rehearing  77  X.  W.  748;  44 
L.  R.  A.  .-,79:  5  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  255; 
13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  603, 
and  opinion  of  Marshall,  .J.;  and  see 
cases  in  last  note  herein.  I.ierman 
v.  Chicago.  M.  <&  St.  P.  R.  Co. 
(Wis.),  52  X.  W.  But  a  special  ad- 
ministrator may  maintain  an  action. 
Swan  v.  Worvell,  107  Wis.  625;  83 
X.  W.  934. 

■  Toppingv.  St.  Lawrence,  86Wis. 
526;  57  X.  W.  365. 

"Haggerty  v.  Central  K.  R.  Co., 31 
X.  J.  L.  349,  under  Nixon's  Dig. 211. 
e  Michigan  statutes  oited  at 
beginning  of  this  Bection. 

'1  Laws,  1893,  ch.  220.  See  Wis. 
Rev.  Siat.  1898,  sec.  1816. 

821 


§£  044,  645  FAIR    AND    JUST    DAMAGES 

an  action  lies  therefor  under  the  death  loss  enactment  which 
permits  an  action  where  deceased  could  have  sued  if  the  injury 
had  not  been  fatal.13  Again,  a  right  of  action  against  a  city  for 
death  resulting  from  defects  in  a  highway,  given  by  the  Michi- 
gan death  loss  statute,  is  not  taken  away  by  the  enactment  mak- 
ing cities  liable  for  defective  highways  and  abrogating  the  com- 
mon-law liability  although  it  contains  no  provisions  for  damages 
to  any  person  other  than  the  one  injured.13 

§  644.  Same    subject    concluded. — So  in  New  Jersey  the 

board  of  chosen  freeholders  in  a  county  is  liable  under  the  death 
loss  statutes  where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  it  would 
have  been  liable  to  the  injured  person  if  death  had  not  ensued.14 
Nor  is  there  any  presumption  that  the  intent  of  the  death  loss 
statute  of  Michigan  was  to  create  a  different  rule  of  damages 
against  private  and  other  corporations  in  case  of  death  from  that 
in  such  actions  against  a  railroad  company.13  It  is  apparent 
therefore,  that  although  the  prescribed  statutory  measure  of 
damages  is  in  the  same  language  in  these  states,  nevertheless, 
there  are  other  peculiarities  of  the  statutes  which  will  affect  the 
beneficiaries '  rights  either  as  a  class  or  otherwise,  so  that  any 
decision  in  one  state  which  applies  to  a  certaiu  class  of  those 
entitled  should  be  carefully  examined,  except  perhaps  upon  cer- 
tain general  questions,  before  being  relied  on  in  another  state  as 
an  authority. 

§645.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Pecuniary  loss.— The  measure  of  recovery 
is  the  pecuniary  loss  solely,  either  present  or  prospective,  sus- 
tained by  those   entitled  to  recover.10     In  Michigan,  however, 

i'2Ean  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  |  holders    (N.    J.),  31  Atl.  229,  under 
Co.,  95  Wis.  69;  69  N.  W.  997;  1  Am.    X.  J.  Act,  March  3,  1848. 
Neg.    Rep.  537.     See  extended  note  \      15  Van  Brunt   v.   Cincinnati,   J.  & 
at  end  of  chapter  29,  herein,  as  to  fel-    M.   R.   Co.,  78  Mich.  530;  44  X.   W. 
low  servants.  j  321. 

«  Radio  v.  Detroit  (Mich.),  51  N.  ^  Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
W.  360,  under  Pub.  Acts,  1887,  No.  I  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mich.  518;  69  N.  W.  1114; 
264,  and  How.  Ann.  Mich.  Stat.  sees.  '  3  Det.  L.  X.  775;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
8313,8314.  267  (see  S.   C,   104   Mich.  606;  62  N. 

»  Murphy  v.  Mercer  County  Free-    W.    1032;   2   Det.    L.    X.  34),  citing 


WITH     REFERENCE  TO    PECUNIAR!     QSJXJSY. 


645 


while  the  damages  recoverable  are  those  sustained  by  the  stat- 
utory beneficiaries  who  have  suffered  pecuniary  Loss,  neverthe- 
less persons  who  have  not  been  subjected  to  pecuniary  loss 
may  be  entitled  to  a  share  of  the  amount  recovered.17  In  de- 
termining what  constitutes  a  pecuniary  loss  within  the  intent 
of  the  statute,  the  decisions  in  two  of  these  states  are  that  the 
injury  must  be  such  as  is  capable  of  a  money  compensation 
and  that  no  other  loss  can  be  considered."  Thus  it  must  be 
shown  that  advice  and  counsel  relates  to  the  pecuniary  affairs  of 


Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 
104  Mich.  582;  02   X.  W.  993,  2  Det. 
Leg.  X.  33;  Van  Brunt  v.  Cincinnati, 
J.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  78  Midi.  530;  -it   N. 
W.  321;  Batch  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  S. 
R.  Co.,  07  Mich.  3D4;  34  X.    W.   884; 
11  West.  470;  Mynniug  v.  Detroit,  L. 
A-  X.  R.  Co.,  59  Mich.  201;.  20  X.  W. 
514;    Chicago   &    X.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Bayfield,  37    Mich.     214.      See    also 
Richmond  v.   Chicago  &    W.    M.    R. 
Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  361;  10 
Ry.  &    Corp.   L.  J.    324;  49   Am.    & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  307;  Hurst   v.    Detroit 
City  R.  Co.,  84  Mich.   539;  48  X.  W. 
44;  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  K. 
Co.,   66   Mich.    201,  271;   33    X.    W. 
306;  10  West.  104;  Chicago  &  X.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Whitton,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
270;  20  L.  Ed.  571  (in  error  to  U.  S. 
C.  C.  S.  E.  D.  Wis.);  Graham  v.  Con- 
solidated Tract.  Co.,  64  X.  J.  L.  10; 
44  Atl.  994,  per  Magie,   Ch.  J.;  Con- 
solidated Tract  Co.  v.  Hone,  60  X. 
J.  L.  244;  38  Atl.  759;  9  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.    Cas.   X.  S.  249,   case  reverses  59 
X.  J.  L.   275;  35    Atl.   899;    5  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S.  679;  Consolidated 
Tract.   Co.   v.   Graham,   (52   X.  J.   L. 
90;  40  Atl.  773;  58  Alh.  L.  J.  93;  31 
Chic.    L.    Xews,    35;    17    Xat.  Corp. 
Rep.  213;  4   Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  660,  per 
Gummere,  J.;    May  v.   West  Jersey 
&   S.   S.   R.  Co.,  62   X.   J.    L.  67;  42 
Atl.  165;  13  Am.  &   Eng.  R.  Cas.  X. 
S.  517;  5  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  417,  a  case 


of  child's  death;  May  v.  West  Jer- 
sey &  S.  R.  Co.,  62  X.  J.  L.  63;  42 
Atl.  103,  a  case  of  wife  and  mother's 
death;  Myers  v.  Holhoru,  58  X.  J. 
L.  (29  Vr.)  193;  33  Atl.  3s9;  30  L.  R 
A.  345;  Demarestv.  Little,  47  X.  J. 
L.  (18  Vr.)  28;  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  151;  Telfer  v.  North- 
ern R.  Co.,  30  X.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  188; 
Nickerson  v.  Bigelow  (17.  S.  D.  C.  E. 
]).  Wis.),  02  Fed.  900;  Bauer  v. 
Richter,  103  Wis.  412;  Thompson  v. 
Johnston  Bros.,  80  Wis.  570;  57  N. 
W.  298;  Topping  v.  Lawrence,  86 
Wis.  526;  57  X.  W.  365;  Lierman  v. 
Chicago,  M.  it  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (Wis.  i, 
52  X.  W.  91;  Ewen  v.  Chicago  A  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis.  till;  letter  v. 
Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co.,  21  Wis. 
372. 

17  Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M. 
R.  Co.,  s7  Mich.  374;  49  X.  W.  621; 
lit  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  307;  10  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.J.  344;  Howell's  Annot.  Stat. 
Bee.  3392,  and  miller  statute  of  distri- 
butions. 

w  Mynuing  v.  Detroit.  L.  &  N.  K. 
Co.,59  Mich.  257;26  X.  W.  514:  Dema- 
rest  v.  Little,  47  X.  J.  L.  (18  Vr.)  28. 
••  It  is  simply  an  action  to  recover  in 
dollars  and  cents  a  compensation  for 
the  loss  and  damages  which  have  ac- 
tually been  sustained."  Telfer  v. 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  30  X.  J.  L.  (1 
Vr.)  188,  209,  per  Van  Dyke,  J. 

823 


§  640 


DEATH — FAIH    AND    JUST    DAMAGES 


the  next  of  kin  and  would  probably  result  in  a  pecuniary  bene- 
fit, the  loss  of  which  would  bring  the  case  within  the  statute.19 

§  646.  Same  subject  continued. — And  the  pecuniary  loss 
must  be  alleged  and  proved,  at  least  to  some  extent,  particularly 
so  where  the  damages  are  for  the  loss  of  prospective  earnings 
which  are  special  in  their  character  and  must  be  specially  pleaded 
and  established  by  evidence.'**  Although  in  Michigan  if  the 
fact  appears  from  the  proof  that  the  next  of  kin  have  sustained 
damages  from  the  death  of  the  intestate  the  declaration  may 
be  amended  so  as  to  show  such  fact.21  In  New  Jersey,  however, 
it  seems  that  there  is  no  absolute  requirement  as  to  averring 
that  there  has  been  a  pecuniary  loss,"  but  it  is  evident  from 
another  decision  in  that  state  there  must  be  sufficient  proof  to 
justify  the  award  of  damages,  otherwise  the  amount  of  the  ver- 
dict will  be  reduced  to  the  compensation  which  the  evidence 
shows  to  be  a  proper  sum,  since  the  plaintiff,  it  was  declared, 
could  recover  nothing  but  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  those 


19  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  63;  42  Atl.  163. 

20  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co., 
84  Mich.  539;  48  N.  W.  44,  citing 
Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 
66  Mich.  261,  271;  33  N.  W.  306;  10 
West.  184,  per  Champlin,  J.,  and  nu- 
merous other  cases.  Must  allege 
facts  showing  that  some  person  en- 
titled thereto  has  suffered  pecuniary 
loss.  Charlebois  v.  Gogebie  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  59;  51  N.  W.  812. 
Evidence  of  pecuniary  loss  to  some 
person  essential  in  action  against 
railroad  com  pany.  Van  Brunt  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, J.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  530; 
44  N.  W.  321.  See  further  Topping  v. 
St.  Lawrence,  86  Wis.  526;  57  N.  W. 
365;  Regan  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.,  51  Wis.  599;  8  N.  W.  292; 
Kelley  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  50 
Wis.  381.  Allegations  that  plain- 
tiff was  intestate's  mother  and  show- 
ing the  extent  of  her  dependency 
for  support,  and  averring  pecuniary 
loss  and  damage,  sufficiently   allege 

824 


plaintiff's  representative  character. 
Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46  N. 
W.  234.  And  if  there  is  evidence  to 
support  the  general  verdict  for 
plaintiff  and  a  finding  against  con- 
tributory negligence,  a  nonsuit  is 
properly  refused,  nor  will  the  ver- 
dict be  set  aside  on  such  ground. 
Averments  that  plaintiff's  intestate 
was  a  widow  and  bad  small  children 
dependent  upon  her  for  support, 
nurture  and  education  are  sufficient 
in  action  for  children  for  her  death. 
McKeigue  v.  Janesville,  68  Wis.  50; 
31  N.  W.  298.  Examine  Evven  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis. 
613,  as  to  there  being  no  necessity  of 
averring  special  damages  to  admit 
proof  thereof.  A  case  of  proof  of 
pension. 

21  Canity  v.  Detroit  Citizens  St. 
R.  Co.,  112  Mich.  369;  70  N.  W.  1018; 
2  Chic.  L.  J.  Wkly.  277;  4  Det.  L. 
N.  46;  37  L.  R.  A.  529. 

22  McGlone  v.  New  Jersey  R.  Co., 
8  Vr.  (X.  J.)  304,  per  Beasley,  J. 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECUNIARY    IN.UKV. 


S  647 


entitled  to  the  damages.  The  effect  of  this  decision  as  well  as 
those  below  cited  is  that  the  amount  of  substantial  damages 
must  depend  upon  the  proof  of  pecuniary  injury,-'  for  the  re- 
covery cannot  be  in  excess  of  any  possible  calculation  based 
upon  the  evidence  which  must  furnish  some  standard  for  the 
estimation  of  the  amount  of  damages.21 

§  647.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  " — Damages  for  the  jury.  The  amount  of  dam- 
ages to  be  awarded  rests  largely  in  the  jury's  discretion,  but  it 
must  be  founded  upon  the  evidence,  otherwise  the  verdict  will 
not  be  sustained  for  the  sum  fixed  thereby 


23  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  67;  42  Atl.  165;  13  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  517;  5  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  417.  See  Telferv.  North- 
ern R.  Co.,  30  N.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  188 
and  Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v. 
Graham,  62  N.  J.  L.  90;  40  Atl.  77:; ; 
58  Alb.  L.  J.  93;  31  Chic.  L.  N".  35; 
17  Natl.  Corp.  Rep.  213;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  660,  upon  the  point  of  necessity 
of  some  evidence  to  recover  sub- 
stantial damages. 

24  Jackson  v.  Consolidated  Tract. 
Co.,  59  N.  J.  L.  (30  Vr.)  25;  35  Atl. 
754.  See  Walker  v.  Lake  Shoe.'  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  606;  02  X. 
W.  1032;  2  Det.  L.  N.  34.  See  also 
8.  C,  111  Mich.  518;  69  N.  W.  1144; 
3  Det.  L.  N.  775;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
2G7.  In  this  last  case  there  was  no 
evidence  as  to  nurture,  etc.,  of  chil- 
dren and  this  was  considered,  al 
though  the  court  held  that  damages 
therefor  were  not  recoverable,  but 
this  intimation  of  no  evidence  and 
that  it  was  not  claimed  that  de- 
ceased was  a  tutor  to  his  children 
leaves  room  for  the  inference  of  a 
possibility  of  alleging  and  recover- 
ing upon  proof  of  special  damages 
in  this  respect.  Cooper  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261, 
271;  33    N.  W.    306;  10  West.     184, 


where  the  court  says,  "  The  jury  was 
not  warranted  in  giving  damages 
not  founded  upon  the  testimony  or 
beyond  the  measure  of  compensa- 
tion for  the  injury  inflicted,'1  and 
this  is  quoted  by  the  court  in  Hurst 
v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co.,  S4  .Midi.  :.:;'.'; 
48  N.  W.  44.  See  Nelson  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  582; 
62  N.  W.  993;  2  Det.   L.  N.  :'-;;. 

»  Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  A-  M.S.  R. 
Co.,  104  Mich.  606;  62  X.  W.  1032;  2 
Det.  1..  X.  :D:  Burst  v.  Detroit  City 
R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  539;  IS  N.  W.  -II. 
quoting  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  it  M. 
S.  R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261,  271 :  :):;  X.  W. 
300 ;  lOWest.  184;  North  .Jersey  St.  R. 
Co.  v.  Morhatt,  (34  X.  J.  L.  236;  15 
Atl.  812;  Jackson  v.  Consolidated 
Tract.  Co.,  59  X.  J.  L.  (30  Vr.  i  25; 
35  Atl.  754;  Whit  on  v.  Chicago  & 
X.  W.  R.  Co..  2  I'.iss.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
Wis.)282;  L3  Wall.  (U.  S.) 270;  Wiltse 
v.  Town  of  Tilden,  77  Wis.  L66;  46  N 
W.  2:1  I;  Staal  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  I.  R 
Co..  57  Mich.  2  15  ;  23  \ .  W.  795 
Both  these  cases  are  cited,  upon  the 
point  that  the  jury  should  lie  in- 
formed of  every  fact  ami  circum- 
stance to  assist  them,  in  Gulf,  Colo. 
&S.  F.  R.  Oo.v.  lounger,  90 Tex.  887; 
38  S.  W.  1121:  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  378, 
!  per  Brown,  J.     That  jury  not  limited 

825 


§  648  DEATH       I'AIK    AND    JUST    DAMAGES 

§  648.  "  Fair  and  just "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  " — Factors  generally  to  be  considered. — The 

factors  generally  to  be  considered  are  deceased's  age,  sex,  health, 
occupation,  earnings  and  probability  of  increase  thereof  or  other- 
wise, earning  capacity,  including  the  qualification,  or  otherwise 
for  a  more  remunerative  position,  and  the  increase  or  diminution 
of  such  capacity,  as  well  as  the  education,  capacity,  social  stand- 
ing, the  ability,  skillfulness  or  unskillfulness  of  deceased  in  his 
employment  or  business,  his  personal  qualities,  his  life  expect- 
ancy, habits  as  to  industry,  sobriety,  expenditure  or  otherwise, 
whether  he  was  married  or  not,  his  care  of  his  family,  if  there 
be  any  family  or  dependents,  and  plaintiffs  or  the  beneficiaries' 
age  and  life  expectancy.  There  are  other  elements,  such  as  prob- 
able accumulations,  dependency  for  support  or  extent  of  con- 
tributions thereto,  which  enter  into  the  reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit,  etc.,  which  are  specially  considered  else- 
where herein.26 


by  any  definite  and  exact  rule,  exam- 
ine Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
38  Wis.  613;  Cooper  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  22  Wis.  615.  Damages  rests 
largely  in  jury's  discretion.  Whiton 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (U.  S.  C.  C. 
E.  D.  Wis.),  2  Biss.  282,  289,  per 
Drummond,  J.  See  also  sees.  667- 
672,  herein,  as  to  death  of  children. 

26  Deceased  was  a  woman  56  years 
old ;  only  proof  was  as  to  boarding 
husband  and  minor  children,  and 
clothing  latter— $7,000  excessive. 
Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  104  Mich.  582;  62  N.  W.  993;  2 
Det.  L.  N.  33.  Life  expectancy  of 
deceased  and  of  mother  to  be  con- 
sidered. Richmond  v.  Chicago  & 
W.  M.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N. 
W.  361;  10  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  344; 
49  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  367.  Pro- 
spective earnings  in  Mich,  when 
pleaded.  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  R. 
Co.,  84  Mich.  539;  48  N.  W.  44. 
Age,  health  and  strength  of  de- 
ceased girl  considered.  Cooper  v. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  66  Mich. 
826 


261;  33  N.  W.  306;  10  West.  184. 
Deceased's  age,  contributions  to 
support,  life  expectancy  and  earn- 
ings. Balch  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  S. 
R.  Co.,  67  Mich.  394;  11  West.  476; 
34  N.  W.  884.  Deceased  son's  age, 
earnings  and  disposition  thereof, 
and  father's  age.  North  Jersey  St. 
R.  Co.  v.  Morhart,  64  N.  J.  L.  236; 
45  Atl.  812.  Deceased  son's  age 
and  probabilities  of  pecuniary  bene- 
fits from  son's  earnings.  Graham  v. 
Consolidated  Tract.  Co.  (N.  J.),  44 
Atl.  964;  Consolidated  Tract.  Co.  v. 
Graham,  62  N.  J.  L.  90;  40  Atl. 
773;  58  Alb.  L.  J.  93;  31  Chic.  L.  N. 
35;  17  Natl.  Corp.  Rep.  213;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  660.  Deceased  son's  age, 
occupation,  wages,  exclusive  of 
board,  and  as  compared  with  earn- 
ings of  full  grown  able-bodied  men 
at  the  same  labor,  no  evidence  that 
any  increase  of  wages  could  be  an- 
ticipated during  minority;  no  evi- 
dence that  he  was  qualified  or  would 
be  qualified  during  minority  for  any 
more  remunerative   position.     Held 


WITH    REFERENCE    TO    PECl   NIARY    EN.J1   RY. 


B  649 


§649.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury "  Severance  of  contract  relations  Part- 
nership.— The  severance  of  relations  of  contract  by  the  death, 


that  pecuniary   benefits  would   nol 
reach  amount  of  verdict   and    13,000 
reduced    to    $1,500.      M  iy     v.    West 
.Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co.,  62   N.  J.    L.  67; 
42  Atl.  10-"):   13  Am.  &   Eng.   R.  <   is. 
\.   S.   617;   •">    Am.    Neg.    Rep.    117. 
Next    of    kin     were    two     sons,    one 
married,  and   the  other   17  years  old. 
Deceased  kept   bouse   for   husband, 
and    aided    him    incidentally    iu    his 
occupation — $5,000  excessive.     May 
v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co.,  62  \.  J. 
L.    63;  41   Ail.    10:1.     Deceased   was 
f>7  years  old  at  time  of  t lie  accident, 
a  bricklayer  by  trade,  and  followed 
the  business  of  contracting  and  build- 
ing.     He  was  sober,  industrious  aud 
prosperous  in  business,  and  bad  ac- 
cumulated property  out  of  bis  earn- 
ings.    At  the  time    of  the  accident. 
be    was    in    good    health    and    never 
known   to  be  sick,  although   it    was 
claimed  that  he  had  Blight's  disease. 
He  left  surviving  him  a  widow  aud 
three  children,  aged  IT,  14  and  11 — 
§:>,800   not    excessive.     Williams   v. 
Camden   &  Atlantic  R.    Co.  (X.  J.), 
37  Atl.  1107;  3  Am.   Neg.   Rep.  569. 
Deceased's    probable  accumulations, 
and    that  he  had   acquired    a    com- 
petence considered.      (See   this  case 
also  as  to  age  and  situation  of  the 
parties,     increasing    or     decreasing 
mental   aud    physical   ability   as  ap- 
plied   to     business.)       Demarest     v. 
Little,  47  X.  J.  L.  (18  Vr.)  28.    See 
Telfer  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  SOX.  J. 
L.   (Vr. )   188.      Yearly  earnings  and 
probable    value    of   an    annuity   for 
term  of  expectancy.     Xickerson   v. 
Bigclow  (U.   S.   D.  C.  E.   D.    Wis.), 
62     Fed.     900.      Earning     capacity, 
mental  and  physical  ability,  personal 
qualities,   social  standing   and  char- 


acter. Whiion  v.  Chicago  A  N.  W. 
R.  Co.,  2  Bias.  I  Q.  S.  C.  C.  Wis 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Whiton, 
13  Wall,  i  r.  S.  i  270.  Deceased  was 
r  years  old,  Btrong  and  healthy. 
Decker  v.  McSorley,  ill  Wis.  91; 
86  N.  W.  ."..".4.  Deceased's  son  was 
17  years  old,  intelligent,  in  good 
health,  capable  of  earning  com 
able  money  and  unmarried.  Lues- 
sen  v.  Oshkosk  Elec.  L.  A:  P.  ( 
109  Wis.  94;  85  N.  W.  124.  De- 
ceased was  a  strong,  healthy  man,  38 
years  old.  Carpenterv.  Roeling,  107 
Wis.  559;  83  N.  W.  953.  Deceased 
husband's  life  expectancy  and 
widow's  reasonable  expectations 
from  bis  earnings  ami  aim. nut 
sufficient  for  her  support,  but  not 
gross  earnings  for  life  expectancy. 
Rudiger  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  & 
O.  K.  Co.,  101  Wis.  292;  77  X.  W. 
109;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R,  Cas.  V 
S.  196.  Deceased  was  a  freight 
handler;  railroad  company  liable  to 
employee  for  negligence  of  co-em 
ployee.  Ean  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.,  9.7  Wis.  69;  69  V  W.  '.".'7; 
1  Am.  Xeg.  Rep.  .7:17.  Deceased  was 
a  workman  33  years  old — -S4.000  not 
excessive.  Bright  v.  Barnetl  &  R. 
Co.,  88  Wis.  290;  60  V  W.  418;  26 
1..  R.  A.  524.  Deceased's  age,  occu- 
pation and  financial  condition,  and 
reasonable  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary benefit.  Tuteur  v.  Chicago  & 
X.  W.  K.  Co.,  77  Wis.  505;  46  N.  W. 
897.  Deceased's  education  and 
capacity  for  earning  money.  Wiltse 
v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46  N.  W. 
234.  Deceased's  age.  health,  earn- 
ings and  dependency  of  family  con- 
sidered- 12,500  not  excessive. 
Annas  \.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  <'o.,  07 

S27 


8  650 


DEATH— FAIR    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 


such  as  that  of  partnership,  cannot  be  considered  as  an  element 
of  damages.27 

§  650.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Sufferings  of  person  injured. — In  deter- 
mining whether'  or  not  the  sufferings  of  the  person  injured  con- 
stitute an  element  of  damages,  it  must  be  remembered  that,  as 
we  have  elsewhere  stated,  in  Michigan  there  is  a  survival  stat- 
ute which  covers  negligent  injuries  to  the  person,  and  such  en- 
actment only  includes  those  cases  where  death  results  from  other 
causes  than  the  injuries,  while  the  death  loss  act  applies  where 
death  is  occasioned  by  the  negligent  or  wrongful  act,  and  results 
in  pecuniary  injury  to  the  heirs.28  And  we  have  also  seen  that 
there  are  survival  statutes  in  the  other  states  which  come  under 
this  provision  as  to  fair  and  just  damages  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury,  viz  :  New  Jersey  and  Wisconsin.29  In  so  far, 
therefore,  as  those  actions  rest  upon  different  principles,  and  are 
separate  and  distinct,  the  death  loss  statute  cannot  include  the 
mental  or  physical  sufferings  of  the  person  injured,  for  these 
appertain  only  to  the  person  and  the  survival  action,  and  it  is 
clearly  apparent  that  the  legislature  in  enacting  both  a  death 
loss  and  survival  enactment  could  not  have  intended  that  the 
heirs  or  designated  beneficiaries  should  recover  for  other  than 
the  pecuniary  injuries  resulting  solely  from  the  death.* 


Wis.  46.  Deceased  was  55  years  old, 
married  and  unskilled  laborer — 
§2,000  not  excessive.  Mulcairns  v. 
Janesville,  67  Wis.  24.  Deceased 
son  18  months  old— $2,000  not  ex- 
cessive. Schrier  v.  Milwaukee,  L. 
S.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  05  Wis.  457;  27  \. 
W.  167.  Deceased  son  was  7  years 
old;  character  of  his  services  and 
condition  of  parents  considered — 
$2,500  not  excessive.  Johnson  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  64  Wis. 
425;  25  N.  W.  223.  Deceased  and 
parents'  ages,  and  latter's  condition 
and  circumstances  considered — 
$1,000  not  excessive.  Hoppe  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  61  Wis. 
359;  21  N.  W.  227.     Age  and  services 

828 


of  minor,  situation  and  condition  of 
parents — $2,000  not  excessive.  Ewen 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis. 
613. 

27Demarest  v.  Little,  47  N.  J.  L. 
(18Vr.)  28. 

28S\veetland  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R. 
Co.,  117  Mich.  329;  75  N.  W.  1066; 
5  Det.  L.  X.  283;  43  L.  R.  A.  568, 
under  death  Stat.  2  How.  Ann.  Stat. 
sees.  8313,  8314.  and  survival  act,  3 
How.  Ann.  Stat.  sec.  7397. 

29 See  sees.  642-644,  herein. 

30 See  Mynning  v.  Detroit  L.  &  N. 
R.  Co.,  59  Mich.  257;  26  N.  W.  514: 
Telfer  v.  Northern  R  Co.,  30  ST.  J. 
L.  188,  and  cases  cited;  sees.  642-644, 
herein,  as  to  statutes. 


EEFBUENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    INJURY.      §§  651,  652 

§  651.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Solatium— Mental  suffering.— In  an 
action  to  recover  under  the  death  loss  statute,  nothing  can  be 
allowed  for  the  mental  suffering  of  those  entitled  to  damag 
Nor  can  a  declaration  in  a  cause  of  action  for  a  child's  death  he 
amended  by  inserting  an  averment  for  injuries  inflicted  and 
suffered  up  to  the  time  of  the  death.32 

§  652.  "  Fair  and  just "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the  pe- 
cuniary injury  "—Relationship,  legal  and  actual,  of  deceased 
to  beneliciaries.— The  question  of  relationship,  legal  and  actual, 
of  deceased  to  the  beneficiaries,  is  certainly  important  and  mate- 
rial in  so  far  as  the  existence  of  statutory  beneficiaries  is  neces- 
sary to  be  alleged  and  proven.  This  point  of  relationship  is 
also  involved  in  that  of  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  ad- 
vantage, since  the  probability  of  the  continuance  of  past  benefits 
would,  to  some  extent  at  least,  be  evidenced  both  by  the  legal 
and  actual  relations  between  deceased  and  those  entitled  to  re- 
cover for  his  death,  and  the  question  of  dependency  of  survivors 
upon  deceased  ought  to  be  relevant,  as  is  instanced  by  the  ease 
of  a  widow's  sole  support  being  cut  off  by  her  husband's  negli- 
gent or  wrongful  killing,  the  family  also  being  dependent. 
Other  illustrations  of  the  above  points  are  where  allegations 
that  plaintiff  was  the  mother  of  intestate  and  dependent  upon 
him,  are  facts  showing  her  right  to  sue,  and  that  she  has  sus- 
tained pecuniary  loss.34  So  the  facts  that  a  deceased  son  was 
unmarried  and  that  there  were  a  number  of  other  sons  surviving, 
are  relevant,  and  affect  the  measure  of  recovery."'     And  the  right 


:'i  Teller  v.  Northern  R.  Co..  30  V. 
J.  L.  188.  Nothing  for  injury  to  a 
father's  feelings  for  death  of  a  Bon, 
killed  by  railroad  company,  under 
N.  J.  Act,  March  3,  1848.  Demurest 
v.  Little,  47  N.  J.  L.  28,  a  case  of 
husband  for  wife's  killing.  \\  niton 
v.Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co..  2  Hiss. 
(U.  S.  C.  C.  E.  D.  Wis.)  282,  289,  per 
Drummoud,  J.  See  Nelson  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  K.  Co.,  104  Mich.  582; 
62  N.  W.  998;  2  Det.  L.  X.  S3;  Myn- 
ning  v.   Detroit,  1,.  A  N.   R,  Co.,   •"»'.' 


Mich.  257;  20  N.  W.  :>14:  Castello  v. 
Landwehr.  28  Wis.  522;  Totter  \. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R  Co.,  21  Wis.  372. 
Examine  also  cases  cited  undei 
sees.  645,  646,  herein. 

32  Hurst  v.  Detroit   City  K    Co.,  84 
Mich.  539;  48  V  W.  44. 

83  Annas  v.  Milwaukee  A  N.  R.  Co., 
C7  Wis.  It',;  30  X.  W.  282. 

m  Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;    10 
N.  W.  234. 

35  Innes    v.    Milwaukee.     1<>3    Wis. 
582;  7'.'  V  W.  783. 

829 


§  653  DEATH— FAIR   AND   JUST    DAMAGES 

of  a  divorced  woman  to  the  custody  of  her  children  under  a  de- 
cree of  divorce  is  material.36  Again,  that  the  father  was  next 
of  kin  and  the  actual  relations  between  him  and  a  deceased  son 
with  reference  to  the  disposition  of  such  son's  earnings  and  the 
loss  thereof  by  the  premature  death,  affect  the  right  to  and  the 
measure  of  the  damages  as  well,  also,  as  the  possible  future  re- 
lation of  dependency,  in  case  the  father  should  become  neces- 
sitous.37 But  a  father  and  brother  of  intestate  were  not  permitted 
a  recovery  where  they  were  not  dependent  on  deceased.58  These 
general  illustrations  might  be  continued  indefinitely  if  it  were 
necessary,  but  it  is  not,  for  the  reason  that  like  cases  appeal- 
throughout  the  chapters  covering  this  subject,  especially  so  in 
connection  with  those  sections  which  relate  to  prospective  gifts 
and  contributions  to  support,  as  well  as  to  the  question  of  legal 
and  moral  obligation  to  render  aid  or  support.  It  is  not  intended 
however,  to  assert  by  reason  of  what  is  above  stated  that  proof 
of  the  legal  and  actual  relations  of  deceased  to  the  beneficiaries 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  be  alleged  and  proven  as  a  prerequi- 
site to  a  recovery,  for  that  is  another  question,  viz.,  that  of  the 
right  to  nominal  damages,  which  we  have  elsewhere  considered, 
but  nevertheless,  such  relationship  does  affect  the  extent  of  the 
recovery  in  numerous  cases.39 

§  653.  "Fair  and  just "  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Legal  or  moral  obligation— Legal  right 
—Support  and  dependency. — In  Michigan  the  recovery  does 
not  depend  upon  any  moral  obligation  of  deceased  to  supply 
the  needs  or  wants  of  the  beneficiaries,  although  in  case  of  the 
death  of  a  young  child,  evidence  which  should  be  received  with 
caution,  might  perhaps  be  given,  when  it  tends  to  establish  a 
moral  obligation  to  demand  assistance  in  the  future  from  such 
child,  had  it  lived.40  This  ruling  has  been  frequently  cited  as 
supporting  the  claim  that  damages  do  not  depend  upon  any 
legal  obligation  of  deceased  to  support  or  aid  the  beneficiary. 


36  Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46 
N.  W.  234. 

37  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
hart,  64  N.  J.  L.  236;  45  Atl.  812. 

830 


38  Van  Brunt  v.  Cincinnati,  J.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  530;  44  N.  W.  321. 

39  See  sees.  652,  662,  herein. 

40  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay- 
field, 37  Mich.  205,  per  Cooley,  C.  J. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PEC1  MA1:\     IN.M   RY.  §  653 

Tn  this  connection  it  is  pertinent  to  state  thai  although  the 
right  to  recover  rests  upon  tho  terms  of  the  death  Loss  stat- 
ute, nevertheless,  thai  enactment  bases  the  damages  upon  the 
pecuniary  loss  sustained.  This  point  also  involves  numerous 
other  factors  which  enter  into  what  proof  is  obligatory  to  recover 
any  damages,  and  what  evidence  may  be  given  to  enhance  the 
damages,  and  the  old  questions  of  nominal  damages  and  what 
beneficiaries  are  entitled  are  again  brought  up,  so  that  the  diffi- 
culty of  deducing  any  positive  rule  is  obvious.  It  certainly  is 
true  that  the  right  of  a  wife  or  minor  child  to  support  rests 
upon  a  legal  liability  as  dues  also  the  light  of  a  father  to  a  son's 
earnings  during  the  hitter's  minority,  and  where  the  loss  of 
such  support  or  earnings  is  out  off  by  premature  death,  it  is  hut 
reasonable  to  assert  that  the  consequent,  pecuniary  loss  to  the 
widow,  child  or  parent  rests  upon  a  pre-existing  legal  obliga- 
tion, and  a  corresponding  legal  right.  But  where  damages  are 
recoverable,  not  for  the  benefit  of  specifically  designated  bene- 
ficiaries, but  in  reality  for  the  estate,  to  be  distributed  as  the 
law  provides,  it  might  be  a  question  how  far  such  statutory 
provision  would  bring  such  indirectly  named  distributees  within 
the  law  of  legal  liability  and  legal  right,  as  affecting  the  meas- 
ure of  recovery,  and  this,  again,  takes  us  back  to  the  question 
elsewhere  herein  considered,  as  to  the  necessity  of  alleging  the 
existence  of  persons  entitled  to  recover.  Irrespective,  however, 
of  any  other  question,  that  of  contribution  to  support  is  material 
and  relevant,  and  the  extent  of  the  loss  may  be  measured  by 
and  based  upon  an  estimate  of  the  customary  contributions  by 
deceased. a  So  it  has  also  been  declared  that  deceased  must 
have  left  some  one  dependent  upon  him  for  support  or  some  one 
who  had  a  reasonable  expectation  of  receiving  some  benefit 
from  him  during  his  lifetime.1-     Again,  where  deceased  was  a 


«  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay- 
field, 37  Mich.  203,  per  Cooley,  C.  J. 

*i  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  of  Can.  v. 
Ives,  144  U.  S.  408;  36  L.  Ed.  485, 
under  How.  Ann.  Mich.  sees.  3:>>'.»1, 
3392,  citing  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bayfield,  37  Midi.  205;  Van  Brunt 
v.  Cincinnati,  J.  &  M.  It.  Co.,  78 
Mich.  530;  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  & 


ant  insisted  that  DO  <>ne  was  left 
dependent  litre,  and  therefore  there 
was  no  right  of  action.      Court  stated 

that  above  was  according  to  deci- 
sions of  Michigan,  but  that  do  ques- 
tion as  to  this  phase  of  the  caae  arcs,-, 
for  the  action  alleged  that  it  was 
brought  for  the  benefit  of  three 
daughters  and  one  son,  whose  names 


M.S.  R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261.     Defend     were  given,   although   the  ooly  evi- 

83] 


§654 


DEATH— -FAIR    AND    JUST    DAMAGES 


woman  fifty-six  years  old,  and  the  amount  of  recovery  was  af- 
fected by  the  fact  that  the  only  evidence  was  that  she  boarded  her 
husband  and  two  minor  children  and  clothed  the  latter,  but  it 
did  not  appear  what  was  spent  for  clothing,13  and  where  deceased 
contributed  to  the  support  of  his  mother  and  invalid  sister,  but 
he  did  not  aid  other  members  of  the  family,  the  recovery  was 
limited  to  those  whom  he  had  assisted.44  So  there  can  be  no 
recovery  by  lineal  or  collateral  relatives  where  there  is  no  de- 
pendency.45 

§  654.  Same  subject  continued.— Again,  the  cost  of  an 
annuity  which  will  furnish  the  support  to  which  the  person  is 
entitled  is  the  measure  of  recovery  for  the  loss  of  support.46 
And  the  present  value  of  deceased's  annual  contributions  to  the 
support  of  his  family,  not  to  exceed  the  highest  amount  con- 
tributed for  one  year,  and  the  present  value  of  the  same  for  two 
years,  and  so  on  for  his  life  expectancy,  should  be  considered, 
and  the  sums  added  together  will  represent  the  present  value  of 
the  amount,47  So  the  parents'  dependency  for  support  may  be 
considered,48  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  the  father's  or  mother's 
dependency  in  the  future  ,49  although  the  fact  that  a  deceased 
adult  son  was  not  the  only  child  upon  whom  the  mother  could 
depend  for  support  may  be  considered.50     But   the  aid  and  as- 


dence  as  to  this  allegation  was 
brought  out  incidentally  and  not 
directly,  and  the  record  failed  to 
show  that  any  exception  was  taken 
on  the  trial  as  to  lack  of  any  evi- 
dence in  this  particular  and  it  was 
therefore  not  before  this  court,  and 
the  legal  presumption  is  there  were 
beneficiaries,  and  the  general  charge 
assumed  that  such  evidence  had  been 
introduced  and  a  requested  charge 
of  defendant  proceeded  on  that  as- 
sumption. Id.  per  Mr.  Justice  La- 
mar. 

43  Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  104  Mich.  582;  2  Det.  L.  N.  33; 
t!2  N.  W.  993. 

44  Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M. 
R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49   N.  W.  361; 

832 


10  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  344;  49  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  367. 

45  Van  Brunt  v.  Cincinnati,  J.  &  M. 
R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  530;  44  N.   W.   321. 

46  Brockway  v.  Patterson,  72  Mich. 
122;  40  N.  W.  192;  1  L.  R.  A.  708. 

47  Balch  v.  Grand  Kapids  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  67  Mich.  394;  11  West.  476;  34 
N.  W.  884. 

48  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261;  10  West.  184; 
33  N.  W.  306.     See  sec.  657,  herein. 

49  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
hart,  64  N.  J.  L.  236;  45  Atl.  812; 
Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros.  Co.,  86 
Wis.  576:  57  N.  W.  598;  WTiltse  v. 
Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46  N.  W.  234. 

50  Innes  v.  Milwaukee,  103  Wis. 
582 ;  79  N.  W.  783. 


Willi    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    INJURY. 


E  655 


sistance  rendered  by  a  wife  to  her  husband  in  his  occupation 
are  not  a  ground  of  recovery  by  the  nexl  of  kin,51  and  a  verdict 
of  substantial  damages  will  be  set  aside  where  il  rests  only  upon 
evidence  of  a  general  character,  where  the  deceased,  an  adult, 
left  a  mother  and  minor  brothers,  and  the  mother  was  able  to 
support  herself,  nor  is  a  legal  right  to  support  necessary.82    So 

where  a  deceased  widow  hud  supported  a  daughter  and  assisted 
a  son  from  time  to  time  with  small  sums  of  money,  the  reason- 
able expectation  of  support  or  other  benefit  constitutes  a  factor.53 
And  an  obligation  of  a  surviving  mother  to  support  minor 
children  is  an  element  of  damages."*1  Again  that  the  widow  or 
family  was  largely  or  wholly  dependent  upon  deceased  for  sup- 
port is  material  and  important, B  and  the  relations  of  deceased 
to  his  lather  and  mother,  their  dependence  upon  him  and  his 
obligation  to  support  them  is  relevant  and  admissible  testi- 
mony/'' 

§  655.  "  Fair  and  just "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary 
benefit. — The  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  or 
of  the  continuance  thereof  is  the  important  consideration,  and 
in  New  Jersey  the  damages  are  limited  thereby,  and  it  may  be 
generally  stated  that  the  basis  thereof  is  age  and  the  factors 
elsewhere  noted.57  Necessarily  the  nature  of  this  reasonable 
expectation  depends  upon  the  character  of  the  relation  sus- 
tained by  those  entitled  as  beneficiaries,  since  elements  show- 
ing a  loss  to  a  parent  would  probably  differ  from  the  factors 
proving  pecuniary  damage  to  a  widow,  and  in  this  connection 
what  we  have  stated  elsewhere  concerning  the  differences  in 


51  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  6:3;  42  Atl.  163. 

ra  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J. 
L.  (5  Vr.)  151,  156. 

88  Tuteur  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  77  Wis.  505;  46  N.  W.  807. 

64  Mulcairns  v.  Janesville,  67  Wis. 
24;  29  N.  W.  365. 

65  Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R. 
Co.,  67  Wis.  46;  30  N.  W.  282.  See 
further  as  to  dependency  and  sup- 
port, Johnson   v.   Chicago   &  X.  W. 

53 


R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  425;  25  N.  W.  223; 
Strong  v.  Stevens  Point,  62  Wis.  255; 
22  X.  W.  125;  Hoppe  v.  Chicago,  M. 
&  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  61  Wis.  350;  21  N. 
W.  227;  Ewen  v.  Chicago  *  X.  W. 
R.  Co.,  38  Wis.  613;  Potter  v.  Chi- 
cago *  N.  W.  K.  Co.,  21  Wis.  372; 
22  Wis.  (115.     See  sec.  ti.">7.  herein. 

■  Bright  v.  Barnetl  a-  K.  Co.,  88 
Wis.  209;  60  N.  W.  418;  26  L.  R.  A. 
524. 

,T  See  sec.  648,  herein. 

833 


§  655 


DEATH       FAIR    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 


the  statutes  as  to  those  entitled  to  recover  is  material.58  But 
the  general  rule  is  that  what  it  is  reasonably  probable  deceased 
would  have  earned,  or  accumulated,  or  contributed  towards 
support,  or  care  of  those  entitled  to  recover,  or  what  the  latter 
would  have  derived  from  the  continuance  of  life  except  for  the 
fatality,  or  any  deprivation  of  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary advantage  cut  off  by  the  premature  death  is  properly 
an  element  of  damages.  The  facts  evidencing  this  loss  must 
however  vary  in  each  particular  case  and  all  the  available,  ad- 
missible, material  and  relevant  circumstances  in  each  case  should 
be  proven,  for  the  extent  of  the  damages  depends  largely  upon 
the  proof.59 


58  See  sees.  642-644,  herein. 

59  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144 
U.  S.  408;  36  L.  Ed.  485,  under  How- 
ell's Ann.  Mich.  Stat,  sees.  3391, 
3392;  Sweetland  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T. 
R.  Co.,  117  Mich.  329;  75  N.  W.  1066; 
43  L.  R.  A.  568;  5  Det.  L.  N.  283; 
Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  R. 
Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  621;  49 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  367;  10  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.  J.  344;  Hurst  v.  Detroit 
City  R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  539;  48  N.  W. 
44;  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261;  33  N.  W.  306; 
10  West.  184;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bayfield,  37  Mich.  205,  where 
the  court  says  :  "  What  the  family 
would  lose  by  the  death  would  be 
what  it  was  accustomed  to  receive  or 
had  reasonable  expectation  of  re- 
ceiving in  his  lifetime."  Graham  v. 
Consolidated  Tract.  Co.,  64  N.  J.  L. 
10;  44  Atl.  964,  holding  that  dam- 
ages must  be  limited  to  compensa- 
tion for  the  loss  of  such  reasonable 
expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit 
(under  act  N.  J.  March  3,  1848;  1 
Gen.  Stat.  p.  1188),  and  the  probabil- 
ities as  to  the  pecuniary  benefits 
which  a  father  would  receive  should 
be  considered.  May  v.  West  Jersey 
&  S.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  90;  40  Atl. 
773;    31   Chicago  L.   N.  35;  58  Alb. 

834 


L.  J.  93;  17  Nat.  Corp.  213;  4  Am. 
Neg.  Rep.  660,  where  Glimmers,  J., 
says,  the  pecuniary  injury  "  '  is 
nothing  more  than  a  deprivation  of 
a  reasonable  expectation  of  a  pecun- 
iary advantage  which  would  have 
resulted  by  a  continuance  of  the  life 
of  deceased,'  "  quoting  Beasley,  Ch. 
J.,  in  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34 
N".  J.  L.  158;  May  v.  West  Jersey 
&  S.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  63;  42  Atl. 
163,  holding  that  the  claimed  injury 
must  be  such  as  would  have  re- 
sulted in  a  pecuniary  benefit  or  the 
deprivation  thereof  in  the  case  of  a 
wife's  death.  Demarest  v.  Little, 
47  N.  J.  L.  ( 18  Vr. )  28,  a  case  of 
loss  of  parent.  See  Decker  v.  Mc- 
Sorley,  111  Wis.  91;  86  N.  W.  554; 
Bauer  v.  Richter,  103  Wis.  412;  79  N. 
W.  404,  a  case  where  an  employee 
was  killed  by  the  fall  of  a  derrick 
erected  by  employees  of  another. 
Rudiger  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  101  Wis.  292;  77  N.  W.  169; 
12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  196. 
This  case  considers  wife's  reasonable 
expectations  from  husband's  earn- 
ings, etc.  See  further  as  to  reason- 
able expectations,  Tuteur  v.  Chi- 
cago &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  505; 
46  N.  W.  897;  Kaspari  v.  Marsh, 
74  Wis.  562;  Annas  v.  Milwaukee  & 


REFERENCE    TO    PEC1   NIAKY     INJURY.     §§656,657 


§  656.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  4k\villi  reference  (<>  the 
pecuniary  injnry  " — Prospect  of  inheritance.    -The  prospect 

of  inheritance  in  so  Ear  as  it  Is  involved  in  the  deceased's  in- 
crease of  property  or  probable  accumulations,  and  the  reasonable 
expectation  of  sharing  therein  is  considered  under  that  heading.1 

§  657.  "Fair  and  just  "  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  Injnry  "—Physical  and  financial  condition,  age, 
number  of  family,  etc.— When  admissible.  In  the  three 
states''1  which  we  have  placed  together,  for  the  reason  thai  the 
statutes  therein  prescribe  the  rule  as  to  damages  in  the  same 
terms,  the  designation  of  beneficiaries  differs,82  so  that  it  is  im- 
portant to  remember  this  fact  in  considering  the  admissibility  of 
evidence  as  to  the  physical  and  financial  condition  of  such 
beneficiaries,  the  age,  sex  and  number  of  family  surviving,  their 
dependency,  etc.  In  Michigan,  dependency,  or  the  existence 
of  some  one  dependent  upon  deceased,  seems  to  be  material.''' 
And  this  dependency  is  the  turning  point  in  relation  to  the  ail- 
mission  or  rejection  of  evidence  of  the  character  under  discussion. 
Thus  the  ages  and  number  of  dependent  children  of  deceased 
may  be  proven  where  plaintiff  sues  as  a  personal  representative 
for  the  benefit  of  those  entitled  to  damages  lor  the  pecuniary 
loss/*1  In  another  case  it  was  in  evidence  that  the  deceased 
wife  had  clothed  and  boarded  two  minor  children.65  Again,  the 
aid  furnished  a  mother  and  invalid  sister  confined  the  pecuniary 
loss  to  them,  although  there  were  other  members  of  the  family."'' 
And  the  minority  of  the  children  and  the  marriage  of  the  daugh- 
ter should,  it  seems,  be  considered  in  an  action  by  the  widow.63 


N.  K.  Co.,  07  Wis.  4G,  48;  30  N.  W. 
282;  Lawson  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  64  Misc.  448;  24  V  \V. 
618;  Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  38  Wis.  613;  Totter  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  22  Wis.  615;  21 
Wis.  372. 

60  Sec  sec.  655,  herein. 

«  Mich.  N.  .1.  and  Wis. 

62  See  sees.  624-044. 

63  See  sees.  852  654,  herein. 

64  Breckenfeldor  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.,  79  Mich.  500;  44  N.  W. 
957. 


'  Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  A-  M.  S. 
R.Co.,  101  Mich.  :><)•..':•_'  Dot.  !..  X.  :'.:'.; 
62  V  W.  !".»:'..  a  case  where  the  dam- 
ages were  held  excessive. 

''''•  Richmond  v.  Chicago  A-  \V.  M. 
R.  Co..  87  Mich.  374;  l'.'  V  W.  361; 
in  Am.  A  Eng.  R.  Cas.867;  L0  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.  .1.  344.  See  Van  Brunt  v. 
Cincinnati,  J.  A  M.  R.  Co..  78  Mich. 
530;    it  V  W.  821. 

•'  Rouse  v.  Detroit  Eleo.  R.  Co. 
(Mich.  1901),  ST  N.  W.  68;  8  Det  L 
X.  577. 

835 


§  657  DEATH       I  AlK     AMi    JUST    DAMAGES 

So  evidence  is  admissible  as  to  the  pecuniary  circumstances  of 
the  parents  of  a  deceased  child.68  And  the  jury  should  be  per- 
mitted the  fullest  insight  as  to  the  family  circumstances  where 
the  head  of  the  family  and  its  support  is  killed,  in  order  that 
they  may  ascertain  the  exact  extent  of  the  pecuniary  loss.69  In 
New  Jersey  the  fact  that  the  father,  who  was  next  of  kin,  might 
become  necessitous  and  dependent,  is  relevant  and  material 
upon  the  question  whether  he  had  suffered  pecuniary  loss  by 
his  son's  death.70  And  where  deceased  left  a  widow,  the  number 
and  ages  of  the  surviving  children  were  noticed  as  factors  by 
the  court  in  determining  whether  or  not  the  damages  awarded 
were  excessive.71  So  the  age  of  a  surviving  mother,  her  ability 
to  support  herself,  and  the  number  and  ages  of  surviving 
brothers  appeared  as  facts  in  another  case  where  the  damages 
were  held  excessive.7-  Again,  in  Wisconsin,  the  age  of  a  sur- 
viving mother  suing  for  her  son's  death,  and  also  the  number 
and  ages  of  her  other  surviving  sons  were  in  evidence  and 
considered  upon  the  question  of  the  reduction  of  the  amount  of 
the  verdict.73  And  the  husband's  circumstances  and  financial 
condition  may  be  shown  in  an  action  for  the  negligent  killing 
of  his  wife  in  order  to  enable  the  jury  to  assess  fair  and  just 
damages.74  So  proof  of  a  mother's  pecuniary  circumstances  may 
properly  be  given  in  an  action  for  her  son's  death  in  order  to 
show  her  possible  dependency  upon  such  child  after  his  minor- 
ity.75 And  a  widow  suing  for  the  killing  of  her  husband  may 
show  the  number  and  ages  of  her  dependent  children,75  and 


68  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261;  10  West,  184; 
33  N.  W.  306. 

69  Staal  v.  Grand  Rap.  &  I.  R.  Co., 
57  Mich.  239;  23  N.  W.  795.  See 
next  section  herein. 

70  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
hart,  64  N.  J.  L.  236;  45  Atl.  812. 

71  Williams  v.  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co. 
(N.  J.),  37  Atl.  1107;  3  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  569.  The  question  was  not  dis- 
cussed, however,  it  being  evidently 
conceded  that  the  evidence  was  prop- 
erly before  the  court, 

72  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J. 
L.  151. 

836 


73  Innes  v.  Milwaukee,  103  Wis. 
582;  79  N.  W.  783.  Examine  Decker 
v.  McSorley,  111  Wis.  91;  86  N,  W. 
554. 

74  Thoresen  v.  La  Crosse  City  R. 
Co.,  94  Wis.  129;  68  N.  W.  548;  6 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  101. 

75  Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros., 
86  Wis.  576;  57  N.  W.  298;  Potter  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  21  Wis. 
372. 

76  Abbott  v.  McCadden,  81  Wis. 
563;  51  N.  W.  1979;  Mulcairns  v. 
Janesville,  67  Wis.  24;  29  N.  W. 
565. 


WITH     I.I.I  I.Ki:\«'l      I"    PEC1   NlAfcY    lN.M'kY.  §   657 

that  her  only  means  of  support  has  been  cut  off  by  such  death.11 
So  the  fact  that  the  children  have  reached  majority  does  oot 
preclude  their  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit.' 
Again,  a  mother  who  hud  been  given  the  custody  of  the  intes- 
tate child  under  a  decree  of  divorce  may  prove  such  fact  and 
also  her  pecuniary  necessities.19  And  special  pecuniary  loss  to 
decedent's  minor  children  may  be  shown  by  evidence  that  some 
of  them  are  in  poor  health."  So  the  parents'  ages  and  poverty, 
the  father's  poor  health,  the  nature  of  his  physical  afflictions 
and  the  character  of  his  and  the  mother's  occupation,  as  evi- 
dencing their  necessitous  condition,  are  proper  factors  for  con- 
sideration as  well  also  as  the  fact  that  a  large  family  survived. 
In  addition  to  the  physical  and  financial  condition  of  the  bene- 
ficiaries, we  have  seen  that  the  health,  industry,  habits,  earning 
capacity88  and  probable  accumulations  of  deceased ffl  are  factors, 
and  these  necessarily  include  a  consideration  of  his  or  her  finan- 
cial condition,  either  as  affecting  dependency  upon  deceased 
for  support,  or  the  question  of  reasonable  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary advantage/1 


77  Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  Co., 
G7  Wis.  46;  30  N.  W.  282. 

78  Tuteur  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  77  Wis.  505;  40  \.  W.  897. 

'■■•<  Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46 
N.  W.  2:54. 

80  McKeigue  v.  Janesville,  68  Wis. 
50;  31  X.  W.  298,  a  case  where  de- 
ceased was  the  mother. 

81  Johnson  v.  Chicago  A  X.  W.  R. 
Co.,  64  Mis.  42.",;  25  X.  W.  223;  Strong 
v.  Stevens  Point,  02  Wis.  255;  22  N. 
W.  425;  Hoppe  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.,  01  Wis.  359:  21  X.  W.  227: 
Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  R.  Co..  38 
Wis.  618,  all  cases  as  to  excessive 
damages.  Potter  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  21  Wis.  472:  22  Wis.  015. 
In  this  last  case  the  indigent  condi- 
tion of  the  parents  was  declared  nec- 
essary to  he  shown,  otherwise  the 
damages  would  he  limited.  This  de- 
cision, in  so  far  as  it  is  relied  upon 
as  an  authority  upon  the  point  relat- 


ing to  evidence  of  poverty  heiug  ad- 
missible, is  criticised  as  a  "  dictum" 
and  the  Ewen  case  is  explained  as 
within  that  class  of  decisions  "in 
which  perhaps  such  evidence  must 
he  received,  because  it  tends  to  estab- 
lish a  moral  obligation  to  demand 
assistance  in  the  future  from  one  at 
the  time  incapable  of  giving  it.  as 
where  the  person  killed  was  a  very 
young  child  ami  at  present  contrib- 
uting nothing  in  aid  of  anyone." 
Per  Cooley,  .1..  in  Chicago  &  \.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield,  :'.7  Mich.  205. 

82  See  sec.  648,  herein. 

83  See  sec.  659,  herein. 

84  See  also  as  to  financial  condit  ion 
of  deceased.  Williams  v.  Camden  & 
A.  R.  Co.  (X.  J.),  37  Atl.  1107;  3 
Am.  Neg.  Rep.  569.  The  facts,  how- 
ever, are  only  noticed  as  being  proven 
and  there  is  no  discussion  in  this 
case.  Tuteui  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  EL 
Co.,  77  Wis.  505;   40  X.  W. 

837 


§§  658,659  FAIR    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 

§  658.  «  Fair  and  just "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Financial  condition — When  inadmis- 
sible.— Notwithstanding  the  decisions  under  the  preceding  sec- 
tion, it  is  evidently  the  law  in  Michigan  that  the  damages  recov- 
erable have  no  regard  to  the  needs  of  the  persons  entitled  to 
recover  under  the  statute,  and  that  the  poverty  of  the  family 
can  have  no  tendency  to  prove  the  extent  of  their  reason- 
able expectations  of  receiving  pecuniary  benefit ;  that  is, 
that  the  amount  of  the  loss  is  not  and  cannot  be  measured  by 
the  wealth  or  poverty  of  the  beneficiary.8'  This  decision  is 
followed  in  a  later  case  which  holds  that  the  extent  of  the 
family's  property,  and  of  the  incumbrance  thereon,  cannot  be 
proven  where  a  recovery  is  sought  for  the  killing  of  plaintiff's 
husband.86 

§659.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Probable  accumulations. — The  fact  that 
the  deceased  husband  and  father  had  been  prosperous  in  busi- 
ness, and  had  accumulated  property,  has  been  considered  in 
determining  whether  or  not  the  damages  awarded  were  exces- 
sive.8' But  where  deceased  had  already  accumulated  a  com- 
petence, his  physical  and  mental  health  and  vigor,  as  affecting 
his  ability  to  safely  invest  and  keep  the  same  during  his  life 
expectancy  and  the  probability  of  such  property  remaining  in- 
tact at  his  death  for  his  children's  benefit  should  be  considered 
by  the  jury.**  Again,  the  damages  may  include  compensation  to 
a  widow  for  the  share  which  she  might  reasonably  have  expected 
to  receive  from  her  husband's  increased  property,  had  he  not 
been  killed.89     So  adult  children's  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 


85  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay- 
field, 37  Mich.  205. 

80  Hunn  v.  Michigan  C.  K.  Co.,  78 
Mich.  513;  44  N.  W.  502;  7  L.  R.  A. 
500;  41  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  X.  S. 
452.     See  sec.  G73,  herein. 

5:7  Williams    v.  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co. 


88  Demarest  v.  Little,  47  N.  J.  L. 
(18  Vr.)  28. 

89  Bauer  v.  Richter,  103  Wis.  412; 
79  N.  W.  404.  Examine  Kaspari  v. 
Marsh,  74  Wis.  5(53;  43  N.  W.  368; 
Annas  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  Co.,  <>7 
Wis.  40,  50;  30  N.  W.  282;  Lawson  v. 


(N.  J.),  37  Atl.  1107;  3Am.Neg.  Rep.    Chicago,  St.  P.  M.   &  <>.  R.  Co.,  G4 


569.  Xo  discussion  was  had,  how- 
upou  the  point,  the  facts  heiug 
merely  stated. 

838 


Wis.   448;  24   X.    W.  618;  Castellov 
Landwehr,  28  Wis.  522. 


REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    in.ii  l:V.     §§  660,  661 

cuniary  benefit  from  deceased's  probable  increase  of  property  or 
accumulations  constitute  a  factor." 

§  660.  "  Fair  and  just  "  damages  "with  reference  to  tin' 
pecuniary  injury  "—Expenses  of  funeral,  sickness,  etc.  Fu- 
neral expenses  arc  not  recoverable  as  a  pari  of  the  damages  in 
New  Jersey,91  and  in  Wisconsin  where  the  complainl  alleged  the 

payment  by  intestate's  children  and  heirs  at  law,  of  expensi 
the  funeral  and  of  sickness,  it  was  held  fatally  defective  beean-e 

it  did  not  show  that  any  of  the  children  were  minors,  as  under 
the  death  loss  statute  of  thai  state,  the  damages  are  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  infant  children  who  have  sustained  pecuniary  1 
It  may,  therefore,  be  reasonably  inferred  that  if  it  had  been 
averred  that  the  minor  children  had  been  pecuniarily  dam 
by  such  payment  of  expenses,  the  complaint  would  have  been 
sufficient.93 

§  661.  "  Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Life  expectancy  and  mortuary  tables. — 

Life  expectancy  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  although  stand- 
ard or  statutory  annuity,  mortality  or  mortuary  tables  are  ad- 
missible in  evidence,  they  are  not  conclusive,  for  they  are  subject 
to  variation  by  proof  as  to  age,  health,  habits,  etc.,  of  the  par- 
ties and  are  to  be  considered  in  the  Light  of  such  evidence."      This 


90  Tuteur  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  77  Wis.  505;  40  N.  W.  897. 

al  Consolidated  Tract.  Co.  v.  Hone, 
00  N".  .J.  L.  244;  38  Ail.  759;  9  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  s.  249,  rev'g  59 
N.  J.  L.  275;  35  All.  899;  5  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  679,  which  hold 
that  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  child. 
funeral  expenses  were  part  "f  the 
pecuniary  damages  when  such  ex- 
penses hail  been  paid  l»y  the  father 
and  could  he  recovered  by  him  as 
administrator.  The  reversing  case 
cites  Dalton  v.  Southeastern  K.  Co., 
4C.  B.  N.  S.  296;  Blake  v.  Midland 
R.  Co.,  18  Q.  B.  93.  Examine  Telfer 
v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  30  X.  J.  I..  188, 
209,  where  the  court  intimates 
that    the    expenses    growing    out    of 


child's    injuries    are   recoverable,  al- 
though  the   point   is  nol    discussed. 

See   Sullivan  v.   Horner.  41    V  .1.   Eq. 

299;  7  Atl.   ill,  cited  in  Rowe  v.  Ru- 
per,  23   lnd.   App.  27;  54   V   K.  77". 

as  to  funeral  expenses  of  minor  child 

not  being  a  charge  against  hi>  esl  ate, 
where  he  leases  a  father  able  to  pay 

them. 

9-  Topping  v.  St.  Lawrence.  86  Wis. 
526;  57  \".  W.  365. 

'' ;  Examine  I  looper  \ .  Lake  shore 
&  M.S.  R.  Co..  or.  Mich.  261;  33  N  W. 
306;   m  West.  L84. 

«  Damm  v.  Damm,  109  Mich.  619; 
67  N.  W.  984;  3  Dot  1.  tf.810.  Mor- 
iu:u\  tables  in  How.  Mich.  Statutes, 
sec.  4245,  are  admissible,  Sunn  v. 
Michigan  C.  R  Co.,  7s  Mich.  513;  44 


§661 


DEATH — FAIR   AND   JUST   DAMAGES 


rule,  however,  as  to  conclusiveness  of  such  tables  is  subject  to  this 
qualification,  viz,  that  they  are  controlling,  when  in  evidence  in 
the  absence  of  proof  varying  or  tending  to  vary  their  effect.95 
But  they  are  not  admissible  to  show  the  life  expectancy  of  a  child 
of  an  age  less  than  any  age  computed  in  such  tables.96  It  does 
not,  however,  constitute  error  as  to  defendant,  in  an  action  for 
a  child's  death  to  admit  in  evidence  English  tables  showing  the 
life  expectancy  to  .be  less  than  that  shown  by  American  expe- 
rience under  the  statute.97  In  New  Jersey  the  rule  is  substan- 
tially the  same  as  that  stated  at  the  beginning  of  this  section, 
since  the  standard  mortality  table  may  be  used  there  to  estab- 
lish probable  life  expectancy  without  proof  of  its  repute.  The 
rule  of  computation  furnished  thereby  is  not,  however,  an  abso- 
lute one,  for  the  conditions  of  each  case  must  affect  the  conclu- 
sion. In  determining  the  admissibility  of  such  table,  the  court 
should  be  satisfied  as  to  its  authenticity  by  proof  as  where  wit- 
nesses familiar  with  it  and  its  use  testify  thereto.98  In  deter- 
mining the  pecuniary  loss  to  a  mother  and  sister  who  were 
dependent  beneficiaries  and  to  whose  support  deceased  had  con- 
tributed, the  computation  as  to  them  should  be  confined  to  the 
period  between  the  mother's  life  expectancy  and  that  of  de- 
ceased.99 So  in  case  of  a  husband's  death,  the  annuity  given  as 
a  compensation  for  her  support  should  be  based  upon  his  probable 
duration  of  life.100  And  the  probable  duration  of  a  parent's  life 
affects  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  to  sur- 
viving children.1  It  is  unnecessary,  however,  to  continue  these 
illustrations  as  the  question  of  life  expectancy  of  deceased  or  of 


N.  W.  502;  7  L.  R.  A.  500;  41  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  452.  See  also  Mc- 
Keigue  v.  Janes ville,  68  Wis.  50;  31 
N.  W.  298;  Mulcairns  v.  Jauesville, 
67  Wis.  24;  29  N.  W.  565. 

95  Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  104  Mich.  582;  62  N.  W.  993;  2 
Det.  L.  N.  33. 

96  Rajnowski  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  &  A. 
R.  Co.,  74  Mich.  15;  41  N.  W.  847. 
Child  in  this  case  was  5  years  old; 
no  age  under  10  years  was  given  in 
tables. 

97  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 

840 


Co.,  66  Mich.  261;  33  N.  W.  306;  10 
West.  184. 

9»  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams, 
61  N.  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  646;  40  Atl.  634; 
11  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S.  600. 

99  Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M. 
R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  361; 
10  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  344;  49  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  367. 

100  Rudiger  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  101  Wis.  292;  77  N.  W. 
169;  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N.  S. 
196. 

1  Tuteur  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  77  Wis.  505;  46  N.  W.  897. 


REFERENCE    TO    I'l  •  r.\l.\l:V    tNJTJEY.      §§  662,  663 

survivors  is  involved  in  nearly  every  case  where  damages  are 
sought  for  a  negligent  or  wrongful  killing. 

§  662.  "  Fair  and  just"  damages  kk  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Nomina]  damages. — In  Michigan  nominal 
damages  cannot  be  recovered  for  a  death  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  some  pecuniary  injury  or  loss,-'  and  in  New  Jer- 
sey the  rule  has  been,  as  we  have  shown  elsewhere,  very  posi- 
tively affirmed  and  constantly  followed,  that  nothing  hut  the 
pecuniary  loss  can  be  recovered,  although  there  does  not  Beem 
to  exist  as  strict  a  requirement  with  regard  to  pleading  such 
injury  as  exists  in  some  other  states.1  So  in  that  state  a  ver- 
dict for  the  benefit  of  the  next  of  kin  of  a  decease!  1  wife  and 
mother  will  be  deemed  excessive,  where  the  pecuniary  loss  to 
the  sons  as  such  next  of  kin  is  only  nominal.4  In  Wisconsin, 
however,  the  facts  that  deceased  was  a  widow  and  had  small 
children  dependent  upon  her  sufficiently  show  a  pecuniary 
injury  to  them.3  But  it  is  also  decided  that  there  must  be  some 
evidence  showing  pecuniary  loss  to  justify  an  award  of  nominal 
damages.6 

§  663,  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Death  of  husband — Husband  and  father. 

— Outside  of  the  general  factors  which  enter  into  the  considera- 
tion of  the  pecuniary  loss  and  the  measure  of  damages,  those 
elements  which  should  he  placed  before  the  jury  as  a  basis  of 
their  award  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  husband  or  of  a  husband 
and  father  have  been  stated  herein  under  the  various  headings 
to  which  they  more  properly  belong.  They  are  involved  in  the 
consideration  of  dependency  upon  him  as  the  sole  support  of 


2  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co.,  84 
Midi.  539;  48  N.  \V.  44,  citing  ami 
quoting  from  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  K.  Co.,  66  Mich.  261,  271;  83 
N.  W.  =506;  10  West.  L84.  See  also 
Charlebois  v.  Gogebie  &  M.  K.  Co., 
91  Mich.  59:  51  X.  W.  812;  Van 
Brunt  v.  Cincinnati,  .1.  it  M.  K.  Co., 
78  Mich.  :>:;<>;  44  N.  W.  321.  See  also 
as  to  wife's  services,  Nelson  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  K.  Co.,  104  Mich.  582; 


62  X.  W.  993;  2  Det.  L.  \.  33.  See 
sec.  674.  herein,  as  to  collateral  kin- 
dred. 

3  Sec  Bees.  645,  646,  662,  herein. 

4  May  v.  West  Jersey  a  s.  k.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  63;  42  All.  L63. 

McKeigue  v.   Janesville,  68  Wis. 
50;  ■".  \.  W.  298. 

■  Regan  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  EL 
Co.,  51  Wis.  599;  8  N.   W.  292. 

841 


§  663 


DEATH  -FATR    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 


the  family  and  the  family  circumstances;7  the  measure  of  com- 
pensation to  children  for  a  parent's  death,  their  loss  of  care, 
education  and  training ; 8  the  reasonable,  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary benefit,  probable  accumulations  and  prospective  losses ; 9 
the  legal  and  moral  obligation  to  support  and  the  beneficiaries' 
right  thereto  ; 10  solatium,  and  various  other  factors.11  Again  the 
terms  of  the  statutes  providing  for  fair  and  just  compensation 
with  reference  to  the  pecuniary  injury  must  be  construed  in  the 
light  of  their  provisions  as  to  the  beneficiaries  in  those  states 
which  come  within  this  specific  wording  as  to  the  measure  of 
damages.  Thus  in  Wisconsin  the  surviving  widow's  right  is 
exclusive,  and  her  damages  do  not  include  the  money  value  of 
his  life  to  the  child ren.1'-'  But  it  is  also  decided  that  the  measure 
of  damages  may  be  an  allowance  based  upon  the  pecuniary  loss 
of  the  widow  and  children  within  the  five  thousand  dollar  limi- 
tation, and  although  it  should  not  be  such  a  sum  as  will  produce 
at  six  per  cent  interest  deceased's  yearly  earnings,  yet  there  should 
be  awarded  the  probable  value  of  an  annuity  charge  to  produce 
such  income  for  the  term  of  expectancy,13  or  as  the  rule  has  also 
been  stated,  the  widow  is  not  entitled  to  an  amount  covering  her 
husband's  gross  earnings  during  his  life  expectancy,  but  she  may 
recover  within  the  statutory  limitation  of  five  thousand  dollars, 
a  sum  which  will  yield  an  amount  which  will  support  her  dur^ 
ing  a  period  covering  what  would  have  been  deceased's  expecta- 
tion of  life,  together  with  such  sum  as  she  might  reasonably 


have  expected  to  receive  from  his  earnings.14 


Again, 


the  value 


7  Staal  v.  Graud  Rap.  &  I.  R.  Co., 
57  Mich.  239;  23  N.  W.  795;  Annas 
v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  Co.,  67  Wis. 
46;  30  N.  W.  282;  Mulcairns  v.  Janes- 
ville,  67  Wis.  24;  29  N.  W.  565.  See 
Rouse  v.  Detroit  Elec.  R.  Co.  (Mich. 
1901),  87  N.  W.  68;  8  Det.  L.  News, 
577.     See  sees.  653,  654,  657,  herein. 

8  See  sec.  666,  herein. 

9  See  sec.  655,  herein. 

10  See  sec.  653,  herein. 

11  See  sees.  648,  653,  herein. 

12  Lierman  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  Co.  (Wis.),  52  N.  W.  91;  Abbott 
v.  McCadden,  81  Wis.  563;  51  X.  W. 
1079;  Gores  v.  Graff,  77  Wis.  174;  46 

842 


N.  W.  48;  Schmidt  v.  Deegan,  69 
Wis.  300;  34  N.  W.  83.  See  Topping 
v.  St.  Lawrence,  86  Wis.  526;  57 
N.  W.  365.  As  to  beneficiaries  in 
Michigan  and  New  Jersey,  see  sees. 
642-644,  herein.  As  to  statutes  that 
widow's  second  husband  cannot  con- 
tinue her  action  as  administrator  of 
her  estate  and  that  of  her  former 
husband,  see  Schmidt  v.  Menasha 
Wooden  Ware  Co.,  99  Wis.  300;  74 
N.  W.  797. 

13  Nickerson  v.   Bigelow  (U.  S.  D. 
C.  E.  D.  Wis. ),  62  Fed.  900. 

14  Rudiger  v.   Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  & 
O.  R.  Co.,   101  Wis.  292;  77  N.   W. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIAR!     INJURY. 


I 


of  the  widow's  support  and  protection  does  not  constitute  the 

limitation  of  her  damages,  but  the  share  in  her  husband's  in- 
creased property  had  he  lived,  and  which  she  had  a  reasonable 
expectation  of  receiving  may  be  included.13 

§  664.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Death  of  wife In  Michigan  tin   value  of 

the  wife's  services  to  the  husband  must  be  proven  in  an  action  for 
her  killing,16  and   where  defendant's  malpractice  results   in  her 

death,  this  does  not  prevent  an  action  for  the  loss  to  tin-  hus- 
band of  her  services  between  the  injury  and  death,  although  the 
damages  are  limited  to  such  period  of  time.17  In  New  Jersey 
the  husband's  damages  are  limited  to  such  as  can  be  compen- 
sated for  in  money,  or  by  a  pecuniary  standard.1"  And  the  wife's 
services  in  and  about  the  ordinary  household  duties,  or  rendered 
him  by  way  of  assistance  and  aid  in  his  occupation,  belong  ex- 
clusively to  him.  The  continuance  of  stub  services  during  bis 
life  does  not  afford  a  basis  of  recovery  to  her  next  of  kin,  for 
they  do  not  constitute  a  pecuniary  benefit  to  them  within  the 
statute.  Nor  can  the  question  whether  her  services  after  her 
husband's  death  constitute  such  a  benefit  to  said  next  of  kin 
be  considered  because  it  is  too  remote.19  Nor  does  the  statutory 
remedy  extend  to  injuries  suffered  by  the  husband  for  the  im- 
mediate killing  of  his  wife.'*  Nor  is  he  entitled  to  any  damages 
for  his  mental  distress  or  anguish.21  Fn  considering  the  husband's 
damages  for  the  death  of  bis  wife,  the  statutory  provisions  of 
these  three  states  should  not  be  overlooked,-'  especially  so,  since 


1G9;  12  Am.  A  Eng.  R.  Cas.  N".  S. 
196. 

«  Bauer  v.  Richter,  103  Wis.  412; 
7'.t  N.  W.  -tot.  See  further  as  to 
widow's  damages,  Caspari  v.  Marsh, 
74  Wis.  568;  43  N.  W.  368;  Lawson 
v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  M.  O.  R.  Co., 
04  Wis.  44S:  24  N.  W.  618;  Castello 
v.  Landwehr,  28  Wis.  522;  Totter  v. 
Chicago  A-  X.  W.  R.  Co.,  lit  Wis.  872. 

'"  Nelson  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  104  Mich.  582;  62  X.  W.  993;  2 
Det.  L.  N.  33. 

17  Hyatt  v.  Adams,  10  Mich.  180. 


inTelfer  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  30  V 
J.  L.  188.     See  sees.  645,  646,  herein. 

'•'May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
02  N.  .1.  L.  0:!;  42  All.  L63. 

-(.rosso  v.  Delaware,  I.  &  W  R, 
Co.,  50  X.  .7.  L.  :il7:  l:i  Ad.  238;  11 
Cent.  674,  under  Art.  V  .1.  March  ■'». 
L848I  Rev.  294). 

-1  See  si  0.  651 ,  herein,  as  to  condi- 
tion of  surviving  wife,  consequent 
on  child's  death  and  husband's  loss. 
See  sec.  « *« T : » .  herein. 

-'-'See  sees.  642-644,  herein. 

843 


8  665  DEATH—  FATE    AND   JUST   DAMAGES 

in  Wisconsin,  he  is  expressly  named  as  entitled  to  recover  in  the 
first  instance,  and  in  this  state  the  deceased's  mental  qualities, 
earning  capacity,  social  standing,  ability,  services  and  general 
superiority  as  a  wife  and  mother,  may  be  considered.23 

§  665.  " F&ir  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Death  of  parent.— In  case  of  the  negligent 
or  wrongful  killing  of  a  parent,  the  fair  and  just  damages  under 
the  above  statutory  provision  cannot  include  elements  of  which 
there  is  no  evidence  showing  special  pecuniary  loss  nor  damages 
based  upon  mere  inference  of  such  loss,  nor  for  injuries  based 
upon  duties  which  a  parent  is  supposed  to  render  his  children 
and  which  are  in  their  very  nature  incapable  of  measurement  by 
any  pecuniary  standard.24     Inasmuch,  however,  as  minor  chil- 
dren are  entitled  to  support,  the  damages  should  be  an  annuity 
which  would  furnish  the  same.'25     In   New  Jersey  in  an  action 
for  the  benefit  of  two  sons  who  were  the  next  of  kin  of  the  de- 
ceased wife  and  mother,  the  facts  were  considered  that  one  was 
a  minor,  seventeen  years  of  age  and  the  other  married,  that  the 
damages  to  them  were  merely  nominal,  and  although  she  had 
rendered  services  of  benefit  to  her  husband,  yet  the  question 
whether  such  services  could  benefit  said  next  of  kin,  after  her 
husband's   death,  will  be  too  remote  to  be  considered.     But  it 
may  be  shown  that  her  advice  and  counsel  would  relate  to  the 
pecuniary  affairs  of  the  next  of  kin  and  would  probably  result 
in  a  pecuniary  benefit  to  them,  the  deprivation  of  which  would 
constitute  a  pecuniary  loss.26     The  above  case  is  important  in 
that  it  involves  not  only  the  question  of  advice  and  counsel  of 
a  parent,  but  also  the  factors  were  in  evidence,  that  deceased 
was  a  wife  and  mother  and  had  assisted  her  husband  in  the  house- 
hold and  in  his  occupation,  and  the  children  were  an  adult  and  a 


23  Whiton  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  2  Biss.  (U.  S.  C.  C.  Wis.)  282; 
13  Wall.  (U.  S.)270. 

2*  Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  Mich.  518;  69  N.  W.  1114; 
3Det.  L.  N.  775;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep. 
267,  rev'g  new  trial  granted  iu  104 
Mich.  606;  62  N.  W.  1032;  2  Det.  L. 
N.  34,  per  Montgomery,  J. 

844 


25  Brockway  v.  Patterson,  72  Mich. 
122.  See  Nickerson  v.  Bigelow  (U. 
S.  D.  C.  E.  D.  Wis. ),  62  Fed.  900. 

20  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R.  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  63;  42  Atl.  163.  $5,000  was 
held  excessive  in  this  case.  See  also 
Demarest  v.  Little,  47  N.  J.  L.  (18 
Vr.)28. 


WITH     REFERENCE    T»  >    PECUNIARY    IN. II   KV 


minor,  so  that  the  age  and  situation  of  the  parties  were  evidently 
relevant.  The  case  is  also  noteworthy  by  reason  of  the  decisions 
noted  elsewhere    herein,  as  to  nurture,  training  and  education 

being  a  pecuniary  loss.-'  I i u t  in  view  of  the  decisions  in  thai 
state  which  so  strictly  construe  the  meaning  of  pecuniary  I 
it  is  evident  that  the  mlc  of  compensation  will  noi  be  extended 
in  this  class  of  cases  and  that  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pe- 
cuniary benefit  will  be  limited  thereby.23  In  Wisconsin,  as  we 
have  stated  elsewhere,  the  right  of  the  children  to  recover  must 
depend  upon  the  existence  of  a  surviving  parent,  since  the  par- 
ties entitled  in  the  first  instance  are  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  and  in  the  absence  of  such  survivor  then  the  children  may 
recover  through  the  personal  representative.''  And  the  children 
must  be  minors  since  the  pecuniary  loss  must  be  sustained  by 
them,  the  infant  children  being  the  only  proper  beneficiaries,81 
although  it  seems  to  be  also  true  that  children  who  are  all  of 
the  age  may  recover  damages  upon  the  basis  of  a  reasonable  ex- 
pectation of  pecuniary  benefit  from  a  mother's  increased  property 
or  of  such  expectation  by  way  of  support  or  otherwise.38  The 
effect,  therefore,  of  this  last  mentioned  decision  is  that  the  dam 
ages  are  not  confined  to  the  surviving  children's  minority.  But 
it  may,  however,  be  reasonably  argued  that  the  later  decision 
in  point  of  time  overrules  such  a  qualification  and  does  limit 
the  recovery  to  minors,  that  is,  if  the  decisions  are  not  in  har- 
mony. But,  however  this  may  be,  the  children's  right  of  recov- 
ery for  the  parent's  death  must  rest  largely  upon  the  surviving 
parent's  right  of  recovery  and  the  measure  of  compensation  to 
such  parent.83  In  the  case  of  a  mother's  death,  the  children's 
health  constitutes  an  important  element  of  damages.'1     There  are 


27  See  sec.  600,  herein. 

28  See  sees.  645,  646,  667-672,  here- 
in. 

29  Sec  I  Vina  rest  v.  Little,  47  X.  J.  L. 
( 18  Vr. )  28.  Sec  sees.  655,  659,  herein. 

»See  Bubbard  v.  Chicago*  X.  W. 
R.  Co.  (Wis.),  80  X.  W.  454.  See 
cases  in  next  note. 

81  Topping  v.  St.  Lawrence,  86  Wis. 
52G;  57  X.  W.  865,  a  case  of  death 
caused  by  want  of  repair  of  a  high- 
way.    Lierman  v.  Chicago,  If.  &  St. 


P.  K.  Co.  (Wis.).  52  X.  W.  01:  Ab- 
bott v.  McCadden,  81  Wis.  563;  51 
X.  W.  1079;  Cures  v.  Graff,  77  Wis. 
174;  46  X.  W.  48;  Schmidt  v.  Deegan, 
69  Wis.  300;  34  N.  W.  83.  S< 
663,  herein. 

82  Tuteur  v.  Chicago   A    S.  W.    H. 
c...  77  Wis.  505;   W  V  W   -'.'7. 

88  See  Bees.  663,  68 1.  herein. 
BfcKeigue  v.  Janesville,  68  Wis. 
50;  31  N.  W.  298.    See  also  get 

herein. 

845 


§§666,667  FATE    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 

other  factors  such  as  age,  etc.,  of  deceased,  legal  and  moral  obli- 
gation and  dependency,  income  of  property  or  probable  accumu- 
lations, etc.,  which  have  been  fully  considered  under  appropriate 
headings  herein,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred. 

§666.  "Fair  and  just "  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Training,  etc.,  of  children.— The  jury 
may  not,  in  Michigan,  in  an  action  for  a  parent's  death,  con- 
sider the  nurture,  instruction,  physical,  moral  and  intellectual 
training  which  children  would  have  received  from  their  father 
had  he  lived  during  their  minority,  and  an  instruction  to  this 
effect  will  be  erroneous.  But  notwithstanding  this  express  rul- 
ing the  court  which  asserted  the  rule  declared,  evidently  by  way 
of  qualification,  that  there  was  no  evidence  on  this  matter ;  that 
it  was  not  claimed  that  deceased  was  in  any  sense  a  tutor  to  his 
children.  "  The  most  that  can  be  inferred  is  that  he  rendered 
to  them  occasional  assistance  such  as  a  parent  is  supposed  to 
render  his  children,  but  which  in  its  very  nature  is  as  incapable 
of  measurement  by  a  pecuniary  standard  as  is  the  loss  of  love, 
affection  and  sympathy."  s5  In  Wisconsin,  however,  the  fact  that 
young  children  were  dependent  upon  the  deceased  widow  for 
support,  nurture  and  education,  is  an  averment  showing  pecu- 
niary loss  to  such  children.36 

§  667.  "  Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Death  of  children.— In  case  of  the  negli- 
gent or  wrongful  killing  of  a  minor  child  under  the  above  statu- 
tory provision,  there  are  two  principal  factors  :  first  the  right  of 
the"  father  to  the  services  and  earnings  of  such  child,  and  the 
right  of  support  to  which  the  latter  is  entitled.37     After  a  child, 


as  Walker  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Mich.  518;  69  N.  W.  1114;  3 
Det.  L.  N.  775;  1  Am.  Neg.  Rep.  267, 
per  Montgomery,  J.,  rev'g  judgment 
on  new  trial  granted  in  104  Mich. 
666;  2  Det.  L.  N.  34;  62  N.  W.  1032, 
and  citing  on  last  point  Railroad  Co. 
v.  Austin,  69  111.  426;  State  v.  Bait. 
&  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  106. 

36  McKeigue  v.  Janesville,  68  Wis. 
50;  31  N.  W.  298.  See  Castello  v. 
846 


Landwehr,  28  Wis.  522.  And  see 
also  sees.  665,  666,  herein,  as  to  death 
of  parent,  including  advice  and  coun- 
sel of  parent  as  an  element  of  dam- 
ages. 

37  Prima  facie  a  father  is  entitled 
to  a  minor  child's  earnings.  Reeder 
v.  Moore,  95  Mich.  594;  55  N.  W. 
436.  When  mother  is  obligated  to 
support  infant,  see  Ailing  v.  Ailing 
(N.  J.  Ch.),  27  Atl.  685.     As  to  cus- 


WITH    REFEREN<   I.   TO    PECUNIAR?    LNJ1   BY. 


however,  lias  reached  majority,  other  and  different  elements  af 
fecting  the  measure  of  recovery  enter  into  the  question  of  the  rel- 
ative rights  and  obligations  of  parenl  and  child,  as  will  hereinafter 
appear.  In  New  Jersey  the  father  cannot  maintain  the  action,* 
but  only  the  deceased  son's  personal  representative."  Irrespec- 
tive, however,  of  the  question  whether  or  nol  the  action  must  be 
brought  by  the  personal  representative,  the  measure  of  damages 
rests  upon  the  right  to  the  infant's  earnings  and  services  during 
minority,  and  the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit 
therefrom,  having  in  view  the  right  of  the  minor  to  support,  edu- 
cation and  maintenance  until  majority.  The  father's  liability 
therefor,  and  the  probable  value  of  such  support  should  be  esti- 
mated and  deducted."' 

§668.  Same  subject  continued.— In  New  Jersey,  the  father 
being  entitled  to  his  children's  services  until  they  become  twenty- 
one  years  old,  he  can  recover  only  what  those  services  might  rea- 
sonably have  been  expected  to  be  worth,  subject  to  the  burdens 


tody  and  control  of  child,  see  Griffin 
v.  Gascoigne  (X.  J.  Ch.  1900),  47  Atl. 
25;  Lemmin  v.  Lorfeld,  107  Wis.  264; 
83  N.  W.  350;  Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77 
Wis.  152 ;  46  N.  W.  234.  As  to  eman- 
cipation, evidence  thereof  and  earn- 
ings, see  Monaghan  v.  School  Dist. 
No.  1,  38  Wis.  100;  Wambold  v. 
Vick,  50  Wis.  456. 

«8  Under  1  X.  J.  Gen.  Stat.  p.  1188. 

89Fitzhenry  v.  Consolidated  Tract. 
Co.  (X.  J.),  42  Atl.  416.  It  was  also 
held  in  this  case  that  when  father  as 
such  had  brought  the  action  instead 
of  the  personal  representative,  the 
summons  and  declaration  could  not 
be  amended  after  demurrer  filed, 
by  substituting  the  personal  rep- 
resentative as  plaintiff.  That  amend- 
ment of  cause  of  action  for  loss 
of  services  of  child  cannot  be  made 
by  inserting  claim  for  injuries,  etc., 
before  death,  see  Hurst  v.  Detroil 
City  R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  539;  48  V  W. 
44.  That  mother  may  be  appointed 
administratrix  where   she  is  jointly 


interested  with  father,  see  Rajnow- 
ski  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  &  A.  K.  Co., 
74  Mich.  15;  41  N.  W.  847.  In  case 
of  divorce  a  mother  to  whom  t lie 
decree  has  given  custody  of  her 
children  may  show  that  fact.  Wiltse 
v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  46  N.  W.  234 
40  Rajnowski  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  74  Mich.  15;  41  X.  W. 
847;  Graham  v.  Consolidated  Tract. 
Co.  (N.  J.),  44  Atl.  964.  See  also 
Schrier  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  R 
Co.,  65  Wis.  457 j  27  X.  W.  157; 
Soppe  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  r.  R. 
Co.,  61  Wis.  S59;  21  X  W.  227; 
Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  N".  W.  R  Co.,  38 
Wis.  613.  These  last  three  cases  are 
cited  to  the  point  that  the  measure 
of  damages  for  the  death  of  an  in- 
fant is  the  difference  between  snob 
infant's  probable  gross  income  based 
<m  his  life  expectano;  ami  the  prob- 
able cost  of  his  living  in  Russell  v. 
Windsor  Steamboat  Co.,  126  X.  C. 
961;  36  S.  E.  191. 

8-47 


§  668  DEATH   -FAIR    AND    JUST    DAMAGES 

and  encumbrances  which  that  relationship  imposes  upon  him, 
and  perhaps  the  expenses  growing  out  of  the  injury  are  ele- 
ments.41 As  a  rule  the  question  of  damages  and  of  the  value  of 
decedent's  services,  less  the  expense  of  care  and  support,  are  for 
the  jury,42  although  an  excessive  verdict  will  be  set  aside.43  So 
where  the  deceased  son  was  over  eighteen  years  of  age,  in  an 
action  by  the  administrator  who  was  next  of  kin,  the  father's 
age  was  considered,  and  the  weekly  earnings  of  the  son;  also  the 
facts  that  such  earnings  were  paid  to  the  father,  who  had  fur- 
nished the  intestate  with  board,  lodging  and  small  pocket  money, 
and  the  question  of  the  father's  pecuniary  loss  by  the  deprivation 
of  his  son's  earnings,  was  left  to  the  jury,44  although  it  is  error, 
where  deceased  was  about  six  years  old,  to  instruct  them  that 
the  parent  is  entitled  to  his  son's  services  until  he  becomes 
twenty-one,  but  that  it  costs  a  good  deal  more  to  raise  such  child 
than  the  parent  would  suffer,  and  that  the  court  cannot  see  what 
damages  the  parent  would  suffer  from  the  loss  of  a  child  of  that 
age.43  The  New  Jersey  court,  however,  notwithstanding  the 
same  statutory  provision  as  to  fair  and  just  damages  with  refer- 
ence to  the  pecuniary  injury,  has  asserted  a  rule  not  precisely 
in  harmony  with  the  above  decision,  for  it  has  expressly  and 
clearly  declared  that  children  are  more  often  an  expense  than  a 
pecuniary  benefit  to  the  father,  and  that  in  a  majority  of  cases 
the  money  expended  for  the  child's  benefit  will  be  far  in  excess 
of  the  amount  received  from  the  latter,  and  it  criticises  as  absurd, 
any  claim  that  the  father  could  be  reasonably  expected  to  be 
benefited  in  dollars  and  cents  in  the  sum  of  five  thousand  dol- 
lars, which  was  the  amount  of  the  verdict  in  that  case,  from  the 
continuance  of  the  life  of  a  deceased  child  between  four  and  five 
years  of  age,  and  the  verdict  was  set  aside,  the  court  declaring 
that  where  the  amount  was  grossly  and  palpably  excessive  as  in 
this  case,  it  would  continue  so  to  do  just  as  often  as  the  jury  ren- 
dered such  verdicts.46     So  in  another  case  in  that  state  the  court 


41Telfer  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  30  N. 
J.  L.  188. 

42  McCahill  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co., 
96  Mich.  156;  55  N.  W.  668. 

43  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay- 
field, 37  Mich.  205. 

44  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 

848 


hart,  64  N.  J.  L.  236;  45  Atl.  812. 
See  sec.  647,  herein. 

45 McCahill  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co., 
96  Mich.  156;  55  N.  W.  668. 

46  Consolidated  Trac.  Co.  v.  Gra- 
ham, 62  N.  J.  L.  90;  40  Atl.  773;  31 
Chic.  L.  N.  35;  58  Alb.  L.  J.  93;  17 


WITH    LiEFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY     IN.ll   BY. 


I 


applied  the  strict  rule  of  construction  under  which  it  had  con- 
tinuously  limited  the  damages  to  the  actual  pecuniary  loss,  and 
reduced  a  verdict  for  the  killing  of  a  boy  fifteen  years  old,  be- 
cause the  pecuniary  benefil  to  the  father  by  a  continuance  of 
the  life  during  minority,  did  not  in  the  court's  estimation  reach 
the  sum  awarded  as  damages,  having  in  view  the  boy's  occupa- 
tion ;  that  he  was  earning  the  highest  amount  of  wages  he  could 
earn;  that  there  was  no  evidence  that  during  his  minority  any 
increase  thereof  could  be  reasonably  anticipated,  nor  any  evi- 
dence that  ho  was  qualified  or  would  be  qualified  during  such 
period  for  any  more  remunerative  employment.  It  was  also 
declared  that  the  father  was  bound  if  he  received  his  wages  to 
clothe  him  appropriately,  to  educate  him  and  to  support  and 
maintain  him  when  he  was  sick  or  could  not  obtain  employment, 
and  that  these  were  burdens  which  were  imposed  upon  his  father 
by  law.17 

§  669.  Same  subject  concluded.— It  is  therefore  apparent 
that  although  the  question  of  damages  in  cases  of  this  character 
is  for  the  jury,  nevertheless  in  New  Jersey  the  rule,  especially 
in  case  of  young  children,  might  better  be  expressed  thus:  the 
question  of  damages  is  primarily  for  the  jury  provided,  how- 
ever, that  the  verdict  must  come  within  the  reviewing  court's 
estimation  of  compensation  according  to  the  law  under  a  strict 
construction,  and  this  rule  of  strict  construction  will  always  In- 
applied  against  what  the  court  may  consider  to  be  a  large  ver- 
dict, basing  the  recovery  upon  the  facts  actually  in  evidence  and 
this,  notwithstanding  a  reasonably  liberal  rule  exists  in  other 
states  by  reason  of  the  extreme  difficulty  of  exact  and  certain 
proof  of  pecuniary  loss,  and  although  the  courts  generally  hesi- 


Natl.  Corp.  Rep.  213;  4  Am.  Neg. 
Rep.  tiGO,  per  (Jummere,  J.  This 
was  a  second  verdict  of  the  jury  for 
$5,000,  tlie  former  baying  been  set 
aside  as  "  absurdly  excessive,"  and  a 
venire  de  novo  issued  unless  the 
plaintiff  would  agree  to  reduce  the 
verdict  to  $1,000,  which  he  refused 
to  do,  and  the  rule  was  made  abso- 
lute. The  child  had  been  killed  by 
the  cars  of  the  defendant. 

54 


«  May  v.  West  Jersey  A-  S.  R.  Co., 
i\-2  N.  .1.  L.  67;  42  Ail.  165;  13  Am.  A- 
Eng.  K.  Cas.  V  8.  517;  5  Am  Neg. 
Rep.  417.  $3,000  «ns  reduced  to 
$1,500.  Deceased  were  sons  of  13 
and  15  years  of  age—  $036  and  $1,056 
held  excessive.  Telfer  v.  Northern 
K.  Co.,  :;n  \".  J.  L.  18a  See  Jackson 
v.  Consolidated  Tract  Co., 69 21.  J.  L. 
(30  Vr.  )  _'.".;  :'..".  Ail.  754,  noted  under 
sees.  04.0,  040,  herein. 

849 


§  670  Death — fair  and  just  damages 

tate  to  disturb  a  jury's  verdict  in  the  absence  of  a  clearly  appar- 
ent prejudice,  bias,  etc.,  on  their  part.  In  Michigan,  in  deter- 
mining the  pecuniary  value  to  a  parent  of  a  son,  from  five  to 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  over  and  above  his  support  and  educa- 
tion, such  value  .may  be  proven  by  the  testimony  of  fathers  who 
have  reared  children  from  infancy  to  majority.18  In  many  cases 
actual  services  are  rendered  in  the  household  by  the  infant,  and 
there  is  also  a  reasonable  probability  that  as  it  approaches  ma- 
jority, services  of  pecuniary  benefit  directly  or  indirectly  may 
be  rendered  to  the  family.  Undoubtedly  these  should  be  con- 
sidered, and  in  fact  they  have  been  so  considered,  although  the 
question  of  their  admissibility  has  not  been  discussed,  appa- 
rently being  conceded  or  rather  asserted  as  being  evidential 
factors.49  Again  the  loss  of  a  pension  by  the  mother  through 
the  death  of  a  minor  son  has  been  considered,  and  also  her  de- 
pendency.50 

§670.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  " with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Death  of  adults. — As  we  have  stated  under 
a  prior  section,51  the  measure  of  damages  for  the  death  of  adult 
children  rests  in  some  particulars  upon  other  and  different  ele- 
ments than  in  case  of  minors.  By  this  statement,  however,  it  is 
not  intended  to  exclude  certain  factors  common  to  both  minor 
and  adult  children,  such  as  age,  health,  dependency,  etc.,  but 
only  principally,  such  matters  as  relate  to  the  relative  legal  rights, 
and  obligations  of  parent  and  child  and  which  exist  by  virtue  of 
the  child's  minority.52  In  the  case  of  deceased  adult  children, 
the  questions  of  the  dependency  of  the  parent  or  parents  and  of 
the  reasonable  expectation  of  benefit  from  such  adult  child's 
continued  aid  or  assistance  by  way  of  support  or  otherwise,  had 
he  or  she  lived,  are  material  and  relevant.53     The  facts  that  the 


48  Rajnowski  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  74  Mich.  15;  41  N.  W. 
847. 

49  Cooper  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R. 
Co.,  66  Mich.  261;  33  N.  W.  306,  and 
cases  throughout  the  sections  herein 
relating  to  death  of  children  in 
Michigan,  New  Jersey  and  Wiscon- 
sin. 

850 


50  Ewen  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
38  Wis.  613.  See  sees.  648,  653,  654, 
herein. 

51  See  sec.  667,  herein. 
62  See  sec.  671,  herein. 

53 See  sees.  653,  654,  657,  herein; 
Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  R. 
Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  361;  10 
Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  344;  49  Am.  &  Eng. 


WITH    HEFERENCE  TO    PECUNIAR*    INJURY.  671 

son  was  unmarried  and  the  age  of  the  mother,  thai  he  boarded 
with  lier,  paying  her  therefor,  and  that  there  were  other  children 
from  the  ages  of  twelve  to  twenty-two,  have  been  considered  in 
determining  whether  or  not  the  damages  were  excessive.  ;  Such 
other  elements  of  damage,  however,  as  are  involved  in  deter- 
mining the  amount  of  recovery  for  the  death  of  an  adult  child, 
such  as  age,  health,  earnings,  earning  capacity,  etc.,  have  been 
considered  elsewhere  herein,  under  their  appropriate  head 

§  671.  Death  of  children— Minority  and  majority.— The 

question  whether  a  parent's  pecuniary  loss  for  the  death  <>|  a 
minor  is  confined  to  the  child's  minority,  or  includes  under  tin- 
statute  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefil  from  the 
continuance  of  the  child's  life  beyond  that  time,  has  been  a  sub- 
ject of  considerable  discussion.  Necessarily,  when  a  child  be- 
comes of  age  certain  relative  legal  rights  and  obligations  spring- 
ing from  the  relation  of  an  infant  and  the  parent  cease,  and  in 
so  far  as  the  damages  depend  exclusively  upon  such  rights  and 
obligations,  the  determination  thereof  would  preclude  the  re- 
covery of  damages  dependent  solely  upon  such  a  source.  But 
to  hold  that  the  measure  of  recovery  is  restricted  to  such  sources 
is  in  effect  to  assert  as  the  law  that  a  child's  minority  is  the  limit 
of  his  life  expectancy,  beyond  which  period  the  parent  could  not 
reasonably  hope  to  derive  any  benefit.  To  thus  arbitrarily  fix 
the  expectation  of  life  is  certainly  not  permitting  a  parent  to 
recover  the  pecuniary  loss  according  to  the  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  pecuniary  benefit  from  a  continuance  of  the  child's  life. 
It  is  a  matter  of  general  knowledge  that  as  a  rule  in  a  majority 
of  cases  a  greater  pecuniary  benefit  may  he  derived  by  a  parent 
from  a  child  after  it  passes  its  minority  than  has  resulted  dur- 
ing that  period.  This  is  also  apparent  from  the  large  number 
of  decisions  where  the  facts  in  evidence  in  an  action  for  the 
death  of  adult  children  show  the  great  dependency  of  parents 
upon  them  for  support  or  contributions  thereto  or  for  aid  and 
assistance  of  some  kind.     But  however  favorable  the  argument 


R.  Cas.307;  Van  Brunt  v.  Cincinnati, 
J.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  530;  t 1  V 
W.  321;  Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34 
N.J.   L.    151;   luues  v.   Milwaukee. 


103  Wis.  582;  7'.'   V   W.   783;  Wiltee 
v.  Tilden,  77  Wis.  152;  16  N.  W\  234 

*  limes  v.    .Milwaukee,  103  V\ 
78   N.  \V.  7S3. 

85  I 


§  672 


DEATH — FAIR    AND   JUST    DAMAGES 


may  be  in  support  of  a  rule  which  will  not  limit  the  recovery 
for  the  death  of  a  minor  to  its  minority,  it  will  probably  not 
change  the  decision  of  any  court  which  has  adhered  to  the  op- 
posite rule,  especially  in  view  of  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis, 
and  although  there  may  be  a  modification  or  extension  of  a  rule 
of  law  in  some  cases,  nevertheless  the  rule  remains,  and  the 
modification  or  extension  thereof  is  the  exception.  We  be- 
lieve, however,  that  the  weight  of  authority  should  be  that  the 
pecuniary  loss  is  not  measured  by  the  child's  minority  but  that 
a  reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  parent  by 
a  continuance  of  a  minor's  life  after  majority  may  constitute  a 
basis  of  recovery.55 

§  672.  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury" — Death  of  children — Minority  and  ma- 
jority.— In  Michigan  it  seems  that  the  courts  have  kept  in 
view  the  relative  legal  rights  and  obligations  springing  from 
the  relations  of  parent  and  minor,  and  have  upon  this  basis,  or 
the  loss  of  services,  confined  the  pecuniary  loss  of  a  parent  for 
such  child's  death  to  the  period  of  its  minority.56     In  New  Jer- 


55  "The  rule  for  measuring  dam- 
ages in  actions  like  that  now  under 
consideration  is  not  open  to  doubt  in 
this  court.  The  statute  which  per- 
mits such  action  has  been  uniformly 
construed  to  limit  the  damages  to 
compensation  for  the  deprivation  of 
pecuniary  advantage  from  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  life  of  the  deceased 
person.  .  .  .  The  damages  properly 
to  be  awarded  in  the  case  were  such 
as  would  compensate  the  father  for 
the  reasonable  expectation  of  pecun- 
iary benefit  from  the  deceased  dur- 
ing his  period  of  minority  when  he 
owed  service  to  his  father  and 
thereafter  when  he  would  be- 
come emancipated  by  being  of 
full  age.  ...  It  is  not  impossible 
to  determine  that  $5,000  far  exceeds 
any  reasonable  probability  of  pecun- 
iary benefit  from  the  continued  life 
of  deceased.     Looking  at  the  liability 

852 


of  the  father  for  the  support,  main- 
tenance and  education  of  the  child 
during  minority,  and  considering 
what  pecuniary  benefit  the  father 
would  receive  from  the  son's  earn- 
ings during  or  after  minority  in  its 
most  favorable  aspect,  it  is  plain  that 
the  award  far  exceeds  any  possible 
amount  of  such  pecuniary  benefit." 
Graham  v.  Consolidated  Tract.  Co., 
64  N.  J.  L.  10;  44  Atl.  964,  per 
Magie,  Ch.  J.  But  examine  Decker 
v.  McSorley,  111  Wis.  91;  86  N.  W. 
551;  Luessen  v.  Oshkosh  Elec.  L.  & 
P.  Co.,  109  Wis.  94;  85  N.  W.  124. 

«  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  K.  Co.,  84 
Mich.  539;  48  N.  W.  44;  Cooper  v. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  66  Mich. 
261;  33  N.  W.  306.  In  this  case  the 
deceased  was  a  daughter,  healthy,  11 
years  old,  born  of  poor  parents,  liv- 
ing with  and  being  cared  for  by  her 
grandmother. 


WITH    REFERENCE   TO    PECUNIARY    IVHl:Y 


■'  l  72 


sey,  however,  the  jury  may  consider  the  reasonable  expectation 
of  pecuniary  benefit  to  the  father  from  such  contributions  after 
minority  as  the  son  might  reasonably  be  expected  bo  make,  either 
voluntarily  or  by  compulsion,  in  case  the  father  should  become 
necessitous.57  In  another  case  in  that  state,  however,  where  the 
action  was  for  the  killing  of  a  boy  of  about  fifteen  years  of  age, 
and  in  which  the  damages  were  reduced  one  half,  the  court  said 
that  "the  cause  was  tried  upon  the  basis  that  the  father  was 
entitled  to  the  earning  capacity  of  the  deceased  until  he  should 
arrive  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  and  not  beyond  that  time," 
and  the  instructions  of  the  court  below  were  to  that  effect.  The 
court  further  declared  that  there  was  a  misapprehension,  per- 
haps, of  the  instructions,  and  in  discussing  the  facts  evidencing 
the  pecuniary  loss,  the  court  confined  itself  to  those  relating  to 
deceased's  minority  and  the  loss  of  earnings  or  services  during 
that  period,  and  based  its  ruling  that  there  was  an  excessive 
verdict  upon  the  principle  that  the  pecuniary  benefit  which 
would  accrue  to  the  father  by  a  continuance  of  life  of  the  son 
during  his  minority  could'  not  reach  .the  sum  awarded  by  the 
verdict.58  This  decision  was  based  upon  an  early  case"'1  in  the 
same  court,  which  expressly  limited  the  damages  to  the  pecun- 
iary loss  only,  and  affirmed  said  ruling  with  others  of  the  same 
tenor.  In  the  early  case  the  court  also  expressly  declared  that 
nothing  more  than  what  the  services  of  a  deceased  child  were 
reasonably  expected  to  be  worth  until  minority,  less  support, 
etc.,  could  be  recovered.60  So  that  it  may  be  reasonably  inferred 
from  all  of  the  above  that  the  principle  as  to  minority  was  af- 
firmed by  the  subsequent  decision.  In  Wisconsin  the  jury  may 
consider  evidence  showing  that  a  mother  might  have  become 
dependent  upon  her  son  after  majority,  and  also  her  reasona- 
ble expectation  of  pecuniary  benefit  from  the  continuance  of 


67  North  Jersey  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
hart,  G4  N.  J.  L.  236;  46  Atl.  812. 
Deceased  son  was  over  18  years  old 
in  this  case  Graham  v.  Consoli- 
dated Tract.  Co.  (N.  J.),  II  Atl. 
904.  Deceased  hoy  was  4  years  old, 
and  the  probabilities  as  to  benefit 
from  son's  earnings,  before  or  after 
majority,  considered. 


May  v.  West  Jersej  A  8    R.  Co., 
62    \.   .1.   I..  87;    12  Atl.  165;   L3  Am. 
&  Eng.  K.  (as.  N.  S.  517;  5  Am 
Rep.  417. 

»Telfer  v.  Northern  R.  I 
J.  L.  188. 

'  i  1.1.,  per  Van  Dyke.  .1. 


§§  073,  674 


FATE    AND   ,1UST    DAMAGES 


the  son's  life  even  after  he  has  reached  majority.61  But  this 
rule  as  to  reasonable  expectation  was  limited  in  an  earlier  deci- 
sion to  those  cases  where  the  parent's  indigent  condition  was 
shown,  otherwise  the  damages  were  restricted  to  services  dur- 
ing minority.® 

§  673,  "Fair  and  just"  damages  "with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  "—Mother's  sickness  from  child's  death. — 

The  fact  that  the  shock  occasioned  by  a  child's  killing  caused 
the  mother's  sickness  and  thus  deprived  her  husband  of  her 
services  and  society  and  increased  his  expenses,  is  not  such  a 
pecuniary  injury  within  the  death  loss  statute  as  to  give  a  right 
of  action  for  the  child's  negligent  or  wrongful  killing.63 

§  674.  "  Fair  and  just"  damages  "  with  reference  to  the 
pecuniary  injury  " — Collateral  kindred. — Evidently  in  Michi- 
gan the  right  of  collateral  kindred  and  the  measure  of  damages 
to  them  rests  upon  dependency  for  support  or  the  aid  and  as- 
sistance given  by  deceased  by  way  of  such  support  or  other- 
wise,61 and  this  would  include  the  reasonable  expectation  of 
pecuniary  benefit  to  those  entitled  to  recover.63     But  the  differ- 


61  Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros.  Co., 
86  Wis.  570;  57  N.  W.  298.  The 
court  refused  to  hold  excessive  a 
verdict  in  this  case  of  $1,700,  the  de- 
ceased son  being  16  years  old.  See 
also  Johnson  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  64  Wis.  425;  25  N.  W.  223;  Ewen 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis. 
G13.  See  as  to  excessive  damages, 
where  deceased  were  children,  cases 
cited  under  sec.  648  herein,  as  to 
factors  generally  to  be  considered. 

°- Potter  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  21  Wis.  372.  See  Seaman  v. 
Farmers  L.  &  T.  Co.,  15  Wis.  578. 

63  Myers  v.  Holbern,  58  N.  J.  L. 
(29  Vr.)  193;  33  Atl.  389;  30  L.  R.  A. 
345,  under  N.  J.  Rev.  Stat.  p.  294. 
See  May  v.  West  Jersey  &  S.  R,  Co., 
62  N.  J.  L.  63;  42  Atl.  163,  as  to  con- 
dition of  surviving  son  consequent 
upon  death  of  wife  and  mother,  by 

854 


reason  of  loss  of  her  services  as 
wife. 

G4  Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M. 
R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  361; 
10  Ry.  &  Corp.  L.  J.  344;  49  Am.  & 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  367;  Van  Brunt  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, J.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  530; 
44  N.  W.  321.  But  in  the  following 
case  a  father  and  brother  were  the 
next  of  kin  and  a  recovery  was  had. 
$3,400  was,  however,  held  excessive, 
although  the  court  declared  that  the 
damages  rested  upon  the  actual  con- 
tributions of  deceased.  Chicago  & 
N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield,  37  Mich. 
205.  See  sees.  645,  646,  653,  herein, 
as  to  pecuniary  loss,  and  as  depend- 
ency. 

65 See  cases  in  last  preceding  note, 
and  sec.  654,  herein;  Paulmier  v. 
Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  151, 
156. 


Willi    RKFERENCE    TO    l'l.<   l    SIABY    IN.II'KV. 


ence  in  the  statutes  of  Michigan,  New  Jersey  and  Wisconsin, 
as  to  the  persons  entitled  to  the  right  of  action,  or  1 1 1» -  damages 
when  recovered,  should  not  be  overlooked  In  determining  the 
rights  of  collateral  kindred,  and  this  is  non<  the  Less  true  be- 
cause of  the  same  statutory  provision  as  to  the  measure  of 
damages.66  And  in  Wisconsin  the  statute  excludes  brothers  and 
sisters,  and  they  cannoi  recover  damages  for  their  pecuniary  Loss 
sustained  li\  the  death,  for  the  action  is  for  the  benefit  of  the 
hnshand  or  widow,  if  surviving,  then  to  the  lineal  descendants, 
or  in  default  thereof  to  tin-  lineal  ancestoi 


G0See  sofs..  642  644  herein.  See 
also  remarks  of  Morse,  J.,  in  Rich- 
mond v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  R.  Co.,  87 
Mich.  374;  49  N.  W.  361;  10  Ry.  & 
Corp.  L.  J.  344;  49  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
(as.  367. 

67 Brown  v.  Chicago  it   X.    W.    R. 


Co.,  102  Wis.  137;  77  V  W.  748;  U 
L.  R  A.  570;  18  Am.  &  Eng.  R  Cms. 
V  S.  603;  5  Am.  \> •■_  Rep.  21 
hearing  denied  44  L.  R.  A.  585;  7^ 
\.  W.  771:  13  Am.  a  Eng.  B 
N.  S.  603.  See  sees.  642  644,  herein, 
as  to  statutes. 

Sou 


LAW  UBRARY 


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